In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: child abuse or neglect or who testifies or otherwise participates in a judicial proceeding arising from a report, petition, or investigation of alleged child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Id. 261.106(a) (emphasis added). The dissent also correctly points out that "Immunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Finally, the dissent even recognizes that "[ijmmunity from liability is an affirmative defense, while immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction." Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004); see also City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l
Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in 2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today (C) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional

Output: (B)

Input: Consider Input: requirements under UFTA, Gulf and Security nevertheless contend that as a matter of law and of public policy the statute of limitations should not have commenced in this action until they obtained the default judgment against Clark in August of 1997 in California. 24 As far as the law is concerned, Gulf and Security vigorously argue under the mistaken assumption that a creditor may not assert an UFTA claim until after the underlying judgment is entered. This persistent assumption represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law under UFTA. 25 Gulf and Security base their theory on our decision in Murphy v. Atkinson (1993), 262 Mont. 164, 864 P.2d 273, as well as a recent appellate court decision from California, Cortez v. Vogt (Cal.Ct.App. 1997), 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 853-54 (<HOLDING>). In Murphy, we determined that a cause of
Holding statements: (A) holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final (B) holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment (C) holding that in view of legislative statements of policy and purpose of the ufta as a cumulative and additional remedy limitation period did not commence until debtorcreditor relationship existed after judgment was made final (D) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (E) holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement

Output: (C)

Input: Consider Input: quotation from Rash, 31 F.3d at 329, omitted). Thus, the Eighth Circuit agrees with our conclusion that retail value is the proper measure. A few days after Trimble was decided, the First Circuit followed suit, in Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries v. New Bedford Inst. for Sav. (In re Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries), 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.1995). Like the Eighth Circuit, the Winthrop court gave meaning to the second sentence of 11 U.S.C. 506(a): ... A number of courts ..., including four Circuit Courts, have adhered to this clear expression of congressional .intent and declined to value collateral that a debt- or proposes to retain based on a hypothetical foreclosure sale. These courts reason that because the reorganizing debtor proposes to retain and use the collateral, 4-86 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), ... vacated on other grounds, - U.S. -, 113
Holding statements: (A) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (B) holding that second sentence of 506a precludes deduction of hypothetical costs of sale in valuing chapter 13 debtors real property to be retained by debt or (C) holding that 506a does not require or permit a reduction in the creditors secured claim to account for purely hypothetical costs of sale of chapter 13 debtors residence (D) holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debtor (E) holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debt or
Output: (B)