In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
2 (emphasis added). In its Clarification, the FCC freed itself of this deadline, continuing to state that the order would last until the Fourth FNPRM but giving no time period in which that would occur. Clarification, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, at 1, 35. We hold that this extension newly aggrieved CompTel and thus made its petition timely. See Sam Rayburn Dam Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 515 F.2d 998, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1975) (stating that where a party was "aggrieved" by a later interpretation of a rule that it could not have reasonably anticipated, the time limit starts to run at the later event). Cases have held that extension of a temporary order may entitle the parties to seek judicial review of the order. See Public Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 901 F.2d 147, 151 (D.C.Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Interstate
Holding statements: (A) holding that where a temporary order is later made permanent the permanent order may be challenged (B) holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership (C) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (D) holding that an alien who procured permanent resident status byconcealing his ineligibility had not been lawfully admitted for permanent residence (E) holding an order that was interlocutory in form to be final in substance where the force and effect of the order was tantamount to a permanent injunction depriving complainant of a recognized property right

Ex Output:
holding that the phrase permanent shutdown is unambiguous and can only mean a permanent cessation of plant operations rather than the uneventful transfer of ownership

Ex Input:
the public interest and '[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system' require that the district court defer to local government administrators." Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where "decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all" the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree as well as the fact that the "local government administrators" in this case appear to favor vacating the decree the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes

Ex Output:
holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act

Ex Input:
("It is immaterial that [the defendant's] firearm purchase and domestic violence conviction occurred prior to [18 U.S.C.] 922(g)(9)'s enactment because the conduct prohibited by [18 U.S.C.] 922(g)(9) is the possession of a firearm .... [Thus,] the application of [18 U.S.C.] 922(g)(9) to [the defendant] does not run afoul of the ex post facto prohibition."); United States v. Boyd, 52 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1236-37 (D.Kan.1999), aff'd 211 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir.2000), (concluding the illegal act was not completed until after 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) became effective because the illegal act in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) is the possession of the firearm, not the misdemeanor domestic violence conviction); United States v. Meade, 986 F.Supp. 66, 69 (D.Mass.1997), aff'd 175 F.3d 215 (1st Cir.1999), (<HOLDING>); NAGE, Inc. v. Barrett, 968 F.Supp. 1564,
Holding statements: (A) holding that 18 usc 3559c did not violate separation of powers doctrine or ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding the use of a 1951 felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of 18 usc 922g1 did not violate the ex post facto clause because the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm was not committed until after the effective date of the statute under which he was convicted (D) holding ex post facto clause barred application of mvra to defendant whose criminal conduct occurred before the effective date of the statute (E) holding 18 usc 922g9 penalizes the possession of a firearm after its effective date and therefore does not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause

Ex Output:
holding that 18 usc 3559c did not violate separation of powers doctrine or ex post facto clause