rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
of school principals opted to return to teaching duties. At the same time, three school principals were not discontinued: two who headed _sekolah favorit_ and one with strong political connections.<sup>37</sup> The chair of a Primary School Principals Working Group (KKKS) in District B told us that primary school principals in his area had made it clear to the head of the local education agency branch (UPTD) that they would prefer the government adopt this same solution, rather than returning principals to teaching, when periodization is implemented in that district.<sup>38</sup> In contrast to the three previous policy issues examined here, then, the issue of periodization— and in particular the experience of Municipality A in relation to this issue—suggests that teacher management reform can occur at the local level when three conditions are met: i) independent civil society groups are active; ii) they are able to launch effective public campaigns demanding reform, exploiting their ability to access the independent media and, if necessary, the courts; and iii) local governments are able to find effective ways of buying off the losers from reform. At the same time, the experiences of Municipality B and District B suggest that teacher management reform is possible when it aligns with the needs of local political and patronage networks, in particular, the need for local elites to ensure that teachers continue, as clients within these networks, to receive all monies that are due to them.

> 33 The cause of this delay is unclear but it is possible that it is related to the introduction of Dapodik, MoEC’s new education database. According to a local education agency official in the fifth district, Dapodik will not allow a school principal’s name to be entered for a second four year period at the same school, jeopardizing teachers’ eligibility for the professional allowance if the school principal remains in place for more than one term. This has led to a local policy of rotating school principals every
**(ICA)**|**Ethiopia**|**Vietnam**|**China**|
|food|135|82<br>89-<br>141|181-<br>363|398-<br>442|87|45|26-<br>52|78-<br>207|192-<br>236|
|Garments|85|82<br>37-<br>185|119-<br>181|331-<br>370|54|48|26-<br>48|78-<br>130|237-<br>296|
|textiles|120|71|||71|20||||
|machinery<br>&<br>equipment|163||||125|||||
|chemicals|212||||127|||||
|electronics|119||||79|||||
|non-metallic<br>minerals|106||||66|||||
|wood,<br>wood<br>products & furn|102|151<br>81-<br>119|181-<br>259|393-<br>442|67|35|37-<br>52|85-<br>135|206-<br>251|
|metal & metal<br>products|107|<br>181|168-<br>233|265-<br>369|82||89|117-<br>142|192-<br>265|
|other<br>manufacturing|130|154|||87|67||||

_Source: Nigeria - Productivity and Investment Climate Survey, 2009 and Ethiopia Investment Climate Survey, Manufacturing 2006 (values reported are mean over sample); Others
40 percent of the income distribution, one can undertake the same exercise to understand the incidence, intensity, and severity of fiscal losses and gains in the subpopulation at the bottom of the distribution.

This paper presents an empirical illustration of how the new measures of fiscal losses and gains could be used, using the 2014 household consumption data of Niger. The results show that the experience of the prefiscal poor with the fiscal system is overall better than that of the prefiscal nonpoor in Niger. Looking at fiscal losses, we find that both the incidence and the intensity of fiscal losses are higher in the subpopulation of the prefiscal nonpoor. This is also observed by analyzing the population by the gender and the area of residence of the head of household.

Regarding fiscal gains, the results indicate that the prefiscal poor benefitted more from the fiscal system, with an incidence and an intensity of fiscal gains of 72 percent and 0.17, respectively, compared to 63 percent and 0.09 for the prefiscal nonpoor in Niger.

Finally, when the current method of measuring fiscal gains is contrasted with the new measures proposed in this paper, the findings reveal that the former method is clearly incomplete. Indeed, according to the current measures used in the literature, fiscal gains would be found to be much higher in rural than in urban areas. Yet, following the new measures we propose, the incidence and the intensity of fiscal gains were both higher in urban areas. Moreover, considering the subpopulation of prefiscal poor alone, or the subpopulation of the prefiscal nonpoor alone, the incidence and the intensity of fiscal gains were still higher in urban areas.

Section 2 of this paper describes the current practices in the fiscal incidence literature, and demonstrates their limitations in capturing fiscal impoverishment and fiscal gains. Section 3 defines the new measures of fiscal losses and gains proposed in this paper. Section 4 describes the empirical illustration from Niger that was used. Section 5 discusses the usefulness of this approach over the current one used in the literature, especially
was to prepare the utility for unbundling and privatization. Though staff and their unions were concerned about reforms, this communication and the provision of generous severance packages (provided by MoFPED, through the Privatisation Unit or PU) for voluntary retirement allayed fears somewhat. ‘Right-sizing’ was also not just about cutting staff numbers, it had an explicit focus on retaining and developing skills, with staff benefiting from training and skills development (with support from other countries, including study tours) over this period.

By the time unbundling was due to take place, the utility had been internally restructured, a new billing system had been put into place with support from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), and the technical capacity of the streamlined staff had been advanced with support from multiple donor agencies. When UEB was unbundled in 2001, most of UEB’s staff were offered positions in one of the new companies - UEGCL, UETCL, and UEDCL. Asset division was managed by the Privatization Unit, which worked well according to a Lahmeyer asset evaluation study. In this period, the World Bank debt relief program had also allowed Uganda to restructure its debt portfolio, which meant that tariffs were increased by 100 percent, instead of the 200 percent that would have otherwise been required.

However, the situation was still dire. At the time of unbundling, UEB’s successor companies were close to insolvency (by normal standards) and, while a number of interventions had been made to improve collections, reduce theft, and improve performance, implementation was slow going. At the time, the major cause of the poor state of the sector was identified as UEB’s lack of managerial and financial autonomy from the government which had hindered the development of a commercial business culture, accountability, and modern utility management practices. Under continuing conditions of supply crisis, battling with theft and non-payment (including from the government), and struggling with poor technical performance, Uganda embarked on the next phase of reforms, which would
- Janzen Benedikt, Radulescu Doina. 2021. “Effects of Covid-19 Related Government Response Stringency and Support Policies: Evidence from Europea firms”. Cesifo Working Paper Series No 9116

- <mark>Kuntchev, Veselin & Ramalho, Rita & Rodriguez-Meza, Jorge & Yang, Judy S., 2013. "</mark> **<u><mark>W</mark> hat have we learned from the enterprise surveys regarding access to credit by SMEs ?</u>** <u>," Policy Research Working Paper Series</u> <mark>6670, The World Bank.</mark>

- <mark>Muzi,Silvia; Jolevski,Filip; Ueda,Kohei; Viganola,Domenico.2021. “Productivity and Firm Exit during the COVID-19 Crisis : Cross-Country Evidence “. Policy Research working paper;no. WPS 9671;COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group.</mark>

- <mark>Rathi, Sambhu Singh, Vermaak, Claire, Rural electrification, gender and the labor market: A cross-country study of India and South Africa, World Development, Volume 109,2018,Pages 346-359,</mark>

- <mark>Rosenbaum ,Paul R., Rubin Donald B., 1983, The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects,</mark> _<mark>B</mark> iometrika_ <mark>, Volume 70, Issue 1, April 1983, Pages 41–55, h</mark> ttps://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/70.1.41

33
# **I. Introduction**

Land area measurement has been of concern to humanity since the dawn of time. Some of the buildings constructed in ancient Egypt as early as 2700 BC testify to the knowledge of land surveying techniques. Evidence of boundary surveying in Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley from around 1400 BC have also been found (Lyman and Wright, 2015). The word ‘geometry’ originated in ancient Greece from the Greek words for ‘measure’ and ‘Earth’. Similarly, ancient traces of the command of surveying techniques have been found in China (Swetz, 1992) and India (Joseph, 1997). The need to measure land originated from concerns as diverse as the construction of buildings, tax collection, and the need to demarcate properties and boundaries. Those concerns are still valid today, and many of the basic principles and techniques have remained remarkably similar over the millennia, even though technology has certainly advanced and allows for measurements that are both easier and more precise than they might have once been.

With over 70 percent of the developing world’s poor residing in rural areas where agriculture is the primary means of livelihood, high quality agricultural data and analysis are paramount to informing policy aimed at poverty reduction (IFAD, 2010). Land is a key measure of absolute and relative farmer wealth, a critical input in production, and a key variable for normalizing agricultural input use and output measures. Although easily overlooked by analysts, the quality of land area measurement can have nontrivial implications for agricultural statistics, economics, and policy analysis (Carletto et al., 2013 and 2015; Dillon et al., 2016).

Area measurement holds significant value in the developed country context as well. In Europe, national authorities conduct a regular Farm Structure Survey employing a common methodology devised by Eurostat (Istat, 2008). The EU FIELDFACT Project is one of many schemes that aim to raise farmer awareness on the use of GPS in land measurement for the purposes of precision agriculture and more accurate
)|
|Average Inflation Rate,||||-0.2497|-0.6027|
|1980-92||||(-0.46)|(-1.60)|
|Public Infrastructure Index,<br>1990|||||1.1966<br>(2.04)|
|P-value (F-Statistic)|0.0046|0.0077|0.0305|0.0724|0.0365|
|Adjusted R<sup>2</sup>|0.4595|0.5119|0.5222|0.4735|0.6490|
|Number of Observations|14|14|12|12|12|

Note: The above t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. Regression coefficients are standardized so that they reflect the change in the growth rate produced by a one-standard deviation of the explanatory variable.

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improving the stability of the financial sector (Cook and McKay, 2015). Similarly, a study from South America found that mobile call data could be used to accurately predict creditworthiness (Björkegren and Grissen, 2020). In Germany, credit-scoring models based off a user’s digital footprint outperformed those based solely on credit scores (Berg et al., 2020)

# **5. The importance of consumer protection for enabling safe and beneficial digital payment adoption**

Throughout this paper, we have highlighted the benefits of digitalizing payments for both senders and recipients. It is necessary to also acknowledge, however, the risks that come with advanced digitalization.

The marketplace for retail financial services can be challenging to navigate, especially for financially inexperienced adults. Although millions of people have been able to take advantage of digital financial services and mobile money, using them safely and in a way that delivers benefits requires both financial and digital skills, which many low-income adults do not have.

Atop these challenges lie several consumer risks that can be exacerbated by the speed and rapid change inherent to digital financial services. Responses to Global Findex 2021 survey questions reveal some of them. For example, the survey asked respondents about their ability to use their account without help. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 31 percent of mobile money account holders could not. Women were more likely to say they could not. That is consistent with a government-toperson (G2P) mobile payments study showing that women were significantly more likely than men to send a representative to cash out government transfer payments (Glynn-Broderick and Koechlein 2021). Women are also more likely to report that their transfer was spent by another family member and to say they had to pay a fee or a tip to an agent to get their money when, officially, there should have been no charge. A nationally representative survey in Côte d’Ivoire similarly found that women are less likely than men to understand the financial products offered through their phones and more likely to lose money to scams (CGAP 2022
������ � ∝��∝� ���������� � ∝� ������� �∝� ������� � �� � �� � ����, (1) The model links the greenfield foreign direct investment, _FDIist_ , flowing into country _i_ in sector _s_ in year _t_ with a range of variables underpinning perceived uncertainty and expected returns. These variables include lagged FDI in sector _s_ ; political violence indicator _Pi(t-1)_ for country _i_ in the previous year; a set of control variables _Xi(t-1)_ , which capture conditions that might confound the relationship between political violence and greenfield FDI; a set of country dummies μi for time-invariant country characteristics; and a vector of time dummies μt.

The country fixed effects capture time-fixed heterogeneity, controlling for effects such as country size, resource endowments, culture, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, as well as institutions because institutions change very slowly over time. Moreover, the country fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity, limiting the risk of self-selection bias. We thus consider only within country variation, that is, whether a country attracts less FDI when its level of political violence increases. The time dummies capture time-dependent effects, such as global FDI waves, global commodity price fluctuations, and other global economic phenomena. The lagged FDIis variable minimizes the risk of omitted variable bias because the amount of FDI received in the previous period is one of the best predictors of FDI received in the subsequent period. In addition, this variable makes possible the estimation of the long-term effects of our variables. To reduce the problem of reverse causality, all independent variables are lagged. However, ultimately, this model cannot determine causality, so the results should be interpreted as conditional associations, not causal relationships.

The data on flows of greenfield FDI into developing countries for the period from 2003 to 2012 are obtained from the fDi Markets database, a Financial Times databank tracking cross-border
_Beyond Unequal Development_ section with time series data, show that the Kuznets curve holds only for a very small set of countries (10 percent of the sample) and that in general no statistical significant relationship between the level of income and inequality is found for over 75 percent of the sample. The "universal Kuznets curve" fails to be detected in the data. These recent studies thus, cast doubts on the existence and robustness of the Kuznets curve. More research is needed, to settle the confronting new World Bank and previous evidence on the Kuznets curve. Anyway, there seems to be that as countries move up in the income per-capita ladders, inequality tends to decline. An important practical question is at what levels of per-capita income (US$5,000?, US$8,000?) income inequality start declining and how public policies can help accelerate this process.

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priority to basic research and scholarly publication from the very beginning.<sup>36</sup> Its dedication to the norms of “open science” also has been translated into an unwillingness to allow commercial interests to influence research (Feldman and Desrochers 2004). This academic culture has not encouraged direct involvement with industry, and instead has carried an almost persistent emphasis on fundamental inquiry. The failure of its first spin-off company or

> 35 The Creative Index developed by Florida (2002) is a useful gauge of the creative capabilities of places.  This index is a mix of four equally weighted factors: share of creative employees in the workforce, innovation measured by patents per capita, presence of high-tech industry, and diversity measured by the Gay Index. 36 On the other hand, the university ranked second to lowest among the top twenty American universities in its percentage of industry-sponsored research as a proportion of total research expenditure at the end of 1990s (Feldman and Desrochers 2004).

25
Annex 1: Data Sources for the Worldwide Governance Indicators

|**WGI**<br>**Code**|**Organizaton**|**Data Source**|**Country Coverage***<br>**(most recentyear)**|**Frequency***|**Type****|**Methodology and Data Availability**|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ADB|African<br>Development<br>Bank|Country<br>Performance<br>Assessments|37 African Development<br>Bank client countries<br>eligible for concessional<br>fnance.|Every two years;<br>used in WGI<br>since 2004.|Expert/GOV|Expert assessment along 16 dimensions, scored by AfDB<br>country economists subject to centralized review.<br>Questonnaire and process are similar to the World Bank<br>Country Policy and Insttutonal Assessment (PIA), the IFAD<br>Rural Sector Performance Assessment (IFD) and the Asian<br>Development Bank Country Performance Assessment (ASD).<br>Link to methodologyhere.Data are publicly available only for<br>countries eligible for concessional fnance.|
|AFR|Afrobarometer|Afrobarometer<br>Surveys|35 African economies in<br>Round 9.|Approximately<br>every 2-3 years;<br>used in WGI<br>since 2002|Survey/HH|Detailed descripton of survey instruments and sampling<br>methodology are availablehere.Record-level survey data is<br>publicly available.|
|ASD|Asian<br>Development<br>Bank|Country<br>Performance<br>Assessment|26 Asian Development<br>Bank client countries.|Every two years;<br>used in WGI<
side, the government recruited more teachers,<sup>6</sup> built additional classrooms in existing schools, and new government schools where none existed before. For example, between 2002 and 2011, the number of primary schools in Lesotho increased by about 10 percent, and the primary school pupil-teacher ratio dropped from 48 to 34 pupils per teacher (MOET, 2011). This increase in infrastructure also helped to reduce the average distance to schools, and hence transportation costs. In addition to school infrastructure, the government provides annual capitation grants, furniture and teaching materials to all schools, including church/private schools (Jopo _et al._ , 2011; Lekhetho, 2013). Except for the differences in years of exposure, the supply-side program components benefited everyone at school while fee eliminations and free stationery and textbooks exclusively benefited those covered by FPE.

Figure 3: Changes in Pupil-Teacher Ratio and enrollment <!-- Start of picture text --> Trends in Secondary School Enrolments Rates Trends in Pupil−Teacher Ratios<br>60 60<br>50 50<br>40 40<br>30 30<br>Gross Enrolment Rate Primary school<br>20 Net Enrolment Rate 20 Secondary school<br>2000 2005 2010 2015 2000 2005 2010 2015<br>Year Year<br>Enrolment Rate<br>Pupil Teacher Ratio (PTR)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Source_ : Own representation using data from various Education Statistics Reports (MOET, 2010, 2011, 2016).

Figure 3 shows changes in secondary school enrollment (demand for education), on the left panel, and pupil-teacher ratio (supply of education), on the right panel, since the introduction of the FPE program. From the left panel of the figure, we can see that, while the secondary school gross enrollment rate was on the increase between 2001 and 2011, the increase was much faster between 2006 and 2010. The figure further shows that
Figure 1: Minimum Wages in Korea <!-- Start of picture text --> Nominal Min. Wage Inflation Real Min. Wage<br>(a) Minimum Wages and Inflation Trend<br>Korea USA Japan Korea USA Japan<br>UK Czech Rep. Hungary UK Czech Rep. Hungary<br>(b) Hourly Real Minimum Wages (c) Minimum-to-Median Wage Ratio<br>1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020<br>2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020<br>16<br>14<br>12<br>10<br>8<br>6<br>Growth Rate (%) 4<br>2<br>0<br>-2<br>12 .7<br>10<br>.6<br>8<br>.5<br>6<br>.4<br>4<br>Minimum-to-Median Wage Ratio<br>Hourly Wage (2020 constant US$)<br>2 .3<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes:_ Panel (a) shows the annual growth rates of nominal minimum wages (blue) and consumer price index (CPI, red), respectively, of which the difference is real minimum wages (orange bar). Panel (b) presents hourly real minimum wages for selective countries, while panel (c) compares their minimum to median wage ratios. All values in panels (b) and (c) are in constant prices at 2020 USD exchange rates. The data come from OECD Statistics Database.

# **2.3 Korean MNCs’ Foreign Affiliates**

Here we describe trends in Korean outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and employment by foreign affiliates. Korea first began collaborating with foreign affiliates in the mid-1990s
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young or low-income individuals who cannot borrow to consume and offset the compulsory savings.<sup>4</sup> In any case, even if households saving increase, it is difficult to assess whether such an increase is reflected at the national level. This may be due to at least two factors: 1) it is difficult to say whether household savings is or is not offset by government's response, either as a consequence of tax concession or transitional costs of pension reform; and 2) it is difficult to estimate whether at a company level, saving through pension funds is not offset by dissaving elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, capital markets development is pointed out as one of the main potential consequences of contractual savings development.<sup>6</sup> The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of contractual savings and nonlife insurance on asset markets, and particularly on stock markets. The focus is on macroeconomics and financial effects of contractual savings development thus, emphasizing the role of pension funds, and life and non-life insurance companies as financial intermediaries. This paper is mainly an empirical study. The evidence of the relationship between contractual savings, non-life insurance and stock markets development is presented for some OECD and developing countries. Finally, we explain how the development of the contractual savings sector promotes financial sector development and economic growth, and mitigates social and financial risks.

**Figure 1: Contractual savings in country financial assets (%,1996)**

<!-- Start of picture text --> 100%<br>70% m ll E<br>20%~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2<br>t XMME 2 Al W<br>10%<br><!-- End of picture text --> Source: 1998 OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook and WB institutional investors database.

4 See