In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
a work-related injury, taking into account such factors as age, education, training, and mental capacity." Id. at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and social environment, ... [and] permanent impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quotation marks omitted)). 120 The fact that an employee returned to work for some period of time following his industrial injury does not automatically preclude him from claiming permanent total disability benefits at a later date if he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to the point that he is no longer able to maintain regular employment. See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28 (<HOLDING>). See generally Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n,
Holding statements: (A) holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits (B) holding that an employee who returned to work for six years following his workrelated injury could nevertheless obtain permanent total disability benefits and observing that it may be years before the effect of an injury is felt (C) holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury (D) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability (E) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence

Ex Output:
holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits

Ex Input:
879 (citations omitted). We think there is a reasonable fit here between the State's purpose of protecting society from persons who have been determined to be likely to reoffend if not placed in a secure facility and their placement in such a facility. Therefore, Garren has failed to show a substantive due process violation. VII. Vagueness. Although Garren states in a division heading in his brief that chapter 229A is vague as applied and on its face, he makes no argument in his brief in support of the contention that the statute is vague as applied to him. We deem this issue waived. See Iowa R.App.P. 14(a)(3) ("Failure in the brief to state, to argue or to cite to authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue."); State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13-14 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Garren is precluded from
Holding statements: (A) holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief (B) holding issue waived where matter not addressed beyond reference in heading in brief (C) holding that an issue mentioned in a brief but not addressed is waived (D) holding issues argued orally but not addressed in brief were waived (E) holding an issue listed in statement of issues on appeal but not addressed in brief is abandoned

Ex Output:
holding issue first addressed in appellants reply brief was not waived because it was in response to argument first presented in appellees brief

Ex Input:
of a consecutive five-year sentence where a defendant possesses a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence; however, "if the firearm is brandished, [the defendant shall] be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years." 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). "A defendant may be convicted of a 924(c) charge on the basis of a coconspirator's use of a gun if the use was in furtherance of the conspiracy and was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant." United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 305 (4th Cir.1998). Moreover, a defendant may be convicted of a 924(c) offense on the basis of eoconspirator liability even without a separate conspiracy charge. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 647-48 (8th Cir.2007); cf. United States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). Applying these standards, we hold that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that vicarious coconspirator liability need not be charged in the indictment (B) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (D) holding that elements of statute which became 924e need not be reflected in indictment for crime charged (E) holding that apparent authority as a separate theory of vicarious liability should not be considered in ftca claims

Ex Output:
holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt