In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

42-217. If, based on the proof submitted by the applicant and the field examination, the Department "is satisfied that the law has been fully complied with and that the water is being used at the place claimed and for the purpose for which it was originally intended, the [Department shall issue to such user or users a license confirming such use." I.C. 42-219(1). On the other hand, "[i]n the event that the [Department shall find that the applicant has not fully complied with the law and the conditions of permit, it may issue a license f ls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753, 118 P.3d 78, 85 (2005) (finding that "a party is not entitled to vested rights in a water right by virtue of filing a permit application"); Hardy v. Higginson, 123 Idaho 485, 491, 849 P.2d 946, 952 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court has never considered the
Holding statements: (A) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (B) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (C) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested (D) holding that permits only give the applicant an inchoate or contingent right to put the water to a beneficial use (E) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use
holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate

and seeking to dismiss the four new claims asserted against them in the amended complaint. Also on January 8, 2010, Wells Fargo filed a supplemental motion to dismiss [26], addressing the new claims against it and renewing its request that all counts be dismissed. II. Discussion The Court must determine whether: (1) Giscombe eliminated the deficiencies of his previous shotgun pleading, and (2) if so, whether the complaint should be dismissed for the other reasons asserted by ABN, Citimortgage, and Wells Fargo in their motions to dismiss. A. Legal Standard The sufficiency of Giscombe's amended complaint depends on whether it is a shotgun pleading; if so, it will fall short of the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The defining characteristic of a shotgun
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure (B) holding that under leatherman a federal court may not apply a pleading requirement more stringent than that provided for in the federal rules of civil procedure even in 1983 litigation (C) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (D) holding that the fact that federal rule of civil procedure 9b requires a heightened pleading standard for some claims but not for a section 1983 claim against a municipality means that the rules do not require a heightened pleading standard for such a claim (E) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure
recognizing the liberal notice and simplified pleading principles underlying the federal rules of civil procedure

limit, modify, or eliminate altogether. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commission, 498 U.S. at 510, 111 S.Ct. 905 ("Congress has always been.at liberty to dispense with such tribal immunity or to limit it."); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384, 16 S.Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896) ("Indian tribes are subject to the dominant authority of congress."). Thus, suits such as' this one are barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, unless the plaintiff shows either a clear waiver of that immunity by the tribe, or an express abrogation of the doctrine by Congress. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commission, 498 U.S. at 509, 111 S.Ct, 905 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670); Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 118 S.Ct. 1700, 140 L.Ed.2d 981 (1998) (<HOLDING>). There is no evidence that the Poarch Band
Holding statements: (A) holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity (B) holding that an official of an indian tribe should be stripped of his authority and corresponding immunity to act on behalf of his tribe whenever he exercises a power his tribe was powerless to convey to him (C) holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity (D) holding that because a waiver of immunity is altogether voluntary on the part of the tribe and thus the tribe may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which the suit shall be conducted the issue must be determined in the forum that the tribe has chosen for determination of the viability of claims against it to wit arbitration (E) holding that an indian tribe is subject to suit only where congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity
holding that florida does not have jurisdiction in a suit by other persons against an indian tribe absent express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity