In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") because Erickson failed to allege specific facts showing a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sanford v. Member-Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing elements of a.RICO claim and particularity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). The district court properly dismissed Erickson's claims under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act ("RES-PA") and the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") as time-barred because Erickson filed his action more than three years after the alleged violations. See 12 U.S.C. 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year statute of limitations for violations of RES-PA); 15 U.S.C. 1640(e) (an action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); see also King, 784 F.2d at 915 (<HOLDING>). However, after the district court dismissed
Holding statements: (A) holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc 2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction (B) holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond (C) holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer (D) holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction (E) holding under section 1144s predecessor statute that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period
[EX A]: holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc 2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction

[EX Q]: re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr.D.Mass.1987); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 332-34 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). And, although 105 "does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law," Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, n. 1; "[b]ankruptcy courts ... enjoy inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct." Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.1996). This inherent power authorizes federal courts "to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities." Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)(<HOLDING>); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process (D) recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process (E) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process
[EX A]: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it

[EX Q]: opposing party's motion. We have held that there is an "overarching liberal policy of allowing amendments under Rule 15." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 858 So.2d 950, 954 (Ala.2003). However, Rule 15 "'is not carte blanche authority to amend ... at any time.' " Burkett v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 607 So.2d 138, 141 (Ala.1992)(quoting Stallings v. Angelica Uniform Co., 388 So.2d 942, 947 (Ala.1980)). The trial court has discretion to deny an amendment for good cause. Ex parte GRE Ins. Group, 822 So.2d 388, 390 (Ala.2001); Stallings, 388 So.2d at 947. The deadline in the scheduling order does not curtail the trial court's discretion in considering the merits of the offered amendment. See Moses.com Sec., Inc. v. Comprehensive Software Sys., Inc., 406 F.3d 1052, 1066 (8th Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). The trial court can refuse to allow an
Holding statements: (A) holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act (B) holding that interest does not begin to accrue until the date of judgment not the date of verdict (C) holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions (D) holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions (E) holding that the scheduling order merely prescribes the date by which all motions to amend shall be filed the date on the scheduling order does not confine the district courts consideration of the merits of such motions and does not preclude it from finding that an amendment would result in prejudice
[EX A]:
holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act