In recent years, a number of observers have suggested that United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is generally more effective at acquisitions than the U.S. military departments, in part because of the perception that SOCOM has unique acquisition authorities. This report describes SOCOM's acquisition authorities for unclassified acquisition programs and compares these authorities to those granted to the military departments. It also compares the military departments' and SOCOM's chains of command, and the scope of acquisition activity and program oversight for those organizations. Finally, the report explores whether SOCOM has unique characteristics that influence how it conducts acquisition. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-433 ) reorganized DOD's command and control structure, in part by establishing the current construct and authorities of combatant commands. There are 10 combatant commands: 6 geographic and 4 functional commands. SOCOM possesses unique acquisition authorities when compared with other combatant commands. SOCOM was established and granted its own acquisition responsibilities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1987 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ( P.L. 99-661 ). SOCOM was the first combatant command endowed with acquisition authority and its own budget line for training and equipping its forces. The FY2016 NDAA ( P.L. 114-92 ) granted limited acquisition authority to the U.S. Cyber Command, making CYBERCOM the second command to have current independent acquisition authority. However, SOCOM's acquisition authority is more expansive. Title 10 U.S.C. Section 164(c) grants SOCOM authority to validate and establish priorities for requirements; ensure combat readiness; develop and acquire special operations-peculiar equipment and acquire special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services; and ensure the interoperability of equipment and forces. These authorities are applicable only to "special operations-peculiar items." If SOCOM wants to acquire a weapon system that is not special operations specific, the acquisition must be executed through one of the military departments. The military services are responsible for funding certain types of SOCOM training, service-common equipment, and professional services. For example, the Air Force provides SOCOM with C-130s and the Army provides the ammunition for service-common weapons to include the M4. SOCOM, in turn, can modify these systems to special operations-specific requirements. Pursuant to statute (10 U.S.C. 167), SOCOM has an Acquisition Executive who has the authority to negotiate memoranda of agreement with the military departments to carry out the acquisition of equipment, material, and supplies; supervise the acquisition of equipment, material, supplies, and services; represent the command in discussions with the military departments regarding acquisition programs for which the command is a customer; and work with the military departments to ensure that the command is appropriately represented in any joint working group or integrated product team regarding acquisition programs for which the command is a customer. These statutory authorities enable SOCOM to manage and oversee its acquisition programs, to negotiate with the military departments for systems to be provided to SOCOM, and to have input into military department acquisitions when SOCOM will be one of the customers of the acquisition program. Special Operations Force Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (SOF AT&L) is the organization within SOCOM that leads internal major procurement efforts. The SOCOM Commander is directly responsible for all portions of the command and the Acquisition Executive (AE) reports directly to the Commander. Falling under the AE are the Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and Directorates. This direct chain of command allows for rapid communication on purpose, intent, and decisionmaking (see Figure 1 ). The structure's design is similar to that of the other services, which also follow a Secretary/Commander-AE-PEO-PM structure (see Appendix B ). One difference is that in the services, the Service Acquisition Executive reports to the Service Secretary, whereas in SOCOM the AE reports to the Commander. Internal to SOCOM, the Commander generally delegates acquisition decision authority to the Acquisition Executive. The Acquisition Executive in turn generally further delegates the majority of Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) to the PEOs. SOCOM officials have asserted that this delegation enables more rapid decisionmaking and accelerates the acquisition process. The method SOCOM uses for acquisitions is similar to the acquisition processes used by the military services: they share the same general statutory and regulatory framework; training and education opportunities (i.e., access to Defense Acquisition University and National Defense University); and DOD oversight regime. However, there are also significant differences, many of which relate to the size and scope of SOCOM and its authorities. Table 1 summarizes select similarities and differences. SOCOM's statutory acquisition authorities are more limited than those of the military departments. SOCOM acquisition authority is restricted to Special Operations-specific items, while the military services have the authority to acquire any necessary goods and services. When SOCOM does exercise its authority, it adheres to the same oversight and documentation requirements as the services. As James Smith, the current SOCOM Acquisition Executive, reportedly stated: We are absolutely subject to all of the same oversight and policy as the rest of DOD. Our workforce operates professionally within the same DOD 5000 directives, the same Federal Acquisition Regulation and the same Financial Management Regulation. I think it's important to understand that.... Give credit to our acquisition workforce for the results they achieve, and you might dismiss using USSOCOM as a benchmark for how to do acquisition under the assumption that we're somehow "different." In some instances, SOCOM may in fact have fewer acquisition authorities and flexibilities than the military departments, as in cases where statute specifically provides acquisition authorities to the military departments. For example, 10 U.S.C. 2216 established a Defense Modernization Account and granted authority for its use to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments. Additionally, the FY2017 NDAA ( P.L. 114-328 , SS2447d) granted a new reprogramming authority, referred to as a special transfer authority , to the Secretaries of the military departments in an effort to expedite the selection of prototype projects for production and rapid fielding. The FY2018 NDAA ( P.L. 115-91 , SS809) required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the acquisition authorities available to the military departments that are not available to SOCOM, and to "determine the feasibility and advisability of providing such authorities to the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command." The regulations governing acquisition are found in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS). The DFARS provides DOD-specific regulations that government acquisition officials--and those contractors doing business with DOD--must follow in the procurement process for goods and services. SOCOM is not referenced or discussed in the FAR; the DFARS includes a brief definitional reference to SOCOM, defining it as a defense agency for the purposes of the DFARS. Each military service and many DOD components also have their own acquisition regulatory supplement that provides unique acquisition guidance. For example, the Army maintains the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplements (AFARS) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) maintains the DLA Directive. SOCOM has its own supplement to the DFARS, known as the SOCOM Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (SOFARS). SOFARS Part 5601.101 defines the supplemental regulation's purpose as "provid[ing] the minimum essential implementation of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and DOD FAR Supplement (DFARS)." SOCOM has also issued USSOCOM Directive 70-1, which seeks to set forth an overarching construct for acquisition, within the constraints of the FAR, DFAR, and SOFARS. There are no unique authorities granting SOCOM exemptions or waivers from acquisition requirements. The Office of the Secretary of Defense's issuances establishing policy, defining authorities, and assigning responsibility for acquisitions across all military services and defense agencies include The Defense Acquisition System (DOD Directive 5000.01), Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (DOD Instruction 5000.02), and Defense Acquisition of Services (DOD Instruction 5000.74). As such, SOCOM acquisition personnel are bound by and act with the same freedoms and restrictions as the military services and defense agencies. For example, all large DOD acquisition programs are given an Acquisition Category (ACAT) designation based on dollar figures and program scope. These designations determine the level of oversight required for the program. SOCOM and the military departments adhere to the same oversight standards and dollar threshold for categorizing programs. (For more information on program categories and dollar thresholds, see Table A-1 .) According to officials, SOCOM has a total of six programs that exceed the category II dollar thresholds. Currently, the Silent Knight Radar program, which is developing a SOF-common terrain following/terrain avoidance radar system for use in SOF fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft, is one of SOCOM's largest with a total estimated procurement cost through FY2023 of at $391.7 million. FY2017 actual procurement funding budget for the program was $34 million. In comparison, the military services have numerous major programs with significantly higher procurement appropriations. The Navy's 2017 appropriation for the Virginia Class submarine program ($5.39 billion) is 250% larger than SOCOM's entire FY2017 procurement appropriation ($2.08 billion). In FY2017, the SOCOM procurement appropriation was 1.5% of DOD's total procurement appropriation of $132.2 billion. See Table 2 for a comparison of the largest programs in the military services to that of SOCOM. The different size and scope of the acquisition efforts result in SOCOM having a substantially smaller acquisition workforce than the services. SOCOM's acquisition workforce consists of approximately 500 civilian and military personnel, less than 1% of the total DOD acquisition workforce of 156,000. A number of analysts and government officials have argued that SOCOM benefits from its size relative to the military services. The current SOCOM Acquisition Executive also reiterated this point when he reportedly stated that "[SOCOM's] ability to move relatively fast is a function of scale." When compared to the military services, SOCOM can be seen to operate like a small business. Many analysts argue that small businesses and organizations can be more nimble, more innovative, and more adaptable than large enterprises. As Sir Richard Branson, founder of the Virgin Group, reportedly stated, "Small businesses are nimble and bold and can often teach much larger companies a thing or two about innovations that can change entire industries." A number of analysts also argue that small organizations can be more effective in communication, innovation and redesign, customer service, and risk-taking; while others point out that small organizations can be more agile and less bureaucratic. A 2004 congressional report identified SOCOM's unique size, culture, and close proximity to the warfighter as factors that can contribute to more effective acquisitions. According to the congressional report: The successful use of the Special Operations Command acquisition authority below the acquisition category (ACAT) 1 level illustrates the transformation benefits of having a joint buyer, close to the user, maintain a streamlined acquisition process to deliver low dollar threshold systems rapidly to the warfighter. In discussing the SOCOM acquisition culture and the benefits of a flatter organization, a number of current and former SOCOM officials have stated that the lack of bureaucratic overhead allows the organization to identify emerging issues, modify programs that are underway, or, in certain cases, divest from programs more rapidly. This point has been highlighted by James "Hondo" Geurts, current Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (and former SOCOM Acquisition Executive). Another factor that potentially enables SOCOM's culture of innovation and risk-taking in its acquisition programs is its general ability to execute programs below statutory and regulatory dollar figures that require more rigorous oversight. Because SOCOM programs have lower dollar thresholds, its programs do not generally receive the same level of scrutiny brought to bear on the more expensive and higher-profile programs of the military services. For example, the Nunn-McCurdy Act (10 U.S.C. SS2433) requires DOD to report to Congress when an MDAP experiences cost overruns of 15% or more. There are currently more than 150 MDAPs in DOD; many of these programs have a larger budget in a single year than SOCOM's entire procurement budget for FY2017. If SOCOM's current CAT II program (Silent Knight Radar) experienced 100% cost growth (from approximately $391 million to $782 million), it would still not require a Nunn-McCurdy notification to Congress. In comparison, the cost growth associated with the procurement of the CVN-78 Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier ($1.4 billion) was approximately 70% of SOCOM's entire FY2017 procurement budget ($2.0 billion). Some analysts believe that these lower dollar thresholds allow SOCOM to operate below the radar, thus enabling a more nimble acquisition process and a culture that promotes "failing fast." Despite these perceived organizational advantages, SOCOM has experienced challenges in executing its acquisition programs. The Advanced SEAL Delivery System Program, intended to develop a covert submersible insertion vehicle, was documented by both the Government Accountability Office and RAND as experiencing considerable cost, schedule, and performance issues before finally being cancelled in 2009. This program illustrates observers' argument that it is not only the ability to succeed faster, but also to fail faster and adapt requirements or acquisition strategies faster, that gives SOCOM the ability to execute acquisitions more efficiently and effectively. Additionally, SOCOM's statutory restriction to procure strictly SOF-peculiar equipment, modifications, and services enables a more focused, operations-oriented acquisition culture. In a National Defense interview, James Smith reportedly stated the following: Our direct relationship to USSOCOM for the acquisition of only services and equipment that are unique to special operations gives us three primary advantages. First, USSOCOM is a combatant command with an extremely relevant ongoing mission. We're fully co-located and integrated with the staff here. We have a firsthand understanding of priorities and urgency that gives us a different appreciation for schedule emphasis. It's not a cliche to say that our operators will often accept the "80 percent" solution if we can get that solution into the fight sooner. The services, on the other hand, have a much broader acquisition mandate, including the acquisition of business systems, weapon procurement programs that must be integrated into joint operations, extensive logistic contracts, large- and small-scale platforms, and substantially more complex systems with multiple technologies and capabilities. This broader acquisition portfolio requires the services to manage acquisition programs across domains, using multiple acquisition processes, and to use different acquisition competencies. SOCOM benefits from being a smaller organization with a more focused mission set and limited scope of acquisition authorities. Other SOCOM attributes, such as delegating more decisionmaking to lower levels and promoting a more risk-taking culture, may be transferable to the services. A number of current senior acquisition officials in the military services recently served in SOCOM and appear to be promoting more delegation of authority and cultural risk-taking in the services, including General Paul Ostrowksi, formerly a SOCOM PEO and currently the Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), and James Guerts, formerly the SOCOM Acquisition Executive and currently the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition). One potential issue for Congress may include the following: To what extent do current acquisition-related laws and regulations promote or inhibit a more efficient, less bureaucratic, and more balanced approach to risk in acquisitions? In some instances SOCOM has fewer acquisition authorities than the military departments. This occurs where legislation grants acquisition authorities or flexibilities to the military departments. The definition of military departments, codified in 50 U.S.C. 3004, does not include SOCOM. As a result, SOCOM may not receive new acquisition authorities provided by Congress and must work through the Secretary of Defense to obtain these authorities or seek a legislative change, potentially resulting in lost opportunities for SOCOM in its acquisition efforts. Potential associated issues for Congress may include the following: Based on the DOD report on acquisition authorities required in the 2018 NDAA, should additional acquisition authorities should be granted to SOCOM? Should the definition of military departments as they relate to acquisitions be modified to include SOCOM? Appendix A. Appendix B. Comparison of Chains of Command

Summary:
United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is the Unified Combatant Command responsible for training, doctrine, and equipping all special operations forces of the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. SOCOM has been granted acquisition authority by Congress to procure special operations forces-peculiar equipment and services. There is a perception among some observers and officials that SOCOM possesses unique acquisition authorities that allow it to operate faster and more efficiently than the military departments. SOCOM possesses unique acquisition authorities when compared with other combatant commands. However, SOCOM is generally held to the same statutory and regulatory acquisition requirements as the military departments and, in some instances, has less acquisition authority. There are no unique authorities granting SOCOM exemptions or waivers from acquisition requirements. But when it comes to acquisition, SOCOM is different than the military services. SOCOM's acquisition performance is influenced by the size of the organization, focus of its acquisitions (which are limited to special operations-specific goods and services), and smaller size of its programs in terms of both scope of development and dollars. The current SOCOM Acquisition Executive reiterated these points when he reportedly stated that "[SOCOM's] ability to move relatively fast is a function of scale." These factors allow SOCOM to maintain the majority of its procurement programs at Category III levels, thereby reducing the oversight and bureaucratic burden, and allowing critical Milestone Decision Authority to remain at lower levels within the Command. As a result, some observers have argued that the SOCOM acquisition process is often capable of executing faster (and failing faster), maintaining closer communication between leadership and users, being more nimble, and fostering a culture willing to assume more risk.