DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic forces to provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted; can be expendable or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Generally, UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle, a flight control station, information and retrieval or processing stations, and sometimes wheeled land vehicles that carry launch and recovery platforms. UAVs have been used in a variety of forms and for a variety of missions for many years. After the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane in 1960, certain UAVs were developed to monitor Soviet and Chinese nuclear testing. Israel used UAVs to locate Syrian radars and was able to destroy the Syrian air defense system in Lebanon in 1982. The United States has used UAVs in the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions and to attack a vehicle carrying suspected terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The United States is also considering using UAVs to assist with border security for homeland security or homeland defense. Battlefield commanders' need for real time intelligence has been a key reason for the renewed interest in UAVs. According to the Congressional Research Service, UAVs are relatively lightweight and often difficult to detect. Additional advantages include longer operational presence, greater operations and/or procurement cost-effectiveness, and no risk of loss of life of U.S. service members. DOD operates three UAV types--small, tactical, and medium altitude endurance--in its force structure. The Air Force has operated the MQ-1 Predator since 1996 in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, using a variety of sensors and satellite data links to relay information, and in an offensive combat role using Hellfire missiles. The Air Force also operates a small UAV called Desert Hawk, a 5-pound aerial surveillance system used by security personnel to improve situational awareness for force protection. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have at various times operated the RQ-2 Pioneer since 1986. Only operated by the Marine Corps today, the Pioneer provides targeting, intelligence, and surveillance. The Marine Corps also operates a small UAV called Dragon Eye for over-the-hill reconnaissance. This small, 4.5-pound UAV is currently in full-rate production. Originally envisioned to be a joint Army/Navy/Marine Corps program, the RQ-5 Hunter was cancelled in 1996 after low-rate initial production. The Army currently operates the residual Hunters for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Army also has selected the RQ-7 Shadow to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance at the brigade level, and full-rate production was approved in 2002. Another system, the Raven, a small, 4-pound UAV is being purchased commercially off the shelf by both the Army for regular unit support and the Air Force for special operations. Numerous other UAVs of various sizes remain in development. These include the RQ-4 Global Hawk, a nearly 27,000-pound, jet-powered UAV with a wing span of over 116 feet used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance over an area of up to 40,000 square nautical miles per day; the RQ-8 Fire Scout, a vertical takeoff and landing UAV weighing nearly 2,700 pounds; and the Neptune, weighing under 100 pounds with a wingspan of 7 feet and optimized for sea-based operations. In addition, congressional action in recent years has been directed toward promoting an increase in the number and type of missions on which UAVs can be used. For example, section 220 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 specifies that it shall be a goal of the armed forces that one-third of the aircraft in the operational deep strike aircraft fleet be unmanned by 2010. Moreover, in section 1034 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004, Congress mandated a DOD report of the potential for UAVs to be used for a variety of homeland security and counter drug missions. Finally, the fiscal year 2004 Defense Appropriations Conference Report directs that DOD prepare a second report by April 2004 detailing UAV requirements that are common to each of the uniformed services. Most of our prior work has focused on the development, testing, and evaluation of unmanned aerial vehicles. As recently as September 2000, we reported that DOD was deciding to procure certain UAV systems before adequate testing had been completed. We found that buying systems before successfully completing their testing had led repeatedly to defective systems that were later terminated or required costly retrofits or redesigns to achieve satisfactory performance. Conversely, when DOD focused UAV acquisition on mature technologies that proved the military utility of a given vehicle, the department had an informed knowledge base upon which to base a decision. For example, even though the Predator UAV was based on the existing Gnat 750 UAV, the department required Predator's performance to be validated. As a result, Predator moved quickly to full-rate production and, at the time of our current review, had performed a variety of operational missions successfully. Through our prior work, we have also periodically raised the question of the potential for duplication of efforts among the services and the effectiveness of overarching strategy documents and management approaches to avoid duplication and other problems. For example, in June 2003 we reported that the Air Force and Navy, which previously were independently developing unmanned combat aerial vehicles, had agreed to jointly develop a new system for offensive combat missions that met both of their needs. However, we also pointed out that while one program is more efficient than two, the participation of two services would increase the challenges of sustaining funding and managing requirements. Similarly, as early as 1988, we raised concerns about a variety of management challenges related to UAV development. At that time, various congressional committees had expressed concern about duplication in the services' UAV programs and stressed the need to acquire UAVs that could meet the requirements of more than one service, as the Air Force and Navy have recently agreed to try. In response to congressional direction, DOD developed a UAV master plan, which we reviewed at that time. We identified a number of weaknesses in the 1988 master plan, including that it (1) did not eliminate duplication, (2) continued to permit the proliferation of single-service programs, (3) did not adequately consider cost savings potential from manned and unmanned aircraft trade-offs, and (4) did not adequately emphasize the importance of common payloads among different UAV platforms. DOD generally concurred with that report and noted that it would take until 1990 to reconcile service requirements for acquiring a common family of UAVs. Since our 1988 report, the overall management of defense UAV programs has gone full circle. In 1989 the DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering set up the UAV Joint Project Office as a single DOD organization with management responsibility for UAV programs. With the Navy as the Executive Agency, within 4 years the Joint Project Office came under criticism for a lack of progress. Replacing the office in 1993, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office was created as the primary management oversight and coordination office for all departmentwide manned and unmanned reconnaissance. In 1998, however, this office also came under criticism for its management approach and slow progress in fielding UAVs. In that same year, this office was dissolved and UAV program development and acquisition management were given to the services, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence was assigned to provide oversight for the Secretary of Defense. Overall, Congress has provided funding for UAV development and procurement that exceeds the amounts requested by DOD during the past 5 fiscal years, and the services to date have obligated about 99 percent of these funds. From fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2003, DOD requested approximately $2.3 billion, and Congress, in its efforts to encourage rapid employment of UAVs by the military services, has appropriated nearly $2.7 billion to develop and acquire UAVs. In total, the services have obligated $2.6 billion of the appropriated funds. (See table 1.) Generally, the additional funding provided by Congress was targeted for specific programs and purposes, enabling the services to acquire systems at a greater rate than originally planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003 the Air Force requested $23 million to acquire 7 Predators, but Congress provided over $131 million--an increase of approximately 470 percent-- enough to acquire 29 Predators to meet operational demands in the war against terrorism. The Air Force has obligated 71 percent of the Predator 2003 funding during its first program year. About $1.8 billion (67 percent) of the money appropriated during the fiscal year 1999-2003 period went for research, development, test and evaluation of the various models, as shown in table 2. The programs were generally divided into efforts to develop tactical UAVs and medium-to-high-altitude endurance UAVs and, until 2002 when the Predator was armed, were focused on meeting surveillance and reconnaissance needs. Only three systems--the Army's Shadow and the Air Force's Predator and Global Hawk--have matured to the point where they required procurement funding during fiscal years 1999 through 2003. By fiscal year 2003, appropriations totaled nearly $880 million, as shown in table 3. DOD estimates that an additional $938 million in procurement funding will be needed through fiscal year 2005. DOD's planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide reasonable assurance that UAVs will be integrated into the force structure efficiently, although the department has taken certain positive steps to improve its management of the UAV program. Specifically, DOD created a joint UAV Planning Task Force and developed a key planning document, the UAV Roadmap 2002-2027. However, neither the Joint Task Force nor the Roadmap is sufficient to provide DOD with reasonable assurance that it is efficiently integrating UAVs into the force structure. Consequently, the individual services are developing their own UAVs without departmentwide guidance, thus increasing the risk of unnecessarily duplicating capabilities and leading to potentially higher costs and greater interoperability challenges. Since 2000 DOD has taken positive steps to improve the management of the UAV program. In October 2001 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics created the joint UAV Planning Task Force to function as the joint advocate for developing and fielding UAVs. The Task Force is the focal point to coordinate UAV efforts throughout DOD, helping to create a common vision for future UAV- related activities and to establish interoperability standards. For example, the Task Force is charged with developing and coordinating detailed UAV development plans, recommending priorities for development and procurement efforts, and providing the services and defense agencies with implementing guidance for common UAV programs. Moreover, the development of the 2002 Roadmap has been the Task Force's primary product to communicate its vision and promote UAV interoperability. The Roadmap is designed to guide U.S. military planning for UAV development from 2002 to 2027 and describes current programs, identifies potential missions for UAVs, and provides guidance on developing emerging technologies. The Roadmap is also intended to assist DOD decision makers in building a long-range strategy for UAV development and acquisition to support defense plans contained in such future planning efforts as the Quadrennial Defense Review. While the creation of the joint Task Force and the UAV Roadmap are important steps to improve management of the UAV program, they are not enough to provide reasonable assurance that DOD is developing and fielding UAVs efficiently. The UAV Roadmap does not constitute a comprehensive strategic plan for developing and integrating UAVs into force structure. Moreover, the Joint Task Force's authority is generally limited to program review and advice but is insufficient to enforce program direction. While DOD has some elements of a UAV strategic-planning approach in place, it has not established a comprehensive strategic plan or set of plans for developing and fielding UAVs across DOD. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 provides a framework for establishing strategic-planning and performance measurement in the federal government, and for ensuring that federal programs with the same or similar goals are closely coordinated and mutually reinforcing. The strategic planning requirement of this framework consists of six key components, described in table 4. When applied collectively and combined with effective leadership, the components can provide a management framework to guide major programs, efforts, and activities, including the development and integration of UAVs into the force structure. However, neither the UAV Roadmap nor other DOD guidance documents represent a comprehensive strategy to guide the development and fielding of UAVs that complement each other, perform the range of priority missions needed, and avoid duplication. DOD officials acknowledged that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has not issued any guidance that establishes an overall strategy for UAVs in DOD. While high-level DOD strategic-planning documents provide some general encouragement to pursue transformational technologies, including the development of UAVs, these documents do not provide any specific guidance on developing and integrating UAVs into the force structure. Nonetheless, the Roadmap represents a start on a strategic plan because it incorporates some of the key components of strategic planning provided by the Results Act framework as shown by the following: Long Term Goals--The Roadmap states its overall purpose and what it hopes to encourage the services to attain. The Roadmap refers to the Defense Planning Guidance's intent for UAVs as a capability and indicates that the guidance encourages the rapid advancement of this capability. At the same time, it does not clearly state DOD's overall or long-term goals for its UAV efforts. Similarly, while it states that it wants to define clear direction to the services, it does not clearly identify DOD's vision for its UAV force structure from 2002 through 2027. Approaches to Obtain Long-Term Goals--The Roadmap's Approach section provides a strategy for developing the Roadmap and meeting its goal. This approach primarily deals with identifying requirements and linking them to needed UAV payload capabilities, such as sensors and associated communication links. The approach then ties these requirements to forecasted trends in developing technologies as a means to try to develop a realistic assessment of the state of the technology in the future and the extent to which this technology will be sufficient to meet identified requirements. At the same time, however, the Roadmap does not provide a clear description of a strategy for defining how to develop and integrate UAVs into the future force structure. For example, the Roadmap does not attempt to establish UAV development or fielding priorities nor does it identify the most urgent mission-capability requirements. Moreover, without the sufficient identification of priorities, the Roadmap cannot link these priorities to current or developing UAV programs and technology. Beyond strategic planning, the Results Act calls for agencies to establish results-oriented performance measures and to collect performance data to monitor progress. The Roadmap addresses, in part, key elements of performance measurement, as shown in the following: Performance Goals--The Roadmap established 49 specific performance goals to accomplish a variety of tasks. Some of these goals are aimed at fielding transformational capabilities without specifying what missions will be supported by the new capabilities. Others are to establish joint standards and control costs. Nonetheless, of the 49 goals, only 1 deals directly with developing and fielding a specific category of UAV platform to meet a priority mission-capability requirement--suppression of enemy air defenses or strike electronic attack. The remaining goals, such as developing heavy fuel aviation engines suitable for UAVs, are predominantly associated with developing UAV or related technologies, and UAV-related standards and policies to promote more efficient and effective joint UAV operations. Thus, the Roadmap does not establish overall UAV program goals. Performance Indicators--Some of the 49 performance goals have performance indicators that could be used to evaluate progress, such as the reliability goal for decreasing the annual mishap rate for large UAVs. However, many other goals have no established indicators, such as developing standards to maximize UAV interoperability. Furthermore, the Roadmap does not establish indicators that readily assess how well the program will meet the priority mission capabilities needed by the services and theater commanders. While the Roadmap has incorporated some key strategic-planning components, it only minimally addresses the other key components. According to officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the UAV Roadmap was not intended to provide an overarching architecture for UAVs departmentwide. It does, however, provide some significant guidance for developing UAV and related technologies. In addition to the 49 separate goals, the Roadmap also provides a condensed description of DOD's current UAVs, categorizing them as operational, developmental, and other (residual and conceptual) UAV systems. The Roadmap further sought to identify current and emerging requirements for military capabilities that UAVs could address. In addition to the Roadmap, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has reviewed several UAVs and issued guidance for some systems, such as the Army's Shadow and the Air Force's Predator. According to Joint Staff officials, however, neither the Joint Staff nor the council has issued any guidance that would establish a strategic plan or overarching architecture for DOD's current and future UAVs. In addition, in June 2003 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System to provide a top-down capability-based process. Under the system, five Functional Capabilities Boards have been chartered, each representing a major warfighting capability area as follows: (1) command and control, (2) force application, (3) battle space awareness, (4) force protection, and (5) focused logistics. Each board has representatives from the services, the Combatant Commanders, and certain major functions of the Under Secretary of Defense. Each board is tasked with developing a list of capabilities needed to conduct joint operations in its respective functional area. Transformation of these capabilities is expected, and the boards are likely to identify specific capabilities that can be met by UAVs. Nonetheless, according to Joint Staff officials, these initiatives will also not result in an overarching architecture for UAVs. However, the identification of capabilities that can be met by UAVs is expected to help enhance the understanding of DOD's overall requirement for UAV capabilities. As a joint advocate for UAV efforts, the joint UAV Planning Task Force's authority is limited to program review and advice. The Task Force Director testified in March 2003 that the Task Force does not have program directive authority, but provides the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with advice and recommended actions. Without such authority, according to the Director, the Task Force seeks to influence services' programs by making recommendations to them or proposing recommended program changes for consideration by the Under Secretary. Nonetheless, according to DOD officials, the Task Force has attempted to influence the joint direction of service UAV efforts in a variety of ways, such as reviewing services' budget proposals, conducting periodic program reviews, and participating in various UAV- related task teams. For example, the Task Force has encouraged the Navy to initially consider an existing UAV rather than develop a unique UAV for its Broad Area Marine Surveillance mission. The Task Force has also worked with the Army's tactical UAV program, encouraging it to consider using the Navy's Fire Scout as an initial platform for the Future Combat Systems class IV UAV. The Task Force also regularly reviews services' UAV program budgets and, when deemed necessary, makes budget change proposals. For example, the Task Force, in conjunction with other Secretary of Defense offices, was successful in maintaining the Air Force's Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle program last year when the Air Force attempted to terminate it. The Task Force was also successful in overturning an attempt by the Navy to terminate the Fire Scout rotary wing UAV program. However, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt any of its suggestions. For example, according to the Director, no significant progress has been made in achieving better interoperability among the Services in UAV platform and sensor coordination, but work continues with the services, intelligence agencies, Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Joint Forces Command to this end. As they pursue separate UAV programs, the services and DOD agencies risk developing UAVs with duplicate capabilities, potentially leading to greater costs and increased interoperability challenges. The House Appropriation Committee, in a 2003 report, expressed concern that without comprehensive planning and review, there is no clear path toward developing a UAV force structure. Thus, the committee directed that each service provide an updated UAV roadmap. These reports were to address the services' plans for the development of UAVs and how current UAVs are being employed. Officials from each of the services indicated that their UAV roadmap was developed to primarily address their individual service's requirements and operational concepts. However, in their views, high-level DOD guidance--such as the Joint Vision 2020, National Military Strategy, and Defense Planning Guidance--did not constitute strategic plans for UAVs that would guide the development of their individual service's UAV roadmap. These officials further stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense's 2002 UAV Roadmap provided some useful guidance, especially in regard to UAV technology, but was not used to guide their UAV roadmap's development. Moreover, they did not view the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Roadmap as a departmentwide strategic plan nor an overarching architecture for integrating UAVs into the force structure. Moreover, according to the service officials developing the service-level UAV roadmaps, there was little collaboration with other services' UAV efforts. Thus, DOD has little assurance that the current approach to developing and fielding UAVs in the services will result in closely coordinated or mutually reinforcing program efforts, as recommended by the Results Act. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have tried to coordinate these efforts through the Joint UAV Planning Task Force, the absence of a guiding strategy and sufficient authority has made it difficult to have reasonable assurance that development and fielding are being done efficiently. If not managed effectively, this process can potentially lead to the development and fielding of UAVs across DOD and the services, which may unnecessarily duplicate each other. For example, the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force are individually developing small, backpackable, lightweight UAVs for over-the-horizon and force protection reconnaissance missions. Likewise, both the Marine Corps and Army are individually pursuing various medium-sized tactical UAVs with both fixed and rotary wings to accomplish a variety of missions, including tactical reconnaissance, targeting, communications relay, and force protection. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient program directive authority to implement the plan, DOD has little assurance that its investment will result in UAV programs being effectively integrated into the force structure. Consequently, DOD risks poorly integrating UAVs into the force structure, which could increase development, procurement, and logistics costs; increase the risk of future interoperability problems; and unnecessarily duplicate efforts from one service to the next. To enhance management control over the UAV program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: establish a strategic plan or set of plans that are based on mission requirements to guide UAV development and fielding by modifying the Roadmap or developing another document or documents and, at a minimum, ensure that the plan links operational requirements with development plans to ensure that the services develop systems that complement each other, will perform the range of missions needed, and avoid duplication and designate the UAV Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan; provide this organization with sufficient authority to enforce the plan's direction, and promote joint operations and the efficient expenditure of funds. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation and disagreed with the second. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense establish a strategic plan or set of plans to guide the development and fielding of UAVs by modifying the Roadmap or developing another appropriate document. DOD stated that its preferred way to address UAV planning was through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, which is a capability-based planning process at the Joint Staff level that will identify UAV capabilities as needed across the five major joint warfighting areas through the use of the Functional Capabilities Boards. We continue to believe that DOD needs a departmentwide strategic plan establishing the mission capabilities required of UAVs and the detailed strategy for effectively developing and acquiring these capabilities. DOD acknowledged that its UAV Roadmap is not a broad strategic plan. Moreover, as we pointed out in our report, DOD recognized in its UAV Roadmap the need for a focused strategic plan for UAV capabilities, stating that the Roadmap was "to assist Department of Defense decision makers in developing a long-range strategy for UAV development and acquisition in future Quadrennial Defense Reviews and other planning efforts"--a strategy that has yet to be created. Such a strategic plan would provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint UAV Planning Task Force, or other appropriate authorities with the additional leverage and guidance to ensure effective oversight of the services' development and integration of UAV capabilities into the joint warfighting force structure. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, which DOD referred to, may be a useful tool for DOD to implement its capabilities-based planning approach. However, we continue to believe that a strategic plan for UAVs would be an important element in assuring UAV decisions and development reflect decisions made within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process and are consistent with the strategic plan's intent. DOD did not concur with our recommendation to designate the UAV Planning Task Force or another appropriate organization to oversee the implementation of a UAV strategic plan and provide this organization with sufficient authority to enforce the plan's direction. In its response, DOD indicated that the Secretary of Defense already has the authority needed to accomplish the intent of our recommendation. To buttress its point, DOD identified four actions taken to influence service development, evaluation, acquisition, and fielding of certain UAVs. We acknowledge in our report that the formation of the Task Force represents a step in the right direction for DOD and that the Task Force has achieved some successes in coordinating some UAV programs. In our recent report on the Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, in fact, we gave the Task Force credit for bringing the Air Force and Navy programs together into a joint program. However, the Task Force has not always been successful. For example, no significant progress has been made in achieving better interoperability among Service UAVs and sensors. Our concern is that with UAVs assuming ever-greater importance as key enabling technologies, and with increasing sums of money being allocated for a growing number of UAV programs, DOD needs more than a coordination mechanism. It needs an organization with authority to achieve the most cost-effective development of UAVs. Consequently, we continue to believe that the recommendation is sound, and that to effectively implement a strategic plan for UAVs, the Secretary needs to designate an appropriate office with the authority to oversee and implement the strategy. DOD's comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. DOD provided technical comments, which we included in our report as appropriate. Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 14 days from its issue date. At that time,we will send copies of this report to other appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and it will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4914. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) requested, received, and used funds for major unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003, we reviewed department and service documentation for major operational UAV programs, programs that are in procurement, and programs that are under development and to be procured by 2010. Funding data were obtained from various sources. We obtained the funding levels that DOD requested for UAV programs from the justification books used to support DOD's budget requests and the DOD Comptroller's Congressional Funding tracking database. We also obtained the funding levels appropriated to service UAV programs by analyzing the services' Appropriation Status by Fiscal Year Program and Subaccounts reports. Additionally, we analyzed these reports to determine the extent to which these appropriated funds were obligated within their allowed program years. We did not conduct a comprehensive audit to reconcile the differences in appropriated and obligated funds. To assess whether DOD's approach to developing and employing UAVs ensures that UAVs will be efficiently integrated into the force structure, we reviewed key departmentwide strategic documents, such as the Defense Planning Guidance, to identify the level of DOD's strategic planning for UAVs and its impact on service planning. We discussed the level of strategic planning for UAVs with key DOD and service officials from organizations with key roles in DOD's g development, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Joint UAV Planning Task Force; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence; the Joint Requirements Oversight Council; and U.S. Joint Forces Command. We reviewed each service's current UAV roadmap and held discussions with officials from service activities involved in planning and developing their UAV force structure roadmaps. We also reviewed in detail the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002-2027, and assessed the extent to which it establishes an overall DOD management framework for developing and employing UAVs departmentwide. We used the principles embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 as criteria for assessing the UAV Roadmap. We performed our work from June 2003 to February 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition to the person named above, Fred Harrison, Lawrence E. Dixon, James Mahaffey, James Driggins, R.K. Wild, and Kenneth Patton also made major contributions to this report. Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed for Controls on Exports of Cruise Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-493T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004. Nonproliferation: Improvements Needed to Better Control Technology Exports for Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. GAO-04-175. Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2004. Defense Acquisitions: Matching Resources with Requirements Is Key to the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Program's Success. GAO-03-598. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Questionable Basis for Revisions to Shadow 200 Acquisition Strategy. GAO/NSIAD-00-204. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2000. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress of the Global Hawk Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration. GAO/NSIAD-00-78. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2000. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Demonstration Approach Has Improved Project Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 1999. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Progress toward Meeting High Altitude Endurance Aircraft Price Goals. GAO/NSIAD-99-29. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1998. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Outrider Demonstrations Will Be Inadequate to Justify Further Production. GAO/NSIAD-97-153. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1997. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DOD's Acquisition Efforts. GAO/T-NSIAD-- 97-138. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1997. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Hunter System Is Not Appropriate for Navy Fleet Use. GAO/NSIAD-96-2. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1995. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Performance of Short Range System Still in Question. GAO/NSIAD-94-65. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 1993. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: More Testing Needed Before Production of Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4, 1992. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not Fit. GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of Short Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 1990. Unmanned Vehicles: Assessment of DOD's Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Master Plan. GAO/NSIAD-89-41BR. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1988.

Summary:
The current generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has been under development for defense applications since the 1980s. UAVs were used in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003 to observe, track, target, and strike enemy forces. These successes have heightened interest in UAVs within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services. GAO was asked to (1) determine how much funding DOD requested, was appropriated, and was obligated for major UAV development efforts during fiscal years 1999-2003 and (2) assess whether DOD's approach to planning for UAVs provides reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure. During the past 5 fiscal years, Congress provided more funding for UAV development and procurement than requested by DOD, and to date the services have obligated most of these funds. To promote rapid employment of UAVs, Congress has provided nearly $2.7 billion for UAV development and procurement compared with the $2.3 billion requested by DOD. Because Congress has appropriated more funds than requested, the services are able to acquire systems at a greater rate than planned. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Air Force requested $23 million to buy 7 Predator UAVs, but Congress provided over $131 million--enough to buy 29 Predators. DOD's approach to planning for developing and fielding UAVs does not provide reasonable assurance that its investment in UAVs will facilitate their integration into the force structure efficiently, although DOD has taken positive steps to improve the UAV program's management. In 2001 DOD established a joint Planning Task Force in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To communicate its vision and promote commonality of UAV systems, in 2002, the Task Force published the UAV Roadmap, which describes current programs, identifies potential missions, and provides guidance on emerging technologies. While the Roadmap identifies guidance and priority goals for UAV development, neither it nor other key documents represent a comprehensive strategic plan to ensure that the services and DOD agencies develop systems that complement each other, perform all required missions, and avoid duplication. Moreover, the Task Force serves in an advisory capacity to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, but has little authority to enforce program direction. Service officials indicated that their service-specific planning documents were developed to meet their own needs and operational concepts without considering those of other services. Without a strategic plan and an oversight body with sufficient authority to enforce program direction, DOD risks fielding a poorly integrated UAV force structure, which could increase costs and the risk of future interoperability problems.