In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired"), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination" for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487,
Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay

A: holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a
****
Q: 602 F.Supp. 859, 864 (D.N.J.1985); Tedesco v. U.S. Po esentation against the Government. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). Further, the FTCA requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to adjudication in a federal court, all claims to first be brought before the appropriate agency-here, the USPS's Tort Claims Examiner. See 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). It is undisputed that Mr. Foster did not bring his claims to the USPS before initiating this suit. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. II Mr. Foster also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration and its denial of sanctions against USPS. We review these determinations for abuse of discretion. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gary v. The Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive (B) holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions (E) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit

A: holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive
****
Q: not a legislator and therefore not entitled to assert legislative immunity. (Pls.Mem. in Opp'n at 24.) Presumably plaintiffs are analogizing the dictum of Forrester that state executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official acts to the same extent as the President of the United States. See 484 U.S. at 226, 108 S.Ct. at 543-44. However, the Municipal defendants do not assert Zwim's immunity as an executive, but only with respect to his participation in approving legislated Board resolutions. (Mun. Defs.Mem. of Law at 21.) Although defendant Zwirn is chief executive of the Town, he has legislative responsibilities in his dual capacity as a Town Board member. N.Y.Town Law 60, 63 (McKinney 1987); see also Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>); Orange, 830 F.Supp. at 706 (county executive
Holding statements: (A) holding chief of police an executive officer because a member of the executive branch and an officer (B) recognizing that the fellow officer rule functions to include officers outside the common investigation (C) holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself (D) holding that in extraordinary circumstances where a police officer neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard qualified immunity may still be available (E) holding that a mayor although the executive officer may still have legislative functions

A:
holding chief of police an executive officer because a member of the executive branch and an officer
****