The AIM-9 family of air-to-air missiles has protected U.S. fighter aircraft for over 40 years, but now there are more modern foreign missiles that may present a threat to U.S. aircraft. The U.S. Navy and Air Force considered buying a foreign missile but determined that the best solution to meet U.S. requirements was to extensively upgrade the current AIM-9M missile. The services selected Hughes Missile Systems Company (now the Raytheon Corporation) to develop and produce a very maneuverable missile that, together with a new helmet-mounted cueing system, is expected to be the best in the world. The AIM-9 Sidewinder family of air-to-air missiles is carried on all tactical fighter aircraft and is used at short ranges when target aircraft are too close for radar-guided missiles to be effective. The Sidewinder was first deployed in the 1950s--as the AIM-9B. Over the years, improvements were made as new models were introduced. The missiles have been sold to many friendly countries. The current missile, the AIM-9M, evolved in 1978. U.S. fighter aircraft equipped with the AIM-9M missile, however, are facing modern foreign-built missiles and advanced cueing/targeting systems. The rules of engagement for U.S. pilots require that, in many situations, they make a positive identification before firing on an adversary. This results in the pilot's not being able to fire until the target aircraft is well within visual range. At combat speeds such an encounter can quickly evolve into a close-in fight, during which a short-range missile is required. A joint Navy and Air Force study predicts that a significant percentage of air-to-air encounters will result in a close-in flight. In April 1996, the Air Force Chief of Staff testified that U.S. pilots have the fourth best short-range missile in the world. Modern short-range missile systems with their cueing/targeting systems can engage targets throughout the forward hemisphere of the aircraft, providing a decisive advantage in a close-in fight. The services are trying to develop tactics and countermeasures to neutralize these threats, but there is general agreement that a more capable U.S. short-range missile system is needed as soon as possible. In the 1970s, the United States and several European countries signed a Memorandum of Agreement that specified that the Europeans would develop a new short-range missile to replace the AIM-9 Sidewinder series. That missile became the Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM). In the late 1980s, however, the European consortium dissolved. When the consortium dissolved, the Navy and the Air Force reexamined U.S. requirements and determined that the ASRAAM did not have the capability they required. The United States subsequently left the ASRAAM program. The two services then worked on separate upgrades to the AIM-9M. After false starts with their separate programs, a joint Navy and Air Force program with the Navy as lead service was started to extensively upgrade the AIM-9M. The upgraded missile is the AIM-9X. As a part of the alternative evaluation process before starting the AIM-9X program, the services considered acquiring one of the modern foreign missiles such as the Russian AA-11, the Israeli PYTHON 4, or the British ASRAAM as an alternative to developing a new U.S. missile. DOD determined, however, that none of these missiles was able to meet all of the U.S. requirements. The services conducted an evaluation of the ASRAAM, including a 6-month Foreign Comparison Test that included firing the missile from a U.S. F-16 aircraft. The ASRAAM is electrically and physically compatible with U.S. aircraft and uses the same infrared sensor as the AIM-9X. The evaluation, however, showed that ASRAAM does not meet all of the U. S. performance requirements. Also, the evaluation showed that, because of the additional time and cost that would be needed to upgrade, test, and integrate ASRAAM for U.S. aircraft, it offered no advantage over the proposed AIM-9X missile. During the 2-year AIM-9X concept development phase, the services analyzed user needs, current and future threats, and available technology to determine the requirements for the new missile. The resulting AIM-9X system requirement has five key performance parameters: the ability to operate during the day or at night; the ability to operate over land and at sea in the presence of infrared countermeasures; weight, size, and electrical compatibility with all current U.S. fighters and the F-22; the ability to acquire, track, and fire on targets over a wider area than the AIM-9M; and a high probability that a missile launched will reach and kill its target. The analyses showed that user requirements could be met and that technical risk could be reduced, by modifying the existing AIM-9M and developing a new targeting/cueing system. The AIM-9X missile is planned to have increased resistance to countermeasures and improved target acquisition capability over the AIM-9M. It will have a new infrared seeker, a tracker to interpret what the seeker sees, a streamlined missile body, and rocket motor thrust vectoring for improved maneuvering. It will be carried on all U.S. fighter aircraft, including the F/A-18, F-15, F-16, and F-22. An 18-month AIM-9X competitive demonstration and validation program began in 1994 with the Hughes Missile Systems Company and the Raytheon Corporation as the competing contractors. Both companies demonstrated, among other things, how they would reduce the technical risk of developing the AIM-9X missile. Examples of demonstration and validation work include trade studies, simulating missile performance, analyzing missile compatibility with Navy and Air Force aircraft, and flight testing target-tracking capability. Additionally, the contractors were required to plan for manufacturing the missile, including identifying new or unique processes and special tooling and facilities requirements. Hughes was selected as the AIM-9X missile contractor in December 1996. Hughes has total performance responsibility, including development, production, and maintenance support for the missile. Engineering and manufacturing development began in January 1997 and is planned to end in 2001. The services plan to buy a total of 10,000 missiles at an average unit cost of $264,000 (then-year dollars). The AIM-9X missile is shown in figure 1.1. A separate, parallel program is developing a helmet-mounted cueing system that would allow U.S. pilots to aim the AIM-9X missile seeker toward a target aircraft by turning their heads and looking at the target. The pilot can then fire the missile without having to turn the aircraft toward the target, increasing the probability of killing a hostile aircraft before it can launch a missile. Another effort is developing the necessary hardware and software modifications to integrate the missile and helmet into the aircraft. All three elements of the AIM-9X weapon system--the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications--are seen as critical to countering the capabilities of modern threat missiles. The Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, House Committee on National Security, requested that we provide an independent assessment of the AIM-9X program's status. Our objectives were to determine (1) the services' efforts to reduce missile development risk, (2) the missile program's plan to transition from development to production, and (3) the importance of separately managed but essential supporting systems. To evaluate the missile's development risk, we visited the program office and the contractor where we discussed technology and schedule risk. We reviewed the program acquisition and test plans. We visited the Naval Air Weapons Center at China Lake, California, where we discussed the missile program's technology and schedule with the government short-range missile experts. We reviewed reports prepared by the contractors during the program demonstration and validation phase. We also reviewed several studies of foreign missiles, including the Senior Review Team analysis of the ASRAAM program. To assess the missile program's plan to transition from development to production, we examined the planned development and operational test schedules and production plans. We considered the amount and type of testing that is planned to be accomplished before the first and subsequent production decisions. We discussed test plans and potential risks with program, contractor, and DOD officials charged with managing and overseeing missile flight testing. We also reviewed our previous reports on other major acquisition systems with regard to readiness to enter low-rate initial production. We reviewed the helmet-mounted cueing system, a separately managed but essential supporting system, to determine its importance to the AIM-9X system. We discussed program technical issues with program managers. We also compared schedule plans for the AIM-9X missile, helmet-mounted cueing system, and associated aircraft modifications. During the course of this review, we met with representatives from the DOD Inspector General, Naval Air Systems Command, and Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Air Weapons Center, China Lake, California; Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; Aeronautical Systems Center and National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; ASRAAM Senior Review Team, Baltimore, Maryland; and Hughes Missile Systems Company, Tucson, Arizona. We performed our audit between July 1996 and October 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The AIM-9X missile development program is designed to balance the requirements for a more capable short-range missile with the users' limited resources and the need to field the new missile as soon as possible. Key elements of the approved development plan are strategies to reduce technical risk and incentives to lower cost and ensure schedule performance. By early 1999, when the AIM-9X missile design is expected to be finalized and flight tests are underway, a more accurate assessment of the program status can be made. Technology problems are often the cause of cost growth and schedule delays in development programs. To help ensure a successful AIM-9X missile development program, the services have adopted several strategies to minimize technical risk. Among these are: using existing subsystems, components, and items not requiring conducting a competitive demonstration and validation of new technology; combining government and contractor technical expertise through integrated product teams. The AIM-9X missile will use some existing subsystems that do not require development. For example, several key components are identical to those used in the AIM-9M missile, including the warhead, rocket motor, and fuze. These components satisfy user requirements and can be obtained either from existing inventory missiles or from new production. In either case, the design and production processes for these items are tested and proven. The winning Hughes missile design also includes many nondevelopmental items. For example, Hughes will use fins, an airframe, and an engine control system previously developed and tested by the Air Force. The cryoengine, which cools the missile sensor, is a modified version of a similar device used in other systems. These components do not require lengthy development and testing but will require some modification for the AIM-9X. Hughes officials told us that over 70 percent of the missile design uses parts that do not require development. The company also estimates that 66 percent of AIM-9X missile software can be obtained from existing programs. To help anticipate, identify, and solve technical problems, the government's technical experts in short-range missile development have been added to the Hughes AIM-9X development team as a part of the integrated product teams concept. Technical experts from the Naval Air Warfare Center at China Lake, California, and the Aeronautical Systems Center at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, are now a part of the AIM-9X team. Under this teaming approach, the combined knowledge and efforts of both contractor and government are focused on the development process. Hughes has also implemented a comprehensive technical risk assessment system that identifies and tracks all known technical risks in the program. Each risk is described, quantified, monitored, and reported. For example, Hughes has assessed the guidance and control and thrust vectoring system as moderate to low-risk items. The company has developed management plans to address these risks. Affordability is a central objective of the AIM-9X missile program. The emphasis on cost began during the requirements definition process, continued through the demonstration and validation phase, was a factor in the selection of the development contractor, and is an integral part of the program acquisition strategy. As a DOD flagship program for the Cost as an Independent Variable Initiative--under which cost is considered more as a constraint and less as a variable--the AIM-9X program has incorporated a series of acquisition reforms to focus both government and contractor efforts to reduce and control program costs. As a program objective, AIM-9X affordability is second only to achieving the missile's key performance characteristics. Low cost was and remains one of the users' critical requirements for the system. During the concept development phase, an assessment of needed capabilities and anticipated cost considered the projected threat, available and emerging technologies, and projected resources. Performance and cost trade studies identified the minimum essential performance requirements and determined they could be obtained at an acceptable cost if the AIM-9M was upgraded with a new sensor and airframe instead of developing an entirely new missile. Reducing AIM-9X missile development and production cost and obtaining high confidence in the contractors' cost estimates and cost management approach were key objectives of the 18-month demonstration phase. Under the competitive pressure of the winner-take-all development contract, the government required the contractors to establish design-to-cost goals and implementation plans, conduct affordability and producibility studies, and propose a production quantity and price structure. According to the program manager, this emphasis on cost control and cost management both reduced the expected cost of the program and increased the program office's confidence that the contractor's development and production cost proposal was sound and likely to be achieved. Eight initiatives were pursued during the demonstration phase to reduce program costs with only minor changes to the system's performance requirements resulting in an estimated cost avoidance of $1.2 billion. Examples of successful reductions include relaxing computer processing time requirements (which eliminated one circuit board) and standardizing missile seeker cooling methods (which eliminated the need for two different cooling systems). The AIM-9X missile program has adopted several strategies to establish a realistic and achievable development schedule that provides the first missiles to Navy and Air Force fighter units as soon as possible. Principal among these strategies is the requirement that Hughes develop and follow a detailed integrated master plan and master schedule. The program manager told us that the government strategy for reducing schedule risk on the AIM-9X program has been to encourage the contractor to develop and follow soundly based development plans. Accordingly, both contractors were required to develop and submit integrated master plans and schedules for development and low-rate initial production during the demonstration phase. Following the successful demonstration phase, Hughes and the missile program office reexamined the proposed development schedule. On the bases of that reexamination, they agreed to reduce the development schedule from 68 to 61 months and to begin low-rate initial production a year earlier, thereby lowering development cost by $35 million. This reduction, according to the program manager, was made possible by the Hughes comprehensive development and test schedule. The AIM-9X missile development program contains a series of strategies to reduce technical risk and incentives to lower cost and ensure schedule performance. Whether program efforts to reduce technical, cost, and schedule risk will succeed will not be known for at least another year. Both program and contractor officials told us that most of the AIM-9X missile development will be completed by the spring of 1999. At that time, the AIM-9X design will be finalized, assembly of engineering development missiles underway, and development flight testing in process. The missile program manager believes any remaining development risk will be well understood at that time. In an effort to initiate AIM-9X missile production as soon as practical, the services plan to make the low-rate initial production decision in early 2000. This production decision is to be made before completing development flight tests, before adequately testing production representative missiles, and before full operational testing begins. This plan risks later discovery of problems requiring design changes and the associated cost, schedule, and performance impacts. We believe initiating low-rate initial production before developmental flight testing is complete and before there is some operational testing with production representative missiles adds unnecessary risk to the production program. The services plan to begin AIM-9X missile low-rate initial production in early 2000 by exercising the first production contract option for 150 missiles. A year later, the second production contract option for 250 missiles is to be exercised. Figure 3.1 shows the program's planned test and production decision schedule. As figure 3.1 shows, the low-rate initial production decision for the AIM-9X missile is to be made about 1 year before completion of the planned developmental flight test program. All of the flight tests to be conducted before the missile low-rate initial production decision, including those to be conducted as part of the preliminary operational testing, will use engineering development missiles. These missiles are manufactured early in the development program and represent the contractor's design before any significant flight testing begins. These flight tests will also use development level software and may not incorporate the helmet until the last several flights. Later in the development program, changes to the missile design are likely as the test results and manufacturing improvements are incorporated in production representative missiles. These test missiles are intended to be very close in physical configuration and performance to the AIM-9X production missile. They are to be used during the last phase of the developmental flight tests and for all of the operational flight tests. Developmental and independent operational flight testing using production representative missiles is scheduled to begin at about the same time as the low-rate initial production decision and continue for about 2 years. These tests expand upon earlier developmental testing, verify design changes incorporated in the production representative missiles, and focus on the system's operational effectiveness and suitability. These test results, however, will not be available until after low-rate initial missile production begins, with most operational flight tests occurring after the second missile production contract is exercised. Indeed, the first low-rate initial production missiles are expected to be delivered before the operational testing is complete. The significant body of developmental and operational flight testing planned after the low-rate initial production decision point is important to realistically demonstrate and assess the AIM-9X weapon system's ability to meet its minimum acceptable requirements for performance and suitability without major or costly design changes. Should problems be disclosed in these tests necessitating changes to the missile design, the missile cost, schedule, and performance may be adversely affected. Moreover, because the low-rate initial production missiles are to be deployed directly to operational units, such changes would directly affect operating units. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to revise the AIM-9X missile's acquisition strategy to allow for the completion of all developmental flight tests and enough operational flight tests with production representative missiles to demonstrate that the missile can meet its minimum performance requirements before low-rate initial production begins. DOD did not concur with the recommendation, stating that adequate testing is planned prior to the low-rate initial production decision for an informed decision. The performance data to support the low-rate initial production decision will be based on incomplete testing of developmental missiles and software. Flight testing of the production representative missiles and associated systems is scheduled to begin more than a year after the planned production decision. As we have reported previously, many of the weapon systems that start production without performing operational tests to gain assurance that the systems will perform satisfactorily later experience significant operational effectiveness and/or suitability problems. All three elements of the AIM-9X weapon system--the missile, the helmet-mounted cueing system, and the associated aircraft modifications--must be present and properly working together to ensure that U.S. fighters can prevail against modern threat missiles. The services are closely coordinating the separate development programs and plan to test all of the elements together during AIM-9X flight testing. However, there is no requirement that production representative versions of the missile, helmet, and associated aircraft modifications be successfully demonstrated together before the AIM-9X missile goes into low-rate initial production. Moreover, helmets and associated aircraft modifications are not linked to the approved AIM-9X missile production and funding plans. By not requiring that the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications be tested, produced, and deployed together, as a "system of systems," DOD risks fielding a missile unable to prevail in aerial combat. To help them prevail in the close-in air battle, U.S. pilots are going to need not only the AIM-9X missile, but also the helmet and associated aircraft modifications. The Russians and Israelis have already developed, produced, and deployed short-range missile systems with helmet-mounted cueing systems. The Russian AA-11 missile and helmet system have been widely exported. The British, French, and other nations are also developing modern missiles. While the AIM-9X missile with the helmet is expected to be superior to all of them, the missile alone is not. Figure 4.1 illustrates the relative capabilities of the AIM-9X system of systems, the AA-11, and the AIM-9M, which is currently operational. Service officials told us that the rules for engaging enemy aircraft and the requirement for positive identification of targets increase the likelihood of close-in air battles in the future. While the AIM-9X and other missiles can be used at longer ranges, the positive identification requirement, together with the speed and agility of modern fighter aircraft, can quickly transform the fight into a close-in air battle where the advantage is held by the aircraft that can lock-on to its adversary and shoot first. As figure 4.1 shows, the AIM-9X missile without a helmet is expected to have greater lethal range than the AIM-9M and the AA-11. Without the helmet, however, a U.S. pilot would be unable to take full advantage of the AIM-9X capability to take the critical first shot that often determines the survivor in a close-in air battle. This first shot capability is achieved by the combination of the (1) helmet and the missile sensor acquiring a target well off to the side of the aircraft, as well as in front of it and (2) computer software that links the pilot's helmet, the missile, and the aircraft fire control system. As shown in the figure, the AIM-9X system (missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications) is expected to have a distinct advantage over the AA-11 missile. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the projected range and sensor tracking capability of AIM-9X without the helmet-mounted cueing system is equivalent to the capability of the AA-11 threat missile in azimuth and exceeds the capability of the AA-11 in range. DOD's position is based on using the fighter aircraft radar to cue the AIM-9X missile to the target of interest when it is beyond the view of the aircraft's heads-up display. Using the radar to cue the missile, however, will take more time and be less certain than with the helmet and will require DOD to train pilots in yet to be developed procedures and tactics that would be considerably different than current practices for aerial combat. Moreover, DOD officials we spoke with agreed that it is questionable whether DOD can meet its own positive identification requirement using the aircraft radar for cueing purposes. The AIM-9X missile, helmet, and associated aircraft modifications are being developed under separate but closely coordinated programs. The missile and helmet contractors have negotiated detailed working agreements to ensure the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications are developed to operate together and to be fully compatible with both Navy and Air Force aircraft. While each development program will test its system independently, the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications are also planned to be tested together as a part of AIM-9X missile flight testing. An early operational assessment of the combined system, including five flight tests, is planned prior to the AIM-9X low-rate initial production decision. Then, for the next 2 years, production representative missiles, helmets, and aircraft software are to be tested under both developmental and realistic operating conditions. While plans are in place to perform total system testing with the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications prior to the initial AIM-9X missile low-rate initial production decision, those tests will not be done using production representative hardware and software. Moreover, there is no formal requirement that sufficient total system testing take place prior to starting missile low-rate initial production to demonstrate that the AIM-9X weapon system can meet its key performance parameters. We are concerned about this because of the criticality that all three elements work together to ensure that the AIM-9X system will prevail against modern threat missiles. If technical problems delay development of the helmet or aircraft modifications, missile testing will proceed to support the low-rate initial production decision. At that time, the ability of the AIM-9X system to achieve its performance parameters will not be known. There is an approved and funded AIM-9X production plan to acquire 10,000 missiles over 18 years beginning in 2000; however, no such production plan or approved funding exists for the helmet or for the associated aircraft modifications. We were told by the helmet program manager that each of the aircraft program offices must plan and budget for helmets and associated modifications consistent with their needs and resources. All elements of the AIM-9X weapon system must be in place to achieve the program's objective, which is to ensure that Navy and Air Force fighters prevail in close-in aerial combat. Without a requirement that all elements of this system of systems be tested together, produced together, and deployed together, the full capability of the system will not be realized. Until the weapon system is tested and evaluated using production representative missiles and helmets, DOD decisionmakers will not have information on whether the AIM-9X weapon system's key performance parameters are achievable. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force to revise the AIM-9X missile acquisition strategy to allow for enough operational testing of the missile, helmet, and associated aircraft modifications to be accomplished, using production representative hardware and software, to demonstrate that the AIM-9X system can meet its minimum performance requirements before low-rate initial production begins. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to provide a coordinated production, deployment, and funding plan for all three elements of the system. On the first recommendation, DOD did not concur and stated that significant improvement over the current operational system is possible with just the AIM-9X missile only. DOD added that it would not be prudent to delay the missile development and testing to provide concurrent development and test demonstration with the helmet and aircraft modifications. On the second recommendation, DOD partially concurred and stated that it would continue to coordinate all three elements of the system but would not formally tie the three elements together. DOD expressed concern that insisting that the schedules for the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications remain synchronized risks burdening it with higher costs if one element falls behind schedule and the other elements have to proceed at a reduced, inefficient level. The objective of the AIM-9X program has been to develop a system that will provide the capability to prevail in aerial combat against modern threat missiles. Using the missile without the helmet will not provide that capability and will require DOD to train pilots in yet to be developed procedures and tactics that would be considerably different than current practices for aerial combat. Although there are risks in continuing to synchronize the helmet and missile schedules, we believe that DOD would be accepting more risk than necessary by committing to low-rate initial production of the missiles before demonstrating, using production representative hardware and software, that the total AIM-9X system can meet its minimum performance requirements. Following are our comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD) letter dated January 16, 1998. 1. The last AIM-9X schedule that we reviewed indicated that one test firing of a production representative missile is planned to occur within days of the low-rate initial production decision. Should these two development (vice operational) tests be accomplished as DOD now proposes, the detailed assessment of the test results will not be available to decisionmakers. 2. Figure 4.1 has been modified to indicate the potentially greater level of lethal azimuth of the AIM-9X when the missile is cued by the aircraft radar. However, that radar cueing of the missile is neither as fast nor as certain as with the helmet. Also, procedures and tactics for using the radar cueing capability with the AIM-9X would have to be developed and pilots would have to be trained. 3. Our recommendation addresses only those aircraft modifications needed to integrate the AIM-9X missile and the new helmet into each aircraft. Other aspects of the operational flight program should not be affected. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. 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Summary:
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the development status of the AIM-9X missile program and its concerns about the testing and production of all elements of the AIM-9X weapon system, focusing on the: (1) services' efforts to reduce missile development risk; (2) missile program's plan to transition from development to production; and (3) importance of separately managed but essential supporting systems. GAO noted that: (1) the AIM-9X missile program includes many initiatives to reduce the risk of technical, cost, and schedule problems; (2) it uses many existing subsystems, components, and items not requiring development, and government and contractor technical experts have joined together in integrated product teams; (3) in addition, the services conducted a competitive demonstration and validation of new technologies to reduce technical risk; (4) GAO is concerned, however, about two situations; (5) the plan to start missile low-rate initial production about 1 year before completing development flight testing and before operational testing of production-representative missiles will risk later discovery of technical or operational suitability problems; (6) accordingly, at this critical juncture, Department of Defense (DOD) decisionmakers will not have enough verifiable information on the system's key performance parameters in an operational environment to make an informed production decision; (7) GAO is concerned that the helmet-mounted cueing system is being developed under a separate program from the missile even though U.S. fighter pilots need both the AIM-9X missile and the helmet-mounted cueing system to ensure that they can prevail in air-to-air combat against modern threat missiles; (8) while the separate development programs are being coordinated, there is no requirement that the missile, helmet, and aircraft modifications be thoroughly and realistically tested and evaluated together as a system of systems prior to initiating AIM-9X missile production; (9) until the weapon system is tested and evaluated using production-representative missiles and helmets, DOD decisionmakers will not have information on whether the AIM-9X weapon system's key performance parameters--such as the ability to acquire, track, and fire on targets over a wider area than the AIM-9M--are achievable; and (10) further, if all elements of the system are not produced and deployed together, the AIM-9X may not be able to prevail in aerial combat against modern threat missiles.