Afghanistan has been a central U.S. foreign policy concern since American forces, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, helped lead a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored it. Since then, the United States, along with NATO and other international partners, has deployed tens of thousands of troops and provided tens of billions of dollars in development assistance. The overarching goal of this effort is to support the elected Afghan government and bolster its security forces against a resilient insurgency by the Taliban and others, including (since 2014) an active affiliate of the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh ). After an Afghan opposition coalition known as the Northern Alliance drove the Taliban government out of Kabul with the help of American airpower and a small number of U.S. special forces, the U.N. convened Afghan leaders in Bonn, Germany to lay out a roadmap for the creation of a democratic government in Afghanistan. Taliban representatives were not invited to participate in the meetings in Bonn. That conference established an interim administration headed by Hamid Karzai, and called for a June 2002 emergency loya jirga (a traditional Afghan consultative assembly). Another loya jirga was convened in late 2003 to endorse a new constitution, which was ratified in January 2004. Afghanistan held its first presidential election in October 2004, and Karzai was elected with 55% of the vote. The first parliamentary elections followed in September 2005. Sporadic Taliban attacks continued during this time, with U.S. intelligence collecting evidence of an "organized Taliban revival" by early 2004. Under intense U.S. pressure most Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters had fled into Pakistan, where they helped to inspire an Islamist insurgency that would later drive the Pakistani state into full-scale crisis. At the same time as they battled Al Qaeda and other Islamist militants at home, Pakistan's security institutions aided the Afghan Taliban, including by providing safe haven to much of its leadership, a legacy of Pakistan's formal recognition of the group from 1996 to 2001. By 2007, despite nascent democratic development and improvements in most Afghans' quality of life, the American effort in Afghanistan, once described as "the good war," appeared "off course," with security deteriorating, narcotics production increasing, and levels of Taliban violence steadily rising. In response, President Barack Obama increased the number of American forces (from approximately 36,000 in February 2009 to a high of about 100,000 in 2011) as part of an effort to combat the Taliban insurgency and increase the capacity of the Afghan government and security forces. Most security metrics improved during the "surge," but uncertainty rose as Afghan forces took the lead for security nationwide (in mid-2013) amidst a steady drawdown of U.S. and international forces as part of a planned withdrawal. That uncertainty was compounded by the 2014 presidential election, which was marred by widespread allegations of fraud and was only resolved with the creation of a fragile unity government formed after months of U.S. mediation. Still, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, 2003-2014) mission was replaced by Resolute Support Mission (RSM, 2015-present) at the end of 2014 as scheduled. The killing of Taliban leader Mullah Mansour (successor to original Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who died of natural causes in 2013) in a May 2016 U.S. airstrike in Pakistan demonstrated continued Taliban vulnerabilities to U.S. military and intelligence capabilities. At the same time, the Taliban expanded their control and influence in rural areas while pressuring urban centers (as evidenced by their brief seizure of the provincial capital of Kunduz in 2015). President Donald Trump expressed few policy positions on Afghanistan during the 2016 presidential campaign, though he had previously conveyed skepticism about the American effort there. After months of debate within the Administration, President Trump announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia in a nationwide address on August 21, 2017. The strategy features a tougher line against Pakistan and a larger role for India; no set timetables; expanded targeting authorities for U.S. forces; and around 3,000 additional troops, bringing the total number of U.S. forces in the country to approximately 14,000-15,000 (about 8,500 of which are part of RSM). President Trump, who criticized his predecessor's use of "arbitrary timetables," did not specify what conditions on the ground might necessitate or allow for alterations to the strategy going forward. Some have characterized the Trump strategy as "short on details" and serving "only to perpetuate a dangerous status quo." Others welcomed the strategy, contrasting it favorably with proposed alternatives such as a full withdrawal of U.S. forces, which President Trump described as his "original instinct," or a strategy that relies heavily on contractors. More than a year after President Trump's speech, it remains unclear to what extent the new strategy has changed dynamics on the ground in Afghanistan. While U.S. officials continue to publicly express optimism, the extent of territory controlled or contested by the Taliban has steadily grown in recent years by most measures. In its July 30, 2018, report, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that the share of districts under government control or influence remains at 56%, tied for the lowest level recorded in the two years SIGAR has tracked that metric, with 14% under insurgent control or influence, and the remaining 30% contested. While most Taliban gains have been in sparsely populated rural or mountainous areas, the group has also been able to contest urban centers; militants have briefly overrun two provincial capitals in 2018 thus far (Farah in May, Ghazni in August). Additionally, the Taliban have demonstrated an ability to conduct operations in different parts of the country simultaneously and inflict significant casualties on Afghan forces, though the U.S. military classified those figures and various other metrics related to ANDSF performance in 2017. Reflecting the Trump Administration's reported frustration with the 17-year-old U.S. war effort, 2018 has seen a flurry of diplomatic activity that may portend progress toward peace talks. Most importantly, the Trump Administration is reportedly considering direct talks with the Taliban in what would represent a significant change in American policy. Other reports, which U.S. officials have not denied, indicate that at least some preliminary discussions between U.S. and Taliban officials have already taken place. However, the Afghan government, or some of its members, may be opposed to any negotiation with the Taliban in which they are not the lead interlocutor, and the Taliban's own stance on negotiations is unclear. Ongoing disputes between Afghan leaders may worsen in advance of long-delayed and already controversial parliamentary elections, set for October 2018, and the presidential election slated for April 2019. In the decade before the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, Afghanistan was not a major focus of congressional attention. Since then, Congress has taken an active role in shaping U.S. policy toward Afghanistan. Major initiatives and areas of congressional interest are described below. U.S. military forces deployed into Afghanistan under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40 ), which allows the president "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 11, 2001, attacks as well as any entities that harbored them. The Taliban regime collapsed after about two months of major combat operations. U.S. operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the local Islamic State affiliate continue under that resolution, though Members have proposed a range of measures to replace the 2001 AUMF with a new authorization that could alter U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan, as outlined in the chart below. After the fall of the Taliban, U.S. efforts shifted quickly to providing humanitarian support to the Afghan people, stabilizing the country, and building up a democratic Afghan government. One of the most important congressional measures in this regard was the 2002 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act (AFSA, P.L. 107-327 ), which authorized a total of $3.8 billion in humanitarian, developmental, counter-narcotics, and security assistance over four years. The act contains a number of provisions directing U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and establishing congressional oversight thereof; many of these provisions anticipate additional congressional directives enacted in subsequent years. Such provisions include the authorization of funds for specific purposes (including the creation of positions within executive branch agencies; see below); regular notification and reporting requirements; and subjecting aid to Afghanistan to the same conditions as assistance provided under other pieces of legislation, like the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export and Control Act of 1976. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 largely overshadowed the war in Afghanistan, and much of the legislative attention to Afghanistan in the subsequent several years came in bills and legislative provisions that treated the two wars together. As conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated, however, congressional attention returned to Afghanistan and some Members sought to scrutinize the U.S.-led international project there more closely. Congress mandated a number of reports, which remain among the most important sources for information on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. One of the most significant congressional oversight actions was the 2008 establishment of a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), modeled in part on a similar office overseeing Iraq. Congress directed that SIGAR publish quarterly reports detailing the obligation and expenditure of funds appropriated for Afghan reconstruction. Congress also required periodic audits and investigations of specific projects and funds. The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) added more reporting requirements. Section 1230 of the Act directed the President, through the Department of Defense, to submit a biannual report on "Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan." The first report was submitted under that title in June 2009. In the FY2015 NDAA ( P.L. 113-291 ), Congress required a report on "Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan," among other reporting requirements, and biannual reports have been submitted under that title since June 2015 (most recently on July 3, 2018). In addition to these ongoing reports, Congress has regularly mandated the submission of one-time reports on specific issues in appropriations and defense authorization bills. Individual report directives proposed to and included in legislation in the 115 th Congress can be found below. Congress has appropriated $126.3 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan s ince FY2002 , according to SIGAR's July 30, 2017 quarterly report. During the Karzai administration, the United States and oth e r international donors "increasingly sought to condition assist ance funds for Afghanistan... as a result of inadequate reforms." A 2014 report by m ajority s taff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee also recommended that "a higher proportion of U.S. assistance should be conditioned based on specific reforms by the Afghan government." Accordingly, Congress has imposed a number of directives and conditions on the use of both security and development assistance to Afghanistan (e.g. , Economic Support Fund, ESF, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, INCLE) for a number of years. Most of those statutory conditions have been enacted through appropriations measures. As outlined below, FY 2019 appropriations bills would prohibit the use of funds for activities that involve individuals suspected of involvement in corruption, narcotics trafficking, or human rights violations . A dditionally, they would require the Secretary of State to certify that the Afghan government is governing democratically , protect ing women's rights, and publicly reporting its national budget (among other conditions) before obligating funds . T here are a number of additional conditions on U.S. assistance not specific to Afghanistan, such as the Leahy Laws prohibiting security assistance to foreign security forces that have perpetrated a gross violation of human rights. S ome have suggested that Afghan forces may have committed such violations . Congress has also played an important role in shaping the bureaucratic structures within the executive branch that are responsible for U.S. policy on Afghanistan. In the 2002 AFSA, Congress authorized the creation of a "coordinator" for Afghanistan and U.S. assistance there, to serve at the rank of ambassador. In 2007, the House passed a bill that would have authorized a Senate-confirmed special envoy to promote cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The George W. Bush Administration described the section authorizing the special envoy as "significantly objectionable," and the Senate did not take up the bill." In 2009, however, the Obama Administration created a similar position under State Department general authorities by appointing Richard Holbrooke as the first Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP). Various congressional proposals in recent years would have statutorily authorized, altered the mission of, required reporting on, or otherwise addressed the office, which the Trump Administration closed in September 2017. Other congressional measures have sought to condition, limit, or end the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan. While no measure limiting or terminating the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan has ever passed either chamber, support for such proposals in the House of Representatives generally seems to have grown from 2009 to 2014, the period when most of these measures were introduced. House bills calling for a "responsible end to the war in Afghanistan," for example, attracted 33 cosponsors in 2010 and 72 cosponsors in 2011; NDAA amendments that would have cut off funding for U.S. operations (other than the withdrawal of U.S. forces) attracted 113 and 153 votes in 2012 and 2014, respectively. Since the Trump Administration's announcement of the South Asia strategy in August 2017, congressional interest in Afghanistan seems to have increased, with some Members assessing the new strategy, events on the ground, and broader U.S. foreign and domestic policy interests as they relate to Afghanistan. The table below provides summaries and information on the status of proposed and enacted Afghanistan-related legislation in the 115 th Congress.

Summary:
For nearly two decades, Congress has shaped the U.S. approach to Afghanistan and the ongoing conflict there. This product provides a summary of legislative proposals considered in the 115th Congress that relate to U.S. policy in Afghanistan. These address a number of issues, including the following. The size, mission, and other aspects of the U.S. troop presence in the country. Types of information that the executive branch provides to Congress, largely as part of regular reporting requirements. The role of women in Afghan society, government, and the military. The purposes for U.S. aid, and conditions under which it can be obligated. The overall U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, including prospects for a negotiated settlement. Regional dynamics, including the role of Russia in Afghanistan. While Pakistan is a key player in the Afghan conflict, the measures described in this report do not include any primarily related to Pakistan, though many such proposals reference the war in Afghanistan. This report also does not include legislative proposals related to special immigrant visas for Afghan nationals who work for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan. For more on that program, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs, by Andorra Bruno. For more information on U.S. policy in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief, by Clayton Thomas.