In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr.D.Mass.1987); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 332-34 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). And, although 105 "does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law," Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, n. 1; "[b]ankruptcy courts ... enjoy inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct." Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.1996). This inherent power authorizes federal courts "to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities." Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)(<HOLDING>); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process (D) recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process (E) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process

A: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it
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Q: law. Courts were unwilling to recognize a common law cause of action against purveyors of intoxicating beverages because, as a matter of law, consumption, rather than the furnishing of alcohol, was considered the proximate cause of the ultimate damages. See Haafke, 347 N.W.2d at 384; Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1982). Thus, dram shop statutes were enacted to enable tort plaintiffs to bridge the proximate cause gap between the sale of an intoxicating beverage and the subsequent injury or damage caused by the intoxicated patron. In exchange for this new claim, the legislature mandated that liquor purveyors were strictly liable and carefully prescribed the means by which liability may be ascertained. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227. The statute limits recovery for injuri 984) (<HOLDING>); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa
Holding statements: (A) holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance (B) holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest (C) holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees (D) holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident (E) holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer

A: holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest
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Q: validity of those prior convictions used to enhance his sentence regardless of when they occurred. Davis' and Williams' convictions are AFFIRMED. We VACATE their sentences and REMAND to the district court for re-sentencing. 1 . The parties stipulated that the substance was cocaine base on the second day of trial. 2 . The government argues on appeal that Richardson was not acting as a government agent. But the government cannot make use of an informer and then claim disassociation. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375, 78 S.Ct. 819, 822, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). Where, as here, the informant was clearly acting on behalf of the government before inducing a defendant, the informant is an agent of the government. See id.; United States v. Bushy, 780 F.2d 804, 806-07 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Williams did not contest the court's
Holding statements: (A) holding that inducement occurring before the informant was directed or supervised by the government could not support an entrapment defense (B) holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense (C) holding the defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction when sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment (D) holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction (E) holding that a request for an instruction on entrapment should be refused even if there is evidence to support the defense if the defendant has denied under oath the acts constituting the crime that is charged

A:
holding an inducement to commit a crime by a private party who has no government involvement does not establish an entrapment defense
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