In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
to survive. See Plaintiffs' Brief, 9-10 citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2) general notice pleadings standard remains intact after Twombly) Because this question goes to the very heart of the matter, it must be addressed first. To recapitulate, this Court's April 2007 Opinion weighed the sufficiency of the "enterprise" allegations in accordance with the Third Circuit's ruling in Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.1984). See 365 B.R. at 548. Seville stated that nothing more than general notice pleading was required for pleading a RICO enterprise. Seville relied, implicitly, on the long-standing rule regarding notice pleading first enunciated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (<HOLDING>) But two months after this Court's April 2007
Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (B) holding that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim (E) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief

Ex Output:
holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief

Ex Input:
It is axiomatic, however, that states act through their officials and agencies. Thus, under Will, those state agencies and other political subdivisions which carry out the state's business and have immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment constitute "arms of the state." Pursuant to Will, such entities would not be considered persons under 1983. Those political subdivisions which are not provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, do not rise to the level of "arms of the state" and would, under Will, be considered to be persons for the purposes of 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir.1991) (bi-state agency is a "person" under 1983); Magula v. Broward Gen. Medical Ctr., 742 F.Supp. 645, 649 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the Will decision was handed down, a
Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit (C) holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity (E) holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity

Ex Output:
holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment

Ex Input:
address could have been the same. Not only do the photo S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system thus makng it possible to identify him or her later). Second, the information that Officer Chih learned when he entered apartment 301 did little to corroborate the conclusory tip "from the neighborhood." That Mr. Jackson was inside the apartment, consistent with the tip, does not demonstrate that the "tip [was] reliable in its assertion of illegality" but merely that it was reliable in "its tendency to identify a determinate person." J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (<HOLDING>). Similarly, the Lewises' inaccurate statements
Holding statements: (A) holding that an anonymous tip that described a suspects appearance and location and alleged that he was carrying a concealed weapon was insufficiently corroborated by the officers observation of the appellant who matched the description hanging out at the indicated location (B) holding that automobile exception applied to search of defendants tractor trailer where confidential informant who was detained at border with a trailer full of marijuana told agents that he was driving to meet the defendant to exchange trailers and defendant subsequently arrived at the location described at the time described in a tractor with an empty trailer that matched informants description (C) holding tip to be sufficiently reliable where the officer confirmed an informants description of the suspects appearance and location though the officer did not personally witness any criminal behavior (D) holding an anonymous tip had the requisite indicia of reliability to justify a stop when the caller told the police of the alleged erratic driving automobile location and vehicle description (E) holding that stop of appellant was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion where anonymous 911 caller said that she had seen suspect pull gun out of his pocket 911 caller described suspect and suspects location responding officer located appellant near stated location appellant matched description and no one else in vicinity matched description

Ex Output:
holding that automobile exception applied to search of defendants tractor trailer where confidential informant who was detained at border with a trailer full of marijuana told agents that he was driving to meet the defendant to exchange trailers and defendant subsequently arrived at the location described at the time described in a tractor with an empty trailer that matched informants description