instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
27 . State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 78, 82 n. 8 (Alaska 1973), quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). 28 . Williams v. State, 737 P.2d 360, 362 (Alaska App.1987). 29 . Davenport, 510 P.2d at 80. 30 . Id. at 82 & n. 8. 31 . - See Landon v. State, 941 P.2d 186, 190 (Alaska App.1997); Stam v. State, 925 P.2d 668, 670 (Alaska App.1996) (when assessing the trustworthiness of hearsay information contained in a search warrant application, courts presume that police officers and citizen informants are credible sources of information}. 32 . Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322-25 (Alaska 1985)
Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible (B) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (C) holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis (D) holding as a matter of law that adaptations of subject matter or expressions in the public domain cannot support a finding of copyright infringement (E) holding that as a matter of state law the aguilarspinelli test continues to govern the evaluation of hearsay information offered to support a search or seizure
answer:
(E)

question:
of the offense charged but convict on the included offense. However, the mere chance that a jury may reject uncontroverted testimony and convict on the lesser charge does not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser charge." People v. Ramires, 18 P.3d 822, 827 (Colo.App.2000) (internal citations omitted). 184 The offense of patronizing a prostituted child requires, as relevant here, "knowingly engaging in an act" where "a child perform[s] or offer[s] or agree[s] to perform ... any [sexual] act ... in exchange for money." 18-7-406(1)(a), 18-7-401(6). Based on the language of the statute, actual performance of a sexual act is not necessary; a mere offer or agreement to perform is sufficient, provided money has been promised. See supra Part V.A; Madden, 111 P.3d at 460 (<HOLDING>). 185 Here, because the uncontrovert-ed
Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (B) holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition (C) holding that a party invoking a 547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received (D) holding that patronizing a prostituted child requires some record evidence that the defendant attempted to give anything of value in exchange for sex (E) holding that under 11 usc 547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer
answer:
(D)

question:
for highly compensated employees than for other employees. Exhibit "A" to Appellee's Answer Brief (emphasis added). Clearly, the I.R.S. determination letter does not inquire into the operation of the Profit Sharing Plan and, in fact, limits its own applicability in that regard. Therefore, since the Bankruptcy Court below, did not consider evidence regarding operational aspects of the Profit Sharing Plan, and instead relied upon the favorable I.R.S. determination letter, the Bankruptcy Court committed reversible error. This issue shall be remanded back to the Bankruptcy Court to determine whether, in light of the Debtor's operation of the Profit Sharing Plan, such Plan is qualified under Internal Revenue Code 401(a). See e.g., In re McDonald, 100 B.R. 598 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1989) (<HOLDING>). While this Court understands the lower
Holding statements: (A) holding that a termination of an erisa plans benefits must be based upon the plans terms and language (B) recognizing that benefit plans must designate a fiduciary to serve as the plan administrator (C) holding that since favorable irs determination letter does not express an opinion as to the plans current operation plan is not exempt (D) holding that an erisa insurers declaratory suit seeking a favorable interpretation of a standard policy clause against a party having no obligations under the plan was not an action to enforce the plan terms (E) holding that attorneyclient privilege was not waived when a letter sent by an irs regional counsel to the doj requesting legal services was copied to other irs personnel involved in the investigation
answer:
(C)