QUESTION: Pat, Here is the latest PSA draft for a We've agreed to pay $1mm of the severance. We also have agreed to pay the cost of 2000 bonuses. On options, there is a proposal for Enron to supervest the employees' options at closing -- can we agree to that? I didn't think
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ANS: Bidder D PSA Redlined
"Kirkpatrick, Joe" <joe.kirkpatrick@nrgenergy.com> writes to the NYISO_TECH_EXCHANGE Discussion List: In order to have a functioning market model it is imperative to have a level playing field for all market participants. Is it a level playing field or even appropriate for any individual market participant to dispatch generation and transmission facilities that affect the economics of other market participants? The dispatch of transmission and generation to resolve congestion must be made with the overall economics of the entire market in mind. The only entity that has the information and empowered to make these decisions is the NYISO. With that in mind why does a particular market participant have control over major interfaces that interconnect New York and PJM. Specifically the control points would be the Linden-Goethals phase angle regulator and the Hudson Farragut phase angle regulators. These PARs are under ConEd control and are utilized by ConEd to facilitate whatever requirements they deem required. As this is being written the New York PJM schedule is 546 MW out to New York with a flow of 762 MW the flow on these PARs (including Ramapo) is ~1500 MW to New York. Are the interests of all market participants being considered by a market participant that has over 40% of the load in New York State, that has control over a significant amount of generation utilizing OOM dispatches and by having control over a significant amount of transmission facilities capable of altering the flow into New York City and Central x East. I suspect not. Case in point.. There is a transmission constraint in an area in New York city. This constraint can only be monitored by ConEd and therefore is resolved utilizing an OOM dispatch request. Generation was reduced to resolve the constraint, there is another generator in the area that can be reduced to resolve the constraint, but it would appear that this control action is not utilized . Coincidently the power from this other generator is under contract to ConEd (take-or-pay). There is also a PAR (Linden-Goethals) that can be moved to alleviate the constraint, which unfortunately is not utilized either. Instead generation is reduced that does result in additional uplift charges that is socialized as a cost to all loads in New York. Whether the right economic decisions are being made is an issue but the larger issue is why is a market participant with a large economic interest making these decisions. The NYISO was asked why the PAR was not utilized as a control action to alleviate the constraint, simply put since the PAR is not under their control they do not consider it as a control action. Since ConEd does not have the overall market view or the economic interests of all market participants in mind is it appropriate to allow them to operate and dispatch a large part of New York State? When the NYISO is not controlling major inter-area transmission interfaces but allows that control to be utilized by a market participant it is a compromise of the entire market. Economics of an individual market participant are overriding the economics of all other participants in New York. This is not a "best practice" that any sane individual would recommend for any RTO model. Joe Kirkpatrick
Q: What is a potential subject line for this email?
answer: Who is in Control?
How do you feel about making Enron an advisory member of the Marketing Committee? I'm concerned that we will run afoul of Miss law regarding control. Would this create a problem for us? Kay
Answer: Marketing committee
Here is an email: Please note the following addition to the Credit Reserve for October 2001. CP: PG&E Energy Trading - Power L.P. Deal No: 817705.1 Deal Date: 10/12/01 Deal Specifics: Enron to Buy Financial Swap from PG&E Energy Trading - Power L.P. Term: 01/01/2004 - 12/31/2006 Volume: 50 Mw On-Peak Price: $49 Region: NY Zone G (East) Trader/Mid-Marketer: Fletch Sturm Credit Reserve Amount: $60,000 USD RAC: transaction confirmed under ISDA Master Agreement executed 6/27/01 between ENA and PG&E Energy Trading, Power L.P. Please call with questions or comment. Thank you
What is a potential subject line for this email?
A: Credit Reserve - PGET Deal #817705.1
Q: Attached for your approval is the form of Enron Corp. Guaranty in favor of the referenced Counterparty, which guarantees the obligations of ENA under a financial confirmation. We will need the standard executed copy. The confirmation requires that we deliver the Guaranty within 5 days. Upon approval and execution, please call me at x33399 to pick up the documents. Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
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A: Gas Natural Mexico S.A. de C.V.
Here is an email: Kermit Team, I received a letter from the TNRCC concerning emissions fees that have not been paid for a facility called the "Hendrick/Wink Tank Farm". The letter was addressed to a Mr. Paul Newman of EOTT. The letter stated that we may owe emissions fees for the facility. My question is, do you have such a facility in your team area, and what does it comprise? ie..number and size of tanks, throughput in 2000. The TNRCC letter was dated March 28, 2001 and we are required to provide information to them within 30 days. I just received the letter today. HELP!! I need something from you by this afternoon or tomorrow at the latest.
What is a potential subject line for this email?
A:
Hendrick/Wink Tank Farm