In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: that in December 1995, his wage was $8.67 per hour. Lewis stated that a Caucasian employee, who misrepresented his knowledge of desktop publishing, was hired at a rate of $9.00 per hour in his department. This employee ultimately was "[p]ushed out the door." Supp.App. at 354. Lewis also stated that another Caucasian employee received a pay increase from $7.50 to $8.25 per hour after he went from part-time to full-time status, and that a third Caucasian employee told him that he received a raise after his father called the store manager. The District Court held that Lewis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that the employees he identified were similarly situated to him. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on his wrongful termination claim,
Holding statements: (A) holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated (B) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (D) holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated
[EX A]: holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated

[EX Q]: of whether the images on the site constituted child pornography, the receipt shows Shiver's familiarity with making commercial transactions for pornographic images on the Internet. The government also presented evidence specifically showing that the image of one child in particular had been produced in North Carolina. That the latter image ended up on Shiver's computer in Florida strongly suggests that it traveled in interstate commerce. We likewise reject Shiver's contention that the government's evidence was insufficient to support the jury's conclusion that he "knowingly possessed" the images of child pornography on his computer. Although we have interpreted the meaning of "knowing possession" in other contexts, see, e.g., United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted), we have not yet had
Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase possession or custody in 5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession (B) holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved (C) recognizing theory of constructive possession (D) holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others (E) holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession
[EX A]: holding that the phrase possession or custody in 5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession

[EX Q]: finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. Because Officer Gillespie did not comply with KCPD inventory policy and because her testimony demonstrates pretext, we hold that the search cannot be upheld under the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. The Government argues that the inventory should be upheld because, as the district court concluded, Officer Gillespie was required to impound the vehicle under KCPD standard policy because she "believed" Taylor's vehicle had been used in the commission of a crime. The Government's argument that the inventory was valid because the impoundment was valid conflates two separate issues. The validity of an impoundment is not dispositive of the validity of an inventory search. See Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, we have rejected the argument that
Holding statements: (A) holding that inventory search could not be condemned insofar as department policy permitted opening box for the standard purposes of inventory searches (B) holding police officers were justified in impounding and conducting inventory search which extended to the trunk of the vehicle where vehicle was abandoned and believed to contain stolen goods (C) holding warrantless search of defendants automobile four days after impoundment was permissible under requirements of fourth amendment and state constitution where officers had probable cause to search vehicle when it was impounded and that probable cause continued between the time of the impoundment and the search (D) holding that a search warrant is invalid if not based on an affidavit (E) holding that even though an inventory search was invalid the vehicle was properly impounded
[EX A]:
holding that inventory search could not be condemned insofar as department policy permitted opening box for the standard purposes of inventory searches