In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant's case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts
Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it

Output: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body

Input: Consider Input: of record rather than the alien. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also favor notice of counsel of record rather than actual notice of the client. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) (stating that "whenever service under these rules is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court"). Case precedent also indicates that actual notice of an alien is not required under the INA. See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 669 n. 6 (3d Cir.1990) (noting in dicta that notice to attorney comprised actual notice to alien); Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 502-3 (D.C.Cir.1989) (finding actual knowledge of attorney constitutes reasonable notice); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193, 1194 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Anin received notice as required by the INA.
Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (D) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (E) holding that notice to original attorney not formally withdrawn comprised proper notice

Output: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city

Input: Consider Input: that the newspapers and magazines will use the U.S. Mail to send such matter to them subscribers, and therefore, that such Defendant "caused" the use of the mails within the meaning of the mail fraud statute. See, e.g., Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 28, 108 S.Ct. 316 ("[U]sing the wires and the mail to print and send the [Wall Street] Journal to its customers" containing the column at issue "was not only anticipated but an essential part of the scheme."); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Financial Co., 886 F.2d 986, 992 (8 Cir.1989) ("[I]t was almost certain that notice of [foreclosure sales] would be mailed to other claimants or that notice would be published in newspapers and copies of the notice distributed through the mails."); United States v. Bowers, 644 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Shepherd, 587 F.2d 943, 944
Holding statements: (A) holding that an increased sentence may be imposed for harms that were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants conduct even where the defendant did not directly cause the specific harm (B) holding that in order for a claim to be reasonably ascertainable the debtor must have in his possession at the very least some specific information that reasonably suggests both the claim for which the debtor may be liable and the entity to whom he would be liable (C) holding that it was reasonably foreseeable that newspapers would be mailed to some subscribers containing the advertisements the defendant placed in the newspaper (D) holding that it was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the letter he handdelivered to a newspaper in response to an advertisement would be sent by the newspaper to its customer via the us mails (E) holding that an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future
Output: holding that an increased sentence may be imposed for harms that were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendants conduct even where the defendant did not directly cause the specific harm