DOD defines "explosive ordnance" as all munitions, weapon delivery systems, and ordnance items that contain explosives, propellants, nuclear materials, and chemical agents. Included in this definition are bombs, missiles, rockets, artillery rounds, ammunition, mines, and any other similar item that can cause injury to personnel or damage to material. UXO consists of these same items after they (1) are armed or otherwise prepared for action; (2) are launched, placed, fired, or released in a way that they cause hazards; and (3) remain unexploded either through malfunction or design. Antipersonnel mines pose a particularly difficult clearance problem because they are hard to detect, inexpensive, and prone to proliferation. The Department of State considers landmines to be a distinct class of weapon that is subject to specific doctrinal and international legal controls. Landmines--particularly antipersonnel mines--may pose a greater hazard to innocent civilians than items such as unexploded bombs because they are intended to detonate when a person steps on or near them. Landmines are considered to be a valuable military asset since, by slowing and possibly demoralizing opponents, they multiply the combat impact of defending forces. Their attractiveness to smaller military and paramilitary organizations, such as in the Third World, is further enhanced because mines do not require complex logistics support and are readily available and inexpensive--some can be bought for as little as $3 each. Over 60 countries, developed and undeveloped, report a need to clear areas from landmine and other UXO contamination. As of December 1994, the Department of State estimated that 80 million to 110 million landmines remain uncleared worldwide, the bulk of which are in undeveloped countries. Most of these countries' economies depend heavily on agriculture and thus are particularly vulnerable because the presence of landmines can deny farmers large sections of land. Within the United States, DOD estimates that over 900 military sites are contaminated with UXO. DOD estimates that it has already cost $10.3 billion through fiscal year 1994 to clean up sites contaminated with hazardous materials, including UXO, and that it will cost an additional $31 billion for future actions. In European countries, millions of bombs, landmines, and other munitions from World Wars I and II still remain uncleared. A primary focus of DOD's research and development activities in detection and clearance has been on the countermine mission in support of combat operations. In combat, mines are seen as an obstacle in the way of an attack or a maneuver; overcoming these obstacles involves rapidly detecting, breaching, and marking paths while under assumed enemy fire. Some casualties are expected and accepted. Most of these countermine operations are destructive because heavy or destructive equipment such as plows, rollers, flails, and explosives--are used to breach enemy minefields. Once breached, the cleared paths are marked so that following forces can traverse the minefield safely. These operations do not require the identification of the exact locations of the mines. Also, the operations do not require that an entire area be cleared unless the area is to be occupied for future operations. Detecting and clearing landmines and other UXO in noncombat situations in some ways is less demanding and in other ways more demanding than countermine operations. In noncombat situations, neither time nor enemy fire is a constraining factor, so detection and clearance operations take place under much less hostile circumstances. On the other hand, because the noncombat objective is to render an area safe and worthwhile to repopulate, the corresponding objective is to detect and clear all landmines and other UXO. Thus, not only must contaminated areas be positively identified to very high standards of reliability, but efforts must be made to find all munitions and other hazards. Once found, the explosives must be removed or neutralized in an environmentally sound way. In the process, care must be taken not to destroy the land or infrastructure. These differing demands produce corresponding differences in research and development priorities. For example, money spent to develop an improved plow for an M-1 tank may be a good investment for the countermine mission, but it is not necessarily practical for noncombat operations. Similarly, a detection technology that takes a lot of time may work well in a noncombat situation, but be too slow for countermine operations. On the other hand, countermine and noncombat missions do share some requirements and benefit from the attendant technologies. If a military force plans to occupy a mined area, it must use detection and clearance technologies and methods aimed at achieving as near as possible a 100-percent clearance. Also, it is beneficial to combat forces to detect the presence of minefields so that they can be avoided, if possible. Such a detection capability would also benefit noncombat clearance operations, even if the exact locations of individual munitions could not be pinpointed, because unsafe areas could be posted or cordoned off and avoided by civilians. Several factors have converged into a set of emerging U.S. requirements that go beyond the countermine mission and address the need for detecting and clearing all hazards, including landmines and other UXO. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States has become more involved with operations other than war, including special operations, low-intensity conflicts, and peacekeeping. These operations require U.S. and other forces to routinely clear operational areas and infrastructure--such as roads and buildings--of mines and other explosives. In addition to open area clearance, DOD has developed urban warfare requirements that include the detection and clearance of mines and booby traps. It should be noted that while U.S. military personnel will perform such operations when U.S. interests are at stake, it is against U.S. policy for them to physically remove landmines from other countries for humanitarian purposes. In addition, the closing of numerous bases per the recommendations of the base realignment and closure process and the environmental cleanup of other defense sites have generated a sizeable clearance requirement. Many of these sites, such as test ranges, impact ranges, and training sites, contain large areas of UXO contamination. Clearing these areas--even partially--so that they can be used for other purposes requires detection and clearance methods to meet a 100-percent clearance objective. The research and development efforts sponsored by DOD to support operations such as peacekeeping and base cleanup are likely to have more direct application to the clearance problems faced by Third World countries than those efforts supporting countermine operations. Other U.S. agencies besides DOD are responsible for detecting and clearing explosives and other hazards. For example, the Departments of Treasury, Justice, and Transportation conduct or sponsor research and development of technologies to help curb terrorism, such as detecting explosives and weapons in airports, aircraft, and public buildings. The Department of Transportation is also responsible for detecting subsurface flaws in roads and bridges. The Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency are responsible for detecting hazardous materials, such as buried radioactive and chemical waste. These research and development efforts have some commonality with those needed to detect and clear landmines and other UXO. Specifically, they involve (1) detecting the presence and exact location of explosive and hazardous materials in the open, underground, or hidden in a building or vehicle; (2) removing or neutralizing the materials; and (3) using methods that allow maximum standoff distances. European countries have had broad clearance requirements for a long time as they are still clearing areas from World Wars I and II. For example, in Verdun, France, millions of UXO items from World War I still have not been found or cleared. Germany has been clearing UXO from Berlin since World War II ended. The United Kingdom has clearance requirements both at home following World War II bombardments and abroad. For example, after the Falkland Islands war, the United Kingdom sponsored efforts to detect and clear remaining mines there. Currently, hand-held probes, metal detectors, trained dogs, and mechanical breaching equipment are considered the most effective tools to detect and/or clear landmines and other UXO. These methods are slow, costly, and labor-intensive. They mainly find landmines at or near the surface, although some metal detectors can find larger, more deeply buried UXO items because of their greater metal content. Although current methods offer the greatest assurance that an area is safe to use, they are also quite dangerous because they put the operator in close proximity to the explosive. For example, in the post-Gulf War cleanup of Kuwait, 84 operators, including at least 2 private U.S. contractors, were killed using these methods. This number of fatalities is more significant when one considers that the mines in Kuwait were easier to find than in some Third World countries because they were in sand and had been placed in patterns according to known military doctrine. Metal detectors have been in use since World War II and are still the most effective sensors for use against landmines and other UXO. There are two types of metal detectors. One detects anomalies in the earth's magnetic field caused by ferrous (iron-based) materials. The other creates an electromagnetic field that can detect both ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Improvements made to metal detectors have reportedly been in processing sensor information, weight reduction, and improved sensitivity to disturbances in the magnetic field caused by metallic objects. Detection of trace metal elements and debris--found in most soils--still leads to a high level of false alarms since operators are often unable to discriminate between a metal fragment and a mine. False alarms translate into increased workload because each detection must be treated as if it were an explosive. Efforts to duplicate the knowledge, skills, and abilities of a proficient operator through computers and artificial intelligence have not yet proven successful. Trained dogs have proven effective at detecting hidden explosives. South Africa has developed a system that uses blast-hardened vehicles to collect air samples from geographical sectors in filter canisters. The dogs can then detect which canister--and thus which sector--contains any evidence of explosives. These sectors can then be cleared using traditional methods. Since dogs have been extremely efficient in pinpointing the location of landmines, research and development efforts have been underway to duplicate the dogs' abilities through development of artificial biosensors, spectrum analysis, and computer intelligence. However, no sensor technology has been developed that can replicate the dogs' ability to sense explosives. Mechanical equipment used in combat operations to clear mines includes armored vehicles equipped with devices such as plows, flails, and rollers. This equipment clears a path by pushing mines aside or detonating them. It is not effective in rough or rocky terrain and against more advanced, off-route or wide-area mines. However, these advanced mines do not yet make up a large portion of the landmines already emplaced in Third World countries. For these reasons, and because of the potential environmental impact, such as pollution and soil erosion, heavy mechanical equipment is of limited use for wide-area clearance. Another technique used in combat is the explosive line charge. The line charge is a cord or rope of explosives that is fired across a suspected minefield. The explosives are set off to detonate or disable nearby mines and thus clear a path. Line charges have been used since World War II and are still being improved today. All of these methods are slow and costly. For example, the Navy estimates that it would take $2 billion and 20 years to clear the 28,800-acre Hawaiian island of Kaho'olawe to achieve a 4-foot depth needed for farming. The services have used the island as a bombing range since 1941. Similarly, we have previously reported that a study of the Jefferson Proving Ground found that current cleanup technologies were not practical for removing the UXO from the installation's 51,000 heavily forested acres. Army officials estimated that cleanup estimates for the installation could range from $5 billion to $8 billion. These estimates underscore the current challenge the United States faces in cleaning up millions of acres of its defense sites. The worldwide challenge is even more daunting. Generally, more advanced technologies being pursued aim to make the detection of landmines and other UXO quicker, safer, and more cost-effective. They employ sensors that can be operated from remote distances, such as from manned or unmanned ground and air vehicles. However, no revolutionary area clearance technology with acceptable reliability has been forthcoming. Most of the advanced technologies have drawbacks such as weaknesses under certain environmental conditions or impractical power requirements. At this point, the more promising efforts involve using a combination of technologies either concurrently or sequentially. While standoff sensors do not perform as well as current hand-held methods, they can perform initial searches for landmines and other UXO to help identify contaminated areas that are ultimately cleared using traditional methods. Advanced sensor technologies with application to detection and clearance can be grouped as follows: infrared sensors, ground-penetrating radars, microwave, photon backscatter, nuclear or thermal neutron analysis, and lasers. Their characteristics are summarized in table 1. Some promising recent research and development efforts involve coupling sensor technologies. For example, the Army has the Airborne Standoff Minefield Detection System under development that combines infrared and laser sensors. The Marine Corps has a project underway that couples ground-penetrating radar and infrared sensors. The Department of Energy has initiated a subsurface imaging program utilizing ground-penetrating radar and seismic measurements. Several projects are also underway that link sensors with the satellite-based Differential Global Positioning System. Linkage to this system can help map geographical locations of landmines and other UXO. Advances in mine technologies have been made that can reduce the amount of contamination posed by landmines and other UXO in the future. Specifically, DOD has developed self-destruct mechanisms that detonate munitions a specified time after they have been deployed. According to DOD officials, such mechanisms have been incorporated into U.S. landmines since 1979. While not foolproof--self-destruct mechanisms have demonstrated 90 percent reliability in testing--they do reduce the risk of injury to innocent civilians. DOD officials noted that not all U.S. landmines contain self-destruct mechanisms because some minefields are intended to stay active indefinitely. Self-destruct mechanisms are currently being developed for submunitions, but are not yet fielded. DOD is also developing mechanisms that can detonate munitions on demand from remote locations. Although numerous efforts to advance technology have been made, demonstrations have not produced an ideal solution. The Army Environmental Center, in cooperation with Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, has been conducting an Advanced Technology Demonstration for the detection, identification, and clearance of UXO, including landmines. The demonstration was mandated by the Congress in fiscal years 1993 and 1994. The purpose of this effort was to demonstrate the best available off-the-shelf detection and clearance technologies. Thirty-three projects were demonstrated, with most coming from private industry and a few from government laboratories. The demonstration projects represented airborne, ground vehicle, and man-portable platforms with metal detectors, ground-penetrating radar, and infrared sensors. The test areas included a variety of ordnance buried at realistic depths; however, the terrain was relatively benign--open, clear, and level. Target processing software and clearance technologies were also demonstrated. Some used multiple sensors, such as ground-penetrating radar with infrared or metal detectors. The goals of the demonstrations were to (1) survey large areas; (2) determine density of UXO, as well as type, depth, and exact location; (3) discriminate between UXO and other objects; and (4) demonstrate UXO detection, identification, and clearance systems as integrated technology. UXO, scrap metal, and other objects were planted in two courses--one for ground systems and one for airborne systems. Demonstration results showed that none of the technologies, either individually or coupled, came close to approaching 100-percent clearance. UXO detection ranged from 0 to 59 percent, with the ground-based systems performing the best, especially when vehicle-mounted and man-portable systems were used together. However, the ability to separate UXO from false alarms was dismal for all technologies demonstrated. Again, the ground-based systems were the most reliable, but the system with the highest detection rates did not finish the course in the required time. All but one airborne system completed the course in the required time, but the airborne systems were the least effective of all systems. The clearance systems in the demonstration, which relied on robotics excavations, were considered effective but time-consuming. We identified over 20 U.S. organizations that directly or indirectly conduct or sponsor research and development with application to detection and clearance, review related programs and policies, conduct detection and clearance operations, or provide funds or related training. Some of these organizations are shown in table 2. The number of U.S. organizations involved is greater than indicated in the table because the different offices in the service commands are involved with one or more forms of UXO, national laboratories conduct research and development for DOD, and individual contractors work for different agencies or on commercial applications. Organizations outside the United States are also involved with detection and clearance technologies. For example, the United Nations is actively involved with clearing landmines from Third World countries and promoting policies to counter proliferation. Many individual countries have been working on countermine operations and UXO clearance and are developing clearance technologies and methods. These countries include the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Germany, Russia, and South Africa. No formal mechanism or strategic plan exists to ensure that a fully coordinated U.S. research and development effort is leveraged at the problem. This situation exists because the organizations involved with technologies related to detection and clearance are seeking solutions to more narrowly defined problems that fall under their purview. For example, the combat branches of the military services have traditionally pursued solutions to the countermine problem. The Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency sponsor research and development to detect and clear hazards such as subsurface radioactive, chemical, and other waste. The Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation sponsor research and development to see through concealments to detect explosives, firearms, and contraband. More recently, DOD has sponsored technology efforts to facilitate cleanup of defense sites. Nonetheless, when requirements are more broadly defined as the detection and clearance of harmful, hidden objects or voids (such as concrete flaws and underground facilities), the technologies that various agencies employ or are developing for their own missions can be related. For example, the Army, the Navy, and the Department of Energy are either sponsoring research and development in or have experimented with ground-penetrating radars. This does not necessarily mean that unwanted duplication is occurring, but it does illustrate the potential for one agency to be aware of and possibly take advantage of relevant technologies other agencies are working on. Some interagency coordination occurs on an ad hoc or narrow basis, such as through symposia, technology demonstrations, and joint programs, but this does not necessarily provide a firm basis for technology exchange. Most of the participants at an interagency UXO forum that we sponsored in May 1995 cited the lack of a coordination mechanism as a barrier to making progress in technologies applicable to the detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO. They also pointed out the need for an overarching research and development plan for these technologies and for an entity to be charged with overseeing and coordinating the relevant technology efforts. Even within DOD, full coordination between agencies working on detection and clearance technologies is not occurring. In particular, agencies that are responsible for cleaning up military sites and those responsible for countermine missions are not always working together, even though they share interests in many of the same technologies. Currently, two demonstrations of detection technologies for use against landmines and other forms of UXO are underway. One is being conducted by the Army Communications Electronics Command, which sponsors countermine research and development, and the other is being jointly conducted by the Army Environmental Center and the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division. Neither organization has participated in the other's demonstration. Perhaps illustrative of the need for broader coordination is the fact that several similar demonstrations have been conducted in the past 5 years by the Department of Energy, the Army, and the Marine Corps. Several cooperative efforts have been undertaken by U.S. organizations. In September 1993, the National Security Council established what became known as the Interagency Working Group on Demining and Landmine Control. The group plans, funds, and organizes operations to remove landmines from Third World countries. It also established a research and development subgroup to promote improvements in area clearance technologies. The group includes representatives from the Departments of Defense and State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Central Intelligence Agency. However, not all U.S. organizations involved in technology applicable to the detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO are represented. Within DOD, several organizations have begun to develop mechanisms for coordinating, planning, and budgeting countermine research and development activities. While these efforts may improve coordination, they involve agencies within the countermine community. The Navy and the Marine Corps have recently initiated efforts to formally recognize clearance technology as beneficial to their individual missions. The Marine Corps and the Navy have established a Mine Warfare Program Executive Office and a Shallow Water Mine Countermine Steering Committee. The Army and the Marine Corps have established a joint demonstration effort that is directed toward identifying advanced concepts for a potentially integrated countermine capability. The Mine Countermeasures Subpanel under the Joint Directors of Laboratories, established within the last 2 years, is a multiservice mechanism that involves all of the services. The number of different U.S. organizations supporting relevant research and development also makes it difficult to gauge the level of funding the United States is devoting to technologies that can detect UXO and other hazardous materials. For example, based on fiscal year 1996 budget estimates, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Transportation could invest somewhere between $75 million and $150 million in research and development efforts that may have some application to the detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO. However, it is unclear how much of that amount is directly related to detection and clearance technologies that have application to noncombat situations. Accordingly, it is difficult to determine whether the United States is getting the most from its level of investment in these technologies or whether the current level matches known national requirements. Even if the maximum output could be gained from the various organizations sponsoring research and development, several other factors could blunt the effect of technology gains. One factor is mine technology's ability to stay ahead of detection and clearance technologies. For example, some new mines are made of plastic, composite, and ceramic components, and have little or no metallic content. Thus, the effectiveness of the metal detector, which is one of the most widely used detection technologies, is limited against such mines. Some mines are designed to prevent premature detonation, such as when they are blasted with explosives or dropped. For example, some have air bladders that react to blast or overpressure and inflate to disarm and, then, rearm to await their intended targets. In addition, scatterable mines have been developed that can be deployed by air, increasing the number of these mines that can be rapidly deployed exponentially. Despite these advances, service officials note that even the traditional research and development efforts devoted to the countermine mission have historically been accorded relatively low funding priority. The characteristics of the country to be cleared can also affect the applicability of a given technology. For example, detection and clearance equipment to be used by Third World countries must be inexpensive to buy and maintain as well as easy to understand and use. From a cost and logistics support perspective, a sophisticated military technology may not be practical in such circumstances. Landmine and other UXO detection and clearance equipment must be effective given the geographical and terrain characteristics at hand. For example, soil with traces of metal elements can confuse metal detectors, and rocky soil impairs hand-held probes. High levels of moisture in soil can affect the performance of detection technologies. Mountainous or forested terrain makes technologies that depend on large or heavy vehicles impractical. Finally, despite the efforts of the United Nations, the landmine problem continues to worsen. Each year, many more mines are emplaced than can be removed. For example, the United Nations estimated that in 1993, 2.5 million mines were emplaced, while only 80,000 were removed. The primary mechanism for controlling the use of landmines is contained in Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons. The protocol was designed to reduce the harm to innocent civilians. It limits the use of landmines and booby traps to military objectives, prohibits their use against civilian populations, requires that parties to a conflict try to ensure that the location of minefields is recorded, and requires that scatterable mines contain self-destruct mechanisms or have their location recorded. The protocol has been largely ineffective for several reasons. First, it covers only international conflicts, while most landmine-related injuries have resulted from civil or internal conflicts. Second, it does not regulate the production, stockpiling, transfer, or export of landmines. Third, it contains no provision for monitoring compliance, conducting enforcement, or penalizing violators. The executive branch and the Congress have taken several actions over the past 3 years to curb the proliferation of landmines and improve research and technology directed at detecting and clearing landmines and other UXO. In October 1992, the United States adopted a unilateral export moratorium on antipersonnel landmines, which has been extended until 1996. According to DOD, the United States was the first country to take such a step, which has led other countries to follow suit. In his address to the U. N. General Assembly in 1994, the President called for the eventual elimination of antipersonnel landmines and for the international control of production, export, and stockpiling as the first step toward elimination. On March 24, 1995, the Senate gave its advice and consent and the President ratified the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons as well as Protocol II. In addition, the United States was an active participant in the July 1995 International Meeting on Mine Clearance in Geneva, Switzerland. Beginning on September 25, 1995, 48 nations will convene as full parties to reopen the Convention on Conventional Weapons and conduct a conference to review the Convention, including Protocol II on landmine use. Other signatories and observers are also expected to participate in the conference, which will consider several proposals to strengthen Protocol II. The executive branch strongly supports strengthening the Convention by (1) extending its scope to include internal conflicts, (2) limiting the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel landmines to marked and monitored areas, (3) making the party that placed the mines responsible for clearing them, (4) banning nondetectable mines, and (5) creating a system to verify the restrictions on mine usage. In the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, the Congress directed DOD to undertake a large-scale detection and clearance technology demonstration. Although this demonstration did not produce breakthrough solutions, it did establish a baseline for assessing the state of the art in UXO detection technologies. In the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, the Congress directed the Army to develop technologies for mine detection and neutralization for use in humanitarian mine removal operations and operations other than war. Such technologies were to be capable of being shared in an international environment. In its report on the fiscal year 1996 DOD authorization bill, the House Committee on National Security cited the need for a central authority to plan, oversee, and coordinate the research, development, and acquisition of the technology applicable to area ordnance clearance. It directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan that defines research and development priorities, program management, and cooperative activity with international programs. The numerous research and development efforts funded by the United States and by other countries could be more productive if they were linked by a common purpose--the detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO. Such a common purpose should complement--not supplant--individual missions, such as countermine, cleanup of hazardous waste, cleanup of bases, and humanitarian demining, by serving as a vehicle for sharing technical progress and avoiding duplication. Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense include in the research and development plan called for by the House Committee on National Security, a proposal on how a multiagency clearinghouse function could be performed to maintain visibility over all federally funded research and development projects with application to detection and clearance of landmines, other UXO, and other hazards; develop an overarching strategy that encompasses both near-term and long-term priorities for detection and clearance technologies; and serve as an active link to relevant international and private research and development efforts. Such a proposal should be based on consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the heads of other federal agencies that sponsor research and development that may have application to detection and clearance of landmines, other UXO, and other hazards. We further recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate an executive agent to serve as a clearinghouse for research and development efforts within DOD that may have application to detection and clearance of landmines, other UXO, and other hazards. The role of such an agent would be to gain visibility over and to leverage these efforts against the broader problems of detection and clearance rather than to champion an individual mission. Both DOD and the Department of State concurred with our recommendations. In its comments (see app. I), DOD stated that it could prepare a proposal detailing the functions of a multiagency clearinghouse and that statutory language could facilitate implementation of the proposal by specifically identifying the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies. DOD also said that it would identify an executive agent to serve as a clearinghouse within DOD as part of the February 1996 plan required by the House National Security Committee. The Department of State commented that it endorsed the need for more coordinated research and for the identification of a lead institution in U.S. government research and development (see app. II). Both agencies provided specific technical clarifications that we incorporated in the report, as appropriate. We reviewed pertinent reports, documents, and legislation relevant to detection and clearance technologies. We also interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the military services' program offices, laboratories, and intelligence agencies; the Departments of Energy and State; the Army Environmental Center and the Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division; the Advanced Research Projects Agency; the United Nations; and the National Academy of Science. We also attended related conferences and symposia and spoke with industrial and technical representatives from other countries, such as England, South Africa, Austria, Germany, and Sweden. In May 1995, we hosted a forum to discuss landmine and other UXO problems, technologies, and solutions. Participants included representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, the Departments of State and Energy, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the United Nations, and CMS, Inc., a firm that conducted mine clearance operations in Kuwait. The key questions that the forum attempted to address were (1) whether a legitimate UXO requirement--different from the countermine requirement--exists that warrants the pursuit of technological solutions; (2) whether the research and development efforts currently planned or underway constitute a sound approach toward such a solution; (3) what factors (technical, managerial, or otherwise), if any, impede the advancement of detection and clearance technology for landmines and other UXO; (4) what change in approach to technology development (technical, managerial, or otherwise), if any, should be made in the near term and long term; and (5) who or what organizations should take the lead in instituting change and ensuring that the efforts in developing landmine and UXO detection and clearance technology are well orchestrated. We conducted our review from September 1994 to July 1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and State; the Secretaries of the military services; and the Secretary General of the United Nations. We will also make copies available to others upon request. Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were Sharon Cekala, Paul Francis, MaeWanda Michael-Jackson, and James Dowd. The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's (DOD) letter dated August 29, 1995. 1. A discussion of self-destruct mechanisms has been added to the report. 2. Language has been added to the report to recognize the fact that U.S. forces do not conduct humanitarian demining missions. The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter dated August 17, 1995. 1.We have not concluded that more research and development funds should be appropriated in the future. As noted in the report, because of the number of organizations involved and the various projects underway, it is difficult to estimate the current level of U.S. investment in technologies related to detection and clearance of landmines and other UXO. We believe that once a multiagency clearinghouse function and an executive agent for DOD are established, the data can be assembled to establish the current U.S. level of investment and determine whether that level is appropriate. Such analysis, along with an updated assessment of the landmine and other UXO problem, should be the basis for determining the level of future funding. 2. Change adopted. 3.We have modified our wording throughout the report in reference to landmines and other UXO. We have explicitly recognized the distinction the Department of State makes for the purposes of policymaking. However, we note that (1) landmines are included in the DOD definition of UXO and (2) for the thrust of this report--research and development to advance technology--it is important to stress the similarities between the problems posed by landmines and by other UXO rather than the distinctions. 4.A summary of all U.S. mine clearance programs currently underway was beyond the scope of our work. DOD may be able to provide a reasonable summary at this time, but a better summary would likely be possible following the establishment of the multiagency clearinghouse function. 5.The U.S. Agency for International Development is included in the report as a member of the Interagency Working Group on Demining and Landmine Control. We have also added the agency to our list of U.S. organizations contained in table 2. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 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Summary:
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the extent to which existing or foreseeable technologies offer solutions to worldwide landmine and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems. GAO found that: (1) U.S. research and development requirements for UXO detection and clearance technology are broader today than they were during the Cold War; (2) the Department of Defense's (DOD) technological efforts have supported countermine operations, for which the main priority is making paths through minefields during combat; (3) U.S. research and development efforts cover a group of near-term and advanced technologies that could increase detection and clearance functions; (4) the most effective clearance techniques are time-consuming, expensive, and labor intensive; (5) the current technologies do not perform well against newer, more advanced munitions; (6) no governmentwide strategy exists to ensure that the most is gained from the various clearance efforts; (7) the technologies available today are inadequate and unable to keep pace with the number of landmines being emplaced annually; and (8) the barriers to technical solutions include the relative ease with which inexpensive improvements in mine designs have outstripped detection and clearance methods, the unique clearance challenges that developing countries pose, and the difficulty in controlling the proliferation of antipersonnel landmines.