The dramatic expansion in computer interconnectivity and the rapid increase in the use of the Internet are changing the way our government, the nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. Because of the concern about attacks from individuals and groups, protecting the computer systems that support critical operations and infrastructures has never been more important. These concerns are well founded for a number of reasons, such as escalating threats of computer security incidents, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, the steady advances in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology, and the emergence of new and more destructive attacks. According to experts from government and industry, during the first quarter of 2005, more than 600 new Internet security vulnerabilities were discovered, thereby placing organizations that use the Internet at risk. Computer-supported federal operations are likewise at risk. IBM recently reported that there were over 54 million attacks against government computers from January 2005 to June 2005. Without proper safeguards, there is risk that individuals and groups with malicious intent may intrude into inadequately protected systems and use this access to obtain sensitive information, commit fraud, disrupt operations, or launch attacks against other computer systems and networks. How well federal agencies are addressing these risks is a topic of increasing interest in both Congress and the executive branch. This is evidenced by recent hearings on information security intended to strengthen information security. DLA is an agency of the Department of Defense (DOD). As DOD's supply chain manager, DLA provides food, fuel, medical supplies, clothing, spare parts for weapon systems, and construction materials to sustain DOD military operations and combat readiness. To fulfill its mission, DLA relies extensively on interconnected computer systems to perform various functions, such as managing about 5.2 million supply items and processing about 54,000 requisition actions per day for goods and services. DLA employs about 22,575 civilian and military workers, located at about 500 field locations in 48 states and 28 countries. In accordance with DOD policy, DLA has developed an agencywide information security program to provide information security for its operations and assets. The DLA Director is responsible for ensuring the security of the information and information systems that support the agency's operations. In carrying out this responsibility, the Director has delegated to DLA's chief information officer the authority to ensure that the agency complies with FISMA and with other information security requirements. DLA's chief information officer has also designated a senior agency official to serve as Director of Information Assurance--the agency's senior information security officer--and to head the central security management group, commonly referred to as the information assurance program office. This group carries out specific responsibilities, including the following: documenting and maintaining an agencywide security framework to assess the agency's security posture, identify vulnerabilities, and allocate resources; establishing and managing security awareness and specialized professional security training for employees who have significant security responsibilities; ensuring that all systems are certified and accredited in accordance with both federal and DOD processes; providing personnel at headquarters and the DLA locations with guidance on, and assistance in preparing, system security authorization agreements--single source data packages for all information pertaining to the certification and accreditation of a system in order to, among other things, guide actions, document decisions, specify information security requirements, and maintain operational systems security; and ensuring that field site personnel accurately assess their locations' security postures. Information assurance managers at the various DLA locations directly report to the information technology chief at their location and are expected to assist the Director of Information Assurance by coordinating security activities, establishing and maintaining a repository for documenting and reporting system certification and accreditation activities, maintaining and updating system security authorization agreements, and notifying the designated approving authority of any changes that could affect system security. Information assurance officers at the various DLA locations assist the information assurance managers through the following activities: ensuring that appropriate information security controls are implemented for an information system, notifying the information assurance manager when system changes that might affect certification and accreditation are requested or planned, and conducting annual validation testing of systems. Figure 1 below shows a simplified overview of DLA's information assurance management and reporting structure. Congress enacted FISMA to strengthen the security of information and information systems within federal agencies. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an agencywide information security program to protect the information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency--including those that are provided or managed by another agency, a contractor, or some other source. The program must include the following: periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, disruption, or destruction of information or information systems; training of personnel who have significant responsibility for information security and security awareness training to educate personnel-- including contractors and other users of the agency's information systems--about information security risks and their responsibilities to comply with the agency's security policies and procedures; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of the agency's information security policies, procedures, and practices; and a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting plans of action and milestones that are taken to address any deficiencies in the agency's information security policies, procedures, and practices. To support agencies in conducting their information security programs, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is publishing mandatory standards and guidelines for providing information security all agency operations, assets, and information systems other than national security systems. The standards and guidelines include, at a minimum, (1) standards to be used by all agencies to categorize their information and information systems based on the objectives of providing appropriate levels of information security according to a range of risk levels, (2) guidelines recommending the types of information and information systems that are to be included in each category, and (3) minimum information security requirements for information and information systems in each category. In addition, DOD has developed and published various directives and instructions that comprise an information assurance policy framework that is intended to meet the information security requirements specified in FISMA and NIST standards and publications. This framework applies to all of DOD's systems--both national and non-national security systems-- including those operated by or on behalf of DLA. DLA's policies and procedures for implementing its agency information security program are contained in DLA's One Book policy and agency handbook. DLA has implemented important elements of an information security program--including establishing a central security management group, appointing a senior information security officer to manage the program, and providing security awareness training for its employees. However, DLA has not yet fully implemented other essential elements of an effective information security program to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and information systems that support its mission. Collectively, these weaknesses place DLA's information and information systems at risk. Key underlying reasons for the weaknesses pertain to DLA's management and oversight of its security program. In carrying out their information security responsibilities, both the Chief Information Officer and the Director of Information Assurance have taken several steps to implement important elements of DLA's security program, including the following: ensuring employees and contractors receive information security developing information security procedures and guidance for use in implementing the requirements of the program; deploying information system security engineers to assist headquarters and field staff in implementing security policies and procedures consistently across the agency; developing an agencywide management tool--known as the Comprehensive Information Assurance Knowledgebase--to centrally manage and report on key performance measures, such as the status of security training, plans of action and milestones, and certification and accreditation activities; and developing and implementing various automated information technology initiatives to assist information assurance managers and information assurance officers in improving DLA's security posture. Weaknesses in information security practices and controls place DLA's information and information systems at risk. Our analysis of information security activities for selected systems at 10 DLA locations showed that the agency had not fully or consistently implemented important elements of its program. Specifically, risks that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, or destruction of information or information systems were not consistently assessed; employees who had significant information security responsibilities did not receive sufficient training, and security training plans were sometimes not adequately completed; testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of management and operational security controls were not adequately performed; and plans of action and milestones for mitigating known information security deficiencies were not sufficiently completed. Table 1 indicates with an "X" weaknesses in the implementation of key information security practices and controls for selected systems. FISMA requires that agencies' information security programs include periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of the harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. Identifying and assessing information security risks are essential steps in order to determine what controls are required and what level of resources should be expended on these controls. NIST has developed guidance to help organizations protect their information and information systems by using security controls that are selected through a risk-based process. DOD established a set of baseline security controls for each of three mission assurance categories that determine what security controls should be implemented. These controls are adjusted based on an assessment of risk including specific threat information, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures relative to the system. Vulnerabilities that are not mitigated are referred to as residual risk. The designated approving authority considers the residual risks in determining whether to accredit a system. Such risk assessments, as part of the requirement to reaccredit systems, are to be performed prior to a significant change in processing, but at least every 3 years. Although DLA categorized its systems in accordance with DOD guidance, we found that it did not consistently assess the residual risk for 9 of the 10 systems we selected for review. For example: nine did not use the established baseline security controls to assess the three did not clearly identify the threats, vulnerabilities, and two did not state how the threats and vulnerabilities would affect the mission that the system supports; one only referenced the security controls as the threat or vulnerability; one had not been updated since 2001. Unless DLA performs risk assessments consistently and assesses them against the appropriate set of controls, it will not have assurance that it has implemented appropriate controls that cost-effectively reduce risk to an acceptable level. FISMA mandates that all federal employees and contractors who are involved in the use of agency information systems be provided training in information security awareness and that agency heads ensure that employees with significant information security responsibilities are provided sufficient training with respect to such responsibilities. An effective information security program should promote awareness and provide training so that employees who use computer resources in their day-to-day operations understand security risks and their roles in implementing related policies and controls to mitigate those risks. DOD guidance requires that individuals receive the necessary training to ensure that they are capable of conducting their security duties and that each component establish and implement information assurance training and professional certification programs. DOD also requires that security awareness and training plans be documented for each system as part of the certification and accreditation process. These security training plans specify that training for individuals associated with a system's operation be appropriate to an individual's level and area of responsibility. This training should provide information about the security policy governing the information being processed, as well as potential threats and the nature of the appropriate countermeasures. DLA provided annual security awareness training for employees and contractors for whom it was appropriate. However, employees with significant information security responsibilities did not receive sufficient training. For example, of the 17 information assurance managers and information assurance officers located where we reviewed selected systems: eleven reported having received some form of training, although eight of them had received training on only one of their security responsibilities--developing security documentation; six reported never having received any security training; and two reported having received no security training for 2 or more years. Further, security training and awareness plans for 3 of the 10 systems we reviewed were either not system-specific or lacked detailed information. For example, training plans for 2 systems did not specify, for each level and area of responsibility, the system operations appropriate for a given user. The third lacked detailed information about training objectives, goals, and requirements. A key reason for these weaknesses is that the individual responsible for monitoring the agency's security training program had other significant responsibilities and was not able to effectively ensure that employees received the required training. As a result, DLA does not have assurance that employees with significant security responsibilities are equipped with the knowledge and skills they need to understand information security risks and their roles and responsibilities in implementing related policies and controls to mitigate those risks. Another key element that FISMA requires of an information security program is periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency based on risk, but not less than annually. FISMA requires that such testing and evaluation activities shall include the management, operational, and technical controls of every system identified in an agency's information systems inventory. DOD policy requires periodic reviews of operational systems at predefined intervals. Such reviews include testing and evaluating the technical implementation of the security design of a system and ascertaining that security software, hardware, and firmware features affecting the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and accountability of information and information systems have been implemented and documented. The results of testing and evaluation of security controls are to be used in the decision- making process for authorizing systems to operate. Further, DLA's One Book policy requires information assurance managers and information assurance officers to use the security test and evaluations as the method for validating the adequacy of management, operational, and technical controls, at least annually. DLA did not annually test and evaluate the management and operational security controls of its systems. According to DLA officials, vulnerability scans and information assurance program reviews collectively satisfied the annual requirement for testing and evaluating management, operational, and technical controls. However, the combination of the vulnerability scans and the program reviews did not satisfy the annual requirement. Although DLA generally assessed technical controls by conducting annual vulnerability scans on its systems, it did not annually assess the management and operational controls for each of its systems. While the program reviews are intended to satisfy the requirement for testing and evaluating the management and operational controls, DLA does not conduct these reviews annually on every system. For example, less than half of DLA's locations and systems have undergone program reviews in the last 3 years, as shown in table 2. Until DLA tests and evaluates management and operational controls annually, critical systems may contain vulnerabilities that have not been identified or appropriately considered in decisions to authorize systems to operate. Moreover, DLA may not be able to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the sensitive data that its systems process, store, and transmit. FISMA requires each agency to develop a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action plans to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, and practices. Developing effective corrective action plans is key to ensuring that remedial action is taken to address significant deficiencies. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires agency chief information officers to document and report all agency information assurance weaknesses and remedial actions in plans of action and milestones. The plans should list each security weakness and the tasks, resources, milestones, and scheduled completion dates for remedying each weakness. The plans of action and milestones associated with the 10 systems we selected for review were incomplete. For example: none of the plans clearly documented and reported the nature of the seven did not identify the start or completion dates for addressing the none specified the resources necessary to complete the action plan; nine did not list the risk associated with the security weakness; six were not based on the correct set of baseline security controls; and one plan contained steps to identify vulnerabilities rather than the steps required to remedy vulnerabilities. A key reason for these weaknesses is that information assurance managers and information assurance officers reported that they did not understand the requirements for reporting system security vulnerabilities because DLA had not provided specific criteria or instructions on what--or how--to document and report plans of action and milestones for system deficiencies. Having reliable plans of action and milestones is not only vital to ensuring that DLA's information and information systems receive adequate protection, but it is also important for accurately managing and reporting progress on them. Without reliable plans, DLA does not have assurance that all information security weaknesses have been reported and that corrective actions will be taken to appropriately address the weaknesses. OMB requires that agencies establish a certification and accreditation process for formally authorizing systems to operate. Certification and accreditation is the requirement that agency management officials formally authorize their information systems to process information, thereby accepting the risk associated with their operation. This management authorization (accreditation) is to be supported by a formal technical evaluation (certification) of the management, operational, and technical controls established in an information system's security plan. The accreditation decision results in (1) a full authorization to operate, (2) an interim authorization to operate, or (3) no authorization to operate. DOD instructions and DLA's agency handbook provides guidance on the certification and accreditation process. According to DLA officials, the agency has implemented the practice of issuing authorization to operate decisions on a "time-limited" basis-- regardless if certification tasks have been completed because of concern that OMB might not support funding for systems that received an interim authorization to operate decision. However, OMB, DOD, and DLA policies and procedures do not allow for the practice of issuing "time-limited" authorizations; they require interim authorization to operate decisions when all certification tasks have not been completed. To illustrate, the designated approving authority for one of the ten systems we reviewed changed the system's status from an interim authorization to operate to a "time-limited" authorization to operate even though several action items for such authorization had not been met, and this type of authorization is not allowed under current guidance. For example, information assurance personnel had not updated the security plan or completed a risk assessment. Unless DLA complies with the requirements for issuing accreditation decisions, it will not have assurance that its information systems are operating as intended and meeting security requirements. In addition, DLA did not effectively implement controls to verify the completion of certification tasks. As designed and implemented, DLA divides the responsibilities of the system certifier among the information assurance personnel at its locations and a central review team within the information assurance program office. To help ensure quality over the certification process, the central review team established a DLA quality review checklist to verify the certification tasks performed by the information assurance personnel. However, under the current process, the central review team did not interview information assurance personnel at the locations or conduct on-site visits to verify that certification tasks were performed. Instead, the central review team relies on documentation submitted to them by the information assurance personnel who performed the certification tasks. However, this documentation was not always adequate. For example, the checklist contained questions about whether physical access controls were adequate to protect all facilities housing user workstations, but for the central review team to verify such a task, either an on-site inspection or a diagram of the facility or other documentation to demonstrate the physical access controls in place would have been needed. As a result, the certification process may not provide the authorizing official with objective or sufficient information that is necessary to make credible, risk-based decisions on whether to place an information system into operation. Key underlying reasons for the weaknesses in DLA's information security program were that the responsibilities of information assurance managers and information assurance officers were not consistently understood or communicated across the 10 DLA locations we reviewed and the information assurance program office did not maintain the accuracy and completeness of the data contained in the agency's primary reporting tool for managing and overseeing the agencywide information security program. The information assurance program office--as the agency's central security management group for managing and overseeing the security program--is responsible for providing overall security policy and guidance, along with oversight to ensure information assurance managers and information assurance officers adequately perform or execute required information security activities such as those related to performing risk assessments, satisfying security training requirements, testing and evaluating the effectiveness of controls, documenting and reporting plans of action and milestones, and certifying and accrediting systems. Although the information assurance program office developed information security policies and procedures, it did not maintain them to ensure information assurance personnel had current and sufficient documentation to carry out their responsibilities. For example, of the 17 information assurance managers and information assurance officers at the 10 locations we reviewed: nine were unaware of the requirement for security training specific to an employee's information security responsibilities; and three were unaware of the requirement to perform annual self assessments, while ten others had varying understandings of how this requirement was to be met. In addition, data on key information security activities contained in the primary reporting tool were inaccurate or incomplete. For example, for a year, the information assurance program office had not entered weaknesses that had been identified during information assurance program reviews into the primary reporting tool; information assurance personnel at DLA locations used personal discretion for determining whether or not to report a system deficiency to the information assurance program office for entry and compilation in the primary reporting tool, thereby potentially underreporting agency level plans of action and milestones; and information assurance personnel at both headquarters and the DLA locations did not consistently enter key performance metrics related to plans of action and milestones and security training, thereby potentially underreporting important information used to gauge the health of the security program. A key reason for these weaknesses was that DLA had no documentation on the system design or its intended use and, therefore, had no instructional material to guide users. As a result, the data in the primary reporting tool were not reliable or effective for reporting metrics to DOD and OMB for FISMA evaluation reporting. Moreover, because the key information had not been entered into the database, the agency did not readily have all the information about the deficiencies of its program and, therefore, did not have complete information about the security posture of its program. DLA senior officials recognize that the agency's primary reporting tool has not been effectively implemented and used to manage and oversee the security program. Therefore, the agency developed an ad hoc process of data calls to the DLA locations to aggregate the performance data. However, continuation of this ad hoc process will likely not provide the reliable data needed to consistently satisfy FISMA reporting requirements. Until agencywide policies and procedures are sufficiently documented and implemented and are consistently understood and used across the agency, DLA's ability to protect the information and information systems that support its mission will be limited. DLA has not fully implemented its agencywide information security program, thereby jeopardizing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information and information systems that it relies on to accomplish its mission. Specifically, DLA has not consistently implemented important information security practices and controls, including consistently assessing risk; ensuring that training is provided for employees who have significant responsibilities for information security, and that security training plans are updated and maintained; annually testing and evaluating the effectiveness of management, operational and technical controls; documenting and reporting complete plans of action and milestones; implementing a fully effective certification and accreditation process; and maintaining the accuracy and completeness of the data contained in the primary reporting tool. Although DLA's efforts in developing and implementing its information security program have merit, it has not taken all the necessary steps to ensure the security of the information and information systems that support its operations. Ensuring that the agency implements key information security practices and controls requires top management support and leadership and consistent and effective management oversight and monitoring. Until DLA takes steps to address these weaknesses and fully implements its information security program, it will have limited assurance that agency operations and assets are adequately protected. To assist DLA in fully implementing its information security program, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the DLA Director to implement key information security practices and controls by: consistently assessing risks that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure or destruction of information and information; ensuring that training is provided for employees who have significant responsibilities for information security; ensuring that security training plans are updated and maintained; ensuring appropriate monitoring of the agency's security training ensuring that annual security test and evaluation activities include management, operational, and technical controls of every information system in DLA's inventory; documenting and reporting complete plans of action and milestones; establishing specific guidance or instructions to information assurance managers and information assurance officers on what--or how--to document and report plans of action and milestones for system deficiencies; discontinuing the practice of issuing "time-limited" authorization to operate accreditation decisions when certification tasks have not been completed; ensuring that the DLA central review team verifies that certification tasks have been completed; and maintaining the accuracy and completeness of the data contained in the agency's primary reporting tool for recording, tracking, and reporting performance metrics on information security practices and controls. In providing written comments on a draft of this report (reprinted in app. II), the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation) concurred with most of our recommendations and described ongoing and planned efforts to address them. Specifically, he stated that DLA has taken several actions to fully implement an effective agencywide information security program, including publishing a DOD manual that will soon be released to provide detailed guidance on training for employees who have significant information security responsibility. He also stated that DLA is issuing an interim mandatory guide that will soon be released to assist users in documenting and preparing plans of action and milestones, and reinforcing policy requirements for making accreditation decisions. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense disagreed with our draft recommendation to ensure the testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of security controls for all systems annually. He stated that this recommendation would require all information assurance controls for all systems be tested and evaluated every year, which essentially amounts to annual recertification. The department further stated that the level of test and evaluation is neither practical nor cost-effective and that the combination of DLA's assessments, tests, and reviews allow them to ensure compliance of their controls in accordance with DOD Instruction 8500.2. The intent of our draft recommendation was not to require that all information assurance controls for all systems be tested and evaluated annually. Rather, the intent of our draft recommendation, consistent with FISMA requirements, was to ensure that DLA's annual security test and evaluation activities include management, operational, and technical controls of every information system in its inventory. As stated in our report, while DLA generally assessed technical controls annually of every system in its inventory, it did not annually test and evaluate management and operational controls of those systems. We agree that testing and evaluating all controls for every system annually may not be cost-effective. However, unless DLA's annual testing and evaluation activities include management and operational controls, as well as the technical controls of its systems, it may not be able to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and information systems. Accordingly, we have clarified our recommendation to state that the Secretary of Defense direct the DLA Director to ensure that annual security test and evaluation activities include management, operational, and technical controls of every information system in DLA's inventory. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense also disagreed with our draft recommendation to document procedures for performing certification responsibilities that include specific responsibilities related to using the checklist. He stated that the Secretary of Defense provided sufficient direction to agency directors on the certification and accreditation process through DOD Instruction 5200.40, and that additional guidelines on the certification and accreditation process are provided in DOD 8510.1-M. He further stated that DOD 8510.1-M contains a "minimum activities checklist" that all DOD Components are expected to follow when conducting certifications and that DLA's information assurance One Book policy includes roles and responsibilities for performing security certification and accreditation. Our draft recommendation refers to the DLA quality review checklist used by the agency's central review team to verify completion of certification tasks, not to the DOD "minimum activities checklist" described in DOD 8510.1-M. Unless certification tasks performed by information assurance personnel at the various DLA locations have been verified, the authorizing official may not have objective or sufficient information that is necessary to make credible, risk-based decisions on whether to place an information system into operation. Accordingly, we have clarified our recommendation to state that the Secretary of Defense direct the DLA Director to ensure that the DLA central review team verifies that certification tasks have been completed. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense also disagreed with our draft recommendation to update and maintain the agency's primary reporting tool for recording, tracking, and reporting performance metrics on information security practices and controls. He stated that the primary reporting tool was developed and maintained by DLA and that responsibility for updating and sustaining the tool was transferred to an internal application development team for continued maintenance and support. He also stated that DLA initiated implementation of enterprise standard DOD solutions that will replace the functionality currently provided by the agency reporting tool and that sustainment of the tool would not be cost effective or efficient. The intent of our draft recommendation was to update and maintain the accuracy and completeness of data entered into DLA's primary reporting tool, not the application programs. While DLA has several initiatives underway at various stages of development and implementation that are intended to introduce new functionality or replace some of the existing functionality in the agency reporting tool, none of these initiatives have been fully implemented throughout the agency. If DLA continues to use a tool for managing and overseeing its information assurance program, the fundamental practice of having accurate and complete data--whether in the current tool or in a future tool--is important to ensure the data are reliable for reporting performance metrics on key information security practices and controls to DOD and OMB for FISMA evaluation reporting. Accordingly, we have clarified our recommendation to state that the Secretary of Defense direct the DLA Director to maintain the accuracy and completeness of the data contained in the agency's primary reporting tool for recording, tracking, and reporting performance metrics on information security practices and controls. We are sending copies of this report to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation); Assistant Secretary of Defense, Networks and Information Integration; DLA Director; officials within DLA's Information Operations and Information Assurance office; and the Acting DOD Inspector General. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-6244 or by e-mail at wilshuseng@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. To determine whether the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) had implemented an effective agencywide information security program, we reviewed the Department of Defense (DOD) and agencywide information security policies, directives, instructions, and handbooks. We also evaluated DLA's agencywide tool--the Comprehensive Information Assurance Knowledgebase--for aggregating the agency's performance data on information security activities that are required by the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), such as the number and percentage of risk assessments performed, employees with significant information security responsibilities that received training to perform their duties, and weaknesses for which the agency had plans of action and milestones. To gain insight into DLA's certification and accreditation process, we reviewed the agency's methods and practices for identifying vulnerabilities and risks and the process for certifying systems and making accreditation decisions. We assessed whether DLA's information security program was consistent with relevant DOD policies and procedures, as well as with the requirements of FISMA, applicable Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policies, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidance. We also assessed whether selected information security plans and documents related to risk assessments, testing and evaluation, and plans of action and milestones were current and complete. To accomplish this, we non-randomly selected 10 sensitive but unclassified systems. The 10 systems came from 10 different DLA locations and included 3 systems, 4 sites, and 3 types. We selected these systems to maximize variety in criticality and geographic locations. We also conducted telephone interviews with 17 information assurance managers and information assurance officers from the 10 locations in order to gain insight into their understanding of FISMA requirements, relevant OMB policies, NIST guidance, and agencywide and DOD policies and procedures. We performed our review at DLA Headquarters, located at Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; DLA Supply Center, located at Columbus, Ohio; and DLA's Business Processing Center, located at Denver, Colorado, from September 2004 to July 2005, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition to the individual named above, Jenniffer Wilson, Assistant Director, Barbara Collier, Joanne Fiorino, Sharon Kittrell, Frank Maguire, John Ortiz, and Chuck Roney made key contributions to this report.

Summary:
The Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) mission is, in part, to provide food, fuel, medical supplies, clothing, spare parts for weapon systems, and construction materials to sustain military operations and combat readiness. To protect the information and information systems that support its mission, it is critical that DLA implement an effective information security program. GAO was asked to review the efficiency and effectiveness of DLA's operations, including its information security program. In response, GAO determined whether the agency had implemented an effective information security program. Although DLA has made progress in implementing important elements of its information security program, including establishing a central security management group and appointing a senior information security officer to manage the program, it has not yet fully implemented other essential elements. For example, the agency did not consistently assess risks for its information systems; sufficiently train employees who have significant information security responsibilities or adequately complete training plans; annually test and evaluate the effectiveness of management and operational security controls; or sufficiently complete plans of action and milestones for mitigating known information security deficiencies. In addition, DLA has not implemented a fully effective certification and accreditation process for authorizing the operation of its information systems. Key reasons for these weaknesses are that responsibilities of information security employees were not consistently understood or communicated and DLA has not adequately maintained the accuracy and completeness of data contained in its primary reporting tool for overseeing the agency's performance in implementing key information security activities and controls. Until the agency addresses these weaknesses and fully implements an effective agency-wide information security program, it may not be able to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and information systems, and it may not have complete and accurate performance data for key information security practices and controls.