In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: all of the requested documents meet that definition however. That is an issue for the trial court to resolve when it reconsiders Gulfcoast's objections. We next address the issue of the trial court's failure to perform a balancing test or conduct an in camera review. "When a party asserts the need for protection against disclosure of a trade secret, the court must first determine whether, in fact, the disputed information is a trade secret [which] usually requires the court to conduct an in camera review." Summitbridge Nat'l Invs. v. 1221 Palm Harbor, L.L.C., 67 So.3d 448, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Ameritrust Ins. v. O'Donnell Landscapes, 899 So.2d 1205, 1207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)); see also Westco, Inc. v. Scott Lewis' Gardening & Trimming, 26 So.3d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (<HOLDING>). This court has previously held that internal
Holding statements: (A) holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law (B) holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial (C) holding that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a persons due process rights is the mathews balancing test (D) recognizing that a party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court considered an issue that that party consented to submit to the trial court (E) holding that in eases where the state fails to disclose to the defendant prior to trial the substance of any oral statement allegedly made by the defendant then the state has committed a discovery violation and the trial court must conduct a richardson hearing upon learning of the possible violation
[A]: (A)

[Q]: UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants' gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants' liquid product, the court noted that "treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation." Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
[A]: (D)

[Q]: to submit to testing or his license would be suspended. The implied consent law, however, nowhere "requires" a DUI arrestee to submit to testing, and the DPS officer's admonition therefore did not mirror the statute. See A.R.S. 28-1321(A), (B) (stating that although a DUI arrestee "gives consent" to testing of blood, breath, or other bodily substance, he "shall be requested to submit to and successfully complete" any such test) (emphasis added). But even assuming that the officer accurately paraphrased the law, this distinction is immaterial. The Bumper Court's ruling turned on the grandmother's acquiescence to the officer's assertion of lawful authority to search regardless of the truthfulness of the officer's claim to possess a warrant. See Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788 (<HOLDING>). The officer's claim of authority to search
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that custody while not determinative in itself places a heavy burden in showing consent was voluntarily given and noting that custody when coupled with other coercive factors will normally necessitate the conclusion that the consent is not effective (B) holding that consent was freely and voluntarily given despite officers advisement that the police could get a search warrant if consent was not given (C) holding that the prosecutors burden to prove that consent was voluntarily given cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority (D) holding there is no consent as a matter of law where the consent was given under coercion (E) holding that the state must prove consent was voluntary not simply a submission to authority
[A]:
(C)