TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: was safe to operate, afforded discretion to the FAA to "make its own findings" whether the submitted documentation satisfied that requirement. Id. Likewise, as the district court noted, 49 C.F.R. 385.17(f) is not a "check list." J.A. at 105. It leaves it to the FMCSA to determine whether a carrier's submission provides evidence that corrective action has been taken, and whether the agency has the resources to reach a final decision within 45 days. Such decisions, which relate to a regulatory agency's "implementation of a mechanism for compliance review" and necessarily require "balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding," constitute discretionary functions themselves. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (<HOLDING>). Discretion thus suffuses 49 C.F.R.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a discretionary function exception to that waiver (B) holding that the faas alleged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the course of certificating a specific aircraft as part of a spotcheck program involved calculated risks but fell squarely within the discretionary function exception (C) holding that actions against the faa for its alleged negligence in certificating aircraft for use in commercial aviation are barred by the discretionary function exception of the federal tort claims act id at 821 104 sct 2755 because the faas decisions as to the manner of enforcing regulations is plainly a discretionary activity id at 819 21 104 sct 2755 (D) holding that the faas application of a spotcheck system to a particular aircraft was a discretionary function (E) holding that the discretionary function exception may apply in the absence of a conscious decision

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: who are undeniably state actors, colluded with her in her actions. When all intendments are taken in the Plaintiffs' favor, therefore, their allegations indicate both that Malac infringed their substantive due process rights and that she can be considered a state actor. Accordingly, Malac's motion to dismiss is denied. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Barbara Malac's motion to dismiss [Docket No. 47] is DENIED. The motion of Defendant Agent Cynthia Preston and Defendant Agent Nancy Gingras [Docket No. 50] to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Agent Preston, but GRANTED with respect to Agent Gingras. SO ORDERED. 1 . For the propriety of citing this unpublished Second Circuit opinion, see Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir.2000) (Arnold, J.) (<HOLDING>), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.2000)
Holding statements: (A) holding that unpublished opinions are of persuasive value at best and not precedential (B) holding that opinions accompanying the denial of certiorari cannot have the same effect as decisions on the merits (C) holding that even district court cases decided by panels of three have no precedential value (D) holding that unpublished opinions have precedential effect (E) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: Public Sector Accidental Disability Pensions in New Jersey: The Law of Dramatic Events, 31 Rutgers L.J. 491 (2000). This legislative trend in favor of rendering more difficult the conferring of accidental disability pension benefits militates against the liberal approach forcefully championed by Smith in this matter. If adopted, Smith's interpretation would expand the class of persons eligible for the significantly greater monetary benefits permitted when an allowance pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43 is made, and would have a tendency to place a greater strain on the financial integrity of the fund in question and its future availability for those persons who are truly eligible for such benefits. See Mount v. Trustees of P.E.R.S., 133 N.J.Super. 72, 86, 335 A.2d 559 (App.Div.1975) (<HOLDING>). In rejecting Smith's argument, we conclude
Holding statements: (A) holding that the settlor could divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests only by completely revoking the trust because she had limited her ability to eliminate the beneficiaries interests by including language in the trust stating that the interests of the beneficiaries shall continue until this trust is revoked or terminated internal quotation marks omitted (B) recognizing that the members of the board of trustees are fiduciaries and therefore have a duty to protect the fund and the interests of all beneficiaries thereof which duty must be exercised with due care diligence and skill in administering the trust (C) holding that the law imposes on every person who enters upon an active course of conduct the positive duty to exercise ordinary care to protect others from harm and calls a violation of that duty negligence that a complete binding contract between the parties is not a prerequisite to a duty to use due care in ones actions and that architects may be held liable for a breach of the duty of care and breach of contract that results in foreseeable injury economic or otherwise (D) holding that trust beneficiaries have no authority to maintain an action as third party beneficiaries of contracts between the trustee and agents of the trustee concerning the internal affairs of the trust (E) holding that trustees fiduciary duty exists independent of any clause in trust agreement

SOLUTION:
(B)