instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
venture as contrasted with a governmental function.' " Hoffer v. State, 110 Wn.2d 415, 422, 755 P.2d 781 (1988) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1097 (5th ed. 1979)), adhered to on recons., 113 Wn.2d 148, 776 P.2d 963 (1989). 5 Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 118 Wn.2d at 645. 6 Id. at 646 (quoting City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 695, 743 P.2d 793 (1987)). 7 Id. 8 RCW 57.08.081(1). 9 These factors include the difference in cost to various customers, the location of customers within and without the district, the achievement of water conservation goals and discouragement of wasteful practices, and "any other matters which present a reasonable difference as a ground for distinction." RCW 57-.08.081(2). 10 See City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wn.2d 677, 685, 399 P.2d 330 (1965) (<HOLDING>). 11 See Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 118 Wn.2d at
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater (B) recognizing that watershed isolation or acquisition serves to prevent and control water contamination (C) holding that article x 2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (D) recognizing that water retained within a watershed is susceptible to multiple use because all water uses are not consumptive uses (E) holding authority to control limits duty to control
answer:
recognizing that coverage could be triggered by need to prevent imminent contamination of groundwater

question:
partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court's order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants' arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
answer:
holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied

question:
n.3. The circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in Bruton. Here, unlike Bruton, the statements at issue do not involve a custodial confession by Permanian, and the statements were admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception. Permanian's statements were also generally made under circumstances that indicate their reliability including that Permanian had personal knowledge of the incident, it was unlikely that Permanian's statements were founded upon a faulty recollection, the statements were against Permanian's penal interest given their context, and the statements did not contain any express factual assertion of defendant's guilt but only an inference of guilt. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-89, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213, 226-27, 91 S. Ct. 210, 219-20 (1970) (<HOLDING>); Goodman, 81 Ill. 2d at 284-85 (finding
Holding statements: (A) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (B) holding that the sixth amendment right of confrontation applies to all three phases of the capital trial and that the admission of hearsay statements of codefendants in the penalty phase violated the confrontation clause (C) holding that the defendants sixth amendment confrontation clause rights were not violated by the admission of the child victims statements to her mother grandmother a detective and a forensic investigator (D) holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made (E) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements
answer:
holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay