In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: period under IAD never commenced); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting prisoner's substantial compliance argument and recognizing that court is bound by Fex); State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (Ind. 1996) (requiring strict compliance with IAD procedures and recognizing that procedures are "not mere technicalities"); Pinto v. Warden, C.A. No. 972412, 1999 WL 49378, at *7 (Conn. Super. Jan. 20, 1999) (stating that "[wjhile it is true that earlier decisions of courts were split on when the 180 day period begins, the majority of courts ... have held that the period begins to run once the request is actually received by the appropriate court and prosecutor"); Commonwealth v. Flores, C.A. No. 91-493, 1998 WL 792466, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 6, 1998) (<HOLDING>). 48 . 1993 WL 138993, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr.
Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (E) holding time begins when the prisoner knows the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance
Example Output: holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court

Example Input: re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr.D.Mass.1987); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 332-34 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). And, although 105 "does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law," Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, n. 1; "[b]ankruptcy courts ... enjoy inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct." Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.1996). This inherent power authorizes federal courts "to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities." Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)(<HOLDING>); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process (D) recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process (E) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process
Example Output: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it

Example Input: of disposal which would limit its meaning to "active human conduct." United States v. Waste Ind., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir.1984). In Waste Industries, the court held that Congress intended the 42 U.S.C. 6903(3) definition of disposal "to have a range of meanings," including not only active conduct, but also the reposing of hazardous waste and its subsequent movement through the environment. Id. at 164. Id. at 845. The Fourth Circuit concluded "that 9607(a)(2) imposes liability not only for active involvement in the 'dumping' or 'placing' of hazardous waste at the facility, but for ownership of the facility at a time that hazardous waste was 'spilling' or 'leaking.' " Id. at 846; accord Crofton Ventures Ltd. P'ship v. G & H P'ship, 258 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Four years later, in CDMG Realty, the Third
Holding statements: (A) holding that disposal under 9607a2 includes a partys movement and spreading of contaminated soil to uncontaminated portions of property and that congress did not limit disposal to the initial introduction of hazardous material onto property (B) holding that the district court did not err in finding the record sufficient to conclude prior conviction qualified as a violent felony for purposes of the acca as the evidence was sufficient to conclude the criminal action charged in one court was the basis for a judgment against the defendant in a different court (C) holding that individual defendants were not liable under the elcra because they did not have the authority to rehire the plaintiff (D) recognizing the increased breadth of the definition of property damage introduced in the more recent form of policy (E) holding that given the breadth of the statutory definition of disposal the district court must be able to conclude that the buried drums did not leak when the defendants owned or operated the facility to make a finding that they were not liable under 9607a2
Example Output:
holding that disposal under 9607a2 includes a partys movement and spreading of contaminated soil to uncontaminated portions of property and that congress did not limit disposal to the initial introduction of hazardous material onto property