Multiple executive-branch agencies are responsible for different phases of the federal government's personnel security clearance process. For example, in 2008, Executive Order 13467 designated the DNI as the Security Executive Agent. As such, the DNI is responsible for developing policies and procedures to help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of background investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information and eligibility to hold a sensitive position. In turn, executive branch agencies determine which of their positions--military, civilian, or private-industry contractors--require access to classified information and, therefore, which people must apply for and undergo a personnel security clearance investigation. Investigators--often contractors--from Federal Investigative Services within the Office of Personnel and Management (OPM) conduct these investigations for most of the federal government using federal investigative standards and OPM internal guidance as criteria for collecting background information on applicants. OPM provides the resulting investigative reports to the requesting agencies for their internal adjudicators, who use the information along with the federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a personnel security clearance. DOD is OPM's largest customer, and its Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) is responsible for developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of DOD policy, programs, and guidance for personnel, physical, industrial, information, operations, chemical/biological, and DOD Special Access Program security. Additionally, the Defense Security Service, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), manages and administers the DOD portion of the National Industrial Security Program for the DOD components and other federal services by agreement, as well as providing security education and training, among other things. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 prompted government-wide suitability and security clearance reform. required, among other matters, an annual report to Congress--in February of each year from 2006 through 2011--about progress and key measurements on the timeliness of granting security clearances. It specifically required those reports to include the periods of time required for conducting investigations and adjudicating or granting clearances. However, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act requirement for the executive branch to annually report on its timeliness expired in 2011. More recently, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 established a new requirement that the President annually report to Congress the total amount of time required to process certain security clearance determinations for the previous fiscal year for each element of the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 additionally requires that those annual reports include the total number of active security clearances throughout the United States government, including both government employees and contractors. Unlike the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 reporting requirement, the requirement to submit these annual reports does not expire. Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004) (relevant sections codified at 50 U.S.C. SS 3341). In 2007, DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) formed the Joint Security Clearance Process Reform Team, known as the Joint Reform Team, to improve the security clearance process government-wide. In a 2008 memorandum, the President called for a reform of the security clearance and suitability determination processes and subsequently issued Executive Order 13467, which in addition to designating the DNI as the Security Executive Agent, also designated the Director of OPM as the Suitability Executive Agent. Specifically, the Director of OPM, as Suitability Executive Agent, is responsible for developing policies and procedures to help ensure the effective, efficient, and timely completion of investigations and adjudications relating to determinations of suitability, to include consideration of an individual's character or conduct. Further, the executive order established a Suitability and Security Clearance Performance Accountability Council (Performance Accountability Council) to oversee agency progress in implementing the reform vision. Under the executive order, this council is accountable to the President for driving implementation of the reform effort, including ensuring the alignment of security and suitability processes, holding agencies accountable for implementation, and establishing goals and metrics for progress. The order also appointed the Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget as the Chair of the council. To help ensure the trustworthiness and reliability of personnel in positions with access to classified information, executive branch agencies rely on a personnel security clearance process that includes multiple phases: requirements determination, application, investigation, adjudication, appeals (if applicable, where a clearance has been denied), and reinvestigation (where applicable, for renewal or upgrade of an existing clearance). Figure 1 illustrates the steps in the personnel security clearance process, which is representative of the general process followed by most executive branch agencies and includes procedures for appeals and renewals. While different departments and agencies may have slightly different personnel security clearance processes, the phases that follow are illustrative of a typical process. In the first step of the personnel security clearance process, executive branch officials determine the requirements of a federal civilian position, including assessing the risk and sensitivity level associated with that position, to determine whether it requires access to classified information and, if required, the level of access. Security clearances are generally categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential. The level of classification denotes the degree of protection required for information and the amount of damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national defense. A sound requirements determination process is important because requests for clearances for positions that do not need a clearance or need a lower level of clearance increase investigative workloads and resultant costs. In addition to cost implications, limiting the access to classified information and reducing the associated risks to national security underscore the need for executive branch agencies to have a sound process to determine which positions require a security clearance. In 2012, we reported that the DNI, as the Security Executive Agent, had not provided agencies with clearly defined policy and procedures to consistently determine if a position requires a security clearance, or established guidance to require agencies to review and revise or validate existing federal civilian position designations. We recommended that the DNI issue policy and guidance for the determination, review, and validation of requirements, and ODNI concurred with those recommendations, stating that it recognized the need to issue or clarify policy. We routinely monitor the status of agency actions to address our prior report recommendations. As part of that process, we found that a January 25, 2013 presidential memo authorized the DNI and OPM to jointly issue revisions to part 732 of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which provides requirements and procedures for the designation of national security positions. Subsequently, ODNI and OPM drafted the proposed regulation; published it in the Federal Register on May 28, 2013; and the comment period closed. We reported on October 31, 2013 that ODNI and OPM officials stated that they would jointly review and address comments and prepare the final rule for approval from the Office of Management and Budget. Once an applicant is selected for a position that requires a personnel security clearance, a security clearance must be obtained in order for an individual to gain access to classified information. To determine whether an investigation would be required, the agency requesting a security clearance investigation conducts a check of existing personnel security databases to determine whether there is an existing security clearance investigation underway or whether the individual has already been favorably adjudicated for a clearance in accordance with current standards. During the application submission phase, a security officer from an executive branch agency (1) requests an investigation of an individual requiring a clearance; (2) forwards a personnel security questionnaire (Standard Form 86) using OPM's electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) system or a paper copy of the Standard Form 86 to the individual to complete; (3) reviews the completed questionnaire; and (4) sends the questionnaire and supporting documentation, such as fingerprints and signed waivers, to OPM or its investigation service provider. During the investigation phase, investigators--often contractors--from OPM's Federal Investigative Services use federal investigative standards and OPM's internal guidance to conduct and document the investigation of the applicant. The scope of information gathered in an investigation depends on the needs of the client agency and the personnel security clearance requirements of an applicant's position, as well as whether the investigation is for an initial clearance or a reinvestigation to renew a clearance. For example, in an investigation for a top secret clearance, investigators gather additional information through more time-consuming efforts, such as traveling to conduct in-person interviews to corroborate information about an applicant's employment and education. However, many background investigation types have similar components. For instance, for all investigations, information that applicants provide on electronic applications is checked against numerous databases. Both secret and top secret investigations contain credit and criminal history checks, while top secret investigations also contain citizenship, public record, and spouse checks as well as reference interviews and an Enhanced Subject Interview to gain insight into an applicant's character. Table 1 highlights the investigative components generally associated with the secret and top secret clearance levels. After OPM, or the designated provider, completes the background investigation, the resulting investigative report is provided to the requesting agencies for their internal adjudicators. In December 2012, ODNI and OPM jointly issued a revised version of the federal investigative standards for the conduct of background investigations for individuals who work for or on behalf of the federal government. According to October 31, 2013, testimony by an ODNI official, the revised standards will be implemented through a phased approach beginning in 2014 and continuing through 2017. During the adjudication phase, adjudicators from the hiring agency use the information from the investigative report along with federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a security clearance. To make clearance eligibility decisions, the adjudication guidelines specify that adjudicators consider 13 specific areas that elicit information about (1) conduct that could raise security concerns and (2) factors that could allay those security concerns and permit granting a clearance. If a clearance is denied or revoked, appeals of the adjudication decision are possible. We have work under way to review the process for security clearance revocations. We expect to issue a report on this process in the spring of 2014. Once an individual has obtained a personnel security clearance and as long as he or she remains in a position that requires access to classified national security information, that individual is reinvestigated periodically at intervals that depend on the level of security clearance. For example, top secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 5 years, and secret clearance holders are reinvestigated every 10 years. Some of the information gathered during a reinvestigation would focus specifically on the period of time since the last approved clearance, such as a check of local law enforcement agencies where an individual lived and worked since the last investigation. Further, the Joint Reform Team began an effort to review the possibility of continuing evaluations, which would ascertain on a more frequent basis whether an eligible employee with access to classified information continues to meet the requirements for access. Specifically, the team proposed to move from periodic review to that of continuous evaluation, meaning annually for top secret or similar positions and at least once every 5 years for secret or similar positions, as a means to reveal security-relevant information earlier than the previous method, and provide increased scrutiny of populations that could potentially represent risk to the government because they already have access to classified information. The revised federal investigative standards state that the top secret level of security clearances may be subject to continuous evaluation. Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the process. We have emphasized--since the late 1990s--the need to build and monitor quality throughout the personnel security clearance process to promote oversight and positive outcomes such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely. For example, in 2008 two of the key factors we identified to consider in efforts to reform the security clearance process were building quality into every step of the clearance processes and having a valid set of metrics for evaluating efficiency and effectiveness.We have begun additional work to review the quality of investigations. GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2005). Every 2 years at the start of a new Congress, GAO issues a report that identifies government operations that are high risk because of their vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness. percent of all federal clearance investigations, including those for DOD; and (2) the granting of some clearances by DOD adjudicators even though some required data were missing from the investigative reports used to make such determinations. For example, in May 2009, we reported that, with respect to DOD initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008, documentation was incomplete for most OPM investigative reports. We independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance decision were missing at least one type of documentation required by federal investigative standards. The type of documentation most often missing from investigative reports was verification of all of the applicant's employment followed by information from the required number of social references for the applicant and investigative reports did not contain a required personal subject interview. Officials within various executive branch agencies have noted to us that the information gathered during the interview and investigative portion of the process is essential for making adjudicative decisions. Department of Defense, DOD Personnel Security Program Regulation 5200.2-R (January 1987, incorporating changes Feb. 23, 1996). ability to explain the extent to which or the reasons why some files are incomplete. In November 2010, we reported that agency officials who utilize OPM as their investigative service provider cited challenges related to deficient investigative reports as a factor that slows agencies' abilities to make adjudicative decisions. The quality and completeness of investigative reports directly affects adjudicator workloads, including whether additional steps are required before adjudications can be made, as well as agency costs. For example, some agency officials noted that OPM investigative reports do not include complete copies of associated police reports and criminal record checks. Several agency officials stated that in order to avoid further costs or delays that would result from working with OPM, they often choose to perform additional steps internally to obtain missing information. According to ODNI and OPM officials, OPM investigators provide a summary of police and criminal reports and assert that there is no policy requiring inclusion of copies of the original records. However, ODNI officials also stated that adjudicators may want or need entire records, as critical elements may be left out. For example, according to Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals officials, in one case, an investigator's summary of a police report incorrectly identified the subject as a thief when the subject was actually the victim. As a result of the incompleteness of OPM's investigative reports on DOD personnel and the incompleteness of DOD's adjudicative files that we first identified in our 2009 report, we made several recommendations to OPM and DOD. We recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative reports meet federal investigative standards, so that the executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete reports and take corrective actions. OPM did not agree or disagree with our recommendation. In a subsequent February 2011 report, we noted that the Office of Management and Budget, ODNI, DOD, and OPM leaders had provided congressional members and executive branch agencies with metrics to assess the quality of investigative reports and adjudicative files and other aspects of the clearance process. For example, the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations was one tool the executive branch agencies planned to use for measuring quality, or completeness, of OPM's background investigations. However, in June 2012 an OPM official said that OPM chose not to use this tool and opted to develop another tool. We currently have work under way to review any actions OPM has taken to develop and implement metrics for measuring the completeness of OPM's investigative reports. However, ODNI officials confirmed in January 2014 that OPM did not have such metrics in place. According to OPM officials, OPM also continues to assess the quality of investigations based on voluntary reporting from customer agencies. Specifically, OPM tracks investigations that are (1) returned for rework from the requesting agency, (2) identified as deficient using a web-based customer satisfaction survey, or (3) identified as deficient through adjudicator calls to OPM's quality hotline. In our past work, we have noted that the number of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of the quality of investigative work because DOD adjudication officials told us that they have been reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation of delays that would affect timeliness. Further, relying on agencies to voluntarily provide information on investigation quality may not reflect the quality of OPM's total investigation workload. We also recommended in 2009 that DOD measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet requirements, so that the executive branch can identify the factors leading to incomplete files and include the results of such measurement in annual reports to Congress on clearances.November 2009, DOD subsequently issued a memorandum that established a tool to measure the frequency with which adjudicative files meet the requirements of DOD regulation. Specifically, the DOD memorandum stated that DOD would use a tool called the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales, or RADAR, to gather specific information about adjudication processes at the adjudication facilities and assess the quality of adjudicative In documentation. In following up on our 2009 recommendations, as of 2012, a DOD official stated that RADAR had been used in fiscal year 2010 to evaluate some adjudications, but was not used in fiscal year 2011 because of funding shortfalls. DOD restarted the use of RADAR in fiscal year 2012. Several efforts are underway to review the security clearance process, and those efforts, combined with sustained leadership attention, could help facilitate progress in assessing and improving the quality of the security clearance process. After the September 16, 2013 shooting at the Washington Navy Yard, the President directed the Office of Management and Budget, in coordination with ODNI and OPM, to conduct a government-wide review into the oversight, nature, and implementation of security and suitability standards for federal employees and contractors. In addition, in September 2013, the Secretary of Defense directed an independent review to identify and recommend actions that address gaps or deficiencies in DOD programs, policies, and procedures regarding security at DOD installations and the granting and renewal of security clearances for DOD employees and contractor personnel. The primary objective of this review is to determine whether there are weaknesses in DOD programs, policies, or procedures regarding physical security at DOD installations and the security clearance and reinvestigation process that can be strengthened to prevent a similar tragedy. We initially placed DOD's personnel security clearance program on our high-risk list in 2005 because of delays in completing clearances. In February 2011, we removed DOD's personnel security clearance program from our high-risk list largely because of the department's demonstrated progress in expediting the amount of time processing clearances. We also noted DOD's efforts to develop and implement tools to evaluate the quality of investigations and adjudications. Even with the significant progress leading to removal of DOD's program from our high-risk list, the Comptroller General noted in June 2012 that sustained leadership would be necessary to continue to implement, monitor, and update outcome-focused performance measures.initial development of some tools and metrics to monitor and track quality not only for DOD but government-wide were positive steps; however, full implementation of these tools and measures government-wide has not yet been realized. While progress in DOD's personnel security clearance program resulted in the removal of this area from our high-risk list, significant government-wide challenges remain in ensuring that personnel security clearance investigations and adjudications are high-quality. However, if the oversight and leadership that helped address the timeliness issues focuses now on the current problems associated with quality, we believe that progress in helping executive branch agencies to assess the quality of the security clearance process could be made. Although executive branch agency officials have stated that reciprocity is regularly granted as it is an opportunity to save time as well as reduce costs and investigative workloads, we reported in 2010 that agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to which reciprocity is granted government-wide. In addition to establishing objectives for timeliness, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established requirements for reciprocity, which is an agency's acceptance of a background investigation or clearance determination completed by any authorized investigative or adjudicative executive branch agency, subject to certain exceptions such as completing additional requirements like polygraph testing. Further, in October 2008, ODNI issued guidance on the reciprocity of personnel security clearances. The guidance requires, except in limited circumstances, that all Intelligence Community elements "accept all in-scope security clearance or access determinations." Additionally, Office of Management and Budget guidance requires agencies to honor a clearance when (1) the prior clearance was not granted on an interim or temporary basis; (2) the prior clearance investigation is current and in-scope; (3) there is no new adverse information already in the possession of the gaining agency; and (4) there are no conditions, deviations, waivers, or unsatisfied additional requirements (such as polygraphs) if the individual is being considered for access to highly sensitive programs. While the Performance Accountability Council has identified reciprocity as a government-wide strategic goal, we have found that agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track when reciprocity is granted, and lack a standard metric for tracking reciprocity. Further, while OPM and the Performance Accountability Council have developed quality metrics for reciprocity, the metrics do not measure the extent to which reciprocity is being granted. For example, OPM created a metric in early 2009 to track reciprocity, but this metric only measures the number of investigations requested from OPM that are rejected based on the existence of a previous investigation and does not track the number of cases in which an existing security clearance was or was not successfully honored by the agency. Without comprehensive, standardized metrics to track reciprocity and consistent documentation of the findings, decision makers will not have a complete picture of the extent to which reciprocity is granted or the challenges that agencies face when attempting to honor previously granted security clearances. In 2010, we reported that executive branch officials stated that they routinely honor other agencies' security clearances, and personnel security clearance information is shared between OPM, DOD, and, to some extent, Intelligence Community databases.that some agencies find it necessary to take additional steps to address limitations with available information on prior investigations, such as insufficient information in the databases or variances in the scope of investigations, before granting reciprocity. For instance, OPM has taken However, we found steps to ensure that certain clearance data necessary for reciprocity are available to adjudicators, such as holding interagency meetings to determine new data fields to include in shared data. However, we also found that the shared information available to adjudicators contains summary-level detail that may not be complete. As a result, agencies may take steps to obtain additional information, which creates challenges to immediately granting reciprocity. Further, we reported in 2010 that according to agency officials since there is no government-wide standardized training and certification process for investigators and adjudicators, a subject's prior clearance investigation and adjudication may not meet the standards of the inquiring agency. Although OPM has developed some training, security clearance investigators and adjudicators are not required to complete a certain type or number of classes. As a result, the extent to which investigators and adjudicators receive training varies by agency. Consequently, as we have previously reported, agencies are reluctant to be accountable for investigations or adjudications conducted by other agencies or organizations. To achieve fuller reciprocity, clearance-granting agencies seek to have confidence in the quality of prior investigations and adjudications. Because of these issues identified by agency officials as hindrances to reciprocity and because the extent of reciprocity was unknown, we recommended in 2010 that the Deputy Director of Management, Office of Management and Budget, in the capacity as Chair of the Performance Accountability Council, should develop comprehensive metrics to track reciprocity and then report the findings from the expanded tracking to Congress. Although the Office of Management and Budget agreed with our recommendation, a 2011 ODNI report found that Intelligence Community agencies experienced difficulty reporting on reciprocity. The agencies are required to report on a quarterly basis the number of security clearance determinations granted based on a prior existing clearance as well as the number not granted when a clearance existed. The numbers of reciprocal determinations made and denied are categorized by the individual's originating and receiving organizational type: (1) government to government, (2) government to contractor, (3) contractor to government, and (4) contractor to contractor. The ODNI report stated that data fields necessary to collect the information described above do not currently reside in any of the data sets available, and the process was completed in an agency-specific, semimanual method. The Deputy Assistant Director for Special Security of ODNI noted in testimony in June 2012 that measuring reciprocity is difficult, and despite an abundance of anecdotes, real data are hard to come by. To address this problem, in 2013 ODNI planned to develop a web-based form for individuals to use to submit their experience with reciprocity issues to ODNI. According to ODNI, this would allow it to collect empirical data, perform systemic trend analysis, and assist agencies with achieving workable solutions. However, in January 2014, ODNI officials told us that required resources and information technology were not available to support the development and implementation of a web-based form. Instead, ODNI is conducting a Reciprocity Research Study that will involve, among other things, agencies identifying their ability to collect reciprocity metrics. This study would assist ODNI in developing reciprocity performance measures and a new policy for reciprocity. ODNI would also use the study to determine if a web-based form would be of value. In conclusion, to avoid the risk of damaging, unauthorized disclosures of classified information, oversight of the reform efforts to measure and improve the quality of the security clearance process is imperative. The progress that was made with respect to reducing the amount of time required for processing clearances would not have been possible without committed and sustained congressional oversight and the leadership of the Performance Accountability Council. Further actions are needed now to fully develop and implement metrics to oversee quality at every step in the process. Further, ensuring the quality of personnel security clearance investigations and adjudications is important government-wide, not just for DOD. While reciprocity is required by law and, if implemented correctly, could enhance efficiency and present cost savings opportunities, much is unknown about the extent to which previously granted security clearance investigations and adjudications are honored government-wide. Therefore, we recommended that metrics are needed to track reciprocity, which have yet to be fully developed and implemented. Assurances that all clearances are of a high quality may further encourage reciprocity of investigation and adjudications. We will continue to monitor the outcome of the agency actions discussed above to address our outstanding recommendations. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement for the record. For further information on this testimony, please contact Brenda S. Farrell, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, who may be reached at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to this testimony include Margaret Best (Assistant Director), Lori Atkinson, Kevin Copping, Elizabeth Hartjes, Jeffrey Heit, Suzanne Perkins, Amie Steele, Erik Wilkins-McKee, and Michael Willems. Personnel Security Clearances: Actions Needed to Help Ensure Correct Designations of National Security Positions. GAO-14-139T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2013. Personnel Security Clearances: Opportunities Exist to Improve Quality Throughout the Process. GAO-14-186T. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2013. Personnel Security Clearances: Full Development and Implementation of Metrics Needed to Measure Quality of Process. GAO-14-157T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2013. Personnel Security Clearances: Further Actions Needed to Improve the Process and Realize Efficiencies. GAO-13-728T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2013. Managing for Results: Agencies Should More Fully Develop Priority Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act. GAO-13-174. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2013. Security Clearances: Agencies Need Clearly Defined Policy for Determining Civilian Position Requirements. GAO-12-800. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012. 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012. Background Investigations: Office of Personnel Management Needs to Improve Transparency of Its Pricing and Seek Cost Savings. GAO-12-197. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012. GAO's 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2011. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: February, 2011. Personnel Security Clearances: Overall Progress Has Been Made to Reform the Governmentwide Security Clearance Process. GAO-11-232T. Washington, D.C.: December 1, 2010. Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Improve Timeliness but Continued Oversight Is Needed to Sustain Momentum. GAO-11-65. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2010. DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations on DOD's Progress on Addressing Timeliness and Quality Issues. GAO-11-185T. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2010. Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy and Comprehensive Reporting of Timeliness and Quality Would Provide Greater Visibility over the Clearance Process. GAO-10-117T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2009. Personnel Security Clearances: Progress Has Been Made to Reduce Delays but Further Actions Are Needed to Enhance Quality and Sustain Reform Efforts. GAO-09-684T. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2009. Personnel Security Clearances: An Outcome-Focused Strategy Is Needed to Guide Implementation of the Reformed Clearance Process. GAO-09-488. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009. DOD Personnel Clearances: Comprehensive Timeliness Reporting, Complete Clearance Documentation, and Quality Measures Are Needed to Further Improve the Clearance Process. GAO-09-400. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2009. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-09-271. Washington, D.C.: January 2009. Personnel Security Clearances: Preliminary Observations on Joint Reform Efforts to Improve the Governmentwide Clearance Eligibility Process. GAO-08-1050T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2008. Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process. GAO-08-776T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008. Employee Security: Implementation of Identification Cards and DOD's Personnel Security Clearance Program Need Improvement. GAO-08-551T. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008. Personnel Clearances: Key Factors to Consider in Efforts to Reform Security Clearance Processes. GAO-08-352T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2008. DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Faces Multiple Challenges in Its Efforts to Improve Clearance Processes for Industry Personnel. GAO-08-470T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008. DOD Personnel Clearances: Improved Annual Reporting Would Enable More Informed Congressional Oversight. GAO-08-350. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008. DOD Personnel Clearances: Delays and Inadequate Documentation Found for Industry Personnel. GAO-07-842T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January 2007. DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-1070. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD's Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06-233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005. DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005. DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary:
Recently the DNI reported that more than 5.1 million federal government and contractor employees held or were eligible to hold a security clearance. GAO has reported that the federal government spent over $1 billion to conduct background investigations (in support of security clearances and suitability determinations for federal employment) in fiscal year 2011. A high quality process is essential to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to help ensure that information about individuals with criminal activity or other questionable behavior is identified and assessed as part of the process for granting or retaining clearances. This statement addresses (1) a general overview of the security clearance process; (2) what is known about the quality of investigations and adjudications, which are the determinations made by executive branch agency officials to grant or reject clearance requests based on investigations; and (3) the extent of reciprocity, which is the decision of agencies to honor clearances previously granted by other agencies. This statement is based on GAO work issued from 2008 to 2013 on DOD's personnel security clearance program and government-wide suitability and security clearance reform efforts. As part of that work, GAO (1) reviewed relevant statutes, federal guidance, and processes, (2) examined agency data on the timeliness and quality of investigations and adjudications, (3) assessed reform efforts, and (4) reviewed a sample of case files for DOD personnel. Several agencies have key roles and responsibilities in the multi-phased personnel security clearance process, including the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who, as the Security Executive Agent, is responsible for developing policies and procedures related to security clearance investigations and adjudications, among other things. The Deputy Director for Management at the Office of Management and Budget chairs the Performance Accountability Council that oversees reform efforts to enhance the personnel security process. The security process includes: the determination of whether a position requires a clearance, application submission, investigation, and adjudication. Specifically, agency officials must first determine whether a federal civilian position requires access to classified information. After an individual has been selected for a position that requires a personnel security clearance and the individual submits an application for a clearance, investigators--often contractors--from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conduct background investigations for most executive branch agencies. Adjudicators from requesting agencies use the information from these investigations and federal adjudicative guidelines to determine whether an applicant is eligible for a clearance. Further, individuals are subject to reinvestigations at intervals based on the level of security clearance. Executive branch agencies do not consistently assess quality throughout the personnel security clearance process, in part because they have not fully developed and implemented metrics to measure quality in key aspects of the process. For more than a decade, GAO has emphasized the need to build and monitor quality throughout the clearance process to promote oversight and positive outcomes such as maximizing the likelihood that individuals who are security risks will be scrutinized more closely. GAO reported in 2009 that, with respect to initial top secret clearances adjudicated in July 2008 for the Department of Defense (DOD), documentation was incomplete for most of OPM's investigative reports. GAO independently estimated that 87 percent of about 3,500 investigative reports that DOD adjudicators used to make clearance eligibility decisions were missing some required documentation, such as the verification of all of the applicant's employment, the required number of social references for the applicant, and complete security forms. In May 2009, GAO recommended that OPM measure the frequency with which its investigative reports met federal investigative standards to improve the completeness--that is, quality--of investigation documentation. In January 2014, DNI officials said that metrics to measure quality of investigative reports had not been established. GAO reported in 2010 that executive branch agencies do not consistently and comprehensively track the extent to which reciprocity is occurring because no government-wide metrics exist to consistently and comprehensively track when reciprocity is granted. The acceptance of a background investigation or personnel security clearance determination completed by another authorized agency is an opportunity to save resources and executive branch agencies are required by law to grant reciprocity, subject to certain exceptions, such as completing additional requirements like polygraph testing. GAO's 2010 recommendation that the leaders of the security clearance reform effort develop metrics to track reciprocity has not been fully implemented.