In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

so complete a defense as he might reasonably have desired"), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 820, 115 S.Ct. 81, 130 L.Ed.2d 34 (1994); 2d Cir.: United States v. Lawal, 736 F.2d 5, 9-10 (1984) (applying authorities for non-constitutional error to erroneous exclusion of hearsay); 3d Cir.: United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1498-1500 (3d Cir.1988) (making "non-constitutional 'harmless error' determination" for erroneous exclusion of hearsay), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029, 109 S.Ct. 836, 102 L.Ed.2d 969 (1989); 4th Cir.: United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 184-85 (1992) (citing Kotteakos as authority for holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay was harmless), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 2351, 124 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993); 5th Cir.: United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1301 n. 3 (1991) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1487,
Holding statements: (A) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a (B) holding second sentence of a nearly identical exclusion did not limit the scope of the exclusion (C) holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay did not deny defendant a substantial right (D) holdingthat erroneous admission of hearsay did not prejudiceresults of trial so as to require reversal (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay
holding erroneous exclusion of hearsay harmless under fedrcrimp 52a

Privileges and Immunities Clause. The final interest advanced by Defendants to justify Section 470 is the availability of the remedy of attachment against nonresident attorneys. See Def. Mem. Supp. S.J. at 7 (citing Matter of Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.Div.1972); Matter of Fordan, 5 Misc.2d 372, 158 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surrogates Ct.N.Y.Co.1956)). The remedy of attachment is a disciplinary measure involving a seizure on a defendant's property in order to secure the enforcement of a money judgment. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6201 (McKinney 2011). Under Section 470's current construction, however, an attorney need only maintain an "of counsel" relationship with an in-state office to satisfy the office requirement. Austria v. Shaw, 143 Misc.2d 970, 542 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989) (<HOLDING>). Based on this standard, the remedy of
Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee (B) recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole (C) holding that the district where the defendant attorneys office was located was the proper venue because the defendants omissions related to their failure to communicate from their office in savannah the details of the ongoing case (D) holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid (E) holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement
holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee

summary judgment favoring Defendant eliminated that duty. {13} The question of duty in the present case cannot, however, be resolved simply by reciting the general rules that Plaintiffs assert control. The question is whether the undisputed material facts are sufficient to establish that from the point of Haar's missed appointments after March 8, 2000, to the point of Haar's death, Defendant continued to have a duty of care to treat Haar in a manner that would protect against Haar's suicide. Plaintiffs' argument assumes that Defendant did have that duty. The district court did not think so. Neither do we. {14} "The general rule is that a person does not have a duty to act affirmatively to protect another person from harm." Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawai'i 154, 925 P.2d 324, 329 (1996) (<HOLDING>); see Restatement (Second) of Torts 314
Holding statements: (A) holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error (B) holding a psychotherapist had no duty for the suicide of a patient in a noncustodial setting (C) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (D) holding that counselors had no duty to prevent suicides of noncustodial clients (E) holding no legal duty exists to prevent unforeseeable criminal acts
holding that instructing the jury on a legal duty theory when appellant had no legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense was error