The Air Force's manpower requirements are determined by individual major commands, using a number of methodologies, including manpower standards, logistical models, and crew ratios. Once approved by Air Force leadership, the results serve as the basis for authorizing military, civilian, and contractor positions in the Air Force and are entered into the Air Force's Manpower Data System. The Air Force's Directorate of Manpower and Organization designed the Total Force Assessment (TFA) process to assess whether the various methodologies used by the Air Force to determine manpower requirements generated sufficient manpower to accomplish two purposes: (1) meet deployment commitments should it be called on to fight two major theater wars and (2) conduct multiple small-scale contingency operations in peacetime. To assess whether the authorized manpower was adequate for the wartime scenario, the Air Force compared the authorized forces in the Manpower Data System to the deployment commitments demanded by the two major theater wars. It then calculated the effect of deploying these forces on the manpower needed to continue operations at existing airbases (i.e., in-place support forces). Demands for the deployment commitments were identified using troop deployment listsgenerated from war plans for conducting wars in Southwest and Northeast Asia. The requirements for in-place support forces were calculated using a model that adjusts manpower requirements to account for changes in the personnel needed to support ongoing Air Force operations when forces are deployed. Plans for assessing the adequacy of forces in peacetime were never finalized. The Air Force conducted only the wartime component of the assessment, not the component assessing the adequacy of its manpower in conducting multiple contingency operations in peacetime. Moreover, the wartime component of the assessment was stopped before all discrepancies were resolved and, as a result, it was not conclusive. The incompleteness and irregular timing of this and similar past assessments indicate that they have not been a high priority for the Air Force. The Total Force Assessment was not entirely implemented as planned, and as a result the Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it has the manpower needed to carry out the operations envisioned by DOD. Begun in May 2000, this effort was conducted, in part, to provide the Air Force with an overarching analysis of its personnel requirements in preparation for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. It was to be completed by January 2001. However, as of January 2002, the Air Force had essentially completed its assessment of wartime requirements, but it had not yet begun its assessment of whether Air Force authorized personnel were sufficient to support contingency operations in peacetime. The peacetime analysis was important because it would demonstrate whether particular career fields might be overburdened in peacetime even if sufficient forces were available to meet the two-theater-war scenario. The results of the wartime analysis were somewhat inconclusive because the Air Force stopped work on the study before some discrepancies in the assessment's results were resolved. These discrepancies occurred because the process used for the study resulted in double counting some requirements, which in turn required the Air Force to manually review results for accuracy. Air Force officials told us they discontinued further work resolving discrepancies because Air Force leadership believed there was a strong likelihood that defense guidance would be changed from the two major theater war scenario to some other scenario. Such a change would have reduced the utility of any further efforts to produce more accurate results. At the time they stopped work, Air Force officials had concluded that results were about 90 percent accurate. According to Air Force officials, the leadership of the Air Force Directorate of Manpower and Organization believed that, at that point, the assessment results showed that forces were adequate to support the wartime scenario, and these results were subsequently briefed to the chief of staff of the Air Force. At the time of our review, Air Force officials still planned to conduct the peacetime analysis, but in view of the change in defense strategy they no longer plan to complete this portion of the current assessment. Instead, the Air Force plans to revamp the TFA process. Air Force officials advised us that in the future the TFA might be streamlined and shortened in duration since Air Force leadership believes that the current assessment is too time-consuming and manpower intensive. These officials said that they had proposed that the next TFA capitalize on the modeling that was used in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review to test whether Air Force manpower is sufficient to meet a wide range of scenarios indicated by that review. Using this new approach, Air Force officials now anticipate completing a new iteration of TFA, covering the full spectrum of conflict, by December 2002. The incomplete implementation of the TFA reflects that, to some extent, the Air Force has not placed a high priority on achieving the goals of this type of assessment, as evidenced by the long interval experienced between assessments. A forerunner to Total Force Assessment, FORSIZE, was last completed in 1995--more than 6 years ago. No FORSIZE study was conducted in 1996 or 1997 because the analytical resources needed to conduct the assessment were devoted to the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review instead. Planning for the most recent TFA began in 1999, but efforts were impeded by other changes the Air Force was undergoing, such as the recognition that the Air Force needed forces to conduct contingency operations as well as forces to meet the wartime scenarios, a need that then had to be incorporated in TFA's design. While these changes certainly complicated the Air Force analysis, such uncertainty and change have almost become constants within DOD. Doing without a regular, institutionalized process-- on the basis of inevitable complications--denies the Air Force's Directorate of Manpower and Organization a way to determine objectively whether it has the forces needed to carry out the defense strategy. The Air Force did not use the results from the assessment for all of the purposes it had envisioned. On the positive side, Air Force officials told us that TFA results had been useful in helping some functional managers discuss the health of their career fields in briefings to the chief of staff of the Air Force. For example, the Total Force Assessment showed that the number of active forces fell somewhat short of the numbers demanded for the wartime scenario, while the number of reserve forces exceeded demands. In some situations, functional managers were asked to consider making greater use of reserve forces if active forces were deemed insufficient. On the other hand, the Air Force did not use TFA results as anticipated to support changes in budget submissions or to influence day- to-day management of manpower assets. Officials also noted that TFA results were not used to reallocate forces among various functional managers to make the best use of available forces, although they noted that TFA was not designed to do this. As a result, TFA has not lived up to its full potential for assisting Air Force leadership in making manpower decisions that can lead to a more effective force. We believe there are two possible reasons why the Air Force did not use TFA results to the full extent expected. First, because implementation of TFA was incomplete, the results themselves are incomplete and thus may have been viewed as of limited value for supporting changes to the budget or in making day to day management decisions. For example, officials told us that, with the changes to defense guidance and deployment schedules, TFA results are now viewed as one more data source on which to base decisions. Second, because TFA has not been institutionalized and does not occur on a regular basis, its results may have been viewed as insufficient or not timely for these purposes; for example, the Air Force might not have been able to link TFA results to very formalized and regularly occurring systems like the budget. Because the Air Force cannot objectively demonstrate that it has the forces necessary to carry out the full spectrum of military operations envisioned in defense guidance, its operational risk in both wartime and peacetime may not be fully understood. Both the secretary of defense and the Congress need this information to effectively discharge their respective oversight responsibilities. Without an institutionalized process for assessing risk, which occurs on a regular basis, the Air Force has no way of knowing what mitigating actions might be warranted. On the positive side, the Air Force has identified other aspects of force management that could benefit from the results of a Total Force Assessment. However, it has not been able to capitalize on this potential because the results to date have been incomplete and irregularly obtained. By not placing a high enough priority on conducting a regularly occurring assessment and by underutilizing assessment results, the Air Force may be shortchanging itself in terms of achieving an appropriate force size and mix and in terms of fully developing the related funding requirements. To enable the Air Force to objectively demonstrate it has the forces necessary to support the spectrum of military operations envisioned in the defense strategy and to enhance force management processes, we recommend that the secretary of defense direct the secretary of the Air Force to institutionalize a Total Force Assessment process to be conducted on a regular basis with clearly articulated uses for its results. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Air Force institutionalize TFA but took issue with some of the findings and analysis in our assessment. DOD's concerns center around whether the Air Force implemented TFA as planned and was able to establish its ability to carry out the full spectrum of missions envisioned by the defense strategy. Our assertion that the TFA was not implemented as planned is based on the fact that the chief of staff of the Air Force tasking letter that initiated TFA and the subsequent overarching guidance written by the Air Force specified an assessment of manpower requirements for both peacetime and wartime operations. At the time of our review, the Air Force had completed the wartime portion, but had not yet addressed peacetime operations. We understand, and noted in our report, that the Air Force now expects to complete a new iteration of TFA, covering the full spectrum of conflict, by December 2002. We endorse this effort and are hopeful that it reaches fruition. It does not alter the fact, however, that the fiscal year 1999 TFA was not fully implemented as planned, and that, lacking requirements for peacetime operations, it did not objectively establish the Air Force's ability to fully execute the defense guidance. DOD's comments also stress that the two major theater war portion of TFA was completed and briefed to the chief of staff of the Air Force and that the results showed that the Air Force had sufficient manpower to satisfy mission requirements. Our report acknowledges these facts. We noted, however, that the numbers resulting from the assessment were somewhat inconclusive and less useful than they might have been because work on the study was discontinued before all discrepancies were resolved. As stated in our report, Air Force officials estimated that final results were about 90 percent accurate. DOD's comments further questioned our conclusion that TFA had not capitalized as anticipated on the assessment's results, stating that the results of TFA were used widely for initiating taskings and making decisions. Our report does not indicate that TFA results were not used at all, only that its intended potential was not realized. We were unable to document the extent to which TFA was used for tasking and decision- making because the Air Force Directorate of Manpower and Organization did not produce a final report on TFA results, and it did not establish procedures for systematically tracking issues developed from TFA data and resulting actions to resolve them. Based on information provided by Air Force officials, we did acknowledge in our report that TFA results were used by functional managers to explore increasing the use of reserve forces to mitigate shortfalls in the active forces. However, during our review Air Force officials told us that TFA results would not be used for other purposes envisioned in the initial guidance written for TFA (e.g., supporting budget submissions and for day-to-day management of manpower assets). The department's written comments are presented in their entirety in appendix I. To evaluate whether the Air Force's Total Force Assessment demonstrated that forces are adequate to carry out the defense strategy, we reviewed Air Force policy, guidance, and documents used in planning and conducting the assessment from calendar year 1999 through 2001. We also reviewed the assessment's results and discussed these results with officials responsible for this analysis. These included representatives of the Air Force's Directorate of Manpower and Organization at the Pentagon; Air Force Manpower Readiness Flight at Fort Detrick, Maryland; and the Air Force Manpower and Innovation Agency in San Antonio, Texas. We also discussed the assessment's methodology and past assessments with these officials. We did not independently verify the underlying manpower- requirements system information that serves as the starting point for the Total Force Assessment. To determine how the Air Force used the assessment's results, we identified its anticipated uses and discussed with Air Force officials how these results were actually used. We conducted our review from July 2001 through January 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government audit standards. We obtained comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Defense and incorporated its comments where appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the secretary of defense and the director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to appropriate congressional committees and to other interested parties on request. If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512-3958. Major contributors to this report were Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, James K. Mahaffey, Norman L. Jessup, Jr., and Susan K. Woodward.

Summary:
The Air Force began to test the force requirements in its manpower requirements-determination process in May 2000. The defense strategy envisions simultaneously fighting two major theater wars and conducting multiple contingency operations in peacetime. The Total Force Assessment was the Air Force's first evaluation of manpower adequacy in these contexts since 1995. Because the Total Force Assessment was not implemented as planned, the Air Force cannot demonstrate that it has the forces needed to carry out the full spectrum of military operations. Although intended to examine whether authorized Air Force personnel were sufficient to meet both the wartime and peacetime scenarios, the assessment only addressed the wartime scenario and did not address the adequacy of manpower for conducting multiple contingency operations in peacetime. Air Force officials concluded that manpower was adequate to support the wartime scenario but this assessment was inconclusive because the effort was discontinued before all discrepancies in the assessment's results were resolved. Although the Air Force spent considerable time and effort conducting at least a portion of its planned assessment, it has not used the results to the extent anticipated.