In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute." Sweats Fashions, 833 F.2d at 1562. Plaintiff has neither submitted materials of his own, nor shown how the materials already in the record create a genuine issue of material fact. He has done nothing more than rest on an ambiguous "general denial": that he has either "refused to accept" his severance pay, or that such pay was never "conveyed" to him." Pl.'s Opp. at 4. This is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion. Put simply, while defendant has met its burden under Celotex properly to support Cl. 736, 756 (2011) (declining to consider a claim for relief not contained in the plaintiffs complaint and first raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Michels v. United States, 72 Fed.Cl. 426, 431-32 (2006) (<HOLDING>). Defendant cannot be faulted for failing to
Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff may attempt to survive a rule 12b6 motion by adding essential new facts in a brief on appeal (B) holding that a plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal under rcfc 12b6 by asserting a new claim (C) holding that a respondent cannot avoid the initial pleading element by obtaining a dismissal and filing her own suit (D) recognizing that a rule 12b6 motion is an appropriate vehicle on which to seek dismissal of a claim barred by a prescription statute (E) holding that dismissal pursuant to rule 12b6 is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to articulate enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face

A: (B)
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Q: previously discussed Wilson's subjective complaints, then identified specific discrepancies between those complaints and the medical evidence. He noted that though she claimed back pain since 2000, she continued working till November 2002, when her company merged and she lost her job. He also noted that the record established that she walked with a normal unassisted gait, in contrast with her complaints about her problems walking. Additionally, he indicated that the record showed she had never been hospitalized for any orthopedic reason and had never taken any potent pain medication, though she claimed severely debilitating pain. The ALJ's credibility finding was fully explained and is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Wilson also contends, given her inability to
Holding statements: (A) holding that the alj did not err in discounting a claimants reports of pain where they were not supported by the medical record (B) holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain (C) holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record (D) holding that the alj properly relied on medical evidence undermining claimants subjective assessment of limitations (E) holding that an alj is entitled to make a credibility determination regarding the claimants subjective complaints after specifically addressing these complaints and reviewing the medical evidence in the record

A: (C)
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Q: to the defense of Poole. 6 . Moreover, not only did Poole's unilateral decision to have the school's interior remedi-ated violate the terms of the policy, (see ECF No. 1-2 at 19), and impair Nautilus's ability to protect its interests, which included mounting a litigation strategy to determine fault, see W. Bend Co. v. Chiaphua Indus., Inc., 112 F.Supp.2d 816, 824 (E.D.Wis.2000) (explaining that prohibitions against voluntarily assuming obligations "exist to give the insurer which is being asked to foot the bill an opportunity to protect its interests"), but the late tender to Nautilus appears to have- deprived it of the opportunity to control the defense of Poole in the state action. See Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F.Supp.2d 569, 596 (E.D.N.C.1999) (<HOLDING>). To hold, as Westfield urges, that Nautilus
Holding statements: (A) holding that the insurers failure to pay even what it had considered to be a reasonable sum for defense costs despite having nominally accepted the tender of defense constitutes a breach of the duty to defend (B) holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer (C) holding that insurer must pay for defense after it declined to provide a defense and coverage was found to exist (D) holding that delayed notice relieves insurer of obligation to pay defense costs if it was actually prejudiced by delay (E) recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control

A:
(E)
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