In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director's term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, "the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal...." Drexler, supra, 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) ("At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation."); see also Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). "Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to
Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary
holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders

in the context of an election case, even in the absence of a class action, and concluding that the case was not moot); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973) (concluding that plaintiffs' class action challenge to New York's Election Law was capable of repetition yet evading review, although primary election had passed and the petitioners would be eligible to vote in the next primary); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (in challenge to a provision of Tennessee's election law, concluding that, although plaintiff would be eligible to vote in the next election, the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We adopt the approach of the former cases,
Holding statements: (A) holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added (B) holding that although the 1972 election had long since passed the case was not moot because the statute under review would apply to other candidates in the future (C) holding that election case was not moot after election because there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining parties would be subject to that same action in the future (D) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (E) holding that plaintiffs claims were not moot although the election was over because the same issues would affect minorparty candidacies in the future but failing to address whether fulani herself would be affected
holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added

opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit, PER CURIAM: Tracey Lamont Coad pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2012), and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 212 months' imprisonment. Coad appealed, and this Court affirmed the criminal judgment. The Supreme Court of the United States granted Coad's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated this Court's judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) (<HOLDING>). Coad v. United States, U.S. -, 136 S.Ct.
Holding statements: (A) holding residual clause of acca void for vagueness (B) holding that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the acca violates the constitutions guarantee of due process (C) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (D) holding that va code 182603 is not void for vagueness (E) holding c4c factor void for vagueness unless limiting construction was given
holding that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of the acca violates the constitutions guarantee of due process