Input: Nine families displaced by a fire at Alamo Hills Apartments in March filed lawsuits Wednesday against the apartment complex. They allege that the complex could have done more to protect belongings they were forced to abandon in the aftermath of the blaze. Bernard Dempsey Jr., an attorney with Western Michigan Legal Services, the group that represents the tenants, said Alamo Hills gave the displaced families very limited opportunity to remove belongings. "They were given three days to get their stuff out, and if they couldn't get moved out in three days, their stuff was discarded," Dempsey said. "Alamo Hills just threw it out." Others, he said, lost possessions to looters after the March 23 blaze, which left 78 people temporarily homeless. According to the lawsuit, the tenants were prohibited from entering their apartments to retrieve possessions and were promised that the complex would provide security. A spokesperson for PM One, the company that manages Alamo Hills, could not be reached for comment. Nine separate suits were filed in 8th District Court, which handles civil claims of less than $25,000. "We're asking for the reimbursement of the value of their property and a small amount for stress -- $3,000 on top of their out-of-pocket expenses for their lost stuff," Dempsey said. "They're not looking to get rich off this. A lot of this is simply because they were treated so badly." Dempsey said most of the tenants who filed suits still live at the apartment complex, although many are trying to find homes elsewhere. "The new apartments (they were provided) were not in very good shape. That's actually one of the claims," he said.

Does the response "The tenants were prohibited from entering their apartments to retrieve possessions" correctly answer the question "What is the difference in value between the maximum of a civil claim in 8th District Court, and the reimbursement requested by Dempsey on top of out-of-pocket expenses?"?
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Output: no

Input: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Does the response "Wealthy Donors" correctly answer the question "What different possible funding sources for Bin Laden were considered?"?
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Output: yes

Input: The CIA's senior management saw problems with the armed Predator as well, problems that Clarke and even Black and Allen were inclined to minimize. One (which also applied to reconnaissance flights) was money. A Predator cost about $3 million. If the CIA flew Predators for its own reconnaissance or covert action purposes, it might be able to borrow them from the Air Force, but it was not clear that the Air Force would bear the cost if a vehicle went down. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz took the position that the CIA should have to pay for it; the CIA disagreed. Second, Tenet in particular questioned whether he, as Director of Central Intelligence, should operate an armed Predator." This was new ground,"he told us. Tenet ticked off key questions: What is the chain of command? Who takes the shot? Are America's leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command and control? Charlie Allen told us that when these questions were discussed at the CIA, he and the Agency's executive director, A. B." Buzzy" Krongard, had said that either one of them would be happy to pull the trigger, but Tenet was appalled, telling them that they had no authority to do it, nor did he. Third, the Hellfire warhead carried by the Predator needed work. It had been built to hit tanks, not people. It needed to be designed to explode in a different way, and even then had to be targeted with extreme precision. In the configuration planned by the Air Force through mid-2001, the Predator's missile would not be able to hit a moving vehicle. White House officials had seen the Predator video of the "man in white." On July 11, Hadley tried to hurry along preparation of the armed system. He directed McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Richard Myers to deploy Predators capable of being armed no later than September 1.

Does the response "2 months" correctly answer the question "How many months did Hadley expect the arming of the Predator to take after he began to hurry it along in July?"?
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Output: yes

Input: What a time of it Dawson's Landing was having! All its life it had been asleep, but now it hardly got a chance for a nod, so swiftly did big events and crashing surprises come along in one another's wake: Friday morning, first glimpse of Real Nobility, also grand reception at Aunt Patsy Cooper's, also great robber raid; Friday evening, dramatic kicking of the heir of the chief citizen in presence of four hundred people; Saturday morning, emergence as practicing lawyer of the long-submerged Pudd'nhead Wilson; Saturday night, duel between chief citizen and titled stranger. The people took more pride in the duel than in all the other events put together, perhaps. It was a glory to their town to have such a thing happen there. In their eyes the principals had reached the summit of human honor. Everybody paid homage to their names; their praises were in all mouths. Even the duelists' subordinates came in for a handsome share of the public approbation: wherefore Pudd'nhead Wilson was suddenly become a man of consequence. When asked to run for the mayoralty Saturday night, he was risking defeat, but Sunday morning found him a made man and his success assured.

Does the response "Cause lots of people moved back in the town" correctly answer the question "Why did Dawson's Landing wake up?"?
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Output:
no