In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

where the-plaintiff seeks to subject private parties to 1983 liability by bestowing on them the title of state actors. The instant case does not involve a situation where the State has " 'so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.' " Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1131 (quoting NBC . Communications Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted)). The Eleventh Circuit in Harvey, confronting facts similar to the case at bar and the issue of whether involuntary commitment by private parties may be considered state action, found an insufficient nexus between the defendants, a private hospital and private physicians, and the State. See id.; see also Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258 (<HOLDING>). The court observed that "[b]oth the Supreme
Holding statements: (A) holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test (B) holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors (C) holding that foster parents are not state actors (D) holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability (E) holding that private hospital and physicians who involuntarily committed plaintiff under massachusetts statute were not state actors noting that state regulation even if extensive and receipt of federal funds do not establish state action
holding that ccmc and its employees were not state actors under either the symbiotic relationship or close nexus test

venture" (FAC 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) ("[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... "); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) ("Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.") cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants
Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc 216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc 1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc 1106a (C) holding under 29 usc 216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc 203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc 203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc 1108 from 29 usc 1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision
holding under flsa 29 usc 216c

a qualified right of access to criminal trials, see id. at 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, to the examination of jurors during voir dire, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) ("Press-Enterprise I"), and to preliminary hearings, see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise II"). The circuits, including ours, have concurred in holding that this right applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings. See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir.1984) (asserting that "the First Amendment does secure to the public and to the press a right of access to civil proceedings"); see also Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed (B) holding that the first amendment limits judicial discretion to seal documents in a civil case (C) holding that the first amendment right of access applies to a summary judgment motion in a civil case (D) holding that the rigorous first amendment standard should also apply to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case (E) holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed
holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed