In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: (second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured"). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity" for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans," whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within" the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means "a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance"); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling
Holding statements: (A) holding 1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc 853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 . We do not reach the question of whether it was proper for a Minnesota peace officer to go outside Minnesota's borders and attempt to compel a blood sample under Minnesota law. In this case, the sample was obtained using Wisconsin's procedure inside Wisconsin's borders and our holding is limited to these facts. 2 . Both parties make arguments regarding Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68 (Minn.1978). These cases, due to the natural exigency involved in obtaining blood-alcohol evidence, recognize the power of a peace officer to compel a blood sample from a dri Tex. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waives the attorneyclient privilege when it voluntarily consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the communication in issue (B) holding that the michigan usury act mcla 43831 a statute setting forth the legal interest rate in michigan is preempted according to the explicit terms of hola (C) holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication (D) holding that litigating franchise dispute in michigan does not require that michigan law govern dispute as michigan franchise investment law does not expressly void choice of law provisions in franchise agreement (E) holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under 1983
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: our circuit has noted that we have "no opinion on whether the habitual residence of a child who lacks cognizance of his or her surroundings should be determined by considering the subjective intentions of his or her parents." Robert, 507 F.3d at 992 n.4. By "subjective intentions," we mean the parents' last "settled mutual intent" for where their child would live. Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Nicolson v. Pappalardo, 605 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2010); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995). The district court noted the reliance by courts on the shared parental intent standard in cases concerning especially young children. See, e.g., Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 746 (7th Cir. 2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Holder, 392 F.3d at 1016-17).
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that claim meaning will sometimes be readily apparent even to lay judges and that claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words (B) recognizing parental intent acts as a surrogate in cases involving very young children for whom the concept of acclimatization has little meaning (C) holding the prospective adoptive father of surrogate children did not comply with the interstate compact on the placement of children (D) holding that taking care of three young children one of whom suffered from a serious medical condition and being needed at work were purely personal circumstances not exceptional reasons for release (E) holding that the clear and convincing standard provides appropriate due process in cases involving parental rights
[EX A]:
(B)