pwc-archive/papers-with-abstracts huggingface dataset:
$PD^3F$: A Pluggable and Dynamic DoS-Defense Framework Against Resource Consumption Attacks Targeting Large Language Models
Authors: Yuanhe Zhang, Xinyue Wang, Haoran Gao, Zhenhong Zhou, Fanyu Meng, Yuyao Zhang, Sen Su
Date: 2025-05-24 00:00:00
Tasks: Scheduling

Large Language Models (LLMs), due to substantial computational requirements, are vulnerable to resource consumption attacks, which can severely degrade server performance or even cause crashes, as demonstrated by denial-of-service (DoS) attacks designed for LLMs. However, existing works lack mitigation strategies against such threats, resulting in unresolved security risks for real-world LLM deployments. To this end, we propose the Pluggable and Dynamic DoS-Defense Framework ($PD^3F$), which employs a two-stage approach to defend against resource consumption attacks from both the input and output sides. On the input side, we propose the Resource Index to guide Dynamic Request Polling Scheduling, thereby reducing resource usage induced by malicious attacks under high-concurrency scenarios. On the output side, we introduce the Adaptive End-Based Suppression mechanism, which terminates excessive malicious generation early. Experiments across six models demonstrate that $PD^3F$ significantly mitigates resource consumption attacks, improving users' access capacity by up to 500% during adversarial load. $PD^3F$ represents a step toward the resilient and resource-aware deployment of LLMs against resource consumption attacks.
MLRan: A Behavioural Dataset for Ransomware Analysis and Detection
Authors: Faithful Chiagoziem Onwuegbuche, Adelodun Olaoluwa, Anca Delia Jurcut, Liliana Pasquale
Date: 2025-05-24 00:00:00
Tasks: feature selection

Ransomware remains a critical threat to cybersecurity, yet publicly available datasets for training machine learning-based ransomware detection models are scarce and often have limited sample size, diversity, and reproducibility. In this paper, we introduce MLRan, a behavioural ransomware dataset, comprising over 4,800 samples across 64 ransomware families and a balanced set of goodware samples. The samples span from 2006 to 2024 and encompass the four major types of ransomware: locker, crypto, ransomware-as-a-service, and modern variants. We also propose guidelines (GUIDE-MLRan), inspired by previous work, for constructing high-quality behavioural ransomware datasets, which informed the curation of our dataset. We evaluated the ransomware detection performance of several machine learning (ML) models using MLRan. For this purpose, we performed feature selection by conducting mutual information filtering to reduce the initial 6.4 million features to 24,162, followed by recursive feature elimination, yielding 483 highly informative features. The ML models achieved an accuracy, precision and recall of up to 98.7%, 98.9%, 98.5%, respectively. Using SHAP and LIME, we identified critical indicators of malicious behaviour, including registry tampering, strings, and API misuse. The dataset and source code for feature extraction, selection, ML training, and evaluation are available publicly to support replicability and encourage future research, which can be found at https://github.com/faithfulco/mlran.
LAMDA: A Longitudinal Android Malware Benchmark for Concept Drift Analysis
Authors: Md Ahsanul Haque, Ismail Hossain, Md Mahmuduzzaman Kamol, Md Jahangir Alam, Suresh Kumar Amalapuram, Sajedul Talukder, Mohammad Saidur Rahman
Date: 2025-05-24 00:00:00
Tasks: Malware Detection

Machine learning (ML)-based malware detection systems often fail to account for the dynamic nature of real-world training and test data distributions. In practice, these distributions evolve due to frequent changes in the Android ecosystem, adversarial development of new malware families, and the continuous emergence of both benign and malicious applications. Prior studies have shown that such concept drift -- distributional shifts in benign and malicious samples, leads to significant degradation in detection performance over time. Despite the practical importance of this issue, existing datasets are often outdated and limited in temporal scope, diversity of malware families, and sample scale, making them insufficient for the systematic evaluation of concept drift in malware detection. To address this gap, we present LAMDA, the largest and most temporally diverse Android malware benchmark to date, designed specifically for concept drift analysis. LAMDA spans 12 years (2013-2025, excluding 2015), includes over 1 million samples (approximately 37% labeled as malware), and covers 1,380 malware families and 150,000 singleton samples, reflecting the natural distribution and evolution of real-world Android applications. We empirically demonstrate LAMDA's utility by quantifying the performance degradation of standard ML models over time and analyzing feature stability across years. As the most comprehensive Android malware dataset to date, LAMDA enables in-depth research into temporal drift, generalization, explainability, and evolving detection challenges. The dataset and code are available at: https://iqsec-lab.github.io/LAMDA/.
Benchmarking Poisoning Attacks against Retrieval-Augmented Generation
Authors: Baolei Zhang, Haoran Xin, Jiatong Li, Dongzhe Zhang, Minghong Fang, Zhuqing Liu, Lihai Nie, Zheli Liu
Date: 2025-05-24 00:00:00
Tasks: Benchmarking, Question Answering, RAG, Retrieval, Retrieval-augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has proven effective in mitigating hallucinations in large language models by incorporating external knowledge during inference. However, this integration introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly to poisoning attacks. Although prior work has explored various poisoning strategies, a thorough assessment of their practical threat to RAG systems remains missing. To address this gap, we propose the first comprehensive benchmark framework for evaluating poisoning attacks on RAG. Our benchmark covers 5 standard question answering (QA) datasets and 10 expanded variants, along with 13 poisoning attack methods and 7 defense mechanisms, representing a broad spectrum of existing techniques. Using this benchmark, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of all included attacks and defenses across the full dataset spectrum. Our findings show that while existing attacks perform well on standard QA datasets, their effectiveness drops significantly on the expanded versions. Moreover, our results demonstrate that various advanced RAG architectures, such as sequential, branching, conditional, and loop RAG, as well as multi-turn conversational RAG, multimodal RAG systems, and RAG-based LLM agent systems, remain susceptible to poisoning attacks. Notably, current defense techniques fail to provide robust protection, underscoring the pressing need for more resilient and generalizable defense strategies.
Adapting Novelty towards Generating Antigens for Antivirus systems
Authors: Ritwik Murali, C Shunmuga Velayutham
Date: 2025-05-24 00:00:00
Tasks: Evolutionary Algorithms, Malware Analysis, Malware Detection

It is well known that anti-malware scanners depend on malware signatures to identify malware. However, even minor modifications to malware code structure results in a change in the malware signature thus enabling the variant to evade detection by scanners. Therefore, there exists the need for a proactively generated malware variant dataset to aid detection of such diverse variants by automated antivirus scanners. This paper proposes and demonstrates a generic assembly source code based framework that facilitates any evolutionary algorithm to generate diverse and potential variants of an input malware, while retaining its maliciousness, yet capable of evading antivirus scanners. Generic code transformation functions and a novelty search supported quality metric have been proposed as components of the framework to be used respectively as variation operators and fitness function, for evolutionary algorithms. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework in generating diverse variants and the generated variants have been shown to evade over 98% of popular antivirus scanners. The malware variants evolved by the framework can serve as antigens to assist malware analysis engines to improve their malware detection algorithms.
Invisible Tokens, Visible Bills: The Urgent Need to Audit Hidden Operations in Opaque LLM Services
Authors: Guoheng Sun, Ziyao Wang, Xuandong Zhao, Bowei Tian, Zheyu Shen, Yexiao He, Jinming Xing, Ang Li
Date: 2025-05-24 00:00:00
Tasks: Large Language Model

Modern large language model (LLM) services increasingly rely on complex, often abstract operations, such as multi-step reasoning and multi-agent collaboration, to generate high-quality outputs. While users are billed based on token consumption and API usage, these internal steps are typically not visible. We refer to such systems as Commercial Opaque LLM Services (COLS). This position paper highlights emerging accountability challenges in COLS: users are billed for operations they cannot observe, verify, or contest. We formalize two key risks: \textit{quantity inflation}, where token and call counts may be artificially inflated, and \textit{quality downgrade}, where providers might quietly substitute lower-cost models or tools. Addressing these risks requires a diverse set of auditing strategies, including commitment-based, predictive, behavioral, and signature-based methods. We further explore the potential of complementary mechanisms such as watermarking and trusted execution environments to enhance verifiability without compromising provider confidentiality. We also propose a modular three-layer auditing framework for COLS and users that enables trustworthy verification across execution, secure logging, and user-facing auditability without exposing proprietary internals. Our aim is to encourage further research and policy development toward transparency, auditability, and accountability in commercial LLM services.
Towards Anonymous Neural Network Inference
Authors: Liao Peiyuan
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00

We introduce funion, a system providing end-to-end sender-receiver unlinkability for neural network inference. By leveraging the Pigeonhole storage protocol and BACAP (blinding-and-capability) scheme from the Echomix anonymity system, funion inherits the provable security guarantees of modern mixnets. Users can anonymously store input tensors in pseudorandom storage locations, commission compute services to process them via the neural network, and retrieve results with no traceable connection between input and output parties. This store-compute-store paradigm masks both network traffic patterns and computational workload characteristics, while quantizing execution timing into public latency buckets. Our security analysis demonstrates that funion inherits the strong metadata privacy guarantees of Echomix under largely the same trust assumptions, while introducing acceptable overhead for production-scale workloads. Our work paves the way towards an accessible platform where users can submit fully anonymized inference queries to cloud services.
Dynamic Risk Assessments for Offensive Cybersecurity Agents
Authors: Boyi Wei, Benedikt Stroebl, Jiacen Xu, Joie Zhang, Zhou Li, Peter Henderson
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00
Tasks: GPU

Foundation models are increasingly becoming better autonomous programmers, raising the prospect that they could also automate dangerous offensive cyber-operations. Current frontier model audits probe the cybersecurity risks of such agents, but most fail to account for the degrees of freedom available to adversaries in the real world. In particular, with strong verifiers and financial incentives, agents for offensive cybersecurity are amenable to iterative improvement by would-be adversaries. We argue that assessments should take into account an expanded threat model in the context of cybersecurity, emphasizing the varying degrees of freedom that an adversary may possess in stateful and non-stateful environments within a fixed compute budget. We show that even with a relatively small compute budget (8 H100 GPU Hours in our study), adversaries can improve an agent's cybersecurity capability on InterCode CTF by more than 40\% relative to the baseline -- without any external assistance. These results highlight the need to evaluate agents' cybersecurity risk in a dynamic manner, painting a more representative picture of risk.
A Critical Evaluation of Defenses against Prompt Injection Attacks
Authors: Yuqi Jia, Zedian Shao, Yupei Liu, Jinyuan Jia, Dawn Song, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, and several defenses have recently been proposed, often claiming to mitigate these attacks successfully. However, we argue that existing studies lack a principled approach to evaluating these defenses. In this paper, we argue the need to assess defenses across two critical dimensions: (1) effectiveness, measured against both existing and adaptive prompt injection attacks involving diverse target and injected prompts, and (2) general-purpose utility, ensuring that the defense does not compromise the foundational capabilities of the LLM. Our critical evaluation reveals that prior studies have not followed such a comprehensive evaluation methodology. When assessed using this principled approach, we show that existing defenses are not as successful as previously reported. This work provides a foundation for evaluating future defenses and guiding their development. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/PIEval123/PIEval.
An Attack to Break Permutation-Based Private Third-Party Inference Schemes for LLMs
Authors: Rahul Thomas, Louai Zahran, Erica Choi, Akilesh Potti, Micah Goldblum, Arka Pal
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00
Tasks: Privacy Preserving

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to the widespread adoption of third-party inference services, raising critical privacy concerns. Existing methods of performing private third-party inference, such as Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC), often rely on cryptographic methods. However, these methods are thousands of times slower than standard unencrypted inference, and fail to scale to large modern LLMs. Therefore, recent lines of work have explored the replacement of expensive encrypted nonlinear computations in SMPC with statistical obfuscation methods - in particular, revealing permuted hidden states to the third parties, with accompanying strong claims of the difficulty of reversal into the unpermuted states. In this work, we begin by introducing a novel reconstruction technique that can recover original prompts from hidden states with nearly perfect accuracy across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs. We then show that extensions of our attack are nearly perfectly effective in reversing permuted hidden states of LLMs, demonstrating the insecurity of three recently proposed privacy schemes. We further dissect the shortcomings of prior theoretical `proofs' of permuation security which allow our attack to succeed. Our findings highlight the importance of rigorous security analysis in privacy-preserving LLM inference.
Architectural Backdoors for Within-Batch Data Stealing and Model Inference Manipulation
Authors: Nicolas Küchler, Ivan Petrov, Conrad Grobler, Ilia Shumailov
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00

For nearly a decade the academic community has investigated backdoors in neural networks, primarily focusing on classification tasks where adversaries manipulate the model prediction. While demonstrably malicious, the immediate real-world impact of such prediction-altering attacks has remained unclear. In this paper we introduce a novel and significantly more potent class of backdoors that builds upon recent advancements in architectural backdoors. We demonstrate how these backdoors can be specifically engineered to exploit batched inference, a common technique for hardware utilization, enabling large-scale user data manipulation and theft. By targeting the batching process, these architectural backdoors facilitate information leakage between concurrent user requests and allow attackers to fully control model responses directed at other users within the same batch. In other words, an attacker who can change the model architecture can set and steal model inputs and outputs of other users within the same batch. We show that such attacks are not only feasible but also alarmingly effective, can be readily injected into prevalent model architectures, and represent a truly malicious threat to user privacy and system integrity. Critically, to counteract this new class of vulnerabilities, we propose a deterministic mitigation strategy that provides formal guarantees against this new attack vector, unlike prior work that relied on Large Language Models to find the backdoors. Our mitigation strategy employs a novel Information Flow Control mechanism that analyzes the model graph and proves non-interference between different user inputs within the same batch. Using our mitigation strategy we perform a large scale analysis of models hosted through Hugging Face and find over 200 models that introduce (unintended) information leakage between batch entries due to the use of dynamic quantization.
Towards a Quantum-classical Augmented Network
Authors: Nitin Jha, Abhishek Parakh, Mahadevan Subramaniam
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00

In the past decade, several small-scale quantum key distribution networks have been established. However, the deployment of large-scale quantum networks depends on the development of quantum repeaters, quantum channels, quantum memories, and quantum network protocols. To improve the security of existing networks and adopt currently feasible quantum technologies, the next step is to augment classical networks with quantum devices, properties, and phenomena. To achieve this, we propose a change in the structure of the HTTP protocol such that it can carry both quantum and classical payload. This work lays the foundation for dividing one single network packet into classical and quantum payloads depending on the privacy needs. We implement logistic regression, CNN, LSTM, and BiLSTM models to classify the privacy label for outgoing communications. This enables reduced utilization of quantum resources allowing for a more efficient secure quantum network design. Experimental results using the proposed methods are presented.
Gaming Tool Preferences in Agentic LLMs
Authors: Kazem Faghih, Wenxiao Wang, Yize Cheng, Siddhant Bharti, Gaurang Sriramanan, Sriram Balasubramanian, Parsa Hosseini, Soheil Feizi
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00

Large language models (LLMs) can now access a wide range of external tools, thanks to the Model Context Protocol (MCP). This greatly expands their abilities as various agents. However, LLMs rely entirely on the text descriptions of tools to decide which ones to use--a process that is surprisingly fragile. In this work, we expose a vulnerability in prevalent tool/function-calling protocols by investigating a series of edits to tool descriptions, some of which can drastically increase a tool's usage from LLMs when competing with alternatives. Through controlled experiments, we show that tools with properly edited descriptions receive over 10 times more usage from GPT-4.1 and Qwen2.5-7B than tools with original descriptions. We further evaluate how various edits to tool descriptions perform when competing directly with one another and how these trends generalize or differ across a broader set of 10 different models. These phenomenons, while giving developers a powerful way to promote their tools, underscore the need for a more reliable foundation for agentic LLMs to select and utilize tools and resources.
\texttt{Range-Arithmetic}: Verifiable Deep Learning Inference on an Untrusted Party
Authors: Ali Rahimi, Babak H. Khalaj, Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00

Verifiable computing (VC) has gained prominence in decentralized machine learning systems, where resource-intensive tasks like deep neural network (DNN) inference are offloaded to external participants due to blockchain limitations. This creates a need to verify the correctness of outsourced computations without re-execution. We propose \texttt{Range-Arithmetic}, a novel framework for efficient and verifiable DNN inference that transforms non-arithmetic operations, such as rounding after fixed-point matrix multiplication and ReLU, into arithmetic steps verifiable using sum-check protocols and concatenated range proofs. Our approach avoids the complexity of Boolean encoding, high-degree polynomials, and large lookup tables while remaining compatible with finite-field-based proof systems. Experimental results show that our method not only matches the performance of existing approaches, but also reduces the computational cost of verifying the results, the computational effort required from the untrusted party performing the DNN inference, and the communication overhead between the two sides.
One Model Transfer to All: On Robust Jailbreak Prompts Generation against LLMs
Authors: Linbao Li, Yannan Liu, Daojing He, Yu Li
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00
Tasks: All, Safety Alignment

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is increasingly compromised by jailbreak attacks, which can manipulate these models to generate harmful or unintended content. Investigating these attacks is crucial for uncovering model vulnerabilities. However, many existing jailbreak strategies fail to keep pace with the rapid development of defense mechanisms, such as defensive suffixes, rendering them ineffective against defended models. To tackle this issue, we introduce a novel attack method called ArrAttack, specifically designed to target defended LLMs. ArrAttack automatically generates robust jailbreak prompts capable of bypassing various defense measures. This capability is supported by a universal robustness judgment model that, once trained, can perform robustness evaluation for any target model with a wide variety of defenses. By leveraging this model, we can rapidly develop a robust jailbreak prompt generator that efficiently converts malicious input prompts into effective attacks. Extensive evaluations reveal that ArrAttack significantly outperforms existing attack strategies, demonstrating strong transferability across both white-box and black-box models, including GPT-4 and Claude-3. Our work bridges the gap between jailbreak attacks and defenses, providing a fresh perspective on generating robust jailbreak prompts. We make the codebase available at https://github.com/LLBao/ArrAttack.
JALMBench: Benchmarking Jailbreak Vulnerabilities in Audio Language Models
Authors: Zifan Peng, Yule Liu, Zhen Sun, Mingchen Li, Zeren Luo, Jingyi Zheng, Wenhan Dong, Xinlei He, Xuechao Wang, Yingjie Xue, Shengmin Xu, Xinyi Huang
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00
Tasks: Benchmarking, Diversity

Audio Language Models (ALMs) have made significant progress recently. These models integrate the audio modality directly into the model, rather than converting speech into text and inputting text to Large Language Models (LLMs). While jailbreak attacks on LLMs have been extensively studied, the security of ALMs with audio modalities remains largely unexplored. Currently, there is a lack of an adversarial audio dataset and a unified framework specifically designed to evaluate and compare attacks and ALMs. In this paper, we present JALMBench, the \textit{first} comprehensive benchmark to assess the safety of ALMs against jailbreak attacks. JALMBench includes a dataset containing 2,200 text samples and 51,381 audio samples with over 268 hours. It supports 12 mainstream ALMs, 4 text-transferred and 4 audio-originated attack methods, and 5 defense methods. Using JALMBench, we provide an in-depth analysis of attack efficiency, topic sensitivity, voice diversity, and attack representations. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies for the attacks at both the prompt level and the response level.