In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

fundamental error analysis. 4 . During this hearing the court allowed Dr. Bail-on to testily telephonically from the hospital at which the patient was located. 5 . Alternatively, an appellate court could remand the matter to the superior court for evidentiary hearings and findings on the effectiveness of appointed counsel. See In re Condry's Estate, 117 Ariz. 566, 568, 574 P.2d 54, 56 (App.1977). In In re Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-4942, 142 Ariz. 240, 242, 689 P.2d 183, 185 (App. 1984), we reversed and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parent had received adequate notice of the hearings against him and whether the parent had received effective assistance of counsel. 142 Ariz. at , 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carriger, 132 Ariz. 301, 304, 645
Holding statements: (A) holding that constitution requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (B) holding that the due process clause is violated if the prosecution fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to a criminal defendant (C) holding if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial testing the adversary process itself is presumptively unreliable (D) holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (E) holding that the prosecutions suppression of evidence material to guilt or punishment violates due process regardless of the prosecutions good or bad faith
(C)

carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the 924(c) offense. Thus, because 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant's offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of 924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for 924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a 924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a 924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by 924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting when it applied an increase under 2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating 924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants 924c conviction
(D)

16(b)(2) would not preclude its discovery, for we understand this provision only to state the limits of discovery under the authority of Rule 16, not the limits of the court's potential discovery powers. See Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 116-20 (D.C.1979) (noting that while "any venture beyond the[ ] limited principles [of the Jencks Act and Rule 16 discovery] must be subjected to close scrutiny," more extensive disclosure may be sustained "[i]n proper circumstances" under the court's "'inherent powers' over the discovery process"). Furthermore, to the extent that our ruling here authorizes discovery during trial, Rule 16 is irrelevant, for it applies only to pretrial discovery. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 234-35, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2168-69, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Waldron v. United States, 370 A.2d 1372, 1373
Holding statements: (A) holding a defendant is liable as a control person if the defendant had the power to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time the entity violated the securities laws but declining to decide whether power to control means simply abstract power to control or actual exercise of the power to control internal quotations omitted (B) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (C) recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available (D) holding that fedrcrimp 16 does not control courts discovery power once trial has begun (E) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it
(D)