In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to Richardson. 6 . In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), the Supreme Court extended Batson and its progeny to prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of gender. 7 . The Slate also points out that the presiding judge in the instant case is an African American jurist. Judge Green's sensitivity and efforts to seat a constitutional and racially-diverse jury for defendant, is evidenced in the debate over Richardson. Even though the judge originally found the state's race-neutral reasons as to Richardson valid, he became concerned about the exclusion of African Americans from defendant's jury. However, the judge's race is not relevant to Batson analysis. See State v. Tilley, 99-0569, p. 8 (La.7/6/00), 767 So.2d 6, 15 (<HOLDING>). 8 . A discussion of the assignments of error
Holding statements: (A) holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case (B) holding that a criminal defendant can bring a third party challenge to the peremptory striking of jurors based on race whether or not he is of the same race as the jurors who are struck (C) recognizing that certain forms of race consciousness do not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination (D) holding that custody decision based on race is not justified (E) holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant
[EX A]: holding that more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the race classification is required to make a prima facie race discrimination case

[EX Q]: of the INS were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296, 471(a), 116 Stat. 2135, 2205 (codified at 6 U.S.C. 291(a)). 3 . Petitioner argues that it was inappropriate to look to the treatment of his family members in determining the likelihood of petitioner being persecuted if he returns to Algeria, because his situation is not identical to theirs. This is mistaken; relatives' situations in the home country, while not conclusive, are certainly relevant. See Aguilar-Solis, 168 F.3d at 573 ("Without some explanation, the fact that close relatives continue to live peacefully in the alien's homeland undercuts the alien's claim that persecution awaits his return"); In re A-E, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1157, 1160 (BIA 1998) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Petitioner also argues that the BIA
Holding statements: (A) holding that the reasonableness of an aliens fear of persecution is reduced when his family remains in his native country unharmed for a long period of time after his departure (B) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (C) holding that an applicant may establish eligibility for asylum based exclusively on activities undertaken after his arrival in the united states so long as he demonstrates that authorities in his country are aware of his activities or likely to become aware of his activities (D) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (E) holding the respondent implicitly exercised his right to withdraw his voluntary departure request and instead elected to remain to pursue his motion
[EX A]: holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction

[EX Q]: firms to determine what is reasonable in the relevant community." Nike, Inc. v. Top Brand Co., No. 00 Civ. 8179, 2006 WL 2946472, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8381, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2006) (citing Miele v. N.Y. State Teamsters Conf. Pens. & Retirement Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir.1987)). "The relevant community to which the court should look is the district in which the case was brought." Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 111 F.Supp.2d 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir.1987)). Courts in this circuit routinely consider the rates of both the Eastern District of New York as well as the Southern District when undertaking this analysis. See, e.g., New Leadership Committee v. Davidson, 23 F.Supp.2d 301, 305 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (<HOLDING>). "Overall, hourly rates for attorneys approved
Holding statements: (A) holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district (B) holding that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in considering the prevailing hourly rates in the southern district of new york when awarding attorneys fees (C) holding that a district judge may rely on his own knowledge of private firm hourly rates in the community in determining the prevailing market rate (D) recognizing the time honored practice of applying new york city rates in calculating attorneys fees throughout the southern district of new york including in counties north of the city (E) holding that judge in southern district of new york could authorize wiretap in maryland
[EX A]:
holding that only a district judge in the charging district and not a magistrate judge in that district may review the release order of a magistrate judge in the arresting district