rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
. To construct this variable, we rely on the national locality registry and an administrative database from the national cash transfer program. Specifically, we obtained a geo-localized list of the 1,190 villages that benefited from cash transfers at any point between 2012 and 2019.<sup>10</sup> We then merged this administrative data set with the national locality registry to identify which locality was assigned to the cash transfer program within each commune. The remaining localities became the pool of control localities.<sup>11</sup> Our village data set characterizes which villages were assigned or not assigned to the cash transfer program, but it does not contain much information on covariates. It includes population numbers at the village level (estimated from a 2012 population census), as well as population numbers for the administrative units to which the village is mapped (commune, department, and region). We document further below the balance in locality populations and the absence of pre-trend in incidence between treatment and control localities.<sup>12</sup>

> 6For a more detailed account of the “Filets Sociaux” cash transfer program, see Premand and Barry (2022); Bossuroy et al. (2022).

> 7For the same reason, this dimension was not the focus of the original RCT designed to analyze the program.

> 8Lotteries were initially introduced for a randomized control trial of the first phase of the program (Premand and Barry 2022). Program implementers found the public lotteries helpful to select beneficiary villages in a context of overwhelming need but limited data with which to rank villages by poverty level. In particular, the transparency of the public lotteries shielded them from interference and complaints, and they continued to use them for purely operational reasons after the initial trial. As such, the paper is not based on a specific trial, but instead uses secondary, observational data as part of a larger natural experiment.

> 9Premand and Schnitzer (2021) describe the household targeting methods in detail and analyze
allocation, increase efficiency and ultimately diminish rent-seeking behavior, we document the existence of significant political rents in the Mexican banking sector. Second, using a time-varying measure, we exploit within-firm variation by comparing a firm’s loan terms and performance when it is politically connected and when it is not. The political connection measure used in our paper, firms operating in the politician's state, allows us to target a broader sample of borrowers and thus provide a more general evidence of political rents in banking. Third, using a matched bank-firm data, we show how political considerations in bank lending have important effects on firm’s real economic outcomes. Specifically, we show that firms use the excess credit supply to hire new employees and to increase their assets. Finally, we provide evidence of _quid pro quo_ as banks that extend more political loans receive more and better public loans.

**Related Research -** Our paper adds to the literature of political distortions in the supply of credit. It most closely relates to Sapienza (2004) and Khwaja and Mian (2005) as they also use loan-level data to study how political connections affect bank lending. Sapienza (2004) presents evidence of Italian state-owned banks used as instruments in the supply of political patronage: firms located in an area with a relatively stronger political party affiliation obtained lower loan spread. Similarly,

> 7 One concern is that private banks do not have the advantage of soft budget constraints like government organizations. However, given that our estimates are smaller relative to the case of government lending, the concern of whether the rent provision can sustain is less of a problem.

5
in the study). These surveys cover different dimensions of caregiver characteristics and behaviors as well as child outcomes, which we now describe.

2.3.1 Parental beliefs, attitudes and expectations A set of variables we consider measure different dimensions of parental beliefs, attitudes and expectations. At least one-third of the sessions in NEP aims to promote participants’ self-care and self-image as parents. This dimension of parental, perceptions, related to parental self-efficacy, is grounded in social cognitive theory (Bandura 1986, 1995)). In order to measure this concept, we use the Parenting Sense of Competence Scale (Ohan, Leung, and Johnston 2000), a 17-item scale that evaluates parental confidence in their capacity to overcome daily child-rearing tasks. A complementary instrument captures how parents perceive that their behavior has any impact on child outcomes. To this end, we adopt a subscale of the Parental Cognitions and Conduct Toward the Infant Scale (PACOTIS) (Boivin et al. 2005), a 5-item Likert scale to assess the perceived parental impact of their behavior on the developing child. We dichotomized the items and constructed a perceived impact indicator adding all items.

Social support has been signaled as an important mediator of change in group-based health interventions (Briscoe and Aboud 2012). To measure perceived social support by parents we used a short version of the Social Provision Scale (Cutrona and Troutman 1986), with subscales for perceived support from the family, from friends or the community, and from significant others.

To capture parental beliefs about how to raise children, in particular ideas about structure and warmth in child-rearing tasks, we adapt the Ideas About Parenting (IAP) questionnaire (Heming, 8
by incidents perpetrated by actors from outside the villages, especially foreign groups linked to international terrorism (such as Boko Haram incursions from Nigeria). In particular, while severe conflict events remained quite rare, we find that their incidence increased by 0.63 percentage point, including a 0.41 percentage point increase in events involving terrorism and a 0.34 percentage point increase in events involving foreign terrorists.

We find that these effects are temporary: in the years after the end of the program, treated villages did not experience a persistently higher level of conflict events. In addition, we do not find evidence of local spillovers, as the cash transfer program did not affect the likelihood of conflict in nearby control villages relative to control villages further away. Lastly, using as a secondary data source a household-level survey in a subsample of villages, we show that (self-reported) within-village conflict events neither decreased nor increased during treatment.

Our results can be read through the lens of a framework with several countervailing forces (see the discussion in Rohner and Thoenig 2021): (i) productivity increases may raise the opportunity cost for locals of engaging in conflict; (ii) an increase in lootable wealth increases the “prize” that can be appropriated (both by local inhabitants as well as by foreign groups); (iii) international terrorist groups may have incentives to “sabotage” successful government-led poverty eradication programs which increase government legitimacy (see, e.g., Crost et al. 2014). Groups such as Boko Haram have indeed been observed to attack government services such as schools or health centers (see discussion below).

The interplay of these countervailing forces can account for the temporal patterns that we observe. In particular, during the program (when the cash payments took place), effects (ii) and (iii) may have gained traction, causing conflict to _increase_ . The scope for mechanism (i) seems more limited in the context of this paper, given that much of the observed violence
households, which can be either couples or individuals, make choices over time with regard to labor supply, private savings and retirement in an environment with uncertainty about future wages, returns on pension savings, fertility, divorce or widowhood and own survival. Men and women choose not only whether to work or not but also whether to work in the formal sector where pension contributions are mandatory or in the informal sector. The distinction between formal and informal sector work is important in Chile (and most countries across the world) because many individuals work in the informal sector and reach old age having contributed little to the system. In addition, women choose whether to work part-time or full-time. The model is estimated on longitudinal microdata from the _Encuesta de Protecci ́on Social (EPS)_ merged with administrative data on pension funds.<sup>4</sup> We use the estimated model to study how labor supply and savings behavior changes with the introduction of the 2008 pension reform in comparison to the previous pension system behavior and in comparison to alternative pension system designs. We estimate model parameters by the method of simulated moments using pre-reform data from the 2004 and 2006 EPS Surveys. The estimation results reveal substantial heterogeneity in how individuals value pecuniary and non-pecuniary dimensions of formal and informal work. Some individuals have strong comparative advantages to working in the formal or informal sectors, which dampens behavioral responses to pension rule changes.

Incorporating the pension rules explicitly in our model allows us to construct counterfactual simulations in which the reform did not happen, keeping everything else constant. In this way, we perform an ex ante prediction of the short-run behavioral impacts of the pension reform and compare our predictions to some evidence from other causal impact studies of the reform’s impacts. Consistently with other studies, we find that the more generous safety net induces negative wealth effects on the labor supply of men and women at older ages. Contrary to other studies that model reform changes at the individual level, our simulations show that household structure is an important
90|0.88|0.96|0.52|0.98|0.97|0.58|1.00|
|**Panel B: Poverty**|||||||||
|Malawi|0.37|1.00|0.74|0.52|1.00|0.71|0.05|1.00|
|Tanzania|0.93|0.79|1.00|0.07|1.00|0.98|0.00|1.00|
|Average|0.65|0.90|0.87|0.30|1.00|0.84|0.03|1.00|

Note: The columns list the different types of candidate variables used in estimation. For each country, we calculate the proportions of simulations in which lasso selects at least one of each variable type for use in EBP. GPS variables include the longitude and latitude of each subarea centroid, while region is defined separately by country, but is generally dummy variables for the strata used in sampling (usually admin2, sometimes also stratified by urban/rural).
For the analysis, the number of households is reduced slightly to 13,732 due to missing values in some of the key variables, which is equivalent to 4.35% of the sample (6.63% for individuals aged 15-64).

# Mobile Broadband Coverage Data

Nigeria is the largest mobile market in Africa. At the end of 2019, there were more than 170 million mobile connections (60% of which used 3G or 4G mobile broadband technologies) and the country accounted for around one in six mobile subscriptions on the continent.<sup>8</sup> Figure 1 shows how the adoption of 2G and 3G/4G technology evolved in Nigeria between 2010-2016.

In this study, we look at mobile broadband network coverage (or availability). Coverage is distinct from usage (or access), which is when an individual has a SIM card that can be used in a mobile phone to access the internet. We look at coverage because it is not determined at the household-level and because coverage captures not only the direct impacts of individuals accessing the internet but also spillover effects. The latter includes, for example: internet users sharing information with non-users and non-users benefitting from lower market prices; job creation and productivity gains among domestic firms due to more technology use and access to international markets; or more financial capital accumulation and utilization due to increased use of digital payment platforms and mobile banking.

Mobile networks can be conceptually divided in two components. The first is the Core Network that ensures the intelligence of the network, such as switching user calls or routing user data to and from the internet. The second is the Radio Access Network, which is the collection of relay sites (i.e. towers hosting base stations and radio equipment) that connects the User Terminal (e.g. mobile phones) to the core of the network. Relay sites communicate with mobile phones in their vicinity using electromagnetic signals. The quality and availability of this communication link can be affected by several factors such
in 90 countries

We use this model to quantify socioeconomic resilience in 90 countries and assess how different policy options can improve resilience and reduce the welfare impacts of river floods. Since we cannot rely on ex‐ post observation and household surveys to calibrate the model, we use proxies and national‐level data. Also, we do not calculate the resilience for one event – like for Mumbai in 2005 – but the resilience to many possible flood events. We calculate asset and welfare losses for several return periods (between 5 and 1,000 years) and estimate the socioeconomic resilience as the ratio of expected asset losses to expected welfare losses. A complete description of the model is available in the Online Technical Note.

Hazard is represented by a flood’s probability of occurrence, above the level of protection provided by embankments and artificial dikes. In each country, we set to zero the exposure to all events with a return period equal or lower than the protection level. We calibrate the protection level by country using the global open and collaborative database FLOPROS (Scussolini et al., 2015). FLORPOS provides estimates at the sub‐national level based on expert estimates of _de facto_ protection if available, _de jure_ legislation and performance standards otherwise, or simple economic modeling if both de facto and de jure data are lacking.

Above the protection level, population and asset exposure to floods is estimated using GLOFRIS, a global river flood model (Jongman et al., 2015, Jongman et al., 2012). This model provides gridded flood inundation estimates at the 1km<sup>2</sup> resolution for 9 return periods (from 5 to 1000 years), all countries, and in all large river basins. The model does not include all floods: coastal floods are not taken into account, 9
# **1 Introduction**

Non-tariff measures have become progressively more important trade policy instruments as applied tariff rates have fallen across the world in recent years. From a development perspective, technical regulations and product standards are a particularly important type of non-tariff measure because they highlight the fact that the favorable market access accorded under duty and quota-free preferential schemes remains conditional on compliance with regulations in areas such as consumer safety. Previous research shows that product standards and technical regulations in the large, developed markets can have two contradictory sets of effects for developing country exporters. On the one hand, the costs of compliance—retooling, product re-design, testing, and certification—can be substantial enough to keep many small and medium enterprises out of international markets, thereby affecting the pattern of international specialization (e.g., Essaji, 2008). But at the same time, foreign standards can also provide the impetus for firms and sectors to upgrade production technologies and realize beneficial productivity gains (e.g., Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). The question of which types of standards tend to promote which set of effects is clearly of vital policy importance to developing country exporters. The issue of how best to direct technical assistance resources so as to support the upgrading of standards systems and development of compliance mechanisms in developing countries is also an important part of broader Aid for Trade discussions.

Most previous work on standards and technical regulations has focused on the rules themselves, rather than their design and application or enforcement through specific at-the-border mechanisms. There are a number of recent exceptions, however. Karov et al. (2009) focus on identifying the trade impacts of US phyto-sanitary regulations at the product-country level by analyzing the effects of treatment requirements and grants of new market access. Similarly, Alberini et al. (2005) examine implementation of the FDA’s seafood HACCP program using a dataset of plant inspections. Neither paper, however, deals with the food import refusals mechanism that is the focus of the present paper. Buzby et
# **Figure 1a**

- China Data: Inventory of Main Input by Industry (Days)

<!-- Start of picture text --> 40<br>35<br>30<br>25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>apparel and consumer electronic electronic vehicles and<br>leather goods products components equipment vehicle parts<br>Industry<br>Days<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **Figure 1b**

- Brazil Data: Inventory for Main Inputs by Industry (Days)

<!-- Start of picture text --> 25<br>20<br>15<br>10<br>5<br>0<br>Textiles Garments Shoes and Electronics Auto-parts<br>leather<br>products<br>Industry<br>Days<br><!-- End of picture text --> The logistical edge of Brazilian firms does not appear to extend into public sector institutions, however. Delays in clearing goods through customs may constitute significant impediments to efficient trade (Subramanian, 2001). Figures 2a and 2b show the number of days necessary for imported inputs to clear customs in China and Brazil respectively. In this case, the order is reversed, with Chinese firms able to receive goods in about half as long as Brazilian firms.<sup>9</sup>

> 9 There is considerable variation across cities in the China data, from a minimum of 6 days in Guangzhou to a maximum of 13 days in Chengdu. In the Brazilian data, only Paraná state is significantly above the national average.

12
These results open new avenues for research, highlighting that: (i) in terms of top-down views of management, it might be preferable to use a small number of individual surveys of senior managers to measure management practices if it is more cost e↵ective than the consensual approach followed in RR; and (ii) there remains scope to understand _why_ top-down and bottom-up views of management do not coincide, and whether organizational discord measured this way captures elements of organizational functioning and is predictive of their performance.

# **5.3 External Validity**

The final issue we turn to is that of the external validity of our findings linking management practices that central civil servants are subject to, and the quantity of public services delivered. To do so it is most natural to compare our findings from Ghana to our earlier work linking management practices for middle-tier bureaucrats and public sector output in the Federal Civil Service of Nigeria [Rasul and Rogger 2018]. In the Nigerian context, RR hand-coded independent engineering assessments of project completion rates for 4700 public projects. For each of 63 civil service organizations tasked to implement these projects (including 10 ministries and 53 other Federal civil service organizations), RR conducted a survey among senior bureaucrats to elicit management practices in place for middle-tier bureaucrats, also building on the methods pioneered by BSVR.

The comparison across Ghanaian and Nigeria settings exploits obvious similarities in terms of civil service structures and economic environment. At the same time, the two sets of analysis di↵er in the measurement of key variables. How projects and project completion is measured di↵ers across contexts, and this is necessitated by the fact that civil service bureaucracies worldwide di↵er greatly in whether and how they collect data on their own performance. Second, the precise way in which management practices are measured also di↵ers across settings, although each approach is anchored in the BSVR methods. The Appendix details these key data features from Nigeria.

Table 12 repeats our core results for Ghana and Nigeria. Columns 1 to
The migrants interviewed in the VMS originated in all Vietnam’s 64 provinces. Whereas about two thirds (63.7 percent) of them resided in urban<sup>23</sup> areas after their migration in this sample, about 78.3 percent of them came from rural areas. The “distance”<sup>24</sup> of re-location, which is approximated by the distance between the capitals of a migrant’s source province and destination province, averaged around 563 kilometers for the entire sample. About 79.8 percent of those who work for foreign firms came from rural areas, traveling long distances (771 kilometers on average). The migrants to the Central Highlands also tended to come from remote provinces at an average “distance” of 874 kilometers. In contrast, the “distance” of re-location for those who work for the state sector is relatively small at 226 kilometers on average.<sup>25</sup> Table 2 presents some key economic and demographic indicators by urban/rural locations and by Vietnam’s two biggest cities and eight regions, which are computed from the VHLSS 2004 and the _Enterprise Survey_ data.<sup>26</sup> Evaluating the standard of living by per capita expenditure, Table 2 reveals disparity between urban and rural areas and across regions. In 2004, the per capita average monthly expenditure in urban areas (.66 million dong) was more than double that in rural areas (.32 million dong). By this measure, HCMC, followed by Hanoi, and the Southeast (other than HCMC) attained the highest standard of living, while people living in the mountainous areas in the Northwest, Northeast and Central Highlands, as well as those residing in the North Central Coast, lagged behind.

> 23 Destination or origin areas are referred to as “urban” if migrants reported that they reside(d) in “large city”, “small city”, or “town”; areas are
insured under CIP can receive mostly free

> 11 For water, these estimates represent the full cost-recovery reflecting the production costs after taking into account all other losses. Estimates are from the World Bank Water team based on Water Authority of Jordan audited financials.

> 12 The Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) is the main entity responsible for the water supply in the country. Amman, Aqaba, Irbid, Jerash, Aljoun, Mafraq and Zarqa are served by subsidiary water companies. 13 Fuel prices adjusted monthly since discontinuation of fuel subsidies.

> 14 Not accounting for CIP premiums transferred by NAF to the MoH.