pwc-archive/papers-with-abstracts huggingface dataset:
Trojan Horse Hunt in Time Series Forecasting for Space Operations
Authors: Krzysztof Kotowski, Ramez Shendy, Jakub Nalepa, Przemysław Biecek, Piotr Wilczyński, Agata Kaczmarek, Dawid Płudowski, Artur Janicki, Evridiki Ntagiou
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00
Tasks: Model Poisoning, Time Series, Time Series Analysis, Time Series Forecasting

This competition hosted on Kaggle (https://www.kaggle.com/competitions/trojan-horse-hunt-in-space) is the first part of a series of follow-up competitions and hackathons related to the "Assurance for Space Domain AI Applications" project funded by the European Space Agency (https://assurance-ai.space-codev.org/). The competition idea is based on one of the real-life AI security threats identified within the project -- the adversarial poisoning of continuously fine-tuned satellite telemetry forecasting models. The task is to develop methods for finding and reconstructing triggers (trojans) in advanced models for satellite telemetry forecasting used in safety-critical space operations. Participants are provided with 1) a large public dataset of real-life multivariate satellite telemetry (without triggers), 2) a reference model trained on the clean data, 3) a set of poisoned neural hierarchical interpolation (N-HiTS) models for time series forecasting trained on the dataset with injected triggers, and 4) Jupyter notebook with the training pipeline and baseline algorithm (the latter will be published in the last month of the competition). The main task of the competition is to reconstruct a set of 45 triggers (i.e., short multivariate time series segments) injected into the training data of the corresponding set of 45 poisoned models. The exact characteristics (i.e., shape, amplitude, and duration) of these triggers must be identified by participants. The popular Neural Cleanse method is adopted as a baseline, but it is not designed for time series analysis and new approaches are necessary for the task. The impact of the competition is not limited to the space domain, but also to many other safety-critical applications of advanced time series analysis where model poisoning may lead to serious consequences.
IF-GUIDE: Influence Function-Guided Detoxification of LLMs
Authors: Zachary Coalson, Juhan Bae, Nicholas Carlini, Sanghyun Hong
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00

We study how training data contributes to the emergence of toxic behaviors in large-language models. Most prior work on reducing model toxicity adopts $reactive$ approaches, such as fine-tuning pre-trained (and potentially toxic) models to align them with human values. In contrast, we propose a $proactive$ approach$-$IF-Guide$-$which leverages influence functions to identify harmful tokens within any training data and suppress their impact during training. To this end, we first show that standard influence functions are ineffective at discovering harmful training records. We then present a novel adaptation that measures token-level attributions from training data to model toxicity, along with techniques for selecting toxic training documents and a learning objective that can be integrated into both pre-training and fine-tuning. Moreover, IF-Guide does not rely on human-preference data, which is typically required by existing alignment methods. In evaluation, we demonstrate that IF-Guide substantially reduces both explicit and implicit toxicity$-$by up to 10$\times$ compared to uncensored models, and up to 3$\times$ compared to baseline alignment methods, e.g., DPO and RAD$-$across both pre-training and fine-tuning scenarios. IF-Guide is computationally efficient: a billion-parameter model is $not$ $necessary$ for computing influence scores; a million-parameter model$-$with 7.5$\times$ fewer parameters$-$can effectively serve as a proxy for identifying harmful data. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/ztcoalson/IF-Guide
ReGA: Representation-Guided Abstraction for Model-based Safeguarding of LLMs
Authors: Zeming Wei, Chengcan Wu, Meng Sun
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved significant success in various tasks, yet concerns about their safety and security have emerged. In particular, they pose risks in generating harmful content and vulnerability to jailbreaking attacks. To analyze and monitor machine learning models, model-based analysis has demonstrated notable potential in stateful deep neural networks, yet suffers from scalability issues when extending to LLMs due to their vast feature spaces. In this paper, we propose ReGA, a model-based analysis framework with representation-guided abstraction, to safeguard LLMs against harmful prompts and generations. By leveraging safety-critical representations, which are low-dimensional directions emerging in hidden states that indicate safety-related concepts, ReGA effectively addresses the scalability issue when constructing the abstract model for safety modeling. Our comprehensive evaluation shows that ReGA performs sufficiently well in distinguishing between safe and harmful inputs, achieving an AUROC of 0.975 at the prompt level and 0.985 at the conversation level. Additionally, ReGA exhibits robustness to real-world attacks and generalization across different safety perspectives, outperforming existing safeguard paradigms in terms of interpretability and scalability. Overall, ReGA serves as an efficient and scalable solution to enhance LLM safety by integrating representation engineering with model-based abstraction, paving the way for new paradigms to utilize software insights for AI safety. Our code is available at https://github.com/weizeming/ReGA.
SALAD: Systematic Assessment of Machine Unlearing on LLM-Aided Hardware Design
Authors: Zeng Wang, Minghao Shao, Rupesh Karn, Likhitha Mankali, Jitendra Bhandari, Ramesh Karri, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Muhammad Shafique, Johann Knechtel
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00
Tasks: Code Generation, Machine Unlearning

Large Language Models (LLMs) offer transformative capabilities for hardware design automation, particularly in Verilog code generation. However, they also pose significant data security challenges, including Verilog evaluation data contamination, intellectual property (IP) design leakage, and the risk of malicious Verilog generation. We introduce SALAD, a comprehensive assessment that leverages machine unlearning to mitigate these threats. Our approach enables the selective removal of contaminated benchmarks, sensitive IP and design artifacts, or malicious code patterns from pre-trained LLMs, all without requiring full retraining. Through detailed case studies, we demonstrate how machine unlearning techniques effectively reduce data security risks in LLM-aided hardware design.
Silence is Golden: Leveraging Adversarial Examples to Nullify Audio Control in LDM-based Talking-Head Generation
Authors: Yuan Gan, Jiaxu Miao, Yunze Wang, Yi Yang
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00
Proceeding: CVPR 2025 1
Tasks: Misinformation, Talking Head Generation

Advances in talking-head animation based on Latent Diffusion Models (LDM) enable the creation of highly realistic, synchronized videos. These fabricated videos are indistinguishable from real ones, increasing the risk of potential misuse for scams, political manipulation, and misinformation. Hence, addressing these ethical concerns has become a pressing issue in AI security. Recent proactive defense studies focused on countering LDM-based models by adding perturbations to portraits. However, these methods are ineffective at protecting reference portraits from advanced image-to-video animation. The limitations are twofold: 1) they fail to prevent images from being manipulated by audio signals, and 2) diffusion-based purification techniques can effectively eliminate protective perturbations. To address these challenges, we propose Silencer, a two-stage method designed to proactively protect the privacy of portraits. First, a nullifying loss is proposed to ignore audio control in talking-head generation. Second, we apply anti-purification loss in LDM to optimize the inverted latent feature to generate robust perturbations. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of Silencer in proactively protecting portrait privacy. We hope this work will raise awareness among the AI security community regarding critical ethical issues related to talking-head generation techniques. Code: https://github.com/yuangan/Silencer.
System Calls for Malware Detection and Classification: Methodologies and Applications
Authors: Bishwajit Prasad Gond, Durga Prasad Mohapatra
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00
Tasks: Anomaly Detection, Malware Analysis, Malware Detection

As malware continues to become more complex and harder to detect, Malware Analysis needs to continue to evolve to stay one step ahead. One promising key area approach focuses on using system calls and API Calls, the core communication between user applications and the operating system and their kernels. These calls provide valuable insight into how software or programs behaves, making them an useful tool for spotting suspicious or harmful activity of programs and software. This chapter takes a deep down look at how system calls are used in malware detection and classification, covering techniques like static and dynamic analysis, as well as sandboxing. By combining these methods with advanced techniques like machine learning, statistical analysis, and anomaly detection, researchers can analyze system call patterns to tell the difference between normal and malicious behavior. The chapter also explores how these techniques are applied across different systems, including Windows, Linux, and Android, while also looking at the ways sophisticated malware tries to evade detection.
ETDI: Mitigating Tool Squatting and Rug Pull Attacks in Model Context Protocol (MCP) by using OAuth-Enhanced Tool Definitions and Policy-Based Access Control
Authors: Manish Bhatt, Vineeth Sai Narajala, Idan Habler
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00
Tasks: Management

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) plays a crucial role in extending the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling integration with external tools and data sources. However, the standard MCP specification presents significant security vulnerabilities, notably Tool Poisoning and Rug Pull attacks. This paper introduces the Enhanced Tool Definition Interface (ETDI), a security extension designed to fortify MCP. ETDI incorporates cryptographic identity verification, immutable versioned tool definitions, and explicit permission management, often leveraging OAuth 2.0. We further propose extending MCP with fine-grained, policy-based access control, where tool capabilities are dynamically evaluated against explicit policies using a dedicated policy engine, considering runtime context beyond static OAuth scopes. This layered approach aims to establish a more secure, trustworthy, and controllable ecosystem for AI applications interacting with LLMs and external tools.
Align is not Enough: Multimodal Universal Jailbreak Attack against Multimodal Large Language Models
Authors: Youze Wang, WenBo Hu, Yinpeng Dong, Jing Liu, Hanwang Zhang, Richang Hong
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00
Tasks: Safety Alignment

Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved into Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), significantly enhancing their capabilities by integrating visual information and other types, thus aligning more closely with the nature of human intelligence, which processes a variety of data forms beyond just text. Despite advancements, the undesirable generation of these models remains a critical concern, particularly due to vulnerabilities exposed by text-based jailbreak attacks, which have represented a significant threat by challenging existing safety protocols. Motivated by the unique security risks posed by the integration of new and old modalities for MLLMs, we propose a unified multimodal universal jailbreak attack framework that leverages iterative image-text interactions and transfer-based strategy to generate a universal adversarial suffix and image. Our work not only highlights the interaction of image-text modalities can be used as a critical vulnerability but also validates that multimodal universal jailbreak attacks can bring higher-quality undesirable generations across different MLLMs. We evaluate the undesirable context generation of MLLMs like LLaVA, Yi-VL, MiniGPT4, MiniGPT-v2, and InstructBLIP, and reveal significant multimodal safety alignment issues, highlighting the inadequacy of current safety mechanisms against sophisticated multimodal attacks. This study underscores the urgent need for robust safety measures in MLLMs, advocating for a comprehensive review and enhancement of security protocols to mitigate potential risks associated with multimodal capabilities.
SPEAR: Security Posture Evaluation using AI Planner-Reasoning on Attack-Connectivity Hypergraphs
Authors: Rakesh Podder, Turgay Caglar, Shadaab Kawnain Bashir, Sarath Sreedharan, Indrajit Ray, Indrakshi Ray
Date: 2025-06-02 00:00:00

Graph-based frameworks are often used in network hardening to help a cyber defender understand how a network can be attacked and how the best defenses can be deployed. However, incorporating network connectivity parameters in the attack graph, reasoning about the attack graph when we do not have access to complete information, providing system administrator suggestions in an understandable format, and allowing them to do what-if analysis on various scenarios and attacker motives is still missing. We fill this gap by presenting SPEAR, a formal framework with tool support for security posture evaluation and analysis that keeps human-in-the-loop. SPEAR uses the causal formalism of AI planning to model vulnerabilities and configurations in a networked system. It automatically converts network configurations and vulnerability descriptions into planning models expressed in the Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL). SPEAR identifies a set of diverse security hardening strategies that can be presented in a manner understandable to the domain expert. These allow the administrator to explore the network hardening solution space in a systematic fashion and help evaluate the impact and compare the different solutions.
Nearly-Linear Time Private Hypothesis Selection with the Optimal Approximation Factor
Authors: Maryam Aliakbarpour, Zhan Shi, Ria Stevens, Vincent X. Wang
Date: 2025-06-01 00:00:00

Estimating the density of a distribution from its samples is a fundamental problem in statistics. Hypothesis selection addresses the setting where, in addition to a sample set, we are given $n$ candidate distributions -- referred to as hypotheses -- and the goal is to determine which one best describes the underlying data distribution. This problem is known to be solvable very efficiently, requiring roughly $O(\log n)$ samples and running in $\tilde{O}(n)$ time. The quality of the output is measured via the total variation distance to the unknown distribution, and the approximation factor of the algorithm determines how large this distance is compared to the optimal distance achieved by the best candidate hypothesis. It is known that $\alpha = 3$ is the optimal approximation factor for this problem. We study hypothesis selection under the constraint of differential privacy. We propose a differentially private algorithm in the central model that runs in nearly-linear time with respect to the number of hypotheses, achieves the optimal approximation factor, and incurs only a modest increase in sample complexity, which remains polylogarithmic in $n$. This resolves an open question posed by [Bun, Kamath, Steinke, Wu, NeurIPS 2019]. Prior to our work, existing upper bounds required quadratic time.
Simple Prompt Injection Attacks Can Leak Personal Data Observed by LLM Agents During Task Execution
Authors: Meysam Alizadeh, Zeynab Samei, Daria Stetsenko, Fabrizio Gilardi
Date: 2025-06-01 00:00:00

Previous benchmarks on prompt injection in large language models (LLMs) have primarily focused on generic tasks and attacks, offering limited insights into more complex threats like data exfiltration. This paper examines how prompt injection can cause tool-calling agents to leak personal data observed during task execution. Using a fictitious banking agent, we develop data flow-based attacks and integrate them into AgentDojo, a recent benchmark for agentic security. To enhance its scope, we also create a richer synthetic dataset of human-AI banking conversations. In 16 user tasks from AgentDojo, LLMs show a 15-50 percentage point drop in utility under attack, with average attack success rates (ASR) around 20 percent; some defenses reduce ASR to zero. Most LLMs, even when successfully tricked by the attack, avoid leaking highly sensitive data like passwords, likely due to safety alignments, but they remain vulnerable to disclosing other personal data. The likelihood of password leakage increases when a password is requested along with one or two additional personal details. In an extended evaluation across 48 tasks, the average ASR is around 15 percent, with no built-in AgentDojo defense fully preventing leakage. Tasks involving data extraction or authorization workflows, which closely resemble the structure of exfiltration attacks, exhibit the highest ASRs, highlighting the interaction between task type, agent performance, and defense efficacy.
Graph Neural Networks for Jamming Source Localization
Authors: Dania Herzalla, Willian T. Lunardi, Martin Andreoni
Date: 2025-06-01 00:00:00
Tasks: feature selection, graph construction, Graph Neural Network, Graph Regression

Graph-based learning provides a powerful framework for modeling complex relational structures; however, its application within the domain of wireless security remains significantly underexplored. In this work, we introduce the first application of graph-based learning for jamming source localization, addressing the imminent threat of jamming attacks in wireless networks. Unlike geometric optimization techniques that struggle under environmental uncertainties and dense interference, we reformulate the localization as an inductive graph regression task. Our approach integrates structured node representations that encode local and global signal aggregation, ensuring spatial coherence and adaptive signal fusion. To enhance robustness, we incorporate an attention-based \ac{GNN} that adaptively refines neighborhood influence and introduces a confidence-guided estimation mechanism that dynamically balances learned predictions with domain-informed priors. We evaluate our approach under complex \ac{RF} environments with various sampling densities, network topologies, jammer characteristics, and signal propagation conditions, conducting comprehensive ablation studies on graph construction, feature selection, and pooling strategies. Results demonstrate that our novel graph-based learning framework significantly outperforms established localization baselines, particularly in challenging scenarios with sparse and obfuscated signal information. Our code is available at https://github.com/tiiuae/gnn-jamming-source-localization.
CAPAA: Classifier-Agnostic Projector-Based Adversarial Attack
Authors: Zhan Li, Mingyu Zhao, Xin Dong, Haibin Ling, Bingyao Huang
Date: 2025-06-01 00:00:00
Tasks: Adversarial Attack

Projector-based adversarial attack aims to project carefully designed light patterns (i.e., adversarial projections) onto scenes to deceive deep image classifiers. It has potential applications in privacy protection and the development of more robust classifiers. However, existing approaches primarily focus on individual classifiers and fixed camera poses, often neglecting the complexities of multi-classifier systems and scenarios with varying camera poses. This limitation reduces their effectiveness when introducing new classifiers or camera poses. In this paper, we introduce Classifier-Agnostic Projector-Based Adversarial Attack (CAPAA) to address these issues. First, we develop a novel classifier-agnostic adversarial loss and optimization framework that aggregates adversarial and stealthiness loss gradients from multiple classifiers. Then, we propose an attention-based gradient weighting mechanism that concentrates perturbations on regions of high classification activation, thereby improving the robustness of adversarial projections when applied to scenes with varying camera poses. Our extensive experimental evaluations demonstrate that CAPAA achieves both a higher attack success rate and greater stealthiness compared to existing baselines. Codes are available at: https://github.com/ZhanLiQxQ/CAPAA.
A Large Language Model-Supported Threat Modeling Framework for Transportation Cyber-Physical Systems
Authors: M Sabbir Salek, Mashrur Chowdhury, Muhaimin Bin Munir, Yuchen Cai, Mohammad Imtiaz Hasan, Jean-Michel Tine, Latifur Khan, Mizanur Rahman
Date: 2025-06-01 00:00:00
Tasks: In-Context Learning, Language Modeling, Language Modelling, Large Language Model, RAG, Retrieval-augmented Generation

Modern transportation systems rely on cyber-physical systems (CPS), where cyber systems interact seamlessly with physical systems like transportation-related sensors and actuators to enhance safety, mobility, and energy efficiency. However, growing automation and connectivity increase exposure to cyber vulnerabilities. Existing threat modeling frameworks for transportation CPS are often limited in scope, resource-intensive, and dependent on significant cybersecurity expertise. To address these gaps, we present TraCR-TMF (Transportation Cybersecurity and Resiliency Threat Modeling Framework), a large language model (LLM)-based framework that minimizes expert intervention. TraCR-TMF identifies threats, potential attack techniques, and corresponding countermeasures by leveraging the MITRE ATT&CK matrix through three LLM-based approaches: (i) a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) method requiring no expert input, (ii) an in-context learning approach requiring low expert input, and (iii) a supervised fine-tuning method requiring moderate expert input. TraCR-TMF also maps attack paths to critical assets by analyzing vulnerabilities using a customized LLM. The framework was evaluated in two scenarios. First, it identified relevant attack techniques across transportation CPS applications, with 90% precision as validated by experts. Second, using a fine-tuned LLM, it successfully predicted multiple exploitations including lateral movement, data exfiltration, and ransomware-related encryption that occurred during a major real-world cyberattack incident. These results demonstrate TraCR-TMF's effectiveness in CPS threat modeling, its reduced reliance on cybersecurity expertise, and its adaptability across CPS domains.
SafeGenes: Evaluating the Adversarial Robustness of Genomic Foundation Models
Authors: Huixin Zhan, Jason H. Moore
Date: 2025-06-01 00:00:00
Tasks: Adversarial Robustness

Genomic Foundation Models (GFMs), such as Evolutionary Scale Modeling (ESM), have demonstrated significant success in variant effect prediction. However, their adversarial robustness remains largely unexplored. To address this gap, we propose SafeGenes: a framework for Secure analysis of genomic foundation models, leveraging adversarial attacks to evaluate robustness against both engineered near-identical adversarial Genes and embedding-space manipulations. In this study, we assess the adversarial vulnerabilities of GFMs using two approaches: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and a soft prompt attack. FGSM introduces minimal perturbations to input sequences, while the soft prompt attack optimizes continuous embeddings to manipulate model predictions without modifying the input tokens. By combining these techniques, SafeGenes provides a comprehensive assessment of GFM susceptibility to adversarial manipulation. Targeted soft prompt attacks led to substantial performance degradation, even in large models such as ESM1b and ESM1v. These findings expose critical vulnerabilities in current foundation models, opening new research directions toward improving their security and robustness in high-stakes genomic applications such as variant effect prediction.