rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
associated 134-by-134 matrices of wage bills and remittance flows for the benchmark year. Also, the GMig2 database provides total population headcounts by region of origin and residence.

In this analysis, the model is implemented with the databases aggregated to consider 24 regions and countries and seven sectors.<sup>8</sup> The selection of the regional aggregation aims to balance tractability with the desire to separately capture major migration corridors, to separate high-income regions from other regions, and to separate as far as possible low-income regions from middleincome regions.

# **2.3 Scenarios**

The first of three scenarios considered in this analysis is a baseline of the global economy out to 2030. The baseline population and labor force paths are drawn from the medium variant projections of the United Nations’ World Population Prospects 2015 Revision (United Nations 2015). The labor productivity parameters are calibrated residually so that the baseline scenario replicates real GDP growth projections from World Bank (2015b) till 2017 and from the OECD projections documented in IIASA (2013) till 2030. The exogenous baseline migrant worker stocks by host region and origin are assumed to evolve in proportion to host regions’ given total labor force path, i.e. the 2007 benchmark shares of workers by origin and skill class in each host region’s total labor force are preserved. In the subsequent scenarios below, all changes are always relative to the baseline. For example, an increase reported in one variable means an increase over the corresponding value of the same variable in the baseline.

The second scenario considers a gradual increase in labor migration from low- and middle-income (LMI) regions to high-income countries (HIC), in the spirit of the exercise of Rodrik (2001), Walmsley and Winters (2005), World Bank (2006), and Walmsley, Winters, and Ahmed (2011). It is assumed that existing binding restrictions on LMI-HIC migration to each of the six HIC regions are relaxed such that the total labor force in each of the host
: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/images/ReturnIndex/20203145217451_iom_returnindex_thematic_seriesNov2019.pdf

> 15 For detailed information on IDP return in Iraq see: IOM Iraq (2021). An Overview of Return Movements in Iraq. 16 A breakdown of the ethno-sectarian identity of IDPs is not available, since this data is not typically collected by humanitarian actors due to the potential stigmatization or discrimination it may cause. Overall, as of 30 April, 2021, according to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Mechanism (DTM), there are 1,198,940 IDPs displaced across Iraq, and 4,867,050 returnees. IOM Iraq (2021) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). Available at: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/

> 17 For example, an IOM study reported that IDPs perceived the greatest barriers to return as damage to housing (affecting 71% of IDPs), lack of livelihoods (53%), and lack of basic services (62%.) IOM Iraq (2021). _Protracted Displacement in Iraq: Revisiting Categories of Return Barriers._

4
effect. If initial pre-FTA imports are low, the likelihood of replacing a low-cost MFN supplier with a higher-cost FTA supplier increases.

Last but not least, there is a danger of trade deflection if MFN applied tariff rates vary across countries of a free trade area. Traders then have incentive to seek to enter through a ‘lower tariff’ country, obtain a fraudulent certificate of origin and move a shipment to a ‘higher tariff’ country resulting in losses of customs revenue. The extent of trade deflection depends on tariff differentials and the quality of customs administration—high differentials and corrupt customs lead to high trade deflection.

‘Pan-European’ arrangements denote broadly the trade component of the European Association Agreement effective as of 1994, Bulgaria’s participation in CEFTA (Bulgaria joined in 1999 liberalizing market access for then six other CEFTA members) as well as other parties of the Pan-European Cumulation of Origin Agreement, that is, Romania and Turkey. Turkey has had customs union agreement with the EU since 1997 and applies the EU Common External Tariff on most products. Taking into account schedules of tariff reductions on industrial imports, since around the end of the 1990s most tariff rates on industrial products from pan-European countries have been zeroed. As for other FTAs—with SEE-5 countries and Israel—most industrial products under these agreements either already or soon will have duty-free access to Bulgarian markets.

Bulgaria’s applied MFN tariff rates on industrial products create significant potential for reverse discrimination. Data tabulated in Table, based on six-digit Harmonized System (HS) tariff lines processed for UNCTAD TRAINS database, offer insights as to its potential scope—potential, as the information is limited to imports by six-digit HS items without identifying whether these imports come from preferential partners. In other words, MFN tariff rates are not applied to all imports of six-digit HS items, yet the database provides information on all imports in 2003, from preferential and MFN partners alike. Had Bulgaria had no FTAs, 21 percent of its imports in 2003 would have been subject to zero tariff
are obtained from the UCDP/PRIO Battle Related Death database (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015) and are gathered using information taken from a selection of publicly available sources, including journals, news agencies, NGO reports and statements of governments. The battle-related deaths variable is a best estimate, based on all information evaluated by UCDP/PRIO. The variable measures fatalities in conflict situations such as conventional battlefield fights, guerrilla attacks on government personnel, and bombardments of military bases, cities, and villages. It only includes battle-related deaths for conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths per year. Although this indicator has limitations – e.g., it does not measure non-fatal casualties or damage to property – it is widely available for conflict countries and is considered a good proxy for 18
_Table 1: Impacts of large floods_

|**Year**|**Duration(days)**|**No. people affected(m)**|**Damages($m 2022 price)**|
|---|---|---|---|
|1996|35|1.30|2.8|
|2000|31|3.45|272.0|
|2001|97|1.67|24.8|
|2002|101|1.47|0.2|
|2011|84|1.64|677.8|
|2013|21|1.50|628.1|

Notes: Table shows floods with more than 1m people affected in Cambodia since 1990. Source: EM-DAT database.

In the period since 1990, four floods have impacted more than 50,000 km<sup>2</sup> in Cambodia, representing more than a quarter of the country’s total land mass. Davies and others (2014) report that 18 of the 24 provinces were impacted in the 2011 floods. The 2011 floods affected more than 10 percent of the population and caused over $677 million in damages (5.3 percent of GDP). Even if the floods do not hit major urban centers (meaning that monetary damages are much reduced), the impacts on agriculture and transport infrastructure can be substantial. Despite the 2011 floods having the highest recorded cost in terms of damages, ADB (2012) suggests that more than half of the damages could be attributed to agriculture (particularly rice paddy) and transport infrastructure. Furthermore, damage to transport infrastructure can have important implications for providing disaster relief and assistance in recovery (Davies and others, 2014), which increases the possibility of cascading disaster effects (see next section).

The impacts of disasters can be difficult to identify in macroeconomic statistics because efforts to rebuild can create a stimulus effect
Time periods are based on the end date of the intervention (November 2018) and use data downloaded from the Nairobi Water billing data for December 2018, and September 2019 to estimate impacts 1 and 9 months after the intervention respectively. All monetary amounts are in USD using an exchange rate of 100:1, unless otherwise stated.

Table 5: Impacts of Contract Enforcement on Payment

||Made at <br>payment|least one<br>within. . .|Total a<br>paid wit|mount<br>hin. . .|Propor<br>bala<br>paid wi|tion of<br>nce<br>thin. . .|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||1 month|9 months|1 month|9 months|1 month|9 months|
||(1)|(2)|(3)|(4)|(5)|(6)|
|Coefcient|0.300***|0.195***|8.783***|9.078**|0.113***|0.078***|
||(0.039)|(0.043)|(1.714)|(4.154)|(0.025)|(0.027)|
||r0.000s|r0.000s|r0.000s|r0.031s|r0.000s|r0.005s|
|Control Mean|0.110|0.334|5.026|24.722|0.268|0.300|
|Observations|1001|1001|1001|1001|1001|1001|
|Number of Clusters|142|142|142|142|142|142|

_Notes_ . Clustered standard errors based on the
altogether, when household characteristics such as education and location of residence are controlled for. Ranganathan et al. (2017) conduct a similar analysis with the IHDS data, but come to somewhat different conclusions from Azam (2019). Notably, they conclude that income mobility in rural areas is higher for the backward castes than for the forward castes (Ranganathan et al. 2017). The source of this disagreement is not entirely clear, but it could be related to differential treatment of data. For example, Ranganathan et al.’s study does not include split households in the analysis, leaving them with a total of just under 20,000 rural households in their analysis. This contrasts with Azam’s study, in which roughly 23,000 rural households were included in his balanced panel.

Seetahul (2018) examines occupational and earnings mobility in urban areas using the IHDS data. Her analysis shows that women enjoy less occupational mobility than men, but that the data reveal little systematic difference in patterns of earnings mobility across genders. With respect to caste and religious groups, the Hindu upper-caste group is found to be particularly well placed to transition out of casual wage employment into regular jobs, and to transition into increasingly skilled occupations. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in contrast, see little transition into such skilled occupations. Relative income mobility, proxied by rank changes in — earnings, is found to be less pronounced among the upper-caste group possibly as a result of their already generally occupying the upper percentiles of the earnings distribution in the initial period, thus being less able to further improve their ranking.<sup>7</sup> Income mobility has also received attention in more focused microstudies in India. One such study by Himanshu et al. (2018) focuses on income mobility in the village of Palanpur in western Uttar Pradesh over a period of seven decades, extending from the late 1950s to 2015.

> 7 Some smaller panel surveys have been fielded for India, but none of these provides nationally
# _5.1. A Gravity Model to Assess Trade Performance_

Countries’ economic characteristics and geographical distance to trading partners can be used to predict the potential bilateral trade flows and compare the predicted volume to actual trade and estimate the untapped exports potential. We use a gravity model<sup>4</sup> to analyze the determinants of bilateral trade flows, essentially the countries’ income level and the geographical distance between them, in addition to other relevant factors such as common borders, common languages, common legal systems, common currencies and common colonial legacies. The model is also used to test the effectiveness of free trade agreements. The basic model for trade between two countries (i and j) takes the following form: where F stands for the trade flow, G is the constant, D stands for the distance and M stands for the economic dimensions of the countries _i_ and _j_ that are being measured. A better understanding of the gravity equation is achieved by using the logarithmic values of all variables. We use the UN Comtrade database for 175 countries including Egypt, with 99 sectors (two‐digit HS commodities) for the period 1995 – 2016.<sup>5</sup> Our equation takes the following form: lnX���� �β� �β�lnGDP/cap�� �β�lnGDP/cap�� �β� lnDist�� �β�Contig�� �β�Comleg�� � β�Col�� �β�ComLang��� β�Landlocked� β�GAFTA��� �β��Agadir���� β��EgyptEU��� � β��COMESA��� �σt�σj�ε���� where _Xijkt_ is the bilateral trade flow between Egypt (the exporter) and country _j_ (the importer) in year _t_ for sector _k_ ; lnGDP/cap�� and lnGDP/cap�� are country _i_ and j’s real gross domestic
Bliss, M.A., F.A. Gul. 2012. “Political Connection and Cost of Debt: Some Malaysian Evidence.” _Journal of Banking and Finance_ 36(5), 1520-1527.

- Bond, S., Elston, J. A., Mairesse, J. and Mulkay, B. 2003. “Financial Factors and Investment in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A Comparison Using Company Panel Data,” _Review of Economics and Statistics_ , 85(1), 153-165.

- Boubakri, N., JC Cossett, W Saffar. 2008. “Political Connection of Newly privatized Firms,” _Journal of Corporate Finance_ 14(5), 654-673.

- Boubakri, N., O. Guedhami, D. Mishra, W. Saffar. 2012. “Political Connections and the Cost of  Equity Capital,” _Journal of Corporate Finance_ 18(3), 541-549.

- Boyreau-Debray, Genevieve, 2003. “Financial Intermediation and Growth: Chinese Style,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3027.

- Boyreau-Debray, Genevieve, and Sheng-Jin Wei, 2005. “Pitfalls of a State-dominated Financial System: The Case of China,” NBER working paper 11214.

- Bruhn, Miriam, Dean Karlan, and Antoinette Schoar. 2010. “What Capital is Missing in Developing Countries?” _American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings,_ 100(2): 629–633.

- Cai, Hongbin, Hanming Fang, Lixin Colin Xu. 2011. “Eat, Drink, Firms, Government: An Investigation of Corruption from Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms.” _Journal of Law and Economics_ 54, 55-78.

- Calomiris, C.W., R. Fisman, Y.X. Wang. 2010. “Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: Evidence from Chinese Asset Sales.” _Journal of Financial Economics_ 96(3), 399-412.

- Chan, K.S., V.Q.T. Dang
, the spending levels by LIC percentile were computed using World Development Indicators data for 2019 (World Bank 2020). The link between the spending percentile, the HCI, and labor productivity is based on data in World Bank (2021).

> 11 LIC percentile data for spending on social safety nets were computed on the basis of data in the World Bank’s ASPIRE dataset (World Bank 2018). For FDI, discussed in the following paragraph, the calculation was based on World Bank (2021).

24
Average Cost MPF Lowest Cost MPF Highest Cost MPF<br>1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030<br><!-- End of picture text --> Note: real wage growth = 4%, rate of return = 8%. Source: Own calculations on HFSA data.

> 16 Colins (ibid) and Investment Company Institute (ibid).
##

Finally, since the employment status of the household head and the food insecurity status vary between before and during COVID-19 periods and could influence children’s school attendance, we added these two variables as controls to the baseline specification. The obtained results are consistent with our main findings (results are not shown, but available upon request).

# **5 Conclusion**

This paper provides some of the first evidence in a developing country context that the COVID-19 lockdown measures undermine children’s school resilience after the school system’s reopening. We obtain this evidence by using a unique dataset from Nigeria to estimate the effect of the COVID-19 lockdown measures on children’s school attendance probabilities. We find that the COVID-19 lockdown measures reduce children’s school attendance all across Nigeria. Importantly, our results show that the magnitude of this negative effect of the COVID-19 lockdown measures increases with children’s age. In particular, this negative effect is largest among children aged 15 ́ 18—those for whom schooling is no longer free and compulsory in Nigeria. It suggests that when hit by a shock, families disproportionately discontinue the school attendance of those of their children for which education is not compulsory. For these children, therefore, the negative effect of the COVID-19 lockdown measures on school attendance is likely permanent, leading to school dropout. We also find that, among children aged 12 ́ 18 in the child marriage-prone North-West Nigeria, the COVID-19 lockdown measures increase gender inequality favoring boys in school attendance, thus increasing girls’ risk of becoming child brides.

We take the above results as suggestive evidence that in countries where cultural practices harmful to children are relatively common, the COVID-19 lockdown measures are likely to exacerbate children’s vulnerability to these practices. The main reason for this is that the economic consequences of these lockdown measures disproportionately reduce the school attendance probability of older children whose schooling is no longer compul29
homogeneous commodities, there is some evidence that agricultural trade is differentiated. Note that under the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework, all goods are treated as homogeneous products (e.g., a car is a car). However, after many distinguished economists, including Dixit, Helpman, and, most notably, Krugman, noticed that international trade can be generated by increasing returns to scale and product differentiation, people came to believe that most manufacturing goods are more or less differentiated (e.g., a Japanese car is differentiated from an American car). But, agricultural products have continued to be regarded as homogeneous, and therefore the assumption has been that consumers only care about its price.

However, there are several reasons to believe that agricultural products are also differentiated, as discussed in detail below. While manufacturing products are generally more strongly differentiated than agricultural products, some agricultural goods (e.g., rice in the Japanese market) are more differentiated than some manufacturing goods (e.g., cotton yarn).

# **(i) Apples and oranges as the same product**

When we analyze trade statistics, or any statistics for that matter, using available data, we are observing data which are aggregated at least to some extent. For the analysis of international trade, we often use trade flow data classified according to the SITC. Many studies, including the present paper, rely on the 2-digit or 3-digit SITC data. As discussed in detail below, this kind of aggregation makes it all the more important to analyze the data under the framework of product differentiation assumption rather than homogeneous product assumption.

Note that the degree of product differentiation depends on how we define the product. If we define the product with sufficient disaggregation, almost any product can be treated as a 8
, such as listings of high-end properties.<sup>7</sup> The potential of CAMA is illustrated by the mass valuation of properties in Rwanda, which suggests that a 1 percent ad valorem tax could increase revenue up to tenfold and be more equitable (Ali _et al._ 2020).

Since the 1990s, institutional mechanisms to allow low-cost implementation of CAMA models have been adopted (Gouriéroux and Laferrère 2009) and are now routinely used in most developed countries, with positive impacts on revenue and the perceived fairness and transparency of property taxation. In the Netherlands, valuations of some 8 million properties via CAMA are conducted annually, yielding 2.8 percent of GDP in revenue from real estate taxes. Assessed property values are publicly available, improving market functioning and preventing fraud (for example, related to mortgages), owners can update their data online, and interoperability provides additional benefits (Kuiiper and Kaathman 2015).<sup>8</sup> A

> 5 The Swedish cadaster was launched in 1530 and achieved complete national coverage in 1628. Greece still lacks a functioning national cadaster. This variation is associated with vast differences in tax discipline and trust. <mark>Even a decade ago, establishing tax maps for individual cities in World Bank–supported projects took years, as the example of Tanzania shows.</mark>

> 6 As the use of drones is not always well-regulated (Stöcker et al. 2017), obstacles to their use may be more regulatory than technical. 7 Registry records can be used if land markets are sufficiently representative and liquid and if transfer taxes do not discourage truthful land value declaration. Ben-Shahar _et al._ (2020) propose a method to identify transactions suspected of underreporting. They apply this to all transactions in Israel over 1998–2015 and conclude that some 8 percent of transactions are underreported, with an average price that is 30 percent below the projected true price.

> 8 In Europe, owners’ estimated property values are about 9 percent above
longer term contractual agreements, larger capital investments<sup>and more numerous</sup> supplier (and maybe even customer) links. Hence<sup>there is a stronger need for a more</sup> adequate legal and regulatory framework to enforce<sup>multiple-party and/or longer term</sup> contracts. Although being a public good by nature,<sup>it might perhaps be useful to look at</sup> quality of institutions and law enforcement as an<sup>input to production. Then our earlier</sup> point can be rephrased with "the more a production<sup>process relies upon suppliers, sources</sup> of credit, and technological innovations, the more _institutional-qualitxy-intensive_<sup>the</sup> production process becomes." Subsequently, scarcity<sup>of this one input makes it harder,</sup> sometimes even impossible, to invest and engage in productive<sup>activities the more</sup> institutional-quality-intensive the production process<sup>is. In what follows, the effect of</sup> developed institutions and contract enforcement on growth<sup>will be at least as pronounced</sup> in industry as it is in other sectors. Without testing the<sup>hypothesis of the relative</sup> importance of institutional quality on various sectors in the<sup>economy, the paper</sup> contributes to the empirical growth literature in that<sup>it establishes empirically the</sup> relationship between a broad range of institutional quality indicators<sup>and industrial</sup> growth.

# **III. Institutional Quality Variables**

The dataset containing measures of institutional quality<sup>and contract enforcement to be</sup> used in our study was assembled by the IRIS Center<sup>of the University of Maryland from</sup> the International Country Risk Guide - a monthly publication<sup>of Political Risk Services