In the past several years, senior policymakers in both Congress and the executive branch have proposed various changes to the way in which officers in the armed forces are managed, most notably with respect to assignment and promotion. Supporters of these proposals typically deem them to be essential to building a force that can meet the challenges of emerging strategic threats, such as cyberwarfare, and to compete with the private sector for talented individuals. Some of these proposed changes would require changes to law, including provisions enacted by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). This report provides an overview of selected concepts and statutory provisions that define and shape important aspects of active duty officer personnel management along with a set of questions that policymakers may wish to consider when discussing proposed changes to current law. The topics discussed below are often inter-related, such that adjusting the parameters of one can affect the operation of others. For example, reducing the number of authorized positions at a higher grade would likely result in slower promotion timing, decreased promotion opportunity, and greater number of mandatory separations under the "up or out" provisions or individuals deciding to leave military service due to perceived lack of upward mobility. Throughout this report, reference will be made to the grade or paygrade of an officer. Table 1 below provides a summary of the various grades in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. As the Navy terms for its grades differ from the other services, this report will typically use paygrade or, if using grade, both terms separated by a slash. For example, the paygrade for an entry-level officer in all services is O-1, while the grade for such officers is ensign in the Navy and second lieutenant in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Thus, officers in this grade will be referred to in this report as either "O-1" or "second lieutenant/ensign." Title 10 United States Code, Sections 531-541. To join the military as an officer, an individual applies for an original appointment. For original appointments in grades of Captain or Lieutenant (Navy) and below, the appointment is made by the President alone. For original appointments made in the grades of Major/Lieutenant Commander through Colonel/Captain, the appointments are made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. When such an appointment is made, the individual receives a commission, a document which designates the individual as an officer of the federal government. There are four main commissioning categories: the service academies, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), and various direct commissioning programs. Although 10 U.S.C. 531 authorizes original appointments in grades up to Colonel/Captain, in practice original appointments are typically made in the grades of Second Lieutenant/Ensign. Original appointments to higher grades, known as lateral entry, are typically limited to professions where the military is primarily interested in the civilian skills of the individual. Some common examples include medical and dental officers, lawyers, and chaplains. In 2010, the Army announced a program to fill critical shortages by directly commissioning, as Captains, individuals with certain civilian skills. The specific areas of expertise included engineering, finance, intelligence, information operations, space operations, acquisition, civil affairs, and psychological operations. Prospective active duty officers must meet the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 532 for original appointments as "regular" commissioned officers. The requirements are: Must be a citizen of the United States; Must be able to complete 20 years of active commissioned service before age 62; Must be of good moral character; Must be physically qualified for active service; and Must have such other special qualifications as the Secretary of the military department concerned may prescribe by regulation. The statute does not define "good moral character" or "physically qualified for active service," but the Department of Defense provides more specific guidance in its internal regulations. Additionally, each of the military services has supplementary regulations concerning qualifications for appointment. Some examples of medical conditions that DOD considers disqualifying for an officer applicant are listed in Table 2 . Periodically, policymakers have looked at whether these accession requirements, particularly the physical qualifications, are too strict or too lenient. Typical areas of debate include the acceptable parameters for body fat, current use or past use of certain medications, past use of illegal drugs, and ability to perform certain physical tasks. One perspective holds that physical qualifications should be lower for those in more technical or supporting specialties (e.g., cyber, finance, human resources) than those in direct combat roles (e.g., infantry, special operations). Others argue that military officers, regardless of specialty, have inherent duties--such as leading subordinates, directing the use of weapons systems when needed, and deploying to austere locations--that require a common baseline of physical and psychological fitness. Increasing the opportunities for lateral entry into the officer corps has also been a topic of considerable discussion. For example, retired General Stanley McChrystal has advocated lateral entry for business executives as general officers, stating "I've dealt with a lot of chief executive officers who could walk in and be general officers in the military tomorrow. All we'd have to do is get them a uniform and a rank." Critics of lateral entry, particularly for direct warfighting occupations, argue that in-depth knowledge of military systems, tactics, and decision-making processes is critical for successful leadership of military units and effective employment of military capabilities. What are the inherent duties of military officers in expected operational environments; what do these imply regarding qualification standards for military officers? To what extent can lateral entry be used to address critical skill shortages without decreasing military effectiveness? Is lateral entry a viable option for direct warfighting specialties? Should physical qualification criteria vary based on the officer's specialty? If so, how much variation is acceptable, and in what areas? Could some of the physical qualifications for appointment be revised without harming military effectiveness? For example, with respect to body fat, could the permissible level immediately prior to appointment be increased, with the expectation or requirement that the officer meet a stricter standard at some point thereafter? Could they body fat standards be replaced by other measures of physical fitness? Should there be a greater acceptance of ongoing use of medication for certain chronic conditions? For example, might the regular or sporadic use of an asthma inhaler be acceptable? Generally, 10 U.S.C. 3013, 5013, 8013; for joint assignments, 10 U.S.C. 663. In general, the military services have broad authority to assign personnel as they deem appropriate. This authority derives from the broad authority of the service secretaries to "assign, detail, and prescribe the duties" of their servicemembers and civilian personnel. Typically, an officer's assignments follow a fairly structured progression, starting with initial training in a specific career field, and followed by a series of progressively more responsible duty assignments in that field. There may also be opportunities to work outside one's career field. At certain points in an officer's career, he or she is required to attend professional military education schools which further develop technical and leadership skills. However, there is a major statutory provision that controls the assignments of certain officers with joint training and experience. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) included provisions to improve integration between the military services, a concept known as "jointness." Among other things, GNA established a corps of "joint qualified officers." Joint qualified officers are those officers who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, "joint matters." Section 663 of Title 10 requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that joint qualified officers who graduate from certain schools within the National Defense University--the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces [the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy], and the Joint Forces Staff College--be assigned to a "joint duty assignment" as their next assignment after graduation. This requirement can be waived by the Secretary of Defense on a case-by-case basis. The Secretary of Defense must also ensure that at least 50% of the other officers (non-joint qualified) who graduate from these three schools be assigned to a joint duty assignment as their first or second assignment after graduation. By law, these assignments are at least three years for officers in the ranks of Colonel/Captain and below, although the Secretary of Defense can waive this. Some argue that this requirement is essential to integrating the efforts of the military services, as it channels the most capable and ambitious officers into joint assignments, where they gain greater knowledge of other services' capabilities and the skills necessary to plan for and conduct joint operations. Others argue that this system is too rigid and that a broader array of assignments should qualify as joint. Is there evidence that current assignment policies have not adequately prepared officers to meet expectations? Will the assignments adequately prepare them for expected operational environments of the future? Does the situation require changes in statute or changes in DOD or service policy? What is the proper balance between assignments which (1) hone technical expertise, (2) provide for broadened perspectives, and (3) develop organizational leadership skills? How does this balance change over the course of an officer's career? Are military careers long enough to develop the skills needed for expected operational environments of the future? Are the substantial investments in officer education and training adequately linked to the value of subsequent assignments? On balance, does the benefit of joint duty assignments outweigh the opportunity costs of less skill development in other areas? Does current law and policy meet the needs of both the joint community and the services? Should the number of joint duty officers and the requirements for joint duty assignments be revised? Are there other areas besides joint duty that might be considered essential to the professional development of mid-grade and senior officers? For example, might duty with a reserve component be considered a required developmental assignment, either for all officers or for a segment of the officer corps? Title 10, Chapter 36 governs promotions; Title 10, Chapter 32 governs grade limitations; Title 10, Chapter 38 governs joint officer management. The officer promotion system is designed to be a competitive system that selects the best qualified for service at the next higher grade. Promotions take place within a grade-limited structure which caps the number of positions for each grade above captain/lieutenant. Officers are considered for promotion at specific times in their career and, due to fewer positions at the higher grades, there is a decreasing likelihood of promotion the further one progresses. Those officers who twice fail to be promoted to the next higher grade are normally separated, a statutory requirement known as "up or out." These concepts of the officer promotion system are explained in more detail below. While there are no direct grade limits in the number of positions for paygrades O-1 to O-3, there are such limits for all higher paygrades. That is, there are progressively fewer authorized positions in each subsequent paygrade after O-3. This results in a roughly pyramidal shape to the officer corps beyond O-3. See Table 3 for a summary of current officer strength levels by grade. This largely pyramidal structure exists in all military organizations, but the ratio of mid-grade and senior officers to the total officer corps can vary considerably between military organizations, both in comparison to other services and foreign nations, or within the same organization over time. There has been some contention over the appropriate ratio of officers to enlisted personnel for U.S. military organizations, where the proportion of officers has been gradually rising. One perspective on this trend is that it is related to the growth of joint organizations and the increased U.S. emphasis on coalition operations, which have created greater demand for officers to fill key staff roles. Another view is that the advanced technologies employed by the armed forces and the complexity of contemporary military operations require an officer corps composed of highly talented and technically knowledgeable individuals. Attracting and retaining such individuals, some argue, requires that there be more opportunity to rise to the higher levels of the officer corps; hence a higher ratio of mid-grade and senior officers to the total officer corps is necessary. On the other hand, some are wary of what they refer to as "grade creep," particularly given the additional costs associated with it. Another concern about higher ratios of officers in the force--particularly senior officers--revolves around whether it promotes a more bureaucratic approach to military decision-making. Table 4 summarizes the changing proportion of officers within the U.S. Armed Forces over the past 50 years. Chapter 32 of Title 10 provides the statutory framework for the maximum number of officers that can serve in each grade above captain/lieutenant. Within that chapter, 10 U.S.C. 523 provides a grade limitation table for officers in grades O-4 to O-6, setting limits based on the total size of a service's officer corps. For example, if the Air Force has 65,000 commissioned officers, 10 U.S.C. 523 limits the number of Air Force majors to 14,073 (21.65%), Air Force lieutenant colonels to 9,417 (14.49%), and Air Force colonels to 3,211 (4.94%). If the total size of the service's officer corps lies between two reference points in the table, the law requires "mathematical interpolation between the respective numbers" to provide the grade limit. Certain officers do not count against these limits, most notably medical and dental officers. Sections 525 and 526 of Title 10 provide grade limitations for officers in paygrades O-7 to O-10, both for service-specific positions and for "joint duty assignments." The grade limitations for these officers are numerical limits (e.g., 7 officers can be appointed to the grade of General in the Army, excluding certain joint and other designated positions). Promotion timing refers to the window of time in which an officer is considered for promotion to the next higher grade. The statutory minimums for "time in grade" before eligibility for promotion are detailed in 10 U.S.C. 619 (summarized in Table 5 ). For example, a second lieutenant/ensign must serve at least 18 months in that grade before being considered for promotion to first lieutenant/lieutenant junior grade, while a major/lieutenant commander must serve at least three years in that grade before being considered for promotion to lieutenant colonel/commander. As a practical matter, an officer's time in grade will typically be greater than the minimum specified in law, which is in keeping with the expected promotion timing guidelines described in the committee reports which accompanied the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. These expectations are included under the heading "Expected Years of Service at Promotion" in Table 5 . Promotion opportunity refers to the percentage of officers in a given cohort who will normally be promoted to the next higher rank. For example, the expectation when DOPMA was passed was that about 80% of captains/lieutenants in a given cohort would be promoted to major/lieutenant commander. This percentage could vary in response to force structure demands. For example, it could increase if a service was expanding--say, during wartime--or decrease if it was undergoing a drawdown. Promotion opportunity is not specified in law, but guidelines were included in the House committee report which accompanied DOPMA. The expectations for promotion opportunity are included in Table 5 , along with the projected impact of death, disability, and promotion opportunity constraints on a given cohort of officers over the course of their career. Note that these cumulative promotion projections do not account for voluntary separations and retirements, so the actual proportion of an entry cohort which achieves a given rank may be lower than the figure provided. Officers are promoted from O-1 to O-2 if they are "fully qualified," which means they meet all the minimum requirements for promotion. Those who are not fully qualified are not selected for promotion. For promotion to O-3 and above, promotions are made on a best qualified basis. Under the best qualified system, one must be fully qualified to be selected for promotion, but being fully qualified is not necessarily sufficient for promotion. Instead, all the fully qualified officers are ranked by the selection board in order from most qualified to least qualified. Those who are ranked most highly are recommended for promotion until all promotion authorizations are filled. The remaining officers, though fully qualified (and sometimes well qualified) are not recommended for promotion. This is an intentional feature of DOPMA. As stated in the House Armed Services Committee report which accompanied the bill: The simple fact is that if the system is working right, it will, of necessity, result in passover for promotion of officers who are fully qualified to serve in the next-higher grade. This is because the function of the up-or-out system [discussed below] is to provide at each grade more officers who are qualified to serve in the next grade than the billets require. Thus the services will have selectivity and can pick the best from a selection of fully qualified officers. For over 70 years, military officers have been subject to a statutory "up or out" requirement. Officers in paygrade O-1 must be discharged within 18 months of being found not qualified for promotion. Officers in paygrade O-2 through O-4 who have "failed of selection for promotion to the next higher grade for the second time" are normally separated from military service. Those within two years of retirement eligibility are permitted to remain on active duty until retirement and others may be selectively continued, as described below. Officers in paygrades O-5 and above are subject to mandatory retirement if they are not promoted before reaching a specified number of years of commissioned service. The House Armed Services Committee considered this to be the "fundamental concept for the management of officer personnel" within DOPMA: As can be seen from the foregoing, the revised grade table, together with the selective continuation procedures and mandatory retirement and separation points in the bill, contemplates the continuation of the up-or-out system as the fundamental concept for the management of officer personnel. There is nothing new in this concept. It has been in effect for nearly 35 years and on the whole has served the country well. The system has given the armed forces what they never before had in peacetime--a youthful, vigorous, fully combat-ready officer corps. Selective continuation allows the services to allow certain officers to continue serving on active duty, even though they would normally be separated due to the requirements of "up or out". On a selective basis, officers in paygrades O-3 and O-4 who twice fail for promotion may be continued on active duty, if the service needs them and they are selected by a continuation board. Selectively continued O-3 officers may be allowed to stay on active duty until they complete 20 years of service, while selectively continued O-4s may be continued until they complete 24 years of service. Officers in paygrades O-5 and above may also be selectively continued rather than being subject to mandatory retirement for total years of commissioned service. Are there aspects of contemporary warfare which require revisions to the current grade structure of the armed forces? Should the grade limits be raised to allow for greater promotion opportunity and career progression for military officers, or certain categories of military officers? Or, conversely, are there more mid-grade and senior officers than are necessary? Should there be additional categories of officers exempt from the grade limits, as medical and dental officers are now? Could a guarantee of continuation be provided to officers in advance, to provide more flexibility in career progression without fear of being passed over? Do the anticipated personnel requirements of the future require military personnel, or can federal civilians or contractors fill some or most of these positions? For voluntary separation: Title 10, Chapters 367 (Army), 571 (Navy and Marine Corps), and 867 (Air Force) For involuntary separation: See Table 6 Separation refers to various actions which release the individual from active military service, and includes an officer's resignation, discharge, and retirement. Broadly speaking, separations are categorized as voluntary or mandatory, depending on whether they are initiated at the request of the officer or are imposed by the service in accordance with the statutory requirements. Officers are generally free to resign from the armed forces at any time after completion of their required service obligation, which is typically eight years, although some of this time can be served in a reserve component. Upon completion of 20 years of active service, officers are eligible for voluntary retirement. Under Title 10, there are several voluntary retirement authorities for officers, but the most commonly used are 10 U.S.C. 3911, 6323, and 8911 which specify that the President may retire an officer who has completed 20 years of active service, of which at least 10 were as a commissioned officer (the Secretary of Defense can authorize the service secretaries to reduce the years as a commissioned officer to 8 for retirements between January 7, 2011 and September 30, 2018). Although the statutory language is permissive--the President may approve such retirements, but is not required to--as a matter of practice such requests are routinely granted. Additionally, during the period of December 31, 2011 to December 31, 2018, the service secretaries may reduce the minimum length of service for voluntary retirement under these provisions from 20 to 15 years. There has been criticism of the general practice of allowing servicemembers to retire after 20 years of service on the grounds that it encourages individuals to leave the service at a time when their experience could be of great value to the services. Others note that this practice helps maintain a youthful and vigorous military, and that the structure and budget of the armed forces is not designed to sustain an abundance of relatively senior officers (typically, at twenty years of service, such officers are lieutenant colonels/commanders). There are a number of statutory mechanisms that mandate the separation of military officers under certain conditions. As discussed above, several of them stem from failure to advance to the next higher grade. Others occur upon reaching a specific age, in the event of serious disability, for substandard performance, and for force shaping purposes. These provisions are below summarized in Table 6 . Should the routine approval of voluntary retirement requests at 20 years of service be reconsidered? If so, should the voluntary retirement age be increased uniformly, or only for certain categories of officers (for example, those in less physically demanding career fields)? If longer careers are contemplated, should the grade structure and promotion system be changed to adapt to this new career pattern? Should there be greater flexibility to move from more physically demanding specialties to less demanding ones in order to facilitate continuation of service?

Summary:
Congress and the executive branch are currently considering changes to the officer personnel management system. Some of these proposed changes would require changes to the laws, including provision enacted by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). Contemporary debates over officer personnel management policy often revolve around the fundamental questions of "what type of officers do we need to win the next war?" and "what skills does the officer corps need to enable the military services to perform their missions?" These questions are implicitly oriented towards future events. Their answers are therefore somewhat speculative. Still, contemporary trends and military history can provide valuable insight. Additionally, a set of broader questions can help focus the analysis: What will be the key security interests and priorities of the United States in the future? What conflicts will likely arise in the pursuit of these interests? What opponents will we face in these conflicts? How will they fight? What military strategy will the United States employ to secure its interests? How will we fight? What knowledge, skills, and abilities must the officer corps possess to effectively carry out these roles and missions? How do we attract and retain individuals with the necessary potential for service as officers? How should the officer corps be prepared so it can effectively adapt to unforeseen crises and contingencies? Given limited resources, what are the most critical areas for improvement? Where should the nation accept risk? Policymakers often have divergent answers to these questions and thus come to different conclusions about the most appropriate officer personnel management policies. Examples of diverging views can be found in debates on the criteria for accepting or rejecting people for military service; required training and education over the course of a career; assignments to be emphasized; distribution of officers by grade; retention of experienced and talented individuals; and the criteria for selecting individuals for promotion and for separation. In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the armed forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws governing military officer personnel management and periodically changes these laws as it deems appropriate. This report provides an overview of selected concepts and statutory provisions that shape and define officer appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. It also provides a set of questions that policymakers may wish to consider when discussing proposed changes to current law.