In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia's onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts "Where there is no material connection between the district and'the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action." Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 'When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made." Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether
Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action

Ex Output:
holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership

Ex Input:
of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi appears to indicate that the assets must be blocked at the time judgment against the asset is finalized. See 556 U.S. 366, 369, 377-79, 129 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 1739-40, 173 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009) ("We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a 'blocked asset' at the time the Court of Appeals handed down its decision.... "). The controlling determination in that case, though, was that the asset in question was never blocked because Iran's interest in it arose after the Treasury Department unblocked all Iranian assets. Id. at 376, 129 S.Ct. at 1739. In Holy Land Foundation, the assets were unreachable because they were unblocked during the pendency of the original civil suit, prior to the commencement of any execution proceeding. 722 F.3d at 687 (<HOLDING>). This rule is not just prescribed by law; it
Holding statements: (A) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding that the governments restraining order against a blocked asset obtained prior to the entry of a civil judgment unblocked it for tria purposes (D) recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice (E) holding that the cubic judgment was not blocked

Ex Output:
holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment

Ex Input:
the court erroneously exercises its discretion, or exercises it "upon unfounded considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable in light of the evidence"). 27. In affirming the family court decision, we stress what is not covered by this opinion. Wife, recipient spouse, appealed only the decision to find changed circumstances and not the modification decision reached by the family court once it found changed circumstances. Thus, we have not reviewed the amount of the reduction with respect to the improvement of wife's financial situation. Nor have we determined whether part of the original maintenance award in this case was compensatory. If it was, we would question the family court's authority to terminate that part of the maintenance award. See id. at 39-40, 819 A.2d at 690 (<HOLDING>); Stickney v. Stickney, 170 Vt. 547, 549, 742
Holding statements: (A) recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years (B) holding that a trial court has broad discretion to modify a spousal maintenance award (C) holding that denial of petition for modification of maintenance was proper when the parties agreement prohibited modification of maintenance (D) recognizing that recipient spouses improved financial security will support modification of maintenance award (E) recognizing that family court cannot eliminate compensatory part of maintenance award

Ex Output:
recognizing appropriateness of compensatory education award and holding that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory education if she prevailed in her claim that she was denied a fape for several years