In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: but rather whether there is at least one common question that will generate a common answer "apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." Wal-Mart, 131 S.Ct. at 1225 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wang, 737 F.3d at 544 ("[s]o long as there is even a single common question, a would-be class can satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)."). Here, the question of whether using the name-only matching logic assures maximum accuracy is such a question. See Acosta v. Trans Union LLC, 243 F.R.D. 377, 384 (C.D.Cal.2007) (common question of whether defendants maintained reasonable procedures to assure maximum accuracy satisfied commonality prerequisite); Clark v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 2001 WL 1946329, at *2 (D.S.C. March 19, 2001) (<HOLDING>). Rule 23(a)(2) is satisfied for the FCRA
Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant conceded the accuracy of his prior convictions in his psi report by failing to object to the report (B) holding that certain information on police blotter show up and arrest sheets and front page of offense report are public information (C) holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy (D) holding that question of what reasonable procedures if any have been set up by the defendants to assure maximum accuracy of the information contained in the consumer report including information regarding or related to bankruptcy among other questions satisfied the commonality requirement of rule 23a2 (E) holding that the right of access to government information or sources of information within the governments control is not mandated by the first or fourteenth amendments

A: (D)
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Q: Erickson-Puttmann concedes that her Title VII claim against Gill fails because Gill was not her employer. See e.g., Bonomolo-Hagen v. Clay Central-Everly Community Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 446, 447 (8th Cir.1997) ("Our Court quite recently has squarely held that supervisors may not be held individually liable under Title VII." (citing Spencer v. Ripley County State Bank, 123 F.3d 690, 691-92 (8th Cir.1997) (per cu-riam))). Lenhardt v. Basic Inst, of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir.1995) (noting that "[e]very circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII."); Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the court concludes that summary
Holding statements: (A) holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii (B) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (C) holding individual employees may be liable under title vii (D) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (E) holding that there is no individual liability under title vii

A: (D)
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Q: FELA applicable to Jones Act cases. See Harrington v. Atl. Sounding Co., Inc., 602 F.3d 113, 120 n. 2 (2d Cir.2010). We rejected this contention in Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1286-87 (11th Cir.2011), and held that the 2008 amendment did not change the law. Thus, under our prior panel precedent rule, we must conclude that 6 of the FELA does not apply to Jones Act claims. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Fla. League of Prof'l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 462 (11th Cir.1996)). Finally, Escobal invites us to revisit Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2005) and Lindo, 652 F.3d 1257, arguing that these decisions conflict with Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 S.Ct. 1731, 26 L.Ed.2d 252 (1970) (<HOLDING>). We find no conflict between Bautista or Lindo
Holding statements: (A) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (B) holding that injured seamans loss of consortium claim under state law was preempted by jones act (C) holding that the jones act did not operate to make negligent crew members liable to their employers for damages paid to other seamen under the jones act because crew members cannot sue each other for negligence (D) holding that a usbased company was an employer under the jones act (E) holding that jones act claimant against the government must comply with the terms of 2675

A:
(D)
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