Congress has had a longstanding interest in Mexico's counter-narcotics efforts. (1) Beginning with legislationoriginally enacted in the mid-1980s, Congress required the President to certify annually, subject tocongressional review, that drug producing or drug-transit countries had cooperated fully with theUnited States in drug control efforts during the previous year to avoid suspension of U.S. aid. (2) Mexico was fully certified infollowing years, but Congress closely monitored these certifications, and resolutions of disapprovalto reverse the presidential certifications were introduced in 1996-1999. Following the election ofopposition candidate Vicente Fox as President of Mexico in July 2000, several Members called formodification of the certification procedures or exemption of Mexico from the process, but legislativeaction was not completed. President Bush certified Mexico as fully cooperative on March 1, 2001,and no resolutions of disapproval were introduced in 2001. In April and September 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out twomeasures ( S. 219 and S. 1401 ) that would have suspended the certificationrequirements for three years, but no final action was taken by Congress on the measures. InDecember 2001, Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002( H.R. 2506 / P.L. 107-115 ) that waived the drug certification requirements for FY2002for all countries, and instead required the President to designate only countries that had demonstrablyfailed to meet international counter-narcotics obligations. In September 2002, Congress enacted theForeign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 ( H.R. 1646 / P.L. 107-228 ) that, inSection 706, made permanent a requirement that the President designate in mid-September of eachyear, before the beginning of the fiscal year, the countries which have demonstrably failed to meetinternational counter-narcotics obligations. Acting under these modified requirements, President Bush has made the requireddesignations for fiscal years 2002 through 2005, and Mexico has not been mentioned by U.S.officials, except to say that it has been performing well and is far from failing to meet internationalcounter-narcotics standards. (3) According to the Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs, Mexico is the principal transit country for South American cocaine enteringthe United States, the leading foreign source of marijuana, and a principal source of heroin. It is alsoa major producing and transit point for methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs. (4) Agency experts agree thatMexico's share of illicit traffic in the various areas has remained high over the years, although thereare some variations in the estimates. The methodology for making the estimates (whether derivedfrom seizures or some other means) is not regarded as entirely adequate, and the estimates may beaffected by changing trafficking patterns and demand as much as enforcement efforts. With regard to cocaine, the major drug of concern, the State Department's INCSR reportcovering the year 2003 states that "an estimated 70 percent of the U.S.-bound cocaine shipments passthrough [Mexican] territory." The Drug Enforcement Administration's Country Profile for 2003 forMexico states that "an estimated 70 percent of all cocaine originating from South America destinedfor the United States transits the Mexico-Central America corridor." (5) These estimates appear to bea higher percentage than reported in previous years. The INCSR covering 2002 stated that"approximately 65 percent of cocaine reaching the United States passes through Mexico and watersoff the Pacific and Gulf coasts, " and the INCSR covering 2001 stated that Mexico was the transitpoint for "more than one half of the cocaine sold in the United States." With respect to heroin, the INCSR report covering 2003 states that Mexico produces less thanfive percent of the world's opium poppy, but because of the geographical proximity to the UnitedStates it is "the supplier of some 30 to 40 percent of the U.S. heroin market -- especially in stateswest of the Mississippi." This appears to be a slightly higher estimate than in the past. The INCSRreport covering 2002 stated simply that geographical proximity to the United States "allowscultivators and processors [in Mexico] to supply a disproportionately large share of the U.S. heroinmarket." A U.S. Customs official stated, in March 2001 hearings, that 14% of the heroin seized inthe United States comes from Mexico, while an independent study indicated that Mexico is thesource of 29% of the heroin used in the United States. (6) In other areas, the INCSR covering 2003 reports that Mexico "is by far the leading foreignsource of marijuana consumed in the United States," and "is also a major producing and transit pointfor methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs." Moreover, the report says that Mexican drugtraffickers have steadily increased operations in all illicit drug sectors in the United States, and havecome to dominate most of the distribution centers. Mexico continues to be a majormoney-laundering center, in which trafficking organizations exploit Mexican banks and financialinstitutions to transfer significant amounts of illicitly obtained currency through the global financialsystem. Favored money laundering methods include the smuggling of U.S. currency into Mexicoand the movement of the funds back into the United States via couriers, wire transfers, and armoredvehicles. In short, Mexico's share of illicit traffic has remained high over the years, and seemed toincrease in 2003 in major areas, especially in the supply of cocaine and heroin to the U.S. market. Mexico's role as a base for drug traffickers and as a center for money-laundering persisted andperhaps increased as well. The following three tables show State Department estimates of Mexican drug control effortsin three areas -- seizures, arrests, and eradication -- from 1998 to 2003. Supplementary informationcovering the first six months of 2004 is also provided as reported in the written version of PresidentFox's Fourth Report of the Government. (7) Caution should be exercised in considering the changes in thevarious areas as an indication of Mexico's seriousness in controlling drug trafficking. The trendsmay also be affected by the demand for the drugs, the amount of drugs produced or available, thesophistication of the drug traffickers, the intelligence and capabilities of Mexican counter-drugagencies, the effectiveness of reporting and monitoring methods, the effect of weather conditions oneradication efforts, and competition from alternative drug suppliers. Turning to Mexican seizures of drugs in 2003, the results portrayed in Table 1, as reportedby the State Department, demonstrate a mixed result compared to 2002, and compared to the averageof the previous five years (1998-2002) that have been calculated to minimize the effects of annualvariations. The results generally show negative results in the seizures of cocaine, opium, and heroin,while showing positive results in the seizures of marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug labs. Morerecent Mexican data for the first six months of 2004 show positive results in the seizures of opium,heroin, and marijuana. Table 1. Mexican Seizures of Illicit Narcotics,1998-2003 Sources: Data are from the U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control StrategyReport , March 2004, Part I, pp. 159-168, especially the Table on p. 168, with updated data on illicitdrug labs from Mexican official reports provided by the Department of State. Seizures are measuredin metric tons (mt) and kilograms (kg). Seizures of cocaine, which many consider to be the key test, increased significantly, from12.6 metric tons in 2002 to 20.0 metric tons in 2003, according to the State Department. This is a59% increase from one year to the next, but the increase is from what appears to be a particularly badyear. The result for 2003 was still a 15% reduction from average seizures of 23.40 metric tons inthe previous five years (1998-2002), and it surpassed only two of the previous five years. Mexicandata for January-June 2004 show seizures of cocaine at 13.1 metric tons, a 17% reduction comparedto January-June 2003, but a respectable result if projected at the same rate until the end of 2004. Seizures of opium declined from 310 kilograms in 2002 to 189 kilograms in 2003, accordingto the State Department, a 39% reduction from the previous year, and a 30% reduction from theaverage of 409 kilograms in the 1998-2002 period. This was the lowest level of seizures in the lastsix years, except for 1998. Mexican data for the first six months of 2004 show seizures of 269kilograms of opium, a 50% increase compared to the first six months of 2003, and a positive resultif projected to the end of 2004. Seizures of heroin declined 41% from 282 kilograms in 2002 to 165 kilograms in 2003, asreported by the State Department, and this result was a 49% decline from the average seizures of 240kilograms in the 1998-2002 period. However, Mexican data for January-June 2004 show seizuresof heroin up to 154 kilograms, a 166% increase compared to January-June 2003, and a result morein keeping with recent performance, especially when using the much higher Mexican data for 2003. Seizures of marijuana increased 24% from 1,633 metric tons in 2002 to 2,019 metric tons in2003, according to the State Department, making the seizures the largest in the last six years, and a 33% increase over the average of 1,522 for 1998-2002. Mexican data show seizures of marijuanafor the first six months of 2004 at 790 metric tons, a 44% increase over the first six months of 2003,but a result that would be below recent results if projected to the end of the year. Seizures of methamphetamine increased 43% from 457 kilograms in 2002 to 652 kilogramsin 2003, the largest level of seizures in the last six years, and were up 75% compared to the averageof 373 kilograms in the previous five years, according to the State Department. The Mexican datafor 2004 do not contain information on seizures of methamphetamine. Seizures of illicit drug labs increased 69% from 13 in 2002 to 22 in 2003, as reported by theState Department, and seizures were up 34% from the average of 17 labs during the previous fiveyears, on an indicator that is likely to be somewhat erratic. Mexican data shows only two illicit druglabs being seized in January-June 2004, an 85% reduction compared to the number of seizures inJanuary-June 2003. Arrests in General. As indicated in Table 2, thenumber of people arrested in Mexico on drug-related charges increased in 2003 in all categoriescompared to 2002, as reported by the State Department, but the arrests are low compared to theprevious four years and to the average arrests in the 1998-2002 period. Table 2. Mexican Arrests on Drug-Related Charges,1998-2003 Sources: Data are from the U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control StrategyReport , March 2004, Part I, pp. 159-168, especially the Table on p. 168, with missing data beingsupplied by the State Department. The figures show that the arrests of foreigners in 2003 were up slightly from 2002, but lowerthan all previous years, about 31% lower than the average of 201 for the 1998-2002 period. Thenumber of arrests of Mexicans and the number of total arrests were up 10% from 2002 to 2003, butdown 20% from the average in the previous five years. More recent Mexican data show higher arrestfigures for 2003 and total arrests of 5,050 in the first six months of 2004, a 10% increase over theresults in the same period in 2003. Actions Against Major Traffickers. Despite themixed results on arrests, recent State Department's INSCR reports have praised arrest successesagainst the major Mexican drug cartels, although the reports have exhibited slightly diminishingenthusiasm, and new cartels have been emerging to replace those that have been damaged. (8) The report covering 2001stated that the Mexican government's longstanding fight against drug trafficking and crime has"resulted in tangible successes against the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), the Carrillo FuentesOrganization (CFO), and the Gulf Cartel -- widely considered the top three drug groups in thecountry." The report covering 2002 stated that "Mexican authorities continued to achieve impressiveresults in arresting leaders of major drug trafficking organizations, undermining their capabilities tooperate both in Mexico and the United States." The report covering 2003 states that "Mexicanauthorities sustained an intensive counternarcotics effort throughout 2003, including the capture ofmajor drug cartel figures. . . ." In line with these reports, the Mexican State of the Nation reportstates that 31,719 people associated with seven drug organizations were arrested from December2000 to June 2004, including 15 cartel leaders, 39 financiers, and 64 lieutenants. Major successes against the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) based in Tijuana near SanDiego include the following: (1) the arrest in March 2001 of a cell leader, Rigoberto LlanezGuerrero, and several lieutenants; (2) the arrest in August 2001 of Colombian trafficker and cocainesupplier Herbert Alberto Cruz Ruiz; (3) the killing in early February 2002 of drug lord RamonArellano Felix in a police shootout in Mazatlan, although some sources say he was killed by a rivalgang; (4) the arrest in early March 2002 of drug lord and overall leader Benjamin Arellano Felix; (5)the arrest in mid-March 2002 of Miguel Herrera Barraza, another key figure in the organization; (6)the arrest in April 2002 of 43 corrupt police officers protecting the cartel and the subsequent arrestof other cartel lieutenants; and (7) the arrest in June 2004 of drug kingpins Jorge Arellano Felix andEfrain Perez. Accomplishments against the Carrillo Fuentes Organization (CFO) based in Juarez near ElPaso include (1) the arrest in May 2001 of former Governor Mario Villanueva after a two-yearmanhunt for allegedly using his position to facilitate drug shipments and money laundering in thefar southeastern state of Quintana Roo; (2) the arrest in June 2001 of cell leader Ramon AlcidesMagana who was transshipping cocaine through Quintana Roo with tacit support from GovernorVillanueva; (3) the arrest in May 2002 of Jesus Albino Quintero Meraz, a top lieutenant in the GulfCartel who had also worked for former Governor Mario Villanueva; (4) the arrest in April 2003 ofArturo Hernandez, a senior hit man responsible for the deaths of many persons including the plasticsurgery doctors whose bungled efforts led to the death in July 1997 of cartel boss Amado CarrilloFuentes; (5) and the arrests in August and September 2003 of major CFO traffickers Jose LaijaSerron and Rigoberto Glaxiola. In a related development, in July 2003, during "Operation Trifecta,"Mexican authorities arrested three major drug traffickers, including Manuel Medina Campas, aleading lieutenant of the Ismael Zambada Garcia Organization that spun off from the CFO. Achievements against the Osiel Cardenas-Guillen Organization (or Gulf Cartel, formerly ledby the now-imprisoned Juan Garcia-Abrego) include (1) the arrests in April 2001 and March 2002of traffickers Gilberto Garcia Mena and Adan Medrano; (2) the arrest in March 2003 of prime cartelleader Osiel Cardenas-Guillen; and (3) the arrests in August 2004 of major cartel figures RamiroHernandez and Gilberto Higuera Guerrero. Successes against the Caro-Quintero Organization include the arrest in December 2001 ofcartel leader Miguel Caro Quintero. Accomplishments against the Armando Valencia-Cornelio Organization (or Milenio Cartel)that operates primarily in the states of Jalisco and Michoacan include the arrest in August 2003 inGuadalajara of cartel leader Armando Valencia-Cornelio and seven associates. Other achievements include the arrest in May 2001 of Adan Amezcua of theAmezcua-Contreras methamphetamine trafficking organization. Extraditions. The Mexican governmentextradited a record total of 31 persons to the United States in 2003 (including 18 Mexican nationalsand 19 narcotics defendants), compared to 25 in 2002, and 17 in 2001, under the Fox Administration,and 12 by the Zedillo Administration in 2000. In addition, over 70 fugitives who were in Mexicoillegally were expelled to the United States. Denials of U.S. extradition requests fell from 25 in 2002(including 3 high profile cases) to 10 in 2003, and Mexican domestic prosecution of fugitives fromforeign jurisdictions increased, with 178 convictions out of 194 such prosecutions from 2001 to2003. (9) Until the last few years, Mexican policy and court decisions required that Mexican nationalswanted for crimes committed abroad be prosecuted in Mexico. However, the Zedillo Administration broke new ground by extraditing seven Mexican nationals and one dual U.S.-Mexican national tothe United States between 1996 and 2000 on grounds that this was permitted under the U.S.-Mexicoextradition treaty and Mexican extradition law in exceptional cases. Despite this stance, Mexicancourts continued to be reluctant to approve extradition of Mexican nationals, even whenrecommended by the Mexican Foreign Ministry, and they freed several alleged drug traffickers afterraising questions about the constitutionality and appropriateness of extraditions, especially wherecapital punishment or life sentences might be applied. In January 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that Mexican citizens may be extraditedto the United States for prosecution on drug charges provided that they are sentenced under Mexicanguidelines. This seemed to clear one legal hurdle, but the INCSR report in 2001 noted that adverselower court decisions on other issues, particularly the question of life imprisonment and capitalpunishment, continued to impede the extradition process. (10) In October 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that lifeimprisonment is unconstitutional in Mexico and a bar to extradition for fugitives facing that penaltyin another country, although extradition may take place if the requesting country provides assurancesthat this penalty will not be imposed. The INCSR report in 2002 characterized this decision as asignificant setback, with the potential to frustrate the extradition of the most serious criminals. Italso expressed concern about overly technical legalistic analysis of extradition requests. (11) The INCSR report in 2004 noted that the two governments were working hard to narrow the impactof the October 2001 decision and to eliminate the backlog of extradition requests, and that theForeign Ministry was asserting its prerogative to judge the adequacy of U.S. assurances. (12) Temporary Surrender Protocol. The MexicanSenate in December 2000 approved a protocol to the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty, alreadyapproved by the U.S. Senate, that would permit the temporary surrender for trial of fugitives whoare serving sentences in one country but are also wanted on criminal charges in the other country. Following the meeting of Presidents Bush and Fox in Mexico in mid-February 2001, officialsworked to implement this temporary surrender protocol, and the protocol entered into force in May2001. According to the INCSR covering 2003, Mexican authorities have reported legal difficultiesin implementing the Protocol. Anti-Corruption Efforts. As the first presidentto be elected from an opposition party in 71 years, President Fox has promised to strengthendemocracy and the rule of law in Mexico, and to fight corruption and crime. He has proposed theprofessionalization of the police under a new Public Security Ministry to deal with widespread publicconcerns with security and police corruption. As part of those efforts his Administration hasreorganized the Attorney General's office (PGR), reformed the Federal Judicial Police (PJF), andcreated a new Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) patterned after the FBI to some extent. Following the escape from prison of drug lord Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, President Foxannounced a national crusade against drug trafficking on January 24, 2001, promising to eliminatecorruption in the police and prison systems and to enhance law enforcement efforts against drugtraffickers. After that, a large number of the prison officials in the state of Jalisco were questionedand charged, and many customs officials and anti-drug agents in the state of Chihuahua wereremoved from office. In early November 2002, President Fox presented a tougher, morecomprehensive, six-year National Drug Control Plan, which recognized Mexico's growing drugproblem and the need for greater cooperation among agencies, while noting Mexican successesagainst major drug traffickers. At a broader level, President Fox has ordered the Secretariat of PublicAdministration (SFP) to aggressively attack official corruption. He also proposed and isimplementing a Freedom of Information law that went into effect in July 2003 to encourage honestyand transparency. Notable efforts to punish drug-related corruption include the arrest in January 2001 of prisonofficials who facilitated the escape of drug lord Joaquin Guzman; the arrest in February 2001 of stateand local police in Mexicali who had blocked official efforts to capture AFO lieutenant GilbertoHiguera Guerrero; the arrest in April 2001 of a brigadier general and two other officers forcomplicity with the Gulf Cartel; the arrests in Tecate in April 2002 of more than 40 high-level lawenforcement officials with ties to AFO traffickers; the arrest in October 2002 of 25 mid-levelofficials on suspicion of disclosing sensitive information to drug traffickers; the implementationthroughout 2002 of policies to force the retirement of all personnel in the Federal Judicial Police;the seizure in January 2003 of 17 offices of the elite federal anti-drug unit known as FEADS anddisbandment following the discovery of evidence that it was being corrupted by drug traffickers; andthe arrest in late January 2004 of a number of Mexican state police officers in the border state ofChihuahua on suspicion of involvement with drug traffickers in the killing of 11 men from rival druggangs. At a more systematic level, the government maintains a national police registry to preventreemployment of corrupt policeman, and the Attorney General's office has greatly expanded thescreening and vetting of employees, especially for the formation of the Sensitive Investigations Units(SIUs) dealing with extremely sensitive information. According to the INCSR reports, the AttorneyGeneral's office dismissed 1,100 people for irregularities in 2001 of some 14,000 screenedemployees, while the anti-corruption agency took action against over 4,400 employees in 2002, andimposed over 2,500 sanctions in the first half of 2003. (13) Table 3 portrays the results of Mexican efforts to eradicate opium poppy and marijuanacultivation in the last six years, showing the total area of cultivation, the total eradication effortregardless of the number of sprayings, the effective eradication area. the potential area available forharvest and production, and the potential yield of the illicit products. The results for eradication are somewhat surprising, in part because the total area undercultivation and the potential harvest area has been expanding considerably, in part because offavorable growing conditions, so that even where there are increases in the number of hectareseradicated, there may still be increases in the potential yield of the product. Table 3. Mexican Eradication of Illicit Drugs, 1998-2003 Sources: Data are from the U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control StrategyReport , March 2004, Part I, pp. 159-168, especially the Table on page 168, with corrected andupdated data from the State Department in October 2004. Cultivation and Eradication are measuredin hectares (ha), with one hectare equaling 2.47 acres. Cultivation represents the number of hectaresin which the crops are grown. Total eradication reflects the total hectares sprayed, includingspraying a field three times if there are three crops, and is a good representation of Mexican efforts. Effective eradication reflects the U.S. estimates of the number of hectares eradicated, factoring outrepeated spraying in one area and is one factor in calculating potential yield. Potential harvest is theresulting number of hectares available for harvesting and production. Potential yield reflects themetric tons (mt) of the illicit drug that could have been produced given the available hectares of theproduct. The U.S. estimate of total eradication of opium poppy cultivation in 2003 of 20,000 hectaresis 2% above the figure for 2002, and 15% above the average of 16,964 hectares in the 1998-2002period. The effective eradication of opium poppy cultivation in 2003 of 10,100 hectares was 6%below the performance in 2000, and 8% below the average effective eradication in the 1998-2002period. However, with the increase in the total area under cultivation and the better growingconditions, the estimated potential harvest was 4,800 hectares, which produced a potential yield in2003 of 101 metric tons of opium gum, a significant 74% increase from the potential yield of 58 in2002, and a 45% increase over the average of 75 metric tons in 1998-2002. (14) The Mexican State of theNation report provides data only on the total area of eradication, showing a 39% increase from12,302 hectares of opium poppy eradicated in the first six months of 2003 to 17,062 eradicated inthe first six months of 2004. The U.S. estimate of total eradication of marijuana in 2003 was 36,600 hectares, a 19%increase over 2002, and a 21% increase over the average of 30,120 hectares in the 1998-2002 years. The estimate of effective eradication of Mexican marijuana in 2003 was 20,800 hectares, a 39%increase over 2002, and a 44% increase over the 1998-2002 average of 14,240. With a potentialharvest of 7,500 hectares, the potential yield of 13,500 metric tons of marijuana in 2003 was up 71%from 2002, and up 76% from the average of 7,460 for the 1998-2002 period. The Mexican State ofthe Nation report provides data only on the total area of eradication, showing a 72% increase from110,008 hectares of marijuana eradicated in January-June 2003 to 17,209 hectares eradicated inJanuary-June 2004. In short, while eradication efforts expanded in 2003, compared to previous years, theestimated yield of opium poppy gum in Mexico increased 74%, while the estimated yield ofmarijuana in Mexico increased 71%, significant increases for both illicit products. More recentMexican data show continuing increases in the area of poppy and marijuana eradicated. U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics cooperation increased substantially during the Administrationof President Zedillo (1994-2000), with the full range of law enforcement, military, and border anddrug control agencies being involved. Acting through the annual cabinet-level meetings of theBinational Commission, the twice yearly High Level Contact Group (HLCG) on Drug Control, andthe roughly quarterly Mexico-U.S. Senior Law Enforcement Plenary, the countries' leaders agreedon a joint anti-drug strategy with numerous cooperative arrangements. (15) Following the inaugurations of new presidents in the United States and Mexico, PresidentBush, on his first foreign visit, met with President Fox in Guanajuato, Mexico, in mid-February2001, and the two leaders pledged to pursue a "partnership for prosperity." On drug traffickingissues, they agreed to strengthen law enforcement cooperation in accordance with each country'snational jurisdiction, and in the joint press conference, President Bush indicated that he hadconfidence in President Fox's efforts to control corruption and drug trafficking in Mexico, and thatthere was a movement in Congress to reform the U.S. drug certification procedure which Mexicoconsidered unfriendly. With legislation unfinished, on March 1, 2001, President Bush certified thatMexico had cooperated fully with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts, citing arrests of drug traffickers andimpressive eradication results in 2000 During President Fox's official state visit to the United States on September 5-7, 2001, theMexican President, in addressing a joint session of Congress, called upon legislators to passlegislation to suspend the drug certification requirements as a gesture of trust and faith in the newgovernment, arguing that "trust requires that one partner not be judged unilaterally by the other." Following the Bush-Fox talks, the joint communique praised the growing law enforcementcooperation between the countries, expressed support for the OAS' multilateral evaluation ofcounter-narcotics efforts, and noted President Bush's commitment "to work with the U.S. Congress,on a priority basis, to replace the annual counter-narcotics certification regime with new measuresdesigned to enhance international cooperation in this area." Earlier, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 219 (a bill tomodify drug certification requirements) in April 2001, and then reported out S. 1401 (Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003), with similar language in Sections 741-745,in August 2001. These provisions would modify the drug certification process for three years,require designation of the countries subject to sanctions only, and encourage development of amultilateral strategy. Lacking congressional action on S. 219 or S. 1401 ,the drug certification requirements were temporarily modified in late 2001 by enactment of theForeign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 ( H.R. 2506 / P.L. 107-115 ). Thismeasure waived the drug certification requirements for FY2002 and required the President todesignate only countries that had demonstrably failed to meet international counter-narcoticsobligations. (16) During the Bush-Fox meeting in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, the Presidentsacknowledged "major successes achieved by Mexico in the fight against narco-trafficking" andagreed on "the importance of redoubling judicial cooperation" between the countries. The March2002 INSCR report on Mexico noted that the two countries cooperated in a range of bilateralcounter-narcotics and law enforcement fora, including the Legal Working Group of the BinationalCommission, and the Senior Law Enforcement Plenary Group. It emphasized that the climate ofcooperation within the bilateral law enforcement and military communities had improveddramatically in recent years, stating that "For the first time in recent memory, both sides are sharingsensitive information on counternarcotics issues." The report mentioned bilateral air-to-aircommunications on interdiction operations, joint post-seizure analysis of maritime operations, andbilateral military intelligence sharing. It noted that U.S.-sponsored law enforcement training tripledin 2001, and that military-to-military contacts increased, with ion scanner and night vision goggletraining being especially useful in Mexico's drug interdiction efforts. Among the joint operationsthat might be cited to exemplify the close cooperation between the countries is Operation Marquis,which culminated in June 2001 with the arrest of about 80 individuals in the United States andMexico. (17) In this cooperative bilateral environment, in September 2002, the Congress and Presidentenacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 ( H.R. 1646 / P.L. 107-228 )that, in Section 706, made permanent a requirement that the President designate in mid-Septemberof each year, before the beginning of the fiscal year, the countries which have demonstrably failedto meet international counter-narcotics obligations, thereby removing an irritant in the bilateralrelationship. According to the INCSR covering 2002 and 2003, the cooperation between the countries hascontinued along the same trajectory. Both reports state that "the United States and Mexico achievedunprecedented levels of cooperation in fighting drug trafficking and other transnational crimes." Thereport covering 2003 went on to say that "U.S. and Mexican law enforcement personnel routinelyshare sensitive information to aid in the capture and prosecution of drug traffickers and the seizureof cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine shipments." (18) The reports mentionedthe continuing dialogue between officials of the countries through the annual BinationalCommission meetings, the twice yearly Senior Law Enforcement Plenary (SLEP) meetings, and theBilateral Interdiction Working Group (BIWG) meetings, with each forum having various sub-groupsworking on relevant issues. The reports mentioned the continuing professionalization of the law enforcement and militaryinstitutions, and indicated the prominent role of the United States in these efforts. In 2003, theUnited States sponsored over 140 training courses for 6,484 Mexican police officers, prosecutorsand investigators. In 2002, it provided computer equipment and software to the Office of theAttorney General (PGR) and the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) and the National Center forAnalysis, Planning and Intelligence (CENAPI). During FY2002, over 200 Mexican militarymembers received U.S.-sponsored military training, and Mexican liaison officers participated onsome U.S. vessels and task forces. In activities with counter-narcotics and counter-terrorismimplications, U.S. and Mexican officials are installing Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment (NIIE)at border crossing points, establishing Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) to reviewcommercial airline passenger lists, training to rescue migrants stranded in remote desert regions, anddeploying software to plan for infrastructure and staffing needs at ports of entry. In the end, the results of United States and Mexican efforts are mixed. Despite theunprecedented levels of cooperation between the United States and Mexico and the major Mexicanstrides against the leading drug trafficking organizations, Mexico continues to be the principal transitcountry for South American cocaine entering the United States, the leading foreign source ofmarijuana, and a principal source of heroin. Despite impressive eradication efforts, the estimatedproduction in Mexico of opium poppy gum and marijuana increased significantly in the last year forwhich reporting is complete.

Summary:
This report provides information on Mexico's counter-narcotics efforts during the first fouryears of the presidency of Vicente Fox. Special emphasis is placed on calendar year 2003, coveredby the State Department's March 2004 report on international narcotics control, and the first sixmonths of 2004, covered in President Fox's September 2004 "State of the Nation" report. This reportwill be updated when warranted by events. Share of Traffic. According to the State Department, an estimated 70 percent of theU.S.-bound cocaine shipments pass through Mexican territory, a higher estimate than in past years. Mexico remains a major source country for heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine, and a majorcenter for money laundering activities. Control Efforts. Seizures of cocaine by Mexico in 2003 were up 59% from 2002, but theywere down 15% from the average yearly seizures in the previous five years (1998-2002), accordingto the State Department's latest report. Seizures of marijuana were up 24% from 2002, as well, andup 33% from the average in the previous five years. Seizures of methamphetamine and drug labsincreased significantly in 2003 as compared to 2002 and as compared to the 1998-2002 average. Onthe other hand, seizures of opium in 2003 were down 39% from 2002, and down 30% from theaverage of the 1998-2002 period. Seizures of heroin were down 41% in 2003 compared to 2002, andwere down 49% from the previous five years. Arrests were up in all categories in 2003, and therewere major actions against leading drug lords. The Mexican State of the Nation report states that31,719 people associated with seven drug organizations were arrested from December 2000 to June2004, including 15 cartel leaders, 39 financiers, and 64 lieutenants. Mexico extradited 31 personsto the United States in 2003, including 18 Mexican nationals on drug-related charges. Eradication of opium and marijuana increased in 2003, but with more hectares of cultivation, the potential yieldof opium was up 74% over 2002 and up 45% from the previous five years, while the potential yieldof marijuana was up 71% from 2002 and up 76% from the 1998-2002 average. Cooperative Efforts. President Bush and President Fox have met many times and havemade the bilateral relationship a top priority, although disagreements over Iraq created some tension. In these meetings, the presidents agreed to enhance law enforcement and counter-narcoticscooperation between the two countries, and this cooperation was facilitated by the modification ofthe U.S. drug certification process. Top officials say that the countries have achieved unprecedentedlevels of cooperation, including the sharing of sensitive intelligence and expanded training forMexican anti-drug forces. In the post 9/11/01 period, the countries have expanded cooperation intooverlapping counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism programs.