In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We assume the parties' familiarity with the fac appealability on ineffective assistance of counsel, the "cause" Hernandez assigns for his procedural default, suggests that it intended to allow review of the procedural bar. However, even assuming that the district court wished this court to review its procedural bar finding or that we would grant a certificate of appealability on this issue, the correctness of the district court's central holding that there was no error, constitutional or otherwise in the state trial court's charge on intent is dispositive. The test for finding charge-based constitutional error is a strict one. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (<HOLDING>). We see no basis for finding a Fourteenth
Holding statements: (A) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error (B) holding that a trial court does not commit plain error unless the error is clear under current law (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: on the basis of an otherwise constitutional statutory aggravator. 32 Even if we assume Graham supplies the proper analysis for challenging an aggravator, such a challenge fails here. Under Graham, a court "considers 'objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue." 130 S.Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). In the past decade, the Supreme Court has used this approach in three death penalty eases. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (concluding the death penalty cannot be imposed for rape); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122
Holding statements: (A) holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime (B) holding that the execution of individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time they committed capital crimes violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution (C) recognizing that within the world community the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved (D) holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates eighth amendment (E) holding the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: of employment, because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). A commonsense reading of this statement strongly suggests that the statute includes a requirement of intentional discrimination. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir.1996) ("It would be a stretch to read the phrase 'because of such individual's age' to prohibit incidental and unintentional discrimination that resulted because of employment decisions which were made for reasons other than age.") (emphasis in original). However, Title VII contains parallel language, and the Supreme Court concluded almost three decades ago that such language encompassed a theory of liability based on disparate impact. See Chiggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (<HOLDING>). The question, then, is whether the ADEA,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim for discrimination in private employment is not preempted by title vii (B) holding that employment practices which are neutral in form but which result in discriminatory effects are prohibited unless justified by business necessity (C) holding that title vii proscribes racial discrimination against whites upon the same standards as racial discrimination against nonwhites (D) holding that title vii proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation (E) holding that discriminatory employment practices are cognizable under title ix
[EX A]:
(D)