instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin's trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this
Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable
answer:
holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial

question:
acted outside their jurisdiction. In sum, none of Pasiewicz's arguments show that Sandahl and Henning violated the Constitution when they arrested him. They and the other officers (Johnson in particular) certainly could have, and we think should have, proceeded with more caution. They get no commendation ribbons for the way they handled this case. Pasiewicz's claim against the forest preserve district (even assuming it's a suable entity) for failure to train or supervise its officers properly regarding the laws of search, seizure, and jurisdiction is a born loser. Because the officers did not violate Pasiewicz's constitutional rights, he did not suffer constitutional injury. Accordingly, under City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed. 1412 (D.D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>), it is worth pointing out that Ross involved
Holding statements: (A) holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure (B) holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment (C) holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment (D) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding that the concept of reasonableness in the fourth amendment logically presupposes an exercise of lawful authority by a police officer
answer:
holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure

question:
care ... to reasonably assure itself that its immediate vendee and distributor was so informed as to be able and likely to transmit ... knowledge of [the product's] dangers."); In re Brooklyn Navy Yard Asbestos Litigation, 971 F.2d 831, 838 (2d Cir.1992) (stating that "[t]he sophisticated intermediary doctrine protects a manufacturer from liability only if the chain of distribution is such that the duty to warn ultimate users should fall on an intermediary in that chain, rather than on the manufacturer"); Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 741 (3rd Cir. 1990) (weighing totality of factors is required to determine reasonableness of reliance on a third party as a conduit of necessary product information); Stuckey v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480 (11th
Holding statements: (A) holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based (B) holding that the defendant pharmacist had undertaken a duty to accurately warn of a drugs side effects with respect to the warning actually given but not a duty to warn of all possible side effects of the medication (C) holding that there is no necessity to warn a consumer already aware through common knowledge or learning of a specific hazard (D) holding that the staffing agency which forwarded a background check conducted by another entity to the ultimate employer was liable under 1681bb3 because its decision to furnish the report to the ultimate employer was an adverse action (E) holding that a suppliers duty to warn an ultimate consumer can be discharged by a warning given to an intermediary but focus is on whether the intermediarys knowledge was sufficient to protect the ultimate consumer
answer:
holding that arizona rule of civil procedure 52a requires the court to find only the ultimate facts not the evidentiary facts upon which the ultimate facts are based