RS21332 -- The African Union Updated April 30, 2003 The African Union (AU) has its roots in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Economic Community (AEC)Treaty of 1991. It came into force in 1994, following ratification by two-thirds of OAU member states. (1) The AEC Treaty set up asix-stage economic integration process leading to the anticipated creation, by 2028, of a common market and a rangeof commonpolitical and economic institutions. Its lengthy implementation schedule, however, meant that the treaty might yieldfew benefits fordecades. This factor, along with increasing calls for a basic restructuring of the purposes, priorities, and organizationof the OAU,ultimately led to its replacement by the AU. Developments in the late 1990s that contributed to the reformmovement included: Increasing support by OAU member states for good governance and its rejection of undemocratic changes ofpower. A loosening of the OAU's adherence to its long-standing doctrine of non-interference by member statesin theaffairs of their peers, including some marked by human rights abuses and undemocratic transfers ofpower. The rising importance of economic liberalization, renewed attention to market-driven economic growth,andglobal trends toward regional economic integration. H.Res. 155 , introduced by Representative Meeks on March 2003, urges that the United States commend the AU'screation and support its diverse economic and political goals. Sirte Summit. In September 1999, a summit of OAU heads of state held in Sirte,Libya assessed and sought to improve the OAU charter. The meeting, held on the 30th anniversary of Libyan leaderMuammaral-Qadhafi's coup d'etat, was seen as an effort to extend Libya's growing influence in Africa, and to end itsinternational isolation inthe wake of the Lockerbie airplane bombing. (2) Al-Qadhafi hosted the meeting to press for the creation of a United States of Africa,loosely modeled on the United States. Such a union, he asserted, was needed to further intra-continental economicdevelopment andintegration, and to enable more organic relations to emerge between nations divided by arbitrary, colonial-eraborders. He cited theAEC Treaty as the legal and institutional basis of his proposal, stating that it had fundamentally redefined the OAUCharter, andnoting that it allowed for the creation of a range of common, pan-continental institutions. His proposal, whichechoed 1960s-erapan-Africanist ideas, emphasized a need to resolve and prevent Africa's conflicts through the establishment ofcommon defenseinstitutions. Summit participants issued the Sirte Declaration. Explicitly referencing al-Qadhafi's ideas, it called forthe revitalizationof the OAU and provided for the creation of an African Union, which was to conform with the OAU Charter andthe AEC Treaty. Italso called for the accelerated implementation of the AEC Treaty, and set the year 2000 as the projected start-up datefor apan-African parliament. It tasked the presidents of Algeria and South Africa, in consultation with the OAU ContactGroup onAfrica's External Debt, with seeking a substantial reduction or the total cancellation of Africa's foreign debt. Subsequent Developments. In March 2000, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the OAUCouncil of Ministers ratified the Sirte Declaration. In July 2000, in Lome, Togo, the OAU Assembly ofHeads of State andGovernment adopted an African Union Draft Constitutive Act. It also requested that OAU member parliamentariansvet aPan-African Parliament (PAP) Draft Protocol to the AEC Treaty, prior to its ratification. The AU Draft ConstitutiveAct text differedsubstantially from the model proposed by al-Qadhafi, and contained no binding provisions or timetables. In March2001, againmeeting in Libya, an OAU/AEC summit of heads of state mandated that the AU would come into being upon the36th ratification byan OAU member state of the AU Constitutive Act -- a benchmark reached in April 2001, when Nigeria depositedits instrument ofratification. The summit also adopted the PAP Draft Protocol, prior to its approval by OAU members. An OAU/AEC Summit, meeting in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia, charged the OAU Secretary General, in consultation with OAUstates, with determining the modalities necessary for the creation, structuring, and functioning of the organs of theAU. Priority wasgiven to the creation of an Assembly, Executive Council, Commission, and a Permanent RepresentativesCommittee. The sameactors were charged with defining the areas of competence, inter-relationships, and linkages with other externalmultilateral,non-governmental, and professional organizations of the OAU's specialized agencies, and processes forreconstituting these as AUorgans. The Summit also: Determined that regional economic communities would function as key "building blocks" of the AU. (3) Authorized the OAU Secretary General to "identify alternative modalities of funding the activities andprograms of the [AU], bearing in mind that the Union cannot operate on the basis of assessed contributions fromMember Statesonly." (4) Mandated that, as provided by the AU Constitutive Act, OAU assets, liabilities, and agreements withotherparties would devolve to the AU. In July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, the final meetings of the OAU were held. They were followed by official inauguration of theAfrican Union, and meetings of its Assembly, Executive Council, and Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Organization. The Constitutive Act of the African Union defines the institutionalstructure, organizational principles, and broad policy roles of constituent AU organs. These include the following: An Assembly, an Executive Council, and a Commission of the Union. A Pan-African Parliament and a Permanent Representatives Committee. Court of Justice. Peace and Security Council. (5) Specialized Technical Committees, responsible to the Executive Council. These include committeeson:Economy and Agricultural Matters; Monetary and Financial Affairs; Trade, Customs and Immigration Matters;Industry, Science andTechnology, Energy, Natural Resources and Environment; Transport, Communications and Tourism; Health, Laborand SocialAffairs; and Education, Culture and Human Resources. Economic, Social and Cultural Council. Central Financial Institutions (including an African Central Bank; and African Monetary Fund; andan AfricanInvestment Bank). The precise operational relationships among these organs and with their subsidiary bodies, and their structures, functions, mandates,and powers, are yet to be determined. African Union Policy: NEPAD. A key AU policy vehicle is the New Partnershipfor Africa's Development (NEPAD), a multi-sector sustainable development and investment planning and advocacyframework. Ithas been endorsed by diverse African leaders and by key multilateral organizations. (6) A core feature of NEPAD is the voluntary,progress-based African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). APRM signatory states will be subject to peerevaluations that will assesstheir degree of adherence to political, economic and corporate governance goals, codes, and standards containedin the NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance . During the African Union inaugural summit in July 2002, leaders from across Africa joined together in a public display ofcontinental unity and pageantry. The formation of the African Union, however, was reportedly the subject ofsignificant, sometimesdivisive debate among African leaders. The debate arrayed leading political and economic reformers, in particularadvocates ofNEPAD and of Africa's further integration into the global economy, against several leaders who have championedAfrican politicalautonomy and nationalist policy agendas. The latter, including the heads of state of Libya, Zimbabwe, Namibia andGambia,criticized NEPAD. They warned that for such a plan to be successful, it would need to be defined, realized, andcontrolled byAfricans alone, independent of external influences. NEPAD was defined by foreign political and economic models,they asserted,and might subject Africa to externally-imposed political conditions in exchange for credit and other assistance. Theyalso assertedthat NEPAD would create financial dependency on external creditors. (7) Libyan and South African Leadership Roles. Differences over the proposedpurpose and role of the AU played out in reported disagreements between President Thabo Mbeki of South Africaand Libyan leaderMuammar al-Qadhafi. The latter has promoted a range of populist, sometimes radical, proposals. These reflecttraditionalpan-Africanist goals emphasizing a need for greater continental unity and sovereignty vis-a-vis the industrializedworld, and a strongrejection of policy conditionalities in exchange for access to credit. Despite al-Qadhafi's early conceptualcontributions to thecreation of the AU and his subsequent outreach efforts, the AU organization that ultimately emerged reflected broadAfricanleadership support for NEPAD. The gradual displacement of al-Qadhafi's agenda by NEPAD reportedly gave riseto a leadershipstruggle between him and President Mbeki. During a June 2002 state visit by Mbeki to Libya, al-Qadhafi reportedlycalled NEPAD aproject of "former colonisers and racists," i.e., of Western governments. (8) He also reportedly attempted to delay the July 2002initiation of the AU in Durban, South Africa in favor of a launch in 2003 in Libya, with Libya -- not South Africa-- as the first AUchair. Libya has helped some countries to pay their OAU arrears, in an apparent attempt to garner support and toincrease itsinfluence within the OAU during the transition to the AU. The president of Zambia, which received such assistance,reportedlychampioned the transfer of AU headquarters from Ethiopia to Libya, asserting that such a key role was befitting ofLibya, as one ofthe richest AU countries. The Libyan and South Africa governments have dismissed claims that a rivalry exists between them, and efforts to bridge theirdifferences appear to have been successful, albeit broadly in favor of the South African agenda. President ThaboMbeki was namedas the first chairperson of the AU during its inaugural year, and the first AU summit was held in Durban, SouthAfrica. Libya hasindicated its acceptance of NEPAD and its Peer Review mechanism, and Libya is represented on the NEPADImplementationCommittee. Some AU inauguration summit participants reportedly believe that al-Qadhafi's presence in NEPADcould jeopardizethe recent endorsement of the plan by the G-8 countries. (9) HIV/AIDS. World-wide, Africa is the region currently most affected by theHIV/AIDS epidemic. In many African countries, it is rapidly decreasing life expectancy rates, reducing current andfuture economicproduction, and leading to enormous human resource losses, including within the educated work force. Some criticsclaim thatNEPAD fails to substantively and pro-actively address the extreme devastation being engendered by the spread ofAIDS in manyAfrican countries. War and Conflict. Conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola have recently ended, buthostilities continue in Somalia, Liberia, Burundi, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). (10) Many other countrieshave faced armed insurgencies or periodically high levels of political violence in recent years. Such conflicts posepotent challengesto the AU goal of achieving continental peace and security, while upholding the doctrine of member states'non-interference in theinternal affairs of their peers. In late April 2003, the AU began deploying the first 100 members of a planned3,500-strong combinedSouth African, Ethiopian, and Mozambican peacekeeping force that will monitor and reinforce a cease-fire andpolitical successionaimed at ending Burundi's civil war. Democracy and Governance Challenges. The extent of the African Union'sdetermination to consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and ensure good governance and adherence to therule of law -- asreflected in the AU Constitutive Act and in multiple NEPAD texts -- face immediate tests. In recent years, theconstitutions ofseveral African states have been amended expressly to allow current leaders to renew their terms of office. Suchdevelopmentssuggest that the power of incumbency, rather than the rule of law, effectively governs political power-holding inmany Africancountries -- although in several countries, including Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique, the trend towardentrenched presidentialincumbency has been reversed. In other cases, the legitimacy of recent local legislative elections administered byruling parties havebeen questioned by opposition groups and outside observers. Key challenges facing the AU are disputed polls inMadagascar,Zimbabwe; Nigeria also held a widely criticized election. Madagascar. In the island nation of Madagascar, contested presidential elections in late 2001 led to a tense, violent, half year stand-off between the two candidates and their supporters. After theelection, thechallenger, businessman Marc Ravalomanana, citing electoral irregularities, declared himself the electoral winnerover DidierRatsiraka, the longtime incumbent. The Malagasy Supreme Court later sanctioned his claim. In June 2002, theUnited States andseveral other powers formally recognized Ravalomanana's government, and France soon followed suite. The AU,however, has notrecognized the new government, and has called for new elections. Senegal, which had tried to mediate in crisis, didnot endorse theAU decision. It recognized the new government, as did Burkina Faso, Mauritius, Libya and the Comoros. There areindications thatthe AU may soon recognize the current Malagasy government. Zimbabwe. In contrast to its Madagascar decision, the inaugural AU Assembly tacitly accepted the highly disputed March 2002 re-election of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, which was precededby extensivepolitical violence and a controversial land redistribution program. Although the AU did not directly address theelection, it affirmedearlier OAU endorsements of it, mirroring acceptance of the election by sub-regional leaders and SADC. In contrast,the UnitedStates, the European Union, and other countries rejected the Zimbabwean poll. Leaders of the Zimbabweanopposition Movementfor Democratic Change, some of whom were prevented from attending the AU inauguration, called upon the AUto use the NEPADAfrican Peer Review Mechanism to sanction the Zimbabwean government for abuses of human and political rights. Elitism and Popular Participation. Civil society activists have long charged thatthe OAU was a state-centric forum that upheld the interest of political elites, rather than the public good. Somecritics predict that theAU may become subject to similar biases, and assert that without much broader input from African societies atlarge, the AU willbecome irrelevant to the needs of the majority of Africa's citizens. Still, many critics see positive potential in boththe AU andNEPAD, and leading AU architects, such as President Mbeki, have recognized their concerns in public statements.Mbeki hassponsored forums focusing on AU-related policy goals of diverse civil society groups. Structural Poverty and Financing of NEPAD. The AU may face difficulties infinancing its ambitious agenda, as did the OAU. The average sub-Saharan per capita in 2002 was $470 and wasmuch lower in manynon-oil-producing countries. In addition, wealth is highly unequally distributed in many African countries; even inthe wealthiest ofsub-Saharan countries, the majority of people are poor. While NEPAD is an attempt to improve the economicstanding of Africa ingeneral, growth that it may generate is likely to occur over the medium to long-term. In the short to medium term,funding shortfallsare likely to curtail the ability of the AU to meet its planned objectives.

Summary:
In July 2002, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963 during thedecolonization era, was superseded by the African Union (AU). An AU Interim Commission, created to transfer theinstitutional andreal assets and liabilities of the OAU to the AU, and establish the AU's organizational structure, is the focal pointof AU activitiesduring its inaugural year. The AU's policy agenda overlaps substantially with that of the OAU, but more stronglyemphasizes a needfor greater economic growth and for governance reforms. The AU is likely to confront many of the same policy andfiscal challengesfaced by the OAU (see CRS Report RS20945(pdf), The Organization of African Unity). H.Res. 155,introduced in March2003, urges U.S. support of the AU and its diverse economic and political goals. This report will be updated asevents warrant.