In December 2010, the QDDR recommended the creation of the CT Bureau, to supersede the CT Office. State elevated the CT Office to the CT Bureau in January 2012. According to State, one reason for elevating the CT Office to a bureau was that the office's responsibilities for counterterrorism strategy, policy, operations, and programs had grown far beyond the original coordinating mission. In the transition from CT Office to CT Bureau in 2012, some initial organizational changes occurred, such as a reduction from five to four Deputy Coordinators who oversee counterterrorism issue areas within the bureau as well as the creation of an executive office to provide management support to the bureau. The initial organizational changes also elevated the role of strategic planning and metrics and established a new policy and guidance unit. Our preliminary information shows that additional changes to the CT Bureau's organizational structure occurred starting in 2014, after the current Ambassador was confirmed as the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in February 2014. According to bureau officials, the Ambassador initiated a strategic review of the bureau's programs and what they were accomplishing to help form a clear picture of priorities, threats, and where the bureau's efforts and funding should be directed. The strategic review, which was completed in November 2014, led to a reorganization of the bureau and a shift in overall focus to a regional or geographic approach. As a result of the strategic review, the portfolio of the CT Bureau's Office of Programs has changed to reflect a more regional approach rather than an approach based on funding streams. According to CT Bureau officials, the shift is intended to encourage and facilitate cross-bureau discussions across the entire CT Bureau. Specifically, the portfolios of program officials have been broadened by requiring a cross-cutting look at programs across their assigned region. Figure 1 shows how the CT Office has evolved over the last two decades. Our preliminary information shows other changes to the bureau's organizational structure stemming from the strategic review, such as the changes in names of directorates and offices, their portfolios, or both to better reflect the new strategic approach and priorities of the bureau. For example, the portfolio for the multilateral affairs office was shifted and combined with the portfolio for the regional affairs office. In addition, a new office and two new units were created: (1) the Office of Strategy, Plans, and Initiatives; (2) the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Unit; and (3) the Countering Violent Extremism Unit. Appendix I depicts the organizational structure of the CT Bureau, as of May 2015. The CT Bureau manages a range of programs and activities to assist partner nations around the world to combat terrorism, primarily through the following six programs: Antiterrorism Assistance: in partnership with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security as the primary implementer, provides U.S. government antiterrorism training and equipment to law enforcement agencies of partner nations. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): entails programs and activities that work with partner nation civil society sectors and governments to undermine terrorist ideology and to address the underlying local grievances that drive at-risk individuals into violent extremism. Counterterrorism Engagement: entails programs and activities to build political will for counterterrorism at senior levels in partner nations. Counterterrorism Finance (CTF): entails programs and activities to build foreign partner capacity and to implement significant parts of the U.S. government's strategy to cut off financial support to terrorists. Terrorist Interdiction Program: provides the immigration and border control authorities of partner nations with a computer database system that enables identification of suspected terrorists attempting to transit air, land, or sea ports of entry. Regional Strategic Initiative: meets transnational terrorist threats with regional responses coordinated by each region's U.S. ambassadors in the field. Our preliminary analysis shows that from fiscal years 2011 through 2014, the CT Bureau was allocated a cumulative total of $539.1 million for these six counterterrorism-related programs, as shown in figure 2.of these allocations are from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs account, which funds all six programs. Allocations from the Economic Support Fund support those Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Engagement program activities that do not involve law enforcement entities. Our preliminary analysis shows that, in addition to the foreign assistance programming that the CT Bureau oversees and manages, the bureau's allocated resources include funding for the operations of the bureau. The CT Bureau receives funds from two sources to fund its core operations: the Diplomatic and Consular Programs and the Worldwide Security Programs accounts. Figure 3 shows our preliminary analysis of the bureau's total allocations for its overall operations since fiscal year 2012. These allocations increased from $11.7 million in fiscal year 2012 to $14.7 million in fiscal year 2013, as the bureau was being established. The allocations then decreased to $13.1 million in fiscal year 2014. Our preliminary analysis indicates that the CT Bureau's number of authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions has grown annually, and the bureau has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The bureau's number of FTEs grew from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, which is an increase of more than 45 percent. Figure 4 shows the number of FTEs within the bureau for fiscal years 2011 to 2015, along with the number of positions that were filled. While the bureau's current authorized level of FTEs for fiscal year 2015 is 96 positions, it had 22 vacancies as of October 31, 2014.analysis also shows that the percentage of vacancies in FTE positions in the bureau has ranged from 17 percent to 23 percent in fiscal years 2011 to 2015. According to the CT Bureau, these vacancies have included both staff-level and management positions. As of the end of May 2015, the number of FTE vacancies in the bureau had been reduced to 10 positions, most of which are in the Office of Programs, according to the CT Bureau. The CT Bureau utilized various means to assess its performance in fiscal years 2011 through 2014, including performance assessments and program evaluations. Our preliminary analysis indicates that the CT Bureau assessed its progress toward its foreign assistance-related goals but has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. Our preliminary analysis shows that the CT Bureau assessed its progress toward achieving its foreign assistance-related goals in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, as required by State policy. That policy requires bureaus to respond to an annual department-wide data call for foreign assistance- related performance information. Specifically, bureaus must identify indicators and targets for their foreign assistance-related goals, as defined in their multiyear strategic plans, and report results achieved toward each indicator for the prior fiscal year.CT Bureau identified four foreign assistance-related goals in its first multiyear strategic plan and established quantitative indicators and As shown in table 1, the corresponding targets for each of those goals. It also reported results achieved for each indicator. In addition to having assessed its progress toward achieving its foreign assistance-related goals, our preliminary analysis shows that since being elevated to a bureau in fiscal year 2012, the CT Bureau has completed four evaluations of counterterrorism-related programs it oversees. The number of completed evaluations meets the number of evaluations required by State's February 2012 evaluation policy. As shown in table 2, the CT Bureau completed these evaluations during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and focused primarily on evaluating programs providing training courses to law enforcement officials of partner nations, such as the Antiterrorism Assistance program in Morocco and Bangladesh. CT Bureau officials noted that, when deciding what programs to evaluate, the bureau took into consideration whether the evaluation would inform the priority programming and objectives of the bureau and produce results the bureau could use in future programming decisions and evaluation designs. To date, the CT Bureau has not evaluated the CVE program, which has been identified as a priority goal for the bureau. Our preliminary analysis indicates that the CT Bureau has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. The four program evaluations the CT Bureau completed during fiscal years 2013 and 2014 resulted in 60 recommendations; however, according to bureau officials, the bureau does not have a system for assigning time frames for the implementation of recommendations. The officials said program officers are assigned responsibility for following up on recommendations that impact their portfolio; however, the bureau does not have any policy or other guidance outlining the timing for addressing recommendations from evaluations. In response to questions during the course of our review, CT Bureau officials developed action plans to describe the status of efforts to address the 60 recommendations.the basis of our review of these action plans, the CT Bureau reported having implemented about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) made On in the evaluations, as of April 2015. The bureau had put on hold or decided not to implement 4 recommendations; the remaining 28 were still being considered or were in the process of being implemented, or the bureau had made a commitment to implement them. While the action plans are a positive first step to help the bureau monitor and track its progress in implementing recommendations, they do not address the need for the bureau to establish time frames for addressing recommendations from evaluations. Without specific time frames for completing actions in response to recommendations from evaluations, it may be difficult for the bureau to ensure that needed programmatic improvements are made in a timely manner or to hold its implementing partners accountable for doing so. Our preliminary analysis shows that activities between the CT Bureau and other bureaus within State as well as with other U.S. government agencies on counterterrorism programs, specifically the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Counterterrorism Finance (CTF) programs, were generally consistent with key practices that GAO has identified for interagency collaboration in the areas of (1) outcomes and accountability, (2) bridging organizational cultures, (3) leadership, (4) clarity of roles and responsibilities, (5) resources, and (6) written guidance and agreements. Outcomes and accountability. GAO-12-1022. Having defined outcomes and mechanisms to track progress can help shape a collaborative vision and goals. specific requests across regional or functional bureaus or messages defining and assigning specific tasks. We also identified accountability mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results or outcomes of counterterrorism programming. Bridging organizational cultures. Our preliminary analysis shows that while terminology may differ when discussing CVE, within State, some regional and functional bureau officials we spoke with said that they use a common definition for CVE and apply the CVE strategy and policy that the CT Bureau has developed for CVE programming. Similarly, some officials in other U.S. government agencies told us they agree on common terms and outcomes of counterterrorism programming as ideas are discussed between the CT Bureau and the implementing agency, if the bureau funds a program or grant. Our preliminary analysis also shows that there was frequent communication among collaborating agencies, including as it relates to CVE programs. Specifically, we found that frequency of communication between the CT Bureau and other State bureaus as well as other U.S. government agencies varied depending on the project or activity and ranged from daily to monthly interactions. Leadership. Our preliminary analysis shows that for CVE and to some extent CTF, officials at State and other U.S. government agencies were generally aware of the agency or individual with leadership responsibility for the particular counterterrorism program. Officials in State's regional bureaus stated that they are generally aware of when the CT Bureau would have the lead on counterterrorism issues versus the regional bureaus. In addition, officials noted that they receive relevant and timely information on CVE-related programming from the bureau. For the CTF program, our preliminary analysis indicates that there was some uncertainty among officials as to whom they should be working with on CTF programming, due to the recent reorganization of the CT Bureau. Clarity of roles and responsibilities.shows that there was general clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the participants collaborating on CVE and CTF programs with the CT Bureau. For example, several State officials mentioned that for questions related to programs, such as CVE, they knew their point of contact in the CT Bureau and also what that person's portfolio encompassed. Resources. Our preliminary analysis indicates that, in cases where the CT Bureau funded U.S. government agencies on CVE or CTF programming, the funding mechanism was clear and laid out in the interagency agreements. Some agency officials told us that these agreements provide a standard process for providing funding from the CT Bureau to other agencies. Written guidance and agreements.shows that many of the agencies we spoke with had formal interagency agreements with the CT Bureau on CVE- or CTF-related programming or activities. The agreements described, among other things, the service to be provided, roles and responsibilities of each party, method and frequency of performance reporting, and accounting information for funding of the service provided. We found that most of the State bureaus we spoke with that coordinate with the CT Bureau on CVE and CTF programs did not have written agreements laying out the terms of the collaboration, but several State officials said that formalized agreements were not necessary because collaboration between bureaus within State is routine and the CT Bureau has been effective in sharing information pertaining to the CVE program. Thank you again for the opportunity to assist with the oversight of State's Bureau of Counterterrorism. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. For further information regarding this statement, please contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International Affairs and Trade at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Jason Bair, Assistant Director; Andrea Riba Miller, Analyst-in Charge; and Esther Toledo. Technical support was provided by Ashley Alley, Mason Calhoun, Tina Cheng, David Dayton, Martin De Alteriis, and Sarah Veale. Appendix I: Organizational Chart of the Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism, as of May 2015 This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating these at home and abroad remains a top priority for the U.S. government. In 2010, the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), conducted at the direction of the Secretary of State, highlighted these global threats and, among other actions, recommended that State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism be elevated to bureau status. According to the 2010 QDDR report, the elevation of this office to a bureau would enhance State's ability to, among other things, counter violent extremism, build foreign partner capacity, and engage in counterterrorism diplomacy. In addition, the report stated that the bureau's new status would enable more effective coordination with other U.S. government agencies. On the basis of preliminary results of ongoing work that GAO is conducting for this subcommittee and other congressional requesters, this testimony provides observations on (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on select programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C. GAO expects to issue a final report on this work in July 2015, along with any related recommendations. GAO's preliminary analysis shows that the Department of State's (State) Bureau of Counterterrorism has had an annual increase in authorized full-time equivalent (FTE) positions since fiscal year 2011 and has recently undertaken efforts to reduce a persistent staffing gap. The number of FTEs for the bureau increased from 66 in fiscal year 2011 to 96 in fiscal year 2015, and over the same period the percentage of FTE vacancies ranged from 17 to 23 percent. The vacancies have included both staff-level and management positions. During GAO's ongoing work, the bureau indicated that the gaps between authorized and filled positions were due to several factors. These included an increase in FTEs that the bureau was authorized when it was established and postponement of some staffing decisions until the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, who assumed her position in 2014, had sufficient time to assess the bureau's needs and priorities. The bureau has recently made progress in filling vacant positions and reported having 10 FTE vacancies as of the end of May 2015. GAO's preliminary analysis has found that the bureau assessed its progress toward achieving its foreign assistance-related goals but has not established time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. Specifically, the bureau established indicators and targets for its foreign assistance-related goals identified in the bureau's first multiyear strategic plan, and it reported results achieved toward each indicator. Since its elevation to a bureau in fiscal year 2012, the bureau has also completed four evaluations of counterterrorism-related programs it oversees, resulting in 60 recommendations. GAO's preliminary results show that the bureau had addressed about half of the recommendations (28 of 60) as of April 2015 but had not established time frames for addressing the remaining recommendations. GAO's preliminary analysis has also found that the bureau's coordination within State and with other federal agencies on the Countering Violent Extremism and Counterterrorism Finance programs generally reflects key practices for collaboration. For example, with regard to identifying resources, in cases where the bureau funded other U.S. agencies partnering on these programs, the funding mechanism was clear and laid out in interagency agreements.