TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: in the public interest." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Under the Ninth Circuit's "sliding scale" approach, however, "serious questions going to the merits and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support the issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met." Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011). The "sliding scale" approach allows "district courts to preserve the status quo where difficult legal questions require more deliberate investigation." Greene v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 15-00048 JSW, 2015 WL 3945996, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015); see also Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). IY. Analysis . As a threshold matter, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted (B) holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success (C) holding that success on a motion to sever requires a strong showing of prejudice (D) holding that under the sliding scale approach a petitioner had made a sufficiently strong showing of likely success on the merits where he presented a case which raises serious legal questions or has a reasonable probability or fair prospect of success (E) holding that injunctive relief may be warranted where there is a particularly strong likelihood of success on the merits even if there is a relatively slight showing of irreparable injury

SOLUTION: holding that regardless of other factors as to harms a movants likelihood of success must carry at least a fair chance of success on the merits in order to warrant interim relief internal quotation omitted

PROBLEM: California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122
Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review

SOLUTION: holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed

PROBLEM: of A.M., 786 P.2d 476, 478-79 (Colo.App.1989)(interpreting C.R.J.P. 4's requirement that a dependency and neglect petition be filed with the district court within ten days from the day the child is taken into custody as a rule not affecting the court's jurisdiction such that a failure to object in time to the child's extended custody will waive the requirement). Instead, the time requirement of 19-1-108(5) is a procedural rule that creates a condition precedent to the party's right to appeal the magistrate's order. Because such procedures can be waived and because the Department failed to raise the requirements of 19 1108(5) before the district court reviewed C.S.'s petition, the Department has waived any argument under 19-1-108(5). Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 617-618 (Colo.2002)(<HOLDING>); see also Ex Parte H.F., 843 So.2d 190, 191-92
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date (B) holding that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law (C) holding that crim p 35s requirement that criminal defendants file a motion for relief with the state court before proceeding to habeas corpus implicates the doctrine of exhaustion of legal remedies and not the concept of subject matter jurisdiction and any argument based on crim p 35 is therefore waivable (D) holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be resolved on the facts appearing in the record and that under such circumstances the defendants remedy is to file a petition for habeas corpus (E) holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus

SOLUTION:
holding that the district court and this court had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendants motion for modification of sentence based on amendment 706 even though the defendant filed the motion before march 3 2008 because the district court ruled on the motion after that date