In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court's order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants' arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: until after the interview ended. Defendants therefore contend that we should ignore contrary testimony by Whalen and Connelly. On summary judgment, however, we do not merely accept the plaintiff's contentions as true. Instead, we must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovanfs favor. There is no requirement that inferences favorable to the plaintiff may only be based on evidence that she has submitted to us. Here, the justifiable inference favorable to plaintiff is that a question of fact exists regarding this issue. 6 . The Supreme Court's plurality decision in Al-bright casts some doubt on whether a plaintiff may state a claim for coercion of a confession under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See Albright,-U.S. at-,-,-, -, 114 S.Ct. at 813, 814, 817, 820-21 (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has stated that Albright
Holding statements: (A) holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under 1983 because it violates the fourth amendment (B) recognizing 1983 substantive due process claim (C) holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed (D) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding in five separate opinions that 1983 claim based on persons arrest cannot be brought under substantive due process where more specific constitutional provision fourth amendment applies
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985)); see Copening, 506 F.3d at 1248. "An arrest is distinguished" from an investigative Terry stop "by the involuntary, 'highly intrusive' nature of the encounter." Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1115. For example, "the use of firearms, handcuffs, and other forceful techniques generally exceed the scope of an investigative detention and enter the realm of an arrest." Id. at 1115-16 (quotation, alterations omitted). Or an investigative deten tion may last too long under the specific circumstances of a given case and on that basis may be transformed into a de facto arrest. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682-88, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (eschewing a bright-line rule); see United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir.2004) (citing cases); see also Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1116 (<HOLDING>). In this case, however, Defendants do not
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that the state as well as the defendant has a right to rely on compliance with rule 16 (C) holding force used during seizure as well as its duration turned investigative detention into a full custodial arrest (D) holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled (E) holding that plaintiff bears burden of production as well as persuasion
[EX A]:
(C)