In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.

Input: Consider Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Reporting on Influence and
Subversion by the Kremlin Act'' or ''RISK Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) In 1986, an interagency working group issued a report
assessing ''active measures'' by the former Soviet Union
against the United States.
(2) The working group concluded that ''there is a massive
and highly organized effort by the Soviet Union and its proxies
to influence world opinion''.
(3) The working group further observed that ''this effort
includes public diplomacy to enhance the Soviet image abroad
and . . . also includes a persistent, widespread program of
disinformation and deception designed to discredit the U.S.
image abroad and disrupt U.S. policy objectives.''.
(4) Active measures by the Russian Federation have shown no
diminution since the last report issued by the working group in
1987, including--
(A) to influence world opinion;
(B) to undercut democratic processes and
institutions in the United States and partner nations;
(C) to challenge the international liberal order;
and
(D) to establish an unfettered sphere of influence.
(5) The Director of National Intelligence concluded in
light of the Russian Federation's hacking of the 2016
presidential election that ''Russian efforts to influence the
2016 U.S. presidential election represent the most recent
expression of Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the
U.S.-led liberal democratic order.''.
(6) The Russian Federation is deploying an array of
military, cyber, intelligence, and economic tactics to weaken
United States democratic institutions, divide Europe from the
United States, divide Europe from within, undermine
organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and the European Union, and coerce partners to cooperate with
Russia.
(7) Militarily, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered
the forcible and illegal occupation of Crimea in March 2014 and
the invasion of Georgia in 2008.
(8) The Russian military, in which President Putin has
invested heavily, continues to engage in acts of aggression and
intimidation against United States allies across Europe.
(9) The Russian Federation's subversive activities
undermine trust in democratic systems, giving rise to political
instability.

SEC. 3. ASSESSMENT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress
a report setting forth an assessment, obtained by the Secretary for
purposes of the report, of subversive activities by the Russian
Federation.
(b) Independent Assessment.--
(1) In general.--The assessment obtained for purposes of
subsection (a) shall be conducted by a federally funded
research and development center (FFRDC), or another appropriate
independent entity with expertise in diplomatic and military
developments in Europe and the Russian Federation, selected by
the Secretary for purposes of the assessment.
(2) Use of previous studies.--The entity conducting the
assessment may use and incorporate information from previous
studies on matters appropriate to the assessment.
(c) Elements.--The assessment obtained for purposes of subsection
(a) shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of disinformation and propaganda
activities of the Russian Federation, including an assessment
of--
(A) support for disinformation and propaganda
activities with respect to the United States and
foreign countries;
(B) the overall structure of the Russian
Government's disinformation and influence apparatus,
including its intelligence agencies and propaganda
outlets such as Russia Today; and
(C) propaganda techniques, including forgery, use
of media representatives and proxies, use of front
organizations, and efforts to influence international
organizations.
(2) An assessment of support by the Russian Federation for
separatist activities and other aggressive actions aimed at
undermining the sovereignty of foreign countries, particularly
in Ukraine and the Baltic countries.
(3) An assessment of cyber intrusions by the Russian
Federation to influence the infrastructure and democratic
processes in the United States and other countries.
(4) An assessment of--
(A) the use of energy exports by the Russian
Federation for purposes of political or economic
coercion; and
(B) significant investment in energy
infrastructure, including pipelines, by the Government
of Russia or Russian-controlled entities.
(5) An assessment of the deterioration of democratic
conditions in the Russian Federation, including--
(A) suppression of freedom of the press;
(B) detention, beating, and murder of political
activists and opposition leaders;
(C) suppression of minority rights;
(D) suppression of human rights; and
(E) efforts to undermine the Russian
nongovernmental organizations and Russian civil
society.
(d) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 4. COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE FUND.

(a) Establishment.--The President is authorized to establish in the
Department of the Treasury a fund to be known as the Countering Russian
Influence Fund (in this section referred to as the ''Fund'').
(b) Amounts in Fund.--The Fund shall consist of the following:
(1) Amounts appropriated to carry out section 7070(d) of
division C of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (Public
Law 115-31).
(2) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State
to carry out this section.
(c) Purposes of Fund.--Amounts in the Fund for any fiscal year are
authorized to be made available to the Secretary of State for bilateral
assistance for countries in Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, to
counter the following activities in such countries carried out by the
Russian Federation:
(1) Support for disinformation and propaganda.
(2) Interference in foreign elections.
(3) Efforts to undermine financial transparency and
governance.
(d) Civil Society and Other Organizations.--Amounts in the Fund for
any fiscal year may be made available to carry out the purposes of the
Fund under subsection (c) through civil society and other organizations
that seek to mitigate the expansion of Russian influence and
aggression, including through public awareness campaigns and exchange
activities.
(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There are authorized to be appropriated to
the President not less than $100,000,000 to carry out this
section.
(2) Relation to certain other amounts.--Such funds are in
addition to any other amounts made available for bilateral
assistance for countries in Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia.
(3) Rule of construction.--This section shall be considered
to be an authorization of appropriations for purposes of
section 7070(d) of division C of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2017 (Public Law 115-31).
(f) Report.--The Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a
report for each fiscal year for which activities are undertaken
pursuant to this section.

Output: Reporting on Influence and Subversion by the Kremlin Act or the RISK Act This bill directs the Department of State to submit to Congress an assessment of subversive activities by the Russian Federation. The assessment shall be conducted by a federally funded research and development center or another appropriate independent entity with expertise in diplomatic and military developments in Europe and the Russian Federation. Such entity may use and incorporate information from previous studies and shall include assessments of: disinformation and propaganda activities of the Russian Federation; support by the Russian Federation for separatist activities and other aggressive actions aimed at undermining the sovereignty of foreign countries, particularly in Ukraine and the Baltic countries; cyber intrusions by the Russian Federation to influence the infrastructure and democratic processes in the United States and other countries; the use of energy exports by the Russian Federation for purposes of political or economic coercion and significant investment in energy infrastructure by the Russian government or Russian-controlled entities; and the deterioration of democratic conditions in the Russian Federation. The President is authorized to establish in the Department of the Treasury the Countering Russian Influence Fund to be used by the State Department for bilateral assistance to counter activities carried out in countries in Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia by the Russian Federation to support disinformation and propaganda, interfere in foreign elections, and undermine financial transparency and governance. Amounts in the fund may be made available to carry out its purposes through civil society and other organizations that seek to mitigate the expansion of Russian influence and aggression, including through public awareness campaigns and exchange activities.

Input: Consider Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Preserving Marginal Lands and
Protecting Farming Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. MAXIMUM ENROLLMENT.

Section 1231(d) of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C.
3831(d)) is amended to read as follows:
''(d) Maximum Enrollment.--The Secretary may maintain in the
conservation reserve at any 1 time, not more than--
''(1) during fiscal year 2013, 29,000,000 acres;
''(2) during fiscal year 2014, 26,000,000 acres; and
''(3) during each of fiscal years 2015 through 2018,
24,000,000 acres.''.

SEC. 3. INELIGIBLE LAND.

Section 1231 of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3831) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
''(j) Ineligible Land.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary
may not enroll land in the conservation reserve that is classified as
class I or class II land under the land capability classification
system published in the National Soil Survey Handbook of the Natural
Resources Conservation Service, unless such land is enrolled as a
buffer, filterstrip, or strip adjacent to a riparian area.''.

SEC. 4. CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS.

(a) Early Termination by Owner or Operator.--Section 1235(e) of the
Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3835(e)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)(A)--
(A) by striking ''The Secretary'' and inserting
''During fiscal year 2014, the Secretary''; and
(B) by striking ''before January 1, 1995,'';
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (C) and
inserting the following:
''(C) Land devoted to hardwood trees.
''(D) Wildlife habitat, duck nesting habitat,
pollinator habitat, upland bird habitat buffer,
wildlife food plots, State acres for wildlife
enhancement, shallow water areas for wildlife, and rare
and declining habitat.
''(E) Farmable wetland and restored wetland.
''(F) Land that contains diversions, erosion
control structures, flood control structures, contour
grass strips, living snow fences, salinity reducing
vegetation, cross wind trap strips, and sediment
retention structures.
''(G) Land located within a federally-designated
wellhead protection area.
''(H) Land that is covered by an easement under the
conservation reserve program.
''(I) Land located within an average width,
according to the applicable Natural Resources
Conservation Service field office technical guide, of a
perennial stream or permanent water body.''; and
(3) in paragraph (3), by striking ''60 days after the date
on which the owner or operator submits the notice required
under paragraph (1)(C)'' and inserting ''upon approval by the
Secretary''.
(b) Transition Option for Certain Farmers or Ranchers.--Section
1235(f) of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3835(f)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by
striking ''Duties'' and all that follows through ''a
beginning farmer'' and inserting ''Transition to
covered farmer or rancher.--In the case of a contract
modification approved in order to facilitate the
transfer of land subject to a contract from a retired
farmer or rancher to a beginning farmer'';
(B) in subparagraph (A)(i), by inserting '',
including preparing to plant an agricultural crop''
after ''improvements'';
(C) in subparagraph (D), by striking ''the farmer
or rancher'' and inserting ''the covered farmer or
rancher''; and
(D) in subparagraph (E), by striking ''section
1001A(b)(3)(B)'' and inserting ''section 1001(a)''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ''requirement of section
1231(h)(4)(B)'' and inserting ''option pursuant to section
1231(h)''.
(c) Final Year Contract.--Section 1235 of the Food Security Act of
1985 (16 U.S.C. 3835) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
''(g) Final Year of Contract.--The Secretary shall not consider an
owner or operator to be in violation of a term or condition of the
conservation reserve contract if--
''(1) during the year prior to expiration of the contract,
the land is enrolled in the conservation stewardship program;
and
''(2) the activity required under the conservation
stewardship program pursuant to such enrollment is consistent
with this subchapter.''.

Output: Preserving Marginal Lands and Protecting Farming Act of 2013 - Amends the Food Security Act of 1985 to set the maximum number of acres that may be enrolled at any one time in the conservation reserve program (CRP) at: (1) 29 million acres for FY2013, (2) 26 million acres for FY2014, and (3) 26 million acres for each of FY2015 through FY2018. Prohibits the enrollment of land in the conservation reserve that is classified as class I or class II land under the National Soil Survey Handbook's land capability classification system unless such land is enrolled as a buffer, filterstrip, or strip adjacent to a riparian area. Directs the Secretary of Agriculture (USDA), during FY2014, to permit a participant that entered into a CRP contract to terminate the contract at any time if the contract has been in effect for at least five years. Revises the types of land that are not subject to early contract termination.

Input: Consider Input: SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY.

(a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Liberation Army is the principal
instrument of repression within the People's Republic of China,
responsible for occupying Tibet since 1950, massacring hundreds
of students and demonstrators for democracy in Tiananmen Square
on June 4, 1989, and running the Laogai (''reform through
labor'') slave labor camps.
(2) The People's Liberation Army is engaged in a massive
military buildup, which has involved a doubling since 1992 of
announced official figures for military spending by the
People's Republic of China.
(3) The People's Liberation Army is engaging in a major
ballistic missile modernization program which could undermine
peace and stability in East Asia, including 2 new
intercontinental missile programs, 1 submarine-launched missile
program, a new class of compact but long-range cruise missiles,
and an upgrading of medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.
(4) The People's Liberation Army is working to coproduce
the SU-27 fighter with Russia, and is in the process of
purchasing several substantial weapons systems from Russia,
including the 633 model of the Kilo-class submarine and the SS-
N-22 Sunburn missile system specifically designed to
incapacitate United States aircraft carriers and Aegis
cruisers.
(5) The People's Liberation Army has carried out acts of
aggression in the South China Sea, including the February 1995
seizure of the Mischief Reef in the Spratley Islands, which is
claimed by the Philippines.
(6) In July 1995 and in March 1996, the People's Liberation
Army conducted missile tests to intimidate Taiwan when Taiwan
held historic free elections, and those tests effectively
blockaded Taiwan's 2 principal ports of Keelung and Kaohsiung.
(7) The People's Liberation Army has contributed to the
proliferation of technologies relevant to the refinement of
weapons-grade nuclear material, including transferring ring
magnets to Pakistan.
(8) The People's Liberation Army and associated defense
companies have provided ballistic missile components, cruise
missiles, and chemical weapons ingredients to Iran, a country
that the executive branch has repeatedly reported to Congress
is the greatest sponsor of terrorism in the world.
(9) In May 1996, United States authorities caught the
People's Liberation Army enterprise Poly Technologies and the
civilian defense industrial company Norinco attempting to
smuggle 2,000 AK-47s into Oakland, California, and offering to
sell urban gangs shoulder-held missile launchers capable of
''taking out a 747'' (which the affidavit of the United States
Customs Service of May 21, 1996, indicated that the
representative of Poly Technologies and Norinco claimed), and
Communist Chinese authorities punished only 4 low-level arms
merchants by sentencing them on May 17, 1997, to brief prison
terms.
(10) The People's Liberation Army contributes to the
People's Republic of China's failure to meet the standards of
the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding with the United States on
intellectual property rights by running factories which pirate
videos, compact discs, and computer software that are products
of the United States.
(11) The People's Liberation Army contributes to the
People's Republic of China's failing to meet the standards of
the February 1997 Memorandum of Understanding with the United
States on textiles by operating enterprises engaged in the
transshipment of textile products to the United States through
third countries.
(12) The estimated $2 billion to $3 billion in annual
earnings of People's Liberation Army enterprises subsidize the
expansion and activities of the People's Liberation Army
described in this subsection.
(13) The commercial activities of the People's Liberation
Army are frequently conducted on noncommercial terms, or for
noncommercial purposes such as military or foreign policy
considerations.
(b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States that commercial
activities of the People's Liberation Army of China or any Communist
Chinese military company are not extended normal tariff treatment by
the United States or treated as normal commercial intercourse with the
United States.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON MFN TREATMENT FOR IMPORTS FROM THE PEOPLE'S
LIBERATION ARMY.

(a) Determination of Communist Chinese Military Companies.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall compile a list of persons who are
Communist Chinese military companies and who are operating
directly or indirectly in the United States or any of its
territories and possessions, and shall publish the list of such
persons in the Federal Register. On an ongoing basis, the
Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, shall make additions or deletions to the list
based on the latest information available.
(2) Communist chinese military company.--For purposes of
making the determination required by paragraph (1), the term
''Communist Chinese military company''--
(A) means a person that is--
(i) engaged in providing commercial
services, manufacturing, producing, or
exporting, and
(ii) owned or controlled by the People's
Liberation Army, and
(B) includes, but is not limited to, any person
identified in the United States Defense Intelligence
Agency publication numbered VP-1920-271-90, dated
September 1990, or PC-1921-57-95, dated October 1995,
and any update of such reports for the purposes of this
Act.
(b) Tariffs.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation treatment) shall not
apply to goods that are produced, manufactured, or exported by the
People's Liberation Army or a Communist Chinese military company.
(c) Treasury Authority.--
(1) Authority.--The Secretary of the Treasury may exercise
the authorities set forth in section 203(a) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(a))
with respect to any commercial activity in the United States by
a Communist Chinese military company, without regard to section
202 of that Act.
(2) Penalties.--The penalties set forth in section 206 of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1705) shall apply to violations of any license, order, or
regulation issued under paragraph (1).
(d) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall apply with respect to
goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after
the 105th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 3. DEFINITION.

For purposes of this Act, the term ''People's Liberation Army''
means the land, naval, and air military services, the police, and the
intelligence services of the Communist Government of the People's
Republic of China, and any member of any such service or of such
police.
Output: Directs the Secretary of Defense to compile and publish in the Federal Register a list of Communist Chinese military companies that are operating directly or indirectly in the United States or its territories and possessions.
Prohibits the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation treatment) to goods that are produced, manufactured, or exported by the People's Liberation Army or a Communist Chinese military company.