Kishore Mahbubani, formerly a senior official in Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs andTrade, stated that history will view the EAS as the real beginning of the Pacific century. (3) The EAS is viewed asimportant not only because of its implications for regional trade but more importantly for itspotential importance as an indicator of China's rising geopolitical importance. It is also of importancebecause the positions of regional states relative to China and the United States were brought intoperspective as the diplomacy surrounding the summit unfolded. The EAS is viewed as potentiallyof strategic importance because many believe that it could form the basis of a future East AsianCommunity, which might make collective agreements on trade or even security affairs without U.S.input. As such, regional states have sought to be included in the summit so that they will not beexcluded from any future East Asian Community. The United States has not played a role in the EAS process nor was it invited to attend. Whatis of concern to some analysts is that this appears to be a potential challenge to Americaninvolvement in the region. Some fear that by shifting emphasis from APEC, an organization in whichthe United States has played a leading role and which encompasses the broader Pacific Rim, to anannual East Asia Summit, in which the United States is not a participant, America's overall positioncould become relatively less influential and the United States could potentially be excluded frompreferential trade agreements. Though President Bush attended the APEC gathering in Busan, SouthKorea in November 2005, that gathering is being viewed by some as "trumped" by the December2005 EAS meeting. (4) APEC, however, is primarily a trade and economic organization. A major strategic consideration isthat APEC includes Taiwan whereas the EAS does not. (5) Some view the inclusion of India, Australia, and New Zealand as a partial balancer to thegeopolitical weight of China within the grouping. (6) This is thought to be the perspective of countries such asSingapore, Japan, Vietnam, and Indonesia, though other states are thought to be relativelycomfortable with China's role and an ASEAN Plus Three format. (7) Some observers believe thatdespite its acceptance of the current membership of the EAS, China actually favors a future EastAsian Community based on the more restricted membership of the ASEAN Plus Three states. Thiswould exclude Australia and New Zealand, which are more closely aligned with the United States,as well as India. India is China's traditional rival in Asia and is in the process of developing closerties with the United States. This issue came to light as China reportedly favored a draft jointdeclaration for the summit which portrayed ASEAN Plus Three states as having a dialogue withIndia, Australia and New Zealand at the summit. Japan reportedly opposed such a definition of thegrouping. India reportedly opposed any joint declaration that did not imply that the EAS would formthe basis of a future East Asian Community. (8) To some, the EAS is an extension of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) concept putforward by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed of Malaysia. The EAEC was a revisedversion of Mahathir's 1990 East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) concept. (9) The EAEC was to excludenon-Asian states, such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. The United Stateswas opposed to such an exclusive East Asian grouping, and Japan reportedly worked to thwart itwhile Australia promoted the APEC grouping which includes all states concerned. (10) The evolution of the EastAsian Community concept, of which the EAS is the latest manifestation, evolved further whenASEAN joined with China, Japan, and Korea in 1997/1998 to form the ASEAN Plus Threegrouping. (11) Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo stated after a meeting with Secretary of State Ricein February 2005 that the United States "has some concerns that the East Asia Summit will be inwardlooking and exclusive." (12) The United States has been criticized by regional states for notpaying enough attention to Southeast Asia. This was highlighted by Secretary of State CondoleezzaRice's decision to break with tradition and not to attend the July 24-29, 2005 ASEAN Ministerialmeeting in Vientiane, Laos. Secretary of State Rice also canceled a planned visit to Indonesia inJanuary 2006 reportedly due to developments in the Middle East. (13) Some interpreted this moveas "a sign that the United States was ceding the region to China." (14) The Administration hasindicated that the EAS agenda is not clear and that it continues to support APEC as "by far the mostrobust, multilateral grouping in Asia." (15) Despite the perceived lack of attention by the U.S., the UnitedStates and ASEAN announced a Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnershipjust prior to President Bush's meeting with ASEAN leaders on the sidelines of the November 2005APEC meeting in South Korea. (16) A Singaporean Foreign Affairs spokesman greeted the JointVision Statement by stating that "The enhanced partnership ... will substantially broaden the UnitedStates' engagement with ASEAN ... and will better position both sides to meet the challengesahead." (17) China's approach to multilateral institutions which involve ASEAN has undergone atransformation as have Southeast Asian states' perceptions of China. China has evolved fromviewing multilateral institutions in Southeast Asia as potentially constraining to viewing them asuseful for promoting China's foreign policy objectives. (18) Southeast Asian states' views of China have evolved as Chinahas abandoned its support of communist insurgencies in the region, been less assertive in the SouthChina Sea, and has embarked on diplomatic and trade initiatives. Since taking office in March of2003, President Hu Jintao has traveled extensively in the region. (19) Some view the currentdrive for the creation of an East Asian Community as having roots in the perceived failure of theUnited States to effectively respond to the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. (20) At that time, China gainedmuch favor by not devaluing its currency and by providing a reported $US 4 billion in aid to affectedcountries at a time when the United States' response was not viewed positively by regional states.China is also developing defense cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Chinaviews the region as key for its energy security both as a region through which its energy flows (some80% of China's oil imports flow through the straits of Malacca) as well as a region from which Chinacan derive energy resources. (21) China-ASEAN trade exceeded $100 billion in 2004, a 30% increase over 2003 levels. (22) The rapid growth in tradebetween China and regional states provides the economic ballast for a broader relationship that mayincreasingly encompass political and security linkages as well. China and ASEAN have signed aFree Trade Agreement and are negotiating to reduce tariffs to between zero and 5% on certain goodsby 2010 and by 2015 for poorer members of ASEAN. (23) The combined gross domestic product (GDP) of Asian countriesis approximately 22% of the world total while the United States and Europe account forapproximately 28% and 30% respectively. (24) Asia has experienced much higher rates of growth than theUnited States and Europe in recent years, and this trend is widely expected to continue. There are a range of perspectives within ASEAN on the EAS and China's evolving role ina potential East Asian Community. While all invitees to the EAS see value in developing diplomaticand trade relations with China, some are more concerned than others that China's potentiallypreponderant influence should be balanced. Singapore has taken a leading role in articulating thebenefits of an open regional framework for Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong hasstated "ASEAN does not want to be exclusively dependent on China and does not want to be forcedto choose sides between China and the United States or China and Japan." He also reportedly stated"if the world is split up into closed blocs or exclusive spheres of influence, rivalry, antagonism andconflict are inevitable." (25) Singapore has supported India's inclusion in both the East AsiaSummit and India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. (26) Singapore also seekscontinued U.S. engagement in the region. Burma and Laos are viewed as already significantly underChina's sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. (27) It is not only Southeast Asian states that are feeling the pull of China's diplomatic initiatives;"loyal allies of the United States, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, already feel themagnetic force of a new geopolitical pole." (28) Australia reversed its previous policy on the ASEAN Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation and signed the treaty which enabled it to attend the East Asia Summit. It isunclear to what extent current tensions between Japan and China will hinder the future developmentof the EAS. China has reportedly postponed discussions involving Japan which were to take placeon the sidelines of the EAS. (29) This conflict, and Japan's perceived declining regional influence,may have contributed to enthusiasm among others to include India, Australia, and New Zealand inthe group. Some view recent developments in America's bilateral relationship with India as in partinspired by a desire to build ties with another regional state which may not be comfortable with arapidly expanded Chinese position. (30) China was recently able to gain observer status to the SouthAsian Association of Regional Cooperation, the main multilateral grouping in South Asia. (31) The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, of December 14, 2005, madeseveral key declarations which are listed below. "... we have established the East Asia Summit as a forum for dialogue on broadstrategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promotingpeace, stability and prosperity in East Asia." "... the efforts of the East Asia Summit to promote community building in thisregion will be consistent with and reinforce the realization of the ASEAN Community, and will forman integral part of the evolving regional architecture." "... the East Asia Summit will be an open inclusive, transparent and outwardlooking forum ... with ASEAN as the driving force ..." The EAS will focus on "fostering strategic dialogue and promoting cooperationin political and security issues ... promoting development, financial stability, energy security,economic integration and growth eradicating poverty and narrowing the development gap in EastAsia ..." (32) The summit has highlighted a number of evolving geopolitical dynamics in the region. It hasbeen observed that key outcomes of the summit are that ASEAN "successfully projected its politicalcentrality in a wider region fast becoming a function of the economic weight of China and India,"and those within ASEAN Plus Three who advocated a more inclusive membership were able to bringIndia, Australia, and New Zealand into the group. (33) It has been reported that Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia workedto broaden membership to include India, Australia, and New Zealand. (34) Such additions are thoughtto partially offset the influence of China within the group. It was also observed that while the UnitedStates did not participate, "its influence remains directly and via regional allies." While media reportsdid focus on the EAS as a new Asian bloc they also pointed to conflicts within the region,particularly the Sino-Japanese conflict, that may limit future regional cooperation. (35) Some analysts haveobserved that rather than bringing Asia together under Chinese leadership the EAS may have moreclearly defined Asian rivalry and regional geostrategic divisions. (36) Russia, which had observerstatus at the EAS, also is reportedly seeking to become a full member at the next EAS meeting. (37) The group plans to holdits second summit in the Philippines in 2006. (38) Some have asked why the United States should be concerned with an EAS that has yet todemonstrate that it will be a threat to American influence in Asia. Others argue that it will lead toa reduction in influence that would limit America's ability to promote its values or look after itsinterests whether they be economic or strategic. To some, America's preoccupation with Iraq hasbeen a distraction that has led it to underestimate the importance of evolving geopolitical dynamicsin Asia including the EAS. (39) The focus on the EAS comes at a time when APEC is generally perceived to have lostmomentum. There is an increasing perception that APEC, which has 21 members and wasestablished in 1989, is disintegrating into regional and bilateral blocs and that it does not have theleadership necessary to meet future challenges. Some feel that a return to APEC core issues of tradeliberalization and the reduction of trade barriers is the best way for APEC to regain itsmomentum. (40) Australia, which played a key role in the development of APEC, will be the 2007 Chair of APEC.A question is whether the United States should take additional measures to strengthen APEC. Somesuggest this would also keep Taiwan from becoming increasingly isolated. To some, the key question concerning the EAS is whether China's leadership "will be benignor will it be aimed -- or be perceived by the U.S. as being aimed -- at limiting or replacingWashington's (and Tokyo's) influence in the region." (41) China's actions through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO), which includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, areviewed by some as challenging America's regional presence. (42) The SCO asked in July2005 for a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. coalition forces in Central Asia. (43) China's potentialopposition to America presence in a region that it may increasingly see as within its sphere ofinfluence may portend future negative postures relative to American forces elsewhere in Asia. Developing a constructive relationship with China is generally viewed as the most significantforeign policy challenge for the United States in Asia, and possibly the world, in the years ahead.How the United States reacts to China's bid to position itself more centrally in Asia, as demonstratedby the EAS, is an important component of this challenge. A policy approach that seeks to continueto foster the peaceful rise of China appeals to many. (44) Some feel that it is important that American policy on the EastAsia Summit, or a potential future East Asian Community, not be interpreted by China as an effortto contain China but rather as a policy initiative to demonstrate that America seeks to remain anactive and constructive actor in Asian multilateral affairs and that it supports the constructiveintegration of China into regional and world affairs.

Summary:
The first East Asia Summit (EAS) met on December 14, 2005, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.It brought together the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), [Brunei, Burma,Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam] as well as the"plus three" states [China, South Korea, and Japan] and Australia, New Zealand, and India, todiscuss issues of common concern. Japanese officials have described the EAS as an "historic summitmeeting to be held with a view to establishing a future East Asia Community." (1) Such a group could potentiallyreplace Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as the main multilateral forum in Asia on tradeand investment liberalization and economic integration. Russia was invited to attend the EAS as aspecial guest. (2) Some inthe United States are concerned that the East Asia Summit marks a rise in Asian regionalism inwhich the United States is not playing a leading role. There is also concern that China may use theEast Asia Summit to consolidate a leading role in Asia. A key outcome of the first East Asia Summitis that ASEAN appears to have retained a central role in the process. This report will be updated ascircumstances warrant.