In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

(second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured"). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity" for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans," whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within" the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means "a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance"); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling
Holding statements: (A) holding 1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc 853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees
(A)

is correct. We will also assume that the court's erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR's statement that he "recruited Wornick and Sella" into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, "[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes." United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant's recruitment of co-conspirators supports a 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under 3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under 3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under 3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
(E)

to saddle the client with the mistakes of its attorney. The Court today properly rejects that rationale." Id. at 405-06, 113 S.Ct. 1489. There is a small measure of inconsistency between the D.C. Circuit's use of equitable principles in not holding a purely innocent and misled client liable for the neglect of counsel and the Supreme Court's decisions in Link and Pioneer. But this court need not address this inconsistency any further. Even under the slightly more relaxed standard that the D.C. Circuit used in two deei-sions, which allow a client to avoid the consequences of his counsel's malpractice, Moving Plaintiffs still fail to show circumstances that will allow this court to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C.Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>), and Jackson v. Washington Monthly Co., et
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred when it sanctioned client where the evidence showed that the attorney filed frivolous pleadings on behalf of the client but the client did nothing more than rely on her attorneys advice (B) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case (C) holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client (D) holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client
(B)