In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to two judicially cognizable interests. Id. at 560. First, the partisan-elections regime makes the process of getting on the general-election ballot more costly and time consuming. As Nix argues, courts have recognized that "[s]uch ballot-access requirements impose an 'injury-in-faet,' not only because non-compliance prevents 'candidates' from 'appearing] on the ... ballot,' but also because even compliance requires 'significant amounts of time, money, personnel, and energy,' which are limited 'campaign resources' that could have been 'allocate[d]' elsewhere." Appellants' Opening Br. 19-20 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 856-58 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Second, Nix alleges that Kinston's
Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (B) holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance (C) holding that candidates had ample standing to challenge ballotaccess requirements (D) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (E) holding that candidates had standing to challenge requirements for appearing on the generalelection ballot as independents even though they could have chosen to run in a party primary

Ex Output:
holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search

Ex Input:
transfer, and everything else about the transaction was local to St. Thomas, to wit: Franklin Martinez, the lender and president of Transcaribbean, is a St. Thomas resident and has substantial business interests in the Virgin Islands. Those interests include that Martinez is an officer and part-owner of Colombian Emeralds, Inc. and its subsidiaries, and a part-owner of Sea Wind Food Distributors, Inc., Clark asserts that federal jurisdiction is inappo-site because the transaction occurred between Martinez and Peter Clark both local businessmen and involved a loan to fund a local real-estate development. This argument fails because the Court may assume jurisdiction on the basis of a single interstate wire communication. See United States v. Pecora, 693 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, facts alleged by Clark about the
Holding statements: (A) holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction (B) holding that the jurys guilty verdict on the separate substantive count of bribery under federal law confirms beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted the defendant of honest services fraud if the courts definition had been limited to the bribery basis that skilling expressly approved (C) holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored (D) holding that a federal court can assume jurisdiction over a local bribery ease involving only local residents on the basis of a single interstate telephone call (E) holding the federal tort claims act did not permit exercise of pendant jurisdiction over additional parties as to which no basis for federal jurisdiction existed

Ex Output:
holding that single substantial act can support exercise of personal jurisdiction

Ex Input:
a standard of review, the government did not know what its burden would be. Like the district court, it proceeded on the assumption that the highest standard of scrutiny applied and then relied almost entirely on conclusory reasoning by analogy from Heller's reference to the "presumptive" constitutionality of felon-dispossession laws. That was a mistake, for the reasons we have explained. In any event, our discussion here of the appropriate standard of review should provide guidance for the proceedings on remand. Before closing, we offer a few additional observations to help those proceedings along. Intermediate scrutiny tolerates laws that are somewhat overinclusive. See, e.g., Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327-28 (4th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). How much is too much is hard to say; it
Holding statements: (A) holding that appropriate standard of review regarding campaign finance disclosure laws is intermediate not strict scrutiny (B) holding that the commonlaw distinction between governmental and proprietary acts known as the proprietarygovernmental dichotomyapplies in the contractclaims context just as it does in the tort claims context (C) recognizing that intermediate scrutiny in the commercialspeech context allows some latitude between the regulation and the governmental objective (D) holding that some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny applies (E) recognizing a hearing officers latitude in making credibility calls

Ex Output:
holding that appropriate standard of review regarding campaign finance disclosure laws is intermediate not strict scrutiny