In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: exception, which provides that "[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen" if the motion "is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding." 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). After review of the administrative record and consideration of the parties' briefs, we dismiss the petition in part and deny the petition in part. I Ms. Lian acknowledges that binding circuit precedent prohibits us from reaching her challenge to the BIA's refusal to reopen her proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a). See Lenis v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, Ms. Lian urges us to overrule
Holding statements: (A) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte (B) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia (C) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the bia refusing to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte (D) holding that a decision of the bia whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 cfr 10032a is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond the courts review ie the court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias decision not to reopen (E) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: therein ..." 392 U.S., at 436, [88 S.Ct., at 2201]. One of the "rights enumerated" in 1 is "the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens_" 14 Stat. 27. Id. As a result, the Court concluded: Just as in Jones a Negro's 1 right to purchase property on equal terms with whites was violated when a private person refused to sell to [him] solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro's 1 right to "make and enforce contracts" is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to [him], solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees. Id. 427 U.S. at 170-71, 96 S.Ct. at 2594. See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1720, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (<HOLDING>); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
Holding statements: (A) holding with little discussion that section 1981 applies to private racial discrimination (B) holding that section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in private employment against whites as well as nonwhites (C) holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee (D) holding unequivocally that 1981 protects against racial discrimination in private employment (E) holding that conduct occurring after the formation of an employment contract could not be racial discrimination under 1981
[EX A]:
(A)