In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: was merely a voidable act. They rely on Sikes v. Global Marine, Inc., 881 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.1989), rehearing denied by 888 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir.1989), in which the Fifth Circuit found that the filing of a complaint in violation of the stay was voidable but not void. Id. at 178-79. The court reasoned that provisions of the Bankruptcy Code such as section 362(d), by giving courts the power to grant retroactive relief from a stay, indicated Congressional intent that acts in violation of a stay be simply voidable. Id. Spring Meadows, however, urges us to adopt the rule of the Ninth Circuit that any act committed in violation of an automatic stay is void. Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir.1993); In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569, 571-72 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court found such acts void even
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect (B) holding that violations of the automatic stay are void and rejecting the reasoning of sikes (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay (E) holding that an action taken in violation of the automatic stay is void ab initio
[A]: recognizing that any action taken in violation of the automatic bankruptcy stay is void and without effect

[Q]: offense; the maximum sentence is 10 years for each offense, which must run concurrently under Hale. By enhancing only one count and running it consecutively to the second count, appellant was sentenced to 12 years. This sentence exceeds the statutory maximum if both sentences had been enhanced under section 775.084 and run concurrently, or if neither had been enhanced and run consecutively. As such the appellant's sentence violates Hale. Although appellant was not sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 5 years for the second offense, as explained in State v. Hill, 660 So.2d 1384 (Fla.1995), the requirement that sentences run consecutively is not limited to only the minimum mandatory portion of. a total sentence: The State argues that Hale and its predecessors, Palmer v. State A 1997) (<HOLDING>). Here appellant was sentenced as an habitual
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies (B) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (C) holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence (D) holding hfo mandatory minimum sentence for robbery must run concurrently with sentences imposed for nonhfo first degree murder convictions (E) holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment
[A]: holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies

[Q]: contents of Form 4549). 16 . Perez further argues that Form 4549 requires the explicit approval of the IRS's District Director in order for it to be effective. He derives this argument from the last line of Form 4549, which states that the taxpayer understands "that this report is subject to acceptance by the District Director." In this case, the Form 4549 was signed only by the IRS examiner. We reject Perez's contention that an IRS examiner is not a duly authorized agent of the district director capable of accepting a Form 4549. In re Barry, 48 B.R. at 603 ("A revenue agent is a delegate of the district director authorized to accept waivers. His signature is sufficient 'acceptance' of this [IRS Form 4549] waiver."). Cf. Holbrook v. United States, 284 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1960) (<HOLDING>). 17 . See 26 U.S.C. 6212-6213. 18 .
Holding statements: (A) holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal (B) holding that it is not (C) holding that it is not necessary for the irs commissioner to personally consent to a taxpayer waiver in order for it to be effective (D) holding officer personally liable because he agreed to personally guarantee payment on an account (E) holding that persons knowledge of his right to refuse a consent to search is a factor but not a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating a voluntary consent
[A]:
holding that the point on appeal and the objection in the trial court must be the same in order for it to be preserved for appeal