In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court's order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants' arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied

(1986) (relying on section 45(1) and comment a). 24 . See e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) ("railroad [retirement] benefits are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any time"); Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 173 F.3d 94, 103 (2nd Cir. 1999) (a claim to vested welfare benefits is contradicted by the ... unambiguous reservation in the plan documents of its right to amend the plan"); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Amer. v. BVR Liquidating Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1999) ("the inclusion of a 'reservation of rights' provision establishes that there was no intent for benefits to vest"); McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit
Holding statements: (A) holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed (B) recognizing that generally with supposed unilateral contracts if the offeror expressly reserves the power to revoke the offer until the offerees performance is complete then the offer is illusory and cannot give rise to a unilateral contract but noting exceptions (C) holding that the offerors signature on the offerees conditional acceptance bound the offeror to all the terms therein (D) holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell (E) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged
holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed

Schwan's three unsuccessful applications before the PTO demonstrate that BRICK Oven is generic or, at most, descriptive without secondary meaning. As noted above, both of the PTO's final rejections of Schwan's applications stated, The overwhelming evidence shows that BRICK Oven is a generic term when used in connection with pizza, including frozen pizza. For these reasons the [agency's provisional decision] is maintained and made FINAL. (PTO Office Action dated Apr. 29, 2005; PTO Office Action dated May 18, 2005) (emphasis in original). Schwan's objects to the introduction of this evidence, claiming that despite the PTO's use of the word "final" their rejections are not, in fact, final decisions. See Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest Funds Mgmt., LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 764 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (citing Johnson v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative (B) holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony (C) holding that district court acted within its discretion in excluding from the jury evidence of ptos tentative opinion as unfairly prejudicial under fedrevid 403 (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding hearsay evidence and evidence that violated the best evidence rule in deciding a summary judgment motion (E) holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request for counsel
holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a witness that was not highly probative