NEDCTP's mission is to deter and detect the introduction of explosive devices into U.S. transportation systems. As of February 2016, NEDCTP has deployed 787 of the 997 canine teams for which it has funding available in fiscal year 2016 across transportation systems. There are four types of LEO canine teams: aviation, mass transit, maritime, and multimodal; and two types of TSI canine teams: multimodal and PSC. Table 1 shows the number of canine teams by type for which funding is available, describes their roles and responsibilities, and costs per team to TSA. TSA's start-up costs for LEO teams include the costs of training the canine and handler, and providing the handler's agency a stipend. The annual costs to TSA for LEO teams reflect the amount of the stipend. TSA's start-up and annual costs for TSI canine teams are greater than those for LEO teams, because TSI handlers are TSA employees and therefore the costs include the handlers' pay and benefits, service vehicles, and cell phones, among other things. PSC teams come at an increased cost to TSA compared with other TSI teams because of the additional 2 weeks of training and costs associated with providing decoys (i.e., persons pretending to be passengers who walk around the airport with explosive training aids). In fiscal year 2016, approximately $121.7 million of amounts appropriated to TSA were available for its canine program. For fiscal year 2017, TSA is requesting approximately $131.4 million, a $9.7 million increase compared to the prior fiscal year. According to a TSA official, the increase is for projected pay increases and 16 additional positions to support canine training and operations, among other things. Figure 1 shows LEO, TSI, and PSC teams performing searches in different environments. Conventional canines undergo 15 weeks of explosives detection training, and PSCs 25 weeks, before being paired with a handler at TSA's Canine Training Center (CTC), located at Lackland Air Force Base. Conventional canine handlers attend a 10-week training course, and PSC handlers attend a 12-week training course. The 2 additional weeks are used to train PSC teams in actual work environments. Canines are paired with a LEO or TSI handler during their training course. After canine teams complete this training, and obtain initial certification, they acclimate to their home operating environment for a 30-day period. Upon completion of the acclimation period, CTC conducts a 3-day operational transitional assessment to ensure canine teams are not experiencing any performance challenges in their home operating environment. After initial certification, canine teams are evaluated on an annual basis to maintain certification. During conventional explosives detection evaluations, canine teams must demonstrate their ability to detect all the explosive training aids the canines were trained to detect in five search areas (e.g., aircraft). The five search areas are randomly selected among all the possible types of search areas, but according to CTC, include the area that is most relevant to the type of canine team. For example, teams assigned to airports will be evaluated in areas such as aircraft and cargo. Canine teams must find a certain percentage of the explosive training aids to pass their annual conventional evaluation. In addition, a specified number of nonproductive responses--when a canine responds to a location where no explosives odor is present--are allowed. After passing the conventional evaluation, PSC teams are required to undergo an additional annual evaluation that includes detecting explosives on a person, or being carried by a person. PSC teams are tested in different locations within the sterile areas and passenger screening checkpoints of an airport. A certain number of persons with explosive training aids must be detected, and a specified number of nonproductive responses are allowed for PSC certification. TSA has taken steps to enhance NEDCTP since we issued our 2013 report. For example, TSA has used data, such as the results of covert tests, to assess the proficiency and utilization of its canine teams. However, further opportunities exist for TSA to assess its program related to the use and cost of PSC teams. In January 2013, we reported that TSA collected and used key canine program data in its Canine Website System (CWS), a central management database, but it could better analyze these data to identify program trends. For example, we found that TSA did not analyze training minute data over time (from month to month) and therefore was unable to determine trends related to canine teams' compliance with the requirement to train 240 minutes each month. Similarly, TSA collected monthly data on the amount of cargo TSI teams screened in accordance with the agency's requirement, but had not analyzed these data over time to determine if, for example, changes were needed in the screening requirement or the number of teams deployed. Table 2 highlights some of the key data elements included in CWS at the time of our prior review. In January 2013, we recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. These analyses could include, but not be limited to, analyzing and documenting trends in proficiency training minutes, canine utilization, results of short notice assessments (covert tests) and final canine responses, performance differences between LEO and TSI canine teams, as well as an assessment of the optimum location and number of canine teams that should be deployed to secure the U.S. transportation system. TSA concurred with our recommendation, and in June 2014 we reported on some of the steps it had taken to implement the recommendation. Specifically, TSA monitored canine teams training minutes over time by producing annual reports. For example, TSA analyzed canine teams' compliance with the training requirement throughout fiscal year 2013 to identify teams repeatedly not in compliance with the monthly requirement. Field Canine Coordinators subsequently completed comprehensive assessment reviews for their canine teams, which involved reporting on the teams that did not meet the requirement. TSA also reinstated short notice assessments in July 2013, since they had suspended them in May 2012. We reported that in the event a team fails a short notice assessment, the Field Canine Coordinator completes a report that includes an analysis of the team's training records to identify an explanation for the failure. According to TSA officials, in March 2014, NEDCTP stood up a new office, known as the Performance Measurement Section, to perform analyses of canine team data. Those actions, among others, addressed the intent of our recommendation by positioning TSA to identify program trends to better target resources and activities based on what is working well and what may need corrective action. Therefore, we closed the recommendation as implemented in August 2014. Since we closed the recommendation, according to TSA officials, the agency has continued to take steps to enhance its canine program. For example, TSA eliminated the monthly 240-minute training requirement and instead requires canine teams to train on all explosives training aids they must be able to detect, in all search areas (e.g., aircraft), every 45 days. In April 2015, TSA also eliminated canine teams' requirement to screen a certain volume of air cargo. Instead, TSA requires TSI-led canine teams to spend at least 40 percent of their time on utilization activities, such as patrolling airport terminals and screening air cargo. Canine teams can spend the rest of the time on administrative activities, such as taking their canine to the veterinarian. Handlers record their daily activities in a web-based system, which allow TSA to assess how the canine teams are being used. According to TSA, utilization time increased five percent in fiscal year 2015 since the requirement changed. In February 2016, TSA officials told us that starting in fiscal year 2016, TSA increased the number of short notice assessments required from two to five per year for each state and local law enforcement agency that participates in NEDCTP. According to a TSA official, the number was increased since TSA believes such assessments are helpful in determining the proficiency of canine teams. Furthermore, CTC placed 34 Regional Canine Training Instructors in the field to review canine teams' training records and assist them in resolving any performance challenges, such as challenges in detecting a particular explosive aid. We also reported in January 2013 that TSA's 2012 Strategic Framework called for the deployment of PSC teams based on risk; however, airport stakeholder concerns about the appropriateness of TSA's protocols for resolving PSC team responses resulted in these teams not being deployed to the highest-risk airports or utilized for passenger screening. We recommended that TSA coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports, and ensure that deployed PSC teams are utilized as intended, consistent with the agency's statutory authority to provide for the screening of passengers and their property. TSA concurred with our recommendation, and in June 2014, we reported that the PSC teams for which TSA had funding and not already deployed to a specific airport at the time our 2013 report had been deployed to or allocated to the highest-risk airports. We also reported that, according to TSA officials, of all the airports where PSC teams had been deployed, all but one airport had agreed to allow TSA to conduct screening of individuals using PSC teams at passenger screening checkpoint queues. According to TSA, the agency was successful in deploying PSC teams to airports where they were previously declined by aviation stakeholders for various reasons. For example, TSA officials explained that stakeholders have realized that PSCs are an effective means for detecting explosives odor, and no checkpoints have closed because of a nonproductive response. In January 2015, we closed the recommendation as implemented after TSA deployed all remaining PSC teams (those which had previously been allocated) to the highest-risk airports and all PSC teams were being utilized for passenger screening. Since we closed the recommendation, TSA has continued to allocate and deploy additional PSC teams for which it has received funding to the highest-risk airports based on its assessment of how high the risks are to particular airports. In addition, from November 2015 to January 2016, TSA relocated PSC teams located at 7 lower-risk airports to higher-risk airports. As a result, TSA has PSC teams deployed at nearly all category X airports, which are generally higher-risk airports. According to TSA officials, all category X airports will have PSC teams by the end of calendar year 2016. In our January 2013 report, we found that TSA began deploying PSC teams in April 2011 prior to determining the teams' operational effectiveness, and had not completed an assessment to determine where within the airport PSC teams would be most effectively utilized. In June 2012, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA began conducting effectiveness assessments to help demonstrate the effectiveness of PSC teams, but the assessment was not inclusive of all areas of the airport (i.e., the sterile area, passenger screening checkpoint, and public side of the airport). During the June 2012 assessment of PSC teams' effectiveness, TSA conducted one of the search exercises used for the assessment with three conventional canine teams. Although this assessment was not intended to be included as part of DHS S&T and TSA's formal assessment of PSC effectiveness, the results of this assessment suggested, and TSA officials and DHS S&T's Canine Explosives Detection Project Manager agreed, that a systematic assessment with both PSCs and conventional canines could provide TSA with information to determine whether PSCs provide an enhanced security benefit compared with conventional LEO aviation canine teams that have already been deployed to airport terminals. As a result, we recommended that TSA expand and complete testing, in conjunction with DHS S&T, to assess the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines in all airport areas deemed appropriate prior to making additional PSC deployments to help (1) determine whether PSCs are effective at screening passengers, and resource expenditures for PSC training are warranted, and (2) inform decisions regarding the type of canine team to deploy and where to optimally deploy such teams within airports. TSA concurred, and we testified in June 2014 that through its PSC Focused Training and Assessment Initiative--a two-cycle assessment to establish airport-specific optimal working areas, assess team performance, and train teams on best practices--TSA had determined that PSC teams are effective and should be deployed at the passenger checkpoint queue. Furthermore, in February 2014, TSA launched a third PSC assessment cycle to increase the amount of time canines can work and enhance their ability to detect explosives placed in areas more challenging to detect. Since our June 2014 testimony, TSA has continued to carry out the third assessment cycle. According to TSA officials, as of February 2016, 68 PSC teams have undergone the assessment. Additionally, TSA officials told us they began a fourth assessment cycle in January 2016 to test PSC teams and all other canine teams on threats identified through intelligence. Although TSA has taken steps to determine whether PSC teams are effective and where in the airport environment to optimally deploy such teams, TSA has not compared the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines in order to determine if the greater cost of training canines in the passenger screening method is warranted. In June 2014, we reported that TSA did not plan to include conventional canine teams in PSC assessments because conventional canines have not been through the process used with PSCs to assess their temperament and behavior when working in proximity to people. We acknowledged TSA's position that half of deployed conventional canines are of a breed not accepted for use in the PSC program, but noted that other conventional canines are suitable breeds, and have been paired with LEO aviation handlers working in proximity with people since they patrol airport terminals, including ticket counters and curbside areas. In December 2014, TSA reported that it did not intend to include conventional canine teams in PSC assessments and cited concerns about the liability of operating conventional canines in an unfamiliar passenger screening environment. In January 2015, we closed the recommendation as not implemented, reiterating that conventional canines paired with LEO handlers work in close proximity with people since, like PSCs, they also patrol airport terminals. Consistent with our recommendation, we continue to believe that opportunities exist for TSA to conduct an assessment to determine whether conventional canines are as effective at detecting explosives odor on passengers when compared to PSC teams working in specific areas, such as the passenger checkpoint queue. If such an assessment were to indicate that conventional canines are equally as effective at detecting explosives odor on passengers as PSCs, then limiting proficiency training requirements of PSCs to those that currently apply to conventional canine teams could save TSA costs associated with maintaining PSC teams. Also, as we reported in January 2013, TSA was considering providing some PSCs to LEOs to work on the public side of the airport. Should TSA determine that the additional investment for PSCs is warranted, it could reduce the agency's program costs if it deployed PSCs with LEO handlers rather than TSI handlers. Specifically, TSA could save approximately $100,000 per team each year, as a PSC team led by a LEO handler would cost TSA about $54,000 annually (the amount of the stipend), compared with about $154,000, the annual cost per TSI-led PSC team (see table 1). Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Carper, and Members of the committee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time. For questions about this statement, please contact Jennifer Grover at (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Chris Ferencik (Assistant Director), Chuck Bausell, Lisa Canini, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Richard Hung, Brendan Kretzschmar, Thomas Lombardi, and Ben Nelson. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in those products. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
TSA has implemented a multilayered system composed of people, processes, and technology to protect the nation's transportation systems. One of TSA's security layers is comprised of nearly 800 deployed explosives detection canine teams--a canine paired with a handler. These teams include PSC teams trained to detect explosives on passengers and conventional canines trained to detect explosives in objects, such as cargo. In January 2013, GAO issued a report on TSA's explosives detection canine program. This testimony addresses the steps TSA has taken since 2013 to enhance its canine program and further opportunities to assess the program. This statement is based on GAO's January 2013 report, a June 2014 testimony, and selected updates conducted in February 2016 on canine training and operations. The products cited in this statement provide detailed information on GAO's scope and methodology. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed the president's fiscal year 2017 budget request for TSA and interviewed TSA officials on changes made to NEDCTP since June 2014, the last time GAO reported on the program. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken steps to enhance its National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program (NEDCTP) since GAO's 2013 report, but further opportunities exist for TSA to assess its canine program and potentially reduce costs. TSA Uses Data to Assess Canine Team Proficiency and Utilization: In January 2013, GAO reported that TSA needed to take actions to analyze NEDCTP data and ensure canine teams are effectively utilized. GAO recommended that TSA regularly analyze available data to identify program trends and areas that are working well and those in need of corrective action to guide program resources and activities. TSA concurred, and in June 2014, GAO reported that the agency had taken actions that address the recommendation. GAO subsequently closed the recommendation as implemented in August 2014. Since then, according to TSA officials, the agency has continued to enhance its canine program. For example, TSA reported that it requires canine teams to train on all explosives training aids they must be able to detect--any explosive used to test and train a canine--in all search areas (e.g., aircraft), every 45 days. TSA has Deployed PSC Teams to the Highest-Risk Airports: GAO found in January 2013 that passenger screening canine (PSC) teams were not being deployed to the highest-risk airports as called for in TSA's 2012 Strategic Framework or utilized for passenger screening. GAO recommended that TSA coordinate with airport stakeholders to deploy future PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and ensure that deployed teams were utilized as intended. TSA concurred, and in June 2014, GAO reported that PSC teams had been deployed or allocated to the highest-risk airports. In January 2015, GAO closed the recommendation as implemented after TSA deployed all remaining PSC teams to the highest-risk airports and all teams were being utilized for passenger screening. Opportunities May Exist for TSA to Reduce Canine Program Costs : GAO reported in 2013 that TSA began deploying PSC teams prior to determining their operational effectiveness and identifying where within the airport these teams would be most effectively utilized. GAO recommended that TSA take actions to comprehensively assess the effectiveness of PSCs. TSA concurred and has taken steps to determine the effectiveness of PSC teams and where in the airport to optimally deploy such teams. However, TSA did not compare the effectiveness of PSCs and conventional canines in detecting explosives odor on passengers to determine if the greater cost of training PSCs is warranted. In December 2014, TSA reported that it did not intend to do this assessment because of the liability of using conventional canines to screen persons when they had not been trained to do so. GAO closed the recommendation as not implemented, stating that conventional canines currently work in close proximity with people as they patrol airport terminals, including ticket counters and curbside areas. GAO continues to believe that opportunities may exist for TSA to reduce costs if conventional canines are found to be as effective at detecting explosives odor on passengers as PSCs. GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement.