In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: the key elements required to satisfy the discovery rule are injury (we use "damage" interchangeably with "injury") and fault. Legally-cognizable damages occur when a plaintiff detrimentally relies on the negligent advice of an attorney. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d 172. Actual damages are those that are real and substantial as opposed to speculative. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617, 621 (1937). In the legal-malpractice context, actual damages may exist in the form of an adverse judgment. Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 373, 460 A.2d 172. However, a client may suffer damages, in the form of attorney's fees, before a court has announced its decision in the underlying action. See, e.g., Knight, supra, 553 A.2d at 1235 (<HOLDING>); Mant, supra, 189 N.J.Super. at 374, 460 A.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal (B) holding that debtors have no right to jury trial on malpractice claims against their attorneys (C) holding that although attorneys fees are usually not recoverable unless permitted by statute or contract contractual or statutory authorization was not necessary in a malpractice claim to recover attorneys fees and costs as damages (D) holding that statute of limitations for malpractice begins to run when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the alleged malpractice (E) holding that attorneys fees and costs expended as a result of an attorneys alleged malpractice constitute legallycognizable damages for purposes of stating a claim for such malpractice

Answer: (E)

Question: failed to complete the assignment and warranty of title to H & L on the same certificate. See Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-32(a) (Supp. 1988). Winn is still listed on the certificate as the registered owner, and under Georgia law, the certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-25(c) (1985). Although our reading of the Georgia statutes yields the conclusion that ownership of the Buick did not pass to the dealership or to H & L since the certificate of title was not properly assigned, it appears that Georgia courts interpreting the same statutes would reach a different conclusion. See, e.g., American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 280, 253 S.E.2d 825 (1979); Mote v. Mote, 134 Ga. App. 668, 215 S.E.2d 487 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Winn's evidence regarding the sale of
Holding statements: (A) holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision (B) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed (C) holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes (D) holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale (E) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received

Answer: (B)

Question: Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Minn.1986)) (emphasis added). Thus: When read together, these [business risk] provisions exclude coverage when there has been no physical injury to tangible property other than the insured's work. Standard Fire, 972 S.W.2d at 12 (emphasis added). In other words, there is coverage where there has been physical injury to tangible property that is not the insured's work. As we have pointed out earlier in this opinion, we agree with the district court's view that Love's tangible real property is not the insured's "work," and that it was physically damaged by having the construction debris from the road-widening project dumped on it. Therefore, this exclusion does not apply. See Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 159-60 (Minn.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn.2002). Cf. Dewitt
Holding statements: (A) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (B) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (C) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (D) holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for claim against insured by third party arising out of insureds damage to third partys property (E) holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to subcontractors work because damage did not arise from insureds performing operations on subcontractors work

Answer:
(D)