In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy impacted a wide swath of the East Coast of the United States. President Obama had, as of January 31, 2013, declared major disasters for 12 states plus the District of Columbia under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.). The Obama Administration submitted a request to Congress on December 7, 2012, for $60.4 billion in supplemental funding and legislative provisions to address both the immediate losses and damages from Hurricane Sandy, as well as to mitigate the damage from future disasters in the impacted region. The Administration's proposal included $47.44 billion in funding for a range of disaster assistance, and $12.97 billion specifically for mitigation of damage from potential future storms and flooding. Budget authority of $55 billion was requested as emergency funding, while $5.4 billion was requested as disaster relief under the Budget Control Act (BCA). On December 17, 2012, S.Amdt. 3338 , entitled the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, was introduced as an amendment to H.R. 1 of the 112 th Congress. This bill was a continuing resolution that had previously passed the House of Representatives, and served as the Senate legislative vehicle for disaster relief supplemental appropriations. On December 19, the amendment was withdrawn and S.Amdt. 3395 , with the same title and overall cost, was offered in its place. This legislation would have provided $60.41 billion in supplemental appropriations for disaster assistance, as well as a suite of legislative provisions that included reforms to disaster assistance authorities. The Senate amendment did not explicitly separate all its mitigation provisions from other relief appropriations, although it did reference some funding as being for mitigation. Budget authority of $55 billion in the legislation was designated as emergency funding, while $5.379 billion in funding for the Disaster Relief Fund would have been designated as being for disaster relief under the BCA. A budget point of order was upheld against part of the legislation, removing the emergency designation from $3.461 billion of construction funding for the Army Corps of Engineers. The Senate made several changes to the amendment (which was passed by voice vote), and then passed the supplemental appropriations legislation on December 28, 2012, by a vote of 62-32. The House did not act on the legislation before the end of the 112 th Congress. However, one facet of the Obama Administration's request did become law during the 112 th Congress. The Administration had sought a legislative provision to increase the bond limit for the Small Business Administration's Surety Bond Guarantees Revolving Fund. A provision increasing the bond limit to $6.5 million, and up to $10 million if a federal contracting officer certified it was necessary, was included in P.L. 112-239 , the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. On January 4, 2013, the House and Senate both passed H.R. 41 , legislation providing an additional $9.7 billion in borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which had been a part of the Obama Administration's request. The President signed it into law as P.L. 113-1 on January 6, 2013. H.R. 152 , which included another portion of the Obama Administration's supplemental request, was introduced on January 4, 2013, and an amendment was filed that same day that included additional portions. The House Appropriations Committee described H.R. 152 as including $17 billion "to meet immediate and critical needs," and described the amendment as including $33 billion "funding for longer-term recovery efforts and infrastructure improvements that will help prevent damage caused by future disasters." On January 7, an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 152 which contained some minor textual changes, along with a restructured "long-term recovery" amendment, was posted on the House Rules Committee website. The House took up the legislation on January 15, 2013. The amendment with long-term recovery funding passed with several amendments, and the amended bill passed the House by a vote of 241-180. The rule for consideration of the bill combined H.R. 219 , a House-passed package of legislative provisions reforming disaster assistance programs, with the appropriations legislation upon engrossment of H.R. 152 , and sent them to the Senate as a single package. The Senate passed H.R. 152 unchanged on January 28, 2013 by a vote of 62-36, and it was signed into law as P.L. 113-2 the next day. Table 1 below outlines the Obama Administration's request for supplemental funding and mitigation funding in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, and the congressional response to those requests. All figures are in millions of dollars of budget authority. The Obama Administration's request is shown by appropriations subcommittee in Table 1 . Unlike in the Administration's request, no distinction is made in this table between requested mitigation funding and recovery funding. A breakdown of the Administration's request that illuminates the Administration's separate request for mitigation funding is included in CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief . Headers in bold italics note the appropriations subcommittee of jurisdiction, followed by the department or independent agency in bold capitals. Two columns then specify where a given appropriation is going, by bureau, if applicable, then account or program. The Obama Administration's request is next, in millions of dollars of budget authority, followed by the appropriations that would have been provided if Senate-amended H.R. 1 from the 112 th Congress had been enacted. This is provided only for historical reference, as the bill expired with the end of the 112 th Congress. The last column reflects the amount of funding provided in H.R. 152 as it passed both House and Senate and was ultimately signed into law. Where accounts are funded through transfers, that number is shown in the table and the donor account is reduced accordingly. Note that all funding levels in the enacted column show the resources provided by P.L. 113-2 : those resources were ultimately reduced by the sequestration required on March 1, 2013, under the provisions of the BCA, as amended. That sequestration required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to implement across-the-board spending cuts at the account and program level to achieve equal budget reductions from both defense and nondefense funding, under terms specified in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA), as amended by the BCA. The amount and implementation of those reductions was unclear at the time P.L. 113-2 was enacted. The Budget Control Act (BCA) changed the way Congress accounted for federal funding for disaster response and recovery. In previous years, Congress provided funds over and above limits on discretionary appropriations by designating additional appropriations as being for emergency needs. Budget authority provided in this manner did not count against funding limitations on discretionary spending in budget resolutions. Although the BCA included legislation allowing for emergency appropriations, the new law included provisions that outlined separate treatment for disaster relief, as distinct from emergency funding. Funding designated as disaster relief in future spending bills could be "paid for" by adjusting upward the discretionary spending caps. This allowable adjustment for disaster relief is limited, however, to an amount based on the 10-year rolling average of what has been spent by the federal government on relief efforts for major disasters. This disaster relief allowable adjustment for FY2013 was $11.8 billion. Under the continuing resolution signed into law on September 28, 2012 ( P.L. 112-175 ), the amount of disaster relief (as defined under the BCA) that would be provided if the resolution were extended for the full fiscal year was $6.4 billion. This was the first time under the BCA that in the wake of a major disaster more relief funding was sought than could be accommodated under the allowable adjustment. The Administration proposed designating all of the supplemental funding it sought as an emergency requirement, with the exception of a portion of the request for the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which would be designated as being for disaster relief under the BCA. The Administration noted in the letter accompanying the request that it was unclear how much of the disaster relief allowable adjustment might be available pending the finalization of general FY2013 appropriations, and that therefore these numbers could require adjustment. Senate-passed H.R. 1 proposed that $5,379 million in DRF funding be designated for disaster relief under the BCA, with all but $3,461 million (for Army Corps of Engineers construction activities) of the remaining funding in the bill designated as emergency funding. P.L. 113-2 contained $41,669 million in emergency funding, $5,379 million for the DRF designated as disaster relief, and $3,461 million for Army Corps of Engineers construction activities that would count against the discretionary budget caps. One potential method for accommodating disaster response and recovery costs beyond the allowable adjustment for disaster relief would be offsetting the additional spending through rescissions or other means that would reduce the net budgetary scoring of the bill. Traditionally, supplemental funding for the DRF has been treated as emergency spending--it was not counted against discretionary budget caps, nor was an offset required. However, supplemental spending packages have at times carried rescissions or transfers that have offset, to one degree or another, the budgetary impact of other forms of disaster assistance that could be defined as "disaster relief" under the BCA. Of the 59 bills passed with supplemental appropriations from 1990 to the end of 2012, 6 were fully offset by rescissions. Only one of those actually provided net additional resources for the DRF--the Emergency Supplemental and Rescissions for Antiterrorism and Oklahoma City Disaster, 1995 ( P.L. 104-19 ). In other cases, the DRF was used as an offset for disaster assistance provided through other federal entities. Offsetting the Obama Administration's supplemental request in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, however, would have been complicated by two key factors. First, as the federal government was operating under a continuing resolution, there was no baseline appropriation in the current fiscal year from which to offset. It is also worth noting the scale of the offset that would have been required: had the request been an FY2012 annual appropriations bill, it would have been the fourth largest of the group. The budget authority sought in the request exceeded the size of the three smallest appropriations bills from that year combined--even if none of the nearly $13 billion in the Administration's mitigation request were counted. The Obama Administration's request, Senate-passed H.R. 1 , and P.L. 113-2 did not include offsets, and the Administration's request letter and Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 152 specifically stated the Administration's position that the funding could and should be provided without offset. However, an amendment was offered in the House to offset $17 billion of disaster assistance from H.R. 152 by making an across-the-board cut of 1.63% to FY2013 discretionary spending. This amendment did not pass by a vote of 162-258. A Senate amendment to offset the entire cost of H.R. 152 through reducing the caps on discretionary spending through FY2021 also was not agreed to by a vote of 35-62. When the Senate struck the emergency designation for Army Corps of Engineers construction activities, it allowed $3,461 million of Senate-passed H.R. 1 to count against the FY2013 discretionary budget caps. P.L. 113-2 gave the same treatment to the $3,461 million it provides for Army Corps of Engineers construction. This means that $3,461 million in discretionary budget authority that would have been available to resolve the FY2013 regular appropriations legislation has been expended, and the final resolution of the FY2013 appropriations process had to accommodate that reality to avoid violating the budget caps. It is not common practice to have a supplemental appropriations bill focus on a single event to the exclusion of all other purposes, despite the practice of colloquially naming supplemental appropriations legislation for a particular event or problem that has drawn public attention. Appropriations for the FEMA's DRF are regularly obligated to relief and recovery efforts from multiple disasters across many fiscal years, regardless of the legislative vehicle that provided them. More than 80% of the individual appropriations in P.L. 113-2 had uniform explicit language accompanying them that specified the funding provided was "for necessary expenses related to the consequences of Hurricane Sandy." Of the ten appropriations which did not carry that specific language, seven of them (including the three largest appropriations in the act) were either for disaster relief-specific programs or carried language limiting the usage of the entire appropriation provided to disaster relief and recovery activities. All instances of funding in P.L. 113-2 not covered by the uniform controlling language are shown in Table 2 , along with explanatory notes. In cases where controlling language accompanied the appropriation it is highlighted with bold type. As Congress debated the provision of supplemental funding in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, some commentators compared the scope and magnitude of Hurricane Sandy to past disasters. Generally, comparisons were drawn to other major disasters in recent memory, including Hurricane Irene of 2011 because of the similarities in geographic region impacted, and Hurricanes Katrina of 2005 and Andrew of 1992 because of their scope and magnitude of damage. Some comparisons spoke to the loss of life, others to the disruption of daily activities of citizens, and other to the relative impacts on the local and regional economies. While these comparisons helped provide a level of perspective on the scale of devastation, it is important to note that all disasters, and especially disasters of the magnitude of Hurricane Sandy, are produced by a set of unique circumstances that result in an equally unique set of needs for assistance from the federal government. Two major concepts may be useful to keep in mind when comparing the need for federal assistance following disasters. First, because of the principles of federalism in emergency management--that the federal government generally provides assistance to supplement the work of state, tribal, and local governments only after they become overwhelmed and only at their request--the varying capabilities of a state/tribal/local government can change the types and scope of assistance provided by the federal government. This issue was discussed by former Administrator of FEMA, Craig Fugate, in testimony on Hurricane Sandy. In reference to the denial of an application for one form of disaster assistance (individual assistance), Fugate explained that decisions to provide federal assistance are based not upon the need of any particular individual, but upon the need of the state as a whole and whether the state is capable of addressing that need without federal assistance. Second, the relative levels of federal assistance required for each disaster depend on the proportional impact to various sectors of the community. For example, a particular disaster may destroy one community's business district and overwhelm the ability of the state to respond to that impact, while another may significantly damage the majority of the community's public facilities. In the first disaster, the assistance from the federal government may be noteworthy for the relatively large amount of loan assistance provided by the Small Business Administration, while the second disaster may be noteworthy for the relatively large amount of assistance provided through the FEMA's Public Assistance (PA) program. Some additional disaster-specific factors that may inhibit the comparability of disasters include: The comparative density and socioeconomic status of the impacted populations; The percentage of properties and private/public losses that were insured, and the adequacy of the insurance coverage; and The number of jurisdictions impacted by the disasters, and whether these jurisdictions span multiple states requiring greater federal coordination of the response and recovery effort.

Summary:
On January 29, 2013, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, a $50.5 billion package of disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy, was enacted as P.L. 113-2. In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy impacted a wide swath of the East Coast of the United States, resulting in more than 120 deaths and major disaster declarations for 12 states plus the District of Columbia. The Obama Administration submitted a request to Congress on December 7, 2012, for $60.4 billion in supplemental funding and legislative provisions to address both the immediate losses and damages from Hurricane Sandy, as well as to mitigate the damage from future disasters in the impacted region. On January 15, 2013, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 152, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013. This bill included $50.5 billion in disaster assistance. This was the third piece of disaster legislation considered by the House during the first month of the 113th Congress. H.R. 41, which passed the House and Senate on January 4, 2013 and was signed into law two days later as P.L. 113-1, provided $9.7 billion in additional borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program. On January 14, the House passed H.R. 219, legislation making changes to disaster assistance programs. The rule for consideration of H.R. 152 combined the text of H.R. 219 with H.R. 152 upon its engrossment, to send them to the Senate as a single package. The Senate passed H.R. 152 unchanged on January 28, 2013 by a vote of 62-36, and it was signed into law as P.L. 113-2 the next day. H.R. 152 was not the initial legislative response to the storm. In the 112th Congress, the Senate passed a separate package of disaster assistance totaling $60.4 billion, as well as several legislative provisions reforming federal disaster programs. While appropriations legislation generally originates in the House of Representatives, the Senate chose to act on the Obama Administration's request first by amending an existing piece of House-passed appropriations legislation--H.R. 1. This passed the Senate December 28, 2012, by a vote of 62-32. The House did not act on the legislation before the end of the 112th Congress. This summary report analyzes the Obama Administration's request, the initial Senate position from the 112th Congress, and H.R. 152, the legislative package developed in the House that was ultimately enacted as P.L. 113-2. This report is primarily for reference purposes. The material in it is intended to provide context to help the reader better understand how the disaster relief bill that passed in the wake of Hurricane Sandy moved through Congress at what funding it ultimately contained. The report does not track obligation of funds or discuss ongoing recovery efforts. Enacted funding levels in the report represent funding prior to the sequestration of March 2013, as how sequestration would be implemented was not clear at the time P.L. 113-2 was enacted. For details concerning the legislative provisions requested by the Obama Administration, as well as those included in Senate-amended H.R. 1, see CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief. Division B of P.L. 113-2, which amended several disaster assistance programs managed by FEMA, is discussed separately in CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013.