In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

It is axiomatic, however, that states act through their officials and agencies. Thus, under Will, those state agencies and other political subdivisions which carry out the state's business and have immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment constitute "arms of the state." Pursuant to Will, such entities would not be considered persons under 1983. Those political subdivisions which are not provided immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, do not rise to the level of "arms of the state" and would, under Will, be considered to be persons for the purposes of 1983. See Barket, Levy & Fine v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 F.2d 1084, 1086-88 (8th Cir.1991) (bi-state agency is a "person" under 1983); Magula v. Broward Gen. Medical Ctr., 742 F.Supp. 645, 649 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). Since the Will decision was handed down, a
Holding statements: (A) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment (B) holding that an ohio school district is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state and therefore it is not entitled to assert eleventh amendment immunity from suit (C) holding that the anne arundel board of education is an arm of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that the puc is not an arm of the state and rejecting claim of immunity (E) holding that because hospital district is more like a municipality than an arm of the state hospital district did not have eleventh amendment immunity
holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment

is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not the' underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII complaint"). 1. Basic Contributor Rating LMC does not dispute that a basic contributor rating is an adverse employment action and that the action took place after Dr. Chawla's August 2, 2011 and September 22, 2011 complaints. On September. 29, 2011, Mr. Hooker was notified that he was the subject of an investigation of Dr. Chawla's complaints. Docket No. 37-2 at 5. However, Dr. Chawla does not contest that Mr. Nichols had a role in assigning the basic contributor rating and identified no specific facts upon which to conclude that Mr. Nichols was aware of Dr. Chawla's prior complaints of discrimi nation. See Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgm't Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1203 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Dr. Chawla also does not attack the stated
Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to show a causal connection plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that those who decided to fire him had knowledge of his protected activity (B) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (C) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (D) holding that the plaintiff failed to show retaliation where there was no evidence that the employees who disciplined him knew of his protected activity (E) holding that in addition to temporal proximity plaintiff must show further evidence supporting a causal connection
holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity

Original Petition does not affirmatively reveal that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional minimum, despite the existence of statutory caps on the kinds of damages claimed by Plaintiff in excess of the required amount for federal jurisdiction. Because Plaintiffs Original Petition does not contain "a specific allegation that damages are in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount," the Court finds that Plaintiffs Original Petition did not start the thirty-day time limit for removal set forth in 1446(b). Chapman, 969 F.2d at 163. Furthermore, Defendant timely removed the instant cause upon receipt of Plaintiffs Amended Petition, which unequivocally asserts that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional requirement. See Bosky, 288 F.3d at 212 (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Court's exercise of
Holding statements: (A) holding that notice of removal was defective on its face because it failed to contain a copy of the process as required by the removal statute (B) holding other paper must be unequivocally clear and certain to start the time limit running for a notice of removal under the second paragraph of section 1446b (C) holding that the defendants motion to amend their notice of removal was proper due to plaintiffs waived objections to the sufficiency of the notice of removal by failing to seek remand within thirty days of removal (D) holding that the information supporting removal in a copy of an amended pleading must be unequivocally clear and certain to start the time limit running for a notice of removal internal quotation omitted (E) holding that any defect in removal procedure must be cured within the 30day removal period or it is fatal to the removal and defendants failure to attach exhibits to the notice of removal within that time required remand
holding that notice of removal was defective on its face because it failed to contain a copy of the process as required by the removal statute