In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
proceeding"). Here, the only evidence that th .Crim.App.2000) (stating, in motion to suppress context, "[T]he judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted"). Appellant's and Sanchez's after-the-fact, out-of-court averrals about appellant's ability to understand the proceedings and waivers he signed were untimely factual statements in appellant's self-interest. Even though the State did not offer affidavits to controvert appellant's and Sanchez's affidavits, it was within the trial court's discretion to disbelieve the assertions contained in those affidavits that appellant does not read or speak English. See Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 210; Shanklin, 190 S.W.3d at 167; see also Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and not this Court, is in
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (B) holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record (C) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (D) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (E) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record

Ex Output:
holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record

Ex Input:
note that, contrary to Kooby and EHI's assertion, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing on this m 2d 814) (1991) (same). 10 Rogers v. Norris, 262 Ga. App. 857, 857 (1) (586 SE2d 747) (2003) ("Although we review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, 'the trial court must make findings on these issues before we may determine whether its discretion was abused.' " (quoting Ga. Dep't of Human Res. v. Patillo, 194 Ga. App. 279, 279 (390 SE2d 431) (1990))); see also Wood v. Notte, 238 Ga. App. 748, 749 (1) (519 SE2d 923) (1999) (same); Crenshaw, 202 Ga. App. at 611 (1) (same). 11 See Rogers, 262 Ga. App. at 857 (1) ("Failure to make [findings of fact] mandates that we vacate the order dismissing the appeal and remand the case Ga. App. 40, 43 (555 SE2d 508) (2001) (<HOLDING>); A. Roberts Corp. v. Roberts, 207 Ga. App.
Holding statements: (A) holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it (B) holding that trial court made sufficient findings of fact when it dismissed appeal (C) holding the findings of fact required to support an alimony award are sufficient if findings of fact have been made on the ultimate facts at issue in the case and the findings of fact show the trial court properly applied the law in the case (D) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (E) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact

Ex Output:
holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it

Ex Input:
regulatory and dictionary definitions of "nominal"). The plaintiff asserts that the Secretary's approval of the Maine HMP exceeds the Secretary's statutory authority in violation of the APA. See Compl. 7, 59. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the Secretary abused his discretion in approving "nominal" copayments that exceed the Secretary's own regulatory definition of what constitutes a "nominal" copayment. See 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), (C); Compl. 4-5, 23, 55-58; PL's Mot. for Summ. J. at 28. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that it was an abuse of discretion for the Secretary to approve the HMP because it includes unlawfully high copayments. See PL's Mot. for Summ. J. at 28 (quoting Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 711 F.2d 370, 381 (D.C.Cir.1983)) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the defendants argue that the
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language (B) holding that when an agencys interpretation of its own rules flies in the face of the language of the rules themselves it is owed no deference (C) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that deference is owed to state agencys interpretation of state law (E) holding that an agencys interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference

Ex Output:
recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language