Federal regulation is a basic tool of government. Agencies issue thousands of rules and regulations each year to implement statutes enacted by Congress. The public policy goals and benefits of regulations include, among other things, ensuring that workplaces, air travel, foods, and drugs are safe; that the nation's air, water and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amount of taxes is collected. The costs of these regulations are estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and the benefits estimates are even higher. Given the size and impact of federal regulation, it is no surprise that Congresses and Presidents have taken a number of actions to refine and reform the regulatory process within the past 25 years. One goal of such initiatives has been to reduce regulatory burdens on affected parties, but other purposes have also played a part. Among these are efforts to require more rigorous analyses of proposed rules and thus provide better information to decision makers, to enhance oversight of rule making by Congress and the President, and to promote greater transparency and participation in the process. Over the last decade, at the request of Congress, GAO has released over 60 reports and testimonies reviewing the implementation of various regulatory reform initiatives. Some initiatives, such as the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), and Executive Order 12866 on Regulatory Planning and Review, have undergone repeated scrutiny. While our reviews identified specific strengths and weaknesses of individual initiatives, it may be more worthwhile to focus on crosscutting strengths and weaknesses. The common strengths we identified largely mirror the general purposes of various reform initiatives. The common weaknesses reflect issues associated with both the design and implementation of the initiatives. Our reviews suggest at least four overall strengths or benefits that have been associated with existing regulatory reform initiatives: (1) increasing the attention directed to rules and rule making, (2) increasing expectations regarding the analytical support for proposed rules, (3) encouraging and facilitating greater public participation in rule making, and (4) improving the transparency of the rule-making process. First, the simple fact that such initiatives bring added attention to rules and the rule-making process is an important benefit. As we have pointed out in prior reports, oversight of agencies' rule making can result in useful changes to rules. Furthermore, awareness of this added scrutiny may provide an important indirect effect. For example, in a previous GAO review, Department of Transportation officials told us that they will not even propose certain regulatory provisions because they know that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which reviews significant agency draft rules under Executive Order 12866, will not find them acceptable. Similarly, there is evidence that the focus placed on potential mandates under UMRA may have helped to discourage or limit the costs of federal mandates. Second, several of the reform initiatives have increased the analytical requirements and expectations in the regulatory process. These initiatives have raised the bar for agencies regarding the information and analysis needed to support policy decisions underlying regulations. Simply put, the initiatives call for more analysis of the effects--both benefits and costs--of proposed regulations before they are implemented. Whether imposed by statute or executive order, these initiatives seek to answer a basic question, "What are the consequences of this rule?" Closely related are other requirements that encourage agencies to identify and consider alternatives when developing regulations. Executive Order 12866, for example, asks agencies to first identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation. Initiatives such as RFA and UMRA ask agencies to identify regulatory alternatives that will be less burdensome to regulated parties. Third, some of the reform initiatives have encouraged and facilitated greater public participation and consultation in rule making. Initiatives such as the E-Government Act and the Government Paperwork Elimination Act encourage agencies to allow the public to communicate with them by electronic means. Other initiatives require additional consultation by agencies with the parties that might be affected by rules under development. These initiatives ask that agencies seek input earlier in the process, rather than waiting for the public to comment on proposals published in the Federal Register. A final shared strength of many of these initiatives, and one closely connected to the three previous items, is that they help to improve the transparency of the regulatory process. In prior work, we have cited transparency as a regulatory best practice. By providing more information about potential effects and alternatives, requiring more documentation and justification of agencies' decisions, and facilitating public access to and queries about such information, regulatory reform initiatives can help make the process more open. We recommended that more could be done to increase transparency, and we have also highlighted the value of transparency when agencies had particularly clear and complete documentation supporting their rule making. As the Administrator of OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) pointed out, openness can help to "transform the public debate about regulation to one of substance ... rather than process." Despite these strengths, the overall results and effectiveness of regulatory reform initiatives have often been mixed. This may be particularly true when results of the initiatives are compared to the goals and purposes originally established for them. For example, despite the goals set for the reduction of paperwork burdens under PRA, we have repeatedly testified about the growth in burden hours imposed by federal information collections. We similarly reported that initiatives such as UMRA, the executive order on federalism, and requirements imposed under Section 610 of RFA for reviews of existing rules, have had little impact on agencies' rule making. Our reviews have identified at least four general reasons that might explain why reform initiatives have not been more effective: (1) the limited scope and coverage of various requirements, (2) lack of clarity regarding key terms and definitions, (3) uneven implementation of the initiatives' requirements, and (4) a predominant focus on just one part of the regulatory process, agencies' development of rules. First, we have pointed out significant limits in the scope and coverage of certain reform initiatives. UMRA provides one example of the effect of definitional limitations, exceptions, and thresholds on restricting an initiative's coverage. As we noted in a report last year, part of the reason for the relatively small number of rules identified as containing mandates under UMRA could be traced to 14 different restrictions on the identification of federal mandates under the Act. Furthermore, our analysis of all 122 major or economically significant rules (generally, rules with an impact of $100 million or more) published in 2001 and 2002 also showed that more than one of these restrictions applied to 72 percent of the 65 rules that were not identified as containing federal mandates under UMRA but nonetheless appeared to result in significant financial effects on nonfederal parties. UMRA, along with RFA, also illustrates the potential domino effect of building reform requirements on other procedural requirements. Both acts only apply to rules for which an agency publishes a notice of proposed rule making. However, agencies can publish final regulatory actions without notices of proposed rule making using either good cause, categorical, or statute-specific exceptions to the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment requirements. In one of our prior reports, we estimated that about half of all final regulatory actions published by agencies were issued without going through the proposed rule stage. Although many final rules without proposed rules were minor actions, in both that analysis and our recent UMRA review there were major rules that did not have notices of proposed rule making. Another recurring message in our reports has been the effect of unclear terms and definitions that affect the applicability of requirements. Combined with the discretion given rule-making agencies to interpret the requirements in reform initiatives, it is not surprising that we have observed uneven implementation across agencies. In particular, we have often cited the need to clarify key terms in the Regulatory Flexibility Act. RFA requires analyses and other actions to help address concerns about the impact of regulations on small entities, but the requirements do not apply if the agency head certifies that the agency's rule will not have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." However, the Act neither defines this key phrase nor places clear responsibility on any party to define it consistently across government. As a result, we found that agencies had different interpretations of RFA's requirements. We said in a series of reports that, if Congress wanted to strengthen the implementation of RFA, it should consider amending the Act to define the key phrases or provide some other entity with clearer authority and responsibility to interpret RFA's provisions. To date, Congress has not acted on our recommendations. Again, there is a domino effect associated with this uncertainty, because other reform initiatives, such as the requirement for agencies to review existing rules under Section 610 of RFA and a requirement to provide compliance assistance guides to regulated entities, only apply if an agency has determined the rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Sometimes, though, it might not be uncertainty over the provisions of an initiative that help to limit its effectiveness, but rather an agency's implementation of the requirements. For example, as noted in our recent report on the Paperwork Reduction Act, one of the provisions aimed at helping to achieve the goals of minimizing burden while maximizing utility is a requirement for chief information officers (CIO) to review and certify information collections. However, our analysis of case studies showed that CIOs provided these certifications despite often missing or inadequate support from the program offices sponsoring the collections. We recommended that OMB clarify the kinds of support it asks agency CIOs to provide for certifications and that heads of certain agencies direct responsible CIOs to strengthen agency support for CIO certifications, including with regard to the necessity of collection, burden reduction efforts, and plans for the use of information collected. Our reports over the years have also highlighted issues regarding agencies' implementation of analytical requirements, such as the economic analyses that support regulations. Although the economic performance of some federal actions is assessed prospectively, few federal actions are monitored for their economic performance retrospectively. In addition, our reviews have found that economic assessments that analyze regulations prospectively are often incomplete and inconsistent with general economic principles. Moreover, the assessments are not always useful for comparisons across the government, because they are often based on different assumptions for the same key economic variables. In our recent report on UMRA, we noted that parties from various sectors expressed concerns about the accuracy and completeness of agencies' cost estimates, and some also emphasized that more needed to be done to address the benefits side of the equation. Our reviews have found that not all benefits are quantified and monetized by agencies, partly because of the difficulty in estimation. Finally, although not an explicit finding in any of our reports, it is clear when stepping back to look at the big picture presented by the set of reform initiatives and our body of regulatory work that these initiatives primarily target one particular phase of the regulatory process, agencies' development of rules. While rule making is clearly an important point in the process when the specific substance and impact of regulations are most open to public debate, other phases also help determine the effectiveness of regulation. Few of the reform initiatives contain major requirements or processes that address those other phases in the life cycle of regulations-- from the underlying statutory authorizations, through effective implementation and monitoring of compliance with regulatory provisions, to evaluation and revision of existing rules. For example, only UMRA explicitly addresses the potential effect of legislative proposals in creating mandates that would ultimately be implemented through regulations, and that element of UMRA has generally been viewed as among its most effective elements. We have reported that agencies sometimes have little rule-making discretion, so in some cases concerns raised about burdensome regulations are traceable to the statutes underlying the regulations, rather than a failure of an agency to comply with rule-making requirements. With regard to other phases in the regulatory process, RFA is unique among statutory requirements in having a provision (Section 610) for reviews of existing rules, although it is limited to rules with significant effects on small entities. Executive Order 12866 also includes some provisions to encourage agencies to review and revise existing rules. It is not clear, however, that either the Section 610 or the executive order look back provisions have been consistently and effectively implemented. As this subcommittee begins to develop its regulatory reform agenda, our body of work on regulatory issues, and also on results-oriented government management, suggests two general avenues of effort you may want to consider as useful starting points. One avenue is to revisit the procedures, definitions, exemptions, and other provisions of existing initiatives to determine whether changes might be needed to better achieve their goals. Second, the subcommittee may wish to explore options to more effectively and productively evaluate existing regulations and the results they have generated. Not only could such retrospective evaluations help to inform Congress and other policymakers about ways to improve the design of regulations and regulatory programs, but they could play a part in the overall reexamination of the base of the federal government that we have recommended in our recent work on addressing 21st century challenges. With respect to the first avenue, my testimony to this point indicates that there are ample opportunities to revisit and refine existing regulatory reform initiatives. Although progress has been made to implement recommendations and matters for consideration we have raised in our prior reports, there are still unresolved issues. In particular, Congress may want to consider whether some provisions of existing statutory initiatives need to be amended to make those initiatives more effective. We still believe, for example, that Congress should clarify key terms and definitions in RFA or provide another entity with the authority and responsibility to do so. We also believe there is some value to taking a broader look at how all of the pieces of existing initiatives have, or have not, contributed to achieving the purposes intended. For example, we suggested in our recent review of PRA that a new approach might be required to address burden reduction. As illustrated by our work on lessons learned about UMRA in the 10 years since it was enacted, such reviews can reveal opportunities and options for both reinforcing the strengths and addressing the weaknesses that have emerged in practice. The options can take a number of different directions. For example, in our work on UMRA, concerns about the scope of coverage were most frequently raised by the many knowledgeable parties we consulted, but issues and options were also identified regarding enforcement, consultation, and the analytic framework, among other topics. In undertaking reviews of existing initiatives, it will be important to also revisit the reasons why particular limitations and exceptions were included in the initiatives to begin with. As pointed out in the UMRA work, this probably needs to be an inclusive effort to be successful, involving all affected parties in the debate to find common ground if changes are to be accepted. The second broad avenue I would suggest the subcommittee consider in its reform agenda would be to explore using retrospective evaluations of existing regulations. Such evaluations could help to keep the regulatory process focused on results and identify ways to better meet emerging challenges. Among the potential benefits of more retrospective analysis of federal regulations are that it could enable policymakers to better gauge actual benefits and costs and whether regulations are achieving their desired goals, bring additional accountability to the regulatory process, identify opportunities to revise existing regulations, and provide information that could lead to better decisions regarding future regulations. In our work this year on both UMRA and economic performance measures, we clearly heard from the experts we consulted that they believe more retrospective analysis is needed and, further, that there are ways to improve the quality and credibility of the analyses that are done. In the UMRA work, parties had particularly strong views about the need for better evaluation and research of federal mandates, including those imposed by regulations. The most frequently suggested option to address this issue was to do more postimplementation evaluation of existing mandates or "look backs" at their effectiveness. As one of the parties pointed out, retrospective evaluation of regulations is useful because rules can change people's behavior in ways that cannot be predicted prior to implementation. In our recent workshop where we obtained the views of experts about the use of economic performance measures, such as a comparison of benefits and costs (net benefits) and cost-effectiveness, participants identified several gaps in the application of these measures to analyze federal regulations and programs. For example, while some agencies have done retrospective economic performance assessments, the participants said that in general federal agencies often do not assess the performance of regulations or existing programs retrospectively, even though this information could be useful in managing programs. However, there are also challenges to effectively implementing retrospective evaluations. For example, we previously identified some of the difficulties regulatory agencies face in demonstrating the results of their work, such as identifying and collecting the data needed to demonstrate results, the diverse and complex factors that affect agencies' results (for example, the need to achieve results through the actions of third parties), and the long time period required to see results in some areas of federal regulation. There is also a potential balance concern because, as I noted earlier, it may be more difficult to quantify the benefits of regulations than it is to quantify the costs. Finally, I want to emphasize that this is a particularly timely point to be reviewing the regulatory process because of the long-term fiscal imbalance facing the United States, along with other significant trends and challenges. The 21st century challenges that we have been highlighting this year establish the case for change and the need to reexamine the base of the federal government and all of its existing programs, policies, functions, and activities. We recognize that a successful reexamination of the base of the federal government will entail multiple approaches over a period of years. No single approach or reform can address all of the questions and program areas that need to be revisited. However, federal regulation is a critical tool of government, and regulatory programs play a key part in how the federal government addresses many of the country's needs. Asking the questions necessary to begin reexamining the federal regulatory process is an important first step in the long-term effort to transform what the federal government does and how it does it. Madam Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on these important issues. I would be pleased to address any questions you or other members of the subcommittee might have at this time. If additional information is needed regarding this testimony, please contact J. Christopher Mihm, Managing Director, Strategic Issues, at (202) 512-6806 or mihmj@gao.gov. Congresses and Presidents have taken a number of actions to refine and reform the regulatory process within the past 25 years. The following paragraphs summarize the general purpose, applicability, and requirements imposed by some of those regulatory reform initiatives. PRA was originally enacted in 1980, then amended in 1986 and 1995. PRA requires agencies to justify any collection of information from the public in order to minimize the paperwork burden they impose and to maximize the practical utility of the information collected. The Act applies to independent and nonindependent regulatory agencies. Under PRA, agencies are required to submit all proposed information collections to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval. In their submissions, agencies must establish the need and intended use of the information, estimate the burden that the collection will impose on respondents, and show that the collection is the least burdensome way to gather the information. PRA also established the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within OMB to provide central agency leadership and oversight of government efforts to reduce unnecessary paperwork and improve the management of information resources. Subsequent reform initiatives, including amendments of PRA, have added responsibilities for OIRA, such as making the office responsible for overseeing and reporting on agencies' compliance with new regulatory requirements. PRA of 1995, for example, included a requirement that OIRA, in consultation with agency heads, set annual governmentwide goals for the reduction of information collection burdens. RFA was enacted in response to concerns about the effect that federal regulations can have on small entities. RFA requires independent and nonindependent regulatory agencies to assess the impact of their rules on "small entities," defined as including small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and certain small not-for-profit organizations. Under RFA an agency must prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis at the time proposed rules are issued unless the head of the agency determines that the proposed rule would not have a "significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities." The Act also requires agencies to ensure that small entities have an opportunity to participate in the rule- making process and requires the Chief Counsel of the Small Business Administration's Office of Advocacy to monitor agencies' compliance. Further, Section 610 of RFA requires agencies to review existing rules within 10 years of promulgation that have or will have a significant impact on small entities to determine whether they should be continued without change or amended or rescinded to minimize their impact on small entities. Congress amended RFA in 1996 with SBREFA. SBREFA made certain agency actions under RFA judicially reviewable. Other provisions in SBREFA added new requirements. For example, SBREFA requires agencies to develop one or more compliance guides for each final rule or group of related final rules for which the agency is required to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis, and the Act requires agencies to provide small entities with some form of relief from civil monetary penalties. SBREFA also requires the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to convene advocacy review panels before publishing an initial regulatory flexibility analysis. UMRA was enacted to address concerns about federal statutes and regulations that require nonfederal parties to expend resources to achieve legislative goals without being provided funding to cover the costs. UMRA generates information about the nature and size of potential federal mandates but does not preclude the implementation of such mandates. UMRA applies to proposed federal mandates in both legislation and regulations, but it does not apply to rules published by independent regulatory agencies. With regard to the regulatory process, UMRA requires federal agencies to prepare written statements containing a "qualitative and quantitative assessment of the anticipated costs and benefits" for any rule for which a proposed rule was published that includes a federal mandate that may result in the expenditure of $100 million or more in any 1 year by state, local, and tribal governments in the aggregate, or by the private sector. For such rules, agencies are to identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and from those select the least costly, most cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the rule (or explain why that alternative was not selected). UMRA also includes a consultation requirement that agencies develop a process to permit elected officers of state, local, and tribal governments (or their designees) to provide input in the development of regulatory proposals containing significant intergovernmental mandates. CRA was enacted as part of SBREFA in 1996 to better ensure that Congress has an opportunity to review, and possibly reject, rules before they become effective. CRA established expedited procedures by which members of Congress may disapprove agencies' rules by introducing a resolution of disapproval that, if adopted by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, can nullify an agency's rule. CRA applies to rules issued by nonindependent and independent regulatory agencies. CRA requires agencies to file final rules with both Congress and GAO before the rules can become effective. GAO's role under CRA is to provide Congress with a report on each major rule (for example, rules with a $100 million impact on the economy) including GAO's assessment of the issuing agency's compliance with the procedural steps required by various acts and executive orders governing the rule-making process. Congress enacted GPEA in 1998, and the Act promoted the expansion of a trend in the federal government toward using e-government applications to collect and disseminate information and forms. GPEA requires federal agencies to provide the public, when practicable, the option of submitting, maintaining, and disclosing required information--such as employment records, tax forms, and loan applications--electronically, instead of on paper. GPEA also requires agencies to guard the privacy and protect documents from being altered and encourages federal government use of a range of electronic signature alternatives when practicable. In 2000, Congress enacted TIRA to provide a mechanism for Congress to obtain more information about certain rules. TIRA contemplated a 3-year pilot project during which GAO would perform independent evaluations of "economically significant" agency rules when requested by a chairman or ranking member of a committee of jurisdiction of either House of Congress. The independent evaluation would include an evaluation of the agency's analysis of the potential benefits, potential costs, and alternative approaches considered during the rule-making proceeding. Under TIRA, GAO was required to report on its evaluations within 180 calendar days after receiving a committee request. Section 6(b) of the Act, however, provided that the pilot project would continue only if, in each fiscal year, a specific annual appropriation was made. During the 3-year period contemplated for the pilot project, Congress did not enact any specific appropriation to cover TIRA evaluations, and the authority for the 3-year pilot project expired on January 15, 2004. Congress has considered reauthorizing TIRA, and we have strongly urged that any reauthorization of TIRA continue to contain language requiring a specific annual appropriation before we are required to undertake independent evaluations of major rule makings. We have also recommended that TIRA evaluations be conducted under a pilot project basis. Enacted in Section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2001, the Information Quality Act directed OMB to issue governmentwide guidelines to ensure and maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by federal agencies. The Act requires OMB to issue guidelines directing all agencies to issue their own guidelines within 1 year and to establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency. The Act also requires agencies to report periodically to the Director of OMB on the number and nature of complaints received and how such complaints were handled by the agency. The E-Government Act was intended to enhance the management and promotion of electronic government services and processes. With regard to the regulatory process, the Act requires agencies, to the extent practicable, to accept public comments on proposed rules by electronic means. The Act also requires agencies to ensure that publicly accessible federal Web sites contain electronic dockets for their proposed rules, including all comments submitted on the rules and other relevant materials. The E-Government Act also established an Office of Electronic Government within OMB, headed by an administrator appointed by the President. In addition to congressional regulatory reform initiatives enacted in statutes, it is important to also recognize the key role that presidential initiatives have in the regulatory process. Centralized review of agencies' regulations within the Executive Office of the President has been part of the rule-making process for more than 30 years. The formal process by which OIRA currently reviews agencies' proposed rules and final rules is essentially unchanged since Executive Order 12866 was issued in 1993. Under Executive Order 12866, OIRA reviews significant proposed and final rules from all agencies, other than independent regulatory agencies, before they are published in the Federal Register. The executive order states, among other things, that agencies should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including both quantitative and qualitative measures. It also provides that agencies should select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (unless a statute requires another approach). Among other principles, the executive order encourages agencies to tailor regulations to impose the least burden on society needed to achieve the regulatory objectives. The executive order also established agency and OIRA responsibilities in the review of regulations, including transparency requirements. OIRA provides guidance to federal agencies on implementing the requirements of the executive order, such as guidance on preparing economic analyses required for significant rules. There are also other orders that impose requirements on agencies during rule making, such as Executive Order 13132 on federalism that requires agencies to prepare a federalism summary impact statement for actions that have federalism implications. Also, in January 2005, OMB published a final bulletin on peer review that establishes minimum standards for when peer review is required for scientific information, including stricter minimum standards for the peer review of "highly influential" scientific assessments, and the types of peer review that should be considered by agencies in different circumstances. The selection of an appropriate peer review mechanism is left to the agency's discretion. More detailed information about these various initiatives is available in the related GAO products listed at the end of this testimony. Economic Performance: Highlights of a Workshop on Economic Performance Measures. GAO-05-796SP. Washington, D.C.: July 2005. Paperwork Reduction Act: New Approach May Be Needed to Reduce Government Burden on Public. GAO-05-424. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2005. Unfunded Mandates: Views Vary About Reform Act's Strengths, Weaknesses, and Options for Improvement. GAO-05-454. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government. GAO-05-325SP. Washington, D.C.: February 2005. Electronic Government: Federal Agencies Have Made Progress Implementing the E-Government Act of 2002. GAO-05-12. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2004. Unfunded Mandates: Analysis of Reform Act Coverage. GAO-04-637. Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2004. Paperwork Reduction Act: Agencies' Paperwork Burden Estimates Due to Federal Actions Continue to Increase. GAO-04-676T. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2004. Rulemaking: OMB's Role in Reviews of Agencies' Draft Rules and the Transparency of Those Reviews. GAO-03-929. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2003. Electronic Rulemaking: Efforts to Facilitate Public Participation Can Be Improved. GAO-03-901. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2003. Civil Penalties: Agencies Unable to Fully Adjust Penalties for Inflation Under Current Law. GAO-03-409. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003. Regulatory Flexibility Act: Clarification of Key Terms Still Needed. GAO- 02-491T. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2002. Regulatory Reform: Compliance Guide Requirement Has Had Little Effect on Agency Practices. GAO-02-172. Washington, D.C.: December 28, 2001. Federal Rulemaking: Procedural and Analytical Requirements at OSHA and Other Agencies. GAO-01-852T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2001. Regulatory Reform: Implementation of Selected Agencies' Civil Penalties Relief Policies for Small Entities. GAO-01-280. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2001. Regulatory Flexibility Act: Implementation in EPA Program Offices and Proposed Lead Rule. GAO/GGD-00-193. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2000. Electronic Government: Government Paperwork Elimination Act Presents Challenges for Agencies. GAO/AIMD-00-282. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2000. Regulatory Reform: Procedural and Analytical Requirements in Federal Rulemaking. GAO/T-GGD/OGC-00-157. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2000. Federalism: Previous Initiatives Have Little Effect on Agency Rulemaking. GAO/T-GGD-99-131. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 1999. Regulatory Accounting: Analysis of OMB's Reports on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulation. GAO/GGD-99-59. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1999. Regulatory Flexibility Act: Agencies' Interpretations of Review Requirements Vary. GAO/GGD-99-55. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 1999. Regulatory Burden: Some Agencies' Claims Regarding Lack of Rulemaking Discretion Have Merit. GAO/GGD-99-20. Washington, D.C.: January 8, 1999. Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Often Published Final Actions Without Proposed Rules. GAO/GGD-98-126. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 1998. Regulatory Management: Implementation of Selected OMB Responsibilities Under the Paperwork Reduction Act. GAO/GGD-98-120. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 1998. Regulatory Reform: Agencies Could Improve Development, Documentation, and Clarity of Regulatory Economic Analyses. GAO/RCED-98-142. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 1998. Regulatory Reform: Implementation of Small Business Advocacy Review Panel Requirements. GAO/GGD-98-36. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 1998. Congressional Review Act: Implementation and Coordination. GAO/T- OGC-98-38. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 1998. Regulatory Reform: Agencies' Section 610 Review Notices Often Did Not Meet Statutory Requirements. GAO/T-GGD-98-64. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 1998. Unfunded Mandates: Reform Act Has Had Little Effect on Agencies' Rulemaking Actions. GAO/GGD-98-30. Washington, D.C.: February 4, 1998. Regulatory Reform: Changes Made to Agencies' Rules Are Not Always Clearly Documented. GAO/GGD-98-31. Washington, D.C.: January 8, 1998. Regulatory Reform: Agencies' Efforts to Eliminate and Revise Rules Yield Mixed Results. GAO/GGD-98-3. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 1997. Managing for Results: Regulatory Agencies Identified Significant Barriers to Focusing on Results. GAO-GGD-97-83. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 1997. Regulatory Burden: Measurement Challenges and Concerns Raised by Select Companies. GAO/GGD-97-2. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 1996. Regulatory Reform: Implementation of the Regulatory Review Executive Order. GAO/T-GGD-96-185. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 1996. Regulatory Flexibility Act: Status of Agencies' Compliance. GAO/GGD-94- 105. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 1994.

Summary:
Federal regulation is a basic tool of government. Agencies issue thousands of rules and regulations each year to achieve goals such as ensuring that workplaces, air travel, and foods are safe; that the nation's air, water and land are not polluted; and that the appropriate amount of taxes are collected. The costs of these regulations are estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, and the benefits estimates are even higher. Over the past 25 years, a variety of congressional and presidential regulatory reform initiatives have been instituted to refine the federal regulatory process. This testimony discusses findings from the large number of GAO reports and testimonies prepared at the request of Congress to review the implementation of regulatory reform initiatives. Specifically, GAO discusses common strengths and weaknesses of existing reform initiatives that its work has identified. GAO also addresses some general opportunities to reexamine and refine existing initiatives and the federal regulatory process to make them more effective. GAO's prior reports and testimonies contain a variety of recommendations to improve particular reform initiatives and aspects of the regulatory process. GAO's evaluations of regulatory reform initiatives indicate that some of these initiatives have yielded mixed results. Among the goals of the initiatives are reducing regulatory burden, requiring more rigorous regulatory analysis, and enhancing oversight. The initiatives have been beneficial in a number of ways, but they also were often less effective than anticipated. GAO's reviews suggest at least four overall strengths or benefits associated with existing initiatives: (1) increasing the attention directed to rules and rule making, (2) increasing expectations regarding the analytical support for proposed rules, (3) encouraging and facilitating greater public participation in rule making, and (4) improving the transparency of the rule-making process. On the other hand, at least four recurring reasons help explain why reform initiatives have not been more effective: (1) limited scope and coverage of various requirements, (2) lack of clarity regarding key terms and definitions, (3) uneven implementation of the initiatives' requirements, and (4) a predominant focus on just one part of the regulatory process, agencies' development of rules. As Congress develops its regulatory reform agenda, the lessons and opportunities identified by GAO's body of work suggest two avenues that might provide a useful starting point. The first would be to broadly revisit the procedures, definitions, exemptions, and other provisions of existing initiatives to determine whether changes are needed to better achieve their goals. As a second avenue to explore, GAO's reviews found that the regulatory process could benefit from more attention to evaluations of existing regulations, although recognizing some of the difficulties associated with carrying out such evaluations. The lessons that could be learned from retrospective reviews could help to keep the regulatory process focused on results and inform future action to meet emerging challenges. This is a particularly timely point to be reviewing the regulatory process. The long-term fiscal imbalance facing the United States, along with other significant trends and challenges, establishes the case for change and the need to reexamine the base of the federal government and all of its existing programs, policies, functions, and activities. No single approach or reform can address all of the questions and program areas that need to be revisited. However, federal regulation is a critical tool of government, and regulatory programs play a key part in how the federal government addresses many of the country's needs. Therefore, reassessing the regulatory framework must be part of that long-term effort to transform what the federal government does and how it does it.