MALS was formed here more than 30 years ago. Today, 14 staff attorneys, 26 office workers and 21 University of Memphis third- year law students work out of rented offices in the old Claridge Hotel building at 109 N. Main. Offices are spartan. There are no lush rugs or stylish furniture. The large table in the conference room is simple varnished wood. Offices are small and mostly plain, except for the eclectic mix of pop art, African statuary and neon that adorns litigation director Webb Brewer's space. Brewer, who has been at the agency 20 years, said there is a need for lawyers of all stripes to help with the problems of the poor. "The private bar could meet more of the need through pro bono work, but there are still cases that involve the systemic problems for low-income people that we would need to do," said Brewer. "The legal system marketplace just doesn't serve low-income people too well, except in fee-generat-ing type cases," Brewer said. "If a poor person gets run over by a bus, an attorney might take that case because they might be able to recover part of the damage award as attorney fees. But so many of the cases we handle have to do with basic rights and a decent life. There is just no profit motive." Larry Pivnick, law professor at the University of Memphis Law School and director of political programs at MALS, said Legal Services is a great learning laboratory for law students. "There are thousands and thousands of people who have problems that never get an opportunity to appear in court," Pivnick said. "Some people may not be particularly articulate. Courts have rules that clients don't always understand." Brewer said a major focus of the agency's work involves housing. "Although a lot of our work is grant-driven, we find that the lack of safe and decent affordable housing and the prevalence of predatory lending are the biggest problems in our client population," Brewer said, referring to clients such as James.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: The director of political programs at MALS said that there are a lot of people who don't get the opportunity to what?

Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras. Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: Who provided the funds for the attack on the USS Cole?

One day, Phoebe woke up and found that her house had been broken into. Her front door was wide open. She went into the living room and saw that her television set and stereo were missing. She checked the kitchen, but didn't find anything missing there except for a clock. Then she saw that her purse had been stolen too. She called the police to report what had happened. The police officer told her that there had been a lot of cases like this in her neighborhood lately, and they were looking for the criminals. Phoebe went into her bedroom and started to cry. She had no money to buy a new television set or stereo. She was scared that the robbers might try to break into her house again. She called her friend Mary and asked her what to do. Mary told Phoebe to change her front door lock right away. She said she knew a detective who could try to find the robber who had broken into her house. Phoebe thanked Mary, and said she felt safe knowing that there was someone who could help her catch the robber so he wouldn't do it again.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: What made Phoebe cry?

The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION:
What are the main United States offices and committees involved in the following of terrorist funds include Qaeda and Taliban in the late 1990's?