In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: pre-trial release on April 12, 1985. Although this appeal has received expedited review, a decision has not yet been rendered by the Second Circuit. Thus a total of only fifty-six (56) non-excludable days have elapsed since Leon was arrested and detained (assuming that the filing of Elba Rodriguez's omnibus motion stopped the clock as to all the co-defendants). DISCUSSION Leon's first argument is based upon the interpretation of Section 3164(b) itself, which provides that, "[t]he periods of delay enumerated in Section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section." Leon argues that this sent C.Cir.1976) and United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.1976), aff'd. on other grounds, sub nom., United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). According to the House Report accompanying
Holding statements: (A) holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases (B) holding that a court examining if a law should be applied retroactively should consider whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment (C) holding that the first amendment definition should be applied by analogy in the franks setting (D) holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk (E) holding that the exclusions should be applied

Answer: (E)

Question: complaint's allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues." Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford's claim is premised on the officers' alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard's instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort

Answer: (A)

Question: (adopting view among states that if two escape clauses within insurance policy operate to negate coverage, those escape clauses are null and void). 8 . Harris v. Magee, 573 So.2d at 653; see o.2d 670, 673 (Miss.1976) ("An insurance company cannot by the provisions in one uninsured motorist endorsement limit its liability and endorsement in a separate policy and defeat the mandatory provisions of the statute."); Talbot, 291 So.2d at 703 (declaring invalid clause which reduced uninsured motorist coverage by amounts paid under medical coverage provisions of policy); Lowery, 285 So.2d at 771-77 (declaring invalid restriction in policy that required "insured" to own the automobile described in the policy until uninsured motorist coverage applied); Harthcock, 248 So.2d at 459-60, 461-62 (<HOLDING>); see also Youngblood, 515 F.2d at 1256-58
Holding statements: (A) holding that conditioning uninsured motorist coverage on insureds agreement to not settle with other tortfeasors contravenes the um act also declaring void other insurance provision of policy which operated to relieve insurer of payment if insured secured statutory minimum from other source (B) holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted (C) holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy (D) holding that policy exclusion for uninsured motorist claims involving permissive users violated mississippi public policy as expressed in the um act (E) holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid

Answer:
(A)