Central to a global strategy for combating terrorism is defining the threat and understandingwho the enemy is. "Terrorism" as a generic concept is too vague and amorphous to design a strategyagainst. Moreover, terrorism, though often perceived as a threat, is perhaps better characterized asa tactic or a process. An important point made by the 9/11 Commission is that the strategic threatfaced by the United States and its allies is from an enemy consisting of certain groups and with aspecific ideology and with stated objectives. In the words of the Commission: "The enemy goesbeyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that hasspawned other terrorist groups and violence. Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends:dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributesto Islamist terrorism." (1) A comprehensive national anti-terror strategy must address many issues. Included are theappropriate roles for military force, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, economicdevelopment, education, promotion of social and political equality, and nation and institutionbuilding within the context of policies promoting national security. Tactically , in the short term,how does one employ the wide portfolio of tools available to policymakers to reduce pressing andimmediate threats? Strategically , in the long term, how does one win "hearts and minds"? Inaddition, a strategy ideally attracts allies. How does one both maximize international "buy-in" andnational effectiveness? The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism addresses these issues. (2) The recommendations of the9/11 Commission, as they relate to strategy content and implementation, appear consistent with, andsupportive of, the National Strategy. (3) On February 14, 2003, the White House released the National Strategy for CombatingTerrorism, a 30-page interagency document. (4) The intent of the strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against theUnited States, its citizens, its interests, and U.S. friends and allies around the world, as well as tocreate an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters. The strategy emphasizes that all instruments of U.S. power -- diplomatic, economic, lawenforcement, financial, information dissemination, intelligence, and military -- are to be called uponin combating international terrorism. The strategy fits into the wider strategic concept of"defense-in-depth," which projects four concentric rings of defense against terrorist attacks againstthe United States. (5) The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is designed to complement other elementsof the National Security Strategy (6) including sub-strategies for homeland security, weapons of massdestruction, cyberspace, critical infrastructure protection, and drug control. While the NationalStrategy for Homeland Security (7) focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, theNational Strategy for Combating Terrorism focuses on identifying and defusing threats before theyreach U.S. borders. Incorporated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is a strongpreemptive component, a strong focus on reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, anda defense-in-depth framework. While pre-emption and military force remain important components, the strategy recognizesthat the war on terror will not be won on the military battlefield and gives policy emphasis tostrategic long-term policy components. Earlier Bush Administration draft versions of the strategyhad placed even heavier emphasis on international law enforcement cooperation as a policy pillar. The strategy details a desired end state where the scope and capabilities of global terroristorganizations are downscaled to such an extent that they become localized, unorganized,unsponsored, and rare enough that they can be almost exclusively dealt with by criminal lawenforcement. To accomplish this mission, emphasis is placed on international action by "workingwith the willing, enabling the weak, persuading the reluctant, and compelling the unwilling." (8) One aspect of the strategy isthat economic development is formally enumerated as an important factor in reducing conditions thatterrorists exploit. The strategy also raises the priority of using information programs to de-legitimizeterrorism. The Administration's 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is founded on fourpillars -- defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending . Together with U.S. allies, defeating terrorists by attacking theirsanctuaries; leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; andfinances . Components include (1) identifying and locating terrorists by making optimal use of allintelligence sources, foreign and U.S., and (2) destroying terrorists and their organizations by captureand detention, use of military power, and through employment of specialized intelligence resources,as well as international cooperation to curb terrorist funding; Denying terrorists state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary/safehavens. A central strategy objective is to ensure that other states take action against such elements withintheir sovereign territory. Elements include (1) tailoring strategies to induce individual state sponsorsof terrorism to change policies; (2) promoting international standards for combating terrorism; (3)eliminating sanctuaries; and (4) interdicting terrorist ground, air, maritime, and cyber traffic, in orderto deny terrorists access to arms, financing, information, WMD materials, sensitive technology,recruits, and funding from illicit drug activities; Diminishing underlying conditions that terrorists exploit, by fosteringeconomic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, andthe rule of law. Emphasis includes (1) partnering with the international community to alleviateconditions leading to failed states that breed terrorism; and (2) using public information initiativesto de-legitimize terrorism; and Defending U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad to includeprotection of physical and cyber infrastructures. Inherent in these four pillars are the following components: First and foremost is an intelligence component . Counterterrorism requires soundintelligence. Since 9/11, the United States has sought to identify and implement measures designedto better merge domestic with foreign intelligence. (9) Increasingly, U.S. counter-terrorism strategy incorporates a law enforcement component,subject, however, to restrictions found in the Posse Comitatus Act and the Homeland Security Actthat limit involvement of the military in domestic law enforcement. (10) Central to the NationalStrategy for Combating Terrorism is law enforcement cooperation. For example, since September11, 2001, the FBI has initiated cooperative programs with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesiaand other nations aimed at apprehending suspected terrorists and has shared expertise and technologywith the law enforcement agencies of these nations. An increasingly important component of lawenforcement cooperation involves curbing terrorist financing. (11) U.S. counterterrorism policy also has a strong economic component with both defensive andpreemptive characteristics. On the defensive side much attention is being given to minimizedisruption of the American economy by protecting economic infrastructures. A major function ofthe Department of Homeland Security [DHS] is to assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructures. Supporting such efforts is a growing use of risk analysis and threat matrices. On the preemptive side of the economic component, since 9/11, combating global terrorismhas become one of the top priorities of U.S. foreign assistance. (12) The Bush Administrationhas launched a new foreign aid program, the Millennium Challenge Account which would increaseforeign economic assistance starting in FY2004 to a level which would be $5 billion higher byFY2006. Currently, U.S. economic aid worldwide totals $12.87 billion. Aid would go to countriesthat have demonstrated sound development practices and over time the new aid would be limited tocountries with a per capita annual income of less than $2,975. For FY2004, Congress appropriated$994 million for this account; the FY2005 budget proposes $2.5 billion with a commitment for $5billion in FY2006. (13) Also evident is a growing counter-drug component . In the wake of the events of September11th, the international community has placed emphasis on curbing financing of terrorist groups, andhas dramatically enhanced efforts to limit and seize sources of terrorist funding (14) . This has spawnedrenewed focus on the narcotics trade as a source of funding for such groups. Even in instances wheregroups do not actively work together, the synergy of their separate operations and shared efforts atdestabilization pose an increasing threat. (15) In addition, there is a military component . This military component is reflected in the warin Iraq; (16) U.S.operations in Afghanistan; deployment of U.S. forces around the Horn of Africa, to Djibouti, andthe former Soviet Republic of Georgia; and ongoing military exercises in Colombia. The U.S. is alsoundergoing a shift in overseas base locations to tactically support a more flexible strategy allowingfor extended global military reach. (17) On the home front, U.S. policy increasingly has a homeland security focus . The Departmentof Homeland Security was the biggest reorganization of the federal government in America's history,incorporating 22 government agencies and some 179,000 people into a single organization chargedwith coordinating the nation's domestic response to terrorism. The budget of the new departmentis roughly equal in amount to 10% of the nation's defense budget. For FY2003, approximately 44%of federal law enforcement positions and 48% of federal law enforcement funding were transferredto DHS. (18) Central to the U.S. Government approach to combating terrorism is globalizing threatreduction and counter-proliferation of WMD and delivery systems. On May 31, 2003, PresidentBush proposed a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at keeping WMD materials out of thehands of terrorists and rogue nations. (19) Since then, 16 nations have pledged their cooperation ininterdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction-related materials. (20) On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States["9/11 Commission"] issued its final report. (21) Included are forty-one recommendations for changing the waythe government is organized to combat terrorism and how it prioritizes its efforts. Many of theCommission's recommendations are consistent with elements of the Administration's February 14,2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (22) , such as diplomacy and counter-proliferation efforts, preemption,intelligence and information fusion, winning hearts and minds -- including not only publicdiplomacy, but also policies that encourage development and more open societies, law enforcementcooperation, and defending the homeland. (23) The 9/11 Commission's recommendations generally fall into the categories of (1) preemption[attacking terrorists and combating the growth of Islamic terrorism]; (2) protecting against andpreparing for attacks; (3) coordination and unity of operational planning, intelligence and sharingof information; (4) enhancing, through centralization, congressional effectiveness of intelligence andcounter-terrorism oversight, authorization, and appropriations; (5) centralizing congressionaloversight and review of homeland security activities; and (6) increasing FBI, DOD, and DHScapacity to assess terrorist threats and their concomitant response strategies and capabilities. Thereport specifically recommends confronting openly problems in the U.S.- Saudi relationship, readby some to include such issues as terrorist financing and the issue of ideological incitement. Thereport also recommends sustaining aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are perceived to be vitalgeo-strategic allies in the global war on terror. Prominent in the report are specific recommendations calling for (1) creation of a moreunified congressional committee structure for oversight, authorization, and appropriations involvingintelligence and counterterrorism (e.g., a joint committee or separate committees in each chamber-- possibly combining authorizing and appropriating authorities); (2) creation of a single principalpoint of congressional oversight and review for homeland security; (3) creation of a position ofNational Intelligence Director (NID) in the Office of the President; and (4) creation of a NationalCounterterrorism Center. The National Intelligence Director, as envisioned by the 9/11Commission, would exercise some degree of control of intelligence agencies across the federalgovernment, propose and execute a unified intelligence budget, and serve as principal intelligenceadviser to the President. (24) The National Counterterrorism Center, in the view of theCommission, should be the central office for intelligence gathering, analysis, and overallcounterterrorism operations. Mirroring Commission recommendations, on August 2, 2004, President Bush urged Congressto create the position of a National Intelligence Director -- a position separate from that of CIADirector -- to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and to serveat the pleasure of the President. The Director would serve as the President's principal intelligenceadvisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligencecommunity. The President also announced plans to establish a National Counter-Terrorism Center-- a move envisioned as building on the analytical work of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The new center is envisioned as serving as a central knowledge bank for information about knownand suspected terrorists and would be charged with coordinating and monitoring counter-terrorismplans and activities of all government agencies, and preparing the daily terrorism threat report forthe President and senior officials. (25) On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Actof 2004 ( S. 2845 , P.L. 108-458 ) establishing the position of National IntelligenceDirector (a position separate from that of the CIA Director) to serve as the President's principalintelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of theintelligence community. Established as well is a National Counterterrorism Center designed toserve as a central knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and tocoordinate and monitor counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies. The Centerwill also be responsible for preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President. Some, however, are concerned that the newly created National Intelligence Director (NID),as an integral part of the President's team, might be more vulnerable to political pressure. (26) Central to this debate isa desire to maintain the independence of objective intelligence from administration policygoals. (27) As theproposed National Intelligence Director would have access to both domestic and foreignintelligence, another concern is the overall power wielded by the proposed position and its potentialfor abuse. (28) Given the potential access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction, designing effectiveresponses to terrorism may well be the greatest challenge facing governments today. Bedevilingpolicymakers is how to combat effectively this growing global phenomenon with sufficientintelligence support and at a sustainable level of economic, social, and political cost. Inherent in thispolicy debate are two overarching issues: (1) how to ensure protection of civil liberties whileenhancing security, and (2) how to deal with the seemingly unending costs of enhancingsecurity. (29) Critical toboth these issues is the development of a methodology to measure the adequacy of antiterrorismefforts, an issue not addressed in the 2003 National Strategy, or in the 9/11 Commission reportrecommendations. In this regard, some raise concern that creation of positions or structures in government wheredomestic and foreign intelligence are coordinated or fused -- such as the National IntelligenceDirector and National Counter-Terrorism Center -- will result in encroachments on civil liberties. Clearly as a nation, they say, the United States does not seek to defend freedom abroad and ignoreit at home. On the other hand, others counter that providing security in today's increasinglyborderless world is a basic responsibility of governments to their citizenry. Without intelligencegathering and analysis that adequately detects an increasingly intertwined continuum of threats ofboth foreign and domestic origin, they say, policymakers may find themselves at a majordisadvantage in implementing strategies to counter such threats. Concern also exists over the potential for seemingly limitless economic costs of securityassociated with homeland defense. No sizeable nation can afford the cost of fortifying every squareinch of its territory from terror attacks, so as the 9/11 Commission recommends, both strategy andimplementation policies must wisely prioritize allocation of resources for counterterrorism andhomeland defense. (30) Complicating these efforts, governments and terrorists may be fighting "different" wars. Policymakers often view success against terrorism in terms of minimizing physical damage -- death,injury, and destruction of property -- and concentrate their energy and resources in this area. On theother hand, terrorists, while seeking physical damage, may also view success in abstract orideological terms. For example, what is the impact of an action on recruitment? How does it affectgovernment policies or the stability of the government in power? What is the impact of an act ofterrorism on the economy of a nation or on global economic networks? What is the impact onbehavioral patterns of a target population? Might the public pressure government to pursue policiesthat appease terror? The question arises, how long can democratic governments pursue policies thatpressure terrorists if such policies are seen as bringing on terrorist retaliation? Breaking orweakening this political will is likely to be a central terrorist goal. Some well thought out strategies promote holding the line on terrorism or setting it back. But a potential danger in formalized strategies such as the National Strategy for CombatingTerrorism (31) is that thestrategy may rigidly dictate the response instead of the threat dictating the response -- as the threatis often rapidly evolving. One option for policymakers charged with combating terrorism is todesign flexibility into strategies, organizational structures, and funding utilization. While strategies or changes in governmental organizational structures such as thoserecommended for the intelligence community by the 9/11 Commission may accelerate successagainst global terrorism, other factors are equally critical as well. Strong national leadership and ahigh quality of rank-and-file personnel and technology are central, as is the strong political will ofleadership and the general population. Hence, one potential pitfall of relying on strategies andreforms involving restructuring of government organizations is that a focus on implementingstrategies or administrative changes may overshadow other important factors such as quality ofpersonnel and technology. In particular, this human factor may warrant more attention in anenvironment where organizations may feel pressed to find personnel to fill a plethora of newlycreated counter-terror related positions. Overall, the 9/11 Commission recommendations share many features of the Administration'sNational Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The theme of using a portfolio of "all elements ofnational power" resounds in both documents. Both documents emphasize the core importance oftimely and actionable intelligence. Both emphasize a need for pre-emptive strategy, for attackingterrorists and their organizations, for international cooperation, for foreign economic assistance, forwinning hearts and minds, for strengthening counter-proliferation efforts, for attacking terroristfinancing, for denying sanctuaries, and for border security. (32) Pursuit of governmentpolicies that draw potential recruits away from terrorist agendas is a core recommendation of the9/11 Commission report. (33) Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the "last war" and not a future one, and likenthe Commission's recommendations to picking the "low hanging fruit on the tree while avoidinggoing after the higher -- more difficult to reach, yet richer -- clusters." (34) For example, theCommission, as its first recommendation, suggests identifying and prioritizing terrorist sanctuarieswith a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terrorists increasingly return to theirpolitically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blend into local communities, where theirtraining camps are in civilian housing complexes, and where their bomb factories are in privateresidences. In another recommendation, the Commission suggests that vigorous efforts to trackterrorist financing remain front and center, yet does not address the prickly, and growing, issue ofuse of the hawalah system by terrorist networks. (35) A number of the Commission's recommendations fall within the category of preventing thegrowth of Islamist extremism and both the 2003 National Strategy and the 9/11 Commission Reportto a large degree equate the terrorist threat with al Qaeda and affiliated groups. However, a validquestion is the degree to which, if at all, such a single-minded approach detracts attention fromindividuals or groups with other motivations that may soon appear on the horizon. Another issuecentral to combating Islamist extremism, not addressed in the 2003 National Strategy or the 9/11Commission recommendations, is that of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted,countenanced, or facilitated by the action, or inaction, of nation states. (36) Although, the 2003 National Strategy and the 9/11 Commission both support the use offoreign assistance as a means of taking away fertile breeding ground for the nurturing of terroristgroups, the question of a correlation between standard of living levels and terrorism is open todebate. (37) Nevertheless, there is a growing recognition in U.S. anti-terrorism strategy that poverty can breedignorance and despair and that despair can be exploited to support terrorist goals. (38)

Summary:
On July 22, 2004 the 9/11 Commission released its final report. The report calls for changesto be made by the executive branch and Congress to more effectively protect our nation in an ageof modern terrorism and provides forty-one concrete recommendations. Generally, therecommendations of the 9/11 Commission as they relate to strategy content and implementationappear consistent with, and supportive of, the National Strategy. Few question the 9/11 CommissionReport's overarching premise that U.S. counter-terrorism structure, strategy, and implementation canbe improved. Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the "last war" and not a future one and suggestthat the Commission consciously avoids tackling some of the more complex, yet pressing issues. For example, the Commission, as its first recommendation, stresses the need for identifying andprioritizing terrorist sanctuaries with a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terroristsare increasingly returning to their politically stable home countries for sanctuary where they blendinto local communities, where their training camps are in civilian housing complexes, and wheretheir bomb factories are in private residences. Although a number of the Commission'srecommendations fall within the category of preventing the growth of Islamic extremism, noneaddresses directly the issue of confronting incitement to terrorism when promoted, countenanced,or facilitated by the action -- or inaction -- of nation states. With terrorists able to change targets, tactics, and weapons on short notice, many argue thata successful counterterrorism strategy and institutional structures will need similar flexibility. Thedegree to which such flexibility will be built into strategy, and into any new institutional structuresrecommend by the 9/11 Commission, is yet to be determined. On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Actof 2004 ( S. 2845 , P.L. 108-458 ) establishing the position of National IntelligenceDirector (a position separate from that of the CIA Director) to serve as the President's principalintelligence advisor, overseeing and coordinating the foreign and domestic activities of theintelligence community. Established as well is a National Counterterrorism Center designed toserve as a central knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists and tocoordinate and monitor counterterrorism plans and activities of all government agencies. The Centerwill also be responsible for preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President.