In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled "An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions" (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill's sponsors also
Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs 37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent
holding analogous circumstances conclusive of legislative intent

the common level ratio. The Board may hold a hearing to consider the objections, but it may also decide the objections have merit and adjust its calculations. If not satisfied with the outcome of the hearing, the taxpayer may "appeal de novo such ratio determination to the Commonwealth Court." Id. It has long been established that "[wjhere a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive." Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63, 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). This Court has explained that "where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby." Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541, 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). Where the statutory remedy is an
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (B) holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a class action in equity (C) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action (D) recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice (E) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action
holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa

v. Eggleston, 202 Ariz. 523, 527, 16, 47 P.3d 1161, 1165 (App.2002). Second, a statute should be construed in conjunction with other statutes that relate to the same subject or purpose, giving effect to all statutes involved. Id. Third, in furtherance of such harmonization, courts should review the history of the various sections in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature and thereby construe the statutes to further that intent. State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366, 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989). After reviewing the history of the relevant statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the acquisition of land for park purposes be subject to the public auction requirement. See State v. Cornish, 192 Ariz. 533, 537, 16, 968 P.2d 606, 610 (App.1998) (<HOLDING>). 12 As part of its comprehensive statutory
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning (B) holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding courts should apply statutory constructions that make practical sense and do not frustrate legislative intent (E) holding that courts should avoid constructions that would render statutory text superfluous
recognizing that courts should look to other sources of legislative intent if the statutory language does not convey a clear meaning