Once upon a time there was a princess who lived in a high tower and she was not allowed to leave because of her mean mother. One day she chose to leave but her mother would not let her. The princess climbed out the window of the high tower and climbed down the south wall when her mother was sleeping. She wandered out a good ways. Finally she went into the forest where there are no electric poles but where there are some caves. There she met a young man who was running. His name was John. John asked the princess why such a beautiful woman like her was out in the middle of a forest. She said that she had been trapped for her whole life by an evil woman who said she was her mother. The man said that he would take the princess to a castle that was near. He also said that he thought that she may be the missing princess. As they go through the forest they run into many problems. They see that they are lost and have no way of finding where to go. After several days pass, the princess climbs up to the top of a tree in order to find out where they are. She sees that the castle where they want to go is not that far away and near a mountain. After thinking of the best way to get there, John and the princess go to the castle where they live for the rest of their lives.
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QUESTION: What was a problem the princess and John encountered?

While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued.
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QUESTION: Who were the U. S. envoys General Musharraf told that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden?

Joe's parents are farmers and they have a huge farm with cows, chickens, and ducks. Joe loves the farm and all the things he gets to play around and play on. One day, Joe's father told him not to get near a tractor that was sitting in the field. His father was worried that Joe would climb on it and hurt himself. Joe went out to the field and was feeding the horses and cows. When he was done, he saw the tractor his father told him not to get near. He knew that climbing on the tractor wouldn't hurt anything, so he did. He climbed on to the seat and sat there. Then, he pretended he was his father and pretended that he was driving the tractor. Joe's father saw him playing on the tractor and called for him. Joe heard his father calling for him and got off the tractor really fast. When he did that, he fell off and hurt his arm. Joe was in pain and his father came running to check on him and picked him up and sat him on a bench and asked him why he did that. Joe looked at his father and said, "I wanted to be like you." Joe's father gave him a hug and asked him if he wanted to ride with him on the tractor. Joe did and after he got a bandage on his arm, he and his father rode in the field on the tractor.
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QUESTION: Which animals was Joe not feeding

After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION:
What was the US government trying to find during 1999 and 2000?