98-733 -- Terrorism: U. S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy Direction? Updated September 1, 1998 On August 7, 1998, the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. At least 252 people died (including 12 U.S. citizens) and more than 5,000 wereinjured. Secretary of State Albright pledged to "use all means at our disposal to track down and punish" thoseresponsible. On August 20,1998, the United Stateslaunched missile strikes against training bases in Afghanistan used by groups affiliated with radical extremist andterrorist financier Usama bin Laden. U.S.officials have said there is convincing evidence he was a major player in the bombings. A pharmaceutical plant inSudan, identified by U.S. intelligence as aprecursor chemical weapons facility with connections to bin Laden, was hit as well. The United States has bombed terrorist targets in the past in retaliation for anti-U..S. operations (Libya, in 1986 following the Berlin Disco bombing and Iraq in1993 as a response to a plot to assassinate former President Bush) and an increasingly proactive law enforcementpolicy has resulted in bringing roughly 10suspected terrorists to the U.S. for trial since 1993. However, this is the first time the U.S. has given such primaryand public prominence to the preemptive , notjust retaliatory, nature and motive of a military strike against a terrorist organization or network. This may besignaling a more proactive and globalcounter-terrorism policy, less constrained when targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure. (1) The proactive nature of the U.S. response, if official Administration statements are to be taken at face value, can readily be interpreted to signal a new direction inanti-terrorism policy. A series of press conferences, TV interviews and written explanations given byAdministration officials reveal what appears to be acarefully orchestrated theme that goes well beyond what could characterized as one-time, isolated-show-of-strength-statements. Defense Secretary William S.Cohen, in words similar to those of National Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, characterized the response as "the longterm, fundamental way in which the UnitedStates intends to combat the forces of terror" and noted that "we will not simply play passive defense." Secretaryof State Albright stressed in TV interviews that:"We are involved in a long- term struggle.... This is unfortunately the war of the future.." and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger stressed in public mediaappearances that "You can't fight this enemy simply in defense. You also have to be prepared to go on the offense". In what some see as a warning to otherterrorist groups who may seek weapons of mass destruction, President Clinton in his August 20thstatement from Martha's Vineyard, gave as one of four reasonsfor ordering the attacks :" because they are seeking to develop chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons". (2) Statements aside, the fact remains that this is the first time the U.S. has: (1) launched and acknowledged a preemptive strike against a terrorist organization ornetwork, (2) launched such a strike within the territory of a state which presumably is not conclusively,actively and directly to blame for the action triggeringretaliation, (3) launched military strikes at multiple terrorist targets within the territory of more than one foreignnation, and (4) attacked a target where theavowed goal was not to attack a single individual terrorist, but an organizational infrastructure instead. Moreover,in the case of the facility in Sudan, the targetwas characterized as one that poses a longer term danger rather than an immediate threat. Inherent in Administration statements and actions are allusions to a terrorism policy which, in response to immediate casualties and a global vision of higherlevels of casualties is: (1) more global, less defensive, and more proactive; (2) more national security oriented andless traditional law enforcement oriented, (3)more likely to use military force and other proactive measures, (4) less likely to be constrained by nationalboundaries when sanctuary is offered terrorists or theirinfrastructure in instances where vital national security interests are at stake, and (5) generally more unilateral whenother measures fail, particularly if othernations do not make an effort to subscribe to like-minded policies up front. A policy with such elements can becharacterized as one shifting from a long termdiplomatic, economic and law enforcement approach to one which more frequently relies on employment ofmilitary force and covert operations. Implied in sucha policy shift is the belief that though terrorism increasingly poses a threat to all nations, all nations maynot sign up with equal commitment in the battle against itand bear the full financial and retaliatory costs of engagement. In such an environment, the aggrieved nations withthe most at stake must lead the battle and mayneed to take the strongest measures alone. Arguments in favor of a proactive deterrent policy. Such a policy: (1) shows strength and world leadership-- i.e ., other nations are less inclined to support leadersthat look weak and act ineffectively; (2) provides disincentives for other would be terrorists; (3) is morecost-effective by thwarting enemy actions rather than trying to harden all potential targets, waiting for the enemy to strike, and suffering damage; (4) may truly damageor disrupt the enemy--dry up hissafehavens--sources of funds and weapons and limit his ability to operate, and (5) provides governments unhappywith the U.S. response an incentive to pursuebilateral and multilateral diplomatic and law enforcement remedies to remain active players. Argumentsagainst a proactive military/covert operations orienteddeterrent terrorism policy : Such a policy: (1) undermines the rule of law, violating the sovereignty of nationswith whom we are not at war ; (2) could increase,rather than decrease, incidents of terrorism at least in the short run; (3) leaves allies and other nations feeling leftout, or endangered--damaging future prospectsfor international cooperation; (4) may be characterized as anti-Islamic, and (5) may radicalize some elements ofpopulations and aid terrorist recruitment; and (6)may result in regrettable and embarrassing consequences of mistaken targetting or loss of innocent life. The U.S. government has employed a wide array of policy tools to combat international terrorism, from diplomacy, international cooperation and constructiveengagement to economic sanctions, covert action, protective security measures and military force. Implementationof policy is often situation-driven and a militaryresponse is more likely in close time proximity to a terrorist attack when public world outrage is high and credibleaccountability can quickly be established. When combating non-state sponsors of terrorism like bin Laden's networks, direct economic or politicalpressure on sanctuary states and indirect pressure throughneighboring states may be an effective policy tool in restricting activities and sanctuary locations as well creatinga favorable climate for legal approaches such ascriminal prosecution and extradition which is gaining prominence as an active tool in bring terrorists to trial.Working with other victim states through the U.N.and the Organization of African Unity are options which would build on the March 1996 Sharm al-Sheikhpeacemaker/terrorism summit. Enhanced intelligencetargeting of non-state "amorphous" groups and intelligence coordination and sharing among agencies,governments, and with the private security community iscritical, but mechanisms to achieve such intelligence objectives must be in place. All agree that more effectivehuman intelligence sources must be developed. Inthis regard, other nations such as Saudi Arabia and Kenya may be more effective in penetrating terrorist groups thanthe U.S. Another option is not tooverpersonalize conflicts against terrorist organizations and networks. Publically focusing on individualslike bin Laden (instead of on their networks ororganizations) too often glamorizes such persons--drawing funding and recruits to their cause and misses thepurpose of countermeasures --e.g. disabling terroristcapabilities. Enhanced unilateral use of covert operations , (3) though not without downsides, holds promise as an effective long-term policy alternative to highprofile use ofmilitary force. A seeming industrial explosion at a factory believed to be producing nerve gas chemicals draws lessformal criticism and political posturing byother nations than an openly announced missile attack. The dangers here are that the United States is not especiallycompetent at secret-keeping and thatcounter-terror can be misequated to terrorism. Effective use of covert policy alternatives requires institutionalization of covert action capability tapping into thebest that each agency has to offer. In a world where state sponsorship for terrorism is drying up, private fundingbecomes critical to the terrorist enterprise.Terrorist front businesses and banking accounts could increasingly become the target of creative covert operations.To support such efforts and effective lawenforcement oriented approaches to curbing money flows, assisting personnel in other countries in tracing andstopping money flows to terrorists, theirorganizations and front companies may warrant consideration. So-called "grey" area or "black" area information operations which bring to light vulnerabilities inthe personalities of key terrorist leaders ( i.e .corruption, deviant sexual behavior, drug use), promoteparanoia, and inter-organizational rivalries, warrantincreased attention as well. One can assassinate a person physically only once; but "character assassination" in themedia can be done daily. (4) U.S. terrorismpolicy lacks a multifaceted information offensive aspect which is not merely reactive in nature. Issues of special concern to Congress include: (1) U.S. domestic and overseas preparedness for terrorist attacks and retaliatory strikes, (2) the need for consultationwith Congress over policy shifts which might result in an undeclared type of war, and (3) sustaining public supportfor a long-term policy which may prove costlyin: (a) dollars; (b) initial clearly seen loss of human lives, as well as (c) potential restrictions on civil liberties. Whether the Presidential ban on assassinationsshould be changed and whether Afghanistan should be placed on the "terrorism" list warrants consideration aswell. (5) An important issue brought to the forefront in the wake of the U.S. military response to the August 7, 1998 embassy bombings is that of U.S. preparedness fordomestic and overseas terrorist and retaliatory attacks . There is no absolute preparedness; a determinedterrorist can always find a soft target somewhere. Thus,advance intelligence is perhaps the most critical element of preparedness. Good working relationships with foreignintelligence services are important here. Otherkey elements of preparedness include: (1)the ability through law enforcement channels and covert means to activelythwart terrorist actions before they occur, (2)high profile physical security enhancement measures; (3) and the ability to limit loss of life and mass hysteria,confusion and panic in the face or wake of terroristattacks. Particularly in situations involving weapons of mass destruction, effective mechanisms to minimize panicand ensure coordinated dissemination of criticallife saving information is important, as is planning on practical matters such as how to dispose of bodies. Essentialis the ability to maintain and promptlydispatch emergency teams to multiple disaster sites. A central issue of concern is Administration consultation with Congress over policy shifts which may result in an undeclared war. To paraphrase a familiarcongressional adage: We need to be there for the takeoffs if you expect us to support you on the crash landings. Itcan be argued that given the need for secrecyand surprise, and given the fact that the Administration's timing of the miliary response was dependent to largedegree on the configuration of events and theactivities of terrorist operatives on the ground, the Administration made reasonable efforts to inform Congress inadvance of the August action to be taken as wellas the targets and rationale of the pending missile-strike-response (6) . Notwithstanding Administration efforts to brief Congress on the attack, has theAdministration been remiss in its failure to consult with and brief Congress on any new policy or major change inpolicy emphasis or direction? Questions forCongressional inquiry might include: What is the policy; how exactly is it different; how does it fit in with otherpolicy options; what consequences areforeseeable; how is it to be implemented; how is effectiveness to be measured; how is it to be coordinated; whatfunding, organizational mechanisms orlegislative authority are required to implement it effectively, and how is international support for, and cooperationin, this strategy to be pursued? In justifying the U.S. missile response under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter (self defense), the Clinton Administration has invoked 22 USC 22377 note (otherwiseknown as) Section 324(4) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 P.L. 104-132 whichprovides: "The Congress finds that.... The Presidentshould use all necessary means, including covert action and military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroyinternational infrastructure used by internationalterrorists, including overseas terrorist training facilities and safehavens." Does 22 USC 2377, as passed by Congressin 1996, amount to the counter-terrorismanalogue to the Vietnam era Gulf of Tonkin Resolution? Some analysts suggest that such authority is too broad andopen-ended and may pave the way for aquagmire of unconventional violent exchanges, and consequently amendment of the statute may be warranted.Others, however, feel that such broad authority isessential to allow a president maximum flexibility to counter mounting terrorist threats and stress that potential forabuse can be checked through activecongressional oversight and reporting to Congress. Another issue involving presidential authority is how thepresidential ban on assassinations (E.O. 12233) fitsinto any policy shift and if it should be modified or rescinded. A more proactive terrorism policy may prove costly in dollars (even in relatively quiet times) as well as in potential restrictions on civil liberties. Unresolvedquestions include: (1) what is the potential dollar cost; and is the public prepared to accept the loss of lives and otherconsequences of such a "war of the future?" In this regard, should there be a more active federal role in public education? An informed, involved, and engagedpublic is critical to sustain an activeanti-terrorism response. The American public will be more likely to accept casualties if they understand why theywill be sustained and that sometimes it ischeaper to pay the cost up front.

Summary:
On August 20,1998, the United States launched retaliatory and preemptive missile strikes against training bases andinfrastructure in Afghanistan used by groups affiliated with radical extremist and terrorist financier Usama binLaden. A "pharmaceutical" plant in Sudan, makinga critical nerve gas component, was destroyed as well. This is the first time the U.S. has unreservedly acknowledgeda preemptive military strike against a terroristorganization or network. This has led to speculation that faced with a growing number of major attacks on U.S.persons and property and mounting casualties,U.S. policymakers may be setting a new direction in counter-terrorism-- a more proactive and global policy, lessconstrained when targeting terrorists, their bases, or infrastructure. Questions raised include: What is the nature and extent of any actual policy shift; what are its prosand cons; and what other policy optionsexist? Issues of special concern to Congress include: (1) U.S. domestic and overseas preparedness for terroristattacks and retaliatory strikes; (2) the need forconsultation with Congress over policy shifts which might result in an undeclared type of war; and (3) sustainingpublic and Congressional support for a long termpolicy which may prove costly in: (a) dollars; (b) initial up-front loss of human lives, and (c) potential restrictionson civil liberties. Whether to change thepresidential ban on assassinations and whether to place Afghanistan on the "terrorism" list warrants attention as well.This short report is intended for Membersand staffers who cover terrorism, as well as U.S. foreign and defense policy. It will be updated as events warrant.For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB95112, Terrorism, the Future and U..S. Foreign Policy and CRS Report 98-722(pdf), Terrorism:Middle East Groups and State Sponsors.