TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: not issue a permit to install" a waste disposal system unless that system "[m]eets all applicable county zoning and land use requirements .... " Taken together, these provisions indicate a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to locate environmental permitting with the MDE, and zoning with local government. There is no reasonable way to construe these provisions of the Maryland Code as doing anything other than complementing local government's role in planning and zoning. If we held otherwise, we would be reading an over-broad preemptive intent into an otherwise clear statutory scheme. MRA's preemption argument fails because it does not account for the dual nature of this process. See Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Preemption Based on Legislative Changes to
Holding statements: (A) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state (B) holding that the relevant body of state law did indeed regulate many aspects of sewage sludge utilization but was not so comprehensive that the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by occupation is compelled (C) holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption (D) recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way (E) recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: is correct. We will also assume that the court's erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR's statement that he "recruited Wornick and Sella" into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, "[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes." United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant's recruitment of co-conspirators supports a 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under 3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under 3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under 3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: issue in question." Bradley Ventures, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark. 229, 264 S.W.3d 485, 490 (2007). UAMS maintains that collateral estoppel applies to Dodson I and II, barring both of Dodson's pending claims, but our discussion is considerably narrower. First, I would set aside Dodson I because I am uncertain that the court's relevant finding was "essential to the judgment." Powell, 289 S.W.3d at 444. Second, I would set aside Count II, which is Dodson's impliedeontract claim. Importantly, Count II is premised on UAMS's conduct after Dodson II, i.e., sending Dodson bills for the embryo storage fees, and therefore cannot be precluded by the earlier chancery court decision. See Ripplin Shoals Land Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 440 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); cf. id. at 1042 ("[R]es judicata does not
Holding statements: (A) holding that an assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract (B) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (C) holding that a prior judgment regarding a permit to modify an existing bridge does not preclude a plaintiff from challenging a decision on a new application describing and a different bridge design (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit a design defect products liability expert to submit an untimely addendum stating a new claim of failure to warn after defense expert refuted the basis of original design defect opinion (E) holding untimeliness of motion to modify medical insurance payment did not preclude motion to modify maintenance

SOLUTION:
(C)