In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: to allege damages through June 30, 2006 is the focus of their motion."). Because the Government does not oppose Plaintiff supplementing the September 4, 2009 Complaint to seek damages through the end of 2009, the issue before the court is whether Plaintiff may supplement to allege a claim for damages incurred through December 31, 2009, or through December 31, 2010. See System Fuels, 73 Fed.Cl. at 211 ("Supplementation may be limited or curtailed to avoid prejudice." (citation omitted)). Although Plaintiff may have given the Government an estimate of 2010 damages as early as July 2010, Plaintiff did not identify the specific 2010 damages claimed or provide the Government with supporting documentation of those damages until April 20, 2011 t 4 Fed.Cl. 727 (2006) ("SMUD III") (<HOLDING>), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 293 Fed.Appx.
Holding statements: (A) holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding (B) holding that smud was entitled to 39796234 in damages (C) holding that a plaintiff is entitled to either statutory treble damages or punitive damages whichever is the greater (D) holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a presumption of nominal damages when she had failed to request them (E) holding that smud was entitled to mitigation damages for costs incurred from may 15 1997 to december 31 2003

Answer: holding that smud is entitled to 53159863 in mitigation costs but staying entry of judgment pending the outcome of this proceeding

Question: stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in "temporary, intermediate storage," however, these courts have limited that subsection's coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP's server after delivery no longer fall within the Act's coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate's server after delivery are stored "by an electronic communication service" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages
Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service

Answer: holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca

Question: assert that, in many of the class members' cases, there was no "consumer transaction" because the debts arose from phy sician-patient transactions, and as such, Defendants are exempt from the OCSPA. Plaintiffs argue that the physician-patient exemption does not apply to Defendants. The OCPA's physician exemption in the definition of "consumer transaction" is narrowly construed, and Ohio courts have rejected its application to non-physicians. See Summa Health Sys. v. Viningre, 140 Ohio App.3d 780, 749 N.E.2d 344, 356 (2000) ("While transactions with physicians are exempted from the CSPA, a transaction between a service provider such as a hospital and the consumer is not clearly exempted."); Elder v. Fischer, 129 Ohio App.3d 209, 717 N.E.2d 730, 734-35 (Ohio Ct.App. 1st Dist.1998) (<HOLDING>); Thorton v. Meredia Suburban Hosp., 1991 WL
Holding statements: (A) holding that antitrust claims arising out of an international commercial transaction were arbitrable despite the fact that they were not specifically mentioned in the arbitration clause (B) holding that physicians were specifically excluded from the ocspa but hospitals were not so they must abide by the ocspa (C) holding that this court can consider claims not specifically excluded by a coa (D) holding that all claims submitted by defendant were false because they were acquired by kickback (E) holding that because the record does not indicate that the extraneous documents or averments were excluded by the court we must assume that they were considered

Answer:
holding that antitrust claims arising out of an international commercial transaction were arbitrable despite the fact that they were not specifically mentioned in the arbitration clause