rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
property rights in Sudan: one based on a statutory legal system and one based on a customary system. People who own land under the statutory legal system generally have title to their land, while people who hold land under the customary system generally do not. If a woman is married to a man who has title to his land, and if her husband dies, it is difficult for the widow to acquire title to her late husband’s land in her own name. This has been especially difficult for many female IDP heads of households. Conversely, land that is communal under the customary system is no easier for women to access. It is generally managed by a high-status adult male member of the community, and women can generally only obtain access through a male relative.<sup>13</sup> As mentioned earlier in this report, data from the Arab Barometer (2018) show that there is not a lot of support for equal inheritance rights. The overwhelming majority of respondents, 87 percent, disagree with the statement that “Women’s share of inheritance should be equal to that of men” (Arab Barometer 2018). Having a land title has several advantages, including the ability to use it as collateral to access financing. Limiting women’s ability to obtain land titles limits their ability to access financing opportunities that may help them start a business or finance other productive activities that have the potential to benefit not only their families but also the economy in general. Women and agriculture are discussed in greater detail in Section 6.

# **_National strategies and grassroots initiatives_**

There are currently two Sudanese ministries that specifically address women’s and youth’s affairs: the Ministry of Social Development and the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Under the transitional government, each ministry is headed by a woman. As mentioned earlier, the transitional government is planning to draft a new Constitution, as well as various pieces of legislation, which may inform the development of new or revised national
men and women aged 16 to 30 years in São Paulo.  These foundational conversations led to the national quantitative instrument, conducted face-to-face with 1,800 participants aged 16 and over in 70 municipalities across five regions of Brazil. Research was completed between September and November 2016.

> 22 These behaviors include: criticism of women who wear short or low-cut clothing, catcalling, saying a woman was promoted because of appearance or because of relations with superior, sharing nude photos of women without their consent, use of terms “slut” or “piranha” to describe women, use of violence (physical or verbal) to win argument with a woman, be aggressive with women to whom they are related, to try to take advantage of an intoxicated woman.

> 23 Approaches studied range from large-scale communications campaigns and “edutainment” series, to economic empowerment and asset ownership programs for women, to community mobilization or group education efforts to promote behavioral change specifically among men and boys and educate bystanders on response to VAW.

_21_
these two studies. We also highlight an economic loss about 3.1 higher than found in Kešeljević and Spruk (2023) (10) although the authors also identify dramatic human development and infant mortality costs of the Syrian civil war. To the best of our knowledge, the estimated cumulative loss of GDP _per capita_ during the CAR civil war is among the highest in the academic literature, just below the Libyan case between 2011-14 (12)– which was a mix of revolts following the _Arab_ – _Spring_ , a civil war and an international war and comparable in magnitude with the local cumulative loss of GDP found in the Donetsk and Luhansk _Oblasts_ of Ukraine between 2013-16 (13).

It is important to note that we do not discuss here any potential solution for the CAR, including the potential role of official development aid, structural reforms and financing programs (1,30– 34). The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The first section presents the methodology used to estimate the socio-economic impacts of the 2013 civil war in CAR as well as our identification strategy. The second section elaborates on the key variables used and data. The third section presents the empirical results. The last section provides some concluding remarks.

# **Methodology and identification strategy**

To assess the socio-economic impacts of the 2013 civil war in CAR, we consider country-year level data, with a post-`treatment’ period starting in 2013. We distinguish two phases in the civil war: the period 2013-14, when the Séléka rebel coalition took over Bangui and a subsequent period (2015-17) when the conflict has fragmented into several localized skirmishes concentrated mostly in regions (called locally _Préfectures_ ) close to the northern and western borders and in the East of the country. We do not go beyond 2017 to avoid noisy effects possibly coming from more recent events (e.g., Wagner group starting to operate in 2018, leading to the cut of budget support from France and other traditional partners; the COVID-19 lockdowns, the
11 binding for sonme (extreme) age groups. In Figure 2, the shaded area below and above the critical age levels (A*, A**) represents the total coverage if one follows their methodology. Of course this area and the one resulting from the method used in this study do not necessarily coincide.

# V. The Data

We will use the data provided by the Labor Force Survey conducted annually by the University of Chile in the Greater Santiago area. The survey questionnaire has been fairly similar throughout time, while the sample size and its distribution has been reviewed periodically to account for the city's expansion. The quality of the survey and its representativity is supported by the consistency of its main reported results regarding labor force categories and incomes. Corbo and Stelcner (1980), Uthoff (1983) and Riveros (1986) have used this information to examine wage setting and earnings across several labor force groups, and their conclusions support the accuracy of this sample's information for statistical analysis. The above mentioned study by Castaneda (1983) used this same data source, thus allowing a direct comparison with our empirical results.

In this study we will use a sample of males for the years 1968, 1977, 1980 and 1985, thus spanning a wide range of economic experiences and MW regimes. The sample included employed, unemployed and discouraged job seekers (seeking inactives). Inclusion of seeking inactive. reflects our expectations that, under a binding MW regime there will be a decline in participation rates, the effect of which we would like to account for.<sup>10</sup> The distribution of the sample and the average values for the variables are presented in Appendix 1.
Supplement Figure VI summarizes learning for selected countries for the last decade. We observe a few interesting case studies. Russia outperforms the United States. Chile outperforms Eastern European countries such as Georgia. Saudi Arabia places near the bottom outperforming only African countries. The gap between Morocco and Singapore is substantial. Singapore and Finland have low variation due to a potential plateau on the upper end of performance. Rwanda has low variation due to limited data. Russia has high variation due to improving learning, whereas South Africa has high variation due to declining learning.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Rwanda<br>Morocco<br>Egypt<br>South Africa<br>Saudi Arabia<br>Georgia<br>Chile<br>Israel<br>France<br>United States of America<br>Germany<br>Russian Federation<br>Finland<br>Hong Kong, SAR China<br>Singapore<br>0 200 400 600<br>HLO<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> SUPPLEMENT FIGURE VI<br><!-- End of picture text --> Average Learning (2007-2017) – Selected Countries _Notes:_ Average learning is calculated across subjects and schooling levels over the given period of time. _Source:_ Our learning outcomes database.

Supplement Figure VII plots average learning for each country by the log of their GDP per capita. This graph illuminates cases where countries have managed to improve learning despite a lack of resources, as well as cases where countries have resources to invest in to date unrealized learning potential. Former or current centrally planned economies display better learning outcomes than their income would suggest, such as Singapore, Poland, Bulgaria, Cuba and Vietnam. Countries in the Middle East and Africa reach lower learning levels than predicted by income, such as Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana. We also
Miguel, 2007]. These types of studies are relevant for policies that explicitly attempt to change network composition or information flow. However, often networks and information flows are predetermined, limiting the policy implications of such approaches. Our identification strategy uses instrumental variables to identify causal peer effects in the context of endogenously formed networks and information flows. Specifically, we instrument for social networks using caste.

We collected data on up to five of the women’s friends. Only 42 of our final sample of 404 women listed five friends, so the top code does not appear to be restrictive and the exclusion restriction is likely to hold.<sup>3</sup> Further, we instrument for endogenous group formation, which crucially allows us to relax the assumption of separability of group formation and information flows. In this paper, we instrument for the network weights matrix _W_ , and participation in _Mahila Samakhya_ , _X_ , of woman _i_ in caste _c_ and village _v_ . Our first-stage regression equations are: where _V_ is the number of same caste women in the village as an instrument for networks<sup>4</sup> ; _Z_ is the vector of instruments for participation; _φc_ is a caste fixed effect;

> 3Our exclusion restriction would also be violated if nonparticipants were able simply to observe program activities without officially participating. However, in our observation of this program, the closeness of ties within the support group acted as a barrier to entry for nonparticipants, who reported feeling “intimidated” or “out-of-place” and could not explain to their in-laws and spouses why they were leaving the house since they were not participating in _Mahila Samakhya_ .

> 4During data collection, we first listed the number of households by caste in each village, and then extrapolated the number of women in each caste in each village using the sex ratio (962/1000) and average household size (five) for Uttarakhand from the 2011 Census.

13
Slovenia<br>0,1<br>1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001<br>Grubel-Lloyd Index<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Sources_ : Eurostat COMEXT Database, WIIW Industrial Database, own calculations.

> 14  The ‘new’ trade theory suggests that intra-industry trade, measured by the share of simultaneous export and import of similar products, is motivated by product differentiation and economies of scale. Intraindustry trade is measured by Grubel-Lloyd index (GL=1-�ABS(xij+mij), where xij and mij are country i's export and import of NACE 3 digit sector j, respectively).

17
security over time. This paper assesses the degree to which the worsening food security situation is related to the localized effects of violence, as opposed to other factors. Better understanding these correlations can help to better identify populations that could most be helped by food assistance and can better identify policies that have the potential to most improve food security.

Using a monthly mobile phone survey conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) in Yemen since September of 2015, this paper demonstrates that the evolution of poor food access‐ as measured through standard food coping strategies‐ does not match the evolution of violence after the conflict began.<sup>6</sup> In the most complete empirical specification, one can reject the hypothesis that the effect of doubling the monthly fatalities in a governorate on average having a larger than 0.008 increase in the share of people reporting to have poor food access in the following month at standard significance levels.<sup>7</sup> This lack of a statistically significant or meaningful relationship survives numerous robustness checks, including incorporating the effects of lagged violence, separating the violence by either type of violence or by actors involved, separating the effect of violence separately for different years or for different locations in the country, accounting for food assistance being distributed in the country, and accounting for the possibility of internal displacement obscuring the true relationship.

> 4 For example, see (accessed September 2018): <u>https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/escalating‐humanitarian‐ crisis.</u>

> 5 For example, see (accessed September 2018): <u>https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen‐rapid‐assessment‐ report‐december‐2016‐measuring‐impact‐public‐sector‐wage.</u>

> 6 Prior to the conflict, 85 percent of the population resided in a household that owned a mobile phone and would be able to be reached by the household‐level
we did find one of the brick kilns in our rapid survey of kilns that relied 100% on biomass pellets in the western part of the country.

<!-- Start of picture text --> Min Max Average<br>20.6<br>16.6<br>16.0<br>15.4<br>12.5<br>10.9<br>9.3<br>8.5<br>6.8<br>6.1<br>5.1<br>4.1<br>2.1<br>10% 25% 50% 75% 100%<br>Percentage of coal substituted by biomass pellets (%)<br>Fuel cost savings (billion NRs)<br><!-- End of picture text -->

# **Figure 10. Annual fuel cost savings by switching from coal to biomass pellets with FC BTK and ZZK combined in 2022**

_Notes_ : The estimated total number of brick production in 2021 is 4.1 billion from FC BTK and ZZK. The ranges of values are dependent on the quality of coal (gross calorific value). Lower quality of coal yields lower cost savings. The calorific values considered are 4750 kcal/kg (low), 5,000 kcal/kg (average), and 5,500 kcal/kg (high) (SMSEE, 2017). The average price of coal for Nepal is NRs 43.4 per kg and the biomass pellets is NRs 12 per kg in 2022 from the survey.

# **6. Policy Discussion**

# 6.1 Increased coal prices through a carbon tax

The economic analysis shows that energy-efficient technologies such as the VSBKs are the most economical fired clay brick production technology in terms of total private costs currently followed by ZZK and FC BTK. However, VSBK technology has low penetration in the country due to its high upfront costs
on a review of 60 publications of very diverse nature, dated back to 2009 and revised later in 2011. Although such qualitative work is important and should be an integral part of any data driven strategy, on its own it cannot be considered comprehensive or objective, and it is not easy to update. Progress in the adoption of green technologies during the last decade has been phenomenal, and this progress is being left out of the GEP.

The use of O*NET GEP outside the U.S. and in developing countries is also subject to important assumptions that cast doubts about its validity in these contexts. When O*NET data is used to study countries outside the U.S. the following assumptions are inevitably made: first, the production function (technology, capital, and labor—tasks and skills) is the same as that of the U.S. Internationally comparable firm data, like that from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, show that the input mix and the returns of firms vary across countries. Country efforts to replicate O*NET in Indonesia and Uruguay show that there is variation in the task content and skills requirement of occupations across each of these countries and the U.S.<sup>38</sup> A second major problem is that most countries when collecting occupational data use the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) at the 4-digit level of aggregation or higher. This entails relying on a crosswalk to transform the 8-digit O*NET SOC to the 4- digit ISCO and making assumptions about the structure of employment within each 4-digit occupation. Although crosswalks are available<sup>39</sup> and commonly used by the research community, they have been found particularly problematic for capturing green jobs given the low levels of employment and the high measurement errors produced by the crosswalks.<sup>40</sup> For example, Elliot et al. (2021) applies the O*NET classification and Vona et al. (2019) methodology to
labor income, consumption, and health. Yet, the program prompted negligible effects on the labor market outcomes of Colombian workers (Bahar et al. 2021). It also reduced crime rates and the fiscal costs of hosting migrants in Colombia (Bahar et al. 2022; Ib ́a ̃nez et al. 2024).<sup>3</sup> Our analysis assesses the impacts of the PEP program on electoral turnout, support for left-wing, center, and right-wing political ideologies, and electoral competition in Colombia.<sup>4</sup> We examine the causal effects of the PEP program by comparing mayoral and firstround presidential election results in municipalities with higher and lower PEP take-up rates, before and after the program’s rollout in 2018.

We employ municipal data from six mayoral elections for 1,098 of the 1,122 municipalities in Colombia (recorded after the year 2000, when information about the electoral roll became available). Each municipal election is conducted independently and mayors are elected at the local level by plurality rule. As such, the analysis exploits data from more than six thousand individual election points. For robustness, we also examine the effects of the PEP program on first-round presidential elections. Presidents are elected nationally in the first round if they receive fifty percent of the votes, plus one. Hence, the presidential election analysis includes six individual election points.

Our analysis controls for municipal and election-year fixed effects, a rich set of baseline municipal characteristics, their interactions with election-year trends, and department election-year trends. The data supports the validity of the empirical strategy as we observe parallel trends for mayoral and presidential elections in municipalities with higher and lower PEP program take-up rates before the program’s onset in 2018. In line with

> 3Particularly, regularized migrants had higher incomes than those who remained undocumented. This prompted higher tax consumption payments. Moreover, regularized migrants also used the health system more efficiently, employing disproportionately preventive instead of emergency services. Finally, AmuedoDorantes et al.
# **Figure VI-3: Real Credit Growth and Medium-term Credit Cycle**

## **A- Oil exporter**

<!-- Start of picture text --> Kuwait: Real Credit<br>(in percent)<br>1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017<br>year<br> Medium-term cycle Real credit growth (y/y)<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>-50<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Algeria: Real Credit<br>(in percent)<br>1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017<br>year<br> Medium-term cycle Real credit growth (y/y)<br>UAE: Real Credit<br>(in percent)<br>1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017<br>year<br> Medium-term cycle Real credit growth (y/y)<br>100<br>50<br>0<br>-50<br>-100<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>-20<br><!-- End of picture text --> <!-- Start of picture text --> Iran: Real Credit<br>(in percent)<br>1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017<br>year<br> Medium-term cycle Real credit growth (y/y)<br>Bahrain: Real Credit<br>(in percent)<br>1967 1977 1987 1997 2007 2017<br>year<br> Medium-term cycle Real credit growth (y/y)<br>60<br>40<br>20<br>0<br>-20<br>30<br>20<br>10<br>0<br>-10<br>-20
Table 13. Smartphone data: average daily time (mins), and share of daily time, spent in passive care across non-care and non-sleep activities

|||Po|p-up data: activity|conducted with|:||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Any ch<br>(aged<br>|ildren<br>0-17)<br>|Children a<br>|ged 0-9<br>|Children a<br>|ged 10-17<br>|
||Women|Men|Women|Men|Women|Men|
|Average daily minutes:|||||||
|Agriculture|8.8|7.0|3.1|1.8|6.2|5.5|
|Nonfarm employment|5.5***|16.3***|3.2|5.4|3.0***|13.0***|
|Unpaid work:|||||||
|Obtaining services/resources for HH|5.9***|2.4***|3.9***|0.8***|2.3|1.9|
|Cooking, cleaning in house|42.1***|5.1***|29.6***|1.6***|16.9***|3.7***|
|Transport|21.5|19.1|14.8***|5.4***|8.1***|14.7***|
|School/studying|3.8|5.8|0.02|0.5|3.7|5.3
Policy Research Working Paper 6279

# **Abstract**

Fixed costs associated with learning about demand and setting up distribution networks are expected to be lower when there are more potential contacts in the destination market, suggesting a greater probability of market entry and larger export revenues. The authors match historically-determined emigration stocks with detailed firm-level data from Portugal to examine the effect of migrant networks on these export outcomes.

They find that larger stocks of emigrants in a given destination increase export participation and intensity. In addition, they show that the former of these effects tends to be more pronounced among firms that are more likely to have close ties with the emigrants. These results are consistent with a multiple-destination version of the Melitz (2003) model featuring market-specific entry costs and idiosyncratic firm-destination demand shocks.

This paper is a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at pbastos@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent._ Produced by the Research Support Team