In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: while the parties informally agreed to extend the discovery deadline in order to allow further expert depositions, we do not regard this arrangement as a waiver by plaintiffs of their right to receive documents of such volume and complexity in a sufficiently timely manner to allow an effective response. We recognize, of course, the normal tendency for preparations to intensify as trial approaches and, thus, suggest no general bar to material produced seasonably and in good faith. See Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 266 (1st Cir.1993). In this case, however, we believe that, if Ford intended to rely on this evidence at trial, it should have made more diligent efforts at its timely production. Cf. Glover v. Grace Pac. Corp., 86 Hawai'i 154, 164, 948 P.2d 575, 585 (App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, nevertheless, distinguished
Holding statements: (A) holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates (B) holding the record which included the opinion of several physicians was sufficient for the alj to arrive at a decision (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded an expert who failed to arrive at his final opinion before the discovery cutoff date (D) holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates (E) holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates
[EX A]: holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates

[EX Q]: The savings clause states that "[compliance with an order [under the MDA] shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law." 21 U.S.C.A. 360h(d). While the savings clause almost certainly prohibits a holding that the MDA preempts all state law liability, our interpretation of 360k(a) does not preclude all liability. Further, nothing in the savings clause suggests that some tort liability, as opposed to other types of liability, must be preserved. Interpreting the savings clause to preserve non-tort liability, such as contract liability, is not only permissible, but also comports with the Supreme Court's interpretation of a savings clause in a recent preemption case. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 817, 826, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, where the preemptive intent of
Holding statements: (A) holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs (B) holding consumer claims under the texas deceptive trade practices act nonassignable (C) holding that the airline deregulation act preempts claims under the illinois consumer fraud and deceptive business practices act but does not preempt state breach of contract actions (D) holding that erisa preempts a plaintiffs claims for violation of the state insurance code and consumer protection act (E) holding that cjlaims for unfair competition and deceptive business practices involving trade names brought under illinois statutes are to be resolved according to the principles set forth under the lanham act and noting that illinois courts look to federal case law and apply the same analysis to state infringement claims
[EX A]: holding the illinois consumer fraud act preempted by the federal airline deregulation act to the extent the state law applied to airline frequent flier programs

[EX Q]: a portion of the original district court decision. Id. at 640. But our holding only affirmed the small portion of the decision that found that an exception in the ordinance was preempted by the FCLAA. The relief sought by Federation was far broader than that which we upheld. It sought not the elimination of merely this exception, but rather the elimination of the entire ordinance. In fact, our holding that the generic advertising exception was preempted actually did not provide Federation any relief at all; rather, it further limited Federation's ability to advertise. Therefore, the fact that we affirmed this portion of the original district court decision certainly does not make Federation a prevailing party. See generally Cady v. City of Chicago, 43 F.3d 326, 329 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Federation also tries to characterize itself
Holding statements: (A) holding that even under the catalyst theory a plaintiff is not a prevailing party unless he obtains the relief sought or at least relief that is directly beneficial to him (B) holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action (C) holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought (D) holding that exhaustion is required even where the relief sought is not available in the administrative process (E) holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees
[EX A]:
holding that a defendant is the prevailing party within the meaning of statutory provisions awarding attorneys fees to the prevailing party even when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action