In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: in original). With the possible exception of his claim that he was not permitted to testify, Man-giardi has not satisfied either prong of the Strickland test. Because each of Mangiardi's claims relating to the proceedings is meritless, appellate counsel was not unreasonable for any failure to raise any of them on direct appeal. See Williams, 166 F.Supp.2d at 305 (finding that where each of the claims raised in the defendant's 2255 motion was meritless, appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to raise them on direct appeal). The same reasoning applies to appellate counsel's failure to raise Man-giardi's claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See id., James v. Superintendent of SCI Huntington, No. CIV.A. 97-2864, 2000 WL 5196, at *3 (E.D.Pa. January 4, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as discussed above, claims for
Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim (B) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (C) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate (E) holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue
[A]: (B)

[Q]: removal purposes. Instead, for complete preemption to apply, the cause of action not only must be preempted by ERISA but also must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA 502(a), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 ("[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted. The preemptive force of ERISA 502(a) is still stronger.... Hence, causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of 502(a) [are] removable to federal court." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62-63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Da-Ponte v. Manfredi Motors Inc., 157 Fed.
Holding statements: (A) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under 1132a1b (B) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under 502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan falls directly under 502a1b of erisa and therefore was necessarily federal in character and subject to removal to federal court
[A]: (E)

[Q]: counts. Again, the motion was denied. The jury convicted appellant on all charges, and the trial court imposed sentence. Preservation Appellant's motions for judgment of acquittal did not specifically set forth the ground argued on this appeal namely, that the confinement of three-year-old Victoria Linn did not constitute a kidnapping since it was merely incidental to the robbery. See Reed v. State, 603 So.2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)(explaining that only those grounds raised in a motion for judgment of acquittal are reviewable on appeal). A motion for judgment of acquittal which does no more than generally allege that the State has failed to establish a prima facie case is insufficient to preserve the instant issue for appeal. See Johnson v. State, 478 So.2d 886, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)(<HOLDING>); Gibbs v. State, 693 So.2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA
Holding statements: (A) holding that a general motion for judgment of acquittal which asserted without explanation or argument that the state had failed to prove a prima facie case of the crime charged in the indictment was insufficient to preserve for appeal the specific argument that the state had failed to prove the age of the victim to support a conviction for sexual battery of a child under the age of eleven (B) holding that a defendants general objection that the city of mobile failed to make out a prima facie case was sufficient to preserve for appellate review the issue of the citys failure to prove the ordinance (C) holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same (D) holding that trial court erred in denying motion for judgment of acquittal when state failed to prove venue (E) holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive
[A]:
(A)