Congress and President Bush devoted considerable attention to how the nation can best prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural and human-caused disasters. Events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina of August 2005, prompted Congress and President Bush to require the development of a plan for how government at all levels, and also the nongovernmental sector, should respond to all types of emergencies and disasters. Pursuant to statutory requirements and presidential directives, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), an agency located within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued such a plan in March 2008 with publication of the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF is the end product of a long history. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the structure for responding to emergencies and disasters resided in at least 5 separate plans. With the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 ) and Sections 15 and 16 of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (hereafter HSPD-5), Congress and President Bush directed DHS to consolidate these plans and create a single, overarching, integrated, and coordinated national response plan, and to develop a National Incident Management System (NIMS). These efforts culminated in the initial National Response Plan (NRP) on October 10, 2003, followed by the release of NIMS on March 1, 2004. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall, followed shortly by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. A number of studies on the responses to these hurricanes found shortcomings in the NRP itself and its implementation. DHS made the decision to revise the NRP partially based on these reports. The revision of the NRP was also due to mandates in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-295 , hereafter the Post-Katrina Act). In January 2008, DHS issued the NRF, which took effect in March 2008. Since that time, the NRF has been the nation's core response document, providing a structure for the response to such disasters as the 2008 Midwest floods and California wildfires, as well as Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. This report reviews selected statutory provisions related to the NRF and provides an overview of the document. It discusses some of the reasons the Bush Administration revised the NRP, as well as some controversial aspects of the review process. The report also summarizes selected pending legislation concerning national response planning and concludes with a discussion of issues over which Congress might consider exercising oversight. Authority for the creation of the NRF emanates from numerous sources. FEMA has described the NRF as being guided by 15 "principal emergency authorities," 48 other statutory authorities and regulations, 17 executive orders, and 20 presidential directives. This report does not offer an exhaustive overview of these authorities. Rather, this section discusses some of the major authorities establishing the NRF, legislation that shaped the development of the NRF, and legislation tied to congressional oversight. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (hereafter the Stafford Act) establishes the programs and processes by which the federal government provides emergency and major disaster assistance to states and localities, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. Section 611 of the Stafford Act authorizes the Director of FEMA to prepare federal response plans and programs and to coordinate these plans with state efforts. Consistent with this authorization, FEMA released the Federal Response Plan in April 1992. The primary purpose of the Federal Response Plan was to maximize the availability of federal resources to support response and recovery efforts taken by state and local emergency officials. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 ). Subsection 502(6) required the consolidation of "existing federal government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan." The Homeland Security Act also created DHS, consolidating over 20 agencies, including FEMA, into a single department. Under DHS, FEMA retained both its authority to administer the provisions of the Stafford Act and its designation as the lead agency for the nation's response plan. On February 28, 2003, President Bush issued HSPD-5. Section 16 of HSPD-5 directed the Secretary to develop and submit for review to the Homeland Security Council a national response plan. Section 16 also mandated that the plan use an "all-discipline" and "all-hazards" approach in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from domestic incidents. In December 2004, through the primary guidance and authorization of the Stafford Act, the Homeland Security Act, and HSPD-5, DHS issued a successor to the Federal Response Plan , which was entitled the National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP was in place and implemented for the Hurricane Katrina response in August 2005. The problems that arose from Hurricane Katrina prompted numerous studies. Some of these studies attributed the poor response, in part, to the implementation of the NRP. Concerned by perceived deficiencies in the NRP, Congress sought a remedy through legislation in the Post-Katrina Act. The Post-Katrina Act provides the most comprehensive legislation concerning the NRP (or any subsequent plans) by mandating numerous adjustments to the NRP as well as mechanisms for oversight. Section 642 amended the Stafford Act and the Homeland Security Act to mandate that the President develop a national preparedness system. Section 643 further establishes that the President shall, through the Administrator of FEMA "complete, revise, and update, as necessary, a national preparedness goal... to ensure the Nation's ability to prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters." It further states that the national preparedness goal, to the extent possible, should be consistent with NIMS and the NRP. Section 649(b) of the Post-Katrina Act requires that the national preparedness goal, NIMS, and the NRP be subjected to clear and quantifiable performance measures to ensure they are continuously revised and updated. Section 652 of the act establishes annual reporting requirements concerning preparedness capabilities. Section 652(c) requires the reporting of state compliance with the NRP. Finally, Section 653 requires the president to ensure that federal agencies assigned with responsibilities in the NRP have the capability to meet the national preparedness goal, and develop plans to "respond effectively to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters in support of the National Response Plan to ensure a coordinated federal response." In response to the Post-Katrina legislation and perceived problems with the implementation of the NRP, DHS revised the plan and issued the NRF. The following section describes the various components of the document. The NRF is part of a national strategy for homeland security. It provides the doctrine and guiding principles for a unified response from all levels of government, and all sectors of communities, to all types of hazards regardless of their origin. Although the primary focus of the NRF is on response and short-term recovery, the document also defines the roles and responsibilities of the various actors involved in all phases of emergency management. The NRF is not an operational plan that dictates a step-by-step process for responding to hazards. Rather, the NRF appears to be an attempt to build flexibility into response efforts by setting up a framework that DHS believes is necessary for responding to hazards. Within this framework, the NRF gives users a degree of discretion as to how they choose to respond to the incident. The NRF is organized into five parts. The introductory chapter presents an overview of the entire document and explains the evolution of the NRF, and identifies the various actors involved in emergency and disaster response. The chapter also discusses the concepts undergirding emergency preparedness and response by providing a list of what DHS describes as the "five key principles" of response doctrine. The first chapter of the NRF, entitled "Roles and Responsibilities," provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, the nonprofit and private sectors, and individuals and households. The first chapter also discusses the roles and responsibilities of those who hold various positions within these entities. The second chapter, entitled "Response Actions," describes and outlines key tasks as they pertain to what DHS calls the "three phases of effective response." These phases include "prepare," "respond," and "recover." Preparing includes planning, organizing, equipping, training, exercising, and conducting evaluations. Activities related to responding include gaining and maintaining situational awareness, activating and deploying resources and capabilities, coordinating response actions, and demobilizing. "Recover" activities are broken down into two broad categories. These are short-term and long-term recovery. The third chapter of the NRF, entitled "Response Organization," discusses the organizational structure and staffing used to implement response actions, all of which are based on NIMS and ICS. The NRF describes the organization and staffing structure of every entity responsible for preparedness and response in detail. The fourth chapter, entitled "Planning," describes the process of planning as it pertains to national preparedness and summarizes planning structures relative to the NRF. The chapter describes the criteria for successful planning and offers example scenarios for planning. The fifth and final chapter of the NRF, entitled "Additional Resources," describes the 15 Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes to the NRF, eight Support Annexes, and seven Incident Annexes. These annexes are listed in Table A-1 and Table A-2 of this report. The final chapter also explains that the NRF and its annexes are posted online through the NRF Resource Center, which allows for ongoing revisions to the document. As mentioned earlier in the report, several studies attributed the problematic response to Hurricane Katrina partly to the implementation of the NRP. Although the NRP was used for smaller emergencies and disasters prior to Hurricane Katrina, the hurricane marked the first time the NRP was used for a catastrophic incident. The section that follows discusses how some of the changes in the NRF have addressed these criticisms. The NRP was widely criticized as complicated and overly bureaucratic. Some said it was long and weighed down with technical language. Additionally, users of the NRP reported that the document failed to clarify roles and responsibilities and that the federal chain of command was confusing. It was further pointed out that the name "National Response Plan" was a misnomer (and hence misleading) because it was not a true operational plan in the sense that it did not provide a step-by-step process for responding to an incident. The NRF uses less technical language than the NRP, and attempts to make the roles and responsibilities more transparent. The NRF is also shorter. Whereas the NRP contained over 400 pages, the NRF is roughly 80 pages. Still, some have contested the clarity of the NRF. This will be discussed in greater detail later in the report. Despite efforts to make the NRP a nationwide response plan, the NRP was widely seen as not sufficiently national in its focus because it emphasized federal preparedness and response. Some have further argued that the process of creating the plan excluded nonfederal stakeholders, such as states and localities. According to DHS, the NRF more clearly articulates the roles and responsibilities of nonfederal entities. Additionally, when drafting the NRF, DHS held outreach sessions to solicit the feedback of nonfederal partners. The extent of nonfederal participation in the creation of the NRF has been questioned and is discussed later in this report. Several emergencies and disasters have taken place since implementation of the NRF. In general, responses to the NRF have been mixed. Some have indicated that its implementation has been successful. One observer stated that coordination among federal, state, and local governments has improved. In the case of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, officials in Texas related that the federal response to the hurricanes was good. Other officials have been ambivalent regarding implementation of the NRF, noting that the scale of recent disasters has not warranted enough federal involvement to understand how well the NRF works. A review of various reports may hint at some problems, however. For instance, during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, state officials in Texas said it was the local government's responsibility to set up distribution points for supplies. However, the local government claimed it was unaware of this responsibility. Such confusion may indicate that the NRF still does not clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities of state and local governments during emergencies and disasters. Other, more serious criticisms of the NRF have surfaced since its implementation. A report issued by the Inspector General of DHS stated that some of the decisions made by FEMA during the response to Hurricane Ike did not adhere to certain principles set forth in the NRF. The following section discusses these in greater depth and highlights issues Congress might examine or policy options it might consider. One frequent criticism of the NRF is the ambiguity surrounding the relationship and role of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and the Principle Federal Officer (PFO). The FCO determines the types of relief most urgently needed, establishes field offices, and coordinates relief efforts. The FCO position is authorized by the Stafford Act. Immediately upon declaring a major disaster, Section 302(a) of the Stafford Act requires the President to appoint an FCO. The PFO, on the other hand, is not a legislatively authorized position. Rather, the PFO position was created by DHS in the NRP. The PFO is designated by the Secretary of DHS, represents the Secretary as the leading federal official, and serves as the primary point of contact for state and local officials. During Hurricane Katrina, Michael Brown, who was serving as the Director of FEMA, was additionally designated as the PFO. William Lokey served as the FCO for Louisiana. To some observers (such as the Inspector general for DHS), these roles created a great deal of confusion during Hurricane Katrina, because it appeared that two people were in charge of the relief operations. Despite criticisms of the position, DHS made the decision to retain the PFO in the NRF. The decision spurred congressional concern prompting several attempts to clarify or abolish the PFO position. For example, Section 526 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-161 ) states that "none of the funds provided by this or previous appropriations Acts shall be used to fund any position designated as a Principal Federal Official for any Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act declared disasters or emergencies." Persistent congressional oversight and legislative efforts may have resolved the issue. In a hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate stated that DHS has determined that the PFO position would not be used for an emergency or major disaster under the Stafford Act and that planning and response documents were in the process of being updated to reflect that decision. A criticism of the NRP was that input from nonfederal stakeholders, such as state and local governments, nonprofit groups, and the private sector, was poorly integrated into the document. Congress addressed this issue in Section 653 of the Post-Katrina Act, where Congress required DHS and FEMA to develop operational plans with state, local, and tribal government officials. According to a GAO report, DHS initially included nonfederal stakeholder input in the creation of the NRF, but later "deviated" from the process. Rather than disseminating the first draft of the NRF to stakeholders, DHS conducted an internal review of the document. GAO found that the issuance of a later draft to nonfederal stakeholders was delayed, reducing the amount of time for the stakeholders to respond with comments on the draft. Additionally, GAO reported that DHS failed to establish FEMA's National Advisory Council (NAC) by the December 2006 deadline that was set forth in Section 508 of the Post-Katrina Act. According to the act, the NAC is responsible for incorporating the input of state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector in the development and revision of the NRF. The importance of meeting the congressional mandate has been addressed by one analyst. Donald Kettl, a public policy professor at the University of Pennsylvania, has emphasized the importance of including local officials in the planning process. According to Kettl, "no amount of national planning can side-step the fact that ... the first indicator that something bad is happening is a report from the frontlines." In consideration of these conclusions, some may argue that failing to integrate feedback from local emergency officials could (1) omit hazards that are known at the local level but not recognized by federal officials, (2) miss an opportunity to integrate the lessons learned from local responders who have first-hand experience with emergencies and disasters, and (3) fail to establish "buy-in" to the plan at the state and local level thereby creating a possible reluctance to execute the plan faithfully. If the issue of nonfederal stakeholder input were of concern to Congress, it might move to conduct oversight on the extent to which DHS and FEMA are utilizing the NAC and incorporating nonfederal stakeholders in all aspects of national emergency planning and revision. In testimony before the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, one emergency professional pointed out that there is a gap in the level of emergency readiness between adult and pediatric care. He noted that children are more vulnerable to hazardous materials than adults, have unique treatment needs, and require care from providers who have been specifically trained to meet these needs. The witness stated, however, that federal, state, and local efforts in disaster planning have generally overlooked the unique needs of children. Separately, Mark Shriver, Vice President and Managing Director of Save the Children's U.S. Programs, has stated that children are vulnerable during emergencies and evacuations. According to Shriver, the needs of children are commonly overlooked before, during, and after a disaster. Shelters, for example, often have unsanitary conditions, and many communities lack sufficient stockpiles of diapers, formula, pediatric medications, and child-size respirators. In various legislative provisions, Congress has focused on the needs of children during disasters. For example, the Post-Katrina Act contains a provision to reunite children with their families by establishing, within the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, a new National Emergency Child Locator Center. Congress addressed the subject again in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Division G, Section 603 of the act establishes the National Commission on Children and Disasters. The purpose of the Commission is to conduct a comprehensive study to examine and assess the needs of children during disasters and submit a report to the President and Congress. Under the NRF, the needs of children are addressed in ESF #6 and #13. The support of children's needs in ESF #6 is delegated to several nonprofit organizations, including Catholic Charities, Feed the Children, Save the Children, and the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). One of the functions of ESF #13 is to protect children. Under the annex, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), a private sector organization, is responsible for preventing child abduction and sexual exploitation, and helping locate missing children. Congress might consider how well the issue of child protection in disasters is addressed in the NRF annexes. Several observations about the NRF's current coverage include the following. First, there are no primary agencies designated as responsible for addressing children's needs. Only supporting agencies have this designation. Second, some may argue that the annexes are flawed because the Public Health and Medical Services Annex (ESF #8) and Search and Rescue Annex (ESF #9) do not explicitly mention children in their various functions. Third, some may argue that having multiple annexes focused on the needs of children may create service gaps, and that when several organizations are assigned with responsibility, it becomes unclear what agency will take the lead, and what functions these agencies are carrying out. In addition, they may argue that having multiple organizations creates unnecessary duplication. Having the NRF available online appears to have some benefits. Emergencies and disasters are fluid events and having a document capable of adapting to the needs created by unique emergencies and disasters would seem to add a degree of flexibility to the NRF. It also gives users easy access to the document. Users can also sign up for email alerts to be informed of changes in the NRF. However, it is unclear what mechanisms are in place to ensure users who visit the website infrequently, or do not sign up for alerts, are informed of NRF modifications or changes. Is it possible that a state or locality may use protocols that have been removed or revised? The NRF is always in effect, whereas the NRP had to be invoked when an emergency or disaster struck. According to DHS, this has the benefit of speeding response time because it eliminates the need to wait for some form of announcement that the plan is in effect. Some may argue that a plan that is always in effect lacks a triggering mechanism to alert responders and create situational awareness. Does the NRF benefit response activities by always being in effect? The Post-Katrina Act requires the Administrator of FEMA to submit to Congress annual reports that identify the resources needed to enhance regional offices and undertake planning, training, surge capacity, and logistics. Reporting must also include information about state compliance with the NRF and the extent to which the use of federal assistance during the preceding fiscal year achieved preparedness priorities. Additionally, homeland security grants require broad state compliance with national preparedness policy. Some may argue that emergency management practices are strengthened when states and localities adopt federal standards for emergency preparedness and response. Others may argue that mandating compliance has at least two negative consequences. First, not all states have the same set of hazards. A one-size-fits-all approach may not be the best method of addressing hazards, because states and localities are better positioned to make decisions about how to conduct emergency planning and response. Second, requiring compliance and creating standards increases federal involvement in emergency policy. Again, some may argue this is beneficial, because it can help save lives and reduce property loss, but others might argue that the requirements infringe on state sovereignty. Incident Annexes in the NRF are primarily oriented toward terrorism. Since Hurricane Katrina, some have argued that there has been an emphasis on planning for high-impact, low-probability incidents at the expense of low-impact, high-probability incidents. Additionally, it is possible that planning for terrorism underemphasizes preparedness for natural disasters. For example, in testimony before the House Natural Resources Committee, David Applegate pointed out that earthquakes are among the most expensive of natural disasters in terms of destruction. According to Applegate, this underscores the importance of preparedness and mitigation; however, there is no Incident Annex addressing earthquakes. Concern over a potential earthquake on the New Madrid fault line has persuaded officials to use an earthquake scenario for the 2011 National Level Exercise in Arkansas. An earthquake annex could be used to guide the exercise and assess response capabilities. The President of the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) and Director of Emergency Management, Hillsborough County, Florida, also addressed the terrorism emphasis. Director Larry Gispert responded favorably to President-elect Obama's plan to support first-responders, prepare effective emergency response plans, improve interoperable communications systems, and work with state and local governments and the private sector, and allocate funds based on risk. Gispert objected to plans that focus on terrorism because state and local emergency managers primarily deal with natural disasters. According to Gispert, the plan would have the benefit of allowing state and local governments to prepare for both types of incidents rather than predominantly terrorism. On the other hand, others would argue that planning for terrorism is of the utmost importance and that a terrorist attack would have the same consequences as a natural disaster. They may conclude that planning and preparedness for terrorism can be applied toward natural disasters and therefore fits the all-hazards model of emergency management. If Congress were concerned about the possibility that preparedness for natural disasters is being hampered by overemphasizing terrorism in emergency plans, or that resources for natural disaster preparedness are being diverted to prepare for terrorist events, Congress may elect to have FEMA develop natural disaster annexes, or incorporate more natural disaster planning in existing Incident Annexes. In response to directives from Congress and the President, the Bush Administration issued the NRF to establish a new approach to coordinate federal and nonfederal entities in times of emergencies and major disasters. The NRF does appear to respond to some of the challenges identified by Congress and others. The document is more concise, has less jargon, and has made an attempt to clarify roles and responsibilities. Additionally, anecdotal reports following Gustav and Ike indicate the coordination of emergency activities among federal, state, and local governments has improved. On the other hand, parts of the NRF may have retained some of the problems associated with the NRP. The NRF still contains the PFO arrangement, terrorism and natural disasters are not given equal treatment, and nonfederal stakeholder input appears to be lacking. Some may contend that insufficient implementation studies have been conducted on the NRF to assess its efficacy. Others might argue the NRF has yet to be tested by a large-scale disaster to form a clear picture of its effectiveness; the only way to find out whether the NRF is an improvement over the NRP may be to subject it to a major catastrophe comparable to Hurricanes Andrew or Katrina.

Summary:
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and President Bush moved to consolidate numerous federal emergency plans into a single, unified national response plan. The end product of these efforts was the National Response Plan (NRP), which established broad lines of authority for agencies responding to emergencies and major disasters. Perceived problems with the implementation of the NRP during Hurricane Katrina led Congress to enact the Post-Katrina Management Reform Act (P.L. 109-295) to integrate preparedness and response authorities. The legislation directed DHS to issue a successor plan to the NRP entitled the National Response Framework (NRF). Implemented in March 2008, the NRF establishes a new approach to coordinating federal and nonfederal resources and entities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains that the NRF is an improvement over the NRP. Some, however, assert that the NRF is not an improvement because it does not fully address the problems and challenges associated with the NRP. This report discusses how national response planning documents have evolved over time and describes the authorities that shape the NRF. Several issue areas that might be examined for potential lawmaking and oversight concerning the NRF are also highlighted. This report will be updated as significant legislative or administrative changes occur.