In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the "unified judicial system," is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) ("All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of 'Commonwealth government' and thus are state rather than local agencies."). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in
Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state
holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action

rejected'this argument, holding that the allegations, even if true, did not amount to an -IDEA procedural violation. See 20 U.S.C. 1415 et seq. (setting forth the procedural safeguards afforded to parents when their child is in special education). 13 . It is worth noting that at least one state Massachusetts, as the IDEA permits, has enacted a more stringent standard. Specifically, children in Massachusetts who are eligible for special education services are entitled to IEPs that provide for their "maximum possible development.'' See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B 2 (emphasis added); Frank S. v. School Committee of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District, 26 F.Supp.2d 219, 226 (D.Mass.1998). 14 . See Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County, 118 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task (B) holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors (C) holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied (D) holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity (E) holding that it was pure speculation that if the preference payment had not been made the vendor would have been included as a critical vendor and the court would have approved it
holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors

558 (Bankr.D.N.J.1996). The administrative expense priority only applies to those claims for costs "that were actually and necessarily incurred in preserving the estate for the benefit of its creditors." Id. In order for an expense to qualify as "actual" and "necessary," the claim must benefit the estate as a whole. Id. at 559 (citing Montrose Ctr. v. Northeast Consumer Tech. Store, Inc. (In re Appliance Store, Inc.), 148 B.R. 234, 243 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 1992)). Further, the claimant seeking an administrative expense award has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor's estate benefit-ted from the applicant's services to the extent of the claim allowed. In re Molnar Bros., 200 B.R. at 559. In re Interstate Grocery Distributions Sys., Inc., 267 B.R. at 913 (<HOLDING>). To sustain its burden and thus qualify for
Holding statements: (A) holding a claimant must prove entitlement to benefits by the preponderance of the evidence which is not sustained by mere surmise or conjecture (B) holding that burden is upon employer to demonstrate by preponderance of evidence that claimant committed act in question (C) holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings (D) holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence (E) holding that a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence entitlement to an administrative claim
holding a claimant must prove entitlement to benefits by the preponderance of the evidence which is not sustained by mere surmise or conjecture