Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance reports. As we reported in December 2012, our data analysis showed that apprehensions across the southwest border decreased 69 percent from fiscal years 2006 through 2011. These data generally mirrored a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. As we testified in February 2013, data reported by Border Patrol following the issuance of our December 2012 report showed that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend for Border Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors in part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic objectives, and increased resources for border security. It is too early to In addition to collecting data on apprehensions, Border Patrol collects other types of data that are used by sector management to help inform assessment of its efforts to secure the border against the threats of illegal migration and smuggling of drugs and other contraband. These data show changes, for example, in the (1) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended, (2) percentage of estimated known illegal entrants who are apprehended more than once (repeat offenders), (3) number of seizures of drugs and other contraband, and (4) number of apprehensions of persons from countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism. Our analysis of these data show that the percentage of estimated known illegal entrants apprehended from fiscal years 2006 through 2011 varied across southwest border sectors. The percentage of individuals apprehended who repeatedly crossed the border illegally declined by 6 percent from fiscal years 2008 through 2011. Further, the number of seizures of drugs and other contraband across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Our analysis of the data also show that apprehensions of persons from countries at an increased risk of sponsoring terrorism-- referred to as Aliens from Special Interest Countries--increased each fiscal year from 239 in fiscal year 2006 to 399 in fiscal year 2010, but dropped to 253 in fiscal year 2011. As we reported in December 2012, Border Patrol sectors and stations track changes in their overall effectiveness as a tool to determine if the appropriate mix and placement of personnel and assets are being deployed and used effectively and efficiently, according to officials from Border Patrol headquarters. Border Patrol data showed that the effectiveness rate for eight of the nine sectors on the southwest border improved from fiscal year 2006 through 2011. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that differences in how sectors define, collect, and report turn back data (entrants who illegally crossed the border but were not apprehended because they crossed back into Mexico) and got away data (entrants who illegally crossed the border and continued traveling into the U.S. interior) used to calculate the overall effectiveness rate preclude comparing performance results across sectors. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that until recently, each Border Patrol sector decided how it would collect and report turn back and got away data, and as a result, practices for collecting and reporting the data varied across sectors and stations based on differences in agent experience and judgment, resources, and terrain. Border Patrol headquarters officials issued guidance in September 2012 to provide a more consistent, standardized approach for the collection and reporting of turn back and got away data by Border Patrol sectors. Each sector is to be individually responsible for monitoring adherence to the guidance. According to Border Patrol officials, it is expected that this guidance will help improve data reliability. Implementation of this new guidance may allow for comparison of sector performance and inform decisions regarding resource deployment for securing the southwest border. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs and for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but has not yet identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim performance goal and measure for border security as reported in its annual performance report. Prior to this, DHS used operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security and to assess resource needs to accomplish this goal. Operational control--also referred to as effective control--was defined as the number of border miles where Border Patrol had the capability to detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. DHS last reported its progress and status in achieving operational control of the borders in fiscal year 2010. At that time, DHS reported achieving operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders. Along the southwest border, DHS reported achieving operational control for 873 (44 percent) of the about 2,000 border miles. At the beginning of fiscal year 2011, DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security. We testified in February 2013 that the interim goal and measure of number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs provides information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource identification and allocation decisions, and therefore until new goals and measures are developed, DHS and Congress could experience reduced oversight and DHS accountability. Further, studies commissioned by CBP have found that the number of apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency officials do not compare these numbers with the amount of cross-border illegal activity. Border Patrol officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing performance goals and measures, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. According to Border Patrol officials, establishing milestones and time frames for the development of performance goals and measures is contingent on the development of key elements of its new strategic plan, such as a risk assessment tool, and the agency's time frames for implementing these key elements--targeted for fiscal years 2013 and 2014--are subject to change. We recommended that CBP establish milestones and time frames for developing a performance goal, or goals, for border security between POEs that defines how border security is to be measured, and a performance measure, or measures, for assessing progress made in securing the border between POEs and informing resource identification and allocation efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendations and stated that it plans to set a date for when it will establish such milestones and time frames by November 2013. As part of its homeland security and legacy customs missions, CBP inspects travelers arriving at POEs to counter threats posed by terrorists and others attempting to enter the country with fraudulent or altered travel documents and to prevent inadmissible aliens, criminals, and goods from entering the country. In fiscal year 2012, CBP inspected about 352 million travelers, and over 107 million cars, trucks, buses, trains, vessels, and aircraft at over 329 air, sea, and land POEs. We have previously identified vulnerabilities in the traveler inspection program and made recommendations to DHS for addressing these vulnerabilities, and DHS implemented these recommendations. For example, we reported in January 2008 on weaknesses in CBP's inbound traveler inspection program, including challenges in attaining budgeted staffing levels because of attrition and lack of officer compliance with screening procedures, such as those used to determine citizenship and admissibility of travelers entering the country as required by law and CBP policy.Factors that contributed to these challenges included lack of focus, complacency, lack of supervisory presence, and lack of training. We recommended that CBP enhance internal controls in the inspection process, implement performance measures for apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators, and establish measures for training provided to CBP officers and new officer proficiency. DHS concurred with these recommendations and has implemented them. Specifically, in January 2008, CBP reported, among other things, that all land port directors are required to monitor and assess compliance with eight different inspection activities using a self-inspection worksheet that is provided to senior CBP management. At that time, CBP also established performance measures related to the effectiveness of CBP interdiction efforts. Additionally, in June 2011, CBP began conducting additional classroom and on-the-job training, which incorporated ongoing testing and evaluation of officer proficiency. In December 2011, we reported that CBP had revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own training development standards. Consistent with these standards, CBP convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify and rank the tasks that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new curriculum was designed to produce professional law enforcement officers capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal, biological, and agricultural threats. We also reported that CBP took some steps to identify and address the training needs of its incumbent CBP officers but could do more to ensure that these officers were fully trained. For example, we examined CBP's results of covert tests of document fraud detection at POEs conducted over more than 2 years and found weaknesses in the CBP inspection process at the POEs that were tested. In response to these tests, CBP developed a "Back to Basics" course in March 2010 for incumbent officers, but had no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the training. We also reported that CBP had not conducted an analysis of all the possible causes or systemic issues that may have contributed to the covert test results. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP analyze covert tests and evaluate the "Back to Basics" training course, and DHS concurred with these recommendations. In April 2012, CBP officials reported that they had completed an evaluation of the "Back to Basics" training course and implemented an updated, subsequent training course. Further, in November 2012, CBP officials stated that they had analyzed the results of covert tests prior to and since the implementation of the subsequent course. According to these officials, they obtained the results of covert tests conducted before and after the course was implemented to determine to what extent significant performance gains were achieved and to identify any additional requirements for training. In April 2013, CBP provided a copy of its analysis of the covert test results. GAO is reviewing CBP's analysis of the covert test results and other documentation as part of a congressional mandate to review actions the agency has taken to address GAO recommendations regarding CBP officer training. We expect to report on the status of CBP's efforts in the late summer of 2013. Further, in July 2012, CBP completed a comprehensive analysis of the results of its document fraud covert tests from fiscal years 2009 through 2011. In addition, we reported that CBP had not conducted a needs assessment that would identify any gaps between identified critical skills and incumbent officers' current skills and competencies. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP conduct a training needs assessment. DHS concurred with this recommendation. In April 2013, CBP reported to us that it is working to complete a training needs assessment, but has faced challenges in completing such an assessment because of personnel and budget issues, including retirements, attrition, loss of contract support, sequestration, and continuing resolutions. CBP plans to develop a final report on a training needs assessment by August 2013 outlining findings, conclusions, and recommendations from its analysis. Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the southwest and northern borders and can cause damage to natural, historic, and cultural resources, as well as put agency personnel and the visiting public at risk. We reported in November 2010 that information sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement officials had increased in recent years. For example, interagency forums were used to exchange information about border issues, and interagency liaisons facilitated exchange of operational statistics. Federal agencies also established interagency agreements to strengthen coordination of border security efforts. However, we reported in November 2010 that gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements to ensure law enforcement officials had access to daily threat information to better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity. For example, Border Patrol officials in the Tucson sector did not consult with federal land management agencies before discontinuing dissemination of daily situation reports that federal land law enforcement officials relied on for a common awareness of the types and locations of illegal activities observed on federal borderlands. Further, in Border Patrol's Spokane sector, on the northern border, coordination of intelligence information was particularly important because of sparse law enforcement presence and technical challenges that reduced Border Patrol's ability to fully assess cross-border threats, such as air smuggling of high-potency marijuana. We recommended that DHS, DOI, and USDA provide oversight and accountability as needed to further implement interagency agreements for coordinating information and integrating operations. These agencies agreed with our recommendations, and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol agents emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, DHS would need to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements to enhance border security on federal lands. DHS has stated that partnerships with other federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement agencies are critical to the success of northern border security efforts. We reported in December 2010 that DHS efforts to coordinate with these partners through interagency forums and joint operations were considered successful, according to a majority of these partners we interviewed. In addition, DHS component officials reported that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border had improved. However, DHS did not provide oversight for the number and location of forums established by its components, and numerous federal, state, local, and Canadian partners cited challenges related to the inability to provide resources for the increasing number of forums, raising concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. In addition, federal law enforcement partners in all four locations we visited as part of our work cited ongoing challenges between Border Patrol and ICE, Border Patrol and Forest Service, and ICE and DOJ's Drug Enforcement Administration in sharing information and resources that compromised daily border security related to operations and investigations. DHS had established and updated interagency agreements to address ongoing coordination challenges; however, oversight by management at the component and local levels has not ensured consistent compliance with provisions of these agreements. We also reported in December 2010 that while Border Patrol's border security measures reflected that there was a high reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zones, the extent of partner law enforcement resources that could be leveraged to fill Border Patrol resource gaps, target coordination efforts, and make more efficient resource decisions was not reflected in Border Patrol's processes for assessing border security and resource requirements. We recommended that DHS provide guidance and oversight for interagency forums and for component compliance with interagency agreements, and develop policy and guidance necessary to integrate partner resources in border security assessments and resource planning documents. DHS agreed with our recommendations and has reported taking action to address one of them. For example, in June 2012, DHS released a northern border strategy, and in August 2012, DHS notified us of other cross-border law enforcement and security efforts taking place with Canada. However, to fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, CBP would need to develop policy and guidance specifying how partner resources will be identified, assessed, and integrated in DHS plans for implementing the northern border strategy. To address the remaining recommendations, DHS would need to establish an oversight process for interagency forums to ensure that missions and locations of interagency forums are not duplicative and consider the downstream burden on northern border partners, as well as an oversight process that evaluates the challenges and corrective actions needed to ensure Border Patrol and ICE compliance with interagency memorandums. In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Through this initiative, DHS planned to develop a comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), and tactical infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lighting. Under this program, CBP increased the number of southwest border miles with pedestrian and vehicle fencing from 120 miles in fiscal year 2005 to about 650 miles as of March 2013. We reported in May 2010 that CBP had not accounted for the impact of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on border security. Specifically, CBP had reported an increase in control of southwest border miles, but could not account separately for the impact of the border fencing and other infrastructure. In September 2009, we recommended that CBP determine the contribution of border fencing and other infrastructure to border security. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, in response, CBP contracted with the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. CBP reported in February 2012 that preliminary results from this analysis indicate that an additional 3 to 5 years are needed to ensure a credible assessment. Since the launch of SBI in 2005, we have identified a range of challenges related to schedule delays and performance problems with SBInet. SBInet was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a "virtual fence" along the border, and after spending nearly $1 billion, DHS deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona's border that represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January 2011, in response to concerns regarding SBInet's performance, cost, and schedule, DHS canceled future procurements. CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. In November 2011, we reported that CBP does not have the information needed to fully support and implement its Plan in accordance with DHS and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. In developing the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives and outreach to potential vendors. However, CBP did not document the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan. Specifically, according to CBP officials, CBP used a two-step process to develop the Plan. First, CBP engaged the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute to conduct an analysis of alternatives beginning with ones for Arizona. Second, following the completion of the analysis of alternatives, the Border Patrol conducted its operational assessment, which included a comparison of alternative border surveillance technologies and an analysis of operational judgments to consider both effectiveness and cost. While the first step in CBP's process to develop the Plan--the analysis of alternatives--was well documented, the second step--Border Patrol's operational assessment--was not transparent because of the lack of documentation. As we reported in November 2011, without documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify how the analysis of alternatives was used, assess the validity of the decisions made, or justify the funding requested. We also reported that CBP officials have not yet defined the mission benefits expected from implementing the new Plan, which could help improve CBP's ability to assess the effectiveness of the Plan as it is implemented. In addition, we reported that CBP's 10-year life cycle cost estimate for the Plan of $1.5 billion was based on an approximate order-of-magnitude analysis, and agency officials were unable to determine a level of confidence in their estimate, as best practices suggest. Specifically, we found that the estimate reflected substantial features of best practices, being both comprehensive and accurate, but it did not sufficiently meet other characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate, such as credibility, because it did not identify a level of confidence or quantify the impact of risks. GAO and OMB guidance emphasize that reliable cost estimates are important for program approval and continued receipt of annual funding. In addition, because CBP was unable to determine a level of confidence in its estimate, we reported that it would be difficult for CBP to determine what levels of contingency funding may be needed to cover risks associated with implementing new technologies along the remaining Arizona border. We recommended in November 2011 that, among other things, CBP document the analysis justifying the technologies proposed in the Plan, determine its mission benefits, and determine a more robust life cycle cost estimate for the Plan. DHS concurred with these recommendations, and has reported taking action to address some of the recommendations. For example, in October 2012, CBP officials reported that, through the operation of two surveillance systems under SBInet's initial deployment in high-priority regions of the Arizona border, CBP has identified examples of mission benefits that could result from implementing technologies under the Plan. Additionally, CBP initiated action to update its cost estimate for the Plan by, among other things, providing revised cost estimates in February and March 2012 for the Integrated Fixed Towers and Remote Video Surveillance System, the Plan's two largest projects. We currently have ongoing work in this area for congressional requesters and, among other things, are examining DHS's efforts to address prior recommendations, and expect to issue a report with our final results in the fall of 2013. In March 2012, we reported that the CBP Office of Air and Marine (OAM)--which provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of its customers, primarily Border Patrol--had not documented significant events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement across locations, and as a result, lacked a record to help demonstrate that its decisions to allocate resources were the most effective ones in fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats. OAM issued various plans that included strategic goals, mission responsibilities, and threat information. However, we could not identify the underlying analyses used to link these factors to the mix and placement of resources across locations. OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to mission needs or threats. For example, while the southwest border was Border Patrol's highest priority for resources in fiscal year 2010, it did not receive a higher rate of air support than the northern border. Similarly, OAM did not document analyses supporting the current mix and placement of marine assets across locations. OAM officials said at the time that while they generally documented final decisions affecting the mix and placement of resources, they did not have the resources to document assessments and analyses to support these decisions. However, we reported that such documentation of significant events could help the office improve the transparency of its resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the effectiveness of these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs and addressing threats. We recommended in March 2012 that CBP document analyses, including mission requirements and threats, that support decisions on the mix and placement of OAM's air and marine resources. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it plans to provide additional documentation of its analyses supporting decisions on the mix and placement of air and marine resources by 2014. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Tierney, and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement included Lacinda Ayers, Kathryn Bernet, and Jeanette Espinola (Assistant Directors), as well as Jennifer Bryant, Frances Cook, Joseph Dewechter, Alana Finley, Barbara Guffy, and Ashley D. Vaughan. Border Security: DHS's Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S. Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013. Border Patrol: Goals and Measures Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-330T. Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2013. Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-25. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2012. Border Patrol Strategy: Progress and Challenges in Implementation and Assessment Efforts. GAO-12-688T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2012. Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS's Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2012. Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure Officers Are Fully Trained. GAO-12-269. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2011. Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2011. Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the Southwest Border. GAO-11-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2011. Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010. Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands. GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010. Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. GAO-10-651T. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010. Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009. Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.: January 3, 2008. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
At the end of fiscal year 2004, DHS had about 28,100 personnel assigned to patrol U.S. land borders and inspect travelers at air, land, and sea POEs, with a total security cost of about $5.9 billion. At the end of fiscal year 2011, DHS had about 41,400 personnel assigned to air, land, and sea POEs and along the borders, with a total security cost of about $11.8 billion. DHS has reported that these resources have contributed to stronger enforcement efforts on the border. However, challenges remain to secure the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS border security programs and operations. As requested, this statement addresses some of the key issues and recommendations GAO has made in the following areas: (1) DHS's efforts to secure the border at and between POEs; (2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security information sharing and enforcement efforts; and (3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets used to secure the border. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from January 2008 through March 2013, along with selected updates conducted in April 2013. For selected updates, GAO reviewed DHS information on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has reported progress in stemming illegal cross-border activity, but it could strengthen the assessment of its efforts. For example, since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry (POE) as an interim measure for border security. GAO reported in December 2012 that apprehensions decreased across the southwest border from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, generally mirroring a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. CBP attributed this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and increased resources for border security. Data reported by CBP's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) show that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012. It is too early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend. GAO testified in February 2013 that the number of apprehensions provides information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource allocation decisions. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs, but it has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them, as GAO recommended. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and said that it plans to set a date for establishing such milestones and time frames by November 2013. According to DHS law enforcement partners, interagency coordination and information sharing improved, but challenges remain. GAO reported in November 2010 that information sharing and communication among federal law enforcement officials responsible for federal borderlands had increased; however, gaps remained in ensuring law enforcement officials had access to daily threat information. GAO recommended that relevant federal agencies ensure interagency agreements for coordinating information and integrating border security operations are further implemented. These agencies agreed, and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum affirming the importance of federal partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of GAO's recommendation, DHS needs to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements. Opportunities exist to improve DHS's management of border security assets. For example, DHS conceived the Secure Border Initiative Network as a surveillance technology and deployed such systems along 53 miles of Arizona's border. In January 2011, in response to performance, cost, and schedule concerns, DHS canceled future procurements, and developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. GAO reported in November 2011 that in developing the Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives, but it had not documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of technologies proposed in the Plan, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS concurred with this recommendation. GAO has ongoing work in this area, and among other things, is examining DHS's efforts to address prior recommendations, and expects to issue a report in fall 2013. In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to DHS to strengthen its border security programs and efforts. DHS generally concurred and has taken actions, or has actions planned or underway to address them.