In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: commercial, including ... [any maritime contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce], falls under the Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United States. 9 U.S.C. 201 and 202; see also 9 U.S.C. 2. A seaman's contract that contains an agreement to arbitrate generally falls under the convention. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1299 (<HOLDING>) (citing Francisco v. STOLT ACHIEVEMENT MT, 293
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous (B) holding implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing found in some commercial contracts does not extend to atwill employment contracts (C) holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statutes coverage (D) holding that at will contracts of employment are subject to tortious interference with contracts claims (E) holding that the convention and us implementing statutes do not recognize an exception for seaman employment contracts and concluding that such contracts are commercial for purposes of same

A: holding that the court was not bound by the parties agreement that contracts were unambiguous and holding that contracts were ambiguous
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Q: on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors' assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders
Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion

A: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment
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Q: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled "An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions" (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill's sponsors also
Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs 37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent

A:
holding analogous circumstances conclusive of legislative intent
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