Concerns about the threats posed by nuclear smuggling initially focused on nuclear materials originating from the former Soviet Union. As a result, the first major initiatives to address these threats concentrated on deploying radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. In the United States, the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with portable radiation detection devices in 1998. After September 11, 2001, the agency expanded its efforts to include the deployment of radiation portal monitors (RPM)--large-scale radiation detectors that can be used to screen vehicles and cargo. The U.S. Customs Service was transferred to DHS in fiscal year 2003, and the border inspection functions of the U.S. Customs Service, including radiation detection, became the responsibility of CBP. Accordingly, deploying radiation detection equipment at the U.S. border is part of DHS's strategy for addressing the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. In April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing DNDO within DHS and giving DNDO responsibility, among other things, to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to detect nuclear and radiological materials. From 1995 through 2013, CBP invested over $2.5 billion to acquire, deploy, and maintain radiation detection equipment; provide training; and conduct both overt and covert tests of this equipment to assess the equipment's effectiveness. OFTD's budget for covert operations was $1 million for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 to test CBP capabilities in several areas, including radiation and nuclear detection. A terrorist's use of either an improvised nuclear device (IND) or a radiological dispersal device (RDD)--could have devastating consequences, including not only loss of life but also enormous psychological and economic impacts. An IND is a crude nuclear bomb made with highly enriched uranium or plutonium, generally referred to as special nuclear materials (SNM). It would create an explosion producing extreme heat, powerful shockwaves, and intense radiation that would be immediately lethal to individuals within miles of the explosion, as well as An RDD--frequently radioactive fallout over thousands of square miles.referred to as a dirty bomb--would disperse radioactive materials into the environment through a conventional explosive or through other means. Depending on the type of RDD, the area contaminated could be as small as part of a building or a city block or as large as several square miles. Hundreds of individuals might be killed or injured from the RDD explosion or face the risk of later developing cancer because of exposure to radiation and radioactive contamination. Federal agencies that have a role in combating nuclear smuggling are responsible for implementing their own programs per the GNDA. The GNDA is composed of programs run by U.S. agencies including CBP, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Energy as well as partnerships with local, state, tribal, and territorial governments; the private sector; and international partners. The programs are designed to encounter, detect, characterize, and report on radiological and nuclear material that is out of regulatory control. DNDO serves as the primary entity in the United States to develop GNDA-related programs and initiatives, and improve radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. In addition, DNDO coordinates the GNDA's efforts with other federal agencies, and assists DHS agencies with both implementing the domestic portion of the GNDA and also acquiring radiation detection equipment. CBP's OFO is responsible for implementing scanning procedures to detect smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials at 328 ports of entry composed of airports, seaports, and designated land ports of entry throughout the United States plus selected locations overseas. CBP's USBP is responsible for implementing screening procedures at 35 permanent checkpoints generally located between 25 and 100 miles from the border. Figure 1 displays the locations of air, land, and sea ports of entry and permanent checkpoints across the nation.specific information about each location.) Move mouse over state names to see the breakdown of ports of entry. For a noninteractive version, see app. I. N.Dak. Minn. Vt. S.Dak. Wis. N.H. N.Y. Mass. Wyo. Mich. R.I. Nebr. Pa. Conn. N.J. Ill. Ind. Colo. W.Va. Del. Md. Kans. Mo. Va. D.C. Ky. N.C. Tenn. Okla. N.Mex. Ark. S.C. Miss. Ala. Ga. La. Tex. Fla. OFTD is responsible for conducting covert operations at U.S. ports of entry and checkpoints to test the capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials smuggled into the United States, as well as testing capabilities in foreign locations. In selecting sites for covert operations, OFTD considers a universe of 655 sites. These sites include the 477 facilities at the 328 ports of entry, 35 permanent checkpoints, as well as 143 sites consisting of domestic user fee airports and express consignment carrier facility airports as well as preclearance locations and Container Security Initiative (CSI) ports in foreign locations. The technology, policies, and procedures to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border differ across ports of entry and checkpoints, but consist of four similar functions: (1) the ability to detect radiation, (2) the ability to locate the radiation source, (3) the ability to identify the radiation source, and (4) the ability to contact Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) and transmit data as needed when additional adjudication is required.vehicles or containers entering the United States must pass through RPMs that can detect the presence of neutron-and gamma-emitting radioactive material. As we have previously reported, different radioactive materials emit varying types of radiation, and although sources of neutron radiation are less common than gamma radiation, neutron radiation is emitted from some materials that are used to make nuclear weapons. Thus, RPMs and other tools that can detect neutron radiation are At land and sea ports of entry, particularly important for national security purposes, including securing our borders. RPMs detect the presence of radioactive material, which can include plutonium, kitty litter, or granite. If an RPM detects the presence of radioactive material in a scanned container or vehicle, the responding CBP officer is to utilize a device called a radiation isotope identification device (RIID) to identify the radiation source. For some sources, such as industrial radioactive sources, CBP officers must contact the CBP LSS staff to verify the type of source material in question and, if necessary, verify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee and shipper information through the National Law Enforcement Communications Center. CBP officials reported that CBP officers and USBP agents in checkpoint and air ports of entry locations generally rely on devices called personal radiation detectors (PRD) to protect the health and safety of agency personnel. These devices detect elevated levels of radiation. Aside from relying on different equipment to detect radiological materials, CBP officers at air ports of entry and USBP agents at checkpoints follow procedures outlined in CBP's Radiation Detection Standard Operating In keeping Procedures Directive, used at sea and land ports of entry.with these procedures, if a PRD alerts a CBP officer or USBP agent to the presence of radiation, the officer or agent uses RIID technology to identify the radioactive material. See figures 2, 3, and 4 for photographs of RPM, RIID, and PRD technology. CBP uses covert operations to test and evaluate whether the systems in place are working as designed to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological smuggling. These operations include an assessment of whether the equipment and technology are working according to specification, the policies and procedures for radiation handling and inspection are adequate to cover various smuggling scenarios, and the extent to which CBP personnel comply with established policies and procedures to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border. According to CBP documents, results of covert operations can identify the need for changes in how technology is used to detect nuclear and radiological material, agency policies or procedures, or personnel training to ensure that interdiction programs are working most effectively. Steps used in conducting a covert operation are discussed in appendix II. OFTD limits covert operations to the ports of entry and checkpoints where equipment and personnel are permanently placed. According to OFTD officials, CBP does not conduct covert operations outside of the system's current capabilities, or to test the system's known vulnerabilities. For example, CBP does not conduct covert operations beyond the technical capabilities and specifications of the RPMs, RIIDs, and PRDs. CBP conducts such tests of equipment capabilities using overt operations. OFTD conducted 144 covert operations at air, land, and sea ports of entry, checkpoints, and other sites to assess capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border between fiscal years 2006 and 2013, as shown in table 1.OFTD's covert operations were conducted using radiological materials; however, OFTD officials said they conducted one or two tests using special nuclear material surrogates--radiation test sources with characteristics similar to those of SNM--each year. CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform the decision- making process for prioritizing the materials, locations, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, OFTD's covert operations may not sufficiently account for using nuclear materials that pose the highest risk to the country, testing capabilities in higher-risk border locations, or testing in locations that use key GNDA detection technologies. Specifically: The extent to which OFTD's covert operations use varying source materials is limited. Our review found that OFTD may not give sufficient priority to testing detection capabilities for the most dangerous materials. According to the CBP officials, OFTD has both gamma and neutron radiation sources available; however, DNDO has a broader variety of sources that CBP uses when conducting covert operations with DNDO once or twice a year. The locations selected for covert testing may not be sufficiently taken into account. For example, as shown above in table 1, 45 of 144 OFTD covert operations, or 31 percent of all such operations, were conducted at checkpoints. While checkpoints are an important component in the nation's border security infrastructure, they constitute only about 5 percent (35 of 655) of total locations, and checkpoints are generally situated from 25 to 100 miles from the border. CBP use of key detection technologies may not be sufficiently taken into account. CBP uses a mix of technologies across facility types and locations that can reflect significant differences in capabilities and federal investment. However, CBP's methodology for choosing locations was not clearly linked to these differences in capability and federal investment. DHS's May 2010 Policy for Integrated Risk Management states that components should use risk information and analysis to inform decision making, and we previously reported on the importance of using risk assessments to determine the most pressing security needs and developing strategies to address them. Moreover, CBP's fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2014 strategic plan requires that programs use a risk-based approach to detect and prevent the entry of hazardous materials, goods, and instruments of terror into the United States, and OFTD's documented site selection process states that they should consider available intelligence reports and risk assessments. CBP's January 2013 Integrated Planning Guidance (IPG) for Fiscal Year 2015 through Fiscal Year 2019 included recommendations that CBP integrate risk analysis into all decision making, including a risk assessment for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. CBP has not yet taken steps toward conducting such a risk assessment or integrating existing risk assessments into its covert testing decisions.Specifically, the IPG included recommendations that CBP conduct an in- depth risk and vulnerability assessment by mode and region to clearly identify the future threats that CBP will be facing to better align resources with priorities. According to OFTD, OFO, and USBP officials, they do not currently have risk assessments that could be used to help inform covert testing decisions. A DNDO official stated that DNDO has previously assessed the risks of nuclear and radiological smuggling through various entry points to the United States, pursuant to DNDO's responsibilities under the GNDA. DNDO officials told us that they would share information they have with CBP; however CBP officials stated that DNDO's information may not be applicable for OFTD's risk-based site selection process. Conducting a risk assessment that identifies priorities among nuclear and radiological materials, locations, and technology to evaluate under its covert testing program could help enable CBP to target the program's efforts to maximize the return on the limited resources available. Moreover, a risk assessment could help CBP determine the extent to which its tests should use varying source materials, including SNM or its surrogates. A risk assessment could also help inform whether OFTD should direct more covert operations at certain locations and types of facilities based on the technologies and resources--including RPMs, RIIDs, and trained personnel--deployed at these facilities. By using a risk assessment to inform its decisions on how to prioritize covert operations, CBP would be better positioned to assess the strength of its cross-border capabilities for protecting against the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the country. A risk assessment is particularly important given OFTD's limited resources, as the number of covert operations OFTD is able to conduct is not sufficient to be statistically representative. OFTD issued periodic reports on the results of its covert operations but has not met its goal for reporting these results on an annual basis for all locations where operations were conducted. According to a document on OFTD's policies and procedures for follow-up on covert testing, an OFTD goal is to compile and analyze its findings from covert operations at the end of each fiscal year to determine whether results show trends and systemic weaknesses. To communicate these findings, OFTD's policy states that its goal is to issue reports to CBP management that include a discussion of the findings and the recommendations necessary to address the identified deficiencies. OFTD has issued three periodic reports that summarize results from covert operations testing capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological materials smuggled across the border ports of entry: (1) the Summary Report of OFTD Seaport Assessments for fiscal years 2007 through 2008; (2) the Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing, which summarized the results of covert operations conducted at air, land, and sea ports of entry from fiscal years 2009 through 2011; and (3) the Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing, which summarized the results of covert operations conducted at air, land, and sea ports of entry from fiscal years 2012 and 2013. OFTD officials stated that while their intention is produce comprehensive reports on an annual basis, they have been unable to do so because of resource constraints. OFTD officials stated that they have not yet issued a report on results of covert operations conducted at checkpoints and are in the process of developing the report recommendations. OFTD began covert operations to test capabilities at checkpoints in fiscal year 2009, but did not include results of checkpoint covert operations in its Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing. OFTD officials said that they provided three briefings to CBP senior management, including the Office of Border Patrol (OBP) in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 on preliminary findings and recommendations resulting from covert operations at checkpoints conducted from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. OFTD officials said they plan to issue a comprehensive report for checkpoint covert operations for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 by the end of December 2014. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that program managers are to receive operational information to help them determine whether they are meeting strategic and performance plans, and that pertinent information is to be identified, captured, and distributed to the right people in sufficient detail, in the right form, and at the appropriate time to enable them to carry out duties and responsibilities efficiently and effectively. Further, these internal controls help managers achieve program objectives by ensuring they receive information on a timely basis to allow effective monitoring, enhancing their ability to address weaknesses. Timely reporting of weaknesses identified by covert operations could help CBP management provide timely and necessary oversight to OFO and USBP and appropriately address high-priority border vulnerabilities. According an OFTD document describing its procedures, these reports are important because they often generate requests for high-level discussions led by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner with the heads of operational offices. According to OFTD officials, their periodic briefings on covert testing resulted in management changes at USBP. USBP, for example, took action after OFTD's January 2013 briefing to correct deficiencies that had first been identified in covert operations conducted in 2009. These actions included direction to USBP field management on the importance of USBP agents' compliance with agency policy and procedures for wearing and using PRDs. In addition, because of continued findings of capability weaknesses at checkpoints over the last 5 years, USBP took action to implement an OFTD recommendation to institute its own covert operation program to test capabilities for CBP action to determine detecting radiological and nuclear smuggling.appropriate time frames for comprehensive reports and ensure they are issued would provide CBP, OFO, and USBP with information to strengthen oversight and improve program operations in detecting and interdicting transborder nuclear and radiological threats. Further, providing timely reports on results of covert operations could help ensure awareness among management and personnel at ports of entry and checkpoints about potential areas of weakness and corrective actions used at other facilities to address these weaknesses across the United States. OFTD tracks some corrective actions taken by CBP components to address weaknesses identified by covert operations, but not others. For example, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken by OFO management to address recommendations included in its comprehensive reports resulting from covert operations. However, OFTD does not track the status of corrective actions taken by OFO at ports of entry to address weaknesses identified in covert operations that are not individually cited in these reports. Additionally, OFTD does not track the status of corrective actions taken by USBP to address the weaknesses identified through covert operations at checkpoints. OFTD officials told us that in order to develop the recommendations issued in the Comprehensive Reports on Radiation Testing, they reviewed the test summaries from all covert operations at air, land, and sea ports of entry and used their judgment to develop recommendations to address capability weaknesses related to equipment, technology, and personnel compliance with policies and procedures in the CBP radiation detection directive. The fiscal years 2009 to 2011 comprehensive report summarizes results from 43 covert operations conducted at air, land, and sea ports of entry, and the fiscal years 2012 and 2013 report summarizes results from 26 covert operations. The two comprehensive reports span a 5-year time period, and both identify several of the same issues: (1) CBP officers' noncompliance with radiation detection policies and procedures, (2) radiation detection equipment not always functioning as designed, and (3) CBP officer error primarily due to the lack of training. Our assessment of OFTD's fiscal year 2012 and 2013 report found that it provides CBP senior management with a more detailed analysis of covert operation results, including reasons why test sources were not interdicted, than previous reports. OFTD developed five recommendations to OFO management for addressing selected weaknesses identified from covert operations conducted from fiscal years 2009 through 2011. Specifically, in the Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing, for fiscal years 2009 through 2011, OFTD recommended the following: 1. CBP officers follow policies and procedures on radiation detection as required by CBP Directive 5290-015A, entitled U.S. CBP Radiation Detection Program Directive. 2. All primary officers have PRDs as required. 3. RIID docking stations be made available wherever needed or required. 4. CBP officers receive training required to perform their assigned functions. 5. Speed limits should be enforced as required. OFTD officials stated that as of May 2014, OFO had implemented four of these five recommendations. OFTD officials told us that OFO is continuing to take action and to address the recommendation that all primary officers have PRDs as required. OFO officials stated that they are conducting training and checks during fiscal year 2014 to ensure that the PRD policy is being followed and plan to close the recommendation by procuring additional PRDs for officers by fiscal year 2015.officials further stated that they will keep this recommendation open until OFTD verifies that PRDs have been deployed in the field and that officers are using the PRDs at primary inspection points. The verification process will include spot checks of a random sample of air, land, and sea ports of entry throughout fiscal year 2014. OFTD developed nine recommendations to OFO management for addressing selected weaknesses identified from covert operations from fiscal years 2012 and 2013. response to the nine recommendations identified in the April 2014 Comprehensive Report on Radiation Testing were not yet available for our review, but that OFO is taking steps to address these recommendations. Specific details related to the nine recommendations were removed for the purposes of this public report because DHS considered them to be For Official Use Only. radiation detection procedure, or if the weakness was related to the failure of a procedure affecting overall port operations. Corrective actions would be tailored by the port manager accordingly to address the underlying cause of the weakness. OFO and USBP officials stated that while they have a process in place to address weaknesses identified during OFTD covert operations, they were unable to provide us with complete information about corrective actions that were taken to address the results of the covert operations because they do not fully track them. OFTD officials also informed us that OFTD does not track information about corrective actions taken by OFO and USBP because doing so is outside of OFTD's responsibilities. Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government states that agencies can enhance their ability to address weaknesses by establishing policies and procedures for ensuring that the findings of audits and reviews are promptly resolved, and ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs. Establishing a process for CBP to ensure that OFO and USBP implement corrective actions for individual ports of entry and at checkpoints could help provide CBP with reasonable assurances that radiation detection and interdiction weaknesses indentified at the port of entry and checkpoints are addressed and security is consistently improving. Without an overall mechanism for addressing weaknesses identified, CBP does not have the oversight capabilities necessary to hold officials at ports of entry and checkpoints accountable for managing program operations to detect and interdict transborder nuclear and radiological threats. Preventing nuclear and radiological materials from illegally entering the United States through ports of entry and checkpoints is a complex and challenging process that involves significant resources, including specialized radiological and nuclear detection equipment, detailed policies and procedures, and training for a large number of border protection personnel. The United States has invested billions of dollars to detect and interdict smuggled nuclear and radiological materials at U.S. ports of entry and checkpoints, and CBP reports multiple benefits of its covert operations that can identify the need for changes in how technology is used to detect nuclear and radiological material, agency policies or procedures, or personnel training to ensure that interdiction programs are working most effectively. Given the limited resources directed toward covert operations testing of U.S. detection and interdiction capabilities, it is essential that DHS make risk-informed decisions to enhance its ability to assess the success of these investments. By assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies. In addition, establishing appropriate reporting time frames of covert operations results, and developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions, could help CBP ensure accountability and inform management decision making on the need for further investments or actions to protect U.S. borders from these potential consequences. To help ensure that resources for covert operations provide reasonable assurance that efforts to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border are working as intended and appropriately targeting the most critical materials, locations, and detection technologies, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security conduct or use a risk assessment to inform the department's priorities-- related to such decisions as test locations, materials, and equipment--for covert operations at U.S. checkpoints and ports of entry in air, land, and sea environments. To help ensure that CBP has the information necessary to provide oversight and accountability for implementing corrective actions to address weaknesses identified by covert operations we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP: determine time frames for OFTD reporting of covert operation results and status of corrective actions necessary to timely address border security weaknesses and work with OFTD to address any barriers to meeting these time frames, and develop a mechanism to track the corrective actions taken to address all weaknesses identified through covert operations at the ports of entry and checkpoints. We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS for review and comment. On July 11, 2014, DHS provided written comments and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We provided a draft of this report with redacted sensitive information to DHS for a sensitivity review. On September 12, 2014, DHS approved the draft for public release and reissued its written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix V, and additional technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with all three of our recommendations and discussed action to address them. Specifically: We recommended that the Secretary conduct or use a risk assessment to inform DHS's priorities--related to such decisions as test locations, materials, and equipment--for covert operations at U.S. checkpoints and ports of entry in air, land, and sea environments. DHS concurred and stated that with input from stakeholders, CBP will formulate a process for conducting and using information from risk assessments and that the pending realignment of OFTD with the Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison (OIIL) will facilitate collaboration. DHS has not yet established an estimated completion date for these activities. If implemented effectively, these actions should meet the intent of our recommendation We recommended that the Commissioner of CBP determine time frames for OFTD reporting of covert operation results and status of corrective actions necessary to timely address border security weaknesses and work with OFTD to address any barriers to meeting these time frames. DHS concurred and stated it would develop new policies and procedures that establish strict timelines for reporting results of all testing in all locations, report results within established time frames, and routinely and timely publish comprehensive annual reports. DHS estimated these actions would be completed by April 30, 2015. If implemented and monitored effectively, these actions should meet the intent of our recommendation. We recommended that the Commissioner of CBP develop a mechanism to track the corrective actions taken to address all weaknesses identified through covert operations at the ports of entry and checkpoints. DHS concurred and stated that OFTD will collaborate with all CBP operational offices to develop a mechanism to monitor the status of corrective actions taken by all operational offices as a result of OFTD's covert testing. DHS stated that OIIL will have the primary responsibility for monitoring the status of corrective action. DHS estimated these actions would be completed by December 31, 2014. If implemented and monitored effectively, these actions should meet the intent of our recommendation. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 25 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of Homeland Security; In addition, this report will be made publicly available at no extra charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you have further questions about this report, please contact David C. Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov or David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or trimbled@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 1. Table 2 includes 328 ports of entry and 35 permanent checkpoints. However, some of the 328 ports of entry have one or more facilities, such as airports, sea ports, or land ports. For example, the Brownsville, Texas, port of entry includes air, land, and sea ports, and the San Diego port of entry includes both air and sea ports. Accounting for each air, land, and sea port separately, the map actually includes 477 facilities (241 airports, 110 land ports, and 126 sea ports) and 35 permanent checkpoints for a total of 512 locations. These are indicated in the map under their respective locations within each state or territory. 1. CBP provides no notice to the port of entry or checkpoint officials in advance of the operation. 2. A CBP official inserts the radiological source into a cargo container, a vehicle, or personal luggage.3. An actor attempts to smuggle a hidden radiological or nuclear source material through a port of entry or checkpoint by hiding the source material in a vehicle, cargo, or luggage and attempting to enter the country with it. 4. The operation is recorded using a variety of surveillance equipment. CBP officials observe the test and take notes. 5. After the covert test is complete, OFTD officials interview the CBP officers or U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents involved in the operation and discuss test results with them, explaining what went well and what areas are in need of improvement. 6. Within 24 hours, OFTD officials prepare a one-page summary of the covert test. 7. OFTD officials provide a copy of the summary to the Office of Field Operations (OFO) or USBP management and conduct an out-brief the day after the operation. Information in this appendix is also presented in figure 5. Table 3 lists, for each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and selected territories, the number of covert operations conducted by Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division at (1) air ports of entry, (2) land ports of entry, (3) sea ports of entry, (4) checkpoints, and (5) totals by state or territory. The process for informing the ports of entry and checkpoints of the results of covert tests includes the following: Upon the conclusion of a covert test, Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) personnel will immediately complete a written test highlights using information associated with the test that includes their own observations from the test; interviews of involved officers, agents, and applicable supervisors; and other relevant documents. OFTD will disseminate the written test highlights to local port of entry or sector (checkpoint) management--Director of Field Operations or Sector Chief and headquarters senior management--Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioners, Chief of U.S. Border Protection (USBP), and Executive Directors. OFTD provides an oral debrief the day after a covert test to local senior management informing them of OFTD's findings and best practices. OFTD then prepares a written test summary that contains more details than a test highlights for dissemination via e-mail to local management and headquarters senior management. The test summary will also describe the specific test scenario used during the covert operation. The test summary is provided to local port of entry, sector, and senior headquarters management within several days of a test. Local operational offices will develop corrective action plans to address weaknesses and vulnerabilities identified and noted during the debrief and in the written summary. Office of Field Operations (OFO) and USBP will determine whether there should be changes to national policies and procedures as a result of its covert tests. These may include additional operational unit policy and procedural changes, policy memos, or directives that are disseminated across the United States. OFTD may also adjust test protocols based on test findings. In addition to the individuals named above, Lacinda Ayers, Assistant Director; Ned Woodward, Assistant Director; Nima Patel Edwards; Justin S. Fisher; R. Scott Fletcher; Robert T. Grace; Eric D. Hauswirth; Susan Hsu; Tracey King; Stanley J. Kostyla; and Brian J. Lipman made significant contributions to the work.

Summary:
Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) covert operations provide limited assessment of capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) conducted 144 covert operations at 86 locations from fiscal years 2006 through 2013, selecting its locations from a total of 655 U.S. air, land, and sea port facilities; checkpoints; and certain international locations. These operations allowed OFTD to assess capabilities for detecting and interdicting--or intercepting--nuclear and radiological materials at locations tested. Results showed differences in the rate of success for interdicting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials across facility types. CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities--including nuclear and radiological testing--covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP testing does not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. Given limited resources, assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies. OFTD has not issued reports annually as planned on covert operation results and recommendations, limiting CBP oversight for improving capabilities to detect and interdict smuggling at the border. OFTD has issued three reports on the results of its covert operations at U.S. ports of entry since 2007. However, OFTD officials stated that because of resource constraints, reports have not been timely and do not include the results of covert tests conducted at checkpoints. Furthermore, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken to address recommendations in these reports; however, CBP does not track corrective actions identified from their individual covert operations that were not included in these reports. Establishing appropriate time frames for reporting of covert operations results and addressing barriers to meeting these time frames would help enhance CBP's accountability for its covert testing operations. Further, developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions could help inform management decision making on the need for further investments in equipment or personnel training to protect U.S. borders. GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.