In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

2009) (citations omitted) (quoting Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi, 238 F.3d at 1332-33); accord Advanced Data Concepts, Inc. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The arbitrary and capricious standard ... requires a reviewing court to sustain an agency action evincing rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors."); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. 814 ("The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."). In addition to showing "a significant error in the procurement process," a protestor must show "that the error prejudiced it." Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 404 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (<HOLDING>). "To establish prejudice ..., a protester must
Holding statements: (A) holding that a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure (B) holding that if the procuring agencys decision lacked a rational basis or was made in violation of the applicable statutes regulations or procedures the court must then determine as a factual matter if the bid protester was prejudiced by that conduct (C) holding a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 if the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure (D) holding that a protester must show that the governments error in a bid evaluation was so significant that the government had no reasonable basis for its best value determination (E) holding that in bid protest cases a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure
holding that a bid award may be set aside if either 1 the procurement officials decision lacked a rational basis or 2 the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure

as this is circumscribed but critical. For the Supreme Court has made plain that qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability" and "is effectively lost if a ease is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis in original). IV. We thus turn to the sole question over which we have jurisdiction: whether the district court properly concluded that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment under Norman. The officers contend that Ussery suffered only de minimis injuries and so cannot satisfy the requirements for an excessive force claim under Norman. Blue Br. 8, 16-21. We disagree. During the decade when Norman was good law, we never articulated a precise definition of what c 270 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we note the telling fact that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that where law enforcement officers restrained and abandoned an arrestee for ten minutes causing him to feel frightened vulnerable and humiliated when left alone and immobile in the dark parking lot such that in the months following the incident he had trouble sleeping and was scared to leave his home the resulting injury was more than de minimis (B) holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him (C) holding that a reasonable officer could not have been expected to anticipate that ten to fifteen minutes of unauthorized detention would amount to a greater than de minimis injury (D) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (E) holding that an individuals liberty is restrained only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
holding that the court did not err in concluding that a defendant was not in custody where he made statements to law enforcement officers in his own home was not physically restrained during the conversation never manifested an intent to terminate the interaction and the officers never indicated to the defendant that they had probable cause to arrest him

basis in eminent domain); Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 257, 552 F.2d 343, 346 (1977) ("It is settled that recovery of reasonable compensation under 1498 is premised on a theory of an eminent domain taking under the Fifth Amendment.") (citing Calhoun v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 41, 51, 453 F.2d 1385 (1972)) (stating the government "ipso facto takes by eminent domain a compulsory compensatory license in the patent"); Pitcairn v. United States, 212 Ct.Cl. 168, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (1976) ("The use or manufacture by or for the Government of a device or machine embodying any invention by a United States patent, is a taking of property by the Government under its power of eminent domain."); Irving Air Chute Co. v. United States, 117 Ct.Cl. 799, 93 F.Supp. 633, 635 (1950) (<HOLDING>). 14 . See e.g., Leesona Corp., 599 F.2d at 964
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that 1498 is in effect an eminent domain statute (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that the statute qualifies as an exemption 3 statute (D) holding that the statute is mandatory (E) holding the precursor statute to 1498 to be nonjurisdictional as to private defendants merely establishing an affirmative defense
recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect