In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence." Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla.1986). In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that "resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights." Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 525 (Fla.2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) ("We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a 'clean slate,' meaning that the defendant's vacated sentence becomes a 'nullity' and his 'resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.' " (citation omitted)); Walker, 988 So.2d at 8 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) ("Generally, courts have held that once a def A 1998) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (B) holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing (E) holding that at resentencing on violation of probation trial court may revise guidelines scoresheet to reflect prior convictions mistakenly omitted from the original through no fault of the defendant
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: on one." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Capshaw cannot establish that his attorney's performance was deficient for failing to object to the admission of cell phone records. His trial counsel would not have prevailed on such an objection under the governing law, and thus counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to object. It is undisputed that the government obtained a court order, under 18 U.S.C. 2703, requiring Sprint Nextel to produce the cell phone records of Capshaw and three other people to show calls between them during the period of the murder-for-hire plot. Obtaining those telephone rec ords through a 2703 court order did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Mainland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2582, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (<HOLDING>). Capshaw had no reasonable expectation of
Holding statements: (A) holding anticipatory warrant for search of defendants home was invalid because facts made known to magistrate did not establish at time warrant was issued the required nexus between the contraband to be seized which was mailed to defendants post office box and defendants home (B) holding that search warrant was constitutionally defective because it did not require notice (C) holding that an arrest warrant without a search warrant does not permit law enforcement authorities to enter a third partys home to legally search for the subject of the arrest warrant (D) holding that telephone company records of calls made from a defendants home did not require the government to seek a search warrant (E) holding that consent searches do not require probable cause to justify the search of a home
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: by an objective standard. Lieb, 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir.1986). One view of an "improper purpose" is any purpose other than one to vindicate substantive or procedural rights or to put claims of a right to a proper test. GREGORY P. Joseph, Sanctions, 13(B)(2) at p. 216. But simplifying and isolating the "purpose" of certain litigation tactics is not always helpful. See Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir.1995) (reversing sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 11 and the court's inherent power for the filing of a complaint "with a view to exerting pressure on defendant through the generation of adverse and economically disadvantageous publicity" where complaint did not lack foundation in law or fact); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell, 154 F.R.D. 675, 682 (D.Ariz.1993) (<HOLDING>). As indicated earlier, an objective basis for
Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant is in custody and miranda applies even when the purpose of defendants detention is unrelated to the purpose of the interrogation (B) holding that even when there is a legitimate government purpose the discrimination must bear at least some rational relationship to that purpose (C) holding that rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate when a motion is filed in part for a legitimate purpose even when the motion includes certain evidence which is assertedly presented for an improper purpose (D) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive (E) holding that sanctions under rule 11 are unavailable unless the motion for sanctions is served on the opposing party for the full twentyone day safe harbor period before it is filed with or presented to the court
[EX A]:
(C)