Technological advancement and the proliferation of the smartphone have reshaped the commercial landscape, providing consumers new ways to access the retail marketplace. On-demand companies are one such innovation, and underpinning on-demand commerce is the gig economy , the collection of markets that match service providers to consumers of on-demand services on a gig (or job) basis. Flagship on-demand companies such as Uber (driver services) and Handy (home cleaners and household services) have garnered significant media attention both for their market success and recent legal challenges, particularly concerning the classification of gig workers. Broader questions about the pros and cons of the gig economy have emerged as on-demand markets grow and the gig economy expands into new sectors. By some accounts, workers' willingness to participate in the gig economy provides evidence that gig work is a beneficial arrangement. Indeed, gig jobs may yield benefits relative to traditional employment in terms of the ease of finding employment and greater flexibility to choose jobs and hours. The gig economy may facilitate bridge employment (e.g., temporary employment between career jobs or between full-time work and retirement) or provide opportunities to generate income when circumstances do not accommodate traditional full-time, full-year employment. At the same time, however, the potential lack of labor protections for gig workers and the precarious nature of gig work have been met with some concern. The nationwide reach of gig work and its potential to impact large groups of workers, and their livelihoods, have attracted the attention of some Members of Congress. These Members have raised questions about the size and composition of the gig workforce, the proper classification of gig workers (i.e., as employees or independent contractors), the potential for gig work to create work opportunities for unemployed or underemployed workers, and implications of gig work for worker protections and access to traditional employment-based benefits. In support of these policy considerations, this report provides an overview of the gig economy and identifies legal and policy questions relevant to its workforce. The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on a gig (or job) basis in support of on-demand commerce. In the basic model, gig workers enter into formal agreements with on-demand companies to provide services to the company's clients. Prospective clients request services through an Internet-based technological platform or smartphone application that allows them to search for providers or to specify jobs. Providers (i.e., gig workers) engaged by the on-demand company provide the requested services and are compensated for the jobs. Business models vary across companies that control tech platforms and their associated brands. Some companies allow providers to set prices or select the jobs that they take on (or both), whereas others maintain control over price-setting and assignment decisions. Some operate in local markets (e.g., select cities) while others serve a global client base. Although driver services (e.g., Lyft, Uber) and personal and household services (e.g., TaskRabbit, Handy) are perhaps best known, the gig economy operates in many sectors, including business services (e.g., Freelancer, Upwork), delivery services (e.g., Instacart, Postmates), and medical care (e.g., Heal, Pager). With some exceptions, on-demand companies view providers as independent contractors--not employees--using their platforms to obtain referrals and transact with clients. This designation is frequently made explicit in the formal agreement that establishes the terms of the provider-company relationship. In addition, many on-demand companies give providers some (or absolute) ability to select or refuse jobs, set their hours and level of participation, and control other aspects of their work. In some ways, then, the gig economy can be viewed as an expansion of traditional freelance work (i.e., self-employed workers who generate income through a series of jobs and projects). However, gig jobs may differ from traditional freelance jobs in a few ways. The established storefront and brand built by the tech-platform company reduces entry costs for providers and may bring in groups of workers with different demographic, skill, and career characteristics. Because gig workers do not need to invest in establishing a company and marketing to a consumer base, operating costs may be lower and allow workers' participation to be more transitory in the gig market (i.e., they have greater flexibility around the number of hours worked and scheduling). In addition, a few commonly held characteristics of the provider-company relationship, when taken together, set gig work apart from the traditional freelance worker model. On-Demand Com panies Collect a Portion of Job Earnings. On-demand companies collect commissions from providers for jobs solicited through the company platform. Commissions often take the form of a flat percentage rate applied to job earnings, but some companies employ more sophisticated models. For example, in 2014, Lyft announced that it would return a portion of its 20% commission on rides as a bonus to certain high-activity drivers. On-Demand Companies Control the Brand. On-demand companies rely on the jobs brokered through their platform to generate revenue, and therefore have a clear stake in attracting and retaining clients. Consequently, and to varying degrees, these companies are selective about who can operate under their brand. Some on-demand businesses condition provider participation on a background check and credentials (e.g., some require past work experience, licenses, or asset ownership), and some reserve the right to terminate the relationship if the work delivered does not meet company-defined standards of quality and professionalism. On-Demand Companies Control the Provider-Client Relationship. Some on-demand companies discourage or bar providers from accepting work outside the platform from clients who use the company's platform. The provider agreement for business-services company Upwork, for example, includes a noncircumvention clause that prohibits providers from working with any client that identified the provider through the Upwork site for 24 months. Likewise, "service professionals" working with the on-demand home-services company Handy must agree that they will "not affirmatively solicit [clients] originally referred through the Handy Platform to book jobs through any means other than the Handy Platform." This is a potentially important difference between gig work and traditional freelance work, because it curtails the provider's ability to build a client base or operate outside the platform. Currently, the federal government does not publish statistics on the gig economy workforce. Instead, most of what is known about the number and characteristics of gig workers is drawn from related labor and tax entity statistics or comes from private-sector studies and academic research. Measuring and characterizing the gig economy workforce are challenging tasks for several reasons. A first necessary step to measuring gig workers is establishing a precise and measurable statistical definition of the gig economy, a complicated task given the relative newness of the concept, and its broad and evolving application. A second and closely related challenge is designing a survey that identifies individuals--through self-reported information--who meet this definition. This challenge requires carefully formulated survey questions that account for how workers perceive their gig economy activity and a data collection strategy that aligns with the potential for seasonal or otherwise dynamic participation. In addition to survey design issues, the relative infrequency of gig work in the overall population may create additional challenges to obtaining reliable estimates of these workers' characteristics and work patterns. Finally, modifying existing labor force survey instruments to measure these new labor force areas may require significant time and funding. While not measuring gig work specifically, federal statistics on self-employment, nonemployer establishments (i.e., business owners who are subject to federal income tax and have no paid employees), and nontraditional work arrangements may provide insight into the size and growth of the gig workforce. Existing large-scale labor force survey data on nontraditional work arrangements and self-employment may provide some insights, but are imperfect proxy measures of contemporary gig economy participants. Notably, in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2005, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) funded the collection of data on the number and characteristics of contingent workers (i.e., those who did not expect their jobs to last) and workers in alternative employment arrangements (i.e., independent contractors, on-call workers, temporary help agency workers, and workers employed by contract firms). These data--collected through the Contingent Worker Supplement (CWS) to the Current Population Survey--establish that temporary workers and independent contractors represented a nonnegligible share of the workforce in 2005 and are not new phenomena. However, they are likely to have limited value to analyses of the gig economy workforce today, because these data predate the launch of the Apple iPhone, and the creation of Uber, Lyft, and other gig economy tech-platform companies. New CWS data collection is planned for 2017 and is expected to result in an important source of information on the size and characteristics of the gig workforce. In January 2016, then-Labor Secretary Tom Perez announced plans to rerun an expanded version of the CWS in May 2017 that specifically seeks to measure gig work. In particular, the BLS plans to include new questions in the 2017 CWS that "explore whether individuals obtain customers or online tasks through companies that electronically match them, often through mobile apps, and examine whether work obtained through electronic matching platforms is a source of secondary earnings." How workers participating in the gig economy should be classified--independent contractors or employees--is an open legal question (see section " Are Workers Within the Gig Economy Employees or Independent Contractors? "); nonetheless, self-employment data may provide some value to analyses of this workforce. The Current Population Survey (CPS), the instrument used by the BLS to produce its monthly unemployment rate estimates, routinely collects data on self-employment. Figure 1 shows the average number of unincorporated self-employed workers working each month in the United States from 2002 to 2016 and traces a gradual decline in self-employment from 2006 to 2011, after which growth has been relatively flat, with modest positive growth (approximately 1.3% annualized growth) between 2014 and 2016. Recent trends in self-employment--as illustrated in Figure 1 --do not appear to support a rapidly growing segment of independent contractors operating in the gig economy. However, due to methodological challenges associated with measuring self-employed workers and with capturing gig workers in survey data, it is possible that official self-employment numbers are missing groups of gig workers. CPS asks workers whether they are self-employed and the industry and occupation of their work, but it does not ask if the worker--self-employed or otherwise--uses a tech-based intermediary to find and transact with clients. This could complicate interpretation of self-employment trends because it is not possible to decompose the data into self-employed work in the gig economy and more traditional work that does not include a tech-based intermediary. Another complicating factor to using self-employment data to infer trends in the gig economy workforce is that CPS data are self-reported. This means that how workers are classified in the data is heavily influenced by how workers see themselves (e.g., as an employee or as a self-employed person). Lastly, some gig economy workers are bona fide employees (e.g., Hello Alfred, Managed by Q), and these individuals will not be captured by self-employment statistics. Trends in gig work may be reflected in Census Bureau statistics on nonemployers, business owners who are subject to federal income tax and have no paid employees. Figure 2 plots annual estimates of the number of nonemployer establishments and their receipts from 2002 to 2014. Both the number of establishments and their receipts rose steadily over this period, with temporary declines seen only during the 2007-2009 recession. Figure 1 and Figure 2 tell somewhat different stories about the size and trends in self-employment. Where Census data show a steady rise in nonemployer businesses--most of which are "self-employed individuals operating very small unincorporated businesses" by Census's description--BLS data show that self-employment has declined or experienced modest growth over a similar period. What explains these differences is a matter for further investigation, but some have suggested that they may be related to how survey respondents view their activity. Although individuals recognize (and report to the Internal Revenue Service) that they earn income, they may not view the activities that generate the income as "work," and hence they are not captured in labor force data BLS uses to produce its self-employment estimates. Another possibility is that IRS data reveal self-employed individuals with multiple nonemployer businesses (i.e., IRS data count individual self-employed workers multiple times). A small but growing literature examines data collected from individual companies operating in the gig economy or pockets of gig economy workers. These analyses provide information about worker characteristics, their attitudes toward work in a given company or work arrangement, and earnings. However, with few exceptions, they do not profile the gig economy as a whole; instead, they can be viewed as snapshots of certain groups of gig workers. Together, this body of research suggests that gig workers make up a small share of total workers at a given point in time. Estimates vary, but gig workers constitute less than 1% of total employment in major studies. There is some evidence that workers' participation in the gig economy is transitory (i.e., high rates of worker entry and exit) and that many workers use gig work as a strategy for supplementing income. In 2015, economists Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger collaborated with the RAND Corporation to administer an augmented version of the BLS Contingent Worker Supplement (CWS) to the RAND American Life Panel; notably, the modified CWS survey instrument used by Katz and Krueger included new questions aimed at identifying work in the gig economy. A primary goal of the project was to obtain current estimates of the number of workers engaged in alternative work arrangements (a work er group that encompasses but is broader than gig work), and the survey revealed that this number increased markedly from 10.7% in 2005 to 15.8% in 2015. Regarding gig work specifically, they estimate that approximately 0.5% of workers operated through an online intermediary in 2015. JPMorgan Chase (JPMC) Institute researchers used data on JPMC primary checking account holders between 2012 and 2016 to estimate the number of adults participating in the gig economy over that time period. They identified gig workers (called "labor platform participants" in the JPMC Institute studies) by observing checking deposits (income) from a selection of on-demand platforms. While there are some issues with the representativeness of the underlying data, the study produces some interesting findings that are consistent with other work in this area. Namely, they found that the share of adult checking account holders who received a checking deposit from a labor platform provider (i.e., received income from such a company) increased between October 2012 and June 2016, with a slowdown in the pace of growth since December 2015. In June 2016, 0.5% of adults with a JPMC checking account received income from a labor platform. A month-to-month analysis of participation (i.e., receipt of income) indicates significant movement into and out of gig work. JPMC Institute researchers estimate that in June 2016, 16% of gig workers were new entrants. Further, among workers who earned income through the gig economy between October 2012 and August 2014, 52% ended their gig careers (i.e., did not receive gig economy income in their JPMC checking accounts) within 12 months. The study also provides some evidence that workers use gig work to supplement income from other sources. Other organizations have used a variety of methods to arrive at nationwide estimates of the gig economy workforce. These vary considerably in magnitude and appear to be sensitive to the estimation methodology (e.g., how the data are collected, assumptions about how trends move together, and who is included in the definition of gig workers). For example, Harris and Krueger calculate a rough estimate of 600,000 gig workers in 2015 (i.e., approximately 0.4% of U.S. employment) using administrative data on Uber drivers from 2014 and "Google Trends" data that record the number of times Uber and other on-demand companies' names were searched for using the Google search engine. McKinsey Global Institute estimates that "less than 1%" of the U.S. working-age population are contingent workers operating through "digital marketplaces for services." Uber Technologies partnered with economist Alan Krueger to analyze data collected from a sample of 601 Uber drivers in December 2014 and 632 drivers in November 2015, and aggregate administrative data collected by the company from 2012 to 2015. Administrative data reveal that 464,681 drivers were actively partnered with Uber in December 2015, a significant increase over the 162,037 active Uber drivers in December 2014. This growth in the number of Uber drivers is remarkable, but may not be indicative of long-term trends; Uber and other driver-service companies are exploring the feasibility of driverless car technology, which may eventually curtail the companies' demand for drivers. Survey data indicate that the majority of Uber drivers were male, more than half were between the ages of 30 and 49, and 47.7% had at least a college degree (in December 2014). Many drivers did not use Uber as their sole source of earned income; in both years studied, more than 60% of drivers held another job. The authors interpret these survey data to show that the flexibility in work hours provided by Uber is a primary draw for drivers. For several years, the consulting firm MBO Partners has conducted an annual profiling survey of independent workers. It collects information on demographic characteristics, income earned, and recently whether workers use an "on-demand economy platform or marketplace as a source of work or income." MBO is careful to flag an important caveat: their sample comprises 1,100 individuals who report that they "regularly work as independents in an average work week. Those who work as independents in the on-demand economy occasionally or sporadically--for example drive for Uber once a month, do web design as a side gig a few times a quarter, or rent out a room on Airbnb 3 times a year--are not included." MBO Partners estimate that in 2014 approximately 900,000 individuals who self-identified as independent contractors used "online talent marketplaces such as Freelancer.com" (i.e., labor only), and 500,000 workers used tech platforms that involve the use of a provider-owned asset (e.g., Uber, Lyft, Airbnb). Whether a worker in the gig economy may be considered an employee rather than an independent contractor is significant for purposes of various federal labor and employment laws. In general, employees enjoy the protections and benefits provided by such laws, whereas independent contractors are not covered. Two laws, in particular, have drawn recent attention. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) generally requires the payment of a minimum wage and overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of a 40-hour workweek. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) recognizes a right to engage in collective bargaining for most employees in the private sector. The FLSA applies only to employees and does not regulate the use of independent contractors. Whether an individual is an employee is often a threshold question that must be answered to determine whether the FLSA's requirements apply. Courts have generally concluded that the economic reality of a working relationship will determine whether an individual is actually employed by an employer. To evaluate the economic reality of such a relationship, courts will examine all of the circumstances of the work activity and not just an isolated factor. Among the factors a reviewing court will consider to determine employee status are the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control over the individual; the individual's opportunity for profit or loss; the individual's investment in equipment or materials required for his task; whether the service rendered requires a special skill; the degree of permanency and the duration of the working relationship; and the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business. In July 2015, a Lyft driver in Florida filed a complaint with a federal district court in Tampa alleging a violation of the FLSA. The driver maintained that Lyft controls the manner and means by which all drivers accomplish their work, controls all rates of pay for its drivers, retains the right to discipline drivers at its sole discretion, and restricts drivers' ability to work by permitting them to work only certain hours each day. In December 2015, however, Lyft and the driver entered an agreement to dismiss the case. Several Uber drivers have also alleged violations of the FLSA. In Suarez v. Uber Technologies, Inc ., for example, a group of drivers alleged that they had not been paid (1) for all of the hours they actually worked, (2) the federal minimum wage for each hour worked, and (3) overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in one week. Uber sought to compel arbitration for the drivers' claims based on its services agreement, which includes a provision that requires arbitration for all disputes related to the agreement and the employment relationship between the company and its drivers. Concluding that the arbitration provision was not unconscionable, the court in Suarez ordered the drivers to submit their claims to arbitration. The enforcement of the arbitration provision in Uber's services agreement has resulted in little case law on the FLSA's application to the company's drivers. Uber drivers have also alleged violations of state worker protection laws. Resolution of these claims would also appear to require a determination about whether the individuals at issue are employees and not independent contractors. In June 2015, California's labor commissioner concluded that a former Uber driver was an employee for purposes of the state's worker protection laws based on the company's control over its drivers. In Berwick v. Uber Technologies , the former driver sought unpaid wages, reimbursement related to the use of her own vehicle, liquidated damages, and penalties associated with the failure to pay prompt wages. After considering various factors, similar to those used to determine employee status under the FLSA, the commissioner maintained, "Defendants hold themselves out as nothing more than a neutral technological platform, designed simply to enable drivers and passengers to transact the business of transportation. The reality, however, is that Defendants are involved in every aspect of the operation." The commissioner awarded the former driver amounts reflecting mileage for the use of her car and interest on her unpaid balance of expenses, but dismissed her claims for wages, liquidated damages, and penalties. The commissioner noted that the former driver had, in fact, been paid, and that she lacked sufficient evidence to support her claim for additional wages. The former driver's claims for liquidated damages and penalties appear to have been tied to her claim for unpaid wages. Although Uber initially appealed the commissioner's order, the case now appears to be part of a larger settlement effort by the company. In August 2016, a federal district court denied preliminary approval for a proposed settlement that would have included an $84 million payment to Uber drivers in California and Massachusetts. The court maintained that the settlement, which also provided for nonmonetary relief, was "as a whole ... not fair, adequate, and reasonable." The court's rejection of the proposed settlement was based largely on the settlement of the drivers' claim under California's Private Attorneys General Act, which creates a cause of action for private plaintiffs to recover civil penalties that are otherwise only recoverable by the state. Under the proposed settlement, the drivers would have received just $1 million from the company when the potential verdict value of the claim was over $1 billion. In March 2017, a California court rejected a proposed settlement in a separate case involving Uber's alleged failure to comply with the state's minimum wage and overtime requirements. The settlement was reportedly opposed by the court because it would provide little relief to drivers, with the majority of the settlement being given to the state and paying administrative costs and attorneys' fees. Section 7 of the NLRA states, "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.... " The NLRA requires an employer to negotiate in good faith with a labor organization that becomes the exclusive representative for a bargaining unit of employees. Independent contractors are specifically excluded from the NLRA's definition for the term employee . Thus, the NLRA does not require an employer to negotiate with independent contractors over the terms and conditions of their employment. In light of the exclusion of independent contractors from coverage under the NLRA and a desire to provide collective bargaining rights to at least some gig workers, the city of Seattle has considered legislation that would allow "for-hire vehicle drivers" to be represented by an "exclusive driver representative." Under legislation passed recently by the Seattle City Council, the exclusive driver representative would negotiate with the driver coordinator over various subjects, including minimum hours of work, vehicle equipment standards, and conditions of work. Some, however, have questioned the legitimacy of the measure. At least one commentator has interpreted the NLRA's explicit exclusion of independent contractors as preempting state or local legislation that would restore collective bargaining rights to such individuals. Individuals working in the gig economy may gain potential benefits in the form of easier entry into and exit from work and greater flexibility to choose jobs and hours. In contrast, as discussed above, many of the typical labor protections provided by federal legislation, such as those in the FLSA, center on the concepts of employee and employer. In the case of the FLSA, approximately 128.5 million, or 89%, of the nation's 144.2 million wage and salary workers are covered by its provisions. As discussed, the FLSA protections, including minimum wage and overtime provisions, are generally not extended to independent contractors. In a traditional employment relationship, an individual is economically dependent on an employer, and thus not in control of various aspects of work life (e.g., working hours, choice of work tasks). That economic dependency, however, often comes in exchange for some measure of economic security through benefits and protections. Below is a partial list of labor standards and related provisions that are likely affected by the absence of a traditional employment relationship: Minimum Wage. Most workers covered by the FLSA are entitled to a minimum hourly wage, which is currently $7.25 per hour. In addition, more than half of the states currently have minimum wage rates for FLSA-covered workers that are above the federal rate. In contrast, for workers not covered by the FLSA, a category mainly consisting of independent contractors, there is no guaranteed minimum wage rate. Overtime Compensation. The FLSA does not limit work hours; rather, it requires additional payment for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. Most workers covered by the FLSA must be compensated at one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for each hour worked over 40 hours in a workweek. Workers not covered by the FLSA are not entitled to additional compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek. Unemployment Compensation. The cornerstone of the income support for unemployed workers is the federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program, which is generally financed by employer taxes. Whereas the specifics of UC benefits are determined by each state, generally eligibility is based on attaining qualifying wages and employment in covered work and typically does not include independent contractors. Family and Medical Leave. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) entitles eligible employees to unpaid, job-protected leave for qualifying family and medical reasons. Because eligibility for FMLA benefits is tied to an individual's work history with an employer and uses the FLSA concept of employment, independent contractors are not entitled to FMLA provisions. Employer Payroll Taxes. In a traditional employment relationship, an employer is responsible for paying the employer's share of Social Security and Medicare taxes (payroll or FICA taxes) and for withholding the employee's share of these same taxes. Independent contractors, however, are responsible for paying self-employment taxes (i.e., the employer and employee shares of FICA taxes). Beyond federally mandated labor standards, certain other benefits often associated with traditional employment relationships may not be available in the same form to workers in the gig economy. In many cases, employers may offer a combination of benefit access and subsidies to employees. The information in Table 1 includes rates of access, participation, and take-up that civilian employees have to various benefits. These data are intended to show the relatively high prevalence of certain employer-based benefits that independent contractors, by definition, do not have access to through employers. For each benefit type below, the percentage of workers with access by work status is provided to demonstrate the higher proportion of access for full-time workers. Table 1 data indicate that for some of the major benefit categories, such as health, retirement, and life insurance, a majority of employees have access to these benefits through their employers, with correspondingly high take-up rates for these benefits. The difference between access rates for full-time and part-time workers likewise shows an increasing likelihood of having access to benefits through traditional, full-time employment compared with other work arrangements. To the extent that gig employment more closely resembles part-time employment, it is likely that workers in this segment of the economy might also have relatively lower access to the traditional employment-related benefits. These sorts of benefits have traditionally been provided by employers due to cost (e.g., economies of scale) and administrative efficiency, and are voluntary. This list of possible employer-assisted benefits above does not mean that independent contractors have no access to such benefits. Rather, these benefits, which are more common for traditional, full-time employees, would have to be accessible through another means, such as a spouse's employer or a market mechanism (e.g., health insurance exchange). As shown in previous sections of this report, the gig economy, and the labor and regulatory issues associated with it, is not well understood. There is considerable uncertainty, for example, about the number of workers in the gig economy and whether gig work is a primary or secondary source of income for the workers involved. In addition, some are concerned that gig workers lack access to benefits and protections associated with traditional employment relationships, such as those discussed in " Employee Protections " and listed in Table 1 . Although it is unclear how access to benefits for independent contractors in the gig economy or in general may differ from traditional employment, it is clear that these benefits would likely have to be provided through a nonemployer mechanism, because by definition independent contractors are not employees. If the availability of benefits and protections for independent contractors in the gig economy continues to draw congressional attention, and to the extent that gig workers seek access to benefits traditionally associated with employed workers, several relevant policy-related considerations may arise as to the best approach to resolve these issues. These include the following considerations: Which, if any, protections and benefits should be available to workers in the gig economy? Many of the federal labor protections listed in " Employee Protections " apply to employees but often exclude bona fide independent contractors. This exclusion is often undergirded by assumptions that independent contractors have either sufficient market power or a preference for independence from any employer, such that these workers do not need or prefer the level of protection afforded to traditional employees. If these assumptions do not hold for workers in the gig economy, consideration may be given to which benefits are essential or fundamental for these workers. One recent proposal in this area would provide for the establishment of a third employment category for workers--called independent workers--who are not traditional employees, but who should not be considered independent contractors. Per this proposal, workers in the gig economy who are deemed independent workers would qualify for benefits associated with a more traditional employment relationship (e.g., insurance, tax withholding) but not labor protections that are based on the number of hours worked (e.g., minimum wage and overtime), given the inherent difficulty of tracking hours in gig employment. If protections and benefits are extended to more workers in the gig economy, who is responsible for enforcing protections or providing benefits ? A possible consideration regarding benefits and protections for workers in the gig economy is that individuals may work for multiple businesses. To the extent this occurs and benefits are provided through and protections are enforced by an employer, consideration may be given to determining which of the multiple employers is responsible for providing access or enforcement of labor standards. This could result in determining a primary employer for an individual or determining some shared responsibility across employers. If benefits are accessible outside of a traditional employment relationship, how might access be structured? Rather than employers providing these benefits, intermediaries (e.g., nonprofits) might facilitate the administration and purchasing of various benefits. A recent letter from interested parties in the on-demand economy, for example, urged policymakers to consider creating models that would allow on-demand workers to pay into a common fund that provides health, retirement, unemployment, and other benefits that are not tied to a single employer. New mechanisms, such as portable benefits or risk-pooling, may serve to provide benefits to workers in the on-demand or gig economy.

Summary:
The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on a gig (or job) basis in support of on-demand commerce. In the basic model, gig workers enter into formal agreements with on-demand companies (e.g., Uber, TaskRabbit) to provide services to the company's clients. Prospective clients request services through an Internet-based technological platform or smartphone application that allows them to search for providers or to specify jobs. Providers (i.e., gig workers) engaged by the on-demand company provide the requested service and are compensated for the jobs. Recent trends in on-demand commerce suggest that gig workers may represent a growing segment of the U.S. labor market. In response, some Members of Congress have raised questions, for example, about the size of the gig workforce, how workers are using gig work, and the implications of the gig economy for labor standards and livelihoods more generally. With some exceptions, on-demand companies view providers as independent contractors (i.e., not employees) using the companies' platforms to obtain referrals and transact with clients. This designation is frequently made explicit in the formal agreement that establishes the terms of the provider-company relationship. In some ways, the gig economy can be viewed as an expansion of traditional freelance work (i.e., self-employed workers who generate income through a series of jobs and projects). However, gig jobs may differ from traditional freelance jobs in a few ways. For example, coordination of jobs through an on-demand company reduces entry and operating costs for providers and allows workers' participation to be more transitory in gig markets (i.e., they have greater flexibility around work hours). The terms placed around providers' use of some tech platforms may further set gig work apart. For example, some on-demand companies discourage providers from accepting work outside the platform from certain clients. This is a potentially important difference between gig work and traditional freelance work because it may limit the provider's ability to build a client base and operate outside the platform. Characterizing the gig economy workforce (i.e., those providing services brokered through tech-based platforms) is challenging along several fronts. To date, no large-scale official data have been collected, and there remains considerable uncertainty about how to best measure this segment of the labor force. Existing large-scale labor force survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the U.S. Census Bureau may provide some insights, but are imperfect proxy measures of contemporary gig economy participants. A small literature examines data collected by individual companies operating in the gig economy or from pockets of gig-economy workers. As such, these analyses can be viewed as snapshots of certain gig workers, but they are not necessarily representative of the full market. The apparent availability of gig jobs and the flexibility they seem to provide workers are frequently touted features of the gig economy. However, to the extent that gig-economy workers are viewed as independent contractors, gig jobs differ from traditional employment in notable ways. First, whether a worker in the gig economy may be considered an employee rather than an independent contractor is significant for purposes of various federal labor and employment laws. In general, employees enjoy the protections and benefits provided by such laws, whereas independent contractors are not covered. Two laws, in particular, the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act, have drawn recent attention. In addition, certain other benefits (e.g., paid sick leave, health insurance, retirement benefits) that are often associated with traditional employment relationships may not be available in the same form to workers in the gig economy. Should Congress choose to consider ways of increasing access to such benefits for nontraditional employees, new mechanisms, such as portable benefits or risk-pooling, could serve to provide benefits to workers in the gig economy.