In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 188 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio E.D.1981); In re Davis, 16 B.R. 473 (D.Kan.1981). Or after a judgment has been entered: In re Young, 22 B.R. 620 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.E.D.1982); In re Breuer, 4 B.R. 499, 6 B.C.D. 136 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1980). (5)Courts that hold that a debtor may cure a default where a foreclosure sale has been held provided that the debtor's right of redemption under state law has not expired: In re Johnson, 29 B.R. 104 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Chambers, 27 B.R. 687 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Taylor, 21 B.R. 179 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1982); In re Thompson, 17 B.R. 748 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mich.1982). 32 B.R. at 790. To the fourth group we add the following recent opinions by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits: Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Association, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.1984)
Holding statements: (A) holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally (B) holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court (C) holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank (D) holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default

A: holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally
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Q: income. As the majority notes, the Internal Revenue Code is not the standard for determining weekly gross income for child support purposes, see op. at 13 (quoting Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b) that the weekly gross income figure may not be the same as gross income for tax purposes). It may be unfair to exclude all of the settlement proceeds where they have inured to the family's benefit in the past but it may also be unfair to include all of the proceeds where Scott has need of them for his own care. Commentary to Guideline 3(A) urges judges to "be innovative in finding ways to include income that would have benefited the family had it remained intact, but be receptive to deviations where reasons justify them." Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b); see also Harris, 800 N.E.2d at 940-41 (<HOLDING>). [5] Because the trial court's decision was
Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including only the net amount of settlement proceeds from a wrongful termination lawsuit because that is the amount that would have ultimately benefited the children if the family had remained intact (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial

A: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served
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Q: of his conviction for the Duncan murder and found that Polk did not "interrogate" Howard. See State v. Howard, 296 S.C. 481, 374 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1988). Again, we do not attempt to decide these issues because they are not necessary to our resolution of the ultimate question of whether Howard's confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins are admissible. We only point out these issues in response to the dissent's decidedly incomplete discussion of them. 14 . In his Reply Brief, Howard contends for the first time that his rights under Edwards were initially violated by Detective Warren, prior to Howard's meeting with Polk. This assertion is barred by his failure to raise it earlier. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8-12, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719-21, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, an examination of Howard's
Holding statements: (A) holding that when a petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing in state court to develop the factual basis of a claim but the state court denies such a hearing entitlement to a federal court hearing is analyzed pursuant to preaedpa law rather than the standards set out in 2254e2 (B) holding federal evidentiary hearing not statutorily barred when petitioner had sought to develop factual basis for claim in state court (C) holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint (D) holding that federal court cannot review claim procedurally defaulted in state court absent showing of either cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice

A:
holding that when a petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing in state court to develop the factual basis of a claim but the state court denies such a hearing entitlement to a federal court hearing is analyzed pursuant to preaedpa law rather than the standards set out in 2254e2
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