In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state's use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong's view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner's access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as "dictum" the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter's right of access to a conventional Highway "can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property." 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court's conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court's analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong's concurrence reasons, a
Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property
(B)

further hold that the district court did not commit any procedural error or abuse its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (assuming sentencing decision is procedurally sound, appellate court considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant's proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied, U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1309, L.Ed.2d - (2010); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Having reviewed the record independently
Holding statements: (A) holding district court committed no significant procedural error despite departing downward from the guideline range for multiple reasons without explaining the weight it was attributing to each reason (B) recognizing that a party has not preserved a claim of procedural error if the party did not raise it in a manner sufficient to alert the district court to the specific error (C) holding that reviewing court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence describing factors demonstrating procedural error (D) holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error (E) holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range
(C)

295 Md. 67, 453 A.2d 814 (1982) (same); Hunter v. Board of Educ., Md.Ct.App., 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582 (1982) (same); Swidryk v. Saint Michael's Med. Ctr., N.J.Super.Ct.Law Div., 20l N.J.Super. 601, 493 A.2d 641 (1985) (same); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., N.Y.Ct.App., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 400 N.E.2d 317 (1979) (same); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., N.Y.Ct.App., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (1979) (often-cited case refusing to recognize educational malpractice tort based on claim that school failed to adequately educate student); Poe v. Hamilton, Ohio Ct.App., 56 Ohio App.3d 137, 565 N.E.2d 887 (1990) (stating public policy precludes cause of action for educational malpractice); see also Ross v. Creighton Univ., 7th Cir., 957 F.2d 410 (1992) (<HOLDING>). 8 . In Moore, the Iowa Supreme Court
Holding statements: (A) holding that illinois supreme court would refuse to recognize the tort of educational malpractice (B) holding that the court of appeals lacks the authority to overrule decisions of the supreme court of north carolina and has a responsibility to follow those decisions until otherwise ordered by the supreme court (C) recognizing that only the illinois supreme court could finally resolve the issue of implicit repeal explaining the state must resolve this conflict internally (D) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction (E) holding that court was within its discretion to refuse to consider reports that did not meet the supreme courts standards for admitting reports into evidence
(A)