The Department of Defense's budget is the product of a complex process designed to develop an effective defense strategy that supports U.S. national security objectives. For munitions, the department generally does not have the combatant commands submit separate budgets, but relies on the military services' budget submissions. Thus, the military services are largely responsible for determining requirements for the types and quantities of munitions that are bought. The Department of Defense Inspector General and GAO have issued numerous reports dating back to 1994 identifying systemic problems--such as questionable and inconsistently applied data, inconsistent processes among and between services, and unclear guidance--that have inflated the services' requirements for certain categories of munitions and understated requirements for other categories. (For a listing of these reports, see app. II.) In 1997, as one step toward addressing these concerns, the Department of Defense issued Instruction 3000.4, which sets forth policies, roles and responsibilities, time frames, and procedures to guide the services as they develop their munitions requirements. This instruction is referred to as the capabilities-based munitions requirements process and is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The instruction describes a multi-phased analytical process that begins when the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy develops--in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, and the combatant commands--policy for the Defense Planning Guidance. The Defense Intelligence Agency uses the Defense Planning Guidance and its accompanying scenarios, as well as other intelligence information, to develop a threat assessment. This assessment contains estimates and facts about the potential threats that the United States and allied forces could expect to meet in war scenarios. The combatant commanders (who are responsible for the theaters of war scenarios), in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, use the threat assessment to allocate each service a share of the identified targets by phases of the war. The services then develop their combat requirements using battle simulation models and scenarios to determine the number and mix of munitions needed to meet the combatant commanders' specific objectives. Despite the department's efforts to standardize the process and generate consistent requirements, many questions have continued to be raised about the accuracy or reliability of the munitions requirements determination process. In April 2001, we reported continuing problems with the capabilities-based munitions requirements determination process because the department (1) had yet to complete a database providing detailed descriptions of the types of targets on large enemy installations that would likely be encountered, based on warfighting scenarios; (2) had not set a time frame for completing its munitions effectiveness database; and (3) was debating whether to include greater specificity in its warfighting scenarios and to rate the warfighting scenarios by the probability of their occurrence. These process components significantly affect the numbers and types of munitions needed to meet the warfighting combatant command's objectives. The department acknowledged these weaknesses and recognized that inaccurate requirements can negatively affect munitions planning, programming, and budget decisions, as well as assessments of the size and composition of the industrial production base. In responding to our report's recommendations, the department has taken a number of actions to correct the problems we identified. Our review of the requirements process and related documentation showed that the Department of Defense corrected the previously identified systemic problems in its process for determining munitions requirements, but the reliability of the process continues to be uncertain because of the department's failure to link the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the purchases made by the military services based on computations derived from the department's munitions requirements determination process. Because of differences in how requirements are determined, asking a question about the quantities of munitions that are needed can result in one answer from the combatant commanders and differing answers from the military services. For this reason, the combatant commands may report shortages of munitions they need to carry out warfighting scenarios. We believe--and the department's assessment of its munitions requirements process recognizes--that munitions requirements and purchase decisions made by the military services should be more closely linked to the needs of the combatant commanders. The main issue that the department still needs to address is engaging the combatant commands in the requirements determination process, budgeting processes, and related purchasing decisions to minimize the occurrence of reported shortages. Because of the present gap between the combatant commands' munitions needs and department's requirements determination process, which helps shape the services' purchasing decisions, munitions requirements are not consistently stated, and thus the amount of funding needed to alleviate possible shortages is not always fully understood. In April 2001, we reported that key components of the requirements determination process either had not been completed or had not been decided upon. At that time, the department had not completed a database listing detailed target characteristics for large enemy installations based on warfighting scenarios and had not developed new munitions effectiveness data to address deficiencies identified by the services and the combatant commanders. Additionally, the department had not determined whether to create more detailed warfighting scenarios in the Defense Planning Guidance or to rate scenarios in terms of their probability. We concluded that until these tasks were completed and incorporated into the process, questions would likely remain regarding the accuracy of the munitions requirements process as well as the department's ability to identify the munitions most appropriate to defeat potential threats. In response to our report, the department took actions during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 to resolve the following three key issues affecting the reliability of the munitions requirements process: List of targets--The department lacked a common picture of the number and types of targets on large enemy installations as identified in the warfighting scenarios, and, as a result, each of the services had been identifying targets on enemy installations differently. To resolve this issue, the Joint Chiefs instructed the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the combatant commanders, to develop target templates that would provide a common picture of the types of potential targets on enemy installations. In August 2001, the department revised its capabilities-based requirements instruction to incorporate the target templates developed by the Defense Intelligence Agency as the authoritative threat estimate for developing munitions requirements. Munitions effectiveness data--The department was using outdated information to determine the effectiveness of a munition against a target and to predict the number of munitions necessary to defeat it. The department recognized that munitions effectiveness data is a critical component for requirements planning and that outdated information could over- or understate munitions requirements. To address this shortfall, the department updated its joint munitions effectiveness manual with up-to-date munitions effectiveness data for use by the services in their battle simulation models. Warfighting scenarios--The Defense Planning Guidance contains warfighting scenarios that detail conditions that may exist during the conduct of war; these scenarios are developed with input from several sources, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the services. This guidance should provide a common baseline from which the combatant commands and the services determine their munitions requirements. However, when the department adopted the capabilities-based munitions requirements instruction, details were eliminated in favor of broader guidance. To ensure that the combatant commanders and the services plan for the most likely warfighting scenario and do not use unlikely events to support certain munitions, the department revised the Defense Planning Guidance to provide fewer warfighting scenarios and more detail on each. The department expected that these actions to improve the munitions requirements process would correct over- or understated requirements and provide the combatant commands with needed munitions. However, despite the department's efforts to enhance the requirements determination process, one problem area remains--inadequate linkage between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the purchases made by the military services based on computations derived from the department's munitions requirements determination process. Various actions taken to address this issue have not been successful. The disjunction between the department's requirements determination processes and combatant commanders' needs is rooted in separate assessments done at different times. The services, as part of their budgeting processes, develop the department's munitions requirements using targets provided by the combatant commands (based on the Defense Intelligence Agency's threat report), battle simulation models, and scenarios to determine the number and mix of munitions needed to meet the combatant commanders' objectives in each war scenario. To develop these requirements, the services draw upon and integrate data and assumptions from the Defense Planning Guidance, warfighting scenarios, and target allocations, as well as estimates of repair and return rates for enemy targets and projected assessments of damage to enemy targets and installations. Other munitions requirements are also determined, and include munitions needed (1) for forces not committed to support combat operations, (2) for forward presence and current operations, (3) to provide a post-theater of war combat capability, and (4) to train the forces, support service programs, and support peacetime operations. These requirements, in addition to the combat requirement, comprise the services' total munitions requirement. The total munitions requirement is then compared to available inventory and appropriated funds to determine how many of each munition the services will procure within their specified funding limits and is used to develop the services' Program Objectives Memorandum and their budget submissions to the President. Periodically the combatant commanders prepare reports of their readiness status, including the availability of sufficient types and quantities of munitions needed to meet the combatant commanders' warfighting objectives, but these munitions needs are not tied to the services' munitions requirements or to the budgeting process. In determining readiness, the combatant commanders develop their munitions needs using their own battle simulation models, scenarios, and targets and give emphasis to the munitions they prefer to use or need for unique war scenarios to determine the number and mix of munitions they require to meet their warfighting objectives. The combatant commanders calculate their needs in various ways--unconstrained and constrained and over various time periods (e.g., 30 days and 180 days). Unconstrained calculations are based on the combatant commanders' assessment of munitions needs, assuming that all needed munitions are available. Constrained calculations represent the combatant commanders' assessment of munitions needs to fight wars under certain rules of engagement that limit collateral damage and civilian and U.S. military casualties. Because the combatant commanders' battle simulation models and scenarios differ from those used by the military services, their munitions needs are different, which can result in reports of munitions shortages. In contrast, the U.S. Special Operations Command develops its combat requirements for the number and mix of munitions needed to meet its warfighting objectives using the same battle simulation models and scenarios that the services used and provides these requirements to the services, rather than providing only potential targets to the services as other commands do. This permits the U.S. Special Operations Command to more directly influence the assumptions about specific weapons systems and munitions to be used. As a result of working together, the Command's and the services' requirements are the same. In an effort to close the gap between the combatant commanders' needs and the department's munitions requirements determination process, a 1999 pilot project was initiated by the department to bridge this gap by better aligning the combatant commanders' near-term objectives (which generally cover a 2-year period) and the services' long-term planning horizon (which is generally 6 years). Another benefit of the pilot was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could validate the department's munitions requirements by matching requirements to target allocations. However, the Army, the Navy, and a warfighting combatant commander objected to the pilot's results because it allocated significantly more targets to the Air Force and fewer targets to the Army. Army officials objected that the pilot's methodology did not adequately address land warfare, which is significantly different from air warfare. The Navy did not concur with the results, citing the lack of recognition for the advanced capabilities of future munitions. U.S. Central Command officials disagreed with the results, stating that a change in methodology should not in and of itself cause the allocation to shift. In July 2000, citing substantial concerns about the pilot, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics suspended the target allocation for fiscal year 2000 and directed the services to use the same allocations applied to the fiscal year 2002 to the 2007 Program Objectives Memorandum. In August 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made another attempt to address the need for better linkage between the department's munitions requirements process and the combatant commanders' munitions needs. The combatant commanders were to prepare a near-term target allocation using a methodology developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Each warfighting combatant commander developed two allocations--one for strike (air services) forces and one for engagement (land troops) forces for his area of responsibility. The first allocated specific targets to strike forces under the assumption that the air services can eliminate the majority of enemy targets. The second allocation assumed that less than perfect conditions exist (such as bad weather), which would limit the air services' ability to destroy their assigned targets and require that the engagement force complete the mission. The combatant commanders did not assign specific targets to the engagement forces, but they estimated the size of the expected remaining enemy land force. The Army and the Marines then were expected to arm themselves to defeat those enemy forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff used the combatant commanders' near- year threat distribution and extrapolated that information to the last year of the Program Objectives Memorandum for the purpose of the services' munitions requirements planning. The department expected that these modifications would correct over- or understated requirements and bridge the gap between the warfighting combatant commanders' near-term interests and objectives and the services' longer planning horizon. However, inadequate linkage remains between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the department's munitions requirements determinations and purchases made by the military services. This is sometimes referred to as a difference between the combatant commanders' near-term focus (generally 2 years) and the services longer- term planning horizon (generally 6 years). However, we believe that there is a more fundamental reason for the disconnect; it occurs because the department's munitions requirements determination process does not fully consider the combatant commanders' preferences for munitions and weapon systems to be used against targets identified in projected scenarios. On June 18, 2002, the department contracted with TRW Inc. to assess its munitions requirements process and develop a process that will include a determination of the near-year and out-year munitions requirements. The assessment, which will build upon the capabilities-based munitions requirements process, is also expected to quantify risk associated with any quantity differential associated between requirements and inventory and achieve a balance between inventory, production, and consumption. A final report on this assessment is due in March 2003. The department's munitions requirements process provides varying answers for current munitions acquisitions because of the inadequate linkage between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the munitions requirements computed by the military services. As a result, the services are purchasing some critically needed munitions based on available funding and the contractors' production capacity. For example, in December 2001, both the services and the combatant commanders identified shortages for joint direct attack munitions (a munition preferred by each of the combatant commanders). According to various Department of Defense officials, these amounts differed and exceeded previously planned acquisition quantities. Therefore, the department entered into an agreement to purchase the maximum quantities that it could fund the contractor to manufacture and paid the contractor to increase its production capacity. In such cases, the department could purchase too much or too little, depending upon the quantities of munitions ultimately needed. While this approach may be needed in the short term, it raises questions whether over the long term it would position the services to make the most efficient use of appropriated funds and whether the needs of combatant commands to carry out their missions will be met. Until the department establishes a more direct link between the combatant commanders' needs, the department's requirements determinations, and the services' purchasing decisions, the department will be unable to determine with certainty the quantities and types of munitions the combatant commanders need to accomplish their missions. As a result, the amount of munitions funds needed will remain uncertain, and assessments of the size and composition of the industrial production base will be negatively affected. Unless this issue is resolved, the severity of the situation will again be apparent when munitions funding returns to normal levels and shortages of munitions are identified by the combatant commands. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense establish a direct link between the munitions needs of the combatant commands--recognizing the impact of weapons systems and munitions preferred or expected to be employed--and the munitions requirements determinations and purchasing decisions made by the military services. As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this report. The Director of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense's Strategic and Tactical Systems provided written comments on a draft of this report. They are included in appendix III. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommended linkage of munitions requirements and combatant commanders' needs. The Director stated that the department, through a munitions requirements study directed by the fiscal year 2004 Defense Planning Guidance, has identified this link as a problem and has established a solution that will be documented in the next update of Instruction 3000.4 in fiscal year 2003. The department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the Director, Office of Management and Budget. The report is also available on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. The scope and methodology of our work is presented in appendix I. If you or your staff have any questions on the matters discussed in this letter, please contact me at (202) 512-4300. Key contributors to this letter were Ron Berteotti, Roger Tomlinson, Tommy Baril, and Nelsie Alcoser. To determine the extent to which improvements had been made to the Department of Defense's requirements determination process, we reviewed the Department's Instruction 3000.4, Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements (to ascertain roles and oversight responsibilities and to identify required inputs into the process); 17 Department of Defense Inspector General reports and 4 General Accounting Office reports relating to the department's munitions requirements determination process (to identify reported weaknesses in the requirements determination process); and reviewed requirements determinations and related documentation and interviewed officials (to identify actions taken to correct weaknesses in the requirements determination process) from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C.; Joint Chiefs of Staff (Operations, Logistics, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment), Washington, D.C.; and Army, Navy, and Air Force officials responsible for budgeting, buying, and allocating munitions. To determine whether the munitions requirements determination process was being used to guide current munitions acquisitions, we met with the services' headquarters officials (to determine how each service develops its munitions requirements, to obtain data on the assumptions and inputs that go into its simulation models, to see how each service reviews the outcome of its munitions requirement process, and to determine the basis for recent munitions purchases) and interviewed officials at U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida; U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Florida; U.S. Pacific Command; Headquarters Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Army Pacific; Marine Forces Pacific; U.S. Pacific Fleet, Oahu, Hawaii; U.S. Forces Korea; Eighth U.S. Army, Seoul, Korea; and 7th Air Force, Osan, Korea (to determine whether the munitions needed by the warfighters are available). We performed our review from March 2002 through July 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the Munition Requirements Determination Process. GAO-01-18. Washington, D.C.: April 2001. Summary of the DOD Process for Developing Quantitative Munitions Requirements. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2000. Air Force Munitions Requirements. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: September 3, 1999. Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions. GAO/NSIAD-99-105. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1999. U.S. Special Operations Command Munitions Requirements. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1999. Marine Corps Quantitative Munitions Requirements Process. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 1998. Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to be Reassessed. GAO/NSIAD-99-32. Washington, D.C.: December 9, 1998. Navy Quantitative Requirements for Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 1998. Army Quantitative Requirements for Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 1998. Management Oversight of the Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements Process. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 1998. Threat Distributions for Requirements Planning at U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces Korea. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: May 20, 1998. Army's and Marine Corps' Quantitative Requirements for Blocks I and II Stinger Missiles. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 1996. U.S. Combat Air Power-Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1996. Summary Report on the Audits of the Anti-Armor Weapon System and Associated Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 1995. Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development. GAO/NSIAD-95-95. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1995. Acquisition Objectives for Antisubmarine Munitions and Requirements for Shallow Water Oceanography. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 1995. Army's Processes for Determining Quantitative Requirements for Anti-Armor Systems and Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 1995. The Marine Corps' Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for Anti-Armor Munitions for Ground Forces. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 1994. The Navy's Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for Anti-Armor Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: October 11, 1994. The Air Force's Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for Anti-Armor Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1994. Coordination of Quantitative Requirements for Anti-Armor Munitions. Department of Defense Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 1994.

Summary:
The Department of Defense (DOD) planned to spend $7.9 billion on acquiring munitions in fiscal year 2002. Ongoing military operations associated with the global war on terrorism have heightened concerns about the unified combatant commands having sufficient quantities of munitions. Since 1994, the DOD Inspector General and GAO have issued numerous reports identifying weaknesses and expressing concerns about the accuracy of the process used by the department to determine munitions requirements. DOD has improved its munitions requirements process by eliminating most of the systematic problems--correcting questionable and inconsistently applied data, completing target templates, and resolving issues involving the level of detail that should be included in planning guidance. However, a fundamental problem remains unaddressed--inadequate linkage between the near-term munitions needs of the combatant commands and the purchases made by the military services based on computations derived from the department's munitions requirement determination process. The department's munitions requirements process provides varied answers for current munitions acquisitions questions because of the aforementioned disjunction. As a result, the services, in the short term, are purchasing some critically needed munitions based on available funding and contractors' production capacity. Although this approach may be necessary in the short term, it raises questions as to whether over the long term it would position the services to make the most efficient use of appropriated funds and whether the needs of combatant commands to carry out their missions will be met.