Total Army Analysis is a biennial analytical process the Army uses to determine the numbers and types of support units it would need to support combat units in two simultaneous major theater wars and the infrastructure it would need to augment and support these units. The process also allocates the most recent authorized personnel level (end strength) among these requirements. The most recent iteration--Total Army Analysis 2007--was completed in late 1999. It showed the number and type of units required in the Army's force structure in fiscal year 2007 and allocated the Army's current authorized military end strength of 1,035,000 among these requirements. Total Army Analysis 2007 for the first time determined the numbers and types of units needed for contingency operations separately from its normal analysis of forces needed for two major theater wars. Starting with the Defense guidance, which identifies a number of typical contingency operations in which U.S. forces could be engaged, the Army identified seven operations that would require Army participation and that, according to the guidance, could occur simultaneously. On the basis of the missions to be accomplished, the Army then used expert panels of representatives from headquarters, major commands, and regional commanders in chief to determine the types and numbers of units required for engaging in these contingencies. It used the panels to arrive at these requirements because many of the factors the Army uses to model force requirements for war in Total Army Analysis do not apply to contingency operations. For example, contingencies related to peacekeeping or humanitarian tasks would not require facing a traditional "opposing force" threat. Accordingly, the panel identified the specific tasks to be accomplished and their associated workload, the unit types with the requisite skills to perform those tasks, and the numbers and types of support units needed to support the units carrying out the operation. The force structure requirements identified by this process were unconstrained. In other words, participants identified the logical Army unit types required to carry out the designated missions. This selection of force requirements was made irrespective of whether (1) the unit types currently existed within the Army force structure or (2) there were sufficient unit types to successfully carry out the Army's designated mission. Contingency operations encompass a full range of joint military operations beyond peacetime engagement activities (short of theatre warfare) and include such operations as shows of force, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. According to Army officials, all of these operations, except humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuations, could and in fact have lasted more than 6 months and have required force rotations. Throughout this report, we use the terms "unit" and "unit type." Depending on its purpose and mission, a unit may vary significantly in size, from a 5-member linguistics team to a heavy armor or mechanized division of more than 16,000 personnel. Unit type refers to a specific type of team, company, battalion, or other organizational element comprised of one or more units. The Army has determined that 709 units of 248 different unit types, comprising about 76,000 troops, would be required to support seven simultaneous contingencies requiring Army participation. Our comparison of the Army's planned force structure for fiscal year 2007 (based on the two-war scenario) with these contingency force requirements showed that the Army would have most of the unit types and units required to carry out these illustrative contingency operations simultaneously, provided that U.S. forces were not also engaged in a major theater war. Table 1 identifies the seven illustrative contingencies in which the Army would likely participate and the number of units and personnel required for each operation as determined by the Army's panel of experts. Appendix I shows the types of forces that are most heavily used in such operations. Appendix II shows the total number of units and personnel needed to support the contingencies, by branch of service. To determine whether the Army's planned force structure for two major theater wars would be sufficient to support these seven concurrent contingency operations, we compared the results of Total Army Analysis 2007 with the contingency operations requirements shown in table 1. Our initial comparison showed that, collectively, the active Army, the Army Reserve, and the National Guard would have sufficient unit types, as determined by Total Army Analysis 2007, to meet the requirements of all but 52 of the 248 required unit types. The Army would have insufficient numbers of units for 13 of the 52 unit types. Examples of these unit types include Special Operations Aviation battalions, Psychological Dissemination battalions, and Aerial Reconnaissance battalions. The remaining 39 specific unit types needed for contingencies would not exist in the Army's planned force structure for fiscal year 2007. Examples of these unit types include Heavy Helicopter company, Animal Surgical detachment, Linguist team, Quartermaster Mortuary Affairs team, and Forward Support company. In total, the personnel end strength associated with the missing units would be about 23,000. Army officials pointed out that other existing units possess the same or similar capabilities as those identified as contingency requirements and could be used to cover some of these shortfalls. For example, the Army believes a Psychological Operations tactical company would be a suitable substitute for a Regional Support company. Both units provide support for operations such as the preparation and dissemination of leaflets and posters. Additionally, while the force structure will not contain the specific heavy helicopter company called for, it will contain other companies of a different unit type equipped with the same helicopter. At our request, the Army identified comparable units that could substitute for those experiencing shortfalls. In total, the Army identified substitutes for 5 of the 13 unit types with shortages and for 31 of the 39 unit types that are not planned for through 2007. We analyzed these substitutions and concluded that they were reasonable and would at least partially compensate for the shortfalls. As a result of these substitutions, the force structure deficiencies we initially identified were reduced to 61 units comprising 16 unit types and a total of about 2,500 personnel (about 3 percent of the total requirement). Army officials stated that these remaining shortfalls could be surmounted, since many of the skills required could be obtained in other ways. They pointed out, for example, that individuals in other units possessing the requisite skills could be detailed to meet contingency requirements. In the case of linguists, Army officials believe that they could meet these unfilled requirements through civilian contracts (see app. III for the specific shortfalls that would remain after the Army's substitutions). Although the Army's force structure could provide the 76,000 troops needed to support the seven illustrative contingencies, sustaining these operations beyond 6 months would pose greater challenges because force rotations would be needed. Under current policy, the Army limits unit deployments in contingency operations to no more than 6 months. If an operation lasts more than 6 months, new units and personnel are expected to rotate in as the deployed units return to their home station. This rotation policy applies to all three Army components--active duty, Army Reserve, and National Guard. According to Army officials, five of the seven illustrative contingency scenarios (all but humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations), involving a total of about 61,000 troops, could last more than 6 months. Historical experiences related to counterdrug activities and various types of peacekeeping operations support this assertion. The Army contends that in order to adhere to its deployment policy, it needs to maintain a 3-to-1 pool of troops available for these missions. Should these five contingency operations occur simultaneously, 61,000 troops would be deployed, another 61,000 would be in training to prepare for deployment, and 61,000 recently deployed troops would be in the so-called "reconstitution" phase, retraining for their normal wartime mission. In effect, this policy requires the Army to maintain a ready pool of 183,000 troops to carry out the five contingency operations. Our analysis indicates that the Army's planned force structure for 2007 does not have enough units to support the five illustrative contingency operations over an extended period. For example, only 99 (about 40 percent) of the Army's active unit types have sufficient numbers of units to sustain 6-month force rotations. Collectively, the active Army, the National Guard, and the Army Reserve have enough units to support the rotational requirements of only 181 unit types, or about 73 percent of the 248 unit types required for the 5 operations. The shortfall of 67 unit types includes about 360 units with a total authorized strength of about 26,000. Military Intelligence would be the branch most affected, accounting for about half of the unit shortfall and about one-quarter of the personnel shortfall. The Psychological Operations, Medical, Signal, and Aviation branches would also be affected significantly (app. IV lists the branches that would be unable to sustain long-term rotations). The Army's ability to adhere to its rotation policy in sustaining contingency operations depends heavily on National Guard and Army Reserve participation because most of the Army's total force resides in those two components. For example, of the 6,892 units the Army planned in its latest force structure analysis, only 2,455 (about one-third) were active Army. As shown in figure 1, the National Guard and the Reserve each account for 32 percent of the total number of units. The percentage of units in the reserve components is important because the Army faces certain challenges in deploying these units during peacetime. As we reported in April 1998, peacetime restrictions on the use of reserve components affect the Army's ability to deploy them to a contingency operation. Thus, even if the Army's force structure collectively has sufficient required units, the Army may be restricted from deploying some of those units to a contingency. During recent contingencies, the Army has drawn heavily on volunteers to help reduce deployments of active units. However, if not enough reserve personnel volunteer for active duty, the Army cannot deploy reserve units unless the President exercises the Presidential Selected Reserve Call Up Authority and calls them to active duty. Further, reserve personnel cannot be required to serve on active duty for more than 270 days and may only be called up once for a given operation. Prior to our analysis, Army officials had not compared contingency requirements with the planned force structure for 2007 and thus were not aware of the shortfalls we identified. Therefore, they had neither assessed the criticality of such shortfalls nor developed mitigation plans. Such analysis and plans are important because critical shortages, if left unaddressed, could have adverse effects. Over the past several years, personnel in units that have been heavily demanded by contingencies but in short supply have had to deploy repeatedly and have exceeded Army standards for time spent away from home stations. Concerns that frequent and extensive deployments might adversely affect the services' ability to recruit and retain personnel led the Army to establish a 6-month ceiling on the length of deployments. We believe that past experience supports the Army's hypothetical scenario of five simultaneous contingencies, given the fact that counterdrug activities and various peace operations have in fact occurred simultaneously and have extended far beyond 6 months. Were the Army to decide that mitigating actions are needed, it could consider several alternatives. It could determine whether other type units have similar capabilities, contractors or host nation personnel could be employed, or auxiliary support could be obtained from other military services. Should these not be viable alternatives, the Army could also allocate end strength to new units in critical shortage areas. However, it is important to note that a decision to create new units would mean that other needs might go unaddressed, and that any decision to address these shortfalls would need to recognize the opportunity costs of not addressing others. For example, some currently existing units are not authorized all the personnel they require, while other units needed for the two-war scenario exist only on paper and are entirely without authorized personnel. Another concern Army officials raised about creating new units is whether current Defense guidance allows the Army to create new units if the units are not needed for the two-war scenario. Current guidance states that the services need to be prepared for a full spectrum of conflict, including both major theater wars and contingency operations. However, it does not explicitly say whether units needed exclusively for contingency operations but not major wars can be added and authorized personnel. Army force planning officials said that their interpretation of the guidance is that they can only authorize personnel for units needed for a two-war scenario and not units needed exclusively for contingencies. In support of their interpretation, the officials pointed out that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had allowed the Army to authorize personnel for units needed exclusively for peace operations in only two cases. These involved 17,000 positions for units required for operations in the Sinai to satisfy the 1979 Middle East Peace Treaty and for a rapid reaction force for peacekeeping operations in Europe to satisfy Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Treaty. The rationale for these two exceptions is that these activities, which arise from treaty commitments, would need to continue even if a war arose and, as a result, units engaged in them could not be redeployed to a war effort. Notwithstanding the fact that OSD had permitted only these two exceptions to date, OSD officials said that guidance may be sufficiently broad to permit the Army to allocate personnel to other units needed for contingencies but not for major wars, if it chose to do so. Nevertheless, Army officials emphasized that they would need to have this issue clarified, were they to conclude that authorizing personnel for such units is the best option. In our opinion, the guidance is not explicit on this point, and a clarification may be in order. The Army's force structure, which is based on a two-war scenario, generally provides the number and types of units required to simultaneously carry out seven illustrative contingency operations requiring Army participation. However, it does not contain the number and types of units needed to meet the needs of five simultaneous contingencies lasting more than 6 months and requiring force rotations. If Army forces continue to be called on to engage in such contingencies for extended periods of time, as has been the case in recent years, it would seem prudent to have a force structure that is able to meet such needs. Unless the shortfalls we have identified are dealt with, the Army may continue to have to call on some units repeatedly and to deploy others well beyond its 6-month standard. Assessing the criticality of the shortfalls we have identified is a logical first step for the Army to take. If it decides that certain mitigating actions are needed, the Army could pursue a variety of means to supplement its capability in critical shortage areas. However, if it becomes necessary to authorize personnel for units needed only for contingencies and not for the two-war scenario, a clarification or change in the Defense guidance may be needed to permit the Army clearer direction with respect to its authority to take such action. We recommend that the Secretary of the Army assess the criticality of the shortfalls we have identified with respect to the Army's ability to carry out simultaneous contingency operations lasting more than 6 months. If it is determined that the risks associated with certain shortages require mitigating actions, we further recommend that the Secretary explore the range of options we have outlined. If the Secretary determines that the Army needs to authorize personnel for some units needed only for contingencies but not for the two-war scenario, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense either clarify whether authorizing personnel for such units is permitted under current Defense guidance or amend the guidance to permit this action. In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense concurred with our recommendations. It stated that the Army's analysis of the criticality of contingency operations shortfalls will be based on information derived from upcoming war games, since that information will be more current than that used for Total Army Analysis 2007. Additionally, Defense said that future Defense guidance will allow the services to make certain contingency operations force requirements additive to the major theater war force requirements. However, it said that prioritization of available resources will determine whether particular force requirements will be funded. We believe these actions by Defense and the Army, once implemented, will allow the Army to include in its force structure those units that it believes are critical to sustaining deployments to contingency operations over an extended period of time. Defense's comments are reprinted in appendix V. To determine whether the Army's force structure would provide adequate forces to conduct seven illustrative contingency operations, we met with Defense and Army officials responsible for force planning and obtained pertinent documents concerning the Army's force planning process and the numbers and types of units required to support the contingencies. We also obtained information concerning the Army's planned force for 2007. To determine whether there would be any shortfalls, we then compared the types and numbers of units the Army stated would be required to support the seven contingencies with the types and numbers of units the Army plans to have in its force structure in 2007. We determined the number of personnel required and personnel shortfalls by applying the Army's standard required strength for each unit type. After identifying the initial shortfalls, we asked the Army to review the list to determine whether there were other units in its force structure that were substantially capable of performing the required tasks. We compared the substitutions the Army provided and concluded that they were reasonable and would at least partially compensate for the shortfalls. We then incorporated those substitutions into our analysis. We performed a similar comparison to determine whether the force structure would be able to sustain longer-term deployments. We compared the needs of the five illustrative scenarios that Army officials believe could last more than 6 months with the planned force structure. We accepted the Army's criterion that it needs to maintain a 3-to-1 pool of troops to adhere to its 6-month deployment ceiling. Our analysis, which was based on unit comparisons, included the substitutions the Army had previously identified for unit types experiencing shortfalls. We did not assess Defense's selection of these contingencies or the likelihood that they may occur simultaneously. To identify various actions the Army might take to mitigate the shortages we identified, we gave Army force planning officials the results of our analysis and discussed possible mitigating actions. During these discussions, we became aware of varying interpretations of Defense guidance and whether it would permit the Army to authorize personnel for units needed exclusively for contingency operations. We discussed these varying interpretations with both Army and OSD officials. We also analyzed relevant Defense guidance provisions to understand the merits of individual interpretations. We conducted our review from March through November 2000 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. We will also make copies available to others upon request. Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments to this report are listed in appendix VI. The Army's force structure requirements for the seven illustrative contingency operations include units from nearly all the Army's 26 branches. However, support units are used more heavily in such operations than combat units. Table 2 shows the units and personnel most heavily used for each of the seven contingencies by Army branch. Table 3 shows the number of units and personnel needed to meet the requirements of the seven contingencies. The following table lists those unit types for which there will be insufficient units in the Army's force structure to meet the simultaneous demands of seven illustrative contingency scenarios in 2007. The shortages shown are those that would remain even after the Army substituted units with similar capabilities wherever possible. The following table lists Army branches with insufficient units to sustain deployments to illustrative contingencies lasting over 6 months. The analysis assumes concurrent operations related to counterdrug activities, maritime intercept operations, peace enforcement operations, and peacekeeping operations, each of which could be expected to continue more than 6 months. The analysis also assumes that humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations would occur concurrently, though not for an extended period. In addition to those named above, James Mahaffey, Leo Jessup, Ron Leporati, and Tim Stone made key contributions to this report. The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders by mail: U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013 Orders by visiting: Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders by phone: (202) 512-6000 fax: (202) 512-6061 TDD (202) 512-2537 Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. 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Summary:
The National Military Strategy calls for U.S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Accordingly, the Army calculates its force structure requirements on the basis of this scenario. The strategy also calls for the Army to support operations in a series of concurrent contingencies and assumes that forces thus engaged will be withdrawn and redeployed if war occurs. The Army's difficulty in supporting contingency operations without repeatedly calling on some types of units has raised questions about whether forces structured to meet the two-war scenario can also support multiple peacetime contingency operations. GAO reviewed the Army's force planning process, known as Total Army Analysis 2007, to determine whether the Army's planned force structure will meet its contingency requirements. GAO found that the Army's force structure generally provides the number and types of units required to simultaneously carry out seven illustrative contingency operations requiring Army participation. However, it does not contain the number and types of units needed to meet the needs of five simultaneous contingencies lasting for more than six months and requiring force rotations. If Army forces continue to be called on to engage in such contingencies for long periods of time, it would seem prudent to have a force structure that is able to meet such needs.