In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: a housing development. Streckfus, 504 N.E.2d at 274. She was an at-will employee but had an employment agreement with the development's management company. Id. at 274-275. Her employment agreement referenced a management contract between the development and the management company, and the management contract provided procedures by which the management company could terminate a Resident Manager. Id. Our supreme court held that "as a matter of law, the Employment Agreement did not contain any job security provision which altered the employment at will relationship. ... Id. at 276. The Trails fail to demonstrate that Eddie states a claim upon which relief could be granted based upon the Club's Articles of Incorporation or the Club's standard practices. See also Orr, 689 N.E.2d at 719-720 (<HOLDING>). Even viewing the Trails' breach of contract
Holding statements: (A) holding that an arbitration agreement in an employee handbook was illusory where the employer expressly reserved a right to unilaterally rescind any provisions of the handbook (B) holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will (C) holding employee handbook or employers printed statement of policy are promises in implied offer of unilateral contract which an employee can accept by beginning or continuing to work for employer (D) holding that employee may claim contract created based on employer promise of severance pay to employee (E) holding that an employee handbook did not constitute a valid unilateral contract between the employee and employer in the absence of adequate independent consideration

A: (E)
****
Q: (1993). This privilege has been given an "expansive reach" by California courts, as recognized by the California Supreme Court. See Rubin, 4 Cal.4th at 1194, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. This privilege affords absolute immunity against tort liability arising out of such a communication, regardless of attempts by the "plaintiff' to "plead around" this "absolute barrier." See id. at 1201-02, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. Thus, the immunity applies regardless of the particular label given to the cause of action (e.g., unfair competition). Section 47(b) protects participants in judicial proceedings from derivative tort actions based on communications in or regarding the judicial proceeding. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781-83, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1996) (<HOLDING>). A "communication[ ] preparatory to or in
Holding statements: (A) holding that letter to possible coclaimants seeking support for filing of suit was covered by the privilege (B) recognizing privilege (C) holding that voluntary testimony by spouse is not covered by husbandwife privilege (D) holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated (E) holding that the initial disclosure of a crime to one spouses without more is covered by the marital communications privilege

A: (A)
****
Q: 507(a)(7)(E), even though the Bankruptcy Code itself provides no definition of 'excise,' 'tax,' or 'excise tax.' " Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. at 220, 116 S.Ct. 2106. Even when the definition appears in a single statute, our sister circuits have also held that definitions limited to one section should not be applied to another section. Thus, for example, the Fourth Circuit held that, where Congress limited the definition of "investigative or law enforcement officer" to 28 U.S.C. 2680(h), "[t]o apply the 2680(h) definition beyond that subsection would make meaningless the limitation that Congress placed on the definition." Andrews v. United States, 441 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir.2006); see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Amada, 200 F.3d 647, 650-51 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that 1337 is not designed to
Holding statements: (A) holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc 16 (B) holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract (C) holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa (D) holding that for purposes of 18 usc 924e involuntary manslaughter in ohio is a violent felony the definition of which is identical for all relevant purposes to the definition of crime of violence in 4b12a (E) holding that where the definition of lottery is expressly limited to 18 usc 1307b the definition cannot be applied to a related civil statute

A:
(E)
****