In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 35 . Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 36 . Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 37 . Kimmelman v. Monison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 38 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 39 . The Court notes that the state standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel applied by the state parallels the federal standard as stated in Strickland. See Baker v. State, 243 Kan. 1, 755 P.2d 493 (1988); Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). 40 . Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). 41 . Id. at 753, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 42 .Id. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 43 . Id. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308 ("Legal 2005) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Moreover, the Court finds no error in
Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit (B) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel (C) holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence

Output: (E)

Input: Consider Input: five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ's improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA's ruling in March 2002, the application for 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman's argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218
Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina 212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for 212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina 212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina 212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of 212c relief

Output: (C)

Input: Consider Input: as "[a] voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning some relevant point." Black's Law Dictionary 1427 (7th ed. 1999). The agreed order entered into by the parties on September 9, 1997, also constituted a voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning a relevant issue. Respondent also claims that Gibbs conflicts with another case from the Fourth District, In re Marriage of Fox, 191 Ill. App. 3d 514 (1989). We d 4, 618-19 (1993) (concluding that trial court's authority to modify child support was limited to relief sought in petition); In re J.K., 229 Ill. App. 3d 569, 573-74 (1992) (noting that court is without authority to revoke minor's probation without having before it a petition requesting such relief); Ottwell v. Ottwell, 167 Ill. App. 3d 901, 908-09 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note that respondent's reliance
Holding statements: (A) holding that when a respondent fails to challenge factual allegations contained in a petition for the writ of mandamus the appellate court accepts as true the factual statements in the petition (B) holding that the trial court erred in unilaterally modifying pastdue and future childsupport payments where the only petition before the court was a petition for citation alleging that the respondent was in arrears in his child support (C) holding a petition unexhausted because the petition provides no citation of any case that might have alerted the court to the alleged federal nature of the claim and the petition does not contain a factual description supporting the claim citations omitted (D) holding that the trial court had not erred in including the cost of health insurance covering both the custodial parent and the parties child in determining the noncustodial parents childsupport obligation (E) holding that before denying petition trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and state specific reasons for denying the petition
Output: (B)