In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
[A]: (E)

[Q]: to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) "Duty" of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241
Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties
[A]: (A)

[Q]: the Court has intimated that tolling based on mental incapacity is allowed. More recently, it decided Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 122 S.Ct. 1036, 152 L.Ed.2d 79 (2002), a bankruptcy case that involved whether 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8)(A)(i)'s lookback period could be tolled during the pendency of a prior bankruptcy petition. The Court noted that equitable tolling has been widely permitted in the two situations acknowledged in Irwin, supra, and its progeny. Young, 535 U.S. at 50, 122 S.Ct. 1036. Significantly, and of critical importance to the outcome of Young, the Supreme Court said, "We have acknowledged, however, that tolling might be appropriate in other cases, and this, we believe is one." Id. (citations omitted). Equitable tolling of federal statutes of limi (1st Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C.
Holding statements: (A) holding that 26 usc 6511 may not be equitably tolled but that mental incapacity is a grounds for tolling when available (B) holding that 42 usc 405g may be equitably tolled based on a plaintiffs mental impairment (C) holding that 5 usc 7703b2 can be tolled due to mental incapacity (D) holding that mental incapacity is an extraordinary circumstance that may warrant equitable tolling (E) holding that 2401b of the ftca can be equitably tolled
[A]:
(A)