In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

in original). With the possible exception of his claim that he was not permitted to testify, Man-giardi has not satisfied either prong of the Strickland test. Because each of Mangiardi's claims relating to the proceedings is meritless, appellate counsel was not unreasonable for any failure to raise any of them on direct appeal. See Williams, 166 F.Supp.2d at 305 (finding that where each of the claims raised in the defendant's 2255 motion was meritless, appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to raise them on direct appeal). The same reasoning applies to appellate counsel's failure to raise Man-giardi's claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See id., James v. Superintendent of SCI Huntington, No. CIV.A. 97-2864, 2000 WL 5196, at *3 (E.D.Pa. January 4, 2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, as discussed above, claims for
Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim (B) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel (C) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate (E) holding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue
(B)

of limitations have been held as not capable of waiver or subject to an estoppel, whether pled or not.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissenting opinion cites several re-, cent Supreme Court decisions in support of the proposition that the statute of limitations set forth at section 2501 is not jurisdictional, including Day v. McDonough, U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), Eberhart v. United States, U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam), Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 124 S.Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004), and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). None of the foregoing decisions address section 2501. Day, 126 S.Ct. at 1681 (<HOLDING>); Arbaugh, 126 S.Ct. at 1245 (addressing
Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final (C) holding that aedpas oneyear period of limitations does not support a delay of filing of habeas petition by capital defendant (D) holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights (E) holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions
(A)

811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa.Super.Ct.2002). 10 . Because the Court concludes that the Franchisees have stated a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith within the bounds established by Razumic and Witmer, the Court need not consider the parties' arguments about whether the duty of good faith might extend beyond termination to other aspects of the franchise relationship. 11 . It is undisputed that the defendants are ''persons" that may be held liable under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(3) (defining "person" as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property"). 12 . Indeed, because the corporate defendants are both "persons" and "enterprises," it is not clear whether they could be held liable under 1962(b). See Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1190 (<HOLDING>). The Court of Appeals has held that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that to prevail under civil rico plaintiff must prove that defendants participated in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (B) holding that a pattern of racketeering activity required multiple illegal schemes (C) holding that instructions allowing a jury to find an enterprise from evidence of its activity as opposed to its structure properly conveyed the holding in turkette that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the existence of an associationinfact enterprise (D) holding that to state a 1962a claim plaintiff must allege that the defendants received income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity and invested it in the acquisition of any interest in or the establishment or operation of a rico enterprise (E) recognizing that it is difficult to understand how a corporation can acquire or maintain an interest in itself through a pattern of racketeering activity and that 1962b may require that the person and enterprise be distinct entities
(E)