With more than 100,000 commercial vessels navigating U.S. waters and 12.2 million barrels of oil being imported into the United States each day, some oil spills in domestic waters are inevitable. Fortunately, however, spills are relatively infrequent and are decreasing. While oil transport and maritime traffic have continued to increase, the total number of reported spills has generally declined each year since 1990. OPA places the primary burden of liability and the costs of oil spills on the vessel owner and operator who were responsible for the spill. This "polluter pays" system provides a deterrent for vessel owners and operators who spill oil by requiring that they assume the burden of spill response, natural resource restoration, and compensation to those damaged by the spill, up to a specified limit of liability--which is the amount above which responsible parties are no longer financially liable under certain conditions. (See fig. 1 for the limits of liability by vessel type.) For example, if a vessel's limit of liability is $10 million and a spill resulted in $12 million in costs, the responsible party only has to pay up to $10 million--the Fund will pay for the remaining $2 million. The Coast Guard is responsible for adjusting limits for significant increases in inflation and for making recommendations to Congress on whether other adjustments are necessary to help protect the Fund. OPA also requires that vessel owners and operators must demonstrate their ability to pay for oil spill response up to their limit of liability. Specifically, by regulation, with few exceptions, owners and operators of vessels over 300 gross tons and any vessels that transship or transfer oil in the Exclusive Economic Zone are required to have a certificate of financial responsibility that demonstrates their ability to pay for oil spill response up to their limit of liability. OPA consolidated the liability and compensation provisions of four prior federal oil pollution initiatives and their respective trust funds into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and authorized the collection of revenue and the use of the money, with certain limitations, with regard to expenditures. The Fund's balance has generally declined from 1995 through 2006, and since fiscal year 2003, its balance has been less than the authorized limit on federal expenditures for the response to a single spill, which is currently set at $1 billion (see fig. 2). The balance has declined, in part, because the Fund's main source of revenue--a $0.05 per barrel tax on U.S. produced and imported oil--was not collected for most of the time between 1993 and 2006. As a result, the Fund balance was $604.4 million at the end of fiscal year 2006. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 reinstated the barrel tax beginning in April 2006. With the barrel tax once again in place, NPFC anticipates that the Fund will be able to cover potential noncatastrophic liabilities. OPA also defines the costs for which responsible parties are liable and for which the Fund is made available for compensation in the event that the responsible party does not pay or is not identified. These costs, or "OPA compensable" costs, are of two main types: Removal costs: Removal costs are incurred by the federal government or any other entity taking approved action to respond to, contain, and clean up the spill. For example, removal costs include the equipment used in the response--skimmers to pull oil from the water, booms to contain the oil, planes for aerial observation--as well as salaries and travel and lodging costs for responders. Damages caused by the oil spill: OPA-compensable damages cover a wide range of both actual and potential adverse impacts from an oil spill, for which a claim may be made to either the responsible party or the Fund. Claims include natural resource damage claims filed by trustees, claims for uncompensated removal costs and third-party damage claims for lost or damaged property and lost profits, among other things. The Fund also covers costs when responsible parties cannot be located or do not pay their liabilities. NPFC encounters cases where the source of the spill, and therefore the responsible party is unknown, or where the responsible party does not have the ability to pay. In other cases, since the cost recovery can take a period of years, the responsible party may become bankrupt or dissolved. Based on our analysis of NPFC records, responsible parties have reimbursed the majority--about 65 percent--of the Fund's costs for the 51 spills. Response to large oil spills is typically a cooperative effort between the public and private sector, and there are numerous players who participate in responding to and paying for oil spills. To manage the response effort, the responsible party, the Coast Guard, EPA, and the pertinent state and local agencies form the unified command, which implements and manages the spill response. Appendix I contains additional information on the parties involved in spill response. On the basis of information we were able to assemble about responsible parties' expenditures and payments from the Fund, we estimate that 51 oil spills involving removal costs and damage claims totaling at least $1 million have occurred from 1990 to 2006. During this period, 3,389 oil spills occurred in which one or more parties sought reimbursement from the Fund. The 51 major spills represent less than 2 percent of this total. As figure 3 shows, there are no discernable trends in the number of major oil spills that occur each year. The highest number of spills was seven in 1996; the lowest number was zero in 2006. These 51 spills occurred in a variety of locations and involved a range of vessel types. The spills occurred on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts and include spills both in open coastal waters and inland waterways. In addition, as figure 4 shows, 30 of the 51 spills involved cargo/freight vessels and tank barges, 12 involved fishing and other types of vessels, and 9 involved tanker vessels. The total cost of the 51 spills cannot be precisely determined because private-sector expenditures are not tracked, the various parties involved in covering these costs do not categorize them uniformly, and spills costs are somewhat fluid and accrue over time. Because spill cost data are somewhat imprecise and the data we collected vary somewhat by source, the results described below will be reported in ranges, in which various data sources are combined together. The lower and higher bounds of the range represent the low and high end of cost information we obtained. Our analysis of these 51 spills shows their total cost was approximately $1 billion--ranging from $860 million to $1.1 billion. This amount breaks down by source as follows: Amount paid out of the Trust Fund: Because the NPFC tracks and reports all Fund expenditures, the amount paid from the Fund can be reported as an actual amount, not an estimate. For these 51 spills, the Fund paid a total of $239.5 million. Amount paid by responsible parties: Because of the lack of precise information about amounts paid by responsible parties and the differences in how they categorize their costs, this portion of the expenditures must be presented as an estimate. Based on the data we were able to obtain and analyze, responsible parties spent between $620 million and $840 million. Even at the low end of the range, this amount is nearly triple the expenditure from the Fund. Costs of these 51 spills varied widely by spill, and therefore, by year (see fig. 5). For example, 1994 and 2004 both had four spills during the year, but the average cost per spill in 1994 was about $30 million, while the average cost per spill in 2004 was between $71 million and $96 million. Just as there was no discernible trend in the frequency of these major spills, there is no discernible trend in their cost. Although the substantial increase in 2004 may look like an upward trend, 2004 may be an anomaly that reflects the unique character of two of the four spills that occurred that year. These two spills accounted for 98 percent of the year's costs. Location, time of year, and type of oil are key factors affecting oil spill costs, according to industry experts, agency officials, and our analysis of spills. Officials also identified two other factors that may influence oil spill costs to a lesser extent--the effectiveness of the spill response and the level of public interest in a spill. In ways that are unique to each spill, these factors can affect the breadth and difficulty of the response effort or the extent of damage that requires mitigation. The location of a spill can have a large bearing on spill costs because it will determine the extent of response needed, as well as the degree of damage to the environment and local economies. According to state officials with whom we spoke and industry experts, there are three primary characteristics of location that affect costs: Remoteness: For spills that occur in remote areas, spill response can be particularly difficult in terms of mobilizing responders and equipment, and they can complicate the logistics of removing oil from the water--all of which can increase the costs of a spill. Proximity to shore: There are also significant costs associated with spills that occur close to shore. Contamination of shoreline areas has a considerable bearing on the costs of spills as such spills can require manual labor to remove oil from the shoreline and sensitive habitats. The extent of damage is also affected by the specific shoreline location. Proximity to economic centers: Spills that occur in the proximity of economic centers can also result in increased costs when local services are disrupted. A spill near a port can interrupt the flow of goods, necessitating an expeditious response in order to resume business activities, which could increase removal costs. Additionally, spills that disrupt economic activities can result in expensive third-party damage claims. The time of year in which a spill occurs can also affect spill costs--in particular, impacting local economies and response efforts. According to several state and private-sector officials with whom we spoke, spills that disrupt seasonal events that are critical for local economies can result in considerable expenses. For example, spills in the spring months in areas of the country that rely on revenue from tourism may incur additional removal costs in order to expedite spill clean-up, or because there are stricter standards for clean up, which increase the costs. The time of year in which a spill occurs also affects response efforts because of possible inclement weather conditions. For example, spills that occur during the winter months in areas of the country that experience harsh winter conditions can result in higher removal costs because of the increased difficulty in mobilizing equipment and personnel to respond to a spill in inclement weather. According to a state official knowledgeable about a January 1996 spill along the coast of Rhode Island, extremely cold and stormy weather made response efforts very difficult. The type of oil spilled affects the degree to which oil can be cleaned up and removed, as well as the nature of the natural resource damage caused by the spill. The different types of oil can be grouped into four categories, each with its own set of impacts on spill response and the environment (see table 1). Lighter oils such as jet fuels, gasoline, and diesel fuel dissipate and evaporate quickly, and as such, often require minimal cleanup. However, these oils are highly toxic and can severely affect the environment if conditions for evaporation are unfavorable. For instance, in 1996, a tank barge that was carrying home-heating oil grounded in the middle of a storm near Point Judith, Rhode Island, spilling approximately 828,000 gallons of heating oil (light oil). Although this oil might dissipate quickly under normal circumstances, heavy wave conditions caused an estimated 80 percent of the release to mix with water. Natural resource damages alone were estimated at $18 million, due to the death of approximately 9 million lobsters, 27 million clams and crabs, and over 4 million fish. Heavier oils, such as crude oils and other heavy petroleum products are less toxic than lighter oils but can also have severe environmental impacts. Medium and heavy oils do not evaporate much, even during favorable weather conditions, and can blanket structures they come in contact with--boats and fishing gear, for example--as well as the shoreline, creating severe environmental impacts to these areas, and harming waterfowl and fur-bearing mammals through coating and ingestion. Additionally, heavy oils can sink, creating prolonged contamination of the sea bed and tar balls that sink to the ocean floor and scatter along beaches. These spills can require intensive shoreline and structural clean up, which is time-consuming and expensive. For example, in 1995, a tanker spilled approximately 38,000 gallons of heavy fuel oil into the Gulf of Mexico when it collided with another tanker as it prepared to lighter its oil to another ship. Less than 1 percent (210 gallons) of the oil was recovered from the sea, and as a result, recovery efforts on the beaches of Matagorda and South Padre Islands were labor intensive, as hundreds of workers had to manually pick up tar balls with shovels. The total removal costs for the spill were estimated at $7 million. Some industry experts cited two other factors as also affecting costs incurred during a spill. Effectiveness of Spill Response: Some private-sector officials stated that the effectiveness of spill response can impact the cost of cleanup. The longer it takes to assemble and conduct the spill response, the more likely it is that the oil will move with changing tides and currents and affect a greater area, which can increase costs. Some officials said the level of experience of those involved in the incident command is critical to the effectiveness of spill response. For example, they said poor decision making during a spill response could lead to the deployment of unnecessary response equipment, or worse, not enough equipment to respond to a spill. Several officials expressed concern that Coast Guard officials are increasingly inexperienced in handling spill response, in part because the Coast Guard's mission has been increased to include homeland security initiatives. Public interest: Several officials with whom we spoke stated that the level of public attention placed on a spill creates pressure on parties to take action and can increase costs. They also noted that the level of public interest can increase the standards of cleanliness expected, which may increase removal costs. The total costs of the San Francisco spill are currently unknown. According to NPFC officials, as of December 4, 2007, the Unified Command estimated that $48 million had been spent on the response, which includes approximately $2.2 million from the Fund. The total costs will not likely be known for a while, as it can take many months or years to determine the full effect of a spill on natural resources and to determine the costs and extent of the natural resource damage. Our work for this testimony did not include a thorough evaluation of the factors affecting the spill. However, some of the same key factors that have influenced the cost of 51 major oil spills will likely have an effect on the costs in the San Francisco spill. For example, the spill occurred in an area close to shore, which caused the closing of as many as 22 beaches, according to Coast Guard officials. A weather-related factor was that the spill occurred during dense fog, which complicated efforts to determine how much of an area the spill covered. Moreover, the cargo ship spilled a heavy oil--specifically intermediate fuel oil--that requires particularly intensive shoreline and structural clean-up, and harmed scores of birds and marine mammals through coating and ingestion. Concerns have also been raised about the effectiveness of the spill response and incident command, another of the factors cited as contributing to increased costs. The National Transportation Safety Board, the Coast Guard, as well as other government agencies, are currently investigating the details of the accident and the subsequent response. The Fund has been able to cover costs from major spills that responsible parties have not paid, but risks remain. Specifically, the current liability limits for certain vessel types, notably tank barges, may be disproportionately low relative to costs associated with such spills. There is also no assurance that vessel owners and operators are able to financially cover these new limits, because the Coast Guard has not yet issued regulations for satisfying financial responsibility requirements. In addition, although OPA calls for periodic increases in liability limits to account for significant increases in inflation, such increases have never been made. Aside from issues related to limits of liability, the Fund faces other potential drains on its resources, including ongoing claims from existing spills. The Fund has been able to cover costs from major spills that responsible parties have not paid, but additional focus on limits of liability is warranted. Limits of liability are the amount, under certain circumstances, above which responsible parties are no longer financially liable for spill removal costs and damage claims. If the responsible party's costs exceed the limit of liability, they can make a claim against the Fund for the amount above the limit. Major oil spills that exceed a vessel's limit of liability are infrequent, but their impact on the Fund can be significant. Ten of the 51 major oil spills that occurred since 1990 resulted in limit-of- liability claims on the Fund. These limit-of-liability claims totaled more than $252 million and ranged from less than $1 million to more than $100 million. Limit-of-liability claims will continue to have a pronounced effect on the Fund. NPFC estimates that 74 percent of claims under adjudication that were outstanding as of January 2007 were for spills in which the limit of liability had been exceeded. The amount of these claims under adjudication was $217 million. We identified three areas in which further attention to these liability limits appears warranted: the appropriateness of some current liability limits, the need to adjust limits periodically in the future to account for significant increases in inflation, and the need for updated regulations for ensuring vessel owners and operators are able to financially cover their new limits. The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 significantly increased the limits of liability from the limits set by OPA in 1990. Both laws base the liability on a specified amount per gross ton of vessel volume, with different amounts for vessels that transport oil commodities (tankers and tank barges) than for vessels that carry oil as a fuel (such as cargo vessels, fishing vessels, and passenger ships). The 2006 act raised both the per-ton and the required minimum amounts, differentiating between vessels with a double hull, which helps prevent oil spills resulting from collision or grounding, and vessels without a double hull (see table 2 for a comparison of amounts by vessel category). For example, the liability limit for single-hull vessels larger than 3,000 gross tons was increased from the greater of $1,200 per gross ton or $10 million to the greater of $3,000 per gross ton or $22 million. Our analysis of the 51 spills showed that the average spill cost for some types of vessels, particularly tank barges, was higher than the limit of liability, including the new limits established in 2006. As figure 6 shows, the 15 tank barge spills and the 12 fishing/other vessel spills had average costs greater than both the 1990 and 2006 limits of liability. For example, for tank barges, the average cost of $23 million was higher than the average limit of liability of $4.1 million under the 1990 limits and $10.3 million under the new 2006 limits. The nine spills involving tankers, by comparison, had average spill costs of $34 million, which was considerably lower than the average limit of liability of $77 million under the 1990 limits and $187 million under the new 2006 limits. Similarly, the 15 major spills involving cargo/freight vessels had an average spill cost of $67 million, which was lower than both the 1990 and 2006 limits of liability. In a January 2007 report examining spills in which the limits of liability had been exceeded, the Coast Guard had similar findings on the adequacy of some of the new limits. Based on an analysis of 40 spills in which costs had exceeded the responsible party's liability limit since 1991, the Coast Guard found that the Fund's responsibility would be greatest for spills involving tank barges, where the Fund would be responsible for paying 69 percent of costs. The Coast Guard concluded that increasing liability limits for tank barges and non tank vessels--cargo, freight, and fishing vessels-- over 300 gross tons would positively impact the Fund balance. With regard to making specific adjustments, the Coast Guard said dividing costs equally between the responsible parties and the Fund was a reasonable standard to apply in determining the adequacy of liability limits. However, the Coast Guard did not recommend explicit changes to achieve either that 50/50 standard or some other division of responsibility. Although OPA requires adjusting liability limits to account for significant increases in inflation, no adjustments to the limits were made between 1990 and 2006, when the Congress raised the limits in the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act. During those years, the Consumer Price Index rose approximately 54 percent. OPA requires the President, who has delegated responsibility to the Coast Guard, through the Secretary of Homeland Security, to issue regulations not less often than every 3 years to adjust the limits of liability to reflect significant increases in the Consumer Price Index. We asked Coast Guard officials why no adjustments were made between 1990 and 2006. Coast Guard officials stated that they could not speculate on behalf of other agencies as to why no adjustments had been made prior to 2005 when the delegation to the Coast Guard was made. The decision to leave limits unchanged had financial implications for the Fund. Raising the liability limits to account for inflation would have the effect of reducing payments from the Fund, because responsible parties would be responsible for paying costs up to the higher liability limit. Not making adjustments during this 16-year period thus had the effect of increasing the Fund's financial liability. Our analysis showed that if the 1990 liability limits had been adjusted for inflation during the 16-year period, claims against the Fund for the 51 major oil spills would have been reduced 16 percent, from $252 million to $213 million. This would have meant a savings of $39 million for the Fund. Certificates of Financial Responsibility have not been adjusted to reflect the new liability limits. The Coast Guard requires Certificates of Financial Responsibility, with few exceptions, for vessels over 300 gross tons or any vessels that are lightering or transshipping oil in the Exclusive Economic Zone as a legal certification that vessel owners and operators have the financial resources to fund spill response up to the vessel's limit of liability. Currently, Certificate of Financial Responsibility requirements are consistent with the 1990 limits of liability and, therefore, there is no assurance that responsible parties have the financial resources to cover their increased liability. The Coast Guard plans to initiate a rule making to issue new Certificate of Financial Responsibility requirements. Coast Guard officials indicated their goal is to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by the end of 2007, but they said they could not be certain they would meet this goal. The Fund also faces several other potential challenges that could affect its financial condition: Additional claims could be made on spills that have already been cleaned up: Natural resource damage claims can be made on the Fund for years after a spill has been cleaned up. The official natural resource damage assessment conducted by trustees can take years to complete, and once it is completed, claims can be submitted to the NPFC for up to 3 years thereafter. For example, NPFC recently received and paid a natural resource damage claim for a spill in U.S. waters in the Caribbean that occurred in 1991. Costs and claims may occur on spills from previously sunken vessels that discharge oil in the future: Previously sunken vessels that are submerged and in threat of discharging oil represent an ongoing liability to the Fund. There are over 1000 sunken vessels that pose a threat of oil discharge. These potential spills are particularly problematic because in many cases there is no viable responsible party that would be liable for removal costs. Therefore, the full cost burden of oil spilled from these vessels would likely be paid by the Fund. Spills may occur without an identifiable source and therefore, no responsible party: Mystery spills also have a sustained impact on the Fund, because costs for spills without an identifiable source--and therefore no responsible party--may be paid out of the Fund. Although mystery spills are a concern, the total cost to the Fund from mystery spills was lower than the costs of known vessel spills in 2001 through 2004. Additionally, none of the 51 major oil spills was the result of discharge from an unknown source. A catastrophic spill could strain the Fund's resources: Since the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill, which was the impetus for authorizing the Fund's usage, no oil spill has come close to matching its costs. Cleanup costs for the Exxon Valdez alone totaled about $2.2 billion, according to the vessel's owner. By comparison, the 51 major oil spills since 1990 cost, in total, between $860 million and $1.1 billion. The Fund is currently authorized to pay out a maximum of $1 billion on a single spill. Although the Fund has been successful thus far in covering costs that responsible parties did not pay, it may not be sufficient to pay such costs for a spill that has catastrophic consequences. In conclusion, the "polluter pays" system established under OPA has been generally effective in ensuring that responsible parties pay the costs of responding to spills and compensating those affected. However, increases in some liability limits appear warranted to help ensure that the "polluter pays" principle is carried out in practice. For certain vessel types, such as tank barges, current liability limits appear disproportionately low relative to their historic spill costs. The Coast Guard has reached a similar conclusion but so far has stopped short of making explicit recommendations to the Congress about what the limits should be. Absent such recommendations, the Fund may continue to pay tens of millions for spills that exceed the responsible parties' limits of liability. Further, to date, liability limits have not been regularly adjusted for significant changes in inflation. Consequently, the Fund was exposed to about $39 million in liability claims for the 51 major spills between 1990 and 2006 that could have been saved if the limits had been adjusted for inflation. Without such actions, oil spills with costs exceeding the responsible parties' limits of liability will continue to place the Fund at risk. Given these concerns, in our September 2007 report, we recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard (1) determine whether and how liability limits should be changed, by vessel type, and make recommendations about these changes to the Congress and (2) adjust the limits of liability for vessels every 3 years to reflect significant changes in inflation, as appropriate. DHS, including the Coast Guard, generally agreed with the report's contents and agreed with the recommendations. To date, the Commandant of the Coast Guard has not implemented these recommendations. Madame Chair this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. For further information on this testimony, please contact Susan Fleming at (202) 512-2834 or Flemings@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to this testimony include Nikki Clowers, Assistant Director; Simon Galed; Stan Stenersen; and Susan Zimmerman. Response to large oil spills is typically a cooperative effort between the public and private sector, and there are numerous players who participate in responding to and paying for oil spills. To manage the response effort, the responsible party, the Coast Guard, EPA, and the pertinent state and local agencies form the unified command, which implements and manages the spill response. Beyond the response operations, there are other stakeholders, such as accountants who are involved in documenting and accounting for costs, and receiving and processing claims. In addition, insurers and underwriters provide financial backing to the responsible party. The players involved in responding to and/or paying for major spill response are as follows: Government agencies: The lead federal authority, or Federal On-Scene Coordinator, in conducting a spill response is usually the nearest Coast Guard Sector and is headed by the Coast Guard Captain of the Port. The Federal On-Scene Coordinator directs response efforts and coordinates all other efforts at the scene of an oil spill. Additionally, the on-scene coordinator issues pollution removal funding authorizations--guarantees that the agency will receive reimbursement for performing response activities--to obtain services and assistance from other government agencies. Other federal agencies may also be involved. NOAA provides scientific support, monitoring and predicting the movement of oil, and conducting environmental assessments of the impacted area. The federal, state, and tribal trustees join together to perform a natural resource damage assessment, if necessary. Within the Coast Guard, the NPFC is responsible for disbursing funds to the federal on-scene coordinator for oil spill removal activities and seeking reimbursement from responsible parties for federal costs. Additionally, regional governmental entities that are affected by the spill--both state and local--as well as tribal government officials or representatives may participate in the unified command and contribute to the response effort, which is paid for by the responsible party or are reimbursed by the responsible party or the Fund. Responsible parties: OPA stipulates that both the vessel owner and operator are ultimately liable for the costs of the spill and the cleanup effort. The Coast Guard has final determination on what actions must be taken in a spill response, and the responsible party may form part of the unified command--along with the federal on-scene coordinator and pertinent state and local agencies--to manage the spill response. The responsible parties rely on other entities to evaluate the spill effects and the resulting compensation. Responsible parties hire environmental and scientific support staff, specialized claims adjustors to adjudicate third- party claims, public relations firms, and legal representation to file and defend limit of liability claims on the Fund, as well as serve as counsel throughout the spill response. Qualified individuals: Federal regulations require that vessels carrying oil as cargo have an incident response plan and, as part of the plan, they appoint a qualified individual who acts with full authority to obligate funds required to carry out response activities. The qualified individual acts as a liaison with the Federal On-Scene Coordinator and is responsible for activating the incident response plan. Oil spill response organizations: These organizations are private companies that perform oil spill cleanup, such as skimming and disposal of oil. Many of the companies have contractual agreements with responsible parties and the Coast Guard. The agreements, called basic ordering agreements, provide for prearranged pricing, response personnel, and equipment in the event of an oil spill. Insurers: Responsible parties often have multiple layers of primary and excess insurance coverage, which pays oil spill costs and claims. Pollution liability coverage for large vessels is often underwritten by not-for-profit mutual insurance organizations. The organizations act as a collective of ship owners, who insure themselves, at-cost. The primary insurers of commercial vessels in U.S. waters are the Water Quality Insurance Syndicate, an organization providing pollution liability insurance to over 40,000 vessels, and the International Group of P & I Clubs, 13 protection and indemnity organizations that provide insurance primarily to foreign- flagged large vessels. At the federal level, the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan provides the framework for responding to oil spills. At the port level, each port has an Area Contingency Plan, developed by a committee of local stakeholders, that calls for a response that is coordinated with both higher-level federal plans and lower-level facility and vessel plans. The federal plans designate the Coast Guard as the primary agency to respond to oil spills on water. The Coast Guard has a National Strike Force to provide assistance to efforts by the local Coast Guard and other agencies. The Coast Guard also has an exercise program--known as the Spills of National Significance exercise program--to test national level response capabilities. This program is focused on exercising the entire response system as the local, regional and national level using large-scale, high probability oil and hazardous material incidents that result from unintentional causes such as maritime accidents or natural disasters. The most recent program exercise, in June 2007, tested the response and recovery to an oil and hazardous materials release in the wake of a large scale earthquake in the Mississippi and Ohio river valleys. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
When oil spills occur in U.S. waters, federal law places primary liability on the vessel owner or operator--that is, the responsible party--up to a statutory limit. As a supplement to this "polluter pays" approach, a federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund administered by the Coast Guard pays for costs when a responsible party does not or cannot pay. This testimony is based on GAO's September 2007 report on oil spill costs and select program updates on the recent San Francisco spill. Specifically, it answers three questions: (1) How many major spills (i.e., at least $1 million) have occurred since 1990, and what is their total cost? (2) What factors affect the cost of spills? and (3) What are the implications of major oil spills for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund? On the basis of cost information collected from a variety of sources, GAO estimates that 51 spills with costs of at least $1 million have occurred from 1990 to 2006 and that responsible parties and the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund) have spent between $860 million and $1.1 billion for oil spill removal costs and compensation for damages (e.g., lost profits and natural resource damages). Since removal costs and damage claims may stretch out over many years, the costs of the spills could rise. The 51 spills varied greatly from year to year in number and cost. All vessel types were involved with the 51 major spills GAO identified, with cargo/freight vessels and tank barges involved with 30 of the 51 spills. According to industry and agency officials, three main factors affect the cost of spills: a spill's location, the time of year, and the type of oil spilled. Spills that occur in remote areas, for example, can increase costs involved in mobilizing responders and equipment. Similarly, a spill occurring during tourist or fishing season might produce substantial compensation claims, while a spill occurring during another time of year may not be as costly. The type of oil affects costs in various ways: fuels like gasoline or diesel fuel may dissipate quickly but are extremely toxic to fish and plants, while crude oil is less toxic but harder to clean up. The total costs of the recent San Francisco oil spill are unknown, but these identified factors are likely to influence the costs. To date, the Fund has been able to cover costs from major spills that responsible parties have not paid, but risks remain. Specifically, GAO's analysis shows that the new 2006 limits of liability for tank barges remain low relative to the average cost of such spills. Since 1990, the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) required that liability limits be adjusted above the limits set forth in statute for significant increases in inflation, but such changes have never been made. Not making such adjustments between 1990 and 2006 potentially shifted an estimated $39 million in costs from responsible parties to the Fund.