Hurricane Katrina has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of families from theirhomes. While its magnitude is unprecedented, the resulting need to shelter and house displacedfamilies is not. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the nation's agencywith a mission to provide safe and decent housing for all Americans, has played a role in meetingthose needs in the past and is playing a role in the wake of Katrina. This report is designed to lookat HUD's current programs and their ability and authority to respond to housing crises, and the waythat Congress has expanded that role and authority in the past. It does not track the Department'sresponse to Hurricane Katrina; see CRS Report RS22358 , HUD's Response to Hurricane Katrina ,by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed]. Before looking at existing housing resources, it is useful to think about the housing needs thatemerge after a disaster. Research by E.L. Quarantelli (1) identified four major stages of housing need following a disaster: emergency shelter, temporary shelter, temporary housing, and permanent housing. Emergencyshelter is designed to provide a safe location during or immediately after a disaster. In the case ofHurricane Katrina, people sought emergency shelter on roofs and overpasses, for example. Temporary shelter is one stage beyond emergency shelter, and while it lasts longer than emergencyshelter, families are generally not able to establish day-to-day routines during their stay. Temporaryshelter includes mass shelters that provide food and sleeping accommodation, and homes temporarilyshared by friends or family. Temporary housing is housing that is unique to a family and allowsthem to begin to establish day-to-day routines, but is not seen as permanent. It can last for monthsor even years, and examples include the temporary trailers often made available while damagedhomes are undergoing repair. Permanent housing is a familiar concept and can include families'return to their former residences, new residences in or near their original communities, or permanentrelocation in another community. While most aspects of emergency response are led and organized at the state and local level,the federal government provides resources to aid their efforts. (2) The Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) generally provides assistance to meet all four states of shelter andhousing need, as authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency AssistanceAct ( P.L. 93-288 ). FEMA helps localities designate evacuation areas to provide emergency shelter,and it coordinates with municipalities and organizations such as the American Red Cross and othercharitable organizations to establish temporary shelters. FEMA also provides, in conjunction withstates and municipalities, temporary housing options including rental assistance payments --sometimes under contract with HUD (3) -- that allow families to find temporary accommodation in theprivate rental market as well as temporary physical structures, such as trailer homes. Finally, FEMAalso provides loans and grants to help families repair damaged homes. (4) While FEMA is the primarydisaster response agency, other federal agencies also contribute housing resources, including theDepartment of Commerce (the Small Business Administration, primarily), the Department ofAgriculture (the Rural Housing Service), the Treasury (various tax programs and incentives,including the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)), and HUD, the agency that is the focus ofthis report. (5) Furthermore,a large majority of the restoration and creation of permanent housing is met through the use ofprivate and public insurance. (6) In responding to disasters, HUD generally focuses on aiding families in the final two stagesof housing need; temporary and permanent housing. HUD's programs and assistance in response todisasters fall generally into one of three categories: direct assistance, flexible block grants to statesand localities, and mortgage programs. One primary form of direct assistance provided by HUD is rental assistance provided throughthe Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program. (7) Section 8 vouchers are used by low-income families to reduce theirhousing costs in the private market to an "affordable" level. (8) Families with vouchers pay30% of their incomes towards rent and the federal government pays the difference between thefamilies' contributions and the actual rent, up to a limit. (9) In order to be eligible, families must be very low income, (10) however,75% of allvouchers are statutorily targeted to extremely low income families. (11) The subsidies are portable,meaning families can move anywhere in the country with their vouchers. The program isadministered at the local level by quasi-governmental Public Housing Authorities (PHAs), andCongress currently funds approximately 2 million vouchers. In FY2005, Congress provided almost$15 billion for the voucher program. Another form of direct assistance provided by HUD is low-rent public housing. Very lowincome families are eligible to live in one of the nearly 1.2 million units of public housing ownedand maintained by local PHAs. Families living in public housing pay 30% of their incomes towardstheir housing costs, and PHAs receive two streams of federal subsidies -- operating funds and capitalfunds -- to help make up the difference between tenant rents and the costs of maintaining theproperties. Operating funds are used to help cover day-to-day expenses including utilities, socialservices, staff and security. Capital funds are used to meet modernization needs, such as buildingrepair and refurbishment. In FY2005, Congress provided approximately $2.5 billion each to thecapital and operating funds. (12) The final form of direct assistance provided by HUD is a hybrid between vouchers and publichousing, called project-based rental assistance. The primary project-based rental assistance programsare Section 8 project-based rental assistance, the Section 202 program for the elderly, and the Section811 program for the disabled. In all three programs, private landlords own and manage housing unitsfor which the rent is subsidized by the federal government. Families who live in the units payroughly 30% of their incomes towards rent and the federal government pays the landlord thedifference between the tenant contribution and the negotiated rent for the unit. Generally, thesebuildings are FHA-insured (see discussion of FHA insurance below). In FY2004, 1,309,427 unitsreceived project-based Section 8 rental assistance, 75,227 units received Section 202 rentalassistance, and 21,646 units received Section 811 rental assistance. In FY2005, Congress providedover $5 billion for project-based Section 8, over $230 million for Section 811, and over $740 millionfor Section 202. (13) HUD's direct assistance programs can be both affected by disasters as well as used as toolsin recovering from disasters. When public housing units are damaged, HUD can tap into an existingemergency capital reserve. For private owners of HUD-assisted units, insurance is often availableto cover damage, as are SBA loans and HUD loans (discussed below). HUD-assisted families displaced by a disaster retain their assistance. Displaced voucherholders are eligible to find another unit in which to use their vouchers. For public housing and otherproject-based assisted families, HUD identifies vacant HUD-assisted units to which they are eligibleto relocate. HUD can also provide resources to non-assisted households; in other words, households thatwere not previously receiving HUD housing assistance prior to a disaster. Vacant units of HUDdirect-assistance housing can be made available during a disaster for non-assisted households. Inthe past, Congress has also created special emergency short-term vouchers that can be used toprovide temporary housing to displaced families. HUD administers a number of flexible block grant programs that provide funds to states andlocalities. The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program is the largest of these,funded at $4.9 billion in FY2005. CDBG funds are formula-allocated to states and localgovernments in support of 23 categories of eligible activities, including neighborhood revitalization,economic development, and housing activities. Seventy percent of CDBG funds must be used oneligible activities and projects that principally benefit low- or moderate-income persons. CDBGgrantees are not required to provide a local match. For more information on the use of CDBG fundsfor disaster recovery, see CRS Report RS22303, Community Development Block Grant Funds inDisaster Relief and Recovery , by [author name scrubbed]. The HOME Investment Partnerships Program provides formula-based block grant fundingto states, units of local government, Indian tribes and insular areas to fund affordable housinginitiatives. Eligible activities include acquisition, rehabilitation and new construction of affordablehousing as well as rental assistance for eligible families. Grantees must meet a 25% matchrequirement, and 90% of all assistance must primarily benefit families at or below 60% of the areamedian income. For both HOME and CDBG, grantees must submit consolidated plans detailinghow they intend to use funds to meet local needs. HUD also administers several other special purpose grants and block grants targeting specialpopulations, including the Native American Housing Block Grant, the Homeless Assistance Grants,and the Housing for Persons With AIDS grants. When communities are impacted by a disaster, HUD has the authority to waive manyregulatory requirements governing the use of HOME and CDBG funds. (14) Generally, HUD will issuesuch waivers and permit local communities to redirect HOME and CDBG funds to meet disasterrecovery needs, both short and long-term. Congress has also used CDBG, and, to a smaller extent,HOME, as vehicles for providing emergency funds to communities impacted by disasters. While HUD does not provide any direct mortgage loan programs, the Federal HousingAdministration (FHA) does provide both single and multifamily mortgage insurance. Theseinsurance programs provide security to lenders to encourage them to make loans on terms that wouldnot otherwise be available to prospective homebuyers and to investors wishing to developmultifamily projects serving low- and moderate-income families. When the President declares a disaster, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, the declarationautomatically triggers certain procedures with regard to FHA-insured mortgages in the affected areas. The procedures remain in effect for one year from the date of the declaration. The followingprocedures become effective: (1) a moratorium on foreclosures is in effect for 90 days from the dateof declaration; (2) lenders are encouraged to offer special forbearance, mortgage modification,refinancing, and waiver of late charges to affected borrowers; (3) families whose residences weredestroyed or severely damaged are eligible for 100% financing under Section 203(h) of the NationalHousing Act for the cost of reconstruction or replacement of the residences; (4) damaged propertiesbecome eligible for Section 203(k) financing under which the costs to purchase and to rehabilitatethe property are included in one loan, and HUD waives the requirement that the property has beencompleted for more than one year prior to application for a Section 203(k) mortgage; (5) theunderwriting guidelines are relaxed to permit disaster victims to qualify for loans even if their totalmonthly debt, including the proposed mortgage, would equal 45% of gross income; and (6) lendersare directed to ensure that hazard claims are expeditiously filed and settled, and lenders may notretain hazard insurance proceeds to make up an existing arrearage without the written consent of theborrower. The Section 203(h) program is available for borrowers who already own homes in theaffected area. The loans are limited to the FHA loan limit for the area, subject to the provision thatthe loan may not exceed 100% of the appraised value of the property. In some cases it may not bepossible to obtain 100% financing. It may often be the case that the cost to repair or replace theproperty exceeds the appraised value of the property. This is the reason that most lenders requireborrowers to obtain hazard insurance that covers the replacement cost of the property instead of itsappraised value. The Section 203(k) program permits borrowers who do not already own homes to purchaseand rehabilitate properties in the area that are either abandoned by owners, or are being sold byowners who do not want to repair them and remain in the area. The current FHA underwriting guidelines provide that a prospective borrower's total debt,including the proposed mortgage payment, may not exceed 41% of the borrower's gross monthlyincome. In recognition of the fact that borrowers in these areas may have to incur debt to replacepersonal property, the underwriting guidelines are relaxed to permit loans to borrowers whose totaldebt is up to 45% of gross monthly income. The limit may even be exceeded if justified bycompensating factors. In order to better understand the role of HUD in meeting the housing needs of families andcommunities impacted by disasters, the following section looks at several past disasters characterizedby major housing losses. This section is meant to be an introduction and is not meant to be acomprehensive assessment of post-disaster housing and community recovery. It does not includea discussion of broad community redevelopment nor does it include a discussion of the use of taxincentives. Table 1 lists past disasters in which Congress has provided supplemental appropriations toHUD, dating back to 1992. Table 1. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for DisasterAssistance in Which HUD Received Funds, FY1992-FY2005 Source: CRS search of supplemental appropriations legislation identified in CRS Report RL33053 , Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, andFunding , by [author name scrubbed]. On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck the coast of southern Florida as a category5 hurricane, and then moved across the Gulf of Mexico to Louisiana, weakening to a category 3hurricane as it moved northward. (15) The majority of the damage occurred in Florida's South DadeCounty, including the cities of Homestead, Florida City, and Miami. At the time, Andrew was themost destructive hurricane the United States had experienced. Twenty six people died,approximately 250,000 were displaced, and damage was estimated to reach $26.5 billion. (16) In all, over 25,000 homeswere destroyed, and more than 101,000 were damaged. (17) In response to Hurricane Andrew, Congress passed the Dire Emergency SupplementalAppropriations Act, which the President signed into law on September 23, 1992 ( P.L. 102-368 ). Ittransferred $183 million from FEMA to HUD for additional Section 8 vouchers, not only for victimsof Hurricane Andrew, but for those of Hurricane Iniki, which struck Hawaii on September 11, 1992,and Typhoon Omar, which struck Guam on August 28, 1992. The transfer was expected to fund anestimated 12,000 two-year vouchers for families left homeless by Hurricane Andrew. (18) Another $100 million wasallocated for the development or acquisition of public housing, including major reconstruction ofobsolete public housing projects, in the areas affected by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, and TyphoonOmar. Congress also appropriated $60 million for the HOME program. An additional $500,000 wasappropriated for housing counseling assistance to both tenants and homeowners. Finally, FHAreceived $30.3 million to allow it to insure loans worth up to $2.4 billion to assist with rebuildingefforts. These loans were expected to support about 95,000 units of single-family and multi-familyhousing. (19) Inconnection with use of the Section 8 funds, the public housing funds, and the HOME funds, P.L.102-368 gave the Secretary of HUD the power to waive any provision of any statute or regulationthat the Secretary administered, except those that require nondiscrimination. Hurricane Andrew destroyed over 11,000 manufactured homes in Florida and Louisiana.Manufactured homes were hit hardest by the hurricane. (20) For example, Andrew destroyed 97% of all manufactured homesin Dade County, compared to 11% of all single family homes. (21) After studying the damageto manufactured homes, HUD developed new construction standards to increase their windresistance. (22) The newrule required improved design to make structures resistant to wind up to 110 miles per hour. (23) During the summer of 1993, 10 Midwestern states experienced rainfall levels that exceededthe normal range, resulting in large-scale flooding of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, andvarious smaller rivers and tributaries that flow into them. (24) In nine states (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin) rivers overflowed their banks and levees,destroying homes and requiring many to evacuate. According to FEMA, 534 counties were declaredeligible for disaster aid, and 168,340 people applied for federal assistance. Approximately 50 peopledied as a result of the floods, and 54,000 people were left homeless. Estimates of property damageranged from $12 to $16 billion. (25) In August 1993, Congress passed the Supplemental Appropriations for Relief from theMajor, Widespread Flooding of the Midwest Act ( P.L. 103-75 ). The law appropriated $50 millionfor HUD's HOME program, and $200 million for CDBG, of which $25 million was earmarked forimmediate recovery needs not reimbursable by FEMA. On February 12, 1994, P.L. 103-211 madeavailable an additional $500 million in CDBG funds for both the Midwest flood recovery efforts,and the damage caused by the 1994 Northridge earthquake in California. Of the $500 million, theHUD Secretary was given the authority to transfer up to $75 million to the HOME program. Inconnection with use of both the HOME and CDBG funds, P.L. 103-75 gave the Secretary of HUDthe power to waive any provision of any statute or regulation that the Secretary administered, exceptthose relating to fair housing, nondiscrimination, the environment, and labor standards. HUD directed that CDBG funds be used only to repair, replace or restore facilities, includinghousing, damaged by the floods. (26) HUD waived the limits on the amount of CDBG funds that couldbe used for new construction for flood-damaged properties. All nine affected states received CDBGfunds in 1993 and 1994. Illinois received $84.1 million, Iowa $96.3 million, Kansas $37.2 million,Minnesota $27.1 million, Missouri $136.8 million, Nebraska $23.1 million, North Dakota $19.6million, South Dakota $12.8 million, and Wisconsin $13.1 million. (27) HOME dollars were alsodistributed to each of the nine flood-damaged states. Illinois received $10.8 million, Iowa $11.4million, Kansas $3.4 million, Minnesota $2.7 million, Missouri $15.3 million, Nebraska $1.3million, North Dakota $2.6 million, South Dakota $1.3 million, and Wisconsin $1.3 million. After floods it is common for local communities to engage in mitigation activities that willprotect properties located on flood plains against future damage. Mitigation activities include buyouts, relocation, elevation, and flood proofing. In the buy out, local communities purchase theproperties of businesses and homeowners located on flood plains. Owners agree to sell voluntarilyso that they can afford to relocate to areas that are not at risk of flooding. Some of the cities thatwere damaged by the Midwest flood used CDBG money to buy out properties located on floodplains. For example, St. Charles County, Missouri used $8.8 million in CDBG funds together with$5.78 million from FEMA to purchase 1,159 properties located on the flood plain. (28) Arnold, Missouri used$1.4 million in CDBG funds combined with an additional $2.9 million from FEMA to buy out 72properties. After the Midwest flood, a total of 12,385 properties were mitigated through acombination of funds, including CDBG. Of these, 11,888 were bought out, 356 were relocated, 31were elevated, and 110 were flood proofed. (29) At 4:30 on the morning of January 17, 1994, a 6.7 magnitude earthquake hit the greater LosAngeles area. The Northridge Earthquake was the costliest in the nation's history, with lossesestimated at between $20 and $40 billion. More than 50 people were killed and more than 9,000were injured. (30) Over65,000 residential buildings were damaged in Los Angeles, which represented more than 250,000units of multifamily housing and almost 50,000 units of single family housing. (31) Congress responded to the disaster by passing several supplemental appropriations bills. TheNorthridge Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill, signed into law on February 12, 1994 ( P.L.103-211 ), provided nearly $900 million in appropriations to HUD programs for impactedcommunities. Two-hundred million was directed to provide Section 8 rental assistance/vouchers toimpacted families. Twenty-five million was provided to repair damaged public housing and $100million was provided to repair damaged privately-owned assisted housing through the FlexibleSubsidy Fund. (32) Congress provided CDBG with $500 million, up to $75 million of which was transferrable to theHOME block grant program, to be used both for communities impacted by the NorthridgeEarthquake as well as those still recovering from the earlier Midwest flooding. For all of thesefunds, the Secretary was given the authority to waive or specify alternative requirements for anystatute or regulation in connection with the obligation of the Secretary or use by the recipient of thefunds, as long as the waiver was not inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute or regulation. The waiver authority was not available in the case of fair housing, nondiscrimination, environmentalor labor standards. In addition to the funding provided, P.L. 103-211 made modifications to theSection 203(h) and Section 203(k) programs within the Federal Housing Administration, expandingthe benefits that could be provided to households impacted by the Northridge earthquake, althoughthe changes were only effective for 18 months. The Northridge Earthquake resulted in the displacement of thousands of families; as of April1994, 88,000 people had not returned home, 57,000 of whom were staying with friends and family. In recognition of the serious housing problem, Los Angeles convened a housing task force onJanuary 20, 1994 that included participants from the city, the county, the American Red Cross, theCalifornia Department of Housing and Community Development, the Governors Office ofEmergency Services, FEMA, and HUD. The task force had two main objectives; first, to get peopleinto shelters and registered with FEMA and second, to quickly get people out of shelters and intoreplacement housing. (33) Emergency short-term vouchers, funded both through the Section 8 program and throughCDBG (34) were providedto impacted families. A high percentage of those voucher holders were able to use them within thesame zip code as the home from which they were displaced. (35) City officials intervieweda year after the Northridge Earthquake expressed concern about what would happen to families withtemporary vouchers when they expired, noting that most families who had received them had notceased using them. (36) They stated that the city was pursuing options to have the vouchers made permanent and, in fact,they were eventually made permanent by Congress and absorbed into the Housing Authority of LosAngeles County's mainstream voucher program. (37) A July 26, 1994 report by the HUD Inspector General praisedHUD and the PHAs for responding quickly to the Northridge disaster by providing vouchers, butfound that there was an overlap in federal help. Families were provided vouchers without firsthaving been screened to assure that they were not also receiving FEMA assistance. HUD's Officeof Public and Indian Housing responded that families may have used the FEMA assistance forpurposes beyond rent, such as storage, purchase of furniture, moving expenses and utility connectioncharges and that the assistance should therefore not necessarily be considered duplicative. HUD used the $100 million in supplemental Flexible Subsidy Funds to develop a newprogram, introduced that spring, called the HUD Earthquake Loan Program (HELP). The funds wereavailable first for FHA-insured multifamily properties that were impacted by the earthquake, andsecond for other non-FHA-insured multifamily HUD-assisted properties that had beenimpacted. (38) HELPfunds could be used to cover mortgage payments, loss of rent, temporary staffing costs, tenantrelocation expenses, building repair or replacement, retrofitting, and to meet code requirements. AHUD Inspector General report issued in 1998 found that HUD had not designed the HELP initiativewith sufficient controls to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. The report identified at least $7.1 millionin questionable funds awarded to 27 projects and directed the Department to investigate and attemptto recover those funds. (39) HOME and CDBG funds were used in the short-term to provide rental assistance, to meetsocial service needs (i.e. set up intake centers and provide housing counseling), (40) and some funds were usedfor longer-term redevelopment, including financing repairs on units that could not qualify for SmallBusiness Administration (SBA) loans. (41) Shortly before the earthquake struck, HUD had amended theminimum property standards to which HUD funded housing must comply to include seismic safetystandards. It was hoped that new units assisted with HELP, HOME, or CDBG funds would be betterequipped for a future earthquake as a result of the changes to these standards. (42) The 2004 Atlantic hurricane season was one of the most active and destructive in recentmemory. Eight named storms formed, four of which, in the span of about four weeks, wreakedhavoc on the southern United States across 12 states, although Florida was by far hit the hardest. On August 13, a category 4 hurricane, Charley, made landfall on the southwest coast of Florida. Thestrongest storm to hit the United States since Hurricane Andrew, Charley caused about $14 billionin damages and resulted in 10 deaths in the United States. (43) On September 6, a category 2 hurricane, Frances, made landfallin the United States, striking the central western coast of Florida. Frances left five dead in Floridaand $9 billion in damages. (44) Less than two weeks later, on September 16, Ivan, a category3 hurricane made landfall on the gulf coast of Alabama and the western Florida panhandle. Hurricane Ivan left 25 dead in the United States and over $13 billion in damages. (45) Finally, on September 26,category 3 Hurricane Jeanne struck the eastern coast of Florida, leaving four Floridians dead and$6.8 billion in damages. (46) President Bush responded by making five supplemental funding requests to Congress ofalmost $14 billion. Congress responded by passing two supplemental funding measures totaling$13.6 billion. The Military Construction Appropriations Act and Emergency HurricaneSupplemental Appropriations law ( P.L. 108-324 ), provided $150 million for CDBG. The funds weredesignated only for use for disaster relief, long-term recovery, and mitigation in communitiesaffected by disasters designated by the President between August 31, 2003, and October 1, 2004. The funds were to be awarded by the Secretary directly to states, who were permitted to allocatethem to entitlement communities. The Secretary was also given discretion to waive or specifyalternative requirements for any statute or regulation in connection with the obligation of theSecretary or use by the recipient of the funds, as long as the waiver was not inconsistent with theoverall purpose of the statute or regulation. The waiver authority did not apply to fair housing,nondiscrimination, environmental or labor standards, and at least 50% of the funds provided had tobenefit primarily low- and moderate-income families. The funds could not be used for any projectunderway before the disaster unless the project was impacted by the disaster. States were requiredto provide a 10% match. The conference report accompanying the law ( H.Rept. 108-773 ) directedHUD to coordinate with FEMA to ensure that funds were used only for disasters and targeted to theareas of greatest need. The Conferees also directed HUD to report back to the AppropriationsCommittees prior to any allocation of funds and to submit quarterly reports on their use thereafter. Prior to the allocation of emergency CDBG funds, HUD took a number of steps to respondto the 2004 Florida hurricanes. HUD identified vacant HUD subsidized multifamily units andHUD-owned homes that could be used as temporary housing, relocated displaced HUD-assistedfamilies, permitted HOME and CDBG grantees to reprogram existing funds to meet disaster needs,activated the 203(h) program and 203(k) program waivers and issued a 90-day foreclosuremoratorium for FHA-insured properties. (47) On December 10, 2005, HUD published a notice in the Federal Register informing impactedstates of their eligibility for emergency CDBG funds. The notice included the state allocations andinformed states that, in order to access the funds, they must first submit a plan detailing how theywill use the funds. The allocation formula used SBA and FEMA data on unmet housing, businessand public assistance needs for all designated areas in major disaster declarations. The formulaweighted unmet housing needs at 50%, unmet business needs at 25%, and unmet public assistanceneeds at 25%. The notice also specified waivers applicable to HOME and CDBG funds used fordisaster assistance, primarily related to planning requirements. (48) Over the course of the recovery, HUD also provided more than $26 million in emergencycapital reserve funding to repair damaged public housing units; $40 million in additional Section 8voucher funding to meet the increased costs of serving currently assisted families whose rent hadgone up because of a housing shortage caused by the hurricanes; $10 million for repair of Section202 and Section 811 properties; and $16 million to relocate displaced HUD-assisted families. (49) The four 2004 hurricanes resulted in damage to more than 700,000 homes (50) in Florida. Poor familieswere disproportionately impacted. (51) In response, on November 10, 2004, the governor of Floridanamed a hurricane housing task force to advise the state legislature on how to create more affordablehousing. On February 18, 2005, the group made its final report. It recommended, in addition to theregular allocation of housing funds, the state legislature approve a one-time infusion of $354 millionin state funds to develop several new affordable housing programs including, among others, aHurricane Housing Recovery Program, a Rental Recovery Loan Program, and a FarmworkerHousing Recovery Program. (52) In March 2005, the state of Florida Department of Community Affairs (DCA) submitted itsplan to spend its emergency CDBG funds to HUD. The Action Plan for Disaster Recovery statesthat emergency CDBG funds will be used for repairs, long-term recovery and mitigation. GivenCongress's direction that funds be used in the hardest hit areas, the DCA's plan specifies that ratherthan providing funds to all 67 areas that had been declared emergencies in the wake of thehurricanes, they will invite the 15 communities that were hardest hit to apply for emergency CDBGfunds. The plan specifies that the first priority will be given to infrastructure and public assistanceprojects. Second priority will go to economic development and business assistance projects,including those designed to promote job creation and/or retention. Third priority is given to housingrepair and development projects. The plan explains that housing projects are given the lowestpriority because of the expectation that the state legislature will fund the governor's affordablehousing plan (described earlier). (53) In times of major disaster, private citizens often cannot reasonably be expected to addresstheir own housing and shelter needs. When the United States Housing Act of 1937 set forth ahousing policy for the nation, it stated that the Federal Government should act where there is aserious need that private citizens or groups cannot or are not addressing responsibly. (54) While the Federal Emergency Management Agency is the primary federal entity chargedwith responding to a disaster, HUD is the primary entity charged with meeting the nation's housingneeds. The exact role that each agency is to play following a disaster is not entirely clear. FEMAassistance is available to meet a range of housing needs, from emergency shelters, to trailers, to homerepair grants. The review of past disasters included in this report shows that HUD's programs haveprimarily been used to provide longer-term housing aid, such as rental vouchers and new housingconstruction, as well as aid to communities to repair infrastructure and promote economicdevelopment. In the months following 2005's Hurricane Katrina, HUD's programs were not calledon to play a major role in responding to families' housing needs. FEMA's response has been metwith criticism from observers, including Members of Congress, some of whom have called for anexpansion of HUD's role. As the focus shifts from response to Katrina to the inevitable review ofthat response, the appropriate role for HUD to play following a disaster may be the subject ofCongressional debate.

Summary:
Hurricane Katrina has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of families from theirhomes. While its magnitude is unprecedented, the resulting need to shelter and house displacedfamilies is not. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the nation's agencywith a mission to provide safe and decent housing for all Americans, has played a role in meetingthose needs in the past and is playing a role in the wake of Katrina. This report looks at HUD'scurrent programs and how they have been used to respond to past disasters. The report begins by introducing the concept of a continuum of housing needs following adisaster. Displaced families' needs range from emergency shelter to temporary and permanenthousing. While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary responsibilityfor coordinating disaster relief efforts and providing certain services to help communities recover,other federal agencies, including HUD, also play an important role. HUD's programs fall into three distinct categories. The direct housing assistance programsinclude the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, the public housing program, andproject-based rental assistance (including Section 202 and Section 811 programs for the elderly anddisabled). They can be used to provide temporary housing for both families who were receivinghousing assistance at the time of the disaster as well as those who were not. The block grantprograms, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and HOME Investment PartnershipsPrograms, provide flexible funding sources to states and localities to meet housing and othercommunity development needs, including those in times of disaster. The Federal HousingAdministration (FHA) at HUD provides single-family and multi-family mortgage insurance, the rulesof which become more flexible following a disaster. In order to better understand the role HUD has played in response to disasters, this reportprofiles crises in which the housing stock was severely damaged. Congress provided emergencysupplemental funding to HUD in response to each of the following disasters: Hurricane Andrew,Midwest Flooding, the Northridge Earthquake, and the 2004 Florida Hurricanes. HUD programs have been used as a conduit for funneling short-, interim-, and long-termfunding to disaster-stricken communities many times in the past, however, Katrina's impact on theregion's housing stock eclipses that of any other natural or manmade disaster in the history of thiscountry. While looking to prior uses of HUD resources in times of disaster may be informative,given the scope of Katrina, new and broad initiatives to meet the interim- and long-term needs of theaffected region and its residents may be considered in the 109th Congress. This report containsreferences to other CRS products that track activities specifically in response to Hurricane Katrina. This report will not be updated. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: ALD -- American Law; DSP -- Domestic Social Policy; G&F --Government and Finance