In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

motion at which Pritchett would be represented by counsel or at which the court would determine that Pritchett knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Ex parte Pritchett, 117 So.3d at 362. In the instant case, the circuit court immediately appointed new counsel to represent Trimble after Trimble gave his oral notice of appeal. Despite having newly appointed counsel who could file a motion for a new trial attacking his trial counsel's alleged deficiencies, Trimble elected to file a pro se motion for a new trial. Therefore, unlike the defendant in Pritchett, Trimble had the benefit of newly appointed appellate counsel who represented him and who could file a motion for a new trial on his behalf. See King v. State, 613 So.2d 888 (Ala.Crim.App.1993)
Holding statements: (A) holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage (B) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver (C) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (D) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (E) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel
holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir.2005). The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a right to seek redress of grievances from prison authorities and as well as a right of meaningful access to the courts. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1995); see also Hasan v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir.2005) ("Prisoners' grievances, unless frivolous ..., concerning the conditions in which they are being confined are deemed petitions for redress of grievances and thus are protected by the First Amendment."); Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Jones's complaints of
Holding statements: (A) recognizing first amendment retaliation right (B) holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances (C) recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances (D) holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials (E) recognizing prisoners first amendment right to eom plain to prison officials about discrimination
recognizing first amendment retaliation right

underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the defendant's nature and background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the government if the motion to withdraw is granted. Id. (citation omitted). Upon a review of these factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The first factor weighs against Taylor. Six months elapsed between the entry of his guilty plea and his motion to withdraw. As the district court noted, the Sixth Circuit has affirmed denials of motions to withdraw in cases involving delays far shorter than the delay in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 362 F.3d 903, 912-13 (6th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Durham, 178 F.3d 796, 798-99
Holding statements: (A) holding that a 75day delay justified the denial of a motion to withdraw (B) holding that the district courts denial of motion to continue even though it required counsel to withdraw due to a scheduling conflict protected the adversarial process and the defendants substantial rights (C) holding that a fivemonth delay in filing a motion to disqualify did not bar the motion where there was a reasonable explanation for the delay (D) recognizing the late date of a motion to withdraw filed three weeks before trial (E) holding that the presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on appeal when the granting of an attorneys motion to withdraw had left the petitioner entirely without the assistance of counsel on appeal
holding that the district courts denial of motion to continue even though it required counsel to withdraw due to a scheduling conflict protected the adversarial process and the defendants substantial rights