In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

other non-Virginia cases offer a compelling basis for adopting the per se rule Allied has proposed. In National City Bank v. Fleming, 2 Ohio App.3d 50, 440 N.E.2d 590, 599 (1981), for instance, the court said: It has long been the law of equity that a person who confers a benefit either directly or indirectly upon another in the course of performance of a contract with a third person is not entitled to compensation ... merely because of the failure of performance by the third party. However, where it appears from all the facts that the conferral of such benefit was the product of fraud, misrepresentation or bad faith by the party accepting and retaining such benefit, equity will imply an obligation to make payment therefor. See Costanzo v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430, 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (<HOLDING>), (emphasis added) (some citations omitted).
Holding statements: (A) holding that a hospital could not be an erisa beneficiary (B) holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply (C) holding that a duty may be owed to a beneficiary of a consensual relationship akin to that of a thirdparty beneficiary of a contract where the professional has actual knowledge that the services being provided are in part for the benefit of such third persons (D) holding that a contract beneficiary may be liable in restitution where the beneficiary by his conduct induces the conferral of the benefit (E) holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms
(D)

function of determining the validity of a claim from the function of fixing the claim's monetary value. See In re Devitt, 126 B.R. 212, 215 (Bankr.D.Md.1991). Section 502 therefore required the bankruptcy court to "determine[ ] the validity of the claim[s] and the amount allowed." Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp,, 843 F.2d 636, 646 (2d Cir.1988). It was then but a short and logical step for the bankruptcy court to enter a money judgment against Porges, on the basis of its section 502 determination, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and Bankruptcy Rule 9021. Rule 58 directs the clerk of the court to enter judgment in favor of a prevai 8 L.Ed.2d 939 (1990); see generally United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22, 93 S.Ct. 1562, 1564-65, 36 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). The entry of a money judgment also finds
Holding statements: (A) holding that the time to file an appeal never began to run because the clerk failed to enter a separate judgment as required by rule 58 (B) holding that because the district courts order failed to comply with rule 58 appellants notice of appeal cannot be considered late (C) holding that in order to prevent uncertainty rule 58 must be mechanically applied (D) holding that a district courts marginal order granting summary judgment did not meet the strict requirements of rule 58 because a party may reasonably be confused as to the standing of its ease when a decision is rendered in such an informal manner (E) holding rule 58 and bankruptcy rule 9021 applied in decision denying proofs of claim following adversary proceeding
(C)

adjustment under 3B1.2(b) of the Guidelines. We reject both contentions. A. Walker argues that the district court violated her due process rights by precluding her from conducting "meaningful questioning" into the reliability of Mario Morales's testimony during her sentencing hearing. This assertion is unsupported by the record, which shows that A. Walker was permitted to make an extensive attack on Morales's reliability by inquiring about his drug use and about allegedly inconsistent statements he previously made to law enforcement. The district court only interjected to curtail cross-examination when it became apparent that A. Walker's repetitive questions were not adding anything to the existing record. See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 766 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Adams, 694 F.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court in its discretion may limit crossexamination in order to preclude repetitive questioning upon determining that a particular subject has been exhausted even during the trial phase when defendants actually have a constitutional right to confront witnesses and more extensive due process rights than they have at sentencing (B) holding that sentencing court did not violate defendants due process rights when it reasonably refused to recall a witness for crossexamination (C) holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination (D) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (E) recognizing defendants right to confront witnesses with adequate crossexamination
(A)