rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
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Previous investigators who have discussed this problem, have been able to make only very partial adjustments for inputs. Paige and Bombach did this for fuel inputs on a rather aggregative basis, and Smith, Hitchens and Davies made some illustrative calculations (whose basis is not clear) for fuels and raw materials. However, tables 2.5 and 2.8 on input/output structurez show clearly that fuel and raw material inputs are only a small part of the problem in most industries.

Our analysis of the relation of census to GDP concepts of vtalue added helps to clarify the nature of double deflation because it demonstrates the need to deal with all input,.. Further progress can best be made, when industry of origin studias such as the present one are available for all the major sectors of the economy, i.e. for agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, constructien and services. With this information and input-output tables for each of the countries under comparison, one can return to the problem of double deflation much better equipped to do a thorough job. In the case of Mexico and the USA, input-output tables are available for the census years we covered, and the 1975 table for Brazil is due rather soon, so for these three countries, this work should be feasible.

# Research Priorities

- 1) Research using the industry of origin approach can obvia -hrow new light on comparative performance across countries and i,. Ariation between branches. Such information is of major interest for g-^th analysis. For this reason, it is desirable to extend the present type of comparison to the leading manufacturing economies. Within our team in Groningen we plan to extend our present three country comparison to cover India, Japan and Korea. The NIESR in London intends to extend its previous comparisons for Germany, the UK and USA (Smith, Hitchens and Davies, 1982) to cover also France and the Netherlands. Work of this type can be self reinforcing, can be extended to incorporate
In fact, free trade and imports may well be good substitutes for large numbers of domestic competitors: Scandinavian, and particularly Swedish, industrial policies have for a long time built on this assertion (Hjalmarsson, 1991), although the competition between the few remaining large firms has also been important (Porter, 1990; S6lvell, Zander, and Porter, 1991). The conclusion by Chen (1983, p. 90) from his study of Hong Kong manufacturing, where all industries are either export-oriented or import-competing, is consistent with these arguments: "There are indications that the presence of foreign investment in an industry may have the effect of eliminating wasteful competition ... [without introducing] damaging monopolistic elements into the industry".

Secondly, focusing more closely on technology, there is the classic "Schumpeterian Dilemma" of weighing the static allocative efficiency of competitive markets against the supposed dynamic efficiency of monopolistic and oligopolistic firms. The rate of technical progress can perhaps be higher in concentrated markets, since firms there have internally generated profits to use for R&D, and are generally larger and more able to enjoy economies of scale in R&D. It is also possible that market structure has some impact on what the R&D efforts aim to achieve.

In fact, empirical studies seem to show that market structure affects both the rate and type of technical progress. Looking at the overall rate of technical change, Kamien and Schwartz (1982) summarize a survey of research in industrialized countries by concluding that neither perfect competition nor perfect monopoly, but rather mildly oligopolistic markets, are most conducive to technical progress. Moreover, Katz (1984) and Teitel (1984) in studies of Latin America, and Lall (1980) for India, show that technical change in industries with limited competition largely aims to overcome supply bottlenecks, e.g. by substituting imported raw materials and components, while change in more competitive industries is characterized by costreducing and quality-improving innovations. In these cases, however, limited competition is
**

Using the multi-year data set created, each premise in the conceptual framework was tested in order to estimate associations between the principle independent variable (OGD) and the respective dependent variables (accountability and service delivery). In addition to these aggregates, key relationships were tested with respect to variables contained in the sub-indices of accountability, service provision, and service delivery outcomes, which may be of interest on their own—outside the hypothesized relationships noted in the conceptual framework. Finally, the four enabling “conditions,”—publicity, political agency, public management, and client power—were tested in order to provide important clues regarding the necessary and sufficient conditions in each relationship.

#  **_Premise 1: Higher levels of OGD make government more accountable._**

To test the first premise, the aggregate accountability index is regressed on the overall average score of OGD implementation (across all dimensions of OGD). First, a positive and statistically significant correlation is found between the indexes: for a 1-point increase in OGD, accountability is expected to increase by 0.375 points in the sample of countries surveyed. Second, when controlling for the Political Agency condition index and the Publicity condition index, the association between OGD and accountability remain significant in the case of the Political Agency condition and marginally significant<sup>123</sup> in the case of the Publicity condition, suggesting that all three variables are meaningful both independently and when taken together. As expected, higher levels of per capita GDP are associated with higher levels of accountability.

> 123 Although the OGD coefficient in column 3 is not significant at the 90% confidence interval, the coefficient value was not drastically affected and remains approximately twice the standard error, suggesting that this relationship remains at least marginally significant. Moreover, it is likely that some of the significance was lost given that the broader OGD enabling environment is captured by the sub-indices used to operationalize the Publicity condition (see annex 2 for details).

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same time, reducing such regulatory heterogeneity would also directly minimize services trade costs, thus constituting a services liberalization agenda.

This is illustrated below by discussing various attributes related to business visa applications, all of which translate into costs for service suppliers, including in terms of time, and thus easily form a part of an MNP TFiS agenda. The sample average of these attributes, together with the minima and maxima of the respective distributions, are summarized in Table 4 and by sector in Table 5. A quick look at these two tables shows that the average cost of obtaining a business visa is slightly higher at US$87 for logistics services compared to the sample average of US$84 for the countries covered by the OECD STRI database; for all the other sectors these monetary costs are lower than the sample average.

**<u>Table 4: Attributes of business visa applications: summary statistics (2017)</u>**

|**Attribute**|**Sample avg.**|**Min**|**Max **|
|---|---|---|---|
|Cost to obtain a business visa (USD)|84|7 (JPN)|297 (COL)|
|Duration of visa for crew (no. of months allowed)|5|0 (COL)|23 (IND)|
|No. of documents needed to obtain a business visa|9|2 (GBR)|16 (FRA)|
|Range of visaprocessingtime(days)|13|1(JPN)|32(CAN)|

Source: OECD STRI; own calculations

> 5 There is, however, no variation in limitations on duration for these service professionals across sectors for each country according to the STRI data for the year 2017 (detailed analysis at the sector level is presented in Annex Table 3).

10
Survey or the health rounds of the National Sample Survey—is much worse than that of the rich. If the use of health care providers and the extent of health spending do not decrease gaps in health outcomes between the poor and the rich, what is the missing link? Poor health outcomes may be driven by lack of knowledge, particularly about appropriate preventive measures, the inability of the poor to distinguish between bad and good quality health care, or poor diagnosis of underlying conditions.<sup>16</sup> But simple health care access is not the root of the problem, at least in this context.

> 15 This position has been reiterated in the World Health Report 2008 by the WHO on the thirtieth anniversary of Alma Ata. 16 Jalan and Somnathan (2008), Das and Hammer (2009)

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<sup>88</sup> and Yathrib<sup>89</sup> witnessed some of the highest tensions preceding return and were amongst the most diverse communities (with Sunni and Shia populations living in close proximity.) Tribal leaders also offered a way to ‘guarantee’ the terms of the LPA – that is, to compel compliance on the part of their constituents, whether victimized by or accused of affiliation with ISIL – reflecting the influential role that tribal hierarchy plays in daily life in Iraq, particularly in rural areas.<sup>90</sup> A tribal leader in Tikrit expressed a view that was repeated across locations, noting that:

> 85 Interview with senior tribal leader, Anbar, 25 April 2021.

> 86 All interviewees in Yathrib expressed similar sentiment.

> 87 Interview with Mukhtar #1, Tikrit, 1 May 2021.

> 88 Tikrit witnessed a surge in returns following the LPA signature: 1,500 IDPs returned within 2 months of the Tikrit LPA signature and 63,360 IDPs returned within 6 months, according to IOM’s DTM Master List. No incidents of discrimination or conflict between IDPs and host communities was registered by the IOM Integrated Location Assessment 1 during this period, which is striking given that although no quantitative data is available pre-signature, other sources point to high levels of tensions and threats of violence (for example, see: Human Rights Watch (2015). Ruinous Aftermath. _Militia Abuses Following Iraq’s Recapture of Tikrit_ and Gaston, J. and Maas, F (2017). ‘Iraq after ISIL: Tikrit and Surrounding Areas’. GPPI. 30 August Available at: https://www.gppi.net/2017/08/29/iraq-after-isil-tikrit-and-surrounding-areas). 89 In Yathrib, 21,360 IDPs had returned by the time the Yathrib LPA was signed, and this increased incrementally over 12 months, with 28,368 IDPs returning by 12 months post-signature, according to IOM’s DTM Master List. Context indicators
, which provides a suitable setting for studying corruption in customs. First, like many other developing countries, Madagascar is heavily reliant on tax revenues collected at the border (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010), which account for 48 percent of total tax revenues. Toamasina collects more than three quarters (78 percent) of non-oil tax revenues and employs a limited number of inspectors. Each inspector oversees the collection of 1.3 percent of total yearly taxes in Madagascar. Second, corruption appears rife in customs. A survey of inspectors reveals that only 6 percent believe non-ethical conduct is sanctioned, and only 23 percent believe their colleagues act with integrity. Third, inspectors repeatedly interact with a limited number of brokers, with whom they also share social ties. The combination of high stakes, a small number of players, limited sanctions for improper conduct and extensive repeated interactions is conducive to corruption. Last but not least, Madagascar’s senior customs management were willing to undertake reforms to curb corruption and provided us unprecedented data access. They shared data for the period 2015-2018 covering rich details on each import declaration including declared value and weight, weight measured upon arrival at the port, taxes paid, the identity of the broker which registered it and the inspector assigned to it, whether fraud was recorded, all revisions to inspector assignment, value, weight, and tax liability made during the clearance process, as well as risk 1
exit tax. Indirect taxes include GST and SST. Indirect taxes-indirect is the cascading indirect effect of GST exemptions on selected goods and services. It has been modelled using the 2010 IO table uprated to 2016. Direct transfers include NAF, bread subsidy compensation and other government transfers. Indirect subsidies include electricity and water. Indirect subsidies -indirect is the cascading impact of commercial and industrial tariffs on households. In-kind spending includes health and education, net of costs or user fees. In-kind spending on health based on use of inpatient and outpatient health care. Contributory pension contributions and receipts are treated as deferred savings and income. Total Cash Impact excludes in-kind benefits.
related to internal migration. However, international migration is significant in El Salvador.

The results suggest that residents of former guerrilla areas were not more likely to migrate abroad or to receive remittances than those in nearby locations, and that—if anything—migration abroad seems more recent. The coefficients are also negative, indicating that people were less likely to migrate internationally. These results provide evidence that former guerrilla areas did not face more “brain drain,” a result consistent with the idea that elites did not live in these locations and left their operations there when their workers stayed. Moreover, it accords with the idea that peasants supported the guerrilla movement and wanted to stay in these locations.

We examine in-migration outcomes in Columns 6–9 using data from the 2007 census. To evaluate if there was more migration into rebel areas, we estimate equation (1) for the share of individuals who always lived in the same location, the share of individuals who lived in the same location as their mothers, in-migration during the Civil War period, and years since arrival. Each variable is A. defined in Appendix There is no evidence of large differences in migration patterns for areas under guerrilla control. Moreover, the coefficient estimates are positive, suggesting areas under guerrilla control were less likely to have more in-migration. Importantly, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is small and close to zero for all these outcomes. The sign of the coefficients is consistent with the idea that communities in previous guerrilla areas are closed to individuals from outside.

To further examine if there was more migration from FMLN areas by highly educated people, we examine the same outcomes in Columns 6–9 of Table D.21 using the sample of individuals who had finished at least high school by the time the conflict started. The magnitude of all the coefficients in Table D.21 is close to zero and not significant, implying that migration of highly educated individuals may not underpin the effects. Moreover, the sign of the coefficients in Columns 6–8
it is also used as a proxy for household’s proximity to large cities or towns. Households that are closer to big cities are more likely to be near financial institutions.<sup>7</sup> Hence, we expect a positive relationship between electricity and our dependent variables. Based on the complete sample, 65 percent of households have electricity and the percentage of households with at least one member that worked in any agricultural activity equals 87 percent.

We run the three versions of equation 1 considering the likelihood of having an account, applying for a loan, and obtaining a loan as the dependent variables, respectively. We include fixed effects to control for unobserved characteristics that might affect the link between remittances and the use of financial services. In particular, we allow for three different types of fixed effects with decreasing levels of aggregation: (i) department fixed effects, (ii) municipality fixed effects, and (iii) household fixed effects.

An important concern regarding the interpretation of the results of equation 1 is that they could be affected by endogeneity as a result of reverse causation. There are at least two reasons why endogeneity could arise. First, access to financial services from financial institutions might reduce the costs of remittances and, hence, might make migrants more prone to send and households to receive remittances. Second, financial institutions could finance migration, and, consequently, increase the remittance flow towards households with access to credit. We run instrumental variables regressions to deal with the potential endogeneity problem.

Our main instruments are municipality-level weighted average measures of economic conditions in US states where Salvadoran migrants reside.<sup>8</sup> In particular, we focus on real GDP per capita and poverty rates in US states during 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001.<sup>9</sup> For each municipality in El Salvador, we identify the main US destinations for Salvadoran migrants using data on migration patterns for Salvadorans from the North American Integration and Development Center (NAID)
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differences in the allocation of output by branch. In some cases the two different sources may draw a different boundary between manufacturing and 1 non-manufacturing as well as between branches within manufacturing .

A further difference between the two sources is that BEA includes firms without employees whereas these are not included in the Census, but output of these firms was less than 0.5 per cent of the manufacturing total.

Table 2.7 presents a confrontation of employment and productivity derived from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM), and the National Income and ProducTty Accounts (NIPA). The proiuctivity figures from ASM are higher than NIPA for two reasons. The ASM measure of output is bigger as already noted, and the ASM employment figure is lower than in NIPA. The reason for the latter difference is not clear. Both sources exclude unpaid f'amily helpers, and although NIPA includes self-employed people without employees, this accounts for only a small part of the difference.

Table 2.8 presents a consolidated version of the US input-output table for 1977. The input-output industry classification corresponds very closely with that used in the census, but there is some reclassification of secondary products, i.e. the "the secondary products and associated inputs are excluded from the industry that produced it and included in the industry in which it was primary" (US Dept. of Commerce, 1984a, p. 51). The inputs are for current use only, e.g. construction inputs are only those for repair and maintenance (not for new capital formation). Broadly speaking the inputs in the first five columns of table 2.8 are those which are excluded from the US Census definition of value added, whereas the national accounts definition of value added also involves deduction of service inputs (column (6)). In table 2.8 total value added (USS 487,203 million) is the national accounts definition, the US census definition would be more or less equivalent to 659,622 million US
respectively), credit performance (charge-offs, nonperforming loans, loan and lease loss allowances), and portfolio allocations (loans, unused commitments, deposits) to see if the COVID19 crisis caused significant distress in any of several areas of bank operations. For each ratio, we show for the entire U.S. banking industry the number of banks, mean, standard deviation (SD), and P10, P25, P50, P75, and P90 percentiles.

We also want to be sure that summary statistics for the industry are not masking any systemic risk being posed by large, systemically important institutions that could bring down the banking and financial systems. For this reason, we show additional summary statistics for the eight U.S. Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs).<sup>15</sup> This relatively small number of banks are those deemed by international regulators to pose global systemic risks and hold more than half of all U.S. banking assets. For the G-SIBs, we show the number of banks, mean, SD, minimum (min), P50, and maximum (max), given that some of the other percentiles are not sensible for a sample of only 8 observations per quarter.<sup>16</sup> While there are many statistics that may tell complex stories in Table 1, in the interest of brevity, we narrow our focus in the text to the simplest cases. With only one exception of a potentially misleading mean, for all variables and all time periods and for both all banks and the G-SIBs subsample, we discuss only the mean and the extreme statistic – P10, P90, min, or max – that would signal the worst performance problem if there were one. Thus, for the capital ratio, we focus on the mean and P10 for all banks, and the mean and the min for G-SIBs. In contrast, since

> 15 <mark>The Financial Stability Board (FSB) publishes a list of Globally Systemically Important Banks
Figure 1: Average investment growth, by EMDE region <!-- Start of picture text --> A. EAP investment growth B. ECA investment growth<br>Percent Percent<br>14 2000-21 8 2000-21<br>12 6<br>10<br>4<br>8<br>2<br>6<br>0<br>4<br>2 -2<br>0 -4<br>2000-10 2011-21 2022 2023 2000-10 2011-21 2022 2023<br>C. LAC investment growth D. MNA investment growth<br>Percent Percent<br>6 2000-21 10 2000-21<br>8<br>4<br>6<br>2<br>4<br>0<br>2<br>-2 0<br>2000-10 2011-21 2022 2023 2000-10 2011-21 2022 2023<br>E. SAR investment growth F. SSA investment growth<br>Percent Percent<br>10 2000-21 10 2000-21<br>8 8<br>6 6<br>4 4<br>2 2<br>0 0<br>2000-10 2011-21 2022 2023 2000-10 2011-21 2022 2023<br><!-- End of picture text --> Sources: Haver Analytics; World Bank, World Development Indicators database; World Bank. Notes: EMDEs = emerging market and developing economies; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC =Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

A.-F. Investment growth rates are estimates for 2022 and forecasts for 2023. Regional investment growth rates are calculated using real annual fixed investment in constant U.S. dollars as weights. Growth rates for 2000-10, 2011-21, and 2000-21 are geometric averages of regional annual investment growth. Sample includes 11 EAP, 13 ECA, 20 LAC, 11 MNA, 5 SAR, and