Allegations of North Korean drug production, trafficking, and crime-for-profit activity have become the focus of rising attention in Congress, the press, and diplomatic and public policy fora. As early as October 28, 1997, Senators Charles Grassley and Jessie Helms sent a letter to Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, questioning why North Korea was not included in the State Department's March 1, 1997, annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) as a country involved in illicit drug production and trafficking. The Senators noted that according to press reports, North Korea's opium production in 1995 was 40 metric tons (mt) (roughly comparable to Mexico's) and that they believed that this figure "clearly represents a figure of over 1,000 hectares," the threshold cropland figure for inclusion in the report and designation as a major drug producing country. The Department of State's response of December 12, 1997, cited an inability to obtain data to substantiate North Korean production levels. Subsequently, in October 1998, the conferees for the Fiscal Year 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act directed the President to include in the (March 1, 1999) INCSR "...information regarding the cultivation, production, and transhipment of opium by North Korea. The report shall be based upon all available information." A Senate Bill ( S. 5 ), Section 1209 of the Drug Free Century Act, introduced January 19, 1999, proposed a statement of congressional concern that the Department of State had "evaded its obligations with respect to North Korea" under the Foreign Assistance Act and encouraged the President to submit any required reports. It was not acted upon by the Senate. The Department of State has consistently been cautious not to pin an ironclad label of "state sponsorship" on North Korean drug trafficking activity. To do so would arguably require the imposition of foreign aid sanctions on the Pyongyang regime, a move seen by many as (1) over prioritizing drugs vis-a-vis more pressing issues (i.e., nuclear proliferation) and (2) unwisely restricting the portfolio of Administration options for dealing with what has been called a rogue state. Moreover, if the amount of North Korean illicit poppy cultivation cannot be verified, the 1,000 hectare threshold potentially triggering foreign aid cutoff under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 will not be met. Consistent with such policy concerns, the Department of State has maintained that although allegations of illicit drug activity "remain profoundly troubling.... [T]he United States has not been able to determine the extent to which the North Korean Government is involved in manufacturing and trafficking in illegal drugs." The provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 referred to above require that countries cultivating 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy be subject to annual (March 1 st ) drug reporting and certification procedures. Current law on International Drug Control Certification Procedures ( P.L. 107-228 , Section 706) requires the President to submit to Congress, not later than September 15 of the preceding fiscal year, a report identifying each country determined to be a major drug transit or drug producing country as defined in section 481(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In the report the President must designate each country that has "failed demonstrably" to meet its counternarcotics obligations. Designated countries are ineligible for foreign assistance unless the President determines that assistance is vital to the U.S. national interest or that the country had made "substantial efforts" to improve its counternarcotics performance. International disaster assistance (such as the food aid received by North Korea) is specifically exempted from all limitations on providing assistance under the act. Previous certification requirements had established a 30-calendar day review process during which the Congress could override the President's determinations and stop U.S. foreign aid from going to specific countries, but this process is no longer extant. U.S. foreign aid to North Korea is severely restricted because of North Korea's designation by the U.S. Secretary of State as a country that has "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." Assistance is currently limited to humanitarian assistance (food). In December 2002, the Bush Administration suspended petroleum assistance, i.e., heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea for electrical generating capabilities as an alternative to nuclear generation of electrical power because North Korea has not lived up to its agreement to suspend its nuclear weapons program. As negotiated in the October 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, the United States committed to provide 500,000 tons of oil annually until completion of two lightwater nuclear reactors that are less susceptible to proliferation than facilities that North Korea has previously operated, but "frozen" under the agreement. In Fiscal Year 2004, North Korea received 110,000 metric tons of wheat from the United States valued roughly at $52.8 million. For the year 2003, North Korea's legal exports were estimated by the Korean Trade Promotion Investment Agency (KOTRA) to amount to $1.1 billion in goods--most of which were to its neighbors China, Japan and South Korea. During the same period, imports (mostly from the same three nations) totaled roughly $2 billion, leaving an estimated shortfall of $999 million. North Korea's need for hard currency is exacerbated by ongoing dismal economic conditions--an estimated per capita gross domestic product in the lower range of $750 to $1000--and an ongoing nuclear program the costs of which may have exceeded $200 million per year in 1998 and which North Korea accelerated from 1999 on. President George W. Bush, in his Fiscal Year 2007 determination of major illicit drug trafficking and transit countries, raised the issue of heroin and methamphetamine trafficking linked to North Korea, and expressed his demand that North Korean stop its involvement in all criminal activity. In the words of his memorandum for the Secretary of State: Although there have not been any drug seizures or apprehensions of drug traffickers with a connection to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 2004, we remain concerned about DPRK state-directed criminal activity. The United States Government has made clear to the DPRK that an end to all involvement in criminal activity is a necessary prerequisite to entry into the international Community. President Bush's concern over North Korean drug trafficking activity and other criminal activity is mirrored in earlier testimony before the U.S. Congress on May 20, 2003, by William Bach, of the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: For some 30 years, officials of the DPRK and other North Koreans have been apprehended for trafficking in narcotics and other criminal activity, including passing counterfeit U.S. notes. Since 1976, there have been at least 50 arrests and drug seizures involving North Koreans in more than 20 countries around the world. More recently, there have been very clear indications especially from the series of methamphetamine seizures in Japan that North Koreans traffic in and probably manufacture methamphetamine drugs. The Department of State's March 2006 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) notes longstanding DPRK links to drug trafficking as well: For decades, North Koreans have been apprehended trafficking in narcotics and engaging in other criminal behavior and illicit activity, including passing counterfeit U.S. currency and trading in copyrighted products. This year there were no public reports of specific incidents of narcotics trafficking with clear, demonstrable DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) links. However, given developments during 2005 that linked the DPRK to other forms of state-directed criminality, the Department reaffirms its view that it is likely, but not certain, that the North Korean government sponsors criminal activities, including narcotics production and trafficking, in order to earn foreign currency for the state and its leaders. Similarly, the Department of State's March 1, 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) states: For years during the 1970s and 1980s and into the 1990s, citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea (DPRK), many of them diplomatic employees of the government, were apprehended abroad while trafficking in narcotics and breaking other laws. More recently, police investigation of suspects apprehended while making large illicit shipments of heroin and methamphetamine to Taiwan and Japan have revealed a North Korean connection to the drugs. Police interrogation of suspects apprehended while trafficking in illicit drugs developed credible reports of North Korean boats engaged in transporting heroin and uniformed North Korean personnel transferring drugs from North Korean vessels to traffickers' boats. These reports raise the question whether the North Korean government cultivates opium illicitly, refines opium into heroin, and manufactures methamphetamine drugs in North Korea as a state-organized and directed activity, with the objective of trafficking in these drugs to earn foreign exchange. The March 2003 INCSR includes little information on North Korea in its money laundering section, but notes reports that Pyongyong has used Macau to launder counterfeit $100 bills and used Macau's banks as a repository for the proceeds of North Korea's growing trade in illegal drugs. More detail on DPRK criminal activity is included in the 1998 INCSR's money laundering section which reads in part as follows: "The most profitable lines of state-supported illegal businesses remain drug trafficking, gold smuggling, illegal sale and distribution of endangered species, trafficking of counterfeit U.S. currency, and rare earth metals.......North Korean officials appear to be increasing their involvement in financial crimes as a means to generate operational funds and support their country's anemic economy." Concerns over North Korea's role in international drug trafficking were echoed in the December 2000 United States Government International Crime Threat Assessment which states: A large share of the methamphetamine consumed in Japan comes from North Korea, according to media reports; more than 40 percent of the methamphetamine seized in Japan in 1999 came from North Korea. There have been regular reports from many official and unofficial sources that impoverished North Korea has engaged in drug trafficking--mostly to Japan, Russia, and China--as a criminal state enterprise to raise badly needed revenue. Over the years, customs and police officials of many countries have apprehended North Korean persons employed as diplomats or in quasi-official capacities at North Korean state trading companies trying to smuggle drugs produced elsewhere. Concerns over North Korean drug production and trafficking were also expressed in the 1997 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The report, in circumspect language common to such U.N. documents, notes that "The Board has received disquieting reports on the drug control situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Therefore, the Board expresses its concern that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has not yet accepted its proposal, originally made in 1995, to send a mission to that country to study and clarify drug control issues." In June 2002, the Board sent a mission to the DPRK to review the Government's compliance with the international drug control treaties, and reported in its 2002 annual report that the DPRK authorities "have expressed their willingness to cooperate at the regional and international levels in order to address drug control issues in a concerted manner." In addition, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data compiled from foreign media services in 1999, Department of Defense analysis dated 2000, and a plethora of domestic and foreign press reports portray an ongoing pattern of drug trafficking, trafficking of counterfeit U.S. currency, and other smuggling-for-profit activities by North Korean diplomats over the past 27 years. Since 1976, North Korea has been linked to over 50 verifiable incidents involving drug seizures in at least 20 countries. A significant number of these cases has involved arrest or detention of North Korean diplomats or officials. All but four of these incidents have transpired since the early 1990s. Press reports citing North Korean defectors and South Korean intelligence sources as well as U.S. government investigative agency source material, paint a grim picture of an anemic economy in North Korea, held back by disproportionate military spending, dysfunctional economic policies and the consequences of a broad economic and trade embargo led by the United States since the Korean War. Pressed for cash, and perceiving its vital national security at stake, the regime reportedly created an office to bring in foreign currency: "Bureau No. 39," under the ruling North Korean Communist Party which is headed by North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il. This office is reported to be in charge of drug trafficking and according to some reports all crime-for-profit activity including (1) opium production and trafficking; (2) methamphetamine production and trafficking; (3) counterfeiting; and (4) smuggling. Drugs are reportedly exported through China and Russia to Asia and Europe via government trading companies, diplomatic pouches, and concealed in legitimate commercial cargo. Foreign exchange earned by Bureau 39 is reportedly used to (1) buy loyalty from Party elites and military leaders to Leader Kim Jong Il; (2) fund costs of overseas diplomatic missions; (3) finance national security activity--especially technology and electronic purchases for the intelligence and military services; and (4) procure overseas components for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction programs. Bureau 39 activities, according to interviews conducted by the Wall Street Journal with Asian intelligence officials, have generated a cash hoard, of which an amount in the range of $5 billion is believed to be currently stashed away by the Pyongyang regime. Farmers in certain areas reportedly are ordered to grow opium poppies, with cultivation estimates of 4,000 hectares for the early 1990s and 7,000 hectares for 1995. Subsequent production, however, is believed to be below 1995 figures, initially because of heavy rains, but also as part of a broad decline of agricultural output as a consequence of poor policies, and insufficient fertilizer and insecticides. Looking at all available estimates, a cultivation estimate of 3,000-4,000 hectares for 1998 would appear reasonable, but nevertheless based on indirect and fragmented information. U.S. government investigative agency sources in 1998 estimated North Korean raw opium production capacity at 50 tons annually, with 40 tons reportedly produced in 1995. The March 2000, INCSR states that estimates of the area under opium cultivation range from 4,200 hectares to 7,000 hectares which would yield from about 30 metric tons to 44 metric tons of opium annually. North Korean government pharmaceutical labs reportedly have the capacity to process 100 tons of raw opium per year. U.S. government production estimates, to the extent that they may be available, would likely be classified, but clearly would not be expected to be below 1998 levels as Pyongyang's need for foreign exchange appears to have grown more pressing to accelerate foreign purchases of components for North Korea's secret uranium enrichment program. Methamphetamine production in North Korea is reported to have started in 1996 after heavy rains decreased income from poppy production. This coincides with reports that markets for methamphetamine at that time began dramatically expanding in Asia, especially in Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines. For example, in 2002, North Korea was the source of approximately 1/3 of the methamphetamine seized by Japanese authorities. North Korea's maximum methamphetamine production capacity is estimated by some South Korean officials to be 10-15 tons per year of the highest quality product for export. According to the INCB, North Korean legitimate pharmaceutical needs for ephedrine (a traditional precursor for methamphetamine) are 2.5 tons per year, one ton higher than U.S. investigative agency source estimates. INCB officials confirm receipt of reports of North Korean involvement in an alleged diversion of 20 tons of ephedrine. Moreover, U.S. and foreign investigative agency personnel have in the past noted concerns that North Korea may be bypassing the highly regulated market for ephedrine in favor of an alternate technology for a benzine based product, raising speculation that U.S. and allied petroleum assistance to North Korea may be being used to sustain illicit drug production. Conservative estimates suggest North Korean criminal activity, carefully targeted to meet specific needs, generated about $85 million in 1997: $71 million from drugs and $15 million from counterfeiting. Some recent estimates of Pyongyang's clandestine drug income, however, are substantially higher with the Wall Street Journal citing U.S. military estimates that North Korea's annual drug exports had risen in the year 2003 to at least $500 million from about $100 million a few years ago. Figures widely encountered in the U.S. policy community throughout 2004 are roughly $200 million in profit from the combined illicit methamphetamine and heroin trade and $500 million in profit from additional aggregate criminal activity. Income from counterfeiting of U.S. bills is unclear, with U.S. military sources reportedly estimating such income at $15-20 million for the year 2001. If credence is to be given to U.N., Department of State reporting, and DEA shared information, as well as press reports citing foreign law enforcement activity, North Korean defectors, and South Korean intelligence sources, a pattern of activity emerges which indicates that (1) in the 1970s, North Korean officials bought and sold foreign source illicit drugs; (2) in the mid-1970s, North Korea began cultivating opium poppy as a matter of state policy; (3) in the mid-1980s, North Korea began refining opium poppy for export and exporting refined opium products; (4) and in the mid-1990s, after heavy rains reduced opium production in 1995 and 1996, North Korea began manufacturing and exporting methamphetamine to expanding markets in Southeast Asia--increasingly enlisting the help of foreign criminal groups in its smuggling operations. If this pattern reflects reality, an important question is the degree to which the government of North Korea may respond to increased financial pressures and expanding methamphetamine markets in Southeast Asia by dramatically increasing already record levels of reported drug trafficking activity. Some analysts, however, question the reliability of information reported in the press attributed to North Korean defectors and South Korean government sources. They note that in a closed state such as North Korea "hard" data is difficult to obtain, thus what is obtained is fragmentary and indirect at best. North Korea continues to dismiss media reports and speculation on government involvement in drug trafficking activities as anti-North Korean slander based on politically motivated adversary propaganda sources. North Korean officials are known to stress privately that corruption, drug use, trafficking, and criminal activity in general are maladies to which individuals in all societies may fall prey, and that any involvement by North Korean individuals in such activity is in no way state-connected or state sanctioned. Further, officials have stressed that in instances where such activity has come to the attention of authorities, individuals involved have been duly punished. Finally, North Korean officials maintain that issues such as drug trafficking and production are matters that should be handled, and are best handled, by their government as an internal matter. U.N. officials also point to the politically charged milieu of allegations of drug trafficking by North Korea and point out that drug smuggling by individuals in the diplomatic community is not limited to North Korea. At least fifty documented drug trafficking incidents coupled with allegations of large scale North Korean state sponsorship of opium poppy cultivation, and heroin and methamphetamine production and trafficking, raise significant issues for the United States and America's allies in combating international drug trafficking. The challenge to policy makers, is how to pursue sound counter-drug policy and comply with U.S. law which may require cutting off aid to North Korea while effectively pursuing other high priority U.S. foreign policy objectives including (1) limiting possession and production of weapons of mass destruction; (2) limiting ballistic missile production and export; (3) curbing terrorism, counterfeiting and international crime; and (4) addressing humanitarian needs. As of March, 2005, U.S. aid to North Korea is limited to providing food and other humanitarian assistance. Reports that North Korea may be limiting some of its food crop production in favor of drug crop production are particularly disturbing, though the acreage in question is comparatively small. Another issue of rising concern is the use of profits from any North Korean drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and other crime-for-profit enterprises to underwrite the costs of maintaining or expanding North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Central to the policy debate over the quantity of DPRK illicit poppy production is the need for hard data such as satellite imagery to confirm the extent of reported opium poppy cultivation in North Korea. If such data have been collected through remote sensing, they have not been publically disclosed. Enhanced policy focus and law enforcement intelligence cooperation on targeting, reporting, and tracking North Korean opium/heroin and methamphetamine trafficking and production in the late 1990s have made it significantly more difficult for North Korean entities to engage in illicit smuggling activities. The apparent result has been a need for North Korean trafficking fronts to enter into joint venture arrangements with criminal organizations in neighboring nations, notably Russian, Chinese, and South Korean and Japanese criminal enterprises. As profits are generally shared (often as much as 50/50) in such ventures, the level of North Korean drug smuggling activity might need to more-or-less double to keep income levels for DPRK illicit drug enterprises constant with levels achieved in 1998. The case of the "Pong Su," arguably, is demonstrative of such joint venture activity--reportedly Southeast Asian non-DPRK origin heroin carried by a North Korean crew on a North Korean vessel. The April 20, 2003 "Pong Su" case, however, presents an interesting twist of events. Traditionally, it was assumed that any such joint ventures were established to facilitate the smuggling and distribution of DPRK source drugs. In contrast, reported information in the "Pong Su" case can be interpreted as a sign that such joint venture relationships--to the degree they may exist--have become a "two-way street" with North Korean enterprises smuggling drugs for partner groups as well. A growing area of international concern is escalating ties between those in the DPRK who engage in criminal activity and foreign transnational criminal groups. Notwithstanding, a growing number of analysts attach significance to the fact that there have been few documented instances of DPRK drug trafficking activity being detected recently. They note that the scale of North Korean linked drug trafficking activities that has been detected since 2003 is small relative to seizures linked to the DPRK in previous years. They cite as well the fact that although, in 2004, two incidents were publically reported involving DPRK officials stationed abroad at embassies, these two incidents had been the first to come to light in several years. In addition, the March 2006 INCSR notes that there were no seizures of methamphetamines in Japan in 2005 linked to the DPRK. Traditionally as much as 30% to 40% of methamphetamine seizures in Japan have been linked to the DPRK. However the report speculates that increasingly seizures of DPRK source methamphetamine may be mistakenly identified as "Chinese source" given growing links of Chinese criminal elements to North Korea's drug production/trafficking activities. Supporting the theory of a decline in DPRK drug production/trafficking activity, the March 2005 INCSR notes that the origin of heroin and methamphetamine seized in Taiwan during 2004 was generally ascribed to domestic manufacture; whereas in past years, DPRK origin illicit drugs have been among those seized. Moreover, Japanese press reports cite government officials in that nation as stating that as of early 2006, there had been no seizures of DPRK source stimulants for the third consecutive year. However, a December 2006 Japanese TV documentary stated that 14 kilograms of narcotics believed to be of DPRK origin were seized on December 1, 2006 in Yokohama from a ship that arrived from Dalian, China. In the same report, what appears to be a Chinese mafia figure states in fluent Japanese that Japanese yakuza members are now buying DPRK source methamphetamine directly in China and that since 2002, drug trafficking between China and the DPRK has increased by several to ten times, both in number [of transactions?] and volume. Notwithstanding lack of hard evidence of any recent seizures involving illicit drugs of confirmed DPRK origin or drugs being trafficked by DPRK nationals with confirmed or likely links to DPRK officials, press reports in early 2007 cite earlier arrests in China of North Korean nationals involved with Chinese criminals in the trafficking of methamphetamine. For example, in November 2006, Chinese police in Shenyang reportedly arrested a North Korean and others connected to an international drug ring which had trafficked large quantities of methamphetamine into China. Earlier, in July 2006, the media reported arrests by Chinese police in two other cities, Dalian and Dandong, where Chinese police arrested other North Koreans and Japanese apparently trying to bring methamphetamine purchased near the North Korean/Chinese border to Japan. These were the first cases of involvement of DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) nationals in drug trafficking to become public in two years. Arguably however, fewer seizures may simply be the result of changes in patterns of shipments designed to conceal any direct DPRK role in the process--countermeasures spurred by increased international scrutiny of North Korean trading activities. Consistent with this line of reasoning would be the conclusion that since levels of enforcement success against DPRK linked trafficking in illicit drugs often vary dramatically, it is not possible at this time to reach a definitive consensus about any changes in trends underlying such enterprise. An alternative explanation would be that North Korea has cut back on, if not dramatically curbed, its drug trafficking activity and is compensating from the loss of income in this arena by beefing up its production and trafficking of counterfeit brand cigarettes. In contrast, the aggregate portfolio of North Korean criminal activity over the past decade paints a different picture. Information available points to an expansion in both the scale and scope of North Korean cash generating criminal activity. In addition to production and trafficking in heroin and methamphetamines, major sources of revenue from criminal activity for the DPRK now include (1) counterfeit cigarettes; (2) counterfeit pharmaceuticals (for example "USA" manufactured Viagra; (3) counterfeit currency (e.g. U.S. $100 bill "supernotes"); and (4) indiscriminate sales of small arms, i.e. "gun running." The result is a situation in which criminal activity is seen as playing an increasingly pivotal role in supporting North Korea's fragile economy. Best U.S. available source estimates suggest that the DPRK earns at least $500 million per year in profit from combined criminal activity, and gross revenues are suggested by some to total $1 billion or more. Regardless, however, of the current dollar amount such ventures generate, it appears that the scale and scope of North Korean criminal activities are on the rise. Increasingly, analysts view this as a global and not just as a regional concern. Another question, yet unresolved, is the degree to which Pyongyang will be able to maintain control over drug smuggling--and other foreign currency generating--activities if they become more decentralized with more foreign criminal organizations and gangs participating. Deteriorating economic conditions and rising corruption among mid-level DPRK party functionaries threatened with declining lifestyles gives rise to speculation in the intelligence community that rogue operations constitute an increasing proportion of any current DPRK drug smuggling activity. A final and daunting challenge facing policymakers both in the DPRK and beyond, is the degree to which the North Korea regime would be able to curtail any remaining illicit drug activity--and other foreign currency generating criminal enterprises--should it desire to do so. Policy analysts in the past have suggested that North Korean drug trafficking activity has been carefully controlled and limited to fill specific foreign exchange shortfalls. However, increasingly concern exists that North Korean crime-for-profit activity may become a "runaway train," gaining momentum, but out of control. Experience suggests that those engaged in the drug trade and other continuing criminal enterprises often find themselves "addicted" to the income generated and are unlikely to cease such activity, absent draconian disincentives. Moreover, over time, such illicit activity is often seen as becoming "institutionalized"--taking on a life on its own, a phenomenon which does not bode well for those who would seek to curb drug trafficking and other revenue generating international criminal activity based in North Korea.

Summary:
At least 50 documented incidents in more than 20 countries around the world, many involving arrest or detention of North Korean diplomats, link North Korea to drug trafficking. Such events, in the context of credible, but unproven, allegations of large scale state sponsorship of drug production and trafficking, raise important issues for the United States and its allies in combating international drug trafficking. The challenge to policy makers is how to pursue an effective counter drug policy and comply with U.S. law which may require cutting off aid to North Korea while pursuing other high-priority U.S. foreign policy objectives including (1) limiting possession and production of weapons of mass destruction; (2) limiting ballistic missile production and export; (3) curbing terrorism, counterfeiting, and international crime; and (4) addressing humanitarian needs. Reports that the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK) may be limiting some of its food crop production in favor of drug crop production are particularly disturbing given the country's chronic food shortages, though the acreage in question is comparatively small. Another issue of rising concern is the degree to which profits from any North Korean drug trafficking, counterfeiting, and other crime-for-profit enterprises may be used to underwrite the costs of maintaining or expanding North Korean nuclear and missile programs. As the DPRK's drug trade becomes increasingly entrenched, and arguably decentralized, analysts question whether the Pyongyang regime (or any subsequent government) would have the ability to effectively restrain such activity, should it so desire. Since 2003, overall seizures of North Korean-linked methamphetamine and heroin are generally down, arguably in response to enhanced international attention paid to such activity in the wake of the April 2003 seizure of heroin carried on the North Korean Vessel the "Pong Su." Some suggest that this decline in seizures being identified as DPRK origin is because North Korean source methamphetamine is now regularly being mistakenly identified as "Chinese source" given growing links of Chinese criminal elements to North Korea's drug production/trafficking activities. In line with such a conclusion are press reports in late 2006 of the arrests in differing locations in China of North Korean nationals involved with Chinese criminals in the trafficking of methamphetamine. However, it is not clear from the reports whether the drugs were of DPRK origin or whether the North Koreans arrested had links with DPRK officials. Reduction of illicit drug seizures linked to the DPRK has also given rise to speculation that North Korea has cut back on, if not dramatically curbed, its drug trafficking activity, and is compensating from the loss of income in this arena by beefing up its production and trafficking of counterfeit brand cigarettes. It remains clear, however, that regardless of the mix of DPRK criminal activities at any particular given point in time, income from DPRK criminal activity continues to play a pivotal role in overall DPRK finances.