pwc-archive/papers-with-abstracts huggingface dataset:
Chain-of-Lure: A Synthetic Narrative-Driven Approach to Compromise Large Language Models
Authors: Wenhan Chang, Tianqing Zhu, Yu Zhao, Shuangyong Song, Ping Xiong, Wanlei Zhou, Yongxiang Li
Date: 2025-05-23 00:00:00

In the era of rapid generative AI development, interactions between humans and large language models face significant misusing risks. Previous research has primarily focused on black-box scenarios using human-guided prompts and white-box scenarios leveraging gradient-based LLM generation methods, neglecting the possibility that LLMs can act not only as victim models, but also as attacker models to harm other models. We proposes a novel jailbreaking method inspired by the Chain-of-Thought mechanism, where the attacker model uses mission transfer to conceal harmful user intent in dialogue and generates chained narrative lures to stimulate the reasoning capabilities of victim models, leading to successful jailbreaking. To enhance the attack success rate, we introduce a helper model that performs random narrative optimization on the narrative lures during multi-turn dialogues while ensuring alignment with the original intent, enabling the optimized lures to bypass the safety barriers of victim models effectively. Our experiments reveal that models with weaker safety mechanisms exhibit stronger attack capabilities, demonstrating that models can not only be exploited, but also help harm others. By incorporating toxicity scores, we employ third-party models to evaluate the harmfulness of victim models' responses to jailbreaking attempts. The study shows that using refusal keywords as an evaluation metric for attack success rates is significantly flawed because it does not assess whether the responses guide harmful questions, while toxicity scores measure the harm of generated content with more precision and its alignment with harmful questions. Our approach demonstrates outstanding performance, uncovering latent vulnerabilities in LLMs and providing data-driven feedback to optimize LLM safety mechanisms. We also discuss two defensive strategies to offer guidance on improving defense mechanisms.
Backdoors in DRL: Four Environments Focusing on In-distribution Triggers
Authors: Chace Ashcraft, Ted Staley, Josh Carney, Cameron Hickert, Kiran Karra, Nathan Drenkow
Date: 2025-05-22 00:00:00
Tasks: Backdoor Attack, Data Poisoning, Deep Reinforcement Learning, reinforcement-learning, Reinforcement Learning, Reinforcement Learning (RL)

Backdoor attacks, or trojans, pose a security risk by concealing undesirable behavior in deep neural network models. Open-source neural networks are downloaded from the internet daily, possibly containing backdoors, and third-party model developers are common. To advance research on backdoor attack mitigation, we develop several trojans for deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents. We focus on in-distribution triggers, which occur within the agent's natural data distribution, since they pose a more significant security threat than out-of-distribution triggers due to their ease of activation by the attacker during model deployment. We implement backdoor attacks in four reinforcement learning (RL) environments: LavaWorld, Randomized LavaWorld, Colorful Memory, and Modified Safety Gymnasium. We train various models, both clean and backdoored, to characterize these attacks. We find that in-distribution triggers can require additional effort to implement and be more challenging for models to learn, but are nevertheless viable threats in DRL even using basic data poisoning attacks.
Secure and Private Federated Learning: Achieving Adversarial Resilience through Robust Aggregation
Authors: Kun Yang, Neena Imam
Date: 2025-05-22 00:00:00
Tasks: Federated Learning, Privacy Preserving

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative machine learning across decentralized data sources without sharing raw data. It offers a promising approach to privacy-preserving AI. However, FL remains vulnerable to adversarial threats from malicious participants, referred to as Byzantine clients, who can send misleading updates to corrupt the global model. Traditional aggregation methods, such as simple averaging, are not robust to such attacks. More resilient approaches, like the Krum algorithm, require prior knowledge of the number of malicious clients, which is often unavailable in real-world scenarios. To address these limitations, we propose Average-rKrum (ArKrum), a novel aggregation strategy designed to enhance both the resilience and privacy guarantees of FL systems. Building on our previous work (rKrum), ArKrum introduces two key innovations. First, it includes a median-based filtering mechanism that removes extreme outliers before estimating the number of adversarial clients. Second, it applies a multi-update averaging scheme to improve stability and performance, particularly when client data distributions are not identical. We evaluate ArKrum on benchmark image and text datasets under three widely studied Byzantine attack types. Results show that ArKrum consistently achieves high accuracy and stability. It performs as well as or better than other robust aggregation methods. These findings demonstrate that ArKrum is an effective and practical solution for secure FL systems in adversarial environments.
Harry Potter is Still Here! Probing Knowledge Leakage in Targeted Unlearned Large Language Models via Automated Adversarial Prompting
Authors: Bang Trinh Tran To, Thai Le
Date: 2025-05-22 00:00:00
Tasks: Diagnostic

This work presents LURK (Latent UnleaRned Knowledge), a novel framework that probes for hidden retained knowledge in unlearned LLMs through adversarial suffix prompting. LURK automatically generates adversarial prompt suffixes designed to elicit residual knowledge about the Harry Potter domain, a commonly used benchmark for unlearning. Our experiments reveal that even models deemed successfully unlearned can leak idiosyncratic information under targeted adversarial conditions, highlighting critical limitations of current unlearning evaluation standards. By uncovering latent knowledge through indirect probing, LURK offers a more rigorous and diagnostic tool for assessing the robustness of unlearning algorithms. All code will be publicly available.
MTSA: Multi-turn Safety Alignment for LLMs through Multi-round Red-teaming
Authors: Weiyang Guo, Jing Li, Wenya Wang, Yu Li, Daojing He, Jun Yu, Min Zhang
Date: 2025-05-22 00:00:00
Tasks: Red Teaming, Safety Alignment

The proliferation of jailbreak attacks against large language models (LLMs) highlights the need for robust security measures. However, in multi-round dialogues, malicious intentions may be hidden in interactions, leading LLMs to be more prone to produce harmful responses. In this paper, we propose the \textbf{M}ulti-\textbf{T}urn \textbf{S}afety \textbf{A}lignment (\ourapproach) framework, to address the challenge of securing LLMs in multi-round interactions. It consists of two stages: In the thought-guided attack learning stage, the red-team model learns about thought-guided multi-round jailbreak attacks to generate adversarial prompts. In the adversarial iterative optimization stage, the red-team model and the target model continuously improve their respective capabilities in interaction. Furthermore, we introduce a multi-turn reinforcement learning algorithm based on future rewards to enhance the robustness of safety alignment. Experimental results show that the red-team model exhibits state-of-the-art attack capabilities, while the target model significantly improves its performance on safety benchmarks.
LLM Access Shield: Domain-Specific LLM Framework for Privacy Policy Compliance
Authors: Yu Wang, Cailing Cai, Zhihua Xiao, Peifung E. Lam
Date: 2025-05-22 00:00:00

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied in fields such as finance, education, and governance due to their ability to generate human-like text and adapt to specialized tasks. However, their widespread adoption raises critical concerns about data privacy and security, including the risk of sensitive data exposure. In this paper, we propose a security framework to enforce policy compliance and mitigate risks in LLM interactions. Our approach introduces three key innovations: (i) LLM-based policy enforcement: a customizable mechanism that enhances domain-specific detection of sensitive data. (ii) Dynamic policy customization: real-time policy adaptation and enforcement during user-LLM interactions to ensure compliance with evolving security requirements. (iii) Sensitive data anonymization: a format-preserving encryption technique that protects sensitive information while maintaining contextual integrity. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework effectively mitigates security risks while preserving the functional accuracy of LLM-driven tasks.
Mitigating Cyber Risk in the Age of Open-Weight LLMs: Policy Gaps and Technical Realities
Authors: Alfonso de Gregorio
Date: 2025-05-21 00:00:00

Open-weight general-purpose AI (GPAI) models offer significant benefits but also introduce substantial cybersecurity risks, as demonstrated by the offensive capabilities of models like DeepSeek-R1 in evaluations such as MITRE's OCCULT. These publicly available models empower a wider range of actors to automate and scale cyberattacks, challenging traditional defence paradigms and regulatory approaches. This paper analyzes the specific threats -- including accelerated malware development and enhanced social engineering -- magnified by open-weight AI release. We critically assess current regulations, notably the EU AI Act and the GPAI Code of Practice, identifying significant gaps stemming from the loss of control inherent in open distribution, which renders many standard security mitigations ineffective. We propose a path forward focusing on evaluating and controlling specific high-risk capabilities rather than entire models, advocating for pragmatic policy interpretations for open-weight systems, promoting defensive AI innovation, and fostering international collaboration on standards and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) sharing to ensure security without unduly stifling open technological progress.
CRAKEN: Cybersecurity LLM Agent with Knowledge-Based Execution
Authors: Minghao Shao, Haoran Xi, Nanda Rani, Meet Udeshi, Venkata Sai Charan Putrevu, Kimberly Milner, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, Sandeep Kumar Shukla, Prashanth Krishnamurthy, Farshad Khorrami, Ramesh Karri, Muhammad Shafique
Date: 2025-05-21 00:00:00
Tasks: Large Language Model, Task Planning, Vulnerability Detection

Large Language Model (LLM) agents can automate cybersecurity tasks and can adapt to the evolving cybersecurity landscape without re-engineering. While LLM agents have demonstrated cybersecurity capabilities on Capture-The-Flag (CTF) competitions, they have two key limitations: accessing latest cybersecurity expertise beyond training data, and integrating new knowledge into complex task planning. Knowledge-based approaches that incorporate technical understanding into the task-solving automation can tackle these limitations. We present CRAKEN, a knowledge-based LLM agent framework that improves cybersecurity capability through three core mechanisms: contextual decomposition of task-critical information, iterative self-reflected knowledge retrieval, and knowledge-hint injection that transforms insights into adaptive attack strategies. Comprehensive evaluations with different configurations show CRAKEN's effectiveness in multi-stage vulnerability detection and exploitation compared to previous approaches. Our extensible architecture establishes new methodologies for embedding new security knowledge into LLM-driven cybersecurity agentic systems. With a knowledge database of CTF writeups, CRAKEN obtained an accuracy of 22% on NYU CTF Bench, outperforming prior works by 3% and achieving state-of-the-art results. On evaluation of MITRE ATT&CK techniques, CRAKEN solves 25-30% more techniques than prior work, demonstrating improved cybersecurity capabilities via knowledge-based execution. We make our framework open source to public https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/nyuctf_agents_craken.
Neuromorphic Mimicry Attacks Exploiting Brain-Inspired Computing for Covert Cyber Intrusions
Authors: Hemanth Ravipati
Date: 2025-05-21 00:00:00
Tasks: Anomaly Detection, Autonomous Vehicles, Edge-computing, Intrusion Detection

Neuromorphic computing, inspired by the human brain's neural architecture, is revolutionizing artificial intelligence and edge computing with its low-power, adaptive, and event-driven designs. However, these unique characteristics introduce novel cybersecurity risks. This paper proposes Neuromorphic Mimicry Attacks (NMAs), a groundbreaking class of threats that exploit the probabilistic and non-deterministic nature of neuromorphic chips to execute covert intrusions. By mimicking legitimate neural activity through techniques such as synaptic weight tampering and sensory input poisoning, NMAs evade traditional intrusion detection systems, posing risks to applications such as autonomous vehicles, smart medical implants, and IoT networks. This research develops a theoretical framework for NMAs, evaluates their impact using a simulated neuromorphic chip dataset, and proposes countermeasures, including neural-specific anomaly detection and secure synaptic learning protocols. The findings underscore the critical need for tailored cybersecurity measures to protect brain-inspired computing, offering a pioneering exploration of this emerging threat landscape.
Covert Attacks on Machine Learning Training in Passively Secure MPC
Authors: Matthew Jagielski, Daniel Escudero, Rahul Rachuri, Peter Scholl
Date: 2025-05-21 00:00:00

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows data owners to train machine learning models on combined data while keeping the underlying training data private. The MPC threat model either considers an adversary who passively corrupts some parties without affecting their overall behavior, or an adversary who actively modifies the behavior of corrupt parties. It has been argued that in some settings, active security is not a major concern, partly because of the potential risk of reputation loss if a party is detected cheating. In this work we show explicit, simple, and effective attacks that an active adversary can run on existing passively secure MPC training protocols, while keeping essentially zero risk of the attack being detected. The attacks we show can compromise both the integrity and privacy of the model, including attacks reconstructing exact training data. Our results challenge the belief that a threat model that does not include malicious behavior by the involved parties may be reasonable in the context of PPML, motivating the use of actively secure protocols for training.
GSDFuse: Capturing Cognitive Inconsistencies from Multi-Dimensional Weak Signals in Social Media Steganalysis
Authors: Kaibo Huang, Zipei Zhang, Yukun Wei, TianXin Zhang, Zhongliang Yang, Linna Zhou
Date: 2025-05-20 00:00:00
Tasks: Data Augmentation, Feature Engineering, Linguistic steganography, Steganalysis

The ubiquity of social media platforms facilitates malicious linguistic steganography, posing significant security risks. Steganalysis is profoundly hindered by the challenge of identifying subtle cognitive inconsistencies arising from textual fragmentation and complex dialogue structures, and the difficulty in achieving robust aggregation of multi-dimensional weak signals, especially given extreme steganographic sparsity and sophisticated steganography. These core detection difficulties are compounded by significant data imbalance. This paper introduces GSDFuse, a novel method designed to systematically overcome these obstacles. GSDFuse employs a holistic approach, synergistically integrating hierarchical multi-modal feature engineering to capture diverse signals, strategic data augmentation to address sparsity, adaptive evidence fusion to intelligently aggregate weak signals, and discriminative embedding learning to enhance sensitivity to subtle inconsistencies. Experiments on social media datasets demonstrate GSDFuse's state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance in identifying sophisticated steganography within complex dialogue environments. The source code for GSDFuse is available at https://github.com/NebulaEmmaZh/GSDFuse.
From nuclear safety to LLM security: Applying non-probabilistic risk management strategies to build safe and secure LLM-powered systems
Authors: Alexander Gutfraind, Vicki Bier
Date: 2025-05-20 00:00:00
Tasks: Management

Large language models (LLMs) offer unprecedented and growing capabilities, but also introduce complex safety and security challenges that resist conventional risk management. While conventional probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) requires exhaustive risk enumeration and quantification, the novelty and complexity of these systems make PRA impractical, particularly against adaptive adversaries. Previous research found that risk management in various fields of engineering such as nuclear or civil engineering is often solved by generic (i.e. field-agnostic) strategies such as event tree analysis or robust designs. Here we show how emerging risks in LLM-powered systems could be met with 100+ of these non-probabilistic strategies to risk management, including risks from adaptive adversaries. The strategies are divided into five categories and are mapped to LLM security (and AI safety more broadly). We also present an LLM-powered workflow for applying these strategies and other workflows suitable for solution architects. Overall, these strategies could contribute (despite some limitations) to security, safety and other dimensions of responsible AI.
Streamlining HTTP Flooding Attack Detection through Incremental Feature Selection
Authors: Upasana Sarmah, Parthajit Borah, D. K. Bhattacharyya
Date: 2025-05-20 00:00:00
Tasks: feature selection

Applications over the Web primarily rely on the HTTP protocol to transmit web pages to and from systems. There are a variety of application layer protocols, but among all, HTTP is the most targeted because of its versatility and ease of integration with online services. The attackers leverage the fact that by default no detection system blocks any HTTP traffic. Thus, by exploiting such characteristics of the protocol, attacks are launched against web applications. HTTP flooding attacks are one such attack in the application layer of the OSI model. In this paper, a method for the detection of such an attack is proposed. The heart of the detection method is an incremental feature subset selection method based on mutual information and correlation. INFS-MICC helps in identifying a subset of highly relevant and independent feature subset so as to detect HTTP Flooding attacks with best possible classification performance in near-real time.
Safety Alignment Can Be Not Superficial With Explicit Safety Signals
Authors: Jianwei Li, Jung-eun Kim
Date: 2025-05-19 00:00:00
Tasks: Binary Classification, Data Augmentation, Safety Alignment

Recent studies on the safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) have revealed that existing approaches often operate superficially, leaving models vulnerable to various adversarial attacks. Despite their significance, these studies generally fail to offer actionable solutions beyond data augmentation for achieving more robust safety mechanisms. This paper identifies a fundamental cause of this superficiality: existing alignment approaches often presume that models can implicitly learn a safety-related reasoning task during the alignment process, enabling them to refuse harmful requests. However, the learned safety signals are often diluted by other competing objectives, leading models to struggle with drawing a firm safety-conscious decision boundary when confronted with adversarial attacks. Based on this observation, by explicitly introducing a safety-related binary classification task and integrating its signals with our attention and decoding strategies, we eliminate this ambiguity and allow models to respond more responsibly to malicious queries. We emphasize that, with less than 0.2x overhead cost, our approach enables LLMs to assess the safety of both the query and the previously generated tokens at each necessary generating step. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly improves the resilience of LLMs against various adversarial attacks, offering a promising pathway toward more robust generative AI systems.
Improving LLM Outputs Against Jailbreak Attacks with Expert Model Integration
Authors: Tatia Tsmindashvili, Ana Kolkhidashvili, Dachi Kurtskhalia, Nino Maghlakelidze, Elene Mekvabishvili, Guram Dentoshvili, Orkhan Shamilov, Zaal Gachechiladze, Steven Saporta, David Dachi Choladze
Date: 2025-05-18 00:00:00
Tasks: In-Context Learning

Using LLMs in a production environment presents security challenges that include vulnerabilities to jailbreaks and prompt injections, which can result in harmful outputs for humans or the enterprise. The challenge is amplified when working within a specific domain, as topics generally accepted for LLMs to address may be irrelevant to that field. These problems can be mitigated, for example, by fine-tuning large language models with domain-specific and security-focused data. However, these alone are insufficient, as jailbreak techniques evolve. Additionally, API-accessed models do not offer the flexibility needed to tailor behavior to industry-specific objectives, and in-context learning is not always sufficient or reliable. In response to these challenges, we introduce Archias, an expert model adept at distinguishing between in-domain and out-of-domain communications. Archias classifies user inquiries into several categories: in-domain (specifically for the automotive industry), malicious questions, price injections, prompt injections, and out-of-domain examples. Our methodology integrates outputs from the expert model (Archias) into prompts, which are then processed by the LLM to generate responses. This method increases the model's ability to understand the user's intention and give appropriate answers. Archias can be adjusted, fine-tuned, and used for many different purposes due to its small size. Therefore, it can be easily customized to the needs of any industry. To validate our approach, we created a benchmark dataset for the automotive industry. Furthermore, in the interest of advancing research and development, we release our benchmark dataset to the community.
GenAI Security: Outsmarting the Bots with a Proactive Testing Framework
Authors: Sunil Kumar Jang Bahadur, Gopala Dhar, Lavi Nigam
Date: 2025-05-14 00:00:00
Tasks: Chatbot

The increasing sophistication and integration of Generative AI (GenAI) models into diverse applications introduce new security challenges that traditional methods struggle to address. This research explores the critical need for proactive security measures to mitigate the risks associated with malicious exploitation of GenAI systems. We present a framework encompassing key approaches, tools, and strategies designed to outmaneuver even advanced adversarial attacks, emphasizing the importance of securing GenAI innovation against potential liabilities. We also empirically prove the effectiveness of the said framework by testing it against the SPML Chatbot Prompt Injection Dataset. This work highlights the shift from reactive to proactive security practices essential for the safe and responsible deployment of GenAI technologies