In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ's improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA's ruling in March 2002, the application for 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman's argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218
Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina 212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for 212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina 212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina 212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of 212c relief
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: ah officer may ask a question outside the scope of the initial justification for the stop so long as it does not further lengthen the time taken to process the initial justification for the stop. In other words, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. This reasoning is explained in both United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc), and United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-37 (5th Cir.1993). In both cases, the courts held that questions by police officers during a traffic stop are not seizures or searches proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, and cited United States Supreme Court cases dealing with non-custodial police-citizen encounters for support. See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (<HOLDING>); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111
Holding statements: (A) holding district courts finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous when police encounter lacked drawn weapons threats or prolonged questioning and consent was given without reluctance or hesitation even though police did not advise defendant of right to refuse consent (B) holding that police may approach persons and ask questions or permission to search so long as police do not imply that answers or consent are required (C) holding consent involuntary when police told defendants grandmother they had a search warrant and she allowed them to enter and search (D) holding that police must prior to entering the home inform the person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the search (E) holding that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search the respondents car included consent to search a bag within that car
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: Here the facts are undisputed. Where the facts upon which liability is claimed or denied under an insurance policy are undisputed and the existence or amount of liability depends solely upon a construction of the policy, the question presented is one of law and this court reviews the finding de novo. See Tonka, 9 F.3d at 52; Auto-Owners, 667 F.2d at 721. Substantial Probability A review of Minnesota and Eighth Circuit decisions recognizes the fundamental premise that an insurance policy protects an insured from fortuitous loss. For example, if a budding contractor suffers a loss because of unknowing mistakes or carelessness, the resulting damage is intended to be covered. If, however, the loss is incurred due to intentional acts, no coverage is intended. See Bartlett, 240 N.W.2d at 313 (<HOLDING>). While an insured has a reasonable expectation
Holding statements: (A) holding that the loss of a contract failed to constitute ascertainable loss under cutpa (B) holding that officers reliance on accountant negated a finding that he acted consciously voluntarily intentionally knowingly or recklessly in his failure to pay tax (C) holding that insurer who after being told of occurrence contacted insureds attorney for information should have issued reservation of rights letter within a reasonable time after it was informed of the occurrence (D) holding that contractor who knowingly violated contract specifications consciously controlled risk of loss precluding an occurrence (E) holding that loss of an arm includes loss of the hand
Example Output:
(D)