In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

at 1459-60 (references to subsidiary as "division" of Kodak not equivalent to evidence that two companies operated as "single economic entity"); Akzona, 607 F.Supp. at 238 (language of annual report and employee testimony describing subsidiaries as divisions of parent not sufficient, even in conjunction with other evidence, to establish alter ego relationship). ... In a case presenting similar questions, the Ninth Circuit found no alter ego relationship was created where the parent company guaranteed loans for the subsidiary, reviewed and approved major decisions, placed several of its directors on the subsidiary's board, and was closely involved in the subsidiary's pricing decisions. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir.1980).... Id. at 927-928 (<HOLDING>). Here, plaintiffs proffer evidence that CNOFG
Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding that to establish that subsidiary is agent of parent for jurisdictional purposes the parent must exert control that is so pervasive and continual that the subsidiary may be considered an agent or instrumentality of the parent notwithstanding the maintenance of corporate formalities (C) holding that because the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants before it observed all of the corporate formalities necessary to maintain corporate separateness notwithstanding the parents active involvement in the subsidiaries operations the evidence did not establish that the entities were alter egos of one another (D) holding constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an usually high degree of control over the subsidiary (E) holding that under north carolina law a corporate parent cannot be held liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless the corporate structure is a sham
(C)

Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 386-87 (6th Cir.1992). The district court below also acknowledged this interest as a substantial one. TSSAA's other two justifications, however, are very much in dispute. Brentwood, for example, argues that there is no support in the record for the proposition that student athletes need protection from exploitation. The district court agreed. It concluded that TSSAA offered no proof that exerting undue influence on middle school athletes to recruit them for athletic purposes actually harms those students. Proof of actual harm, however, is not required in order to recognize a state actor's interest in preventing reasonably anticipated harm. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, Ohio, 240 F.3d 553, 565-66 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Finally, TSSAA's newly asserted interest in a
Holding statements: (A) holding that the village could regulate doortodoor solicitation based on a fear of an anticipated harm without proof of actual harm (B) holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer (C) recognizing 1951 includes fear of economic harm (D) holding that because persecution cannot be based on a fear of psychological harm alone petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal based on the psychological harm she would suffer if her us citizen daughter were to undergo fgm (E) holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm
(A)

boundaries of a search in the same manner as the specifications in a warrant. If the government does not conform to the limitations placed upon the right granted to search, the search is impermissible. In justifying a consensual search, the government bears the burden of establishing that the search was conducted within the purview of the consent received. When an individual gives a general statement of consent without express limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless. Rather it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to encompass. United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). See also State v. Nabarro, 55 Haw. 583, 583-87, 525 P.2d 573, 574-75 (1974) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation mark omitted). Hence,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that while a lawfully issued warrant to search premises authorizes the officers executing it to search in a reasonable manner whatever spots within the described premises their professional experience indicates may be used as a cache for the items named in the warranty such a warrant does not by its own force permit a search of the persons residents or visitorswho chance to be at the premises at the time the warrant is executed or belongings of a nonresident visitor present on the premises (C) holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises (D) holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises (E) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted
(B)