In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Statement. They were, however, obtained prior to this Court's actual approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement, which occurred on December 19, 2008 (i.e. at the joint hearing on approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement and the Amended Plan). Although typically a disclosure statement should be approved before the proponent solicits votes for the plan, here the premature solicitation was harmless and, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a harmless failure to comply with 1125's solicitation requirements "is not necessarily fatal to the success of a Chapter 11 reorganization." In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.D.Ga.1980); see also First Am. Bank of N.Y. v. Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274, 278-80 (D.Del.1988) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105(d)(2)(B)(vi),
Holding statements: (A) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (B) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (E) holding that a plan proponents failure to obtain court approval of solicitation materials is not per se fatal to the confirmation process
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: includes a determination of the significance, if any, of the TNRC's involvement. When the EPA in 1990 shifted from a "strict" to "substantial compliance" standard for private parties, it did so "to encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the contamination." 55 FecLReg. at 8792-93. The EPA expressly recognized that requiring private parties to adhere to a set of mechanical rules would impede this objective. Thus the list of public comment provisions identified in 40 C.F.R. 300.700(c)(6) is only a "universe of requirements which are potentially relevant," and should "not be c Ry. Co. v. Gee Co., 2002 WL 31163777, at *30 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 2002) (<HOLDING>); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Amcast Int'l Corp., 177
Holding statements: (A) holding that government involvement must be accompanied by public comment because a purpose of ncp is to ensure that those responsible for the cleanup receive citizens input regarding environmental conditions in the community (B) holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment (C) holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment (D) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (E) holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: certain provisions are met. Fla. Stat. 624.155 (1999). Before the adoption of section 624.155, Florida courts refused to recognize a cause of action by an insured against his insurer alleging the insurer, in bad faith, refused to settle his claim; i.e., a "first party" bad faith cause of action. Opperman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 515 So.2d 263, 265-67 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987). While "first party" bad faith claims were not permitted, if an insured could allege an independent tort, such as fraud or intentional infliction of emotional distress, he could proceed against the insurer on those claims and receive punitive damages. Greene v. Well Care HMO, Inc., 778 So.2d 1037, 1042 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001); see also Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So.2d 854, 858 (Fla.1957) (<HOLDING>). GEICO essentially argued during its motion
Holding statements: (A) holding that while punitive damages are normally not recoverable for breach of contract where acts constituting a breach of contract also amount to a cause of action in tort there may be recovery of exemplary damages however the breach must be attended by some intentional wrong insult abuse or gross negligence which amounts to an independent tort (B) holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship (C) holding that generally punitive damages are not available for a breach of contract (D) holding that the failure to act in good faith does not amount to an independent tort the breach of the implied duty under the ucc gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract (E) holding that absent an independent tort a plaintiff alleging a breach of contract may only seek to recover the damages flowing from the breach
[EX A]:
(A)