In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

prolonged; and (4) the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Alpert, 816 F.2d at 964, citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). DiGiovanni's continued investigation after issuing the warning was entirely reasonable in light of these factors. First, any detention incident to that investigation was of limited duration. The encounter between Rodriguez and law enforcement personnel, from the moment he was pulled over until the currency's discovery, lasted approximately forty minutes. Under these circumstances, even if Rodriguez's detention occupied that entire time interval, it might not suggest a Terry Stop of unreasonable scope. See United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1194 (4th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the alleged detention here only
Holding statements: (A) holding that where officers had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense seizing defendants luggage for 38 minutes under terry did not mature into an unlawful arrest (B) holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest (C) holding that a defendants response to even an invalid arrest or terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest (D) holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had dispelled the officers reasonable suspicion (E) holding that totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs and therefore officer was justified in seizing truck
(A)

Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City's denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave "gaps" in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves "significant gaps" in wireless services, 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding
Holding statements: (A) holding that 332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that 332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest
(C)

trial be granted on the grounds that the State knowingly used perjured testimony. In making this recommendation, the magistrate judge relied primarily on Prewitt's testimony that (1) Jones wielded a knife as he approached Fairman before their altercation, and (2) the police coerced him to lie at Fairman's trial. The magistrate judge found Prewitt's testimony "wholly credible" in light of his courtroom demeanor and awareness that he risked prosecution for perjury. The district court adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge in its entirety, and we will not reverse the district court where the factual predicate at issue is susceptible to two, equally compelling, views. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (<HOLDING>). We pause in conclusion to address several
Holding statements: (A) holding that the clearly erroneous standard of review applies unless judgment is entered on the basis of documentary evidence alone (B) holding that a court would abuse its discretion by relying on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence (C) holding that the factfinders choice between two views of the evidence cannot be clearly erroneous (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous
(C)