QUES: The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here." On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August. Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA personnel. We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them. We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION: How much longer was the United 93 takeover than their previous attemps?

QUES: Imagine you are standing in a farm field in central Illinois. The land is so flat you can see for miles and miles. On a clear day, you might see a grain silo 20 miles away. You might think to yourself, it sure is flat around here. If you drive one hundred miles to the south, the landscape changes. In southern Illinois, there are rolling hills. Why do you think this is? What could have caused these features? There are no big rivers that may have eroded and deposited this material. The ground is capable of supporting grass and trees, so wind erosion would not explain it. To answer the question, you need to go back 12,000 years. Around 12,000 years ago, a giant ice sheet covered much of the Midwest United States. Springfield, Illinois, was covered by over a mile of ice. Its hard to imagine a mile thick sheet of ice. The massive ice sheet, called a glacier, caused the features on the land you see today. Where did glaciers go? Where can you see them today? Glaciers are masses of flowing ice.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION: How big were the glaciers?

QUES: Recommendation: Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is now dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in each house of Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities, is another. The new committee or committees should conduct continuing studies of the activities of the intelligence agencies and report problems relating to the development and use of intelligence to all members of the House and Senate. We have already recommended that the total level of funding for intelligence be made public, and that the national intelligence program be appropriated to the National Intelligence Director, not to the secretary of defense. We also recommend that the intelligence committee should have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the budget. The resolution creating the new intelligence committee structure should grant subpoena authority to the committee or committees. The majority party's representation on this committee should never exceed the minority's representation by more than one. Four of the members appointed to this committee or committees should be a member who also serves on each of the following additional committees: Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Appropriations subcommittee. In this way the other major congressional interests can be brought together in the new committee's work. Members should serve indefinitely on the intelligence committees, without set terms, thereby letting them accumulate expertise. The committees should be smaller-perhaps seven or nine members in each house-so that each member feels a greater sense of responsibility, and accountability, for the quality of the committee's work. The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88 committees and subcommittees of Congress. One expert witness (not a member of the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding the department's successful development. The one attempt to consolidate such committee authority, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, may be eliminated. The Senate does not have even this. Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the kind of clear authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Department to deal with crime and the Defense Department to deal with threats to national security.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION: What is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding the department's successful development

QUES: Even though electronic espionage may cost U.S. firms billions of dollars a year, most aren't yet taking precautions, the experts said. By contrast, European firms will spend $150 million this year on electronic security, and are expected to spend $1 billion by 1992. Already many foreign firms, especially banks, have their own cryptographers, conference speakers reported. Still, encrypting corporate communications is only a partial remedy. One expert, whose job is so politically sensitive that he spoke on condition that he wouldn't be named or quoted, said the expected influx of East European refugees over the next few years will greatly increase the chances of computer-maintenance workers, for example, doubling as foreign spies. Moreover, he said, technology now exists for stealing corporate secrets after they've been "erased" from a computer's memory. He said that Oliver North of Iran-Contra notoriety thought he had erased his computer but that the information was later retrieved for congressional committees to read. No personal computer, not even the one on a chief executive's desk, is safe, this speaker noted. W. Mark Goode, president of Micronyx Inc., a Richardson, Texas, firm that makes computer-security products, provided a new definition for Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign for greater openness, known commonly as glasnost. Under Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Goode said, the Soviets are openly stealing Western corporate communications. He cited the case of a Swiss oil trader who recently put out bids via telex for an oil tanker to pick up a cargo of crude in the Middle East. Among the responses the Swiss trader got was one from the Soviet national shipping company, which hadn't been invited to submit a bid. The Soviets' eavesdropping paid off, however, because they got the contract.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION:
Are Europeans spending more or less to combat electronic espionage than the U.S.?