In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: and misunderstanding of the local rules involving summar he district court abused its discretion in denying their Rule 60(b)(3) motion for relief from judgment. See Hesling v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir.2005). The Sangis did not provide the district court with clear and convincing evidence that FCC engaged in fraud or other misconduct or that any misconduct prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their case. See Gov't Fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir.1995). Rather the Sangis offered only allegations of fraud and misconduct. Nor have the Sangis shown exceptional circumstances to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants (B) holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances (C) holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant (D) holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances (E) holding that rule 60b6 only applies in extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay
[A]: (E)

[Q]: we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee's sexual organ with the child's female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee's mouth with the child's sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child's sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91
Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity
[A]: (A)

[Q]: that the State of Colorado is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the District Court properly dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim against Colorado for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We next turn to the court's decision to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claim against the University of Colorado Board of Regents for lack of standing. We need not address this issue, however, because the Colorado Board of Regents is, like the state itself, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 494 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e have no doubt that UNMSM, its Regents, and the Committee on Admissions are 'arms of the state,' entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity."); Lujan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 69 F.3d 1511, 1522 (10th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Hensel v. Office of Chief Admin. Hearing
Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens (B) holding that the university of californias board of regents is shielded from suit under the eleventh amendment (C) holding that a debtors adversary proceeding against the university of virginia to determine the dischargeability of a debt is a suit for eleventh amendment purposes (D) holding that governors duty to nominate and appoint members of the board of regents of the university of hawaii is subject to a reasonable time standard judged by the totality of the circumstances (E) holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981
[A]:
(B)