And William Martinez, 28, who cut his medical school studies short because he couldn't afford the $39,000 in loans after two years of graduate school and four years of college. Martinez works two jobs as a physician's assistant and supports his elderly parents and 8-year-old son. Uncommon Good has a 22-member board of doctors, lawyers and representatives of Christian groups and is recruiting mentors. One goal is to get the state Legislature to pass a law to provide loan forgiveness to medical professionals and lawyers who work with the poor. Mintie said she hopes her organization can be a national model for other professions. She is trying to bring legal aid services to the Inland Valley -- the closest legal aid office is in El Monte and represents 700,000 poor people throughout the San Fernando, San Gabriel and Inland valleys. "Unless the legal aid is in the community, you can't say you are serving the poor," Mintie said. Neal Dudovitz is the executive director of Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County, the legal aid office in El Monte. He sees attorneys new to poverty law leave all the time because they can't afford the salary with their law school debt. "She's really opened a lot of eyes in terms of having people understand how the educational debt is limiting and reducing the services that are available to low-income communities," Dudovitz said. "Nancy is light years ahead of the curve on this stuff. Very little is being done practically to solve it." Mintie, her colleagues say, could have made a lot of money in private practice. "She's very kind and pleasant," said Julius Thompson, 45, an attorney at Inner City Law Center and an Uncommon Good recipient. "But she's also a woman on a mission. When she sets her sights on something, she's a formidable force."

Question: "What is the reason Neal Dudovitz sees so many new poverty law attorneys leave?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "Their offices are not well run"

Response: no

Alexander earned the epithet "The Great" due to his unparalleled success as a military commander. He never lost a battle, despite typically being outnumbered. This was due to use of terrain, phalanx and cavalry tactics, bold strategy, and the fierce loyalty of his troops. The Macedonian phalanx, armed with the sarissa, a spear 6 metres (20 ft) long, had been developed and perfected by Philip II through rigorous training, and Alexander used its speed and maneuverability to great effect against larger but more disparate Persian forces. Alexander also recognized the potential for disunity among his diverse army, which employed various languages and weapons. He overcame this by being personally involved in battle, in the manner of a Macedonian king. In his first battle in Asia, at Granicus, Alexander used only a small part of his forces, perhaps 13,000 infantry with 5,000 cavalry, against a much larger Persian force of 40,000. Alexander placed the phalanx at the center and cavalry and archers on the wings, so that his line matched the length of the Persian cavalry line, about 3 km (1.86 mi). By contrast, the Persian infantry was stationed behind its cavalry. This ensured that Alexander would not be outflanked, while his phalanx, armed with long pikes, had a considerable advantage over the Persian's scimitars and javelins. Macedonian losses were negligible compared to those of the Persians. At Issus in 333 BC, his first confrontation with Darius, he used the same deployment, and again the central phalanx pushed through. Alexander personally led the charge in the center, routing the opposing army. At the decisive encounter with Darius at Gaugamela, Darius equipped his chariots with scythes on the wheels to break up the phalanx and equipped his cavalry with pikes. Alexander arranged a double phalanx, with the center advancing at an angle, parting when the chariots bore down and then reforming. The advance was successful and broke Darius' center, causing the latter to flee once again. When faced with opponents who used unfamiliar fighting techniques, such as in Central Asia and India, Alexander adapted his forces to his opponents' style. Thus, in Bactria and Sogdiana, Alexander successfully used his javelin throwers and archers to prevent outflanking movements, while massing his cavalry at the center.

Question: "Why did Alexander only use a small part of his forces in his first battle in Asia?"

Response: "Persian force was small in number"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A: no

Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. We had to live there." Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles.

Question: "Why were the AC 130's never deployed?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "Special Operations Command couldn't justify using them"

Response:
yes