In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
farmer-brewer, importer or wholesaler. If the legislature intended the obligation to run with the product, it would have said it." Heublein, 434 Mass. at 698 (approving Commission declaration to this effect) (citations and quotations omitted). It is thus the general rule that "a supplier is not obligated under Section 25E to continue to make sales to those wholesalers with whom an unaffiliated predecessor did business." Brown-Forman, 65 Mass.App.Ct. at 499. This principle has been applied consistently in the few reported decisions by Massachusetts courts, confirming that purchasers of liquor businesses are not ordinarily saddled with the Section 25E restrictions of either their sellers or those through whom their sellers distributed product. See, e.g., Heublein, 434 Mass. at 701-02 (<HOLDING>); Pastene Wine & Spirits, 401 Mass. at 619
Holding statements: (A) holding that supplier who acquired all assets and operations related to manufacture and sale of prod uct in armslength transaction did not succeed to predecessor suppliers section 25e obligations a former suppliers obligations under section 25e to continue to sell its product to its wholesalers is not imputed to a successor supplier who obtains ownership of the product through an arms length asset acquisition (B) holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury (C) holding that a successor corporation had a duty to arbitrate the extent of its obligations under its predecessors cba because there was substantial continuity in the business enterprise (D) holding that section 388 of the restatement does not require the supplier to give information concerning available means for amelioration of obvious dangers even though the supplier is aware of those means and the party to whom the chattel is supplied is not (E) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury

Ex Output:
holding a successor corporation does not have a postsale duty to warn of product defects where the successor never succeeded to any service contracts was not aware of the products defects and did not know the location of the product at the time of plaintiffs injury

Ex Input:
state witnesses regarding their credibility during the course of the trial in chief. Angela Sweat had negotiated with state prosecution involving armed robbery charges, the facts of the plea agreement for impeachment was not permitted by the trial court. This witness was the sole evidence against the petitioner and had the jury known of her motive to lie they would have found me not guilty of the armed robbery charges. This was a denial of my right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the jury would have found me not guilty. Generally, federal courts should not review a state trial judge's rulings with respect to the admissibility of evidence. Shaw v. Boney, 695 F.2d 528, 530 (11th Cir.1983). Even if the trial court' h Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Evidentiary rulings are within the broad
Holding statements: (A) holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge (B) holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity (C) holding that denigrating insanity defense was inappropriate (D) holding that where the sole defense was insanity excluded testimony was material a crucial critical and highly significant factor (E) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense

Ex Output:
holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge

Ex Input:
contrast to Paulsen, plaintiffs here seek the direct payment of benefits that they claim they are owed under the plans, and that defendants allegedly have in their possession. Consequently, their claims for tortious interference with contract and inducing breach of contract seek to "duplicate, supplement, or supplant" the remedies provided by ERISA. See Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 269 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir.2001) ("Claimants simply cannot obtain relief by dressing up an ERISA benefits claim in the garb of a state law tort"). Consequently, all of plaintiffs' state law causes of action are preempted to the extent they seek to recover compensation owed under the top hat plans. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 375, 122 S.Ct. 2151, 153 L.Ed.2d 375 (2002) (<HOLDING>). D. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint States a
Holding statements: (A) holding that erisas preemption of state contract claims in a benefitsdue action is an affirmative defense subject to waiver (B) recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality (C) holding that erisa preemption is an affirmative defense where erisas preemptive effect would result only in a change of the applicable law and would not subject the claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction (D) recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof (E) recognizing that erisas preemption regime is driven by the overpowering federal policy in favor of federal regulation

Ex Output:
holding that erisas preemption of state contract claims in a benefitsdue action is an affirmative defense subject to waiver