rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
3 areas, for example, differences in incomes can be vast between landless unskilled farm workers, subsistence farmers, the larger commercial farmers, and non-farm workers in rural towns.

Assessing what has happened to the world’s income distribution in recent decades depends on one’s focus. Milanovic (2005) points to three possibilities. One is _intercountry_ inequality, which compares country-level average incomes where each country has an equal weight in the world distribution regardless of population size. In that case income distribution appears to have become more unequal. The second is _international_ inequality, which still compares country average incomes but this time weighting by the populations of countries. In that case income inequality appears to have decreased, although mostly due to the fast growth in populous China and India (Bourguignon, Levin and Rosenblatt 2004; Atkinson and Brandolini 2004). And the third possible focus is _global_ inequality, which involves comparing individual incomes regardless of country of citizenship, thus taking into account within-country inequality which is ignored by the international inequality approach where individuals are deemed to earn their country's average income. Rapid growth in the large emerging economies has tended to offset the increase in inequality within countries and so, by this last definition, global inequality appears to have remained roughly constant since the late 1980s.<sup>2</sup> In the light of the evidence currently available, the question this paper focuses on is: how much scope is there to further reduce poverty and inequality in the world, and in specific developing countries, by getting rid of remaining distortions to incentives facing producers and consumers of tradable goods unilaterally or globally?

> 2 A study by Sala-i Martin (2006) found that GDP per capita disparities between countries have shrunk as economies have converged. See also the analyses based on household survey data rather than GDP per capita, such as by Milanovic (2002, 2006). A recent review of the global poverty and inequality evidence is available in Ferreira and Ravallion (2009).
on, including fixed effects by the administrative ward in Harare �J′���. This is akin to claiming that the tolerance for corruption can vary by neighborhood, ward, or precinct. As harassment by public officials and police may be a primary mechanism for the extraction of bribes, HARASS is included as a control in later specifications. However, as this certainly introduces simultaneity problems (if harassment is a means of bribery extraction, businesses may be solicited for a bribe because they are harassed or harassed to solicit a bribe), an additional measure is used. This measure averages the harassment experiences of similar businesses—those located nearby—as a proxy for harassment exposure, without including the direct experience of an individual business. Specifically, location data are used to estimate the rate of harassment in the 500-meter radius around each location point, exclusive of those points within 200 meters of each informal business. Other studies on firm-level corruption have used “leave-out” averages, where an average of an inter-sectional stratum (e.g. sizesector-location) is calculated omitting the firm-level input (see, e.g. Freund _et al_ , 2016); the measure of harass, called “harass donut”, uses GPS data to provide a location-based structure of these measures. As such, it proxies an informal business’s exposure to harassment. Lastly, as proximity to fixed premises may vary, controls for the measured location to eight municipal city offices are included.

# _<u>Descriptive Statistics</u>_

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables and controls; as described above, the data are representative of the Harare administrative area. Nearly one in four informal business operators reports having to pay bribes or give informal gifts to remain un-registered (BRIBE=1). Similarly, roughly one-quarter of the informal sector reports being harassed by police or government officials in the last month; the proxy, ‘donut’ measure is a lower rate of 10%. The average informal business had
is apparent only in the long run suggests that the effect comes mainly through reducing the number of people willing to join the insurgency, rather than by increasing the population’s willingness to share information with the government. The results, however, indicate that development projects can prevent the spread of violence in relatively secure regions, but they are not effective in reducing violence in regions already experiencing significant security problems. Finally, the results are particularly important in demonstrating that the benefits of development projects are not limited to the provision of direct economic and social benefits, but can also contribute to preventing the spread of violent civil conflicts.

> 23 Results of the follow-up survey indicate that more than 70 percent of respondent indicate central government as the sponsor of the projects, about 22 percent indicating that they are provided by NGOs and about 2 percent of villagers indicating that they are provided by either sub-national governments, local leaders, foreigners or villagers themselves.

22
effects (i.e., within income groups) more pronounced than the horizontal distributional effects (i.e., across income groups). Alonso and Kilpatrick (2022) also analyze the distributional impact of a carbon tax in 14 economies in Asia and the Pacific region (Australia; China; Hong Kong SAR, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kiribati; the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; Myanmar; New Zealand; the Philippines; Singapore; and Taiwan, China). They show that the distributional impacts of a carbon tax vary across the country and the revenue recycling schemes. The costs on households (in terms of consumption loss) of a US$50/tCO2 carbon tax range from less than 2% (Kiribati and Myanmar) to 10% (Mongolia). They find the carbon tax regressive in China, Indonesia, and Mongolia, and progressive in India, Kiribati, Myanmar, and the Philippines.

Studies investigating this issue for Sub-Saharan African economies do not exist. Yet, some countries in the region are showing interest in carbon taxes to help achieve their NDCs under the Paris Agreement or their net zero goals in the long run. The objective of this study is to contribute to filling the research gap and provide new knowledge that could be helpful to policy makers in Ethiopia and similar economies in the region and elsewhere.

Ethiopia also subsidizes fossil fuels. While subsidies are gradually reduced, there was a significant subsidy to petroleum products in 2016, the base year used for this analysis. It would be relevant to understand the economic and distributional impacts of removing fossil fuel subsidies before analyzing the impacts of a carbon tax. It would be also interesting to compare the economic impacts removal of fossil fuel subsidies and the introduction of a carbon tax. It would be further important to analyze the economic impacts when both policies are implemented simultaneously. However, the lack of necessary data in the social accounting matrix (SAM), the main database for the analysis, we could not include the impacts
_understanding of the development process must not only take account of the initial conditions and the role of existing institutions in shaping the response to modernization and globalization, but must also consider how these traditional institutions are shaped in turn by the forces of change_ ”.

Geographical mobility in rural Tanzania is associated with large income gains. Our data show that despite only minor welfare differences during the 1991-94 baseline survey, those who moved out of the region to other parts of Tanzania have grown roughly twice as rich as those who did not by the time we interviewed them again nearly two decades later. As we are measuring consumption and not income, it is clear that the main beneficiaries of this migration-led growth were the migrants themselves and certainly not their relatives who remained at home.

But did these migrants simply leave and never look back, or did they maintain links with the home community? We investigate this question by exploiting the fact that the 3,314 households interviewed in 2010 are grouped in 817 geographically disperse extended family networks. Using techniques from the risk-sharing literature, we quantify how migrants’ consumption responds to shocks experienced by others in their extended family network. Much of the migration literature has a very strong focus on dealing with the selectivity of the migration decision. Interestingly, in this paper, the endogeneity of migration turns out to be irrelevant for our most important contribution: the documentation of the long-run dynamics of risk-sharing arrangements among extended family members in a context of large internal migration flows. Whether or not migration is causally responsible for any of our findings is an interesting, but secondary question, which we will nevertheless attempt to answer in Section 8.

Our analysis departs from a number of other studies in the migration literature by focusing on consumption instead of transfers. This choice of the outcome variable is motivated by the fact that risk sharing and other economic exchange could happen through a multitude of different mechanisms, of which transfers is just one. Other mechanisms could include looking for a job for someone, employing them directly, providing them with
|
|Numberofobservations<br>1470|1482|1482|1396|1482|1482|
|<br><br>Number of unions<br>735|741|741|698|741|7Al|
|Within R2<br>0.15|0.058|0.13|0.097|0.060|0.21|
|Unconditionalmean(wave1)<br>11.8|10.3|4.40|0.25|8.04|0.61|

Panel union fixed effect model estimates. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped (300 replications); + p<0.12, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,*** pO. Dependent variables: col (1): Level of per capita household food consumption (in log); col. (2): Level of per capita cell non-food consumption; col. (3): Level of per capital cell non-food consumption funded by the wife (in log), col (4.) share of cell non-food consumption funded by the wife; col. (5): Level of per capital cell non-food consumption funded by the husband (in log), col (4.) share of cell non-food consumption funded by the husband. Sample: monogamous unions in the two waves; All regressions include union fixed-effects * Controls not shown: time (in months) between the two survey waves and its square Controls not shown: time, time squared, dummies for the deceased father of each spouse, household size, relative cell size, share of dependents. * Control not shown: time, time squared, dummies for the deceased father of each spouse, household size, relative cell size, share of dependents, all step-1 controls (see Table 1) interacted with time Data source: PSF Survey, waves | and 2 (2006-2007 and 2010-2012)
efficiency of family farms, includes a renewed emphasis on access to land and the promotion of secure land rights, particularly for the rural poor and socially excluded (World Bank 1997). Restrictions on land rentals, for example, are discouraged as they hurt the poor by restricting the supply of land to rent. Where land distribution is highly unequal, land reform is called for, and lessons from experience suggest that negotiated, decentralized and participatory approaches to land reform hold considerable promise. Institutional reforms lie at the heart of such approaches, and require the careful building of consensus among all stakeholders involved in land administration.

The India CAS identifies regulations around land, labor and capital markets as factors inhibiting private investment. For example, high transaction costs in land markets act as a significant brake on access to land through the market, and the resolution of land disputes is bogged down by an overburdened judicial system. World Bank support to India's poverty alleviation efforts emphasizes the social and economic inclusion of poor and disadvantaged groups, complemented by a growing emphasis on rainfed agriculture within the rural development program. Improving access to land by women is among the priority areas envisaged for Bank support to redress gender inequities, particularly in North India. During public consultations held to support CAS preparation in September 1997, attention was widely drawn to the importance of land rights of the poor, women, and tribals, in the context of poverty reduction strategies.

Land reforms are a major policy focus of the Government of India's Department of Rural Development under the Ninth Plan (1997-2002), following recent reassessment of India's postIndependence land reform experience. State-initiated land reforms are conventionally believed to have been unsuccessful in getting land to the poor in India (albeit with notable exceptions such as West Bengal), although it is widely acknowledged that they have been successful in creating the conditions for agricultural growth by consolidating the position of small and medium farmers. However, recent evidence suggests that much more redistribution has been achieved than is often supposed'. The
Figure 24. Resource rents vs adjusted net savings, 2004-2014 average <!-- Start of picture text --> 40<br>30<br>BWA<br>CPV<br>20<br>LSOTZANAM MRT<br>SDN ZMB<br>10<br>MUSETHSWZSENNER CIV NGA GAB<br>0 GNBBEN COM KENUGAMWIMDG RWA SLE BFA MOZ MLI GHAZAF CMRTGOCOD AGO<br>-10 COG<br>GIN SSD<br>GMB<br>-20<br>ZWE<br>-30<br>BDI<br>-40<br>-50<br>-60 LBR<br>-70<br>0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50<br>Average natural resource rents % GDP (2004-2014)<br>Fossil fuel rich Non-RR Mineral rich Resource-rich<br>Average adjusted net savings % GNI (2004-2014)<br><!-- End of picture text --> _Notes: Average adjusted net savings as percent of GNI and average natural resource rents as percent of GDP over the boom period in Sub-Sahara African countries. Source: authors’ calculations using the Changing Wealth of Nations 2021 and World Bank data._ In Africa many fossil fuel-rich countries with the most depletion (proxied by rents) – such as Angola and Republic of Congo – have seen low and negative rates of net saving, meaning they are running down the overall stock of assets in the country, and instead consuming a large share of this value. Such a pattern means countries are bringing forwards consumption as the expense of future GDP, effectively reducing the available assets for future generations. Venables (2016) documents this phenomenon. Meanwhile, the ANS of some mineral-rich countries have been less impacted reaching 10% of GNI – such as Zambia and Mauritania.

According to the Changing Wealth of Nations 2021 report, in 2004, 10 countries in SubSaharan Africa had the most of their wealth held in natural assets, versus human
of beneficiaries entailed cross-tabulation of the indicator to determine whether the respondent had ever used the maternal health voucher by household wealth index among women who participated in the 2010–11 survey. Analysis of health service utilization that considered births occurring before and after the voucher program was initiated among voucher clients (women who had used the maternal health voucher) and nonvoucher clients. The impact of the program on health service utilization was determined by the difference-in-differences estimate—that is, the difference in changes over time between voucher and nonvoucher clients (Gertler et al. 2010).

The difference-in-differences estimate was obtained both from a simple comparison of changes in proportions utilizing services as well as from an estimation of multilevel, randomintercept, logit models, due to the hierarchical nature of the data. The multilevel logit models include an interaction term between the indicator of whether a voucher or nonvoucher client gave birth and the period of occurrence (birth before or after the program started). The models controlled for maternal age at birth, education level, marital status, place and duration of residence, religious affiliation, poverty status, parity, birth order, and sex of child.

The impact of the program on out-of-pocket expenses involved a simple difference-indifferences comparison of changes in the proportions paying for delivery, and an estimation of multilevel, random-intercept, logit models predicting the likelihood of paying for delivery at any public or private facility. With respect to equity, the analysis examined the gap in the use of maternal health services by poor and nonpoor women in villages with and without a voucher client in the five years preceding the 2010–11 survey. The impact of the program on reducing inequity was examined by performing a simple comparison of the difference in the proportions of poor and nonpoor women using the services in villages with and without a voucher client, and an estimation of multilevel random-intercept models.

The multilevel logit models included interaction terms between the survey year and whether a voucher client was resident in the village at follow-up. The models control for maternal age at birth of the
<br>(percentage3)|
|---|---|---|
|Brazil<br>Mexico|27.1<br>22.8|278.8<br>199.9|
|France|27.8|119.8|
|Germany|33.9|97.1|
|Japan|28.2|124.6|
|UK|26.0|91.2|
|USA|21.3|102.0|

a) The German definition of manufacturing is somewhat broader than in the other countries with respect to repair services and quarrying.

Source: Brazil: output from Contas Nacionais do Brasil: Metodologia e Tabelas Estatisticas, Vargas Foundation, Rio, 1984; employment in manufacturing from IBGE, Censo Industrial, Dados Gerais, 1980, Rio, 1984; non-manufacturing employment from Anuario Estatistico do Brasil, IBGE, Rio, 1985. Mexico: INEGI, Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico: Principales Variables Macroeconomicas, Periodo 1970-1982, Mexico, 1983. OECD countries (except USA) from OECD, National Accounts 1972-1984, Paris, 1986. USA from US Dept. of Commerce, Survey of Current Business.

There are several reasons for this relatively high level of labour productivity in the manufacturing sectors of Brazil and Mexico. One is that in many sectors of manufacturing, the nature of technology is such that it is often rational to use processes which are labour saving and capital intensive, even in countries with low wages. Low income countries do have
school closure) and 2020 (during COVID-19 and before school reopening) using the Standardised Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), which captures the severity of drought according to its intensity and duration.<sup>13</sup> Since the lean period in Nigeria covers the period from April to August,<sup>14</sup> we calculate the average SPEI index between April and

> 12 `https://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=261150` and `https://adore.ifrc.org/Download.aspx?FileId=352740`

> 13SPEI data are available at `https://spei.csic.es/`

> 14 `http://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=NGA`

15
Our results shed light on whether large bank size is desirable. In practice, bank managers have taken the decisions that have led to the considerable growth of banks around the world in the last two decades or so. This is prima facie evidence that such growth was in the interest of bank managers. Bank managers can benefit from size, as their status and pay may be positively affected by bank size.

It is less clear that large bank size is in the interest of bank shareholders. Our results suggest that bank growth may increase a bank’s rate of return in relatively large economies, but even then at a cost of more bank risk. In smaller countries, bank growth may have reduced bank return on assets, and increased bank risk. These findings suggest that bank growth has not been in the interest of bank shareholders in smaller countries, while there are doubts whether shareholders in larger countries have benefited. Inadequate corporate governance structures at banks may have enabled managers to pursue high-growth strategies at the expense of shareholders.

This paper builds on the literature dealing with bank size, business models and market discipline. Berger and Mester (1997) estimate banking returns to scale using US bank data for the 1990s to find an optimal banking size of around $25 billion in assets. In line with this, Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo (2004, Table 2) report that commercial banks in North America with assets in excess of $50 billion have higher operating costs than banks in smaller size classes. This suggests that today’s large banks, with assets in some instances exceeding $ 1 trillion, are far beyond the technologically optimal point. Demsets and Strahan (1997) further find that large bank holding companies have a diversification advantage, as evidenced by lower idiosyncratic risk. Large bank holding companies, however, are not less risky as they tend to have lower capital ratios. These contributions on the scale and risk effects of bank size cannot distinguish between absolute and systemic size as they use data for only the
.108]|[0.116, 0.921]|[-0.015, 0.806]|[-0.401, 0.323]|
||R<sup>2</sup>|0.125|0.165|0.194|0.199|0.273|
||N.obs|960|955|878|876|876|
|Demogra|phics|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Lagged o<br>early con|utcomes &<br>ditions|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Maternal<br>& endow|education<br>ments|No|No|Yes|Yes|Yes|
|Home en|vironment|No|No|No|Yes|Yes|
|Concurre|nt ability|No|No|No|No|Yes|

Note: The dependent variable is the standardized score of each test, normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one by 2-months age groups in each wage of the full sample. Estimation is done using censored least absolute deviations estimator (CLAD) and bootstrap estimates of its sampling variance. We present the estimated coefficient (and 95% confidence intervals of bootstrap estimates using the normal approximation) on quintile 5 relative to quintile 1, and the pseudo R-squared for each model. Coefficients on quintiles 2-4 are not reported for parsimony. Demographics include age (in years) dummies, gender, birth order dummies, urban and regional dummies. Lagged ability and early conditions include all lagged z-scores for developmental measures as assessed in 2007, as well as lagged stunting indicators and low birth weight indicators. Maternal endowments include the log of maternal height, maternal education defined as completed primary, secondary or higher (relative to no schooling), the maternal vocabulary score, and the crowding indicator. Home environment includes the total HOME score. Concurrent ability include the concurrent developmental measures as assessed in