In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: law. Courts were unwilling to recognize a common law cause of action against purveyors of intoxicating beverages because, as a matter of law, consumption, rather than the furnishing of alcohol, was considered the proximate cause of the ultimate damages. See Haafke, 347 N.W.2d at 384; Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Iowa 1982). Thus, dram shop statutes were enacted to enable tort plaintiffs to bridge the proximate cause gap between the sale of an intoxicating beverage and the subsequent injury or damage caused by the intoxicated patron. In exchange for this new claim, the legislature mandated that liquor purveyors were strictly liable and carefully prescribed the means by which liability may be ascertained. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227. The statute limits recovery for injuri 984) (<HOLDING>); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa
Holding statements: (A) holding tavern employees could be held liable for negligently furnishing alcohol to a patron in violation of a criminal statute or ordinance (B) holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest (C) holding that employer who failed to take remedial action could be held liable for sexual harassment of employee by subcontractors employees (D) holding that tavern will be held liable for serving alcohol to visibly intoxicated patron who then foreseeably becomes involved in a motor vehicle accident (E) holding tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained when intoxicated patron assaulted a police officer

A: holding proprietor of a tavern was not liable to officer who sustained injuries caused by a patron while the officer was attempting to make an arrest
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Q: two separate legal insufficiency claims. When the party without the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding, the challenge is one of "no evidence to support the finding." See Creative Manufacturing, Inc. v. Unik, 726 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.). Where the party having the burden of proof suffers an unfavorable finding (failure to find), the proper complaint is that the fact was established as "a matter of law." See Sterner v. Marathon Oil Company, 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex.1989). Here, Tech filed a verified special denial that it received timely notice. Consequently, Lucero had the burden to plead and secure a finding on notice. See Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center v. Apodaca, 876 S.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied)(<HOLDING>); see also Harrison v. Texas Department of
Holding statements: (A) holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice (B) holding that the government need not prove actual notice to the prisoner (C) holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice (D) holding that where the governmental unit filed a verified special denial that it received timely actual notice the plaintiff had the burden to prove and secure a finding on actual notice at trial (E) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice

A: holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice
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Q: that the cited driver will not appear in court or is under the influence, the officer is statutorily empowered with discretion to arrest or cite the driver. 16 The case before us is distinguishable from Collins v. State, 113 Nev. 1177, 946 P.2d 1055 (1997), and Ortega v. Reyna, 114 Nev. 55, 953 P.2d 18 (1998), which were decided based on the mandatory provision of NRS 484.795. 17 Black's Law Dictionary 419 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). 18 Id. (emphasis added). 19 Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 325-26, 44 P.3d 523, 525 (2002); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (explaining states may restrict police power under state law to a greater degree than the Supreme Court holds is necessary under the Federal Constitution); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (<HOLDING>). 20 Zale-Las Vegas v. Bulova Watch, 80 Nev.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the idaho constitution provides no greater protection from double jeopardy than does the federal constitution (B) holding that our federal constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the states power to control the selection of ones spouse (C) recognizing that state constitution imposes more stringent limitations on power of state to inquire into lawful associations and speech than those imposed by federal constitution (D) holding that under leatherman a federal court may not apply a pleading requirement more stringent than that provided for in the federal rules of civil procedure even in 1983 litigation (E) holding that individual states may construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the federal constitution

A:
holding that the idaho constitution provides no greater protection from double jeopardy than does the federal constitution
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