In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of limitations have been held as not capable of waiver or subject to an estoppel, whether pled or not.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissenting opinion cites several re-, cent Supreme Court decisions in support of the proposition that the statute of limitations set forth at section 2501 is not jurisdictional, including Day v. McDonough, U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), Eberhart v. United States, U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam), Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 124 S.Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004), and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). None of the foregoing decisions address section 2501. Day, 126 S.Ct. at 1681 (<HOLDING>); Arbaugh, 126 S.Ct. at 1245 (addressing
Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final (C) holding that aedpas oneyear period of limitations does not support a delay of filing of habeas petition by capital defendant (D) holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights (E) holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions
(A)

efforts to persuade an Immigration Judge to exercise her discretion to grant him a deportation waiver the removal of that discretion would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Furthermore, given that parole eligibility is "considered an integral part of any sentence," Shepard, 556 F.2d at 654; see also Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36, I think that the availability and likelihood of a deportation waiver should also be so considered. In explaining the basis for its con- elusion that parole eligibility or gain time should be considered part of 86, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) ("It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment."); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913) (<HOLDING>) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
Holding statements: (A) holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior (B) holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that habeas review is for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation
(B)

reasonably be viewed as so affecting the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. See Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 933 (Fla.1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Thus, based on Strickland and Maxwell, we find that the record conclusively shows Franqui is not entitled to relief on this claim. Finally, in the penalty phase, the prosecutor made comments that tended to disparage Franqui's mitigation. The prosecutor argued, "That's the world of Dr. Toomer [Franqui's mental mitigation expert], folks. Through the looking glass at Disney World. Make believe. Use your common sense." This comment, suggesting that the mental mitigation is make-believe or a fantasy, is improper. See, e.g., Brooks, 762 So.2d at 904 (<HOLDING>). We have "long recognized that a prosecutor
Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that a district court can cure the effect of an improper prosecutorial comment with a jury instruction (C) holding that alleged prosecutorial misconduct must be evaluated in light of the prosecutors argument and the entire record and if a review of the record convinces the court that the jury would have convicted defendant even if it were not exposed to the alleged improper prosecutorial comments then no actual prejudice occurred (D) holding that prosecutorial denigration of a defendants mitigation by suggesting it is phantom is improper (E) holding failure to turn over brady material after prosecutorial phase of case had begun was covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity
(D)