In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: supervising, or otherwise controlling the agent" in addition to any vicarious liability that may be imposed via the agent's actions. We hold that plaintiffs under the ICRA may proceed against the employer on either a direct negligence or vicarious liability theory for supervisor harassment in a hostile-work-environment case. The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, with the burden of proof on the employer, applies only to claims of vicarious liability. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764, 118 S.Ct. at 2270 (adopting affirmative defense "in order to accommodate the agency principle of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority" (emphasis added)); accord Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. at 2292; see also Johnson v. Shinseki, 811 F.Supp.2d 336, 348 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 803
Holding statements: (A) holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct (B) holding that if a state case explicitly states that the state standard is more favorable to the defendant than the federal standard the federal claim is considered adjudicated below when the state standard is applied (C) holding because the court applied the negligence standard the faragher defense is inapplicable (D) holding that equitable defense of laches is inapplicable to claims of fraud (E) holding that even though the court does not usually apply the clearly erroneous standard to mixed questions of fact and law this standard is properly applied to the materiality issue
[A]: holding that the victims negligence is not a defense to criminal conduct

[Q]: This Court has reviewed these decisions and is in agreement with their reasoning and conclusions that the public policy exception does not give rise to a protected property interest in continued employment in this case. Likewise, the implied covenant is not the source of a protected property interest. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment and affords an employee the right to be dealt with fairly and in good faith. See Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 191 P.3d 205, 213-14 (2008). Breach of the covenant may give rise to an action for wrongful termination but it does not convert at-will employment to term employment nor form the basis for a protected property interest. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950, 952-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate (B) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (C) holding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment under montanas statutory scheme for at will employment (D) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (E) recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages
[A]: recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate

[Q]: State, 918 S.W.2d 511, 518 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Baird, J., concurring), urged that McFarland should be overruled, the Court of Criminal Appeals has not done so. I would hold that we are not bound by the interpretation of the federal rule by the United States Supreme Court, based on the substantial differences in the respective evi-dentiary rules regarding statements against penal interest. Indeed, the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Williamson was to evaluate each statement within a confession as a separate statement for purposes of admissibility under the federal hearsay exception. Id. at 2434-35 This is antithetical to the general approach Texas has taken in evaluating admissibility of statements. See, e.g., Marini v. State, 593 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) (<HOLDING>). The federal interpretation would lead to the
Holding statements: (A) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (B) holding that question is whether defendants will was overborne by police at the time of the confession (C) holding that rule of completeness did not apply where statements made at the scene and the statement made at the police station were distinct and not part of one confession (D) holding that trial judges determination of the admissibility of a confession is based on whether the confession was voluntarily given (E) holding that later declarations during defendants confession leading officers to evidence of the crime constituted part of one continuous confession that began at the police station
[A]:
holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed