TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: paid with Vested Funds and Seized Funds. And while the majority of the ICE contract price was paid with DFI money, approximately $12 million, the record reflects that $8 million of the contract price was paid with Seized Funds. Thus, defendants have failed, with respect to either contract, to demonstrate that no "claim" was submitted within the meaning of the-FCA. And, accordingly, they are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. B. Presentment Before FCA liability will attach to a "claim" for payment under 3729(a)(1), the false or fraudulent "claim" must be "knowingly presented], or caus[ed] to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United Government or a member of the Armed Services of the United States." 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1); see also Totten II, 380 F.3d at 491 (<HOLDING>). This requirement ultimately presents no
Holding statements: (A) holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment (B) holding that presentment is a requirement of the fca (C) holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement (D) recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment (E) holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: entered an order finding probable'cause that the property was used to facilitate the commission of a felony. Although Flagg's atto ation of a discovery order will constitute an abuse of discretion where the trial court fails to make express written findings of fact supporting the . conclusion that the failure to obey the court order demonstrated willful or deliberate disregard. Express findings are required to ensure that the trial judge has consciously determined that the failure was more than a mistake, neglect, or inadvertence, and to assist the reviewing court to the extent the record is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492, 495-96 (Fla.2004) (citing Tubero, 569 So.2d at 1273); cf. Ledo v. Seavie Resources, LLC, 149 So.Sd 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Flagg filed a motion to set
Holding statements: (A) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (B) holding because defendant does not argue in his brief that these findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record this court is bound by the trial courts findings of fact (C) holding that where the record plainly reflected ledos willful and deliberate disregard of the courts repeated orders to respond to interrogatory requests the trial courts failure to provide written findings of fact in its order striking ledos pleadings did not require reversal (D) holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment (E) holding that erroneous findings of fact not necessary to support the judgment of the court are not grounds for reversal

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: of status, positing that we need not address this question because the BIA, in the alternative, considered and denied Petitioner's second application on the merits. However, because we must ensure that we review the correct BIA opinion, which turns on which adjustment application the IJ had jurisdiction to adjudicate, see Cadapan v. Att'y Gen., 749 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2014), we i pause to clarify the IJ's jurisdiction. We have held that when the BIA does not expressly retain jurisdiction over a petitioner's case and issues a remand order unlimited in scope and purpose, an IJ has jurisdiction to consider any matters pertinent to that case under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and its implementing regulations. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 702-03 (3d Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Matter of Patel, 16 I. & N. Dec. 600,
Holding statements: (A) holding that in exercising its discretion in choosing the appropriate sanction the trial court is not limited to considering only the specific violation committed but is entitled to consider other matters which have occurred during the litigation (B) holding that a remand unless qualified or limited for a specific purpose is effective for the stated purpose and for consideration of any and all matters that the ij deems appropriate (C) holding that unless remand from the bia is qualified or limited to a specific purpose an ij may consider any and all matters he deems appropriate in the exercise of his administrative discretion or which are brought to his attention in compliance with the appropriate regulations (D) holding that where issues were not considered by the bia remand is appropriate (E) holding that any inherent power to remand to the bia for the consideration of additional evidence should not be exercised where i the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the bia and ii the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the bia for the taking of additional evidence

SOLUTION:
(C)