For most of the first four decades after the country was founded in 1948, South Korea was ruledby authoritarian governments. Ever since the mid-1980s, when widespread anti-government protestsforced the country's military rulers to enact sweeping democratic reforms, democratic institutionsand traditions have deepened in South Korea. In 1997, long-time dissident and opposition politician Kim Dae Jung (commonly referred to as "DJ") was elected to the presidency, the first time anopposition party had prevailed in a South Korean presidential election. By law, Korean presidentscan only serve one five-year term. In December 2002, Kim was succeeded by a member of his party, Roh (pronounced "noh") Moo-hyun , a self-educated former human rights lawyer whoemergedfrom relative obscurity to defeat establishment candidates in both the primary and general elections. Roh campaigned on a platform of reform -- reform of Korean politics, economic policymaking, andU.S.-ROK relations -- to narrowly defeat conservative candidate Lee Hoi Chang in the generalelection. Roh captured 48.9% of the vote to Lee's 46.6%. Prior to assuming the Presidency, Roh's only previous government experience was an eight-month term as Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries in 2000 and 2001, and two stints asa lawmaker in the National Assembly, from 1988-1992 and 1998-2000. During the 1990s, Roh losttwo legislative elections and one bid for the mayoralty of his hometown, Pusan. Ironically, duringthe presidential campaign, the circumstances surrounding these defeats contributed to Roh's imageas a principled reformer. Noteworthy Aspects of the 2002 Presidential Election. The 2002 election was notable for several inter-related reasons. First, itexposed the deep generational divide among South Koreans. Exit polls showed that nearly 60% ofpeople in their 20s and 30s voted for Mr Roh, compared with less than 40% of people in their 50sand 60s. It is perhaps not coincidental that those supporting Lee directly experienced the KoreanWar (1950-53) and its immediate aftermath. Roh, 56, himself represents a generational shift. Eleven years younger than Lee, he also is the first South Korean president who was not an established political figure when the country began toemerge from authoritarian rule in the late 1980s. Second, Roh's victory was due in part to his call for South Korea to become a more "equal" partner in the U.S.-ROK alliance and to his criticism of U.S. policies on the Korean peninsula. Rohpledged to largely continue Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea. Althoughthese views resonated most strongly among younger generations of South Koreans, they have enteredthe mainstream of Korean society, as shown by the massive demonstrations in late 2002 protestingthe acquittal of two U.S. servicemen who were operating a military vehicle when it killed twoKorean schoolgirls. Third, the election and the anti-American demonstrations highlighted the growing influence and sophistication of Korean civil society groups, which now have a significant voice in determiningpolicy outcomes in Seoul. Many of these organizations garnered support for Roh during the electioncampaign and organized the anti-U.S. protests and the "Red Devil" rallies to cheer South Korea'snational team on to the semifinal during the 2002 Soccer World Cup. The groups' goals and means-- which tend to rely heavily upon networking through the Internet -- have been particularlyeffective in encouraging younger Koreans to become politically active. Higher-than-expectedturnout of younger voters benefitted Roh, as overall turnout in the 2002 election was a record lowof 70%, compared with 80% in the 1997 election. A Country Divided. The challenge facing Roh, who was inaugurated on February 25, 2003, is how to carry out his reform agenda despite the deepdivisions in South Korea. The country is split not only generationally, but also regionally. TheNational Assembly is controlled by the opposition Grand National Party (GNP). And Roh's ownparty, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) is also divided between his supporters and a largefaction of party elders that nearly succeeded in ousting Roh as the MDP's presidential candidateseveral weeks before the election. Roh's task will be complicated by the National Assembly elections scheduled to take place in April 2004. These are likely to exacerbate the zero-sum tendency in South Korean politics, in whichruling and opposition parties rarely cooperate. Furthermore, both the ruling MDP and oppositionGNP are under significant internal stress, and there is speculation that there will be a major politicalrealignment before the next legislative election. A Weak Legislature. Nominally, power in SouthKorea is shared by the President, who is elected to one five-year term, and the 273-memberunicameral National Assembly. National Assembly members are elected to 4-year terms. Of these,227 members represent single-member constituencies. The remaining 46 are "at large" membersselected on the basis of proportional voting. As mentioned above, the next legislative elections willbe held in April 2004. Since the Assembly's powers were enhanced in the 1987 constitution, it has at times altered the political climate by providing opposition parties with a forum to criticize, inspect, and attempt toembarrass the executive branch. Indeed, one of the Assembly's major accomplishments since 1987has been to institutionalize its oversight of the executive; executive branch officials regularly appearbefore committees, helping to make South Korean policy-making more transparent. Also, from timeto time, opposition parties have used Assembly proceedings to successfully stymie presidentialinitiatives, usually by boycotting legislative sessions. In reality, however, the President continues to be the dominant force in South Korean policymaking, as formal and informal limitations prevent the National Assembly from initiatingmajor pieces of legislation. For instance, the Korean constitution grants the Assembly the poweronly to cut funds from the President's budget, not to propose any increases or alter the executive'sbudgetary allocations. (Article 57) Also, the Assembly must act on the budget not later than thirtydays before the start of the new fiscal year on January 1. (Article 54) South Korean legislators suffer from numerous other limitations. They have little in the way of legislative support agencies, and the typical Seoul legislative office is staffed by three salaried,full-time workers. Even the Prime Minister, who has little power, is nominated by the President. The fact that parties in the Assembly repeatedly have resorted to the brinkmanship tactic of theboycott reflects the legislative branch's weakness. Institution-Building by the National Assembly. Roh's election has accelerated moves by the opposition Grand National Party (GNP), which controls theNational Assembly, to increase the National Assembly's resources through the creation ofinstitutions modeled after the U.S. Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional ResearchService, and/or the General Accounting Office. The Assembly's Other Powers. A bill in the National Assembly may be introduced by members or by the executive branch. If passed, a bill is sent to theexecutive for presidential promulgation within 15 days. The President may veto the bill and sendit back to the National Assembly for reconsideration. If the assembly overrides the veto with theconcurrence of two-thirds or more of members present, the bill will become law. With respect tothe judiciary, the consent of the National Assembly is also required for the presidential appointmentof all Supreme Court justices. Also required is the ratification by the Assembly of treaties andagreements as well as international acts or conventions to which South Korea is a signatory. Thedeclaration of war, the dispatch of troops abroad, or the stationing of foreign troops in South Koreanterritory requires the consent of the Assembly as well. PDFversion Political Parties. South Korean political partiesform, disband, and merge regularly, in part because they tend to be regionally-based and centeredaround charismatic personalities rather than substantive issues. It is not uncommon for members ofthe National Assembly to jump from one party to another, a practice that has led to considerabledisaffection among the South Korean electorate. During the 2002 presidential election, RohMoo-hyun benefitted from his image of a principled politician who had suffered personally becauseof his resolution not to participate in these political machinations. In 1990, Roh chose not to followhis mentor and long-time opposition leader, Kim Young Sam, into an alliance with the then-rulingparty, a decision that contributed to Roh's defeats in the 1992 National Assembly election and the1995 Pusan mayoralty election. In 1992, Kim won the presidential election. Presently, there are three major political parties in South Korea: President Roh Moo-hyun's center-left ruling Millennium Democratic Party ( MDP , formerly the National Congress for NewPolitics), which has 101 seats in the National Assembly (137 seats constitutes a parliamentarymajority); the generally conservative opposition Grand National Party ( GNP ), which at 153 seatshasa majority in the Assembly; and the smaller (14 seats) conservative United Liberal Democrats(ULD), which is led by the veteran politician Kim Jong-pil and has declined dramatically in size andinfluence in recent years. In April 2003, the GNP further increased its majority by winning 2 of 3bi-elections that were notable for a turnout of below 30%, the lowest in nearly 40 years. There is speculation that there may be a major political realignment before the April 2004 National Assembly elections. The MDP and GNP both are undergoing unsettled times. The GNP,which suffered from defections early in the presidential campaign, is still recovering from Lee HoiChang's defeat. The divisions are even more acute in the MDP, where Roh's base of support withinthe ruling party is confined to a relatively small group of younger reformers. During the presidentialelection, the party's "establishment" figures favored another candidate who Roh defeated in theMDP's primaries -- the country's first-ever -- in the winter of 2002. Later in the presidentialcampaign, opposition to Roh inside the MDP grew to such an extent that several party leaderspublicly talked of disbanding and forming a new party led by another candidate. Some politicalanalysts speculate that Roh may seek to gather into a new party reformist politicians from the MDP,GNP, and smaller parties. Regionalism. South Korean politics is highly regionalized. The MDP's base is in the southwestern Cholla region (also known as Honam), whereRoh won 93% of the vote in the 2002 presidential election. (See Figure 2) In the last nation-wideNational Assembly elections, held in April 2000, no GNP candidate won any of Cholla's 29 seats. Conversely, GNP candidate Lee Hoi Chang won 71% of the vote in the southeastern Kyongsang region (also known as Yongnam), the GNP's stronghold. In the 2000 National Assembly elections,the GNP won 64 of the 65 constituencies in Kyongsang. Before Kim Dae Jung's victory in 1997,South Korea's military governments gave preferential treatment to the Kyongsang region, leadingCholla residents to accuse the government of discrimination. The greater Seoul area, which is thehome of nearly half of the South Korean electorate, has emerged as the swing vote. There has beendiscussion of combating regionalism by adopting multiple-seat constituencies in the NationalAssembly. Corruption. (1) NGOs. Since the end of military rule, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increased dramatically in South Korea, particularlyin the past five years. The groups exist on both the local and national levels, range widely in size,and focus on a wide array of issues, including the environment, government and corporatecorruption, disability rights, women's rights, crimes committed by U.S. forces in Korea, revising theU.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and returning land used by U.S. forces. Manyinternational NGOs have set up local chapters in Seoul. In contrast to the student-led, class-basedgroups of the 1980s that spent much of their time organizing militant anti-government and anti-U.S.protests, an increasing number of NGOs have hiring permanent staff, fundraisers, and researchoffices. (2) As they have begun to professionalize theiroperations, they seem to have begun to havea greater impact on South Korean domestic and foreign policy. South Korean NGOs have been particularly adept at forming loose, temporary coalitions with one another to organize large-scale protests on a particular issue. Many of the most successfulexamples of citizen activism in South Korea involved the formation of umbrella organizations thatpool the resources of member groups. The country's rapid adoption of the Internet -- South Koreahas one of the world's highest rates of Internet usage -- has facilitated such networking by enablinggroups to quickly establish linkages, coordinate activities, and spread the word about protestactivities. (3) The anti-American protests in 2002 werea case in point. Decentralization. The growing influence of Korean civil society groups has been possible in part because of the growing decentralization ofpower in South Korea. In the early and mid-1990s, new laws were passed creating local assembliesand establishing popular election of local officials for the first time since the 1950s. Increased localautonomy has encouraged political consciousness and activism, as South Koreans have come toexpect local and national elected leaders to be more responsive and accountable to theirconstituents. (4) Despite these changes, Seoul remainsthe locus of political power in South Korea, inpart because local governments have little authority to impose their own taxes. (5) President RohMoo-hyun has vowed to further decentralize political power giving more autonomy to the provincesand by transferring certain executive offices to locations outside of Seoul. South Korea's Media. During the country's period of military rule, South Korea's media operated under tight censorship rules. Additionally,the government rewarded favorable coverage by exempting Korean newspapers from intrusivescrutiny into the companies' internal operations. In recent years, however, tensions between thegovernment and South Korea's print media have surfaced, and appear to have worsened under thecurrent Roh administration. South Korea has nearly two dozen major newspaper and broadcast companies. Korea's three leading mainstream newspapers, the Chosun Ilbo , Donga Ilbo , and the JoongAngIlbo , control about70% of the market. All claim circulation figures of between 1.8 and 2.1 million and haveright-of-center political leanings. The leading left-of-center daily, Hankyoreh , has an estimatedreadership of 400,000. (6) In recent years, manyyounger South Koreans have turned to internet newssources such as OhMyNews . Most Korean newspapers are affiliates of and/or highly dependent on the advertising revenues from the country's chaebol conglomerates, giving many an allegedly predisposed hostility to the chaebol reforms pushed by former President Kim Dae Jung and continued by President Roh. Traditionally, mainstream newspapers have been opaque operations that have benefitted theircorporate patronage . Circulation figures are not independently audited, journalists are known toaccept pay-offs from companies and government agencies to supplement low wages, and for yearsnewspapers were exempt from tax audits. The government often has been reluctant to criticize themedia because of fears that owners would retaliate by publishing embarrassing stories. Koreannewspapers' political biases frequently are reflected in their news coverage, and articles often arebased upon rumors or hearsay rather than actual evidence. (7) In 2001, President Kim Dae Jung launched a highly public tax probe of the country's leading dailies that was criticized for targeting those papers that were most critical of the government. During the 2002 campaign, President Roh frequently complained about a "conservative" bias in thepress and made greater openness in the media an element of his reform platform. Since hisinauguration, Roh has acted to contain "unfair" ways newspapers "distort" government policies byreplacing restrictive press clubs with open press briefings and by requiring government agencies toprepare daily summaries that classify newspaper articles into one of five categories: "positive,straight and simple, constructive criticism, malicious criticism, and error." The reports are then tobe sent to the Blue House, the President's office. Criticism over these moves contributed to theresignation of Roh's appointee as president of the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). Roh has also moved to grant greater access to Korea's internet publications that are widely used byyounger readers and many of which backed Roh during the election campaign. (8) Roh Moo-hyun won the South Korean Presidency by adopting a mantle of reform, one thatcovers three areas: Korea's relations with the United States, Korea's economic policy, and Koreanpolitics. Additionally, Roh has pledged to continue the essence of Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policytoward North Korea, which he has renamed the "peace and prosperity" policy. "Anti-Americanism". Anti-American sentiments have long been present in South Korean society, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. After theend of military rule they were largely confined to highly ideological groups, particularly studentorganizations, that generally operated on the political margins in Korea. In the late 1990s, however,criticisms of United States policy moved into the mainstream, a move that also has madeanti-Americanism less ideological and more issue-specific. The criticisms range widely and includeaccusations that the Bush Administration is not listening to South Koreans in general, that the BushAdministration is blocking rapprochement between North and South Korea, that U.S. forces in SouthKorea are not sufficiently accountable for crimes they commit in South Korea, that the United Statesis covering up alleged atrocities committed during the Korean War, and that the South Koreangovernment too often caters to U.S. interests. (9) Underlying these sentiments is the declining senseof threat that South Koreans feel from North Korea. This trend was evident in the late 1990s, andhas deepened since the North-South Korean summit in June 2000. (10) Two events in 2002 caused thecritiques to coalesce into massive anti-U.S. demonstrations: President Bush's inclusion of NorthKorea in his "axis of evil" countries, and the June 2002 killing of two Korean schoolgirls by a U.S.military vehicle. Critics of the United States tend to be younger than 50, and appear to fall into three broad groups: 1) radical leftists, many of whom ideologically reject the U.S.-ROK alliance and some ofwhom support North Korea; 2) nationalists, who resent perceived intrusions into South Korea'ssovereignty by the United States (most prominently, the U.S.-South Korea status of forcesagreement) but who do not necessarily oppose the alliance per se ; and 3) individuals who supportthe alliance but oppose U.S. policy on specific issues, such as alleged crimes committed by U.S.servicemen. This latter group appears to be in the majority among current anti-American activists. (11) Some analysts have pointed out that a failure to address the concerns of the latter group couldexacerbate the problem by causing these individuals' concerns to morph into a nationalistic orideological-based opposition to the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Opinion polls taken over the past few years generally have found that large majorities of respondents favor a partial or total withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, though mostholding this position say they favor a drawdown unless there are improvements in North-SouthKorean relations; few favor an outright withdrawal. The Bush Administration's initiatives to actupon longstanding, but never enacted, plans to reduce or redeploy U.S. forces, including an April2003 pledge to move from the Yongsan base in Seoul, appear to have calmed the anti-basemovement somewhat. The Roh government has asked the U.S. not to undertake these moves untilthe nuclear issue with North Korea is settled. Relations with the United States under Roh. During the presidential campaign, Roh tapped into anti-American sentiments in several ways. Hecriticized the Bush Administration for not negotiating with North Korea. He called for"modernizing" the U.S.-ROK alliance to make South Korea a more equal partner in the relationship. He demanded a renegotiation of the U.S.-South Korea Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). And,Roh bucked South Korean tradition by not traveling to the United States during the campaign. Indeed, Roh's May 14, 2003 summit with President Bush in Washington, DC will be his first tripto the United States. In the late 1980s, Roh called for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces after ahoped-for reunification with the North, a stance he backed away from during the campaign. Since winning the election, Roh has sought to reduce bilateral tensions by moderating the tone of many his statements regarding U.S.-South Korean relations. Additionally, in March, he riskedalienating many of his supporters by publicly supporting the U.S.-led war against Iraq and promisingto send 700 engineering and medical troops to Iraq. Polls show that about 80% of South Koreansopposed the invasion of Iraq. While Roh has expressed reservations about the war, he has justifiedthe move as necessary to maintain South Korea's ability to influence U.S. policy toward NorthKorea. The move prompted large anti-war demonstrations in South Korea, leading the South KoreanNational Assembly to delay a vote on the deployment three times. In response, Roh appeared beforethe National Assembly -- a rare event in South Korea -- to personally appeal for the measure. Thedeployment was approved on April 2, 2003, thanks to support from the opposition GNP, which haslong supported close alliance relations with the United States. Relations with North Korea. Underlying the wave of America bashing in South Korea is the declining sense of threat most South Koreans feel fromNorth Korea. During the presidential campaign, Roh called for a continuation of Kim Dae Jung'ssunshine policy of engaging North Korea, albeit under a different name and with broader domesticsupport. He frequently stated that "South and North Korea are the two main actors in inter-Koreanrelations." Additionally, he often criticized the Bush Administration's refusal to negotiate withPyongyang, and on the eve of the election stated that South Korea should try to play the role of asemi-neutral mediator over the nuclear dispute between the two countries. Roh has called for the North to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, though he has opposed the Bush Administration's desire to use economic sanctions to achieve this end. Instead, he hascalled for a peaceful resolution of the problem through dialogue. In his inaugural address, Roh put forth the vague outlines for a "policy of peace and prosperity" on the Korean Peninsula, one that he said will include a greater transparency than was true of thesunshine policy. This last item was a reference to $500 million in secret payments the Hyundaicorporation made to North Korea shortly before the historic North-South Korean summit in June2000. In March 2003, Roh announced he would not oppose the formation of an independentprosecutor to investigate charges that the Kim Dae Jung administration reimbursed Hyundai formuch of the payments. The prosecutor's office reportedly began its probe in April 2003. Although some in Washington, DC, viewed Roh's main opponent, Lee Hoi Chang, as a staunch critic of the sunshine policy, others believed that if elected, Lee would not have ushered in awholesale change in South Korea's policy toward the North. Though Lee called for a greater"reciprocity" in North-South relations, the main thrust of his criticisms were about implementationrather than overall direction. Lee proposed that further South Korean aid should be made conditionalupon reductions in the North's military threat, a linkage that the Kim government did not make, andthat the Roh government has only implied without making explicit. Lee also said that no new aidshould be provided until North Korea dismantles its nuclear weapons program. Economic Policy. President Roh has stated that market-oriented reforms are a key to achieving his goal of turning South Korea into "an internationallogistics and financial hub in Northeast Asia." During the campaign, Roh pledged to continue KimDae Jung's economic reforms, to force Korea's huge conglomerates ( chaebol ) to become moretransparent and to redress Korea's income gap, which has widened since the country's 1997 financialcrisis. Since his inauguration in February, Roh has pushed his chaebol reforms aggressively. Hisgovernment has encouraged the investigation and prosecution of fraudulent accounting of SKGlobal, the trading arm of the third-largest chaebol , SK. His administration also is discussingproposals to induce the chaebol to form holding companies that would reduce the power of thefounding families who currently dominate many conglomerates and reduce the practice ofcross-shareholding among individual companies within each conglomerate. Although some chaebol leaders have adopted these practices on their own, others have stated their opposition to thegovernment's proposals. Roh's ability to push through his reforms is expected to be made more difficult by the country's current economic slowdown. The Bank of Korea recently revised its economic growth forecast for2003 from 5.7% to 4.1%, due to rising tensions with North Korea, rising oil prices, decliningexports, the repercussions of the SK Global scandal, and a slump in consumer confidence. Additionally, pursuing economic reforms aggressively could require Roh to take steps that couldantagonize South Korean organized labor, which is one of the few big and coherent interest groupswith which Roh has close ties. (12) Political Reforms. By allowing the National Assembly to appoint a prosecutor to investigate Hyundai's secret payments to North Korea, Roh wasseeking to fulfill three campaign goals: make North-South relations more transparent, reducecorruption, and increase cooperation with the opposition GNP. Tactical, bipartisan alliances onindividual issues is a rarity in South Korea, where politics tend to have a zero-sum quality. TheGNP's control of the legislature, a situation that Kim Dae Jung did not face until the GNP tookcontrol in his third year in office, makes it imperative that Roh periodically work with the opposition. However, such political pragmatism risks alienating his base in the MDP. The fast-looming NationalAssembly elections, to be held in April 2004, are likely to reduce the likelihood of Roh and the GNPcooperating. The deepening of democracy and related support for populist and nationalistic policies in South Korea is likely to make U.S.-ROK alliance relations more difficult to manage and reduces U.S.options in dealing with North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. A policy of confronting Pyongyang -- for instance, by asking for the United Nations to impose sanctions -- almost certainly would require at least the tacit cooperation of Seoul to be successful. A preemptive attack on North Korea's known nuclear facilities, as was contemplated by the ClintonAdministration in 1994, would likely be strongly opposed by the Roh government and the SouthKorean people. The recent surge in anti-American sentiment also mean that a failure to obtain SouthKorea's cooperation could lead to a serious strain, if not a rupture, in the fifty year old U.S.-ROKalliance. Yet suspicions of the Bush Administration's policy toward North Korea among manySouth Koreans arguably will make it politically costly for President Roh to support a moreconfrontational approach if the United States decides to pursue this course, particularly during a yearwhen Roh's party is trying to capture the National Assembly. On the other hand, Roh's election could present the Bush Administration with an opportunity. If Roh is persuaded to follow the United States' lead, his outspoken advocacy of engaging North Korea may position him to sell a more aggressive North Korea policyto the South Korean public, which remains divided about how best to deal with North Korea. Asrecently as the summer of 2002 -- before the anti-American protests grew in size -- domesticdisenchantment with Kim Dae Jung's sunshine policy appeared sufficiently strong that Roh beganto distance himself from the approach. NGO activity in South Korea tends to have an exaggerated peak-and-valley nature that appears to be a direct result of what one U.S. scholar of Korean politics has called a "loose, coalition styleof civic activism." Typically, a high-profile event results in a few groups taking the lead in puttingtogether a coalition of disparate NGOs, resulting in large-scale protests. As issues lose steam, theactivism fades dramatically because each member organization has its own agendas that may havenothing to do with the anti-American issue at hand. (13) Thus, although the recent anti-American demonstrations have largely vanished from South Korea's streets, this does not necessarily mean that anti-American sentiments have died down. Itmay only mean that the feelings are lying dormant until either another event triggers a further roundof protests or the fundamental issues of concern are addressed. The recent announcements by theU.S. Department of Defense that it plans to realign the structure of U.S. forces in South Korea mayrepresent a fundamental change that could address some of the concerns that have generatedanti-American attitudes. Roh Moo-hyun's election demonstrated the degree to which Korean non-governmental organizations now are able to influence South Korean politics and policy. This development placesconstraints upon the Seoul government, which is under pressure from its own citizens to be moreaccountable and transparent than ever before. In turn, this perhaps points to a need for U.S. publicdiplomacy to focus on reaching out to Korean interest groups and new online news sources. At onetime, particularly at the height of anti-American activity in the 1980s, the United States had a largepublic affairs presence across South Korea. However, all of the USIS centers in South Korea havebeen permanently closed for security reasons, replaced by Internet libraries and increased publicaffairs staff in Seoul. Additionally, there are few if any cultural exchanges conducted with SouthKorea. For decades, South Korea foreign policy was dominated by a set of elites who generally came from the same region, attended the same schools and universities, and tended to have a similarworld-view that revolved around maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK alliance. This monopoly on powerwas broken somewhat in the 1997 election of former opposition leader Kim Dae Jung. Roh'selection demonstrated that the South Korean polity has shifted further, bringing to power a new setof individuals who -- like Roh himself -- on the whole are younger, did not necessarily attend eliteschools, and are more apt to criticize the United States, particularly on matters relating to NorthKorea and to the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, many of these individualshave complained in the past that they have been ignored by the United States, raising the point thatperhaps the U.S. government should make more concerted efforts to reach out to these groups, whichoften do not rely upon the mainstream media for news and analysis. For their part, many U.S.policymakers are worried that the number of defenders of the United States is decreasing, outsideof the conservative South Korean elite. As reported out of the House International Relations Committee on May 8, 2003, the House version of The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005( H.R. 1950 ), contains four sections directed at U.S. public diplomacy in Korea,including sections that: a) would create a new, $750,000 per year program of summer institutes inthe U.S. for Korean students; b) would increase funding for the Fulbright English Teaching AssistantProgram in Korea, which sends United States citizens to serve as English language teachingassistants at Korean colleges and high schools; c) convey the sense of the Congress that theU.S.-Korea Fulbright program should try to expand beyond traditional Korean elites and eliteinstitutions; and d) convey the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State should try toestablish a diplomatic presence in the city of Pusan. (14)

Summary:
In December 2002, South Koreans elected Roh Moo-hyun, a little-known, self-educated lawyer, as their president. The left-of-center Roh narrowly defeated the conservative candidate, Lee HoiChang. Roh ran on a platform of reform, pledging to make South Korean politics more transparentand accountable, to make the economy more equitable, and to make South Korea a more equalpartner in its alliance with the United States. During the campaign, Roh pledged to continue hispredecessor, Kim Dae Jung's, "sunshine policy" of engaging North Korea, and harshly criticized theBush Administration's approach to Pyongyang. The 2002 election was notable for several inter-related reasons. First, it exposed the deep generational divide among South Koreans. Roh was favored by voters under the age of 45, whoemerged during the election as an anti-status quo force. In contrast, Lee easily won the votes ofthose over 45. Second, Roh's victory was due in part to his criticisms of the United States, and hebenefitted from the massive demonstrations in late 2002 protesting the acquittal of two U.S.servicemen who were operating a military vehicle when it killed two Korean schoolgirls. Third, theelection and the anti-American demonstrations highlighted the growing influence and sophisticationof Korean civil society groups, which now have a significant voice in determining policy outcomesin Seoul. These shifts in the South Korean polity, particularly the rise in anti-Americanism, confront the Bush Administration with a policy dilemma: how to manage the U.S.-ROK alliance while pursuinga more confrontational approach toward North Korea than that favored by many, if not most, SouthKoreans. Institutionally, the South Korean presidency has few checks on its power. While the unicameral National Assembly's influence has been slowly rising since South Korea became a democracy in1987, it is hampered by formal and informal limitations on its power. The National Assembly iscontrolled by the opposition, right-of-center Grand National Party (GNP). The second-largestgrouping is President Roh's party, the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). Both major parties areunder significant internal stress, and there is speculation that they will split and be reconstitutedbefore the next quadrennial legislative election, to be held in April 2004. This report will be updated periodically.