TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: that subsequent extraneous offenses are admissible to show a defendant's intent as to an earlier offense. See U.S. v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 128 (2nd Cir.1998) (upholding admission of subsequent act under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show intent regarding charged offense and holding, "[t]he fact that the evidence involved a subsequent rather than prior act is of no moment"); U.S. v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C.Cir.) (construing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and holding that it "draws no distinction b Austin 1990, no pet.) (same). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Russell's contention that the Vogt Street offense was not admissible simply because it occurred after the Fast Freddy's offense. Cf. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Although, based on the authorities cited by
Holding statements: (A) holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court (B) recognizing that an appellate court reviews a trial courts decision whether or not to grant equitable relief only for an abuse of discretion (C) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (D) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) recognizing that an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding principles or rules

SOLUTION: holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court

PROBLEM: removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director's term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, "the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal...." Drexler, supra, 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) ("At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation."); see also Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). "Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to
Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary

SOLUTION: holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders

PROBLEM: on the secured creditor's position." Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 49 n. 6 (quoting Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap from Strip Down to Chapter 7, 8 Bankr.Dev.J. 131, 137 (1991)). 11 . Since the debtors have failed to either redeem or reaffirm, the Bank concludes that cause has been shown to modify the automatic stay. As discussed above, however, I am addressing the 521 issue on its own merits and not in support of a claim for modification under 362(d)(1). In any event, it is unclear whether a violation of 521(2) would necessarily constitute cause for modification under 362(d)(1). See Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 48 ("It is not clear to us that violation of 521(2) would automatically require a bankruptcy court to lift the automatic stay."); Lowry, 882 F.2d at 1546 (<HOLDING>); but see Johnson, 89 F.3d at 252 ("If the
Holding statements: (A) holding that if the application for a warrant contains probable cause apart from the improper information then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies providing that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry (B) holding that a similar denial was not superseded because the appellant did not seek a stay of the trial courts order (C) holding that noncompliance with 5212 did not warrant relief from the automatic stay so that the creditor could repossess the collateral (D) holding that the warrant application at issue did not specifically mention the presence of criminal activity at defendants residence but that the executing officers reasonably relied on the warrant (E) holding that an appeal was not moot because the amendment to the ordinance at bar did not give the petitioner the relief sought so that the petitioners claim and injury remain viable

SOLUTION:
holding that if the application for a warrant contains probable cause apart from the improper information then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies providing that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry