RS21948 -- The Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis Updated February 11, 2005 The fundamental responsibility of intelligence services is to provide information to support policymakers and military commanders. In reviewing theperformance of the U.S. Intelligence Community prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 9/11Commission, the National Commissionon Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, concluded that greater coordination of the nation's intelligence effortis required to enhance thecollection and analysis of information. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission recommended that a new position ofNational Intelligence Director (NID)be established to ensure greater inter-agency coordination. A number of legislative proposals were introduced in2004 to establish such an officeseparate from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). (1) The NID was envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as having a number of budgetary and managerial responsibilities. (2) In addition, the occupant of theposition would "retain the present DCI's role as the principal intelligence adviser to the president." (3) The Commission also envisioned that the NIDwho would "be confirmed by the Senate and would testify before Congress, would have a relatively small staff ofseveral hundred people, taking theplace of the existing community management offices housed at the CIA." (4) The Commission adds, however, that "We hope the president will cometo look directly to the directors of the national intelligence centers [the National Counterterrorism Center, and othercenters focusing on WMDproliferation, international crime and narcotics, and China/East Asia] to provide all-source analysis in their areasof responsibility, balancing theadvice of these intelligence chiefs against the contrasting viewpoints that may be offered by department heads atState, Defense, Homeland Security,Justice, and other agencies." (5) There is some debate whether the 9/11 Commission envisioned the NID as having the responsibility for coordinating national intelligence estimatesand other community products. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has been responsible for providingintelligence to the President, to theheads of departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and seniormilitary commanders, and "whereappropriate" the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof. The statute provides that "suchnational intelligence should betimely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligencecommunity." (6) Draft legislation inthe fall of 2004 did include the assignment of responsibilities for preparing national intelligence estimates to theDNI. On December 17, 2004, the President approved the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter the "Intelligence ReformAct")( P.L. 108-458 ). The Act incorporated many of the proposals of the 9/11 Commission, including theestablishment of a Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) separate from the Director of the CIA. Although most of the debates prior to passage of thelegislation addressed the DNI'sresponsibilities for managing the intelligence budget, the Act also made a number of changes affecting thepreparation of analytical products forconsumers at the highest levels of government. The DNI will serve as head of the Intelligence Community and asthe principal adviser to thePresident and the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters relatedto the national security. (7) Under the new legislation, the Office of the DNI will include the National Intelligence Council (NIC), composed of senior analysts within theIntelligence Community and substantive experts from the public and private sector. (8) The members of the NIC "shall constitute the seniorintelligence advisers fo the Intelligence Community for purposes of representing the views of the [I]ntelligence[C]ommunity within the United StatesGovernment." The members of the NIC are to be appointed by, report to, and serve at the pleasure of the DNI. The Intelligence Reform Act, provides that the DNI, when appointed, will be responsible for NIEs and other analytical products prepared under theauspices of the NIC. The three statutory responsibilities of the NIC have been to: produce national intelligence estimates for the Government, included, whenever the Council considers appropriate, alternativeviews held by elements of the intelligence community; evaluate community-wide collection and production of intelligence by the intelligence community and the requirements andresources of such collection and production; and otherwise assist the [DNI] in carrying out responsibilities established in law. (9) The DCI historically, and the DNI in the future, has a unique responsibility for the quality of intelligence analysis for consumers at all levels ofgovernment. While a number of agencies produce analytical products, the most authoritative intelligence productsof the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity are published under the authority of the DCI and potentially the DNI. NIEs are the primary, but not thesole, form in which theIntelligence Community forwards its judgments to senior officials, and they are the only one prescribed in statute. NIEs are produced at the NIC'sinitiative or in response to requests from senior policymakers. NIEs are sometimes highly controversial. They are designed to set forth the best objective judgments of the Intelligence Community, but theyoccasionally are more closely related to policy rationales than some analysts would prefer. An NIE produced inOctober 2002 on Iraq's ContinuingPrograms for Weapons of Mass Destruction has been much criticized; a more recent NIE on prospects for Iraq hasbeen the source of significantmedia attention. (10) Although the importance of particular NIEs to specific policy decisions may be debatable, (11) the NIE process provides a formal opportunity fortheIntelligence Community's input to policy deliberations. Arguably, it is the responsibility of policymakers to seekthe input of the IntelligenceCommunity, but most observers would argue that the DNI should not be reticent in presenting intelligenceinformation and judgments on majorpolicy issues when difficult decisions are under consideration. The most recent chairman of the NIC is Ambassador Robert L. Hutchings, who had previously served in the State Department and in academicinstitutions. (12) In addition, there are senioranalysts, known as National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), for Africa, East Asia, Economics and GlobalIssues, Europe, Intelligence Assurance, Latin America, Military Issues, Near East and South Asia, Russia andEurasia, Transnational Threats,Warning, and Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation. The NIOs, who do not receive Senate confirmation,come from a variety ofgovernment agencies, inside and outside the Intelligence Community, and from the private sector. National Intelligence Officers supervise the production of NIEs and other community-wide products. Typically, an analyst in one agency isdesignated by the relevant NIO to prepare a draft analytical product; the draft then is reviewed by relevant analyststhroughout the Community. Subsequently, if approved by the leadership of the Intelligence Community (the National Foreign Intelligence Board)and the DCI, the draft has beencirculated to policymakers in the Executive Branch and, on occasion, to Members of Congress. NIEs set forth thebest information and judgments ofthe Intelligence Community and are usually directed at significant issues that may require policy decisions. The NIOs have worked for the DCI in his capacity as head of the Intelligence Community rather than in his capacity as director of the CIA. (In thefuture they will report to the DNI.) Thus, NIEs and related analytical products have not been CIA products; theyhave represented the consolidatedviews of the Intelligence Community (with alternative views held by elements of the Intelligence Community noted,in accordance with the statutorymandate (13) ). It may be reasonably assumed that the NIC will continue to depend heavily on the resources of the CIA. The CIA contains the most extensiveanalytical capability across the board on all subjects that might concern national policymakers, as well asconsiderable capability to support militarycommanders and mid-level desk officers. The CIA was originally designed to be "central," without obligations tosupport departmental objectives ashas been considered to be the case with the intelligence arms of the military services and the State Department. Insome areas, however, otheragencies have more extensive capabilities and can make an equal or greater contribution to NIEs and other productsdesigned to express thejudgments of the entire Intelligence Community. Some critics, moreover, charge that CIA on occasion developsan agency "position" that tends todiscourage alternate perspectives. (14) On many topics, there are inevitably different perspectives, and according to many observers, policymakers are best served by rigorous presentationsof alternative positions. (15) At the same time,however, some NIEs reflect an effort to craft language that all agencies can agree on and thus to avoidairing differences that might draw agencies into policy arguments between and among government departments. Agency managers understand thattoo close involvement in a policy argument by intelligence analysts can make their analyses unwelcome across theboard. In addition, they wellunderstand that analysis is an uncertain science and art and that even the best analysts can miss developments thatloom large in retrospect and leavetheir agencies open to harsh criticism or retribution. Concern is often expressed about the extent to which intelligence products can become "politicized," i.e., be drafted to support or undermine certainpolicy options. A charge of politicization is difficult to prove and is often dependent upon a reader's subjectiveviewpoint. Most observers believethat analysts make a conscientious effort to avoid policy advocacy, but note that they are fully aware of policydisputes and may have their own viewsthat may, subconsciously or otherwise, influence their products. There is, according to some observers, a tendencyto avoid making intelligencejudgments that directly conflict with policy options that have been chosen. Observers caution that placingintelligence analysis at the center of policydisputes can undermine the effectiveness of the analytical contribution; they suggest that intelligence can best serveby informing policy debates, butanalysts cannot be expected to provide definitive judgments that will resolve disputes that may involve a myriadof different factors, some farremoved from intelligence questions. In addition, observers note that it should be recognized that policymakingsometimes involves makingjudgments based on incomplete intelligence or on a willingness to accept risks and uncertainties beyond the ken ofanalysts. Analysis can have asubjective quality to some degree and can be undermined by unreasonable expectations. The Intelligence Reform Act provides several provisions designed to ensure that analysis is well-prepared and not politicized. In addition to havingauthority to establish an Office of Inspector General, the DNI is to assign an individual or entity to ensure thatagencies conduct alternative analysesof information and conclusions in intelligence products (section 1017). The DNI is also to assign an individual orentity to ensure that intelligenceproducts are "timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based on all sources of availableintelligence, and employ the standards ofproper analytic tradecraft" (section 1019). Another section requires that the DNI assign an individual to addressanalysts' concerns about "real orperceived problems of analytic tradecraft or politicization, biased reporting, or lack of objectivity in intelligenceanalysis" (section 1020). Left uncertain are responsibilities for preparing the written brief on current intelligence that is prepared daily for the President and a very few othersenior officials. The President's Daily Brief (PDB), along with the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) thathas a somewhat widerdistribution, have been prepared by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and are considered that directorate's"flagship products." Nonetheless,should the DNI be responsible for daily substantive briefings at the White House rather than the CIA Director, itmight be considered appropriate thatthe DNI staff draft the PDB and the SEIB, based on input from the CIA and other agencies. The number of analystswho actually prepare thePBD/SEIB is not large, but their work reflects ongoing analysis in the CIA and other parts of the IntelligenceCommunity. Some might argue,moreover, that close and important links between CIA desk-level analysts and the PDB would be jeopardized shouldthe briefs be prepared outside ofthe CIA. In addition, there are myriads of other analytical products: reports, memoranda, briefings, etc. that are prepared on a routine basis. The IntelligenceReform Act does not transfer extensive analytical efforts to the NID; leaving such duties to existing agencies; theNIC will be responsible forassessments that set forth the judgments of the Intelligence Community as a whole. The Intelligence Reform Act provides that the DNI will assume responsibilities for managing the NIC. The DNI will be support by the NIC staff(probably numbering less than 100 positions). This gives the DNI the capability to oversee the preparation of NIEsand to ensure that the views of allagencies have been taken into consideration in inter-agency assessments. A major change will be the fact that theNIOs and their staff will work forone person (the DNI) while CIA analysts will report to a separate Director of the CIA. Congress may ultimatelyassess whether these changes, as theyare implemented, have improved the efforts of the Intelligence Community and its analytical products. The future responsibility for the production and presentation of the PDB/SEIBs is uncertain. They are currently prepared by CIA's Directorate ofIntelligence, and that responsibility could be continued. On the other hand, if the DNI, rather than the CIA Director,is to conduct the daily briefingfor the President and senior White House officials, it might be argued that the DNI and the DNI's immediate staffshould have responsibility for thedocument that provides the basis for the daily briefings.

Summary:
The 9/11 Commission made a number of recommendations to improve the quality ofintelligenceanalysis. A key recommendation was the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position tomanage the national intelligenceeffort and serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the President -- along with a separate director of the CentralIntelligence Agency. Subsequently, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, made the DNI theprincipal adviser to the President onintelligence and made the DNI responsible for coordinating community-wide intelligence estimates. Some observersnote that separating the DNIfrom the analytical offices may complicate the overall analytical effort. This report will be updated as newinformation becomes available.