In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: state witnesses regarding their credibility during the course of the trial in chief. Angela Sweat had negotiated with state prosecution involving armed robbery charges, the facts of the plea agreement for impeachment was not permitted by the trial court. This witness was the sole evidence against the petitioner and had the jury known of her motive to lie they would have found me not guilty of the armed robbery charges. This was a denial of my right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the jury would have found me not guilty. Generally, federal courts should not review a state trial judge's rulings with respect to the admissibility of evidence. Shaw v. Boney, 695 F.2d 528, 530 (11th Cir.1983). Even if the trial court' h Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Evidentiary rulings are within the broad
Holding statements: (A) holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge (B) holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity (C) holding that denigrating insanity defense was inappropriate (D) holding that where the sole defense was insanity excluded testimony was material a crucial critical and highly significant factor (E) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense

A: holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge
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Q: to the "enforcement" of the reversal of the Bankruptcy Court's Order allowing IMC an administrative expense. It would also be considered a core proceeding since it follows directly from a core proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. 503(b) and 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(2)(B). Basic principles of restitution and appellate procedure which dictate that a lower court always has the jurisdiction to order the restitution of an award overturned on appeal, even without a remand from the appellate court, also support our conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to rule on the Debtor's Motion. See Caldwell v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship and Training Trust, 824 F.2d 765, 766-67 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. U.S., 279 U.S. 781, 786, 49 S.Ct. 492, 493, 73 L.Ed. 954 (1929)) (<HOLDING>). "The right to recover what one has lost by
Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (B) holding that the court had appellate jurisdiction to review the merits of the case because only the collateral issue of attorneys fees remained to be decided on remand to the bankruptcy court (C) holding that the fourth circuit has jurisdiction to review a district courts sua sponte remand order even when that remand order is styled as a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the order was in fact based on the procedural insufficiency of the notice of removal (D) holding the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the circuit court had the power to remand the agency decision for further proceedings (E) holding that the district court had jurisdiction to order restitution of award overturned on appeal even in the absence of a remand from the appellate court

A: holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial
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Q: by 1681a(r)(5), and there was no "credit transaction" within the meaning of 1681b(a)(3)(A). PCA, therefore, had no purpose specified as permissible under the statute to obtain Pintos's credit report. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court relied on our decision in Has-bun. Hasbun presented the question of whether a government agency looking to enforce a child support judgment could obtain a credit report on a judgment debt- or under 1681b(a)(3)(A). 323 F.3d at 802-03. The court determined that debt collection was generally a permissible purpose for obtaining credit reports under 1681b(a)(3)(A), and that the government, which stood in the shoes of the judgment creditor, could, like any other creditor, obtain credit reports for debt collection. Id. at 803-04, 805 (<HOLDING>). Relying on Hasbun, the district court
Holding statements: (A) holding that 1681ba3a applies only if the con sumer initiates a credit transaction (B) holding that amtrak is an agency of the government for purposes of the constitutional obligations of government (C) holding that the government agency was engaged in the collection of an account under 15 usc 1681ba3a and therefore had a permissible purpose for obtaining the credit report (D) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude an agency finding of no discrimination on the ground that the report would suggest to the jury that it should reach the same conclusion as the agency (E) holding in the context of a fcra violation that a jury could find that a consumers credit score was negatively influenced by the failure to list a debt as disputed because evidence was presented that when a credit reporting agency received notice of a dispute it records the dispute in the credit report and does not include the derogatory information in assessing the credit score

A:
holding that 1681ba3a applies only if the con sumer initiates a credit transaction
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