TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor "reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another." Id. 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert's conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert's use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768
Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car

SOLUTION: holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle

PROBLEM: by jury is a fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties of the people. C Prudential that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right means that the starting point of our analysis is a presumption against the waiver of this constitutional right. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co., 301 U.S. at 393, 57 S.Ct. at 811-12; In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 132 (giving right to trial by jury "same protections as other constitutional rights"); accord Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775 (Ala.2000) (construing scope of contractual jury waiver strictly and narrowly "in deference to the constitutional guarantee of the right to a jury trial"); see also Note, 58 Baylor L.Rev. at 259. But see Lowe Enters. Residential Partners, L.P. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 92, 40 P.3d 405, 410 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Despite the existence of a presumption
Holding statements: (A) holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy (B) holding that the government was not bound by its waivers in three prior contracts (C) holding that german law presumptively confers joint custody upon both parents until a court enters a contrary order (D) holding without reference to supreme court case law to the contrary that in nevada contractual jury waivers are presumptively valid (E) holding appellate waivers are enforceable if invoked by the government

SOLUTION: holding that prospective waivers of claims are void as against public policy

PROBLEM: the Lighting Ridge sale will not have an adverse effect on any of the species at issue. However, the Lighting Ridge EA does not suffice to show compliance with the Forest Act because it does not assess pileated woodpecker habitat by means of a valid forest-wide standard. 7 . We do not suggest that the Forest Service must adopt the R4 definition of old growth. It must, however, put in place and observe with respect to each site specific action a valid forest-wide standard for ensuring viable populations of old growth dependent species. 8 . We are aware that other courts have held that 219.19 does not allow use of habitat as a proxy for population. Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1 (11th Cir.1999). See also Utah Environmental Congress v. Zieroth, 190 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1272 (D.Utah 2002) (<HOLDING>); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, 180
Holding statements: (A) recognizing district courts authority to exclude opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert should it conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered (B) holding that 21919 unambiguously requires collection of population data (C) holding that the fourteenth amendment which makes persons bom in the united states and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the united states and requires that representatives be apportioned among the states based on population excluding indians not taxed did not make an indian a citizen of the united states (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that because the statute requires commerce to use to the extent possible data from countries that are significant producers of comparable merchandise commerce may not employ a methodology that requires using data from countries which almost certainly have no domestic production at least not any meaningful production capable of having influence or effect

SOLUTION:
recognizing district courts authority to exclude opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert should it conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered