In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
for the district court to grant his motion to withdraw his plea. But Harvey has not challenged the district court's ultimate finding that he was competent to stand trial based on the court's consideration of the opinions of all three psychiatrists. In light of the district court's unchallenged and supported determination that Harvey was competent to stand trial (and therefore competent to plead), Harvey cannot argue that the court committed obvious error in failing to sua sponte permit him to withdraw his plea on the basis of his "marginal competence." Nor can he claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue Harvey's marginal competency as a reason for withdrawing the plea. Harvey's claims related to his competency therefore fail. { 18 We affirm. 1 . The court stat Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 940-42
Holding statements: (A) holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel (B) holding an attorneys mistaken prediction about a possible sentence does not render a defendants plea unknowing and involuntary (C) holding that a defense attorneys failure to uncover a defendants prior felony convictions and the attorneys inaccurate sentencing prediction did not render the defendants plea unknowing and involuntary because the defendant knew at the time he pleaded guilty what his sentence might be (D) holding that ineffective assistance can render a guilty plea involuntary (E) holding that an inaccurate sentencing estimate did not render a plea unknowing unintelligent or involuntary because the defendant was informed of the statutory maximum

Ex Output:
holding defendant cannot waive claims of an illegal sentence a sentence violating terms of plea agreement an unknowing and involuntary plea and ineffective assistance of counsel

Ex Input:
interests that a lawful permanent resident or even an illegal entrant residing more than two weeks may have developed.... Diaz Rodriguez has not shown that he has been lawfully admitted, so the due process rights of a lawfully admitted citizen are not implicated here."). Accordingly, Petitioner has no constitutional due process rights in relation to her admission beyond that authorized by Congress. The restricted habeas review provisions set forth in Section 1252 adequately protect Petitioner's rights because she has a meaningful review of the cause for her exclusion and of the Executive's power to exclude her. The writ therefore has not been suspended and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner's claims. See Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1140-41; Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 1281 (<HOLDING>); Vaupel, 244 Fed.Appx. at 895 (holding that
Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1252e2 clearly does not permit court to review whether expedited removal statute applies in first place (B) holding that court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review aliens habeas claims seeking review of expedited removal order including whether expedited removal statute was lawfully applied to alien and whether expedited removal procedures violated his right to due process because language of section 1252e5 clearly precludes review in habeas proceedings of whether alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal (C) holding that strict limitations set forth in section 1252e preclude judicial review of any constitutional or statutory claims related to the underlying expedited removal order (D) holding that 1252a2a barred review of petitioners claims including asapplied due process challenges to expedited removal order (E) holding prior to enactment of section 1326d that a person charged with illegal reentry has a constitutional right to collaterally attack the underlying removal order when a due process violation in a removal proceeding amounts to a complete deprivation of judicial review

Ex Output:
holding that section 1252e2 clearly does not permit court to review whether expedited removal statute applies in first place

Ex Input:
part: "If no objections have been timely filed, the court shall forthwith enter judgment on the referee's report." 2 . An amended order was entered on December 22, 2009, to correct a typographical error. 3 . Prejudgment interest awarded to a successful defendant on a counterclaim accrues from the date the counterclaim, not the plaintiff's complaint, is filed. Uncle Henry's, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting, Inc., 382 F.Supp.2d 150, 154 (D.Me.2005) (interpreting 14 M.R.S. 1602-B(5) (2009)). 4 . We recognized an exception to this general rule with respect to post-judgment interest on certain child support arrearage claims, which were deemed to be a "unique area of the law." Walsh v. Cusack, 2008 ME 74, 9, 946 A.2d 414, 417. 5 . See also Walsh, 2008 ME 74, 10-11, 946 A.2d at 417-18 (<HOLDING>); Tarbuck v. Jaeckel, 2000 ME 105, 25 n. 5,
Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1961 applied where the parties agreement failed to specify that the selected interest rate applied to either judgements or judgment debts (B) holding that walsh was entitled to postjudgment interest on child support arrearage but vacating and remanding the arrearage judgment because the judgment did not state the interest rate or specify that the interest was fully or partially waived as required by section 1602c (C) holding that the insured was entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest and attorney fees as found by the jury (D) holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case (E) holding as a mutter of law that divorce actions are civil actions within the meaning of the postjudgment interest statute and that the wife was entitled to postjudgment interest under the statute with respect to unpaid spousal support payments ordered under a divorce judgment

Ex Output:
holding that section 1961 applied where the parties agreement failed to specify that the selected interest rate applied to either judgements or judgment debts