President George Washington set the precedent for making special, temporary diplomatic appointments in 1789 when he named Gouverneur Morris as a private agent to establish normal diplomatic relations with British officials. From that point on, the number of these temporary special representatives expanded and contracted, depending on each Administration's governing style and the issues at the time. As the United States became more deeply involved in world affairs, and as Presidents became more directly involved in international relations, the number of special appointments grew, particularly in the 20 th and 21 st centuries. In the 115 th Congress, the authority of the President and the Secretary of State to make or change temporary, special appointments of special envoys, representatives, coordinators, advisors, and related positions has emerged as an ongoing issue of interest. Congressional concern and scrutiny regarding these special appointments has occurred during previous Administrations, including those of Presidents William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. Critics of these special positions sometimes view them as a way to circumvent the Senate's constitutional prerogative to provide its advice and consent required for long-term positions at the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), perhaps because the nominee or the position is controversial. Furthermore, such critics contend that these positions may (1) create tension or cause disputes over funding and resources with the regional and functional bureaus that would otherwise be tasked with addressing the issue at hand, (2) confuse foreign government officials regarding the importance of the issues on which the positions focus compared with other Administration policy priorities, and (3) make it harder for foreign officials to identify the correct point person representing the U.S. government on select topics. In contrast, proponents often view special appointments as a temporary, flexible tool that administrations can leverage quickly to draw attention and direct resources to a particular issue. Some proponents assert that if special envoy positions are folded into larger parts of the department, they may be overlooked and, as a result, the issues under the relevant envoy's purview may not receive the necessary attention. On August 28, 2017, Secretary Tillerson transmitted a letter to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that unveiled the department's plans to address special envoys. According to Department of State comments to the press, of the 66 positions outlined, 30 will be retained, 21 will be integrated into regional and functional bureaus, 9 will be eliminated, and 5 will be folded into existing positions. In addition, one position will be transferred to USAID. In his letter, Secretary Tillerson made note of concerns that special envoys can "circumvent the regional and functional bureaus that make up the core of the State Department." He asserted that his planned changes would empower regional and functional bureaus, create a more efficient State Department, and improve the department's ability to achieve critical foreign policy goals that are currently the responsibility of special envoys. The Administration proposed one of the following policy options for each special envoy position (see tables below to review specific proposals for each position): retain and expand the position; retain the position, with no changes; retain the position and staff, but realign them under a more appropriate bureau or office; retain the position and staff, dual-hat the position with an existing position, and keep its staff and functions aligned under its existing bureau or office; retain the position and staff, dual-hat the position with an existing position, and realign the position, staff, and functions under a more appropriate bureau or office; transfer the functions and staff of the position to USAID; remove the title of the position, but keep its staff and functions aligned under its existing bureau or office; remove the title of the position and realign staff and functions under a more appropriate bureau or office; or remove or retire the position. While it is not unusual for Congress to express concern regarding the department's use of these temporary positions in the foreign policy arena, the 115 th Congress is particularly interested because of the Trump Administration's announced goals to reorganize the executive branch, including the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. On June 13 and 14, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held budget hearings with Secretary of State Tillerson that indicated congressional interest in special envoy use. On July 17, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing with Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan on the State Department FY2018 Reauthorization and Reorganization Plan. Extensive discussion focused on special envoys, representatives, coordinators, negotiators, and advisors (hereinafter referred to as special envoys or special appointments). Congressional interest in this issue has surfaced at additional hearings in the 115 th Congress. In July 2017, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed S. 1631 , the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2018. If enacted into law, this bill would limit the use of temporary foreign affairs appointments and require most appointees to be confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Title III, Section 301, of S. 1631 would require that the Secretary of State provide a report, not later than 30 days after enactment of the bill, comprising recommendations regarding whether to maintain each existing "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" that is not expressly authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress; no later than 90 days after the issuance of the aforementioned report, the Secretary of State present any "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" that the department intends to retain but is not expressly authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the advice and consent of the Senate; the Secretary can establish or maintain "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" positions provided that the appointment is established for a specified term and presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for the advice and consent of the Senate within 90 days of the appointment; the Secretary of State may maintain or establish temporary "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, or Special Advisor" positions for a limited period of no longer than 180 days without the advice and consent of the Senate as long as the Secretary notifies the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at least 15 days prior to the appointment and certifies that the position is not expected to demand the exercise of significant authority pursuant to U.S. law (the Secretary may renew any position established under these authorities provided that the Secretary complies with these notification requirements); beginning not later than 120 days following enactment, no funds may be obligated or expended for any "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" positions exercising significant authority pursuant to U.S. law that is not being served by an individual who has been presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for advice and consent of the Senate; in addition, funds may not be obligated or expended for any staff or resources related to such positions until the appointed individual has been presented; beginning not later than 120 days following enactment, no funds may be obligated or expended for temporary positions (those lasting for a duration of no longer than 180 days) or any related staff and resources unless the Secretary of State has complied with the notification process; no "Special Envoy, Special Representative, Special Coordinator, Special Negotiator, Envoy, Representative, Coordinator, or Special Advisor" authorized by a provision of law enacted by Congress shall be appointed absent the advice and consent of the Senate (with the exception of the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues); the congressional authorization for the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma shall be repealed. Separate provisions of S. 1631 provide congressional authorization for the Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues position and, separately, give the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom the authority to supervise any special envoy, representative, or office, including the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism, with responsibility for protecting international religious freedom, protecting religious minorities, or advising the Secretary of State on matters relating to religion. In September 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations passed S. 1780 , the "Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2018." If enacted, none of the funds appropriated in the bill or in any prior law could be used to downsize, downgrade, consolidate, close, move, or relocate to another United States Government agency several offices and positions, including the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs; the Office of the Special Coordinator for Global Criminal Justice Issues; the Coordinator for Cyber Issues; the Special Advisor for Religious Minorities in the Near East and South Central Asia; the Coordinator for Sanctions Policy; the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues; the Office of Global Women's Issues; the Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTI Persons; and the Special Advisor for International Disability Rights. The committee report accompanying the bill noted that, " the August 28, 2017, notification on special envoys and representatives raises further questions on the integrity of the [reorganization of the Department of State] process, as the Committee notes that any proposal for significant personnel changes should be a component of the [broader] reorganization or redesign." In addition, the 114 th Congress passed the Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017 ( P.L. 114-323 ), which required the Secretary of State to submit a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs comprising a "tabulation of the current names, ranks, positions, and responsibilities of all special envoy, representative, advisor, and coordinator positions at the Department, with a separate accounting of all such positions at the level of Assistant Secretary (or equivalent) or above." In addition, for each position so identified, the department was required to provide information including the date on which each position was created, the mechanism by which each position was created, the current department official to which each position reports, and the total number of staff assigned to support each position. The Department of State provided this report to the committees in April 2017. Temporary positions are often created in response to congressional or public demands for increased Department of State attention to a specific global issue, event, or crisis. These positions may be created to circumvent the advice and consent role of the Senate, among other reasons, although Congress has established some of these positions in statute. The following tables identify key positions, including special envoy, representative, coordinator, advisor, ambassador-at-large, and similar positions that the State Department identified in an April 2017 report transmitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; additional positions that CRS identified; descriptions for each position; and the Trump Administration's proposed plan for each position as described in Secretary Tillerson's August 28, 2017, letter. The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) defines a special envoy as "one designated for a particular purpose, such as the conduct of special negotiations and attendance at coronations, inaugurations, and other state ceremonies of special importance." The designation is temporary. While U.S. law does not include a blanket requirement that the Senate provide advice and consent for the appointment of special envoys, it does require advice and consent for select special envoys. The department's two "special envoy and coordinator" positions, the Special Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center and the Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, are at least in part authorized by statute. In addition, the Department of State has established two existing special presidential envoys, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs. The responsibilities of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs are provided through Executive Order 13698 and Presidential Policy Directive 30. According to the Department of State, the role of the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS is to help coordinate all aspects of U.S. policy related to destroying ISIS. This position was established pursuant to Department of State general authorities. Both special presidential envoys are housed within the Office of the Secretary and report to the Secretary of State. See Table 1 for the status of special envoys, special envoy and coordinators, special presidential envoys, and U.S. special envoys. The roles, responsibilities, and protocol rankings of several special representative positions in the Department of State are addressed in U.S. law. For example, 22 U.S.C. SS2567 authorizes the President to appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, "special representatives of the President for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament matters." This law further stipulates that "each Presidential Special Representative shall hold the rank of ambassador." The Foreign Affairs Manual provides information regarding the roles and responsibilities of select special representatives not mandated by statute. See Table 2 for the status of special representatives and U.S. special representatives. Neither U.S. law nor the Foreign Affairs Manual offers a basic definition or generic overview of the roles, responsibilities, and protocol for the ranking of coordinators, lead coordinators, senior coordinators, special coordinators, or U.S. coordinators (hereinafter, coordinators) in the Department of State. However, the duties of the congressionally authorized coordinator positions are provided in statute. When not detailed in the FAM, descriptions of the coordinator positions that are not congressionally authorized are sometimes available on the Department of State's website. See Table 3 for the status of coordinators. U.S. law does not define the general roles, responsibilities, and protocol ranking of senior advisors and special advisors in the Department of State. The Foreign Affairs Manual makes note of the general responsibilities of special advisors assigned to the department's regional bureaus, dividing them into the categories of labor advisors, economic advisors, political-military advisors, regional planning advisors, and United Nations advisors. The FAM adds that "some bureaus combine a number of these advisors into one office unit under a director" and includes information about the responsibilities of public affairs advisors assigned to both regional and functional bureaus. However, these broader guidelines do not appear to apply generally to those advisors placed outside of regional bureaus. Senior advisors and special advisors in functional bureaus tend to have significant influence over a narrow functional area, while senior advisors and special advisors in regional bureaus support a broader scope of bureau activities with less leadership responsibility. This distinction may explain why the senior advisors and special advisors identified by the department and listed below are located outside regional bureaus. Position descriptions for some department advisors are available on the department's website. See Table 4 for the status of senior advisors and special advisors. Ambassadors-at-large are "appointed by the President and serve anywhere in the world to help with emergent problems, to conduct special or intensive negotiations, or serve in other capacities, as requested by the Secretary or the President." As required by 22 U.S.C. SS3942(a)(1), the appointment of Ambassadors-at-large is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Ambassadors-at-large generally rank immediately below assistant secretaries of state in terms of protocol. They are perceived within the department as managers of crucial yet narrow subject matters, while assistant secretaries have much broader responsibilities. While the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Coordinator of U.S. Government Activities to Combat Global HIV/AIDS, the Special Representative for Global Health Diplomacy, and the Special Coordinator for Global Criminal Justice Issues do not have the position title of "ambassador-at-large," the department currently provides these positions that rank. See Table 5 for the status of ambassadors-at-large. In addition to the position groups noted above, several uniquely titled positions exist within the Department of State identified by both the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and the department as related to special envoys, representatives, coordinators, and related positions. Many of these positions are authorized by statute, and their authorities can be found therein. Nevertheless, no statutory authorization exists for the lone "lead coordinator" position, the "Lead Coordinator for Iran Nuclear Implementation" post. The position is noted in the Foreign Affairs Manual only as being housed within the Office of the Secretary. A description of the position is available in remarks made by then-Secretary Kerry in September 2015. Similarly, no statutory authorization exists for the lone "senior official" position, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Senior Official. The position title reflects the institutional infrastructure of APEC, wherein each member state designates a "senior official" who, according to APEC, participates in guiding the organization's working level activities and projects under the direction of APEC Ministers. The duties of the Senior Official for APEC are defined in the FAM. Descriptions for other positions listed below can be found on the department's website. See Table 6 for the status of miscellaneous positions. Special envoys and related position officeholders are appointed to government service through various avenues, as reflected by the diverse means of pay through which officeholders are compensated. According to the Department of State, these include the Senior Executive Service (SES) pay rates, the Executive Schedule (EX) and the General Schedule (GS) pay rates, and, separately, rates of pay for those appointed as Experts (ED), Consultants (EF), and in senior-level positions (SL). These means of pay, which are authorized by statute, are applied not only to personnel within the Department of State, but also to those elsewhere in the federal government. Special envoys who serve as ambassadors-at-large, assistant secretaries and under secretaries are required by statute to be compensated through the Executive Schedule. According to information transmitted by the Department of State, officeholders compensated through these means are both career FSOs and noncareer officials. Other officeholders are compensated through the Senior Foreign Service (SFS) and Foreign Service (FS) pay rates, whereas others are compensated through statutory guidelines proscribing salaries to chiefs of mission. These means of compensation are authorized pursuant to the Foreign Service Act of 1980 ( P.L. 96-465 , as amended; hereinafter, the Foreign Service Act). The Foreign Service Act authorizes the Secretary of State to make "limited appointments" to the Senior Foreign Service of individuals who are not career FSOs under certain conditions. Therefore, special envoys and related officeholders compensated under SFS and FS pay rates are both career FSOs and noncareer members of the Senior Foreign Service. Many in the foreign affairs community and in Congress have differing views of the advantages and disadvantages of special appointments. In the 1990s, for example, many believed that the Clinton Administration had overused special appointments (for those not established by statute). Early in George W. Bush's terms of office, his Administration announced, in contrast to the previous Administration, that it would avoid the use of special appointments. However, by the end of the Bush Administration, the number of special appointments had matched those under the Clinton Administration. Another factor in appointing special envoys is the sense of urgency regarding a given issue, as determined by Members of Congress and interest groups that may be pressing their representatives and the Administration to elevate their concerns--either through Congress or via the Administration. According to one study, "in nearly every case we examined over several Administrations, the impetus to appoint a [special envoy/special representative] was a combination of congressional pressure and the Administration's readiness to give the matter higher-level attention." In the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 17, 2017, Chairman Corker stated, "Special Envoys do more harm than good.... I think that they hurt the culture of our professional Foreign Service officers candidly because I think they see them in many cases as a work around.... I hope that we'll do away with all of them that are unnecessary. And I think most of them are unnecessary." Following issuance of the Trump Administration's plans regarding special envoys on August 28, 2017, Senator Corker reiterated his concern regarding the accumulation of special envoys at the department. He added that the authorization bill the committee passed in July "recognizes that urgent developments may require the creation of a special envoy" and that he looked forward to examining the proposed changes in detail. At the same hearing, Ranking Member Benjamin Cardin said that "we have too many special envoys. On the other hand, there are areas that I want to have special attention, where I don't think you get it unless there's a point person within the State Department to deal with it.... " Following the publication of Secretary Tillerson's letter outlining the department's plans with regard to special envoys, Senator Cardin commented, "I agree with Secretary Tillerson that there is room for examining the use of our Special Envoys ... while I support creating a more efficient and effective Department, we must be sure that the Administration is not eliminating Envoys who are critical to our ability to advance our interests and our values." There are numerous arguments for and against the use of special envoys--both in general and with regard to specific policy issues. Which positions are necessary or unnecessary may differ from one Member of Congress to another or from one Administration to another. Proponents of special envoys espouse several perceived benefits of such positions, including the notions that such positions are short-term and flexible and can activate U.S. response more easily than having to go through regular channels; are a quick tool that the Department of State can use when a crisis erupts; indicate high-level Administration interest in a particular issue; help an ambassador or an assistant secretary who does not have the time or resources to deal with a specific issue within a country; can coordinate a wider range of aspects that go beyond the country or region under the purview of an ambassador or assistant secretary; can represent directly the views of the President or Secretary of State and, thus, give the U.S. representative greater status (than an assistant secretary, for example) and access to higher level foreign government officials; are generally less expensive than a full-time permanent government employee, whose position may be difficult to eliminate at the end of an Administration; could engage, in certain cases, with enemies or others that regular diplomats would or could not; and address issues that Congress or interest groups are calling attention toward. Critics argue that special envoys, especially if overused, can create concerns. Some concerns are that special appointments could undermine the ambassador in the country, the assistant secretary of state, or cause confusion among foreign government officials and even within the department itself as to who is the point person on certain issues; may create tension between themselves and the ambassador or the assistant secretary by assuming a large share of scarce resources dedicated to a particular issue or taking on a special role and leaving the routine work to the career employees; have a lack of accountability to Congress and the American public, as they frequently work directly for the President or Secretary of State; have, in the past, hired large numbers of staff, while not being able to take advantage of qualified Foreign Service Officers because of timing and a perception among Foreign Service Officers that serving under special envoys does little to advance their careers; could undermine the consistency of the Administration's policy and/or could distort the importance of the issue, as compared with other ongoing foreign policy issues; in some cases are appointed from outside the foreign policy arena and are unable to operate effectively due to a lack knowledge of key policy players in Washington and the means through which the department's bureaucracy operates; tend to remain in place at the department long after the issues for which they were created to address are resolved; and if eliminated after they are created, could signal unintentionally to the rest of the world that the United States is downplaying or ignoring the issue area for which the special representative was responsible. Congress has addressed issues arising from the use of special appointments by requiring the Department of State to report to Congress on the existing use of these positions, holding hearings, and including language in legislation (currently in the Senate) that would require many appointments to be made with the advice and consent of the Senate. Other options might include limiting the scope of individuals eligible to serve as special envoys through several related means, including proscribing limitations on the volume of appropriated funds that can be expended for the compensation of special envoys and related officials; exemptions could be carved out for the remuneration of special pay differentials and death gratuities as needed; and requiring individuals who serve in these positions to be career members of the Senior Foreign Service or the Foreign Service appointed pursuant to 22 U.S.C. SS3492(a)(1), which requires career members of the Senior Foreign Service and Foreign Service Officers to be appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate; exemptions could be carved out for members of the Senior Executive Service, detailees from other federal agencies, or others as needed. Congressional perspectives on these issues over the 115 th Congress may evolve as the Secretary of State and the Trump Administration as a whole continue to pursue and implement specific aspects of State Department and executive branch reorganization.

Summary:
The 115th Congress has expressed interest in monitoring the use of special envoys, representatives, and coordinator positions by the Department of State, as well as any changes to their status. Special, temporary diplomatic appointments originated during the presidency of George Washington, and the number of special representatives has expanded and contracted since then. Tabulating the precise number of these positions is difficult, however, because some special positions have fallen into disuse over time and were never officially eliminated. Administration Action on Special Positions It is not unusual for Congress to express concern or assert legislative prerogatives regarding the department's use of temporary positions in the foreign policy arena. These positions may come under particular scrutiny in the 115th Congress in light of the Trump Administration's ongoing effort to reorganize the executive branch, including the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. On August 28, 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson transmitted a letter detailing the Trump Administration's proposed plans to expand, consolidate, or eliminate several temporary special envoy positions, while keeping others in place without any changes. For those positions that are authorized in statute, congressional action may be required for the Administration to move forward with its proposed changes. Congressional Action on Special Positions The 115th Congress has also taken action to address the issue of special envoys. For example, on July 17, 2017, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing with Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan in which the use of such positions was discussed extensively. Later in July, the committee passed an authorization bill (S. 1631) that, if enacted, would include new limitations pertaining to the use of special envoys, such as provisions subjecting the appointment of individuals to such positions to the advice and consent of the Senate. Furthermore, the Senate Committee on Appropriations passed a State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill (S. 1780) that would prohibit the use of funds to downsize, downgrade, consolidate, close, move, or relocate (to another federal agency) select special envoys or their offices. Some Members of Congress perceive congressional input regarding the use of special envoys as both important in its own right and a crucial component of the broader need for Congress to assert its prerogatives as the Trump Administration continues to reorganize the executive branch and the Department of State. Scope of This Report This report provides background on the use of special envoys, representatives, and coordinators (primarily within the foreign affairs arena; for the most part, interagency positions are not included). It identifies various temporary positions, their purpose, and existing authorities. The report presents commonly articulated arguments for and against the use of these positions and issues for Congress going forward. The scope of this report is limited to the special envoy and related positions identified by the Department of State in a 2017 report to Congress and additional selected positions identified by CRS. This report may be updated to reflect congressional action.