In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Anderson claims that the trial court findings do not justify the decision to "increase" his child support on August 1, 1987. In other words, appellant construes the trial court's 1987 decision as a modification downward to $250 followed by a modification upward to $400. This is a misconstruction of the trial court's order. As the majority opinion indicates, the court did not make an upward modification. It does not follow, however, that the trial court could act without making findings on appellant's ability to pay child support. Without findings on appellant's ability to pay, or another indication that the trial court considered the facts as to appellant's ability to pay, the law commands us to remand the case rather than to affirm. Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859, 864-65 (Minn.1986) (<HOLDING>). The dictates of Moylan should be applied. The
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending (B) holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous (C) holding that a defendants attorney can waive the defendants sixth amendment confrontation right so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorneys decision and so long as it can be said that the attorneys decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy (D) holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant (E) holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors

A: (E)
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Q: to its policy holders. For example, the company's purpose can be readily revealed to the policyholder by the addition of a single line or sentence to the declarations page or by defining the term "driver name." Thus, this court concludes that the arguments of the defendant are unavailing and that although our holding in this case comports with that of the minority of jurisdictions, we are of the opinion that it represents the better public policy. "And we are also convinced that reasonable expectations of coverage raised by the declaration page cannot be contradicted by the policy's boilerplate unless the declaration page itself clearly so warns the insured." Id. at 347, 638 A.2d at 892; see also Elliott Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.I. 321, 327, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (1977) (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, therefore, we affirm the
Holding statements: (A) holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant (B) holding that an ordinary reader in the face of such detail would be warranted in concluding that any significant limitation on collision insurance would have been explicitly noted (C) holding that the patentees argument that any shape would be equivalent to the conical limitation would write such a limitation out of the claim (D) holding that it is most improbable that a significant change to bankruptcy procedure would have been made without even any mention in the legislative history (E) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible

A: (B)
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Q: role of an advocate in prosecuting Srivastava. Likewise, the doctrine of judicial immunity precludes Srivastava's claims against the judge who presided over her criminal case. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.2000) (judicial immunity shields judges from civil actions for their judicial acts unless they have acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1393 (7th Cir.1990) (mere allegations of conspiracy insufficient to overcome judicial immunity). Additionally, Srivastava cannot sue employees of the Marion County Public Defender's Office under 1983 because they are not acting under "color of state law," a requisite element of any 1983 claim. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317 n. 4, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (<HOLDING>). As for Srivastava's claim against the officer
Holding statements: (A) holding that a town manager did not act under color of state law when making allegedly defamatory statements about the plaintiff (B) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (C) holding that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing the traditional functions of counsel to a criminal defendant (D) holding that public defenders do not act under color of state law and therefore are not subject to suit under 42 usc 1983 (E) holding that to prevail on a 1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action

A:
(C)
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