In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS's liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase "liabilities covered" in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not "covered," and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from "liabilities covered." See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once
Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage

A: (E)
****
Q: 664, 669 (Colo.1988), the exercise of such power must be guided so that any action taken by a city "in response to a land use proposal will be rational and consistent." Beaver Meadows v. Board of County Comm'rs, 709 P.2d 928, 936 (Colo.1985). The Colorado Springs Zoning Code specifically allows the City to take into account the effect on the neighborhood. See 4-6-602(C)(1) ("Will the project design be harmonious with surrounding land uses and neighborhood?") In my view, this standard is insufficient to provide "all users and potential users of land with notice of the particular standards and requirements" imposed by the City for plan approval. Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 790 P.2d 827, 832 (Colo.1990); see also Bauer, 182 Colo. at 327, 513 P.2d at 204 (<HOLDING>); Kosinski v. Lawlor, 177 Conn. 420, 418 A.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of requests to change zoning or comprehensive zoning plans (B) holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process (C) holding a zoning authority acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denies a permit meeting the general zoning qualifications solely because of the type of building to be constructed (D) holding that in the limited circumstances when local zoning authorities actions prohibit personal wireless service the act preempts local zoning law (E) holding that a zoning commission was capable of being sued directly under section 1983 because zjoning commissions function legislatively when adopting zoning regulations and holding public hearings for the adjudication of individual petitions for zoning redress

A: (C)
****
Q: a nuisance per se, but [] it may become a nuisance because of its location or manner in which it is operated."). 62 . Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc., 135 F.Supp.2d 675, 689 (D.Md.2001) (citing Burley v. City of Annapolis, 182 Md. 307, 34 A.2d 603 (1946) and Tadjer, 479 A.2d at 1321). 63 . Though Exxon cites two cases which state that a "public nuisance is a criminal offense" neither case holds that a statute criminalizing the activity is a prerequisite to public nuisance. See Exxon Mem. at 4 (citing Hoffman v. United Iron & Metal Co., 108 Md.App. 117, 671 A.2d 55, 64 (1996) (declining to decide whether a scrap metal yard and automobile shredding facility was a public nuisance because the issue was not raised below) and Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180, 190 (1994) (<HOLDING>)). Instead, as noted, Maryland relies on the
Holding statements: (A) holding the fact that an exempt owner who acquired legal title after date when liability for current taxes had accrued was the equitable owner did not make the exemption applicable (B) recognizing a cause of action by the owner of contaminated property against a previous owner who allegedly caused the contamination (C) holding stock dividend payable to actual owner not owner of record (D) holding that because the property owner argued only a theory of taking that was no longer a valid theory property owner did not demonstrate his entitlement to relief (E) holding that the current property owner may not assert a public nuisance claim against the former owner

A:
(E)
****