In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired"), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination" for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487,
Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay

Ex Output:
holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a

Ex Input:
indorsers, and other persons conditionally liable also receive benefits from payment of the debt. If called on to pay, guarantors and the like would have been creditors; the "benefit" to them is that extinguishing the primary debt means that they receive a larger percentage of their claim than they would have had they paid and been converted to general creditors of the bankrupt. Cases under the 1898 Act routinely held that unless a person escapes an obligation to pay and so reaps a larger portion of his claim than do other creditors, he has not received a statutory "benefit". E.g., Mayes v. Palmer, 208 F. 97 (8th Cir.1913); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (5th Cir.1924); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F.2d 614 (8th Cir.1930). See also Bonded Financial, 838 F.2d at 895-96 (<HOLDING>). The Liquidator has not identified, and we
Holding statements: (A) holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a (B) holding that transferee and beneficiary are mutually exclusive categories (C) holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility (D) holding that the remedies are exclusive (E) recognizing that 1983 and 2254 proceedings are mutually exclusive so that if a claim can be properly raised in one of those proceedings it cannot be raised in the other type of proceeding

Ex Output:
holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a

Ex Input:
863 (Alaska App.2006). [34] 34. Crawford, 100 P.3d at 441 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11, 105 S.Ct. at 1294) (alteration in. Crawford). 35 . Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311, 105 S.Ct. at 1294 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). 36 . 903 P.2d 1090 (Alaska App.1995). [37] 37. Id. at 1098 (citations omitted). 38 . Id. at 1099 n. 4 (citing United States v. Knight, 395 F.2d 971, 975 (2nd Cir.1968)). 39 . Id. at 1098. 40 . See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275, 279-80 & n. 13 (Alaska 1978); Longley v. State, 776 P.2d 339, 343-44 (Alaska App.1989). 41 . See Munson v. State, 123 P.3d 1042, 1048 (Alaska 2005) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)). 42 . See Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2259-60 (<HOLDING>); State v. Bailey, 714 S.W.2d 590, 593
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent (B) holding that a suspect who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent must do so unambiguously (C) holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously (D) holding that police may continue questioning a suspect until he unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent (E) holding that an accused must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent

Ex Output:
recognizing that davis was concerned only with the right to counsel and not the right to remain silent