RS21619 -- Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security: A Need for New Weapons Programs? September 15, 2003 Throughout the Cold War, the United States maintained nuclear weapons to deter nuclear and conventional attacks by the Soviet Union and its allies against theUnited States and its allies. At its extreme, such a conflict could have led to a global nuclear war. But the UnitedStates also did not rule out the possible use ofnuclear weapons in smaller conflicts or to achieve goals other than deterrence. However, because U.S. forces weresized to meet the Soviet threat, other nationsand other threats to U.S. security were viewed as "lesser included cases." The Bush Administration has emphasized that, even with the demise of the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons "continue to be essential to our security, and that ofour friends and allies." (3) Furthermore, it hasidentified a role for nuclear weapons that it asserts is both more comprehensive than the Cold War concept ofdeterrence and more integrated with the rest of the U.S. military establishment. The Administration has argued thatnuclear weapons, along with missiledefenses and U.S. conventional forces, not only deter adversaries from attacking the United Statesduring a conflict or crisis by promising an unacceptableamount of damage in response to an adversary's attack, they can also assure allies and friends of the U.S.commitment to their security, dissuade potentialadversaries from challenging the United States during a crisis with nuclear weapons or other "asymmetrical threats,"and defeat enemies by holding at risk thosetargets that could not be destroyed with other types of weapons. (4) Many analysts see little difference between these goals and those the United States pursuedduring the Cold War. Nevertheless, according to the Bush Administration, to support this broader array ofobjectives, the United States may need nuclearweapons that are different, in both numbers and capabilities, from the weapons remaining in the U.S. arsenal afterthe Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States maintained the numbers and types of nuclear weapons that it believed it needed to threaten the full range of potentialtargets in the Soviet Union. The Bush Administration has referred to this as "threat-based" targeting because it islinked to the "Soviet threat." TheAdministration has stated that the United States will no longer use this model to calculate its nuclear requirements. Instead, the United States would "look moreat a broad range of capabilities and contingencies that the United States may confront" and tailor U.S. militarycapabilities to address this wide spectrum ofpossible contingencies. (5) Specifically, the UnitedStates would identify potential conflicts, review the capabilities of its possible adversaries, identify thosenuclear capabilities that the United States might need to attack or threaten the adversary, and develop a force postureand nuclear weapons employment strategythat would allow it to attack those capabilities. For most possible contingencies, such as those against North Koreaor other rogue nations, the numbers ofrequired nuclear weapons is likely to be very small. But, according to the Administration, Russia presents a"potential contingency" that could emerge if therelationship between the two nations were to change. Most analysts believe that this "potential" is the source of theAdministration's interest in retainingseveral thousand nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal. The Bush Administration has not described the specific capabilities it will target with this new strategy. During the Cold War, the United States sought to targetmilitary, industrial, and leadership facilities in the former Soviet Union. Similar facilities are likely to be includedon the list of "capabilities" that the UnitedStates would want to threaten in some contingencies with other nations because, by destroying these capabilities,the United States could expect to achieve itswar objectives. The Bush Administration has specifically highlighted hardened and deeply buried targets andfacilities housing nuclear, chemical, or biologicalweapons as potential capabilities that it might want to threaten. These types of targets are not new to U.S. war plansbecause the Soviet Union had manyhardened and deeply buried targets, such as missile silos and command posts, and it had storage depots that housedchemical weapons. The United Statespresumably planned to attack and destroy these facilities in a conflict with the Soviet Union. According to the Administration, however, the United States cannot be certain where these threats will appear in the future. Therefore, it must plan for known,potential, and unexpected contingencies. (6) Further,to deter potential and unexpected contingencies, the United States would need the capability to crediblythreaten targets in nations that it may not be able to identify ahead of time. It also must have the intelligence toidentify these targets and the rapid targeting andresponse capabilities to address these contingencies as they come up. Hence, the difficulties with this approach stemfrom more than just a requirement toattack hardened and deeply buried targets. The Bush Administration is attempting to integrate the nuclear weapons infrastructure into its new concept of deterrence. According to the Administration, an infrastructure that allows the United States to sustain its forces and adapt them to meet emerging needs would"provide the United States with the means torespond to new, unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner." Furthermore, the "ability to innovate andproduce small builds of special purposeweapons would convince an adversary that it could not expect to negate U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities." (7) The Administration has also linked themodernization of the nuclear weapons complex to its plans to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Theplanned reductions will occur in parallel withimprovements in the weapons complex to ensure that the reductions did not get ahead of the U.S. ability to maintainand modernize its remaining weapons. The Administration has identified several specific tasks that the infrastructure must accomplish over the next decade. Many are associated with the efforts tomaintain and refurbish existing nuclear weapons. But the Administration has also outlined plans to establish small"advanced warhead concepts teams" toevaluate evolving military requirements and assess options for new or modified warheads. (8) The Administration notes that this effort will not only prepare theUnited States to respond to emerging threats, but will also help train the next generation of weapons scientists. TheAdministration has also requested fundingfor a study on the conversion of an existing nuclear weapon into a "robust nuclear earth-penetrator" and for a studythat will explore options for the design of anew low-yield nuclear weapon. The Administration argues that this research will not inevitably lead to the design,development, and production of newweapons. Nevertheless, many analysts fear that the United States will eventually produce new weapons to supportan enhanced warfighting role for nuclearweapons. Battlefield Nuclear Weapons. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types ofdelivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, including short-range missiles and artillery for use on the battlefield,medium-range land-based and sea-based missilesand aircraft, long-range missiles based on U.S. territory and submarines, and heavy bombers that could threatenSoviet targets from their bases in the UnitedStates. In the early 1990s, the United States withdrew from deployment and eliminated almost all of its shorter- andmedium-range nuclear weapons, leaving aforce consisting of mostly longer-range strategic weapons. The United States concluded that the shorter rangesystems had little utility after the demise of theSoviet Union and the virtual elimination of the threat of a ground war in Europe or Asia. Under thesecircumstances, the United States no longer needed tothreaten targets, such as troop concentrations or support and logistics facilities, on the battlefield. If it deploys the new types of nuclear weapons under consideration by the Bush Administration, the United States could return to a nuclear posture that includesbattlefield nuclear weapons. Unlike during the Cold War, when battlefield weapons were deployed near theirtargets, the United States might use long-range orintercontinental missiles or aircraft to deliver these weapons. But they would, like the shorter-range weapons of theCold War era, seek to achieve preciseobjectives on the battlefield, assuming, of course, that the United States had the intelligence and targetingcapabilities to identify these targets. Many analystsconsider these weapons more useful for war-fighting than deterrence, and many have questioned whether the BushAdministration, in pursuing these weapons,might be moving the United States towards a posture where it would be more likely to use nuclear weapons in aconflict. Credible Deterrence vs. Likelihood of Use. The debate over whether the new nuclear weapons concepts arebetter suited to warfighting or deterrence follows from a more fundamental debate over how to make deterrencecredible. This debate surfaced frequentlyduring the Cold War, when the United States sought to deter not only a Soviet nuclear attack on the United Statesbut also a conventional attack by the SovietUnion or its allies against U.S. allies. Many analysts consider this issue to be even more relevant now, when theUnited States might seek to use its nucleardeterrent in contingencies with more specific and limited goals against an adversary who possesses few or nonuclear weapons. The Bush Administration plansto develop a more focused nuclear war-fighting capability for the United States, one that includes an improvedability to destroy hardened and deeply buriedtargets and other capabilities in a number of nations that might threaten the United States. It has stated that theseplans and capabilities would make nuclear use less likely because it would make the U.S. deterrent more credible and robust. (9) Critics of the Administration's policy question this contention. Many analysts doubt that leaders of smaller, non-nuclear countries will view any U.S. threat touse nuclear weapons as credible, regardless of the yield or capability of U.S. nuclear weapons. If they do not believethe United States will strike with nuclearweapons, then they would not be deterred by the threat. Others argue that the United States can credibly threatenany nation, and therefore deter or defeat thatnation, with its conventional forces. They believe this eliminates any requirement for new and improved nuclearweapons. And some analysts questionwhether nuclear threats against specific, and possibly remote facilities, will deter leaders in smaller, rogue nations. These leaders may believe they can absorb asmall nuclear strike from the United States and still achieve their war aims. Critics of the Administration's policy, therefore, fear that by developing nuclear weapons for battlefield uses, the United States may be more likely to use thesesystems in a conflict. They worry that this would be particularly true if the adversary could not strike back againstthe United States with nuclear weapons, asthe Soviet Union could. These analysts fear that, as time passes, as the memories of the horrors of nuclear use fadeand as concerns about the horrors ofchemical and biological weapons increase, U.S. officials may begin to believe that the unilateral use of nuclearweapons by the United States represents the lesshorrible outcome for the United States than the alternative where an adversary uses chemical or biological weaponsagainst U.S. interests. The Bush Administration has stated that nuclear weapons will play a role in U.S. security policy for the foreseeable future. But, under the1968 NuclearNon-proliferation Treaty, the United States has pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. securitypolicy. The Administration claims that these twogoals do not conflict; nuclear weapons will play a smaller, albeit important role in U.S. policy than they did duringthe Cold War era. Critics, however, arguethat the U.S. approach may undermine U.S. efforts to discourage nuclear proliferation. Some believe that it wouldbe difficult for the United States to urgerestraint on nations that may be close to acquiring nuclear weapons if it demonstrates, with its own nuclear posture,that nuclear weapons are critical to nationalsecurity. Some analysts have also noted that, if potential adversaries were to acquire nuclear weapons, the threatthey pose to U.S. security could growdramatically. Consequently, these critics argue, the United States should seek to "marginalize as much as possiblethe role that nuclear weapons play in U.S.defense and foreign policy." (10) Others, however, argue that U.S. nuclear policy is not likely to affect U.S. nonproliferation policy because countries seeking nuclear weapons do so becausethey have concerns about their relationships with regional adversaries, not because the United States has nuclearweapons. In addition, the Bush Administrationhas argued that the U.S. development of nuclear weapons that can defeat hardened and deeply buried targets or candestroy stocks of chemical and biologicalweapons are a part of the U.S. effort to discourage other nations from acquiring and threatening to use WMD. Regardless of the implications, the United States has clearly begun to pursue research, and possibly the development, of new nuclear weapons. Although it isunlikely to resolve the theoretical controversies, Congress may review and debate the merits and particulars of theseprograms -- and their broader implications-- in the coming months.

Summary:
In the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush Administration outlined a new role forU.S. nuclear weapons thatgoes beyond the concept of deterrence from the Cold War. It also identified a new targeting strategy that would seekto threaten specific capabilities inadversary nations. Furthermore, the Administration has pledged to restore and enhance the U.S. nuclear weaponsinfrastructure, as part of the U.S. effort todeter the emergence of new threats in the future. In implementing the NPR, the Administration has requestedfunding for studies on new types of nuclearweapons. The Administration claims these projects, if they eventually produce new weapons, would enhancedeterrence; critics claim they will make nuclearuse more likely and undermine U.S. nonproliferation goals. This report will be updated as needed.