Question:
American Airlines Flight 11: FAA Awareness. Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane's failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft. At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft. The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look for American 11. At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11: American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport. The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words "we have some planes." The next transmission came seconds later: American 11: Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane. After reading the above, is "He told the supervisor he couldn't reach anybody and the supervisor said to try again" the correct answer to the question "What did the controller tell the supervisor when he was not able to communicate with the plane? What was he instructed to do?"?

Answer:
no

Question:
Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras. Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden. After reading the above, is "Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. Sent 14: In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras" the correct answer to the question "Describe the events that occurred before the attack on the USS Cole?"?

Answer:
no

Question:
Fact: I wasn't dead. After I realized this, I left my quarters. The lightscreen provided had informed me when and where official meals were taking place, but I hadn't bothered to acknowledge the invitations. It hadn't seemed relevant, somehow, given that I was still reeling over the explosion, the deaths of my crewmates, and the rescue. I've heard there are a number of stages of grief and shock; I guess I was working my way through them. Food was delivered to my quarters. Initially, I couldn't figure out whyI hadn't requested any be sent. Then I realized, someone must have noticed I hadn't left, and was nice enough to send food my way. The accompanying bottle of wine was a nice touch. I must have consumed it, too, because later on, the plates and the bottle were both empty. I spent a lot of time lying on my back on the bed, staring up at the little etched swirls in the ceiling, or slumped in the old-fashioned armchair, staring out the windows at the stars. I did a lot of staring and not moving. Man, was it good to be done with that stage. It was time to find out what hell looked like. After reading the above, is "Bottle of beer" the correct answer to the question "Did he requested for food and what are the other thing he got with food?"?

Answer:
no

Question:
Iwasaki's careful respect for the Long Beach program and its lawyers earned him the political capital he needed to complete his takeover in a matter of weeks. "The Long Beach program had strong support in the community so in a situation like that, one has to recognize that it's not like a takeover where I have all the answers and I know best," Iwasaki said. "The people in the community who are working there have the contacts and the knowledge that will allow service to continue." Things have gone less smoothly across town. There, Dudovitz, a longtime poverty lawyer and executive director of the San Fernando Valley's 36-year-old legal aid program, continues to struggle with his hostile takeover of the neighboring San Gabriel-Pomona Valleys service area one year after it was accomplished. On the bright side, Dudovitz has extended his respected program to clients in the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley, and he now operates on a much larger budget, $6.5 million last year. However, his clash with the old San Gabriel program resulted in litigation, bitter feelings and a mission that some say is not clearly focused on serving poor people. "It was a difficult situation that was probably mishandled by everyone," a longtime observer of the public interest community said of the San Fernando Valley-San Gabriel-Pomona Valley merger. "There are very few people who come out as the heroes. Personalities got involved when they shouldn't have. Things were said that caused bad feelings and couldn't be unsaid." Iwasaki's merger with the smaller, 48-year-old Long Beach program was friendly and fast, and no one - not even Long Beach board members - lost a job. When it was over, Iwasaki had $1 million more in federal dollars and two new offices. Long Beach clients regained services they had lost years ago when federal budget cuts and dwindling grants reduced the staff of 15 lawyers to five and cut immigration and consumer law programs. Iwasaki said, "[I judged the transition] better than I could have hoped for." After reading the above, is "6.5 years" the correct answer to the question "How long was the Long Beach Program been in operation?"?

Answer:
no