In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
right to additional BLM permits or approvals. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 456, 27 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1971); Angelina Holly Corp. v. Clark, 587 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.D.C.1984). They hold no more than an expectancy, the loss of which does not constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S.Ct. 446, 451, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 828 (D.C.Cir.1977). Their absence from the lawsuit does not preclude the district court from issuing the preliminary injunction. Compare Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). C. Exhaustion Mountain States asserts that
Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (B) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated (E) holding that contract with construction company rendered inequitable a preliminary injunction restraining the contractors from performing the contractual obligations

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
of the property. See C.R.E. 602; C.R.E. 701. However, there is no evidence in the record which establishes that Pomeranz ever paid a bill relating to the maintenance of the property or that he was personally responsible for any aspect of the maintenance because McDonald's had been responsible for the payments for the past fifteen years. Because no adequate evidentiary foundation was laid for Pomeranz's estimation of maintenance expenses on the property, it is impossible, absent pure speculation, to ascertain from the record how Pomeranz obtained the $4,800 estimation. The trial court's factual findings relating to future maintenance expenses are not sustained by either competent or adequate evidence and are therefore clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 170 Colo. at 13, 458 P.2d at 758 (<HOLDING>). The evidence presented by the petitioners on
Holding statements: (A) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (B) holding that a reviewing court will only presume that the trial court made implicit factual findings when such findings were necessary to its ultimate conclusion (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that a reviewing court has the power to reject the findings and conclusions of the trial court where the findings are not supported by the evidence (E) holding that where the original drug quantity determination is not specific enough for the district court to determine whether it has the authority to reduce a defendants sentence under 3582c2 that court may make new findings of fact that are supported by the record and are not inconsistent with the findings made in the original sentencing proceedings

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
veniremembers before attempting to strike them, or (3) attempted a jury shuffle to remove black jurors from the strike zone. See, e.g., Moore, 265 S.W.3d at 89; see also Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. at 2320-21 (court considered State's use of jury shuffle to rearrange panel members when a number of black members were seated at front as indicative of a broader pattern of discrimination, and ultimately found that State's strikes against blacks were also racially motivated). Significantly, the prosecutor's conduct in exercising his peremptory strikes was consistent with his representation to the trial court that he used his strikes in an attempt to remove all veniremembers who, like Robertson, initially indicated that they could not consider life. See Watkins, 245 S.W.3d at 453 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Specifically, of those
Holding statements: (A) holding that reviewing record in its entirety prosecutors raceneutral reason was not a pretext where state applied this reason to strike black veniremember and most but not all similarly situated nonblack veniremembers (B) holding that where a nonblack juror with no prior jury experience was empaneled the proffered reason for striking a black juror for lack of jury experience was not genuine and therefore was pretextual (C) holding that pretext may be established by proving that prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to exclude africanamerican venirepersons for a given reason or reasons but then failed to apply the same reason or reasons to exclude similarly situated white venirepersons (D) holding that a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason (E) holding that age is an acceptable raceneutral reason for striking a prospective juror

Ex Output:
(A)