In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: for relief under 3582(c). Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through 2241. A prisoner may proceed under 2241 if 2255 would be "inadequate of ineffective." 28 U.S.C. 2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam). We have held that 2255's "safety valve" applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner's conduct non-criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but instead asserts only that he is "innocent" of being a career offender. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (<HOLDING>). Brown must obtain a certificate of
Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under 841 and 846 was not cognizable under 2241 (B) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor (C) holding that a 2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (D) holding that dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via 2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law (E) holding challenge to armedcareercriminal enhancement improper under 2241
[EX A]: holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under 841 and 846 was not cognizable under 2241

[EX Q]: assault conviction. See Ohio Rev.Code 3319.39(B). Further, Plaintiffs understanding of the nature of the choice he was required to make is demonstrated by the fact that he discussed the choices with his union representatives' the President and Vice President of his local union and the President of the Central Ohio union and discussed the choice with a teacher at Ft. Hayes High School. See Harris, 2008 WL 4186316, *8, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86385, at *20 (finding that the plaintiff "fully understood the options as he testified that he discussed them with his wife and union steward"). Also, Plaintiff was given a reasonable amount of time to choose between termination and resignation as he was given approximately twenty-four hours in which to decide. See Rhoads, 103 Fed.Appx. at 895 (<HOLDING>); Harris, 2008 WL 4186316, *8, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Holding statements: (A) holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force (B) holding that a difference of opinion about the best course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference (C) holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours (D) holding that seven hours was a reasonable amount of time to deliberate meaningfully about the choice (E) holding that delay of several hours after the vehicle was seized was reasonable
[EX A]: holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force

[EX Q]: provision relevant to pretrial motions filed by a criminal defendant excluded the "time after a hearing has been held where a district court awaits additional filings from the parties that are needed for proper disposition of the motion." 476 U.S. at 331. The Court of Appeals thus did not err in affirming the finding of the district court that the entire period between filing and final disposition of Feldhacker's pretrial motions was excluded from the speedy trial computation. In computing the excluded period, the Court of Appeals correctly followed State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 652 N.W.2d 612 (2002), and determined that the first excludable day was September 22, 2000, the day after Feldhacker filed his pretrial motions. See, also, State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. at 443, 461 N.W.2d at 561 (<HOLDING>). To the extent that State v. Recek, 263 Neb.
Holding statements: (A) holding an excludable period under 2912074a commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendants pretrial motion (B) holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under 3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under 3161h7a (C) holding that the 120day period commences when the applicant appears in person for the interview (D) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer (E) holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act
[EX A]:
holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under 3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under 3161h7a