In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 285 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (quotation omitted). B. Crush Analysis Testimony Yergin was apparently planning to testify about estimated speeds of the F-250 and the Hyundai based on the amount of "crush" to the Hyundai. Although Yer-gin testified in front of the jury that there was probably a difference in speed between the two vehicles of 10 to 20 miles per hour, she never stated at any time what speeds she estimated the vehicles to be traveling. Nor did appellant's counsel explain to the court what speeds Yergin concluded the vehicles were traveling. This information would be crucial to understanding what testimony was excluded and whether the exclusion was harmful. See id. A general statement that she would testify about the vehicles' speeds is insufficient. See id. at 891 (<HOLDING>). Further, appellant's trial counsel explained
Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of impaired mental functioning is inherently mitigating and that a defendant is not required to demonstrate a nexus between his mental capacity and the crime committed (B) holding defendant was not required to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee because the employee did not apprise defendant that she suffered from a mental impairment (C) holding that counsels performance was deficient for failing to investigate readily available evidence of mental impairment (D) holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold (E) holding that a general statement about how the defendant wanted to introduce evidence of medical or mental impairment to show that the defendant lacked the proper mental state was an insufficient offer there must be some meat of the actual evidence
[A]: (E)

[Q]: removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state's use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong's view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner's access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as "dictum" the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter's right of access to a conventional Highway "can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property." 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court's conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court's analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong's concurrence reasons, a
Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property
[A]: (B)

[Q]: Equal Protection Clause's prohibition and is therefore subject to the most exacting scrutiny. Shaw, at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2824. Such action will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Id. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2825. The defendants first argue that the court should not apply the strict scrutiny reserved for racial classifications to the plaintiffs' equal protection claim because Native Americans are a political group, not a race. They rely on a line of Supreme Court decisions holding that federal statutes singling out Native Americans for special treatment do not violate equal protection guarantees. See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500-01, 99 S.Ct. 740, 761, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641,
Holding statements: (A) holding that state failed to assume even partial jurisdiction in compliance with public law 280 (B) holding that a state law that allowed the state to assume only partial jurisdiction over indians and indian territory did not require strict scrutiny and was rationally related to a valid state objective (C) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (D) holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country (E) holding that the state of oklahoma did not have jurisdiction to make an arrest within indian country where the state had neither received by express grant nor acted pursuant to congressional authorization to assume criminal jurisdiction over the reservation
[A]:
(B)