instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
is limited in applicability to only cases, like this one, in which the total noneconomic damages awarded by the jury were in excess of both of the $250,000 caps and in excess of the $500,000 combined total of both applicable caps; the jury here awarded $1,725,000 in noneconomic damages. 29 . Chesser argues that because a jointly and severally liable defendant possesses a right of contribution, the statutory provisions at issue do not conflict. A right of contribution, however, presupposes that the defendant has actually paid the damages that is, has already been civilly liable for noneconomic damages in excess of the $250,000 cap applicable to that defendant, in violation of the express language of section 74.301(b). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. 33.015(a), (b) (West 2008) (<HOLDING>). 30 . Appellees concede that Hospital remains
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a right to contribution (B) recognizing that prior to 1949 when the statute permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors was enacted no right of contribution existed between jointtortfeasors in delaware (C) recognizing contribution in the appropriate case (D) recognizing in both subsections a right of contribution when a defendant has paid a percentage of damages greater than his percentage of responsibility (E) recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf
answer:
(D)

question:
as an entity wholly owned by the Soviet Union's Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Raccoon relies on that portion of 1603(b) which states that "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" does not include an entity created under the laws of a third country. Raccoon's argument is without merit. Navoi has presented credible evidence showing that in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Republic of Uzbekistan's declaration of independence, ownership and control of Navoi passed to the Uzbek Government by decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. At all times relevant to the instant litigation, Navoi was an Uzbek entity created by the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers under the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan. See Gould v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Raccoon challenges Navoi's prima
Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined (B) holding that for purpose of the fsia a foreign entitys status is determined based upon the jurisdictional facts existing at the time the act complained of occurred (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (E) holding that clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court under aedpa is the law at the time of the statecourt adjudication on the merits not at the time the conviction becomes final
answer:
(B)

question:
that the onset of ADEM symptoms is usually rapid, but argues that an onset of four weeks after the vaccination is nevertheless "within the generally acceptable onset." Id. at 9-10. Additionally, petitioner disputes respondent's argument that the severity of petitioner's symptoms was inconsistent with symptoms typically caused by ADEM. Id. at 10-12. Finally, petitioner argues that even if petitioner's protracted course of injury was atypical, it was still within the acceptable range for ADEM. Id. at 12-18. As explained in the preceding section, petitioner has the burden of establishing, by the preponderance of the evidence, that she actually suffers from the specific injury she alleges was caused by the vaccination. Hibbard, 698 F.3d at 1365; see also Broekelschen, 618 F.3d at 1349 (<HOLDING>); Lombardi, 656 F.3d at 1553 (holding that
Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner must establish that she suffers from a vaccinerelated injury not merely a symptom or manifestation of an unknown injury (B) holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act (C) holding that to have standing a plaintiff must establish an injury in fact a casual connection between the injury and that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (D) holding that in order to establish standing a plaintiff must show 1 it has suffered an injury in fact 2 the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and 3 it is likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (E) holding that because fact of injury was a distinct question from quantum of injury common proof could establish classwide injury even though amount of damage to each plaintiff was uncertain
answer:
(A)