rafmacalaba/data-use-mentions-extended huggingface dataset:
Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2019.

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- **Forand, Jean Guillaume, Gergely Ujhelyi, and Michael M Ting** , “Bureaucrats and Policies in Equilibrium Administrations,” _Journal of the European Economic Association_ , 09 2022, _21_ (3), 815–863.

- **Fouirnaies, Alexander and Andrew B. Hall** , “How Do Electoral Incentives Affect Legislator Behavior? Evidence from U.S. State Legislatures,” _American Political Science Review_ , 2021, pp. 1–15.

- **George, Siddharth E.** , “Like Father, Like Son? The Effect of Political Dynasties on Economic Development,” Working Paper 2024.

- **Guiteras, Raymond P and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak** , “Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention,” Working Paper 21434, National Bureau of Economic Research July 2015.

- **Gulzar, Saad and Benjamin J. Pasquale** , “Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India,” _American Political Science Review_ , 2017, _111_ (1), 162–183.

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- *
: Calculated based on UN COMTRADE.

|**Table **|**4: Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) Index* in 2007: Common Set of **|**Products at 6**|**-digit HS**|
|---|---|---|---|
|**HS Code**|**Product**|**IIT India**|**IIT Bangladesh**|
|230220|Rice bran oil|0.935|0.836|
|721550|Bars and rods other than free-cutting steel not further worked<br>than cold formed/cold finished|0.923|0.421|
|850720|Other lead-acid accumulators|0.922|0.557|
|600622|Other knitted or crocheted fabrics of cotton, dyed|0.771|0.929|
|960719|Other slide fasteners|0.770|0.719|
|610510|Men‘s/boys‘ shirts of cotton|0.758|0.819|
|621790|Parts of garments/clothing accessories|0.729|0.463|
|848390|Parts of transmission shafts, cranks, bearing housings, gears or<br>clutch|0.703|0.778|
|854419|Winding wires of other metals/substances|0.505|0.633|
|620319|Suits of other textile materials|0.486|0.704|
|521211|Other unbleached woven fabrics of cotton weighing not more<br>than 200 g/m<sup>2</sup>|0.417|0.770|

*IIT index was calculated for bilateral trade between India and Bangladesh.

_Source_ : Calculations based on UN COMTRADE.

To identify the vertical IIT, the indices at a high disaggregated level (HS 6) are compared with those at a low disaggregated level (HS 2).
its mean is<br>nonzero. Hence,<br>fiscal policy is nol<br>sustainable.|
|Trehan and<br>Walsh (1988)|U.S.<br>1890-1986|real government spending,<br>real interest payments,<br>real revenue, seigniorage|constant real<br>interest rate<br>G. T may be<br>stationary or<br>nonstationary|Test whether<br>fiscal deficit<br>inclusive of real<br>interest payments<br>is stationary.|Reject<br>nonstationarity,<br>implying fiscal<br>policy is<br>sustainable.|
|Trehan and<br>Walsh (1991)|U.S.<br>1960-84|Flavin-Hamilton dataset|Real return on<br>gov't debt is<br>strictly positive,<br>but need not be<br>constant.|Test for<br>stationarity of ()<br>real deficit<br>inclusive of real<br>interest or (2)<br>first-difference of<br>debt.|First difference ot'<br>stock of debt is<br>stationary,<br>implying fiscal<br>policy is<br>sustainable.|

21
---|
|Country|Value|Rank|Value|Rank|
|Moldova|2.6|41|5.1|11|
|Kazakhstan|2.05|39|12.42|65|
|Belarus|8.81|93|16.88|73|
|Ukraine|4.2|56|18.8|80|
|Russian Federation|5.51|73|18.99|82|
|Azerbaijan|5.3|71||.|
|Kyrgyz Republic|3.5|50|.|.|
|Note: "." : no data.|||||

Source: World Trade Indicators (2012). Note: Number of countries ranked: 125 (TTRI) and 102 (OTRI).

The last two indicators provide information on the security of a country’s legal commitments to its current trade policy. The share of bound tariff lines measures the share of lines in a country’s tariff schedule subject to WTO negotiation agreements. The bound rate is the highest rate of duty allowed to be levied on a product under the GATT/WTO agreement. Thus, the bound is a legal commitment above which a country promises not to raise the MFN applied tariff. The other indicator is the, which measures the difference between the average bound rates and the average MFN applied rates at the 6-digit Harmonized System tariff line level in a country’s customs schedule. It is equivalent to subtracting the average of all MFN applied rates from the average of all bound rates for each country. Table 3 presents the indicators.

Countries such as Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have bound 100% of their tariff lines at the WTO, and therefore they are located at 1<sup>st</sup> position in the ranking. In contrast, nations such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan do not bound any tariff lines as they are not WTO members. The total overhang ranges from
Policy Research Working Paper 7911

# **Abstract**

This paper illustrates how the capabilities of GIS and satellite imagery can be harnessed to explore and better understand the urban form of several large African cities (Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Kigali, Dar es Salaam, and Dakar). To allow for comparability across very diverse cities, this work looks at the above mentioned cities through the lens of several spatial indicators and relies heavily on data derived from satellite imagery. First, it focuses on understanding the distribution of population across the city, and more specifically how the variations in population density could be linked to transportation. Second, it takes a closer look at the land cover in each city using a semi-automated texture based land cover classification that identifies neighborhoods that appear more regular or irregularly planned. Lastly, for the higher resolution images, this work studies the changes in the land cover classes as one moves from the city core to the periphery. This work also explored the classification of slightly coarser resolution imagery which allowed analysis of a broader number of cities, sixteen, provided the lower cost.

This paper is a product of the Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at nlozano@worldbank.org.

_The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank
successful region established fertile ground for interventions involving participation and state capacity-building. Whether the effects observed in the third region were sustainable beyond the experimental period remains an open question.

In sum, existing research provides a suggestive body of evidence that direct citizen engagement in participatory processes influences how citizens interact with the state and civil society. Many scholars expect citizens’ relative levels of engagement in participatory processes to influence their behavior surrounding taxation as well. Yet, a large, long-term observational study that links political institutions to tax compliance is missing from this line of research, particularly in developing countries and examining the longer-term effects of these institutions. We address this lacuna by drawing from a database of 5,570 Brazilian municipalities, over a 13-year period to evaluate the extent to which participatory institutions affect local tax outcomes. As noted earlier, our analysis demonstrates a connection between the presence of participatory institutions and municipal revenue collection. We develop theoretical rationales for how participatory institutions influence tax compliance in the next section of the paper.

We theorize that these participatory institutions have an effect on tax compliance because they lie at the confluence of efforts to promote transparency, participation and accountability. Greater transparency associated with public forums dedicated to budgets increases the likelihood that citizens and civil society organizations can hold their governments accountable. The direct, ongoing participation of citizens in policy-making forums increases the likelihood that this information will be used in the policy cycle’s formulation and implementation stages as citizens provide important knowledge to inform policies and monitor officials.

# **Brazil: Municipalization and a new Participatory Architecture**

Brazil provides an excellent environment to test hypotheses connecting governance to tax compliance for several reasons. First, Brazil’s 1988 Constitution decentralized significant service delivery responsibilities to municipalities. Municipalities are now partially responsible for producing public services that allow citizens to more-fully exercise their formally guaranteed constitutional rights; municipal governments now account for roughly 15% of all public spending. Municipal governments receive most of their revenues from the federal government to fund these services, but municipalities also retain the ability
measured relative to a year earlier (to eliminate seasonality).<sup>20</sup> Details on sources and definitions are in Appendix Table 2.<sup>21</sup> We focus on the evolution of each of these variables from 1-year before the turning point of the rate cycle through 3-years after, with the start of each easing or tightening phase denoted as t=0. For countries in the euro area, we include each member country individually for any phases beginning before 1999 when the euro area came into existence, but only include data for the euro area as a whole for phases beginning from 1999.

Charts 4 and 5 show the evolution of these macroeconomic variables during the rate cycles (with tightening and easing phases in Charts 4 and 5, respectively). The graphs include the mean (purple) and median (red) for the entire sample of country-phases identified over the full period from January 1970-March 2024 (the latest available for most countries), as well as the upper and lower quartiles of the distribution (dashed black lines). The patterns for economic activity and the labor market closely mirror results from the business cycle literature. Activity is accelerating and the labor market tightening (based on unemployment falling or employment increasing) before the start of tightening phases, with the opposite before easing phases. After interest rates begin rising (at the start of tightening phases), activity and the labor market continue to have positive momentum for roughly 6 months, but then activity begins to slow and the labor market softens, presumably reflecting in part the lagged effects of tightening monetary policy.

Similarly, after interest rates are decreased (i.e., the start of easing phases), activity and the labor market continue to soften for roughly 6 months, and then gradually recover as the easing takes effect with a lag. By three years after the start of the phase, the mean and median measures of activity and the labor market generally settle back around where they began one year
survey of the existing literature reveals two common methods for doing this. The first is to use a common, pre-determined support for all respondents. Pre-existing data or prior knowledge of the range of possible values of the outcome is used to define the support, and a relatively large number of intervals are often given within this support. The alternative method is to first ask individuals their perceived maximum and minimum for

> 1 Manski (2004) and Hurd (2009) review the experience in developed countries, while Delavande, Giné, and McKenzie (2009) review the experience of developing countries.

> 2 See for example Hurd et al. (2004) on retirement, Delavande (2008) on contraceptive choice, McKenzie et al. (2007) on migration, and Attanasio and Kaufman (2009) on schooling.

> 3 Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) use a similar approach to collect expectation data in the U.S. over the Internet.

2
weight of testimony of women vs men are correlated with lower labor force participation of women relative to men.

Increases in labor force participation for women may not entail economic empowerment, especially if women enter into low paying jobs that may not improve their welfare. We therefore consider an alternate measure of economic empowerment – the proportion of women top managers in formal firms. Table 5 shows that an increase in the overall legal gender disparities is negatively correlated with the proportion of women top managers. The finding is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Regarding subcategories, legal disparities in Accessing institutions, Using property, and Going to court have statistically significant negative associations with the proportion of women top managers. The implication may be that such gender disparities in laws disempower women and thus they are less likely to advance in their careers into top managerial positions.<sup>4</sup> One important caveat is that data on women top managers are mainly available for developing economies from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Thus the findings in table 5 only apply to developing economies. However given the consistency of results between women’s labor force participation and proportion of women top managers, the findings are suggestive of a negative relationship between high legal gender disparities and women’s economic empowerment.

# _Political empowerment_

Economic empowerment does not necessarily imply political empowerment, and thus we explore the relationship between legal gender disparities and the proportion of women in parliament. The

> 4 Amin and Islam (2016) explore this relationship at the firm-level and uncover a negative relationship between legal gender disparities and the probability of a firm having a top woman manager.

18
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OECD (2006) _Live Longer, Work Longer_ , Paris: OECD Publishing.

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a city. Because these risks interact, the existence of natural risk can reduce the willingness to take these other risks, which are necessary for development and growth. Empirical evidence on innovation and entrepreneurship suggests for instance that increased risk-taking behaviors are associated with higher economic growth and development:

- The contribution of risk-taking (e.g. through increased innovation/entrepreneurship) to economic growth is well-established in the economic literature and was grounded on the theory of endogenous technical change (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990). The empirical evidence that has followed has largely supported the theory. For innovation, early reviews find a positive link between innovation and output (Cameron, 1998; Nadiri, 1993). Econometric studies (measuring innovation through patents) provide further support and suggest countries hosting a larger number and higher quality patents also experience higher economic growth (Hasan and Tucci, 2010; LeBel, 2008; Şener and Sarıdoğan, 2011; Yang, 2006).

- Regarding entrepreneurship and growth, early studies suggested new business formation promotes employment growth (Birch, 1987; Reynolds, 1999; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999), increased incomes (Carree and Thurik, 2002; Davidsson, 1995; Picot et al., 1998) and greater total factor productivity growth (Aghion et al., 2004; Baumol, 2014). In a review of 57 studies, (van Praag and Versloot, 2007) find that entrepreneurial firms have higher productivity growth and increased innovation. However, employing data on 37 countries, (Wong et al., 2005) suggest that while fast growing new firms lead to increased job creation and higher growth, new firms in general do not.

- Furthermore, risk _aversion_ has been linked to lower investment in physical and human capital (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), wage growth (Shaw, 1996), and technology adoption (Liu, 2012) thereby reducing growth and economic development potential. If high natural risks lead individuals to become less risk-taking
indicators are constructed corresponding to six basic governance concepts: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.

The various raw data series were chosen because of their relevance to the four concepts of trade facilitation.

- Port efficiency” for each country _J_ is the average of two indexed inputs (all GCR):

- Port facilities and inland waterways are :(1=underdeveloped, 7=as developed as the world's best, GCR)

- Air transport is :(1=infrequent and inefficient, 7=as extensive and efficient as the world's best, GCR)

- “Customs Regimes” for each country _J_ is the average of two indexed inputs (all GCR): `o` Hidden import barriers other than published tariffs and quotas

- Irregular extra payments or bribes connected with import and export permits

- “Regulatory policy” for each country _J_ is constructed as the average of four indexed inputs: `o` Transparency of government policy is satisfactory (WCY) `o` Control of Corruption (KKZ)

- “Information technology infrastructures” for each country _J_ is as the average of three indexed inputs (all GCR):

- Speed and cost of internet access are: (1=slow and expensive, 7=fast and cheap)

- Internet contribution to reduce inventory costs is: (1=no improvement, 7=huge improvement)

29
countries j with positive imports on tariff line _h_ ' . That is, the ad valorem equivalent of tariff line h is based on an aggregation defined below of the following: _h h_ ' _h h_ ' ' _k_ ' (7) _aswjt_ ( _h_ ,' _t_ )'  _q jt_ ' _bt_ / _v jt_ '  _h_  _ht_ ( _t_ )' ; _t_ = 2009, 2010, 2011*, t=2011,...2020, h  At , h  AMt To understand equation 7, take the year t= 2011 as an example. Suppose we have a tariff ten digit tariff line h with a specific tariff and the ten digit classification of h does not correspond to any ten digit tariff line in any of the years t’= 2009, 2010 or 2011* where there are positive imports (i.e., h  AMt). Suppose that tariff line h matches at least one tariff line in the base period at the eight digit level. The specific tariff _b_ 2011 _h_ does not depend on any base period data. We look for all ten digit tariff lines _h_ ' in each of our 3 time periods in our base period, where there is a match with tariff lines at the eight digit level and positive imports for some non-CIS country j. In this case, k=8. If there is no match at the eight digit level, we go to six digits or in a some cases to four digits. Equation 7 defines how we calculate the ad valorem equivalent of the specific tariff based on ten-digit tariff line data on imports from country j in year t’.<sup>16</sup>

# **Tariff Rates for Unmatched Tariff Lines in 2011.**

Employing equation 7, in the case of 2011, we calculate the tariff rate for tariff line h  AMt from the following equation: (8) for h  AMt

# **Average Tariffs for 2011.**

# **Unweighted average
**Table 3**

# **Identification of structural break, aggregate yield index**

|**Identification of structural break, aggregateyield index**<br>**Wald test statistics**<br> y<br>ll (y)|
|---|
|<br>_Supremum_<br>18.85<sup>***</sup><br>162.39<sup>***</sup>|
|<br>_Average_<br>8.38<sup>***</sup><br>92.07|
|_Exponential_<br>6.94<sup>***</sup><br>78.49<br>|
|_Breakyear_<br>1993<br>1978<br>|
|**Note:**Null hypothesis is that no structural break exists in yield (y) and logarithmic yield (log (y)) index.|

**Table 4**

# **Box-Cox transformation**

||**Null hypothe**<br>|**sis**<br>|
|---|---|---|
|**Regressors**|λ<br>λ**= 0**|λ**= 1**|
|_Trend_|0.93 [0.77, 1.11]<br>68.29<sup>***</sup>|0.49|
|_Trend, trend_<sup>_2_</sup>|0.95 [0.39, 1.51]<br>12.60<sup>***</sup>|0.03|
|_Trend_before_1993, trend_after_1993_|1.07 [0.65, 1.48]<br>25.35<sup>***<