In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Thus, CERC-LA specifically provides for a private right of action to institute civil actions to recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes from those responsible for their creation. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.1989); 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917, 111 S.Ct. 2014, 114 L.Ed.2d 101 (1991). Moreover, an entity that is responsible for the remediation of a hazardous waste site under CERCLA may assert a claim for contribution against other responsible parties under 9613(f). New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1122 (3d Cir.1997). See also SC Holdings, Inc. v. AAA Realty Co., 935 F.Supp. 1354, 1362 (D.N.J.1996)(<HOLDING>). In its reply papers, the Novak Group does not
Holding statements: (A) holding the michigan department of natural resources liable under cercla for remedial actions which exacerbated the contamination at a site (B) recognizing a right to contribution (C) holding that investigatory costs are considered costs of response under cercla (D) holding that parties liable for at least a portion of the costs of remediating a hazardous site are limited to the contribution scheme under section 9613f of cercla (E) holding that site control alone is an improper basis for imposition on lessees of owner liability under cercla

A: (D)
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Q: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word "claimant" in subsection four. Under the plurality's view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word "claimant" in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of "prevailing party." This is because, in order for the word "claimant" in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from
Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid

A: (A)
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Q: of his mental illness. Both the ADA and the appellant's counsel spent considerable time discussing insanity and mental illness. During voir dire, the ADA admitted the appellant was mentally ill. The record reflects that the appellant's only-defense to the State's murder allegation was the insanity defense. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to question the veni-re on how they might give effect to mitigating evidence of insanity, mental illness, mental defect, and other elements of the anticipated defense. See Shipley v. State, 790 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The appellant should have been allowed to question the prospective jurors about their feelings on punishment and whether they could consider probation. See Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>). Although the majority acknowledges that
Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question to prospective jurors on their feelings against recommending probation as punishment in a murder case (B) holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question seeking to determine bias or prejudice in favor of the victim because she was a nun (C) holding trial judge was at the very limit of his discretion in refusing to remove prospective jurors for cause (D) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow questions regarding victims status as a child (E) holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion

A:
(A)
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