In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

CBL claim that if the merger is effected, the public will be harmed because Sparrow Hospital will no longer provide late re at the incipiency and block the merger. This court does not find irreparable injury will result from not enjoining the merger because this court sees a very minimal probability that a divestiture would ever be warranted in the future. For reasons that will be explained infra, this court is of the opinion that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits. Also, plaintiffs claim that if the merger is not enjoined they may lose standing to challenge it, thereby suffering irreparable harm. This court finds no merit in this contention. In making this argument, plaintiffs rely on the case of Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (<HOLDING>). For instance, as described above, GLASCCO and
Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a 2 claim (B) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (C) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (D) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing (E) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit
(E)

fact that the oil traversed part of Transocean's vessel before entering the Gulf of Mexico. We recognize that the aforementioned incidents involved blameless third parties, whereas here the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon might have contributed to the discharge. By all accounts, if the vessel's blowout preventer had functioned properly, the oil would not have entered navigable waters in violation of the Clean Water Act. The defendants therefore reason that liability is properly imposed upon the owner or operator of the Deepwater Horizon. Yet it is well estab lished that this section of the Clean Water Act leaves no room for civil-penalty defendants to shift liability via allegations of third-party fault. See United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310, 1314 (7th Cir.1978) (<HOLDING>). Early in the implementation of the Act's
Holding statements: (A) holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys (B) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (C) holding principal liable to third party for tort of agent despite lack of privity between principal and third party (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding defendant liable for penalty notwithstanding fault of a third party
(E)

individually, to her late husband's claims; she cannot be an heir to her own claims"). There is no provision in the agreement stating that Garcia, on behalf of her children, was agreeing to submit the children's claims to arbitration. Garcia did not sign the agreement on behalf of the children or as representative of the children. Accordingly, the children are not bound by the express terms of the agreement. See Fleetwood Enter., Inc., 280 F.3d at 1074; see also Fortune v. Killebrew, 86 Tex. 172, 175, 23 S.W. 976, 977 (1893) ("But [the children] did not sign; and, as we have seen, their father having an adverse interest, had no authority to sign [the arbitration agreement] for them as their guardian."); Snow v. Walker, 42 Tex. 154, 156, 1875 WL 7396, 1874 Tex. LEXIS 288, *4-*5 (1874) (<HOLDING>). Relators argue that Garcia exercised her
Holding statements: (A) holding that mothers agreement to arbitrate matters concerning an estate in which the mother and her minor children had a common interest did not estop the minors from asserting claim to the estate (B) holding that an agreement between a mother and father to waive payment of child support and arrearages in exchange for fathers consent to the adoption of the minor children by the mothers husband was invalid because it violated public policy (C) holding birth mothers samesex partner was a presumed mother because she received the children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children (D) holding that for estate tax purposes property is to be valued as it exists in the hands of the estate (E) holding that a legal malpractice claim arising from errors by an attorney in rendering estateplanning services is properly brought by the personal representative of the estate when excess estate taxes are paid by the estate in contravention of the decedents intended estate plan
(A)