instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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found it "difficult to maintain on a priori grounds that sex is physically dangerous" to every potential victim under the statute. Id. at 299. The First Circuit examined a similar statute-punishing a person over the age of 18 who engages in sexual intercourse with a person between 14 and 16-in United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1999). The court determined that statutory rape crimes fall within the exception to the categorical approach because they "cover[ ] conduct both inside and outside the 'violent felony' sphere." Id. at 4-5. We agree with the First and the Seventh Circuits that statutory rape statutes that include more mature victims and do not contain aggravating factors are not subject to the strict categorical approach articulated in Taylor. See Seaton, 45 F.3d at 111 (<HOLDING>). Thus, this case should be remanded for the
Holding statements: (A) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins (B) holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 16 (C) holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime (D) holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction (E) holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
answer:
holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins

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party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judg ment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). "In deciding a Rule 60(b) motion, a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigant's claims on the merits against the policy in favor of finality." Kotlicky v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir.1987) (citation omitted). Moreover, Rule 60(b) motions are left to the sound discretion of the district judge. See Nat'l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. The M/T Stolt Sheaf, 930 F.2d 240, 244 (2d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). "To prevail on a motion for relief pursuant
Holding statements: (A) holding that motions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of trial justice (B) holding that a motion to vacate a judgment under fedrcivp 60b is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court citations omitted (C) holding that fedrcivp 60b motion premised on fraud on the court is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice (D) holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive 2255 motion (E) holding a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and grant trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the supreme court will not upset the courts ruling unless there is a sufficient showing of abuse of discretion
answer:
holding that motions to vacate a judgment are addressed to the sound discretion of trial justice

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286 (1996). Instead, "[a]pportionment of a fee award between fees incurred on a contract cause of action and those incurred on other causes of action is within the trial court's discretion." Id. In this case, appellants do not challenge the district court's conclusion that Datacom's tort and contract claims were inextricably intertwined. Therefore, we affirm the attorney's fee award against Datacom. However, Moore was not a party to the Charter contract, or to Datacom's causes of action based on contract. As a result, Moore would not have been entitled to fees against Charter had Moore prevailed on his tort claims. We therefore hold Charter is not entitled to fees from Moore by prevailing on contract claims against Datacom. See Abdallah, 43 Cal.App.4th at 1111, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 286 (<HOLDING>); Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal.4th 863, 870, 39
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (B) holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed (C) holding that the plaintiff who prevailed in an ipra enforcement action was entitled to an award of damages fees and costs (D) holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc 1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal (E) holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees
answer:
holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees