The South Florida ecosystem extends from the Chain of Lakes south of Orlando to the reefs southwest of the Florida Keys. This vast region, which is home to more than 6 million Americans, a huge tourism industry, and a large agricultural economy, also encompasses one of the world's unique environmental resources--the Everglades. Before human intervention, freshwater moved south from Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay in a broad, slow-moving sheet. The quantity and timing of the water's flow depended on rainfall patterns and natural processes that slowly released stored water. Water stored throughout the vast area of the Everglades supplied water to wetlands and coastal bays and estuaries even during dry seasons. For centuries, the Everglades provided habitat for many species of wading birds and other native wildlife, including the American alligator, which depended on the water flow patterns that existed before human intervention. The vast Everglades wetlands were generally viewed as an unproductive swamp to be drained for more productive uses. By 1927, the Everglades Drainage District had constructed 440 miles of canals, levees, locks, and dams. However, these water management projects were not sufficient to protect over 2,000 people from drowning and many more from being injured when the waters of Lake Okeechobee overflowed during a devastating hurricane in 1928. In 1930, the Army Corps of Engineers began constructing the Herbert Hoover Dike around the lake. A major drought from the early 1930s through the mid-1940s left the booming population of South Florida short of water and threatened by uncontrollable fires in the Everglades. In 1947, torrential rains, coupled with unusually high seasonal water levels and an abnormally wet summer followed by hurricanes in September and October, flooded nearly 2.5 million acres and left 90 percent of southeastern Florida underwater. Floodwaters stood in some areas for 6 months. As a result, in 1948, the Congress authorized the Central and Southern Florida Project--an extensive system of over 1,700 miles of canals and levees and 16 major pump stations--to prevent flooding and saltwater intrusion into the aquifer, as well as to provide drainage and supply water to the residents of South Florida. Areas immediately south of Lake Okeechobee in the Everglades Agricultural Area, which was drained by the project, are now farmed--primarily by sugar growers--while the eastern part of the region has become heavily urbanized. Canals carry water away from the Everglades Agricultural Area into levied water conservation areas or directly into the Atlantic Ocean, bypassing much of the former Everglades and dramatically altering the timing, quantity, and quality of the water delivered to coastal estuaries. As figure 1 shows, these engineering changes, coupled with agricultural and industrial activities and urbanization, have reduced the Everglades to about half its original size. These changes have also had a detrimental effect on the environment. Wildlife populations have declined significantly, and some scientists believe that the reduced flow of freshwater into Florida Bay may be hastening its environmental decline. To address the deterioration of the ecosystem, the administration, in 1993, made the restoration of the Everglades and the South Florida ecosystem one of its highest environmental priorities. The South Florida Ecosystem Task Force was established by an interagency agreement to promote and facilitate the development of consistent policies, strategies, priorities, and plans for addressing the environmental concerns of the South Florida ecosystem. The Task Force consisted of assistant secretaries from the Departments of Agriculture, the Army, Commerce, and the Interior; an assistant attorney general from the Department of Justice; and an assistant administrator from the Environmental Protection Agency. The Water Resources Development Act of 1996 formalized the Task Force; expanded its membership to include state, local, and tribal representatives; and designated the Secretary of the Interior as the group's Chairperson. To accomplish the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem, the Task Force has established the following goals: Get the water right. This means restoring more natural hydrologic functions while providing adequate water supplies and flood control. This goal will be accomplished primarily by modifying the Central and Southern Florida Project to enlarge the region's freshwater supply and to improve how water is delivered to natural areas using a variety of technologies. More than 500 miles of canals and levees will be removed to reestablish the natural sheet flow of water through the Everglades and restore more natural water flows to South Florida's coastal bays and estuaries. Restore and enhance the natural system. Restoring lost and altered habitats will involve acquiring land and changing current land uses as well as halting the spread of invasive, exotic species and recovering threatened and endangered species. Transform the built environment. Balancing human needs with those of the natural environment will require developing lifestyles and economies that do not have a negative impact on the natural environment and do not degrade the quality of life. This will involve ensuring that traditional industries, such as agriculture, tourism, development, fishing, and manufacturing, continue to be supported while making sure that these industries are compatible with the goals of the restoration effort and that the quality of life in urban areas is maintained or enhanced. Participants in the restoration effort include 13 federal agencies, 7 Florida agencies and commissions, 2 American Indian tribes, 16 counties, and scores of municipal governments. Representatives from the state's major industries, the commercial and private sectors, and environmental and other special interest groups also participate in the restoration effort. Appendix II lists the federal, state, tribal, and county participants. Appendix III contains additional details on the South Florida ecosystem and the efforts undertaken to restore it. Federal funding for the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative does not come from a single source. In addition to funds appropriated directly by the Congress for projects managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and restoration activities designated in the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act (Farm Bill), the federal agencies participating in the initiative determine and allocate funds from their own appropriations. Because the agencies account for these funds independently, no complete and consolidated financial data on the initiative are available. We asked each agency to provide data on the funds provided for the initiative--appropriations from fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1999 and obligations and expenditures from fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1998 (the latest year for which complete data are available). However, many of the agencies had difficulty providing these data because although they track appropriated dollars allocated for the initiative, they do not separately track the funds obligated and expended for it. On the basis of the financial data provided by the federal agencies, we estimate that from fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1999, over $1.2 billion in appropriated funds has been provided to the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative. As figure 2 indicates, the funding for the initiative has increased from about $85 million for fiscal year 1993 to about $238 million for fiscal year 1999. As figure 2 also shows, 1996 was an unusual funding year because the Farm Bill included a specific appropriation of $200 million for restoration activities. Through fiscal year 1998, federal departments and agencies obligated$883 million for various restoration activities. The restoration activities can be grouped into six major categories: (1) land acquisition; (2) the management of federally owned facilities or natural resources, such as national parks, wildlife refuges, and a national marine sanctuary, which may affect or be affected by the restoration initiative; (3) science-related activities, such as mercury contaminant studies; (4) infrastructure, such as the construction of water control structures; (5) water quality and habitat protection, such as the Corps' wetlands permitting program; and (6) information management and assessment, such as coastal mapping. As figure 3 shows, the major activities being conducted are in area/natural resources management (32 percent), land acquisition (31 percent), science (15 percent), and infrastructure (11 percent). Some of these categories, particularly area/natural resources management and science, include activities that may be considered normal agency operations and would take place with or without the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative. Area/natural resources management ($291 million) Land acquisition ($274 million) Science ($128 million) Of the $883 million obligated, $684 million was spent by the agencies or distributed to the state and other nonfederal entities for restoration activities in South Florida. As figure 4 shows, the Department of the Interior and the Corps of Engineers account for the bulk of the total federal expenditures (75 percent) during this 6-year period. The federal funding provided to date represents only a down payment. While an official cost estimate for the total restoration effort has not been made, the implementation of the Central and Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, a major component of the restoration initiative referred to as the Restudy, is estimated to cost $7.8 billion. This cost will be shared equally by the federal and state governments. The Restudy, which will propose modifications to the existing Central and Southern Florida Project, is designed to substantially increase the amount of water that is delivered to natural areas while enhancing agricultural and urban water supplies. Additional efforts will be needed to complete the restoration initiative. According to the executive director of the Task Force, at least $2 billion more will be needed to acquire additional lands, construct other infrastructure projects, and eradicate exotic plant species. Consequently, the restoration effort, which is expected to take at least 20 years to complete, could cost at least $11 billion. Appendix IV contains additional details on the federal funds appropriated, obligated, and expended for the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem. Critical to guiding an endeavor as complex as the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative is a strategic plan that outlines how the restoration will occur, identifies the resources needed to achieve it, assigns accountability for accomplishing actions, and links the strategic goals of the initiative to outcome-oriented annual goals. Such a plan for the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative has not yet been developed. In addition, although the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force is responsible for facilitating and coordinating the initiative, it is not a decision-making body. However, as our review of two integral projects indicates, the coordination efforts of the Task Force and the other groups are not always sufficient to prevent schedule delays and cost overruns. Unless these issues are resolved, there is little assurance that the initiative will stay on track and be accomplished in a timely and efficient manner. While the Task Force has published several documents and is in the process of developing other strategies and plans to address specific restoration issues, it has not yet developed an overall strategic plan to guide the restoration effort. The benefits of having a strategic plan are many. A strategic plan contains goals and a strategy for achieving these goals, providing focus and direction and a benchmark for measuring performance. Such a plan also triggers a reassessment if progress in achieving the goals is not satisfactory. In addition, a strategic plan establishes priorities and time frames for accomplishing results by identifying the steps and resources necessary to achieve the goals, appropriate milestones, and ways to track or measure progress annually. Measurable goals also provide the Congress, the state of Florida, and the other participants with a sense of what can be achieved with the level of resources committed. The Task Force has published several documents --An Integrated Plan for South Florida Ecosystem Restoration and Sustainability: Success in the Making, The Annual Interagency Cross-Cut Budget, the Integrated Financial Plan, and annual reports--that provide information on the restoration activities of the participating agencies. These documents contain some of the components of a strategic plan; however, none, taken either separately or together, contains all the components needed. This document, published in April 1998, is intended to be an integrated plan for restoring and sustaining the South Florida ecosystem. Success in the Making identifies three restoration goals. The first goal is to restore more natural hydrologic functions while providing adequate water and flood control. The goal is to deliver the right amount of water, of the right quality, to the right places, at the right times. The second goal--to restore and enhance the natural system--centers on restoring habitats and recovering threatened and endangered species. The third goal--to transform the built environment--requires the development of sustainable lifestyles and economies that do not negatively affect the natural environment. Success in the Making also describes the strategies--adaptive management and innovative management--that the Task Force and its partners have adopted to achieve these long-term goals. However, the goals are not expressed in quantitative or measurable terms that would allow the Task Force to assess whether they have been achieved or how they need to be revised. The strategies presented do not outline how the goals are to be achieved or identify the resources required. In addition, Success in the Making does not describe how annual goals will be used to gauge progress. This document packages under one cover the justifications for participating organizations' funding requests for restoring the South Florida ecosystem. The document includes a brief narrative describing the intended uses of the funds being requested. However, the document does not link the requests for resources to specific strategic or annual goals. While it includes a budget matrix showing the dollars appropriated to the participating agencies by functional area and fiscal year, this information is not always consistent with the appropriations data provided by the individual agencies. Under the Water Resources Development Act of 1996, the Task Force is required to prepare an integrated financial plan and recommendations for a coordinated budget request. This plan, which is prepared annually and is designed to facilitate budget development and eliminate duplication of effort, compiles descriptions of restoration projects. The plan is intended to provide information on each project's total estimated costs, starting and ending date, and appropriations to date and to identify the agencies involved in the project. However, the plan does not include all of the projects being undertaken by the participating agencies and does not provide consistent information on the total costs of the projects, the agencies responsible for funding the projects, or the sources and amounts appropriated to date. In addition, the information provided on the appropriations to date does not always match the appropriation data contained in the Cross-Cut Budget. Furthermore, although the plan provides information on the starting dates of projects, the plan is organized on a subregional basis and the identification numbers assigned to specific projects have changed from year to year, making it difficult to determine which projects are scheduled to begin in a particular year. Finally, the plan does not link the projects to the strategic goals outlined in Success in the Making. While the Task Force is not required to publish these reports, its Florida-based working group has published an annual report since 1994. These reports summarize the previous years' accomplishments and set goals for the next year. However, because the format and organization of the reports vary from year to year, it is not possible to match the goals set in one year with the accomplishments reported in the following year. Furthermore, the accomplishments cited are not tied to the strategic goals presented in Success in the Making or to specific projects listed in the Integrated Financial Plan, making it difficult to use these reports to evaluate or track the progress made in the restoration initiative. According to federal and state officials we spoke with, these documents provide general information on the initiative and are good reference documents. However, none of the officials thought that the documents were useful as management or tracking tools. In addition to these documents, various strategies or plans are being developed to address specific issues facing the initiative. For example, the Corps has developed the Restudy, which determines the modifications to the Central and Southern Florida Project needed to restore the ecosystem while still providing water and flood control to urban and agricultural sectors. At the same time, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has drafted a multispecies recovery plan to address the recovery of the 68 federally listed threatened or endangered species located in South Florida. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency and Florida's Department of Environmental Protection recently began to develop a comprehensive water quality protection plan for the South Florida ecosystem. The working group is also developing an Integrated Strategic Plan, which will include a common vision for all the participants and strategies to measure their success in achieving this vision. However, according to our conversations with the project leader, this plan, which will not be complete until 2001, will not include all the components of an overall strategic plan. Several agency officials and others whom we spoke with during our review agreed that a strategic plan that integrated these plans and other activities proposed by the participating agencies into a "blueprint" for accomplishing the initiative would be very helpful and useful. Such a plan would also allow the agencies and the Congress to evaluate the progress being made and to assess whether the goals of the initiative are being achieved. Coordination Has Not Prevented Schedule Delays and Cost Overruns Restoring an ecosystem as vast and complex as the South Florida ecosystem will require extraordinary cooperation. The South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, established to coordinate the development of consistent policies, strategies, plans, programs, and priorities, is the first partnership of its kind and coordinates restoration activities with federal, state, and local agencies, affected tribes, and the general public. Coordination among these parties is achieved, in large part, through the Task Force's Florida-based working group, composed of top-level managers in Florida from the organizations represented on the Task Force. The working group holds monthly meetings that are open to the public to discuss issues affecting the restoration of the ecosystem. The Task Force also uses various advisory boards, such as the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable South Florida, which represents a wide variety of public and private interests, and technical working groups, such as the Science Coordination team, to increase the agencies' sharing of information on restoration projects and programs. In addition, several other outside groups have been established to coordinate and address project-specific issues. Several officials cited the development of the Restudy and its proposed implementation plan by a multidisciplinary team composed of 160 specialists from 30 state, federal, regional, local, and tribal governments as an example of increased coordination. However, the Task Force is a coordination body, not a decision-making body. Our review indicates that even with the coordination efforts of the Task Force and the other groups, two ongoing infrastructure projects that are integral to the restoration effort are taking longer and costing more than planned. Both the Modified Water Deliveries project and the Everglades National Park-South Dade Conveyance Canals (C-111) project are more than 2 years behind schedule and together could cost about $80 million more to complete than originally estimated, in part because the agencies involved have not been able to agree on components of the projects. These projects are intended to restore the natural hydrologic conditions in Everglades National Park. Our review of these projects indicates that the federal and state agencies involved are unable to agree on components of these projects, such as the lands to be acquired and the schedules for operating water pump stations. The Modified Water Deliveries project, authorized by the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989, is intended to restore the natural hydrologic conditions in Shark River Slough and Everglades National Park. One of the problems associated with this project has been the inability of the participating agencies to reach agreement and make a decision on acquiring the 8.5 Square Mile Area, a residential area in the East Everglades. Originally, the Corps of Engineers, in consultation with Everglades National Park, completed a plan to protect the residents within the 8.5 Square Mile Area, a section in the East Everglades, from further flooding as a result of the project. The Superintendent of Everglades National Park, however, concluded that the plan did not represent a workable solution, and the Corps of Engineers suspended further planning and design of the plan in 1994. A decision on how to resolve the 8.5 Square Mile Area issue was not made until 1998. With the support of the National Park Service, the local project sponsor recommended the complete acquisition of the area, rather than the original flood protection plan, at an additional federal cost of about $22 million. This decision, however, faces a number of challenges before it can be implemented, including the completion of a supplemental environmental impact statement by the Corps of Engineers, congressional approval, and opposition from an affected Indian tribe. These challenges may delay the acquisition of the area and, ultimately, the completion of the project. The C-111 project is intended to restore freshwater flows to Taylor Slough and Everglades National Park and provide flood protection and other benefits to South Dade County. Problems with this project have been the inability to resolve disagreements among agencies and private interests and to acquire needed land in a timely manner. One of the project's water pump stations was constructed on an expedited schedule to provide immediate environmental benefits to the national park. In December 1997, the Corps of Engineers completed the pump's construction. However, as of March 1999, or 15 months after its completion, this pump has not been operated because Everglades National Park and agricultural interests have not been able to agree on an operating schedule. In addition, the National Park Service has not yet acquired lands needed for the operation of the pump. As early as May 1996, the Corps of Engineers notified the National Park Service that these lands were necessary to operate the pump. In 1999, almost 3 years later, the National Park Service made funds available for the condemnation of these lands. Federal officials attributed the delay in acquiring these lands to insufficient funds and staff needed to complete the land acquisition process. Federal and state officials told us that the agencies involved in the restoration effort have multipurpose missions that differ and sometimes conflict. For example, both the Corps of Engineers and the South Florida Water Management District are responsible for supplying water, controlling flooding, and restoring natural resources. The mission of the Department of the Interior's National Park Service, however, is to preserve unimpaired the natural and cultural resources of the national parks. The inability to resolve disagreements and acquire land in a timely manner has kept Everglades National Park from achieving the anticipated environmental benefits of the C-111 project. Agency officials noted that the C-111 and the Modified Water Deliveries projects are at critical junctures. If the participating agencies cannot resolve their disagreements, the success of these projects may be jeopardized. In addition, agency officials have commented that without some entity or group with overall management responsibility and authority to resolve differences, problems such as those encountered in implementing these two projects could continue to hinder the initiative. Appendix V contains a more detailed description of these two projects and the issues that the agencies cannot agree upon. Restoring the South Florida ecosystem is a complex, long-term effort involving federal, state, local, and tribal entities, as well as public and private interests. The South Florida Ecosystem Task Force, a multiagency group with federal, state, local and tribal representatives, was created to coordinate and facilitate the overall restoration effort. However, a strategic plan has not yet been developed that clearly lays out how the initiative will be accomplished and includes quantifiable goals and performance measures that can be used to track the initiative's progress. In addition, although the Task Force and other groups have improved coordination, our review of two integral projects indicates that coordination does not always achieve consensus and there are times when management decisions are necessary to prevent schedule delays and cost overruns. However, because the Task Force is a coordinating body, not a decision-making body, it is limited in its ability to manage and be accountable for the overall restoration effort. Given the scope and complexity of the initiative and the difficulties already being encountered, unless a strategic or master plan is developed to guide the restoration effort and a mechanism is developed to provide the authority needed to make management decisions, the ability to accomplish the initiative in a timely and efficient manner is at risk. To ensure that the South Florida ecosystem is restored in a timely and efficient manner, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior, as the Chairperson of the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, in conjunction with the other members of the Task Force, develop a strategic plan that will (1) outline how the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem will occur, (2) identify the resources needed to achieve the restoration, (3) assign accountability for accomplishing actions, and (4) link the strategic goals established by the Task Force to outcome-oriented annual goals and work with the organizations and entities participating in the restoration effort to develop and agree upon a decision-making process to resolve conflicts in order to accomplish the initiative in a timely and efficient manner. We provided a copy of this report to the departments of Agriculture, the Army, Commerce, and the Interior; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the South Florida Water Management District for review and comment. The Department of the Interior provided written comments on behalf of the departments of Agriculture, the Army, Commerce, and the Interior and of the Environmental Protection Agency. The agencies agreed with the importance of strategic planning but stated that our report fails to adequately acknowledge the substantial planning efforts that have already taken place and are ongoing. The agencies pointed out that the Task Force is in the process of developing a plan much like the one called for in our recommendation. The agencies believe that our recommendation--to work with the organizations and entities participating in the restoration effort to develop and agree upon a decision-making process to resolve conflicts--is unrealistic, given the large number of federal, state, tribal, and local governments and agencies involved, and may be of questionable legality, given each agency's statutory responsibilities and authorities. In addition, the agencies noted that the report focuses only on the federal efforts and ignores the state's substantial efforts. The agencies also strongly disagreed with our conclusion that additional delays and cost overruns are likely to occur in the future and that the ability to accomplish the initiative's overall goals is at risk. The agencies further believe that we oversimplified the causes of the delays for the two projects discussed in the report. Finally, the agencies provided some technical clarifications to the report, which we incorporated where appropriate. We are encouraged that the agencies recognize the value of and need to have a strategic plan. Our report discusses and describes in some detail the documents published by the Task Force that provide information on the restoration effort, including the goals, activities, and accomplishments of the agencies. In addition, while we do not list--nor did we intend to list-- all of the various plans and strategies developed by the agencies involved in the restoration effort, we do specifically mention key planning efforts undertaken. However, as we point out in our report, an overall strategic plan that integrates all of the Task Force's various documents and planning efforts has not yet been developed. Although the Task Force has begun to develop an Integrated Strategic Plan, which the agencies say will be much like the one our report recommends, this plan is not expected to be complete until 2001. Furthermore, on the basis of our conversations with the project leader responsible for developing the plan, we do not believe that it will include all the necessary components of an overall strategic plan called for in the report. The agencies disagreed with our recommendation to develop a decision-making process to resolve conflicts because they believe that the creation of an entity to resolve conflicts would infringe upon the sovereign responsibilities of the governments and agencies involved in the effort and would, therefore, be of questionable legality and impractical. Our recommendation does not envision the creation of another body to decide conflicts or issues among the participants in the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem. Rather, we believe that a process for resolving conflicts needs to be established within the existing legal authorities and structures. Because we recognized that the restoration effort involves federal, state, tribal, and local governments and entities that have various missions and authorities, our recommendation was that the Task Force's members work with the organizations and entities involved in the restoration effort to develop and agree upon a decision-making process to resolve conflicts in order to accomplish the initiative in a timely and efficient manner. Furthermore, in its written comments, the South Florida Water Management District, a key player and member of the Task Force, stated that the development and implementation of a conflict resolution process is very workable and would benefit the restoration effort, provided that it did not conflict with the sovereign rights of the entities involved and the decision-making authorities of the agencies. Without some means to resolve agencies' disagreements and conflicts in a timely manner, problems such as those encountered in implementing the projects we reviewed could continue to hinder the initiative. While the agencies commented that our report focuses only on federal restoration efforts, appendix III includes information on key legislative and administrative actions taken by both the federal government and the state of Florida to restore the South Florida ecosystem. For example, the report cites the state's establishment of the "Save Our Everglades" program in 1983, passage of the Everglades Forever Act in 1994, and establishment of the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable South Florida in 1994. Although the agencies strongly disagreed with our conclusion that additional delays and cost overruns are likely in the future, we believe that the two projects we reviewed are similar to those that will be conducted in the future and that similar disagreements may occur. As stated in the report, without some means to resolve these disagreements in a timely manner, problems such as those encountered in implementing the two projects could continue to hinder the initiative. In addition, we believe that the report accurately presents areas of disagreement or conflicts that are affecting these two projects. Furthermore, the South Florida Water Management District, the local sponsor for both of these projects, described our characterization of the issues relating to these projects as accurate. The District agreed with the report that these two projects are at critical junctures requiring the expeditious resolution of the outstanding issues. The consolidated response of the federal agencies is presented in its entirety, together with our responses, in appendix VI. In written comments on a draft of this report, the South Florida Water Management District agreed with our recommendation to develop a decision-making process to resolve conflicts. The District stated that the development and implementation of a conflict resolution process was very workable and would benefit the restoration effort as long as it did not conflict with the sovereign rights of the entities involved and did not relinquish the decision-making authority of the entity that is responsible for making the final decision. The District also described our characterization of the issues relating to the two projects discussed in the report as accurate. Without commenting specifically on our recommendation to develop an overall strategic plan, the District stated that it would be helpful if our report contained specific recommendations on how to improve the Task Force's ongoing strategic planning process. In addition, the District believed that readers of our report would benefit if we included information on (1) the key restoration accomplishments of the state agencies and the Florida legislature in protecting the natural system, (2) some of the positive outcomes of coordination and collaboration by the participants in the restoration effort, and (3) the financial contributions of the state of Florida to the restoration effort. We believe that our recommendation sufficiently addresses the major elements that should be included in an overall strategic plan for the restoration effort. These include (1) outlining how the restoration will occur, (2) identifying the resources needed to achieve the restoration, (3) assigning accountability for accomplishing actions, and (4) linking the strategic goals established by the Task Force to outcome-oriented annual goals. We do not believe that we should prescribe more than is contained in our recommendation. Rather, the Secretary of the Interior as Chair of the Task Force, in conjunction with the other Task Force members, should have the flexibility needed to successfully develop the strategic plan. Because appendix III of the report contains information on the key legislative and administrative actions taken by both the federal government and the state of Florida to restore the ecosystem, we did not include additional information on the state's accomplishments. However, we added a statement to the report highlighting some of the positive outcomes of increased coordination among the stakeholders. We also agree that it is important to recognize the state's financial contributions to the restoration effort and have included this information in our report. In addition, our report points out that the costs of one of the major components of the effort--the $7.8 billion Restudy--will be shared equally by the federal and state governments. The report also states that the federal and state governments have entered into several agreements to share the cost of land acquisition. The South Florida Water Management District's comments are presented in their entirety, together with our responses, in appendix VII. To determine how much and for what purposes federal funding was appropriated, obligated and expended for the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem from fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1999, we contacted officials from the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force's Office of the Executive Director. We also reviewed various budgetary documents, such as the Task Force's Annual Interagency Cross-Cut Budget for 1999 and Integrated Financial Plan for 1998. However, because the Task Force does not track obligations and expenditures and no consolidated financial information exists, we contacted both headquarters and field officials from the U.S. Army's Corps of Engineers; the departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and the Interior; and the Environmental Protection Agency to obtain this information. We contacted these agencies because they were the primary federal agencies participating in the restoration initiative. We reviewed the information provided by these agencies but did not independently verify its reliability or trace it to the systems from which it came. We did not verify the completeness or accuracy of the data because such an effort would have required a significant investment of time and resources. However, we did attempt to reconcile inconsistencies in the data provided by the agencies. To determine how the initiative is being coordinated and managed and what other issues may impede its progress, we interviewed officials from the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force's Florida-based working group, including representatives of the federal agencies involved in the restoration initiative, the South Florida Water Management District, and the Miami-Dade County Department of Environmental Resources Management. We also met with the chair of the South Florida Ecosystem Task Force, the executive director of the South Florida Ecosystem Task Force, the chair of the working group, the executive director of the Southern Everglades Restoration Alliance, the executive director of the South Florida Water Management District, and the counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks. In addition, we met with representatives of the Miccosukee Tribe, the National Audubon Society, and the Tropical Audubon Society, as well as the director of the Southeast Environmental Research Program at Florida International University. Because the initiative is just beginning, we reviewed two ongoing infrastructure projects integral to the restoration effort to assess how well the effort was being coordinated and managed. In addition, we reviewed applicable laws and regulations, reports, plans, and other documents relevant to the restoration effort. We conducted our review from September 1998 through April 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are providing copies of this report to the Honorable Dan Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture; the Honorable William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior; the Honorable Carol Browner, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-3841. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VIII.

Summary:
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Initiative, focusing on: (1) how much and for what purposes federal funding was provided for the restoration of the South Florida ecosystem from fiscal year (FY) 1993 through FY 1999; and (2) how well the restoration effort is being coordinated and managed. GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of the data GAO obtained from the 5 primary federal departments and agencies participating in the initiative, GAO estimates that over $1.2 billion in federal funds was provided from FY 1993 through FY 1999; (2) the key restoration activities undertaken by the federal agencies were: (a) land acquisition; (b) the management of federally-owned facilities or natural resources, and a national marine sanctuary; (c) infrastructure projects; and (d) science-related activities; (3) over 75 percent of the federal expenditures during this 6-year period have been made by agencies within the Department of the Interior and by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; (4) the federal funding provided to date represents only a down payment; (5) while no official cost projection for the total restoration effort has been made, a major component, the implementation of the Central and Southern Florida Project Comprehensive Review Study, referred to as the Restudy, is estimated to cost an additional $7.8 billion; (6) the Restudy is designed to substantially increase the amount of water that is delivered to natural areas while enhancing agricultural and urban water supplies; (7) according to the South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force's executive director, at least $2 billion beyond the $7.8 billion will be needed to complete the restoration effort; (8) this money will be used to acquire additional lands, construct other infrastructure projects, and eradicate exotic plant species; (9) the Task Force is responsible for coordinating the participating entities' implementation of the initiative; (10) however, a strategic plan that clearly lays out how the initiative will be accomplished and includes quantifiable goals and performance measures has not yet been developed; (11) the Task Force is a coordinating body, not a decisionmaking body, and thus is limited in its ability to manage and make decisions for the overall restoration effort; (12) as GAO's review of two projects integral to the restoration effort indicates, even with coordination, the federal and state agencies involved are unable to agree on components of these projects; (13) their inability to agree has contributed to delays and cost overruns; and (14) given the scope and complexity of the initiative and the difficulties that have already been encountered, additional delays and cost overruns are likely to occur, and the participants' ability to accomplish the initiative's overall goals is at risk.