TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: are complete and present within the proscribed state statute of limitations. Id. at 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091. Plaintiff argues that because Wallace dealt with a false arrest and not a search and seizure, its analysis is inapplicable. (D.E. 8, Plaintiffs Response). However, the general rule of Wallace soundly applies to a search and seizure scenario, as noted by the Sixth Circuit and several Kentucky district courts. See Harper, 293 Fed. Appx. at 391 n. 1 ("Wallace also clarified that Heck does not delay the accrual of an otherwise complete and present cause of action when judgment in the plaintiffs favor 'would impugn an anticipated future conviction .... ' Harper's claims thus accrued on July 31, 2003, the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure."); Kenney, 2011 WL 1582125 at *6 (<HOLDING>); Lovins v. Hurt, No. 11-216-JBC, 2011 WL
Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs 1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure (B) holding that a ruling on preindictment motion that search and seizure were legal collaterally estopped defendant from later moving to suppress evidence claiming that search and seizure were illegal (C) holding that section 1983 action for unlawful search and seizure accrued on dates of seizures rather than date on which state court declared the acts illegal (D) holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality (E) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: of peremptory strikes, the holdings of those Supreme Court opinions would be undermined. But we can engage in no comparative juror analysis here, because we do not know what happened during the entirety of the voir dire. Because we hold that, under the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of Batson, comparative juror analysis is an important tool that courts should utilize on appeal when assessing a defendant's plausible Batson claim, we also must conclude that all defendants, including those who are indigent, have a right to have access to the tools which would enable them to develop their plausible Batson claims through comparative juror analysis. "[T]he State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior 94, 87 S.Ct. 362, 17 L.Ed.2d 290 (1966) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). We recognize that the Court has never
Holding statements: (A) holding that a courts failure to provide a defendant with any portion of a habeas transcript was error (B) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (C) holding that appellants waived any claim of error as to the portion of the lower courts ruling that they did not expressly challenge on appeal (D) holding that the lack of evidence that the magistrate judge examined the trial transcript in its sufficiencyoftheevidence analysis left the court no alternative but to reverse the denial of habeas relief and remand for review of the transcript (E) holding that failure to review the evidence presented to the magistrate and failure even to have a transcript filed with the district court was reversible error

SOLUTION:
(A)