The DRC's size, location, and wealth of natural resources contribute to its importance to U.S. interests in the region. With an area of more than 900,000 square miles, the DRC is roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River. Located in the center of Africa, the DRC borders nine nations. Its abundant natural resources, which constitute its primary export products, include 34 percent of the world's cobalt reserves, 10 percent of the world's copper reserves, and 64 percent of the world's coltan reserves, as well as diamonds, gold, cassiterite, and other minerals. Moreover, the DRC's rain forests provide 8 percent of the world's carbon. The DRC has had a turbulent history. In 1965, fewer than 5 years after the nation achieved independence from Belgium, a military regime seized control of the DRC and ruled, often brutally, for more than 3 decades. It was toppled in 1997 by a coalition of internal groups and neighboring countries to the east, including Rwanda and Uganda, after dissident Rwandan groups began operating in the DRC. Subsequent efforts by a new DRC government to secure the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops prompted a second war in 1998 that eventually drew the armies of three more African nations into the DRC. Beginning in 1999, a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was deployed to the DRC. After a series of U.S.-supported peace talks that began in 2001, the other nations withdrew all or most of their troops and an interim government was established. Elections held in 2006 with logistical support provided by UN peacekeepers culminated in the December 6, 2006, inauguration of the DRC's first democratically elected president in more than 40 years. However, conflict in the DRC has continued. According to the International Rescue Committee, from 1998 through 2007, 5.4 million Congolese died as the direct or indirect consequence of conflict in the country, with an estimated 2.1 million of those deaths since 2002. The DRC suffers from a wide range of problems, including acute poverty and limited economic prospects. It is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world: the current life expectancy is 43 years, in part because the DRC suffers from high rates of tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. USAID reports that 2 of every 10 children born in the DRC die before their fifth birthday and that the maternal death rate is the world's highest. An international group of donor nations recently concluded that the DRC's educational system is failing and that most rural children do not attend school. In addition, wars and turmoil have reduced its economy to dependence on subsistence agriculture and informal activities. The DRC's prospects are also encumbered by an external debt load of around $8 billion, which is three times greater than the level of debt that the World Bank and the IMF consider sustainable. Moreover, the DRC has not fully qualified for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. The DRC receives assistance from a number of donor nations and organizations. During 2004 and 2005, the 10 largest donors to the DRC were the World Bank's International Development Association, the European Commission, Japan, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, the IMF, and the Netherlands. The United States' goal for its assistance to the DRC, as characterized by State, is to strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and democratization to promote a stable, developing, and democratic DRC. As described by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, U.S. policy is to support, but not lead, the efforts of the DRC to address its problems. Table 1 shows the Act's 15 U.S. policy objectives for the DRC, linked to the five categories of assistance--humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource management, governance, and security. U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities that support the Act's policy objectives. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, about 70 percent of U.S. funding for the DRC was allocated for programs that would support the Act's emergency humanitarian and social development objectives and about 30 percent was allocated for programs and activities that would support the Act's economic, governance, and security objectives (see fig. 1). Seven U.S. agencies--USDA, DOD, HHS, DOL, State, Treasury, and USAID--allocated about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for aid to the DRC in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, with State and USAID providing the majority of these funds (see fig. 2). Examples of U.S. agencies' programs and activities in each category include the following (see app. II for more information). Humanitarian. USAID and State have provided humanitarian assistance to help the DRC meet its citizens' and vulnerable populations' basic needs. USAID has provided emergency assistance to vulnerable populations in the DRC. Working primarily through the UN World Food Program and an NGO, USAID has supported distribution of food to internally displaced persons; people infected with, and orphans affected by, HIV/AIDS; and victims of sexual abuse by soldiers. Working primarily through NGOs, USAID has provided emergency supplies, health care, nutrition programs, water and sanitation improvements, food, and agricultural assistance to other vulnerable populations, such as malnourished children and war- affected populations. USAID has provided emergency assistance to support road rehabilitation and bridge reconstruction projects; schools; and the socioeconomic reintegration of ex-child soldiers, adult combatants, and their families. State has provided humanitarian assistance to help repatriate, integrate, and resettle refugees in the DRC. In fiscal year 2007, this assistance was implemented primarily by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees, other international organizations, and NGOs. Social development. USAID, HHS, and DOL have provided assistance to support the Act's social development and rehabilitation objectives. USAID has worked through NGOs to improve education, health care, and family planning. For instance, USAID has funded efforts to reduce abandonment of children; provide psychosocial support, medical assistance, and reintegration support to survivors of sexual and gender- based violence in the eastern DRC; train teachers; and increase access to education for vulnerable children. USAID has funded efforts to train medical staff and nurses in the management of primary health care, distribute bed nets to prevent the spread of malaria and polio, provide family planning services, and support voluntary counseling and testing centers for HIV/AIDS. HHS has allocated funds for immunization against, and the surveillance and control of, infectious diseases such as polio, measles, and HIV/AIDS. DOL has allocated funds to address children's involvement in mining and related services, small-scale commerce, child soldiering, and other forms of child labor in the DRC. Economic and natural resource management. Treasury, USAID, State, and USDA have provided support for the Act's economic objectives. Treasury has worked with the World Bank and the IMF to relieve the DRC of some of its foreign debt. The United States provided the DRC interim debt relief (primarily through reduced interest payments) in fiscal years 2005 through 2007, following the DRC's admittance into the HIPC debt relief program. Once the DRC qualifies for the completion of its HIPC debt relief, Treasury plans to pay the budgetary costs of fully relieving the DRC's $1.3 billion debt to the United States. USAID has allocated funds to support sustainable natural resource management, forest protection, and biodiversity in the DRC through the Central African Regional Program for the Environment. State has supported efforts to promote transparency in the DRC's natural resource sector by serving as the U.S. representative to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, which deals with rough diamond trade, and to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). USDA has allocated funds to improve agricultural productivity, increase rural market development, provide credit for agribusiness and rural infrastructure, and increase access to potable water and water for irrigation in the DRC. Governance. USAID and State have allocated funds for programs that support the Act's governance objectives. USAID has allocated funds to organize itinerant court sessions intended to bring justice institutions closer to citizens, facilitate greater access to justice for vulnerable people, and provide quality legal assistance to the population in relatively inaccessible parts of the DRC. USAID has supported an NGO's establishment of democracy resource centers to assist political party leaders, civic activists, elected local and national officials, and government institutions in promoting good governance and democracy. USAID, to promote judicial independence, supported an NGO's efforts by fostering improvements to the DRC's legal framework, such as laws on sexual violence and the rights of women, and providing legal assistance activities for victims of sexual and gender-based violence. State allocated funds in 2006 for more than 30 programs by the National Endowment for Democracy, including programs aimed at informing women of their rights, addressing issues of abuse and corruption, and promoting political participation. Security. State, USAID, and DOD have provided security-related assistance in the DRC. State has facilitated a multinational forum, the Tripartite Plus Commission, for the DRC and nations on its troubled eastern border-- Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi--to discuss regional security issues, including militias operating illegally in the eastern DRC. USAID has launched programs to promote the reintegration of some former fighters into Congolese society. State is refurbishing the DRC's military officer training school and training multiple levels of the military, including brigade- and battalion-staff level officers, on military justice reform, civil-military relations, and other issues of concern. U.S., NGO, and other officials and experts identified several major challenges that are impeding U.S. efforts to achieve the Act's policy objectives. These challenges include (1) an unstable security environment, (2) weak governance and widespread corruption, (3) mismanagement of natural resources, and (4) lack of basic infrastructure. Because these challenges are interrelated, they negatively impact progress in multiple areas. Unstable security environment. The DRC's weak and abusive security forces have been unable to quell continuing militia activities in the DRC's eastern regions, where security worsened during 2007. For example, the UN reported that the DRC army is responsible for 40 percent of recently reported human rights violations--including rapes, mass killings of civilians, and summary executions--and DRC police and other security forces have killed and tortured civilians with total impunity. State reported that government and other armed forces in the DRC have committed a wide range of human rights abuses, including forcing children into the security forces. Further, the DRC's unstable security situation has worsened the DRC's humanitarian and social problems and impeded efforts to address these problems. For instance, U.S. agency officials reported that the conflict has forced them to curtail some emergency assistance programs, and NGOs implementing development and humanitarian assistance activities in the DRC reported that the lack of security has resulted in attacks on their staff or led them to suspend site visits and cancel and reschedule work. In addition, the DRC's unstable security situation has negatively affected the country's economic potential by discouraging investment, which in turn could worsen security through renewed conflict. Weak governance and corruption. By many accounts, corruption in the DRC is widespread. For example, Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index identifies the DRC as one of the 10th most corrupt countries in the world. Further, weak governance and corruption in the DRC have hindered efforts to reform the security sector and hold human rights violators accountable. For instance, according to U.S. officials, the DRC lacks a government office with clear authority on security issues, and efforts to reform the DRC's police may be impeded by lack of support from corrupt DRC institutions. According to NGO representatives, the lack of an effective judiciary impedes efforts to hold human rights violators accountable for their actions, which in turn promotes a "culture of impunity." Moreover, governance problems have hindered efforts to implement economic reforms required for debt relief and promote economic growth. For example, according to Treasury officials and IMF documents, the government's lack of commitment to meet certain requirements has jeopardized the DRC's ability to receive some interim debt relief, qualify for full debt relief, and improve the country's overall economic prospects. Finally, the judiciary's ineffective enforcement of commercial contracts in the DRC has likely discouraged private sector investment and hence economic growth. The World Bank rated the DRC's enforcement of contracts as among the weakest in the world, such that a company might need to expend roughly 150 percent of a typical contract's value to ensure enforcement through court proceedings. Mismanagement of natural resources. Governance and capacity challenges in the DRC have limited the ability of international donors, NGOs, and the DRC government to improve natural resource management. For example, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has criticized the DRC for weak internal controls, customs capacity, and ability to track diamonds extracted by large number of self-employed miners. According to U.S. and NGO officials, the DRC also conducted a national mining contract review without publishing its terms of reference or all of the contracts or clearly defining the role of civil society representatives. Further, mismanagement of the DRC's natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption. According to U.S. officials, international donors, and NGOs, the DRC's abundant natural resources fuel conflict between neighboring countries' militias and armed domestic factions and foster corruption among government officials. Lack of basic infrastructure. The DRC lacks many key elements of basic infrastructure, such as buildings, equipment, and transportation. For example, according to a recent study by 17 donor nations, no roads link 9 of the DRC's 10 provincial capitals to the national capital and no roads link the DRC's northern and southern regions or its eastern and western regions. International observers have reported that the DRC's educational and penal infrastructures are dilapidated, and an international group of donor nations stated that the DRC's electrification, communications, and supplies of clean water have major deficiencies. Moreover, the DRC's lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs. According to U.S. officials, the lack of an adequate in- country transportation system increases the time required to get supplies to those in need and, according to U.S. and NGO officials, increases the expense or difficulty associated with their programs. International donors and organizations said that the lack of infrastructure has made economic development impossible in many areas and may stifle the potential for economic growth and private sector activity in most DRC provinces. Although U.S. agencies monitor their efforts in the DRC, the U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall progress toward achieving the Act's policy objectives in the DRC. Further, although State and NSC have developed mechanisms to coordinate some of the agencies' activities in the DRC, neither mechanism systematically assesses overall progress. Some of the key agencies involved in the DRC monitor their respective programs. For example, USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has two program officers in the DRC who regularly visit project sites and publish quarterly reports on OFDA activities. Their partner organizations, or implementers, also provide reports and updates on their projects. However, the executive branch has not established a governmentwide process to use such information for an assessment of overall U.S. progress in the DRC. Although State and NSC have developed mechanisms aimed at providing some degree of coordination among executive branch agencies active in the DRC, neither mechanism currently provides for the systematic assessment of overall U.S. progress toward its goals. In 2006, to ensure that foreign assistance, including assistance provided to the DRC, is used as effectively as possible to meet broad foreign policy objectives, the Secretary of State appointed a Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA), who also serves as the Administrator of USAID. Under DFA's guidance, State and USAID have begun to develop a joint planning and budgeting process that, according to State officials, may eventually assess all U.S. foreign assistance. However, as of February 2008, the Office of the DFA had not completed its DRC operations plan for fiscal year 2007, which ended on September 30, 2007. To focus attention on issues affecting the Great Lakes region of central Africa, which encompasses the DRC, the National Security Council established an interagency working group, comprising officials from DOD, State, and USAID. The group's mission is to establish a coordinated approach, policies, and actions to address issues, such as security, in the DRC and other countries in the region. However, according to NSC and State officials, the group has not developed systematic tools for assessing the impact of all U.S. agencies' efforts to achieve the Act's objectives. Also, the group does not include several agencies providing assistance to the DRC, such as DOL, HHS, and USDA. The lack of a governmentwide process for assessing its overall progress in the DRC limits the U.S. government's ability to ensure that it has allocated its resources in the most effective manner. At the same time, given the DRC's significance to Africa's stability, the scope, complexity, and urgency of the challenges to achieving U.S. policy objectives in the DRC warrant a governmentwide response. To ensure a basis for informed decisions regarding U.S. allocations for assistance in the DRC as well as any needed bilateral or multilateral actions, we recommended in December 2007 that the Secretary of State, through the Director of Foreign Assistance, work with the heads of the other U.S. agencies implementing programs and activities in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the extent to which the U.S. government as a whole is making progress in achieving the Act's policy objectives. Commenting on a draft of our 2007 report, State endorsed our recommendation, noting that it would likely be met as DFA's joint planning and budgeting processes are extended to include all U.S. agencies engaged in the DRC. This completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that Members of the Caucus may have at this time. For our December 2007 report, we identified (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the objectives of the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), (2) major challenges hindering accomplishment of these objectives, and (3) U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing these objectives. To identify U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's objectives, we analyzed policy, planning, budget, and programming documents describing U.S. policies and programs in the DRC provided by key U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury; the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC); and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We identified the amount of funding each agency allocated for its DRC programs in fiscal years 2006 and 2007; we did not determine the extent to which each agency obligated or expended its allocated funds. We also met with representatives from each of these agencies, the National Security Council (NSC), nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and other organizations with expertise on DRC- related issues. To identify key impediments hindering accomplishment of the Act's policy objectives, we analyzed relevant policy and program documents; interviewed U.S. agency officials; conducted a round-table session with a nonprobability sample of 11 NGOs with a broad range of experience and expertise implementing programs and projects in the DRC; and interviewed representatives from other organizations with experience in the DRC. To identify U.S. efforts to assess progress toward accomplishing the Act's policy objectives, we reviewed U.S. agency assessments and implementation documents. Although we did not travel to the DRC, we conducted several telephone interviews with U.S. embassy and USAID mission staff in the DRC. We conducted this performance audit from May 2007 to December 2007, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, Zina Merritt (Assistant Director), Pierre Toureille, Kristy Kennedy, Kendall Schaefer, Martin De Alteriis, Michael Hoffman, Reid Lowe, and Farhanaz Kermalli made key contributions to this report. Grace Lui provided technical assistance. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
During the last decade, conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)--one of the world's poorest countries--led directly or indirectly to the deaths of an estimated 5.4 million Congolese. A U.S.-supported peace process began in 2001, and the country's first democratically elected president in 40 years was inaugurated in 2006. However, conflict in the country has continued. In enacting the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 (the Act), Congress established 15 U.S. policy objectives that address humanitarian, social development, economic and natural resource management, governance, and security concerns in the DRC. The Act mandated that GAO review U.S. programs in the DRC that support these policy objectives. In this testimony, based on its December 2007 report, GAO identifies (1) U.S. programs and activities that support the Act's objectives, (2) major challenges hindering the accomplishment of the objectives. For its report, GAO obtained and analyzed program documents for seven U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor (DOL), State, and the Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also met with officials of these agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) active in the DRC. In fiscal years 2006 and 2007, respectively, seven agencies allocated a total of about $217.9 million and $181.5 million for the DRC. About 70 percent of these funds supported the Act's humanitarian and social development objectives and about 30 percent supported its economic and natural resource management, governance, and security objectives. Agencies' programs and activities included, for example, USAID's provision of emergency supplies, food, and water and sanitation improvements to vulnerable populations; Treasury's provision of interim debt relief; and State's provision of training and other assistance for professionalizing members of the DRC's military. Several major, interrelated challenges--an unstable security environment, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources, and lack of basic infrastructure--have impeded efforts to achieve the Act's policy objectives. For instance, weak and abusive DRC security forces have worsened humanitarian and social problems, forcing U.S. and NGO staff to curtail some efforts. At the same time, corruption and other governance problems have impeded efforts to reform the security sector and hold human rights violators accountable. Meanwhile, mismanagement of natural resources has fueled continued conflict and corruption, and a lack of basic infrastructure has hindered progress in humanitarian, developmental, and governance programs. The U.S. government has not established a process to assess overall progress toward the Act's policy objectives. As a result, it cannot be assured that it has allocated U.S. resources in the most effective manner. In its December 2007 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of State work with the heads of the other agencies implementing programs in the DRC to develop a plan for systematically assessing the U.S. government's overall progress in achieving the Act's policy objectives. State agreed with GAO's recommendation.