In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Dr. Proctor testified about the 2014 Report's conclusion that filtered cigarettes increased the risk of adenocarci-noma (a type of lung cancer) by causing smokers to inhale more deeply, and by ventilating in a way'that "increases certain poisonous compounds." On appeal, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not have been permitted to use the 2014 Report to bolster the testimony of her expert witness. On this point, we also agree with Defendants. It is well established that "experts cannot bolster or corroborate their opinions with the opinions of other experts who do not testify," as -"[s]ueh testimony improperly permits one expert to become a conduit for the opinion of another expert who is not subject to cross-examination." Schwarz v. State, 695 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Tolbert v. State, 114 So.3d 291, 294
Holding statements: (A) holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion (B) holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting 90403 fla stat (C) holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction (D) holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge (E) holding that witness testimony about prior drug purchases from defendant was highly probative of brookins guilt and was not outweighed by any danger of undue prejudice
holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion

the report and recommendation did not notify the parties that they must file timely objections to preserve their right to appellate review. He argues that the firm waiver rule should not be enforced in the absence of such an explicit notification. While we have held that the firm waiver rule is inapplicable when pro se litigants are not given explicit notice of the rule, see id. at 659, we have never extended that practice to counseled cases. We decline to do so today, because we expect counsel to know the rules. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 n. 5 (10th Cir.2007) ("[W]e expect counsel to know the pleading rules of the road without being given personal notice of them by the district court."); United States v. Windrix, 405 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) provides that a
Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules (B) holding that a criminal defendants counsel is charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety including those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying its own local rules even though those rules prevented it from considering some facts improperly alleged by plaintiffs that might have been relevant to the summary judgment motion (D) holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery (E) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules

Moore has to show that an error: (i) was made; (ii) is plain (i.e., clear or obvious); and (iii) affects his substantial rights. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir.2009). Even if we assumed that the district court's brief explanation constituted an obvious error in violation of Carter, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) requires Moore to also show that the district court's lack of explanation had a prejudicial effect on the sentence imposed. See Puckett v. United States,-U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1433 n. 4, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009). Having only summarily raised the reasonableness of his 188-month sentence in an Anders brief to this court, Moore has made no such showing. We thus affirm Moore's within-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed
Holding statements: (A) recognizing presumption (B) recognizing a presumption of reasonableness (C) recognizing that this court applies an appellate presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence (D) recognizing this presumption (E) holding that a court of appeals may afford a presumption of reasonableness to a withinguidelines sentence
recognizing presumption