RS21237 -- Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Updated February 17, 2005 Almost 50 years of nuclear ambiguity were swept away by the May 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. Optimists hoped that overt nuclear weapons capabilities could help providemore conventional stability and that limited nuclear arsenals might dampen competition in missile development. (1) The 1999 conflict in Kargil and 2002 crisis in Kashmirchallengedthis viewpoint. (2) South Asia remains a nuclearflashpoint, and, potentially, a source for terrorists of access to weapons of mass destruction. India began its nuclear program shortly after independence in 1947. After a humiliating defeat in a border war with China in 1962, followed by China's first nuclear test in 1964, thedrive for nuclear weapons intensified. The 1974 test of a "peaceful nuclear device" was an important milestone,but it took several more years to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Simultaneously, India developed a nuclear infrastructure that supported both civilian and military purposes. Forexample, India's development of reprocessing capabilities supportedboth its use of mixed oxide fuel (plutonium and uranium) for its nuclear power plants and its plutonium-basedweapons. The size of India's nuclear stockpile has been a topic of considerable debate within scientific and defense communities. (3) Estimates vary from a few to 100,but several converge onaround 30-35 weapons, probably stored in component form. The U.S. Department of Defense believes that Indiais capable of manufacturing complete sets of components forplutonium-based weapons and has a small stockpile of such components. India "probably can deploy a few nuclearweapons within a few days to a week...and can deliver these weaponswith fighter aircraft." (4) Most agree that India isexpanding its stockpile, and that if India uses unsafeguarded reactor-grade plutonium, the potential to expand itsstockpile is verysignificant. India's delivery capability has long reflected two very different contingencies -- China and Pakistan. Because of the distances involved and India's lack of long-range bombers,capability against China inevitably required ballistic missiles. Against Pakistan, however, Indian officialsrecognized early on that aircraft would be more valuable, particularly in aretaliatory strike; the Indian air force is significantly more sophisticated and capable than Pakistan's. (5) India has some 35 Mirage 2000 fighters that arenuclear-capable, although otheraircraft could also be used. Ballistic missiles add considerable instability into the security equation because they are high priority targets; the pressure to use them quickly and, for the other side, to strike thempreemptively, is great. Indian officials have said short-range Prithvi ballistic missiles (150km and250km ranges) are conventionally armed. While nuclear-capable and able to reachalmost all of Pakistan, the use of nuclear-armed Prithvi s could pose major risks of fallout to India. (6) India has deployed Agni-II missiles witha 1500 km range and tested an 800 kmrange version of the Agni earlier this year. These solid-fueled missiles, which reportedly can belaunched within minutes, considerably enhance India's ability to respond rapidly in acrisis situation. In January 2003, the Ministry of External Affairs released to the public a short document on India's nuclear doctrine. The doctrine reiterated some of the points in the 1999 draftdocument on nuclear doctrine produced by the National Security Advisory Board. and refined others. In summary,the document committed India to a credible minimum deterrent,defined as: 1. a posture of "No First Use" and no use against non-nuclear weapon states, with the exception of theright to retaliate with nuclear weapons against a "major attack againstIndia, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons;" 2. Civil control in the form of the PrimeMinister as head of the Nuclear Command Authority; 3. Nuclearretaliation against a first strike as massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. (7) The document described the Nuclear Command Authority as being composedof a PoliticalCouncil (chaired by the Prime Minister and authorize the use of nuclear weapons) and an Executive Council (chairedby the National Security Advisor). Pakistan's nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the humiliating loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that reportedly triggered a political decision in January 1972 (justone month later) to begin a crash nuclear weapons program. Unlike India, Pakistan focused on the uranium routeto weapons. Pakistan sought technology from many sources, includingChina and North Korea. (8) This extensive assistanceis reported to have included, among other things, uranium enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for asmall nuclearweapon from China and missile technology from China. Most observers estimate that Pakistan has enough nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and a small amount of plutonium) for 30 to 50 nuclear weapons. (9) LikeIndia, Pakistan isthought to have "a small stockpile of nuclear weapons components and can probably assemble some weapons fairlyquickly." (10) Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s it purchased from the United States (28 F-16 and 12 trainer aircraft; 8 are no longer in service), provided the appropriate "wiring"has been added to make them nuclear-capable. In the 1980s, Pakistan moved assiduously to acquire ballistic missilecapabilities and now deploys short-range ballistic missiles and asmall number of medium-range missiles. AQ Khan, former head of Khan Research Laboratories, maintained thatonly the medium-range Ghauri missiles would be usable in a nuclearexchange (given fall-out effects for Pakistan of shorter-range missiles). Other observers view the 30 to 50 Hatf2 short-range (300km) missiles (modified Chinese M-11s) as potentialdelivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Ghauri missiles (1350 and 2300km), which reportedly are basedon the North Korean No-Dong and Taepo-Dong-1 , are capable of reaching NewDelhi with large payloads. (11) Pakistan has not yet enunciated a nuclear doctrine, but it is clear that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is seen as the key to military parity with India. Because of its fears of being overrun bylarger Indian forces, Pakistan has rejected the doctrine of no-first-use. In May 2002, Pakistan's ambassador to theUN, Munir Akram, stated that "We have not said we will use nuclearweapons. We have not said we will not use nuclear weapons. We possess nuclear weapons. So does India ...Wewill not neutralize the deterrence by any doctrine of no first use." (12) On June 4, 2002, President Musharraf went further: "The possession of nuclear weapons by any state obviouslyimplies they will be used under some circumstances." (13) In recent years, Pakistan apparently has taken steps toward refining command and control of nuclear weapons. In April 1999, General Musharraf announced that the Joint StaffHeadquarters would have a command and control arrangement and a secretariat, and a strategic force commandwould be established. (14) The connection to civilianleadership wasunclear, given a recent account of the 1999 Kargil incursion which suggested that Prime Minister Sharif wasunaware that his own nuclear missile forces were being prepared foraction. (15) Pakistan established a NationalCommand Authority (NCA) in February 2000, but little is publicly known about it. Pakistani officials haverepeatedly said that their nuclearcapabilities are safe. The new NCA is believed to be responsible for nuclear doctrine, as well as nuclear researchand development, wartime command and control, and advice toPresident Musharraf about the development and employment of nuclear weapons. (16) Kashmir has been a flashpoint since Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947. Many analysts have feared that nuclear weapons could be used if conventional hostilities over Kashmirwere to spiral out of control, especially if, as in 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, India opened a new front on the Punjabplains to break a stalemate in Pakistan or attempt to settle the issuedecisively by confronting Pakistan with a mortal threat to its territorial integrity. (17) Under these circumstances, some have suggested Pakistan might be temptedto detonate a smallnuclear weapon on its own territory to halt forward Indian movement. Other observers, however, believe such astrategy would be akin to a state acting as a suicide bomber. (18) Somemedia reports have suggested that paradoxically, "the fact that both countries have very small nuclear arsenalsincreases the pressure on both sides to use their weapons againsthigh-value targets." (19) Regardless of whethernuclear weapons might be used to stop war or to gain a military advantage, many observers agree that uncertaintyabout intentions couldworsen stability. Since 1998, both India and Pakistan appear to be integrating nuclear weapons into security strategy and planning. With the ominous logic of nuclear deterrence, each side's desire tomake its nuclear forces more credible may make those nuclear forces more usable. Ballistic missiles offer both sidesadvantages over using aircraft as delivery vehicles, but the shortranges create a hair-trigger situation. From launch to impact, missile flight times may be as short as 5 minutes. Inthe past, both sides appeared to use the separation of warheadcomponents as a form of command and control (in the sense of lowering the risk of unauthorized or accidental use). Some observers have noted that this approach becomes risky whenthe other side can launch short-range ballistic missiles against which there is no defense. These observers havecalled for improving command and control of nuclear forces, whilenoting, ironically, that reduced ambiguity could conversely increase the likelihood of war. (20) The Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly has estimated that a nuclear exchange could kill between 9 and 12 million persons on both sides, with 2 to 6 million injured. Theseestimates are likely predicated on nuclear exchanges aimed at cities; e.g., Indian Defense Secretary Yogendra Narainsuggested in 2002 that "India would retaliate against Pakistaniaggression and that both sides should be prepared for mutual destruction." President Musharraf's interview in June2002 with CNN offered respite from the nuclear rhetoric when hestated, "I don't think either side is that irresponsible to go to that limit [i.e., nuclear conflict]. ... One shouldn't evenbe discussing these things, because any sane individual cannot eventhink of going into this unconventional mode, whatever the pressures." (21) India and Pakistan have a 30-year history of confidence-building measures. These include hotlines between army commanders and prime ministers, a joint India-Pakistan MilitaryCommission (created in 1990), and agreements to provide prior notification of troop movements and ballistic missiletests. In 1991, both sides agreed not to attack nuclear facilities. (22) Implementation, however, has been sporadic. (23) In February 1999, the two parties concluded the Lahore Agreement. That agreement envisioned a plan for futurework, to includemeasures to reduce the risk of unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, reviews of confidence-buildingmeasures and communications links, prior notification of ballisticmissile tests, continuation of unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing, and dialogue on nuclear and security issues. The Lahore process was undermined by the summer 2001 militaryincursion by Pakistan in the vicinity of Kargil, but the two sides began a dialogue in 2004. In September 2004, Indiaand Pakistan announced 13 confidence-building measures. Threesecurity-related ones included: Experts' meetings on conventional and nuclear CBMs, including discussions on a draft agreement on advance notification of missile tests; Biannual meeting between Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and Pakistan Rangers; Implementation of the agreement reached between the defense secretaries in their talks in August todiscuss "modalities for disengagement and redeployment" onthe Siachen glacier. (24) Foreign secretaries reported progress in their discussions on missile notifications in December 2004. (25) Since the passage of the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, Congress has been closely involved in efforts to prevent or slow the development of nuclear arsenals by India and Pakistan. In the light of the global war on terrorism, and limited Pakistani cooperation in nonproliferation, Congress mightconsider the following questions: What sources of leverage does the U.S. now have toward India and Pakistan? Are new sources of leverage vis-a-vis Indian and Pakistani proliferation needed? Should new leveragebe focused on averting nuclear use rather than on limitingnuclear proliferation? Should India and Pakistan be priority recipients of cooperative threat reduction assistance? Whatoptions exist in this regard that do not undermine U.S. obligationsas a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty? How effective are economic or other sanctions, and which might work best?

Summary:
Until 2005, India and Pakistan were the only states outside the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty to declare, openly, their nuclear weaponscapability. In 1998, they tested nuclear weapons and since then, deployed ballistic missiles, enunciated nucleardoctrine, and made organizational changes to their nuclearestablishments. In 2002, they teetered on the brink of war in Kashmir. This paper summarizes Indian and Pakistaninuclear weapon capabilities and thinking, and discusses someconfidence-building measures in place intended to help avert nuclear war. It will be updated as events warrant.