Section 233 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 required DOD to report on various regional BMD topics, including the eight specific elements presented in table 1, by June 24, 2014. DOD identified its current approach to regional BMD in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. In that report, DOD stated it would match U.S. BMD strategies, policies, and capabilities to the requirements of current and future threats and use that information to inform BMD planning, budgeting, and oversight. DOD also noted that phased, adaptive approaches to BMD would enable a flexible, scalable response to BMD threats around the world by incorporating new technologies quickly and cost-effectively, and described the advantages of mobile BMD assets that can be readily transported from one region to another, over fixed assets. In addition, DOD indicated that new assets would undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions, prior to deployment. Finally, DOD emphasized working with regional allies to strengthen BMD and its deterrent value. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report indicates that the United States would pursue a phased, adaptive approach to missile defense within each region that is tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to each region. An area of emphasis in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report was on the EPAA--the U.S. approach to regional BMD in Europe. In the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, DOD also discussed the development of regional phased, adaptive approaches to BMD in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. The 2010 report highlighted differences among the ballistic missile threat posed to each region, as well as the differences among the regional defensive arrangements that exist between the United States and its partners. In an August 2013 report on regional BMD issues, DOD stated that its process of working with regional allies and partners was well under way and included the participation, along with the United States, of some allies and partners in regional command and control centers that conduct BMD operations. In the Pacific, DOD noted that cooperation is most robust with Japan, that other allies and partners participate to varying degrees, and that allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region generally have exhibited an increasing interest in enhanced cooperation with DOD. DOD's August 2013 report also noted that in the Middle East the United States is working with a number of Gulf Cooperation Council States on a bilateral basis, including supporting the purchase of BMD systems through the Foreign Military Sales program. DOD's regional BMD effort consists of a number of specific weapon systems or elements that compose the BMD system as a whole. They are the following: Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC): a system that integrates individual BMD elements and allows users to plan BMD operations, maintain situational awareness and communications, and manage networked sensors. Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2) X-Band Radar: a sensor that tracks ballistic missiles in flight. Aegis BMD Weapons System: a ship-based weapon system that consists of a radar, software, and processors to track threat missiles and cue Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. Aegis Ashore: a land-based version of the Aegis BMD interceptor system, which will employ Aegis BMD Weapons System upgrades and SM-3 upgrades as they become available. Standard Missile-3 (SM-3): a family of defensive missiles that intercept regional threat missiles of various ranges. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD): a mobile, ground- based missile defense system that includes a fire control and communications system, a radar, interceptors, and other support equipment. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): a mobile defense against short-range missiles. It is now operated and fielded by the U.S. Army and may be used in a variety of regional BMD approaches. According to DOD, various versions of these weapon systems are being deployed in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and in the Middle East, but the EPAA is the only regional approach described extensively in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. To support Phase 1 of the EPAA for operations in Europe, by December 2011 MDA delivered an AN/TPY-2 X-band radar, an Aegis BMD ship with SM-3 Block IA missiles, and an upgrade to C2BMC. As we reported in March 2014,the EPAA are intended to provide improved integration and interoperability among sensors and interceptor systems, which would expand the area being defended, as well as improve the ability to defend against attacks involving a larger number of incoming missiles. Specifically, for Phase 2, MDA plans to deploy improved versions of the Aegis BMD Weapons System on ships and Aegis Ashore in Romania with the next generation of SM-3 interceptor, called SM-3 Block IB. MDA also plans to field improvements to C2BMC, upgrading an existing version in the 2015 time frame and fielding a new version in 2017. For Phase 3, MDA is developing further improvements to the Aegis BMD system, including a new version of the weapons system and new interceptor, called SM-3 Block IIA, as well as an additional Aegis Ashore installation in Poland and further improvements to C2BMC for fielding in 2018. Figure 1 depicts the weapon systems that DOD plans to deploy in and around Europe in support of the EPAA in its three phases. DOD, Report to Congress: Regional Ballistic Missile Defense. Compared to the statutory reporting requirements, DOD's June 2014 regional BMD report addressed five of the eight required reporting elements, and partially addressed the remaining three elements. DOD addressed elements that describe the overall risk assessment from the Global Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment, the role of regional missile defenses in the homeland defense mission, the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities, and two elements on the roles and contributions of allies. DOD partially addressed the remaining three reporting elements, regarding the alignment of regional approaches to missile defense with combatant command integrated priorities, the concept of operations for EPAA, and the testing and development of key EPAA elements. Table 2 summarizes our assessment of DOD's report. Additionally, through interviews with DOD officials and from our application of generally accepted standards that define a sound and complete defense research study, we found that DOD's report did not include key details for some required reporting elements that we believe could have benefitted congressional defense committees' oversight of DOD's regional BMD programs. Generally accepted standards that define a sound and complete defense research study include that a report provide complete, accurate, and relevant information for the client and stakeholders. However, DOD's report does not consistently meet this standard, based on GAO's review. For example, the standards for the presentation of results state that findings should be complete and accurate, but we found that key information regarding the characterization of the testing and development of EPAA systems was incomplete. DOD's June 2014 report could have provided additional details for several of the required reporting elements. Specifically: In support of element F, regarding integration of offensive and defensive capabilities, the report described some plans regarding implementation of the imperatives suggested in the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Vision for 2020. We determined that DOD's report met the statutory requirement to describe the manner in which enhanced integration of offensive and defensive capabilities will fit into regional missile defense planning and force structure assessments. Although not required, we found the report did not provide comprehensive information on how DOD will identify and address potential capability and capacity shortfalls in support of air and missile defense missions, nor did it provide a description of policies to increase cooperation among partners and allies, as emphasized by the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Vision for 2020, which is information that provides more insight into how DOD manages regional BMD resources and risks. In support of elements G and H, regarding allied contributions to regional BMD, DOD's report included some information that did not relate to regional missile defense and characterized a number of allied contributions as notional, which could misrepresent the extent to which particular allies and partners contribute to regional BMD. For example, the report mentions Denmark hosting an Upgraded Early Warning Radar in Greenland as an allied contribution to European missile defense, but that radar is used exclusively for supporting the homeland defense BMD mission. Additionally, the report did not include estimates of actual or potential cost savings derived from taking advantage of economies of scale or a reduced number of U.S. deployments due to allied capabilities. For instance, Japan's effort to develop and deploy the Aegis BMD Weapon System on Japanese ships is mentioned by the report, but without concrete information on the effect that may have on U.S. resources. Appendix I highlights U.S. and allied contributions to regional BMD operations. Additionally, we determined that DOD's report omitted key details regarding its approach to regional BMD for the three elements that it partially addressed in the report, regarding the combatant commands' force structure and deployment options, concepts for operating with NATO, and the development of EPAA systems. We believe that by not including these details, although not required, DOD reduced the report's usefulness to the congressional defense committees and to their oversight of DOD's regional BMD programs. In support of element B, regarding the combatant commands' deployment options, as stated earlier, we determined that DOD's report partially addressed the required reporting element because it did not include key details about U.S. European Command's and U.S. Pacific Command's planned options to increase BMD capability in response to an imminent threat, nor did the report provide a comprehensive analysis regarding how the various regional approaches to BMD will meet combatant command integrated priorities. DOD's report also did not provide an analysis of the BMD assets that each combatant command needs to meet their respective integrated priorities, nor did it describe how many assets each combatant command has in-theater to address these requirements, or identify how many assets DOD could reasonably deploy into the area if additional capability were needed during a crisis. U.S. Strategic Command and the Joint Staff track the deployment and availability of BMD forces, such as the Aegis BMD Weapon System, THAAD, and PAC- 3, and make priority recommendations for their deployment, so that senior DOD decision makers can assess risk and priorities when allocating assets among regions. In support of element C, related to operational control of assets in Europe, we found that DOD's report lacked key details about how command of assets are allocated between U.S. European Command and NATO. For example, in the briefing referenced by the report, DOD provides some description of how Aegis ships would be transferred from one command's authority to the other and provides the current operational control status for the forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-band radar. However, neither the report nor the briefing contain the operational details that are important to fully understanding the circumstances under which each of the relevant BMD systems could be transferred from one command's authority to another. This information is important to fully understanding the implications of how control of BMD assets is allocated, as well as the effect those circumstances have on various BMD systems. In support of element D, regarding the development and testing of BMD systems that are part of EPAA, DOD's report did not include details about C2BMC and Aegis BMD testing and development issues, and the lack of such detail may limit Congress' ability to understand the extent to which the EPAA system can be integrated: C2BMC: The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report and MDA's acquisition and system engineering documentation underscore the importance of C2BMC for all regional approaches, since it is the system that enables system-level capabilities. In EPAA, C2BMC is necessary to link allied systems, such as NATO's Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, with the U.S. systems. It also controls the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar, and integrates Aegis BMD ships, as well as additional sensors and an Aegis Ashore as they become available in Phases 2 and 3. As the integrator, C2BMC allows the BMD system to defend against more missiles simultaneously, to conserve interceptor inventory, and to defend a larger area than individual systems operating independently. For Phase 2 of the EPAA, MDA plans to upgrade the C2BMC system in 2015 to address new threats and, in 2017, to integrate additional sensors and improve the ability of Aegis BMD to launch an interceptor before its shipboard radar acquires a threat missile. In 2018, for Phase 3 of the EPAA, MDA plans additional C2BMC upgrades, including some that would enable the Aegis BMD to intercept missiles based on tracks passed through C2BMC from forward-based AN/TPY-2 X-band radars, without having to detect the threat with its own radar. However, our current and previous work indicates that some capability upgrades to C2BMC for Phase 3 of the EPAA have been deferred indefinitely, which DOD did not reference in its June 2014 report. For example, according to our analysis of MDA's system engineering documentation, we found that MDA has deferred the delivery of a key C2BMC capability that would further integrate the BMD system and improve its management of limited BMD resources by allowing C2BMC to directly send engagement commands to interceptor systems. According to the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, effective "battle management" requires C2BMC to not only collect and process information from sensors and weapons, as it currently does, but to also determine which threats should be engaged by which weapon to produce the highest probability of engagement success and then transmit this information back to the sensors and weapons. Aegis BMD Weapon System: DOD's report did not fully describe the performance and acquisition risks to the Aegis BMD systems slated for Phase 2 of the EPAA, which we have identified through our prior work. Aegis BMD is the primary interceptor system for EPAA. MDA plans upgrades for Phase 2 of the EPAA that increase the types and number of threats it can engage. However, in April 2014, we found that one SM-3 Block 1B failed in flight during an interceptor test in September 2013, which, according to our current work, could increase reliability risk. Since then, DOD officials told us that MDA is seeking to maintain reliability of the interceptor by developing a redesign; it is unclear when this redesign will be flight-tested. MDA told us that it plans to ground-test the redesign. Moreover, our reviews of MDA's Aegis BMD Baseline Execution Reviews from April 2013, August 2013, and June 2014 indicated that the certification of a new version of Aegis BMD software called Aegis BMD 4.1, which is needed for Phase 2, had been delayed at least 3 months past Phase 2 declaration. Additionally, based on our analysis of MDA's August 2013 and June 2014 Baseline Execution Reviews, MDA continues to discover software defects faster than it is able to fix them for another version of Aegis BMD, also planned for Phase 2 of the EPAA. Furthermore, although DOD officials told us that the Aegis Ashore program is on track, our review of MDA's March 2014 test documentation identified schedule slips that delayed Aegis Ashore's participation in key interoperability tests, compressing the time to rectify issues should they be discovered prior to the planned Phase 2 declaration in 2015. DOD officials who developed the June 2014 regional BMD report told us that they used their best judgment in determining the appropriate level of detail for the report. The officials added that their goal was to address each of the required reporting elements concisely. Furthermore, they explained that they regularly provide more detailed analysis on some of these topics to congressional defense committees via periodic briefings, and that they did not want to provide duplicative or unnecessary information. Although we recognize the need for professional judgment by DOD officials when preparing the report, our review concluded that DOD's report did not include details that we believe could have made the report more useful to Congress in its oversight of DOD's regional BMD programs. However, DOD's report was prepared in response to a onetime, nonrecurring mandate, and therefore we are not making any recommendations to amend the report and provide additional detail. DOD reviewed a draft of this report, but did not provide formal agency comments. DOD did provide technical comments, and we incorporated these changes as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Director, MDA. This report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-9971 or KirschbaumJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. Appendix I: Allied Contributions to Regional Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Figure 2 summarizes key information provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) regarding the contributions of allies to regional BMD. In addition to the contact named above, Kevin O'Neill, Assistant Director; David Best; Patricia Donahue; Amie Lesser; Randy Neice; Wiktor J. Niewiadomski; Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; Mike Shaughnessy; and Jina Yu made key contributions to this report. Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Address Implementation Issues and Estimate Long-Term Costs for European Capabilities. GAO-14-314. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2014. Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and Improving Accountability. GAO-14-351. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2014. Regional Missile Defense: DOD's Report Provided Limited Information; Assessment of Acquisition Risks is Optimistic. GAO-14-248R. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2014. Missile Defense: Opportunity to Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition Management. GAO-13-432. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2013. Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency. GAO-12-486. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2012. Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Training Integration and Increase Transparency of Training Resources. GAO-11-625. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2011. Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Accountability. GAO-11-372. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2011. Ballistic Missile Defense: DOD Needs to Address Planning and Implementation Challenges for Future Capabilities in Europe. GAO-11-220. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2011. Missile Defense: European Phased Adaptive Approach Acquisitions Face Synchronization, Transparency, and Accountability Challenges. GAO-11-179R. Washington, D.C.: December 21, 2010. Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Program Instability Affects Reliability of Earned Value Management Data. GAO-10-676. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010. Defense Acquisitions: Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach. GAO-10-311. Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2010.

Summary:
Regional BMD constitutes an essential element in deterring enemies from using ballistic missiles and supporting defense commitments to U.S. allies and partners. DOD's 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report noted that the United States would pursue phased, tailored, and adaptive approaches to regional BMD in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, and the Middle East. A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2014 mandated DOD to submit within 180 days a report to the congressional defense committees on eight elements related to the status and progress of regional BMD programs and efforts. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the NDAA mandated that GAO provide its views on DOD's report. Separately, GAO was requested to provide its results in a written, publicly releasable form. This report assesses the extent to which DOD's report addressed the required reporting elements and provides views on other key information, if any, that DOD could have included in the report. GAO used a scorecard methodology to compare the required reporting elements to the information in DOD's BMD report. Further, GAO reviewed the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report , combatant commander integrated priority lists, and other DOD documents and policy, and interviewed DOD officials to gain further insight on DOD's regional BMD efforts. The Department of Defense's (DOD) June 2014 regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) report addressed five of the eight required reporting elements, and partially addressed the remaining three required reporting elements. DOD's report addressed elements relating to a BMD risk assessment, the role that regional missile defenses play in the homeland defense mission, the integration of offensive and defensive capabilities, and two elements on the roles and contributions of allies. DOD's report partially addressed the required reporting elements regarding the alignment of regional approaches to missile defense with combatant command-integrated priorities, the concept of operations for the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), and the testing and development of key EPAA elements. Additionally, GAO determined that DOD's report did not include key details for some elements that would have benefitted the congressional defense committees' oversight of DOD's regional BMD efforts. Generally accepted research standards for preparing sound and complete defense studies include providing complete, accurate, and relevant information. However, DOD's report does not consistently meet this standard, based on GAO's review. For example, the explanation in DOD's report of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's transfer of authority process did not include sufficient detail to clearly convey the process. DOD's report also did not include details regarding the combatant commands' requirements, nor did it fully describe issues affecting the testing and development of key regional BMD systems (see fig.). DOD officials told GAO that the report was intended to address each of the eight required reporting elements concisely, that DOD regularly provides more detailed analysis on some of these topics to Congress via periodic briefings, and that they did not want to provide duplicative information in this report. GAO recognizes that judgment is needed in preparing reports to Congress; however, DOD's report did not include details on key BMD assets and risks to the EPAA schedule, which limits the report's utility to the congressional defense committees in their oversight of DOD's regional BMD programs. Because DOD prepared its report in response to a nonrecurring mandate, GAO is not making recommendations.