In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: any physician that described her as obese, much less gave an opinion that her weight imposed additional limitations upon her or exacerbated her other conditions. Therefore, even if Reynolds' silence on the issue of obesity is not deemed to waive consideration of that issue, it does not appear that evidence existed regarding her obesity that the ALJ should have considered. The ALJ also did not err in assessing Reynolds' credibility. An ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses' de meanor and to make an appropriate evaluation as to their credibility. Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir.1997). Therefore, an ALJ's credibility assessment will not be disturbed "absent compelling reason." Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir.2001); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (<HOLDING>). In making a credibility determination, Social
Holding statements: (A) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (B) holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference (C) holding that the district courts credibility assessments are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error (D) recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference (E) holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: include reasonable attorney's fees for legal services benefitting the children. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. 151.001(a), (c); In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 327, n. 55; Searcy, 17 S.W. at 373; Askey, 11 S.W. at 1101-02. In Hardin v. Hardin, this court cited section 154.001 but did not cite section 151.001 or section 156.401(a). See Hardin, 161 S.W.3d at 24-27. Nonetheless, the Hardin court noted that the duty of a parent to pay attorney's fees as necessaries is based upon a parent's duty to support his children. See id. at 25. In addition, the Hardin court cited non-enforcement cases that cited the statutory predecessor to section 151.001. See id. at 25-26 (citing Roosth v. Roosth and Daniels v. Allen); Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 456-57 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (<HOLDING>); Daniels v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 278, 280
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that father pay attorneys fees to mother as necessaries for the benefit of the children in divorce decree and citing statutory predecessor to section 151001 (B) holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries (C) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay reasonable attorneys fees incurred by mother as necessaries for the children (D) holding in modification suit in which no enforcement was ordered that trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support under the necessaries rule (E) holding in nonenforcement modification suit that court of continuing jurisdiction may order one parent to pay the reasonable attorneys fees of the other parent as additional child support if the fees are necessaries for the benefit of the children

Output: (A)

Input: Consider Input: the Society over in Russia when the company began to sell its SMIRNOV vodka there. A pending litigation in a foreign country between essentially the same parties, even one that concerned a slightly different topic, has been found to create a objectively reasonably apprehension of suit. See Ethicon, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 369 F.Supp. 934, 936-37 (D.N.J.1973). Therefore, even though it appears as if the defendants have never directly threatened the plaintiffs with legal action in the United States, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to support their claim that they reasonably feared a lawsuit if they attempted to enter the U.S. market. Cf. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, 257 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir.1958) (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, because the court finds that
Holding statements: (A) holding that the declaratory judgment act is a procedural device (B) recognizing that the declaratory judgment act is procedural in nature and not an extension of federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment (D) holding that letter stating that the defendant was fully prepared to take all necessary legal action in order to protect defendants work was sufficient to show an actual threat of litigation and created a case or controversy for the purposes of the declaratory judgment act (E) recognizing that it is not essential for there to be a direct threat of litigation in order to invoke the declaratory judgment act
Output: (E)