In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, 527, 16, 47 P.3d 1161, 1165 (App.2002). Second, a statute should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved. Id. Third, in furtherance of such harmonization, courts should review the history of the various sections in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby construe the statutes to further that intent. State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989). After reviewing the history of the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the acquisition of land for park purposes be subject to the public auction requirement. See State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, 16, 968 P.2d 606, 610 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>). 12 As part of its comprehensive statutory
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning (B) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent (E) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous
(D)

is narrowly crafted to get to the heart of the motion for summary judgment without allowing a lot of potentially unnecessary discovery. Montoya has said he did not show Wilks or Armijo his computer screen, or tell them Todd's crimes; if Wilks says othexwise, there will likely be a genuine issue of fact requiring .the Court to deny the motions and allow the parties to proceed to trial. It seems fundamentally unfair to dismiss Todd's case when a deposition of Wilks may make his case. Further, this deposition will not burden any government employees or entities. Accordingly, the Court finds that this limited discovery falls within the exceptions to disallowing discovery once the defense of qualified immunity has been raised. See Garrett v. C.A. Stratmen [Stratman], M.D., 254 F.3d at 953 (<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe this one
Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine (B) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (C) recognizing that a discovery order in the context of qualified immunity is not immediately appealable when the defendants immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual question when the district court is unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts and which are narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim are neither avoidable or overly broad (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
(C)

in violation of the Eighth Amendment. An Eighth Amendment violation may be found only " 'in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.' " See Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 712 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (opinion of Kennedy, J.)); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (noting that the "gross disproportionality principle ... [is] applicable only in ... 'exceedingly rare' and 'extreme' case[s]." (citation omitted)). This is not such a case. Because Whitehead had been convicted of five prior felony drug offenses, see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276, 284-85, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (<HOLDING>), and because cocaine distribution represents a
Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing judge sitting without a jury may not find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty (B) holding that restitution is a criminal penalty that negates the imposition of prejudgment interest (C) holding that the penalty is applicable (D) holding that recidivism may support the imposition of a severe penalty (E) recognizing the unique and irrevocable nature of the death penalty and the consequently overarching need for reliability in the imposition of such a penalty
(D)