As we reported in July 2013, DHS had not yet fulfilled the 2004 statutory requirement to implement a biometric exit capability or the statutory requirement to report overstay estimates, and as of January 2016, DHS has planning efforts underway but has not yet met these requirements. Various planning, evaluation, and data reliability challenges have affected DHS's efforts to meet these requirements. Development and implementation of a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS's efforts to implement a biometric entry and exit system. For example, with regard to an exit capability at land ports of entry, in 2006, we reported that according to DHS officials, for various reasons, a biometric exit capability could not be implemented without incurring a major impact on land facilities. For example, at the time of our 2006 report, DHS officials stated that implementing a biometric exit system at land ports of entry would require new infrastructure and would produce major traffic congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicles upon exit to be processed. With regard to an air exit capability, in February and August 2007, we found that DHS had not adequately defined and justified its proposed expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration projects and that it had not developed a complete schedule for biometric exit implementation. Further, in September 2008, we reported that DHS was unlikely to meet its timeline for implementing an air exit system with biometric indicators, such as fingerprints, by July 1, 2009, because of several unresolved issues, such as opposition to the department's published plan by the airline industry. In 2009, DHS conducted pilot programs for biometric air exit capabilities in airport scenarios, and in August 2010 we found that there were limitations with the pilot programs. For example, the pilot programs did not operationally test about 30 percent of the air exit requirements identified in the evaluation plan for the pilot programs, which hindered DHS's ability to inform decision making for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of information on air exit's operational impacts. In October 2010, DHS issued a memo, in which it identified three primary reasons why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric exit capability at airports: (1) the methods of collecting biometric data could disrupt the flow of travelers through airport terminals; (2) air carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3) challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of departure, including determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information at airports. According to DHS officials, the challenges DHS identified in October 2010 continue to affect the department's ability to implement a biometric air exit system as of January 2016. As discussed in our July 2013 report, following this memo, DHS took additional steps to plan and test options for a biometric exit capability at airports. Specifically, in 2011, DHS directed S&T, in coordination with other DHS component agencies, to research long-term options for biometric air exit. S&T conducted analysis of previous air exit pilot programs and assessment of available technologies, and in May 2012, the department reported internally on the results of S&T's analysis. In that report, DHS concluded that the building blocks to implement an effective biometric air exit system were available. In addition, DHS's report stated that new traveler facilitation tools and technologies--for example, online check-in, self-service, and paperless technology--could support more cost-effective ways to screen travelers, and that these improvements should be leveraged when developing plans for biometric air exit. However, DHS officials stated that there may be challenges to leveraging new technologies to the extent that U.S. airports and airlines rely on older, proprietary systems that may be difficult to update to incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS reported in May 2012 that significant questions remained regarding (1) the effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes and the error rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost-effectively integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g., collecting biometric scans as passengers enter the jetway to board a plane), (3) the additional value biometric air exit would provide compared with the current biographic air exit process, and (4) the overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability. The report also included nine recommendations to help inform DHS's planning for biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that would, among other things, assess the value of collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data and determine whether biometric air exit is economically justified. DHS reported in May 2012 that it planned to take steps to address these recommendations by May 2014, and DHS has begun some implementation steps. For example, in March 2014, DHS took initial steps by finalizing goals and objectives for a biometric system, which CBP plans to use to evaluate system performance. However, as of January 2016, the department has not yet fully addressed the May 2012 report recommendations. For example, as discussed in more detail below, DHS has not completed an evaluation framework to guide its assessment efforts. In fall 2012, DHS developed a high-level plan for its biometric air exit efforts, which it updated in May 2013, but we reported in July 2013 that this plan did not clearly identify the tasks needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework. For example, the plan did not include a step for developing the methodology for comparing the costs and benefits of biometric data against those for collecting biographic data, as recommended in DHS's May 2012 report. Furthermore, the time frames in this plan were not accurate as of June 2013 because DHS was behind schedule on some of the tasks and had not updated the time frames in the plan accordingly. For example, DHS had planned to begin scenario-based testing for biometric air exit options in August 2013; however, DHS did not open the facility used to conduct this testing until June 2014. A senior official from DHS's Office of Policy told us that DHS had not kept the plan up-to-date because of the transition of responsibilities within DHS; specifically, in March 2013, pursuant to the explanatory statement for DHS's fiscal year 2013 appropriation, CBP was named the lead agency for coordinating DHS's entry and exit policies and operations, with responsibility for implementing a biometric exit program. Various challenges have affected DHS's efforts to develop and implement a biometric exit system. For example, in July 2013, we reported DHS officials stated it had been difficult coordinating with airlines and airports, which have expressed reluctance about biometric air exit because of concerns over its effect on operations and potential costs. To address these concerns, DHS was conducting outreach and soliciting information from airlines and airports regarding their operations. In addition, in July 2013 we reported that DHS officials stated that the department's efforts to date had been hindered by insufficient funding. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Public Law 114-113), provides a mechanism for additional funding to implement a biometric entry and exit system of up to $1 billion through temporary fee increases for certain visa applicants. Moreover, in July 2013, we reported that DHS officials told us the department's goal was to develop information about options for biometric air exit and to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional benefits that a biometric air exit system provides beyond an enhanced biographic exit system and (2) costs associated with biometric air exit. However, as of January 2016, DHS is working to develop such a report, and CBP officials told us they were unable to estimate when the report would be completed. According to DHS officials, implementation of a biometric air exit system will depend on the results of discussions between the department and Congress after the department provides its assessment of options for biometric air exit. We concluded in our July 2013 report that, without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework, DHS lacked reasonable assurance that it would be able to provide an assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, because any delays in providing this information to Congress could further affect possible implementation of a biometric exit system to address statutory requirements, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department's assessment of biometric exit options. DHS concurred with this recommendation and indicated that its component agencies planned to finalize the goals and objectives for biometric air exit and use those goals and objectives in the development of an evaluation framework. CBP has finalized goals and objectives for a biometric system and, in November 2014, provided us with a copy of its draft evaluation framework. The draft evaluation framework included preliminary information about how DHS will evaluate different biometric air exit options, but had limited information regarding time frames and milestones for assessing the options. In January 2016, CBP officials stated that they were continuing to refine metrics for measuring performance and effectiveness, which they planned to incorporate into the evaluation framework. In addition, officials stated that CBP was conducting additional planning and analysis to ensure that proposed biometric solutions could integrate with existing CBP data systems. CBP officials stated that they plan to address our recommendation by June 30, 2016. To fully address our recommendation, DHS should finalize its evaluation framework, including time frames and milestones for assessing biometric air exit options. DHS has implemented several projects to test and evaluate biometric air exit technologies since our July 2013 report. For example, in June 2014, S&T and CBP opened a test facility to evaluate biometric technologies and operational processes under simulated airport entry and exit conditions. In July 2015, CBP began testing a handheld mobile device to collect biographic and biometric exit data from randomly-selected, foreign national travelers at 10 selected airports. According to CBP, during testing, CBP officers stationed at the passenger loading bridge of selected flights are to use the device to scan travelers' fingerprints and passports. CBP then plans to match the travelers' data to the data collected when they entered the United States. CBP plans to conduct this test for approximately 1 year. Finalizing the evaluation framework consistent with our recommendation would help guide DHS's efforts to assess the benefits and costs of various air exit options. As we have previously reported, challenges in developing and implementing a biometric exit system, as well as weaknesses in departure data, have affected the reliability of DHS's data on overstays. Specifically, in April 2011, we found that DHS's efforts to identify and report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data, and we identified various challenges to DHS's efforts to identify potential overstays, including the incomplete collection of departure data from nonimmigrants at ports of entry, particularly land ports of entry, and the lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads sent to ICE field offices for investigation. Because of concerns about the reliability of the department's overstay data, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported annual overstay rates to Congress since 1994. According to statute, DHS is to implement a program to collect data, for each fiscal year, regarding the total number of nonimmigrant foreign nationals who overstayed their authorized periods of admission in the United States; and submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the number of aliens from each country in each nonimmigrant classification who overstayed an authorized period of admission that expired during the fiscal year prior to the year for which the report is made. In April 2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not reported overstay estimates because it had not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. DHS officials stated at the time that, as a result, the department could not reliably report overstay estimates in accordance with the statute. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS planned to report overstay estimates by December 2013. We reported in July 2013 that, according to DHS Office of Policy officials, the department was better positioned than in the past to describe the limitations in the overstay data. As of January 2016, DHS has not reported overstay estimates. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, directed DHS to provide to Congress within 30 days of enactment a report on nonimmigrant overstay data by country, and a comprehensive plan for implementation of the biometric entry and exit data system, both of which are required by law. In addition, the Act withheld $13 million from the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management until DHS provides the overstay report and comprehensive plan. Our July 2013 report found that, although DHS had taken action to strengthen its overstay data, DHS had not yet validated or tested the reliability of those actions and challenges to reporting reliable overstay data remained. We reported that DHS had taken action to strengthen its processes for reviewing records to identify potential overstays, including (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases used to identify potential overstays and (2) implementing the Beyond the Border initiative, which collects information from the Canadian government about those exiting the United States and entering Canada through northern land ports of entry. However, our July 2013 report also found that DHS had not assessed or documented how its changes to database connections had improved the reliability of its data for the purposes of reporting overstay rate calculations and had not analyzed the incremental improvements that database changes made in data quality. Furthermore, although DHS had improved connections among its various databases used to help identify potential overstays, the improvements did not address some of the underlying data quality and reliability issues we previously identified, such as incomplete information on nonimmigrants departing the United States through land ports of entry. The Beyond the Border initiative is intended to help address this issue by collecting proxy data on individuals exiting from the United States at northern border ports of entry, but as of January 2016, DHS has not yet identified mechanisms for collecting data on individuals exiting through southern border ports of entry. In our July 2013 report, we concluded that without an assessment and documentation of improvements in the reliability of the data used to develop overstay estimates and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used, decision makers would not have the information needed to use these data for policy-making purposes. Therefore, we recommended that DHS assess and document the reliability of its overstay data. DHS concurred with the recommendation and stated that it was establishing a working group that would include representation from DHS component agencies with responsibility for collecting, recording, and analyzing entry and exit data. In November 2015, CBP officials told us that CBP submitted a draft overstays report for fiscal year 2014 to DHS for review in December 2014. However, as of January 2016, DHS could not provide a timeframe for when they would report overstay data or address our recommendation. To address our recommendation, DHS should assess and document the extent to which the reliability of the data used to develop any overstay estimates has improved and any remaining limitations in how the data can be used. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Schumer, and members of the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time. For information about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals making key contributions include Adam Hoffman, Assistant Director; Ashley Vaughan Davis; Jon Najmi; and Robin Nye. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis. Overstays are individuals who were admitted legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate implementation of a biometric entry and exit data system that matches information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival and departure. Since 2004, DHS has tracked foreign nationals' entries into the United States, and since December 2006, a biometric entry capability has been fully operational at all ports of entry. However, GAO has identified a range of challenges that DHS has faced in its efforts to deploy a corresponding biometric exit capability. DHS's CBP is primarily responsible for implementing a biometric exit program. This statement discusses the extent to which DHS has made progress in developing a biometric exit system and reporting overstay estimates. This statement is based on a report GAO issued in July 2013 ( GAO-13-683 ), with selected updates conducted in January 2016 to obtain information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior recommendations. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces long-standing challenges in developing a biometric exit system and reporting reliable overstay data. In July 2013, GAO reported that DHS had not fulfilled statutory requirements to implement a biometric exit capability and report data on overstays. As of January 2016, DHS has planning efforts underway but has not yet met these statutory requirements. Specifically, in May 2012, DHS internally reported recommendations to support planning for a biometric exit capability at airports. However, as of January 2016, the department has not yet fully addressed those recommendations. For example, DHS has not completed an evaluation framework that, among other things, assesses the value of collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data, as it recommended in May 2012. In July 2013, GAO recommended that DHS establish time frames and milestones for a biometric air exit evaluation framework to help guide its assessment efforts. DHS concurred with the recommendation, and has actions planned or underway to address it. Specifically, in January 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials stated that they were continuing to develop an evaluation framework by developing metrics for measuring the performance and effectiveness of biometric air exit technologies. Moreover, in July 2013, GAO reported that, according to DHS officials, the department's goal was to develop information about options for biometric air exit and report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding the benefits and costs associated with a biometric air exit system. GAO found that, without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework, DHS lacked reasonable assurance that it would be able to provide an assessment to Congress as planned. As of January 2016, DHS is working to develop this report for Congress, and CBP officials told GAO they were unable to estimate when it would be completed. Since GAO's 2013 report, DHS has also implemented several projects to test and evaluate biometric air exit technologies. For example, in July 2015, CBP began testing a handheld mobile device to collect biographic and biometric exit data from randomly-selected, foreign national travelers at 10 selected airports. Finalizing the evaluation framework consistent with GAO's recommendation would help guide DHS's efforts to assess the benefits and costs of various air exit options. GAO also reported in July 2013 that challenges in developing a biometric exit system, as well as weaknesses in departure data, have affected the reliability of DHS's data on overstays. Because of concerns about the reliability of the department's overstay data, neither DHS nor its predecessor has regularly reported annual overstay data to Congress since 1994. In July 2013, GAO found that, although DHS had taken action to strengthen its overstay data, DHS had not validated or tested the reliability of those actions and challenges to reporting reliable overstay data remained. GAO recommended that DHS assess and document the reliability of its overstay data, and DHS concurred with the recommendation. However, as of January 2016, DHS has not yet reported overstay data or documented its reliability, and DHS officials could not provide a time frame for when they would address GAO's recommendation. GAO previously made recommendations to DHS to establish time frames and milestones for a biometric air exit evaluation framework and assess the reliability of its overstay data. DHS concurred with the recommendations, and has actions underway to address them.