In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
for a damages claim. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29. Nor can Russell change the facts that render her remaining grounds not justiciable. As long as there is no dispute that the release between Metro and American Century is not binding on Russell, and Metro and its representatives have not been awarded and do not seek attorney fees based on section 417.003 of the Labor Code, there is no way in which Russell could re-plead her claims to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. See Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467; WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing Russell an opportunity to further amend her pleadings. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 1 . S rters, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Tex.1963) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 366, 190
Holding statements: (A) holding governmental immunity was not implicated in a declaratoryjudgment action seeking an interpretation of a competitive bidding statute as applied to the highway commissions policy of requiring all materials furnished under contracts be manufactured in the united states (B) holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by 14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained (C) holding a declaratoryjudgment action was proper to construe compulsory school attendance law and did not implicate governmental immunity (D) holding governmental immunity not implicated and a declaratoryjudgment action proper to seek determination of whether plaintiffs were motor carriers for purposes of tax statute (E) recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials

Ex Output:
holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by 14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained

Ex Input:
rejected'this argument, holding that the allegations, even if true, did not amount to an -IDEA procedural violation. See 20 U.S.C. 1415 et seq. (setting forth the procedural safeguards afforded to parents when their child is in special education). 13 . It is worth noting that at least one state Massachusetts, as the IDEA permits, has enacted a more stringent standard. Specifically, children in Massachusetts who are eligible for special education services are entitled to IEPs that provide for their "maximum possible development.'' See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B 2 (emphasis added); Frank S. v. School Committee of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District, 26 F.Supp.2d 219, 226 (D.Mass.1998). 14 . See Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County, 118 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task (B) holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors (C) holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied (D) holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity (E) holding that it was pure speculation that if the preference payment had not been made the vendor would have been included as a critical vendor and the court would have approved it

Ex Output:
holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors

Ex Input:
You know that Kenny Mohammed told you the truth from all of the evidence in this case. The evidence in this case corroborates what Kenny Mohammed told you from that stand. The prosecutor then proceeded to summarize that corroborating evidence, discussing the recordings of Mohammed receiving and making calls before the transactions, the testimony of agents who witnessed the wine-colored Corolla and Mohammed's movements at both transactions, the expert testimony of Agent Coleman regarding the typical structure of these drug transactions, and the evasive moves made by Johnson in the wine-colored Corolla. Thus, the prosecutor properly argued that the evidence compelled the conclusion that Mohammed complied with his immunity agreement by testifying truthfully. See Clarke, 227 F.3d at 885 (<HOLDING>). Finally, Johnson challenges the prosecutor's
Holding statements: (A) holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible where defense counsel implied in his opening statement that witness should not be believed because of the favorable consideration he received from the government in his plea bargaining agreement (B) holding that a rule 41e claimant relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property when he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain (C) holding that under subsection al as then written the defendant had no right to appeal whether his sentence was supported by evidence presented because he entered into a plea agreement as to the sentence (D) holding that a merger clause normally prevents a criminal defendant who has entered into a plea agreement from asserting that the government made oral promises to him not contained in the plea agreement itself (E) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement

Ex Output:
holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible where defense counsel implied in his opening statement that witness should not be believed because of the favorable consideration he received from the government in his plea bargaining agreement