rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
officials resisting proposals to reduce storm risks because they did not want to pay their share of federal projects. Local governments care more about ―tangible‖ benefits like creating employment, constructing new schools, etc. than protecting the population against risks that may not materialize.

Decentralization programs might have inadvertently made the local government paradox more prominent in developing countries. Decentralization has been at the center stage of institutional reform over the last thirty years in a large number of developing and transition economies. Independently of the direction of causality between decentralization and governance, our results are compatible with a process of institutional improvement associated with devolution of power from the central to local governments and the local government paradox. Beyond the turning point in the U-shaped governance relationship, this effect would dominate, and thereby increase flood frequency and mortality, over other positive impacts associated with improved governance. Anecdotal evidence from the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch supports this hypothesis: Hurricane Mitch has highlighted the abilities and limitations of municipalities and other local actors in Central America to act in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and in the period of reconstruction. Local actors have mobilized a remarkable effort following Mitch; however they were often forced to respond in an ad-hoc fashion due to the inadequacy of both disaster preparation and internal capacities, and the lack of financial resources. As a result, the Hurricane has also re-energized the debate on decentralization as a factor in the region's reconstruction and long term development.

http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/groups/decentralization_workshop.htm In principle, we could test the potentially opposing effects of governance and decentralization by adding a variable that measures degree of decentralization to our models. Unfortunately, decentralization indicators for our sample are not readily available.

We do not believe that our results are driven by improved reporting of the number of floods and fatalities associated with larger incomes or better governance. If that were the 27
countries have adopted this model, but the number of programs and the breadth of research on these initiatives make them worthy of mention. By 1992, these programs were so widespread in the United States that a national survey of young people (aged 10-16, n=2000) found that approximately two-thirds had participated in a sexual abuse prevention program through their school (Finkelhor and Dziuba-Leatherman, 1995). A large number of studies have evaluated the effectiveness of these programs (see reviews by Finkelhor and Strapko, 1992; Meyer and Stein 2000; 34
counterfactual is explained both for practical and transparency reasons (see the Methodology section for more details) and for structural reasons (although each country is unique and has a specific national context, all LICs face the challenges of structural vulnerability and development trap (26)). These states, however, are also more likely to experience large-scale social unrest and localized armed conflicts (27). If some of the LICs in the donor pool are selected _ex-post_ in the synthetic control, while they also suffered consequences of conflicts during 2013-17, the estimates provided here can be considered conservative.

We did not find any other paper assessing the socio-economic impacts of the CAR civil war using the SCM, so far. Although SCM has been previously used in the literature to assess the economic impact of local conflicts and revolts (8–10) and the social and institutional impacts of civil war (10), we expand the analysis on a variety of key macro-socio indicators, including the innovative satellite NTL extended time series (22), the sectoral composition of the economy, and a reduced version of the human asset index (28) to establish the formal diagnostic of a conflict trap (29), or fragility trap (1). Over the period 2012-17, we find that the civil war led to a significant drop in GDP _per capita_ (41.6percent), NTL intensity (33.9 percent), industrial production (34 percent), manufacturing value added (33.7 percent), and human asset index (20.2 percent). These results are consistent with Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Matta _et al_ . (2017) (8,9), although the magnitude of the adverse socio-economic impacts of the CAR’s civil war seem significantly worse, with cumulative GDP _per capita_ loss found to be between 2.9 times and 7.3 times larger than in 4
of urban population to total population, and ranges from the value of 0 to 1. The urban expansion projection data (Chen et al. 2020) are calculated using panel data regression based on historical population, urbanization rate, and gross domestic product (GDP) data.

# **4. Conclusions**

This paper finds that, if poorly managed, urban expansion will be tied to a projected decline in key crops and animal-source foods that are important for diets and nutrition. There are important regional differences as well as differences across SSP scenarios and through time.

Under SSP1, by 2100, the largest projected decline among crops is for fruits, vegetables, and tubers/roots, and the smallest declines are for oils, sugar, and pulses (relative to current levels of production). Although food production initially declines faster under SSP1 than under SSP3 to 2040, it then slows so that the projected decrease in food production by 2100 somewhat aligns for both the SSP1 and SSP3 scenarios. Under SSP1, by 2100, there is also a projected decline in the number of livestock, important to the production of animal-source foods rich in protein. The largest declines are for poultry (chickens and ducks) and pigs, and the smaller declines are for ruminants (cattle, sheep, and goats). This aligns with the notion that the production of poultry and pigs is more peri-urban than that of ruminant production. By 2100, the largest urban overlap with food 24
Specifically, we use ENEMDU to estimate regional income using aggregate earnings at the canton level. In addition we also include the employment-to-population ratio (for natives) in the canton and the share of the native population with secondary and tertiary education.

The empirical model we estimate is the following: _V zc_ denotes the number of Venezuelans who settled in canton _c_ (though we will also consider a logarithmic transformation of this variable). The right-hand side contains the (logs) of the distance to the three gateways (denoted by a single regressor ln _Distc_ for simplicity) and the economic indicators of the region ( _Xc_ ) along with a disturbance term: We estimate this model using data on the geographic distribution of Venezuelans in 2019 and ENEMDU data for that same year. Table 2 collects the estimates. In columns 1-3 the dependent variable is the number of Venezuelans settled in the canton in 2019 (estimated using the _Telefonica_ data) in thousands. Column 1 includes only our measure of regional income, based on the wage bill in each canton.<sup>21</sup> The estimates show a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that Venezuelans were attracted to higher-income cantons. Column 2 adds the logs of the distance from the canton to the three main gateways. We expected negative coefficients, indicating that migrants tend to remain close to the points of entry. However, this is only the case regarding the airports but the coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels. In both specifications, the coefficient for the log of the wage bill is around 3, implying that regions with 1% higher income receive about 3,000 more Venezuelan migrants than otherwise similar cantons. In column 3, we decompose the wage bill into two components: employment and average wage per worker. In both cases the coefficients are highly significant and are close to 3. Thus Venezuelan migrants are equally attracted to regions with higher levels of employment and higher wages per worker.

Columns 4-6 estimate the elasticity of migration to regional income, by employing logarithmic transformations
income generation with age, with 17 being a critical cross over point: up until that age more girls are enrolled in education full time than are only working, and the situation reverses thereafter.<sup>28</sup> Given these age profiles across activity, we split our analysis between girls aged 12-17 at baseline, and those aged 18-25. The Ebola outbreak also impacts these groups through different channels: younger girls are more impacted by school closures, older girls are more impacted by the loss of work opportunities, with both groups being impacted by the collapse of health infrastructure. Moreover, in terms of ELA, the older cohort are more subject to the provision of vocational skills and microfinance due to the program’s eligibility criteria. Third, this split broadly aligns with the separation by age in secret societies in rural Sierra Leone: in turn this might limit information flows or spillovers between younger and older age cohorts.

The left side axis in Figure 4B shows how relationships and sexual activity vary with age. By age 17, the majority are in relationships and sexually active, with more being sexually active than in relationships at each age. The right side axis shows that among older girls, over 10% at each age experience unwanted sex, and there is a weak gradient in age of engaging in transactional sex. These outcomes might all be impacted by the crisis, as economic opportunities collapse, girls have alternative time uses in the presence of ELA, this placing upward pressure on the price of transactional sex.

# **4.4 Participation**

Given the channels through which ELA clubs might mitigate the impacts of the crisis, we expect there to be high demand for ELA clubs. Table 3 describes membership and participation in ELA clubs. Panel A shows that on average, 31% of eligibles in treated villages are registered ELA club members. Panel B then reports statistics from the endline survey. There is widespread knowledge of ELA clubs: 89% of girls in treated villages have heard of them
dozens of parameters in the model. We also include a plot of residuals for the two continuous items, government ownership and employee size. This plot shows that the model’s assumptions appear to be approximated by the distributions we assigned to the items.

The model does make an assumption of conditional independence. We assume that the responses for each firm are independent conditional on the country of the firm and all firm-level co-variates in the model. We believe this assumption to be met by design as the data were collected through a confidential survey around the same time, and firms did not have access to the responses of other companies. We also make a conditional independence assumption about items, though the assumption is weaker than for firms. By including two parameters for each item (that is, _γ_ and _β_ ), we allow the discrimination and difficulty to vary by item.<sup>17</sup> It is still plausible that the items could interact with each other, but this is also why we emphasize the interpretation of the model parameters as marginal distributions. Adding interactions between item parameters would only be advisable if we had a theoretical reason to expect those interactions as it would significantly complicate the model’s interpretation. The aim of this model is to permit theoretically informed measurement, not to maximize predictive performance.

# **3 Data and Measures of Political Interactions**

Our data are from the World Bank/EBRD/EIB Enterprise Surveys (ES) in 41 economies in Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (N=27,613). Section A.3 in the Data Appendix contains basic information about the samples in each economy. The surveys cover well-defined sectors in each economy, including manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale trade, accommodation, transport,

> since a correct response to a test question (item) is always expected to relate positively to ability. By not bounding direction, our approach follows the ideal points literature from political science (e.g
that job.” As a result of dependence on abusers, women described confusion over how to feel about the perpetrator or how to deal with the situation. There were many cases of women who were or had been in abusive relationships with their partners for several years.

Those women who suffered violence from an (ex)-partner, increasingly experienced controlling behaviors that culminated in their loss of autonomy. Their stories often noted increased demonstrations of jealously followed by the gradual intensification of their partner’s controlling behaviors. These behaviors included appeals for the woman not to work or study; control of her leaving the home; and restricted communication with friends and family. For example, a woman (31-years) in Queimados described controlling behaviors of her partner: “I couldn’t go out a lot. I worked and went straight home...he created this bubble; it was so effective that I actually believed that he was protecting me, but he wasn’t, you see? He wasn’t. I couldn’t go out to have a conversation with anybody. When I went to my sister’s house, he called me every five minutes, ‘where are you?’ ‘are you coming?’” As women conformed to demands – often to please the partner or protect the relationship – the controlling behaviors slowly led to their isolation from the workplace, from family and friends. These patterns are consistent with cross-cultural comparisons of data on domestic violence that argue that social isolation of women is both a cause and a consequence of wife abuse (Heise 1998); and studies have found that women living in situations of violence have fewer interactions with friends, neighbors and relatives (Neilsen, Russell and Ellington 1992, Cazenave and Straus 1979).

Events like changing neighborhoods or cities and pregnancy contributed to deepened social isolation. By staying at home to take care of the house and children, women lost contact with the outside world and with their social support systems. In these cases, restrictive
driver of total expenditure and that education and health spending are tied to revenues and can only increase when revenue increases, which takes time. The 2.1 million Brazilian reais increase that we observe in the second bimonth is due to the influx of displaced Venezuelans as there is universal access to social assistance programs in Brazil, irrespective of immigration status and Cadastro Unico shows that there is jump from 1,100 registered Venezuelans in December 2017 to about 2,800 registered Venezuelans in April 2018, which corresponds to the second bimonth of 2018.

Table 1: Regression discontinuity estimates of expenditure by categories of functions in Roraima

||(1)<br>Total expenditure|(2)<br>Investment|(3)<br>Personnel Spending|(4)<br>Education|(5)<br>Health|(6)<br>Social assistance|(7)<br>Social security|(8)<br>Police|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Conventional|-73.88*|6.689*|-118.4*|-2.397|-12.24*|1.725*|0.457*|1.285*|
||(16.34)|(2.132)|(4.460)|(2.510)|(3.748)|(0.0635)|(0.0726)|(0.413)|
|Bias-corrected|-81.67*|9.082*|-129.1*|-6.347*|-15.60*|2.101*|1.095*|1.539*|
||(16.34)|(2.132)|(4.460
1,617|1,038|967|
|R-squared|0.004|0.014|0.010|0.020|0.004|0.014|
|Firm characteristic|NO|YES|NO|YES|NO|YES|
|Sector FE|NO|YES|NO|YES|NO|YES|
|Region FE|NO|YES|NO|YES|NO|YES|

_Note:_ Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p _<_ 0.01, ** p _<_ 0.05, * p _<_ 0.1

# **8 Concluding Remarks**

This paper has provided a granular view of technology use and adoption in Senegal that can be summarized in three stylized facts. First, the adoption of general-purpose ICT technologies, such as computer, Internet, and cloud computing for business purposes is low, but very heterogeneous and positively associated with size and formal status. Second, most firms still rely on pre-digital technologies to perform general business functions, such as business administration, production planning, supply chain management, marketing, sales, and payment. Third, most firms, including large and formal, still rely on manual methods, or manually operated machines to perform critical production tasks that are sector specific, such as harvesting in agriculture, or packaging in food processing.

The analysis also suggests that promoting technological upgrade of existing firms (formal and informal with 5+ employees) should be a key priority for Senegal. Senegalese firms of all sizes are far from the technological frontier, across all business functions. Upgrading technologies is critical to generate better firms, which are needed for better jobs. The Recensement G ́en ́eral des Entreprises (RGE), which was the last establishment census led by the Agence Nationale de Statistique et de la D ́emographie suggests that formal and informal firms with 5 or more employees cover almost half of the workers and about 80% of the total sales
consistency in our definition of industries, we had to aggregate some industries (e.g., see table C1.1 in online appendix C).

2. **Ensuring industry affiliation is time invariant.** Firms are required to report their industry each year based on what products account for the majority of their sales. It is therefore possible for multiproduct firms to switch industries. Such switches are rare. We assign each firm to a unique industry based on the mode of the reported industry codes over time. In case of tie-breaks, we assign firms to the industry in which they started.

3. **Removing extreme (and nonpersistent) outliers.** The Indonesia manufacturing census data are known to suffer from measurement error (see, e.g., Blalock et al. 2008). To minimize the impact of measurement error, we identify nonpersistent outliers that are likely to be the product of data entry error as follows. An observation is classified as a nonpersistent outlier if (a) labor usage triples relative to the year before but the change does not persist (i.e., labor usage in the subsequent year is not more than twice what it was the year before) and (b) real output, real output per worker, the ratio of real output to real inputs, the ratio of real output to real variable costs (real input plus wages), wages, wages per worker, material input usage, or material input usage per worker reported increase by a factor of more than four relative to the year before but the change does not persist, in that the reported amount for the variable in question the subsequent year is less than twice the amount reported in the preceding year. If more than half of observations for a firm are outliers over its life span, we remove the firm from the sample. We treat other observations/outliers as missing values and linearly interpolate for them for relevant variables.

41
used ex post. The second dimension pertains whether the oversight tools are established inside or out side the Parliament, that is whether they are internal or external oversight tools. Questions, question time, interpellations, hearings, public account committees are internal tools, while ombudsmen and auditors general are external tools.

The IPU, in collaboration with WBI, conducted a survey on Executive-Legislative relations; some 180 Parliaments were surveyed, and 83 responded (82 national parliaments plus the European Parliament). Respondents were asked questions concerning the accountability of the government to the parliament, the impeachment procedure, the dissolution of parliament, the oversight of government, budgetary oversight, oversight of implementation of the budget, oversight over foreign policy, oversight over national defense policy, the parliament and the state of emergency, the verification of the constitutionality of laws, and, finally, oversight over the application and evaluation of laws. In this note we will focus only on the oversight of the government.

Respondents were asked several questions: whether the government in their country was considered an institution that must report to Parliament, how does the parliament exercise oversight, whether parliamentarians could question government officials, whether time for questions was allocated in Parliament, whether interpellations were foreseen and, finally, whether there was an ombudsman in the country<sup>13</sup> .

> 12 Roberta Maffio, “Quis Custodiet Ispos Custodes? Il Controllo Parlamentare dell’Attivitá di Governo in Prospettiva Comparata”, _Quaderni di Scienza Politica_ , ..., pp.333-383. The quote is taken from p. 348. 13 A discussion for why questions, question time, interpellations should be considered as instruments of parliamentary control can be found in Roberta Maffio, “ _Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?_ Il controllo parlamentare dell’ attivitá di governo in prospettiva comparata”, _op. cit._ , pp. 333-383. See also David G. McGee, _The Overseers. Public Accounts Committees and Public Spending_ , London, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Association with Pluto Press, 2002
# 1. Introduction

This paper provides an overview of the data sources, aggregation methodology, and main findings of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI are a long-running data product first published in 1999 (see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) for the first presentation of the methodology and aggregate indicators), with subsequent annual updates. The WGI report data on six aggregate indicators of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption, covering 214 economies over the period 1996-2023. The aggregate indicators, the underlying individual indicators on which they are based, and extensive documentation of the methodology, are available at <u>www.govindicators.org.</u> The WGI do not involve new primary data collection on our part as authors of the WGI. Rather, the aggregate indicators are constructed by combining several hundred individual indicators measuring aspects of governance taken from 35 existing data sources that capture perceptions and views of the quality of governance reported by many experts and survey respondents worldwide. The WGI rely on a diverse set of data sources, including several global and regional surveys of households and firms, as well as many expert assessments produced by a range of organizations in the public, private, and NGO sectors, often scored by networks of experts living and working in the countries or regions that they assess. Five WGI data sources are produced by organizations headquartered in developing countries<sup>1</sup> , and a further eight WGI data sources are household or firm surveys directly capturing the views of survey respondents in developing as well as advanced economies.

The WGI are based on perceptions data for four reasons: (1) perceptions matter, because households and firms make decisions based on their views and perceptions of the quality of governance; (2) for some dimensions of governance such as corruption that do not leave a “paper trail”, data measuring subjective perceptions of corruption or
(37.4) and other services (36.7).<sup>9</sup> Interestingly, the owners of informal businesses are similar in age to their counterparts in the micro-enterprises, averaging 37.8 years compared to 35.4 years.

The skills of the owner play a critical role in the growth and survival of small businesses (Fairlie and Robb, 2007; Akoten et al., 2009; Nechter and Goldmark 2009). It is widely documented that informal business owners have lower level of skills than owners of formal firms (La Porta and Shleifer, 2016). The Informal Sector Enterprise Surveys collect information on the

> 7 While the survey for Iraq also covers micro-enterprises, data collection for the micro-enterprises survey has not been finalized at the time of this writing, and thus not used in the computation of subsequent formal sector comparisons.

> 8 In what follows, estimates at the city level are calculated using sampling weights. When aggregating across cities and countries, each country is weighted as one.

> 9 These differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels.

11