In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: " Boone v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 130, 133, 415 S.E.2d 250, 251 (1992). "A battery is an unlawful touching of another.... Whether a touching is a battery depends on the intent of the actor, not on the force applied." Adams v. Commonwealth, 33 Va.App. 463, 468-69, 534 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2000) (citation omitted). " '[T]he slightest touching of another ... if done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law affords redress.' " Id. at 469, 534 S.E.2d at 350 (citation omitted). Accordingly, where Vaughn claims he only intended to scare Robinson and did not intend to shoot or wound him, Vaughn would not be entitled, in my opinion, to have the jury instructed on assault and battery. See Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d 193, 198 (1987) (<HOLDING>). A second theory supported by the evidence is
Holding statements: (A) holding that shooting at a person intending only to scare the person where no touching or wounding occurs supports instructing the jury on simple assault (B) holding that simple assault includes urinating on another (C) holding with no analysis that any person or organization who may be legally liable therefor applies to a person legally liable for injuries caused by an accident 4 when under the facts of the case the only person to whom the clause could have applied was a tortfeasor (D) holding that punching another person is a statutory assault (E) holding simple assault is a lesser included offense of recklessly endangering another person

A: holding that simple assault includes urinating on another
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Q: cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S.Ct. 1027, 122 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993). Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (10th Cir.1995). This is because 1956 regulates activities that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (stating that "where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence"); cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1361, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463
Holding statements: (A) holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce (B) holding that commerce clause did not provide congress with authority to enact civil remedy provision of violence against women act inasmuch as provision was not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce (C) recognizing that the interstate nexus requirement is satisfied by proof of a probable or potential impact on interstate commerce (D) holding that the government can satisfy the hobbs act interstate commerce requirement by showing that the robbery resulted in the closure of a business engaged in interstate commerce (E) holding that commerce clause authorizes congress to punish any particular criminal action even without proof of a relation to interstate commerce when the activity is part of a class of activities determined by congress to affect interstate commerce

A: holding that congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
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Q: at 536, 280 A.2d at 376 (emphasis added). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had not established a constitutional right to retain their jobs, notwithstanding their allegations that they were being fired solely on the grounds of political sponsorship or affiliation. Id. at 377-78. See also Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 151, 166 A.2d 278 (1960); Mahoney v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 13 Pa.Cmwlth. 243, 320 A.2d 459 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S.Ct. 806, 42 L.Ed.2d 822 (1975). Using hindsight, it is possible to reconstruct a foreshadowing of the Elrod holding in the Seventh Circuit's decisions in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928, 943, 93 S.Ct. 1364, 35 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973) (<HOLDING>) and Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir.
Holding statements: (A) holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political (B) holding a political rally for instance (C) holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting judges running for election from expressing a view on political issues during campaigns (D) holding political discharges were unconstitutional (E) holding that fathers military service alone was neither political opinion nor sufficient to establish imputed political opinion

A:
holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political
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