If you beat a dog in Schuylkill County, you'll probably get a $100 fine. If you repeatedly beat a woman, you'll probably get the same fine. In 2001, county judges heard 98 Protection From Abuse cases, finding the defendant guilty in 48 percent of those cases, either after a hearing or through a technical violation or plea. Of those found guilty, the majority were ordered to pay court costs, plus a $100 fine. No defendants were ordered to pay more than a $250 fine for violating the court order. In 27 percent of the cases, the charges were dismissed or the defendant was found not guilty. In the rest of the cases, charges were withdrawn or the matter is not yet resolved. Sarah T. Casey, executive director of Schuylkill Women in Crisis, finds it disturbing that in most cases, the fine for violating a PFA is little more than the fine someone would get for cruelty and abuse toward an animal. "In most of the counties surrounding Schuylkill County, the penalties given for indirect criminal contempt are much stiffer than those in Schuylkill County," Casey said. "What kind of message are we sending those who repeatedly violate Protection From Abuse orders? That it's OK to abuse women in Schuylkill County, because you'll only get a slap on the wrist?" Under state law, the minimum fine for contempt of a PFA is $100; the maximum fine is $1,000 and up to six months in jail. Like others who are familiar with how the county's legal system does and doesn't work for victims of domestic violence, Casey believes some changes are in order. Valerie West, a manager/attorney with Mid-Penn Legal Services, with offices in Pottsville and Reading, regularly handles domestic violence cases. She finds fault with the local requirement that a custody order must be established within 30 days after a PFA is filed. West said she feels a custody order should be allowed to stand for the full term of the PFA - up to 18 months - as it does in many other counties in the state. "It places an undue burden on the plaintiff, in terms of cost, finding legal representation and facing their abuser - not to mention a further burden on the system to provide those services," West said. "It may be difficult for the parties to reach an agreement so soon after violence has occurred.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer: What kind of message is being sent to those who repeatedly violate Protection From Abuse orders?

In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama Bin Laden and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting Bin Laden expelled from Afghanistan or possibly capturing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of Bin Laden's organization remained intact. President Clinton was deeply concerned about Bin Laden. He and his national security advisor, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on Bin Laden's reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about Bin Laden and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate-intended to avoid enhancing Bin Laden's stature by giving him unnecessary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors and of chemical and biological weapons. As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns-the Y2K scare. Some government officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such breakdowns. On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Bin Laden, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, "The time for training is over." Suspecting that this was a signal for Abu Hoshar to commence a terrorist operation, Jordanian police arrested Abu Hoshar and 15 others and informed Washington. One of the 16, Raed Hijazi, had been born in California to Palestinian parents; after spending his childhood in the Middle East, he had returned to northern California, taken refuge in extremist Islamist beliefs, and then made his way to Abu Zubaydah's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, where he learned the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. He and his younger brother had been recruited by Abu Hoshar into a loosely knit plot to attack Jewish and American targets in Jordan. After late 1996, when Abu Hoshar was arrested and jailed, Hijazi moved back to the United States, worked as a cabdriver in Boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters. After Abu Hoshar's release, Hijazi shuttled between Boston and Jordan gathering money and supplies. With Abu Hoshar, he recruited inTurkey and Syria as well as Jordan; with Abu Zubaydah's assistance, Abu Hoshar sent these recruits to Afghanistan for training.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer: Who, along with his younger brother, had been recruited in Abu Hoshar?

As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer:
What was the amount that the plotters used to fund their attack?Which entities funded these plotters?