In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 188 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio E.D.1981); In re Davis, 16 B.R. 473 (D.Kan.1981). Or after a judgment has been entered: In re Young, 22 B.R. 620 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.E.D.1982); In re Breuer, 4 B.R. 499, 6 B.C.D. 136 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1980). (5)Courts that hold that a debtor may cure a default where a foreclosure sale has been held provided that the debtor's right of redemption under state law has not expired: In re Johnson, 29 B.R. 104 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Chambers, 27 B.R. 687 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Taylor, 21 B.R. 179 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1982); In re Thompson, 17 B.R. 748 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mich.1982). 32 B.R. at 790. To the fourth group we add the following recent opinions by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits: Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Association, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.1984)
Holding statements: (A) holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally (B) holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court (C) holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank (D) holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default
[EX A]: holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally

[EX Q]: defendant's conversion by wrongful act inconsistent with the property rights of the plaintiff; and (3) damages." In re Emery, 317 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 704 (1998)). One partner can be liable to another for conversion of partnership property. Oakdale Vill. Grp. v. Fong, 43 Cal.App.4th 539, 546, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (1996), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Apr. 10, 1996). Further, intangible property such as corporate shares and bonds may be the proper subject of a conversion claim. See Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1411 (9th Cir.1996) (collecting California cases); see also Fremont Indem. Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp., 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 125, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 (2007) (<HOLDING>). However, more abstract intangible property,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding (B) holding that proof of loss is not evidence of extent of loss and insured is not precluded from showing his damages were greater than shown in proof of loss (C) holding that it is not (D) holding insufficiently definite bonus agreement that did not establish amount or method for determining amount of payment (E) holding that a businesss net operating loss is the proper subject of conversion because it is a definite recordable amount
[EX A]: holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding

[EX Q]: (Emphasis added.) Finally, paragraph 13 of the Restrictions states that "[n]o structure shall be commenced or erected on any of said lots" unless approved, either affirmatively or by default, by the architectural committee, "[pjrovided ... that the design, location and the kind of materials and the building to be built on said lot shall be governed by all of the restrictions herein set forth and said building shall be in harmony with existing buildings and structure 193, 197-98 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (interpreting restrictive covenants to manifest an intent to preserve the residential character of the properties, which included the prohibition of constructing roads, especially roads not bene-fitting the property owners); see also Rush v. Miller, 21 Wash.App. 156, 584 P.2d 960, 963 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Hanley v. Misischi, 111 R.I. 233, 302 A.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute (B) holding that a roadway benefitting land outside the subdivision was not a residential purpose and was therefore a violation of the restrictive covenant (C) holding that a restrictive covenant with a tenyear term was unenforceable (D) holding that a restrictive covenant with worldwide restrictions on competition is not reasonable (E) holding that a roadway is a structure and its construction would violate the restrictive covenant limiting the land to residential purposes
[EX A]:
holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute