In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
child abuse or neglect or who testifies or otherwise participates in a judicial proceeding arising from a report, petition, or investigation of alleged child abuse or neglect is immune from civil or criminal liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Id. 261.106(a) (emphasis added). The dissent also correctly points out that "Immunity from liability and immunity from suit are two distinct principles." Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). Finally, the dissent even recognizes that "[ijmmunity from liability is an affirmative defense, while immunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction." Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex.2004); see also City of Hous. v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex.2011) (<HOLDING>); Harris County Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l
Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear bar contained in 2255 acts as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar (B) holding bjecause immunity from liability constitutes an affirmative defense not a jurisdictional bar only immunity from suit is properly before us today (C) recognizing that under texas law governmental immunity embraces two principles immunity from liability and immunity from suit (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding immunity from liability is not jurisdictional

Ex Output:
(B)

Ex Input:
use of low-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle. While we recognize that drivers may be accustomed to quickly flashing their high-beam headlights at an oncoming vehicle as a signal to dim headlights, there is no evidence in this case that the officer was driving with his high-beam headlights. Furthermore, the statute does not provide any exceptions for the momentary flashing of high-beam headlights. Thus, we must conclude the statute prohibits the use of high-beam headlights within 500 feet of an oncoming vehicle, for any length of time and for any purpose. [ 12] We recognize that at least one other appellate court has interpreted similar statutory language and reached the opposite conclusion. See Waukesha County v. Meinhardt, 2001 WI App 146, 9-10, 630 N.W.2d 277 (<HOLDING>). In another case involving a similar statute,
Holding statements: (A) holding that meinhardt did not commit a violation by flashing his highbeam headlights two times at an oncoming vehicle because the plain language of the statute did not prohibit the quick flashing of highbeam headlights (B) recognizing that where the statutory language is not ambiguous the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute must be given effect (C) holding that general statement of intent does not override plain language of statute (D) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (E) holding the trial judge did not commit reversible error through the chosen method of remedying the batson violation

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
type of contract contemplated by the statute and, further, whether his disability benefits were paid as a result of this contract. The context within which the legislature enacted the statute is instructive in ascertaining the statute's intended scope and in determining whether the exception clause covers Keelan's employment contract. The General Assembly enacted section 13 21 111.6 as part of a sweeping array of tort reform legislation designed to limit the amounts that plaintiffs can recover in civil actions. For example, in the same year that it enacted the collateral source statute, the legislature amended an existing statute to limit exemplary damage recoveries. Ch. 106, sec. 1, 13-21-102, 1986 Colo.Sess. Laws 675, 675-76. See Lira v. Davis, 832 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Colo.1992) (<HOLDING>). It also limited the liability of persons who
Holding statements: (A) holding a court may not award punitive damages (B) recognizing that the bill of attainder prohibits punitive legislation (C) recognizing that as part of the sweeping tortreform legislation of 1986 the legislatures purpose in amending section 1321102 was to limit excessive punitive damages awards (D) recognizing the importance of historical analysis in determining whether legislation is punitive (E) holding without discussion of the punitive damages issue that judgment for embezzlement which included actual and punitive damages was nondischargeable

Ex Output:
(C)