The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed off on that concept. The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot. The President emphasized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President's military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft-presumably hijacked-heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.

Question: "The Secret Service was relying on projections from which agency when they were unaware of United 93 already being crashed in Pennsylvania?"

Answer: "The Vice President"

Response: no

(CNN) -- Japan's prime minister conceded defeat in parliamentary elections Sunday, signaling the return to power of the Liberal Democratic Party and ending the brief rule of the disappointing upstart Democratic Party of Japan. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda pledged to step down as party president after exit polls showed a smashing loss in lower house voting. The party, once seen as a breath of fresh air in Japanese politics, came to be regarded as increasingly ineffective. "We got a regrettable result," Noda said. "The result is everything in the politics. The biggest responsibility lies on me. I will quit as the partly leader of DPJ." The move clears the way for the return to power of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the current leader of the conservative-leaning Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP. "The Japanese people will be keenly looking whether the LDP can meet with their expectations," Abe said in interviews after the polling. The LDP ruled the country almost continuously since its establishment in 1955 until it was forced from power three years ago by the DPJ. Public broadcaster NHK said the LDP and its coalition partner, the new Komei party, gained at least 302 seats in the 480-seat lower house. CNN's main affiliate, TV Asahi, reports the LDP/Komei coalition gained at least 312 seats. The official count is expected to be released Monday. The LDP is inheriting a struggling economy, regional tensions and questions over Japan's role in Asia. "The economy is at the bottom. It's our first mission to turn it around," Abe said.

Question: "What is the name of Japan's prime minister who conceded defeat in parlimentary elections?"

Answer: "Shinzo Abe"

Response: no

These incoherent words threw the first glimpse of light on the meaning of her distress and penitence. I doubt if the best woman in Christendom would so reproach and abase herself, if convicted of even a worse sin than the secret use of those stimulants for which the "charny" is a Martial equivalent. No Martialist would dream of poisoning his blood and besotting his brain with alcohol in any form. But their opiates affect a race addicted to physical repose, to sensuous enjoyment rather than to sensual excitement, and to lucid intellectual contemplation, with a sense of serene delight as supremely delicious to their temperament as the dreamy illusions of haschisch to the Turk, the fierce frenzy of bhang to the Malay, or the wild excitement of brandy or Geneva to the races of Northern Europe. But as with the luxury of intoxication in Europe, so in Mars indulgence in these drugs, freely permitted to the one sex, is strictly forbidden by opinion and domestic rule to the other. A lady discovered in the use of "charny" is as deeply disgraced as an European matron detected in the secret enjoyment of spirits and cigars; and her lord and master takes care to render her sufficiently conscious of her fault.

Question: "The Secret use of what kind of stimulants was a Martial equivalent for women?"

Answer: "Alcohol"

Response: yes

While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued.

Question: "Did the CIA and the State Department agree on their advice to President Clinton in terms of his intention to visit both India and Pakistan?"

Answer: "No, the CIA felt it would risk the president's life and they felt that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit"

Response:
yes