In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
fees for tax years 1995 through 1999, the parties stipulated that judgment was sought against Connie Ogg in rem only. 3 . Although it has been amended several times since its enactment in 1985, section 33.011 has always provided a process for a taxpayer to request a waiver of penalties and interest if the act or omission of an officer, employee, or agent of the appraisal district or taxing unit caused or resulted in the taxpayer's failure to pay the tax before delinquency. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. 33.011 (Vernon 2001). Here, the trial court stated in a finding of fact that the Oggs did not request a waiver of penalties or interest pursuant to section 33.011. The parties do not challenge that particular finding of fact. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex.1986) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Act of May 24, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch.
Holding statements: (A) holding unchallenged findings of fact are binding unless contrary is established as matter of law or there is no evidence to support finding (B) holding that unless an affirmative defense is established as matter of law defendant bears burden of obtaining jury findings necessary to support defense (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that judgment on the pleadings will not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes that there are no material issues of fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law (E) holding that motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
complaint's allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues." Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford's claim is premised on the officers' alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard's instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
Kodak Co., 98 F.Supp.2d 141, 147 (D.Mass.2000) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir.2002). 123 . See id. at 46-47 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1298, at 625-26 (2d ed.1990)). 124 . Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 228. 125 . See Cal. Gov't Code 12651(a)(1) & (2); Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, 1201(a)(1) & (2); D.C.Code 2-308-14(a)(1) & (2); Fla. Stat. 68.082(2)(a) & (b); Haw.Rev.Stat. 661-21(a)(1) & (2); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.175/3(a)(1) & (2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 5B(1) & (2); Nev.Rev.Stat. 357.040(1)(a) & (b); Tenn.Code Ann. 71-5-182(a)(1)(A) & (B); Tex. Hum. Res.Code Ann. 36.002; Va.Code Ann. 8.01-216.3(A)(1) & (2). 126 . Cf. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 227-28 (<HOLDING>). 127 .Id. at 232. 128 . See id. at 225
Holding statements: (A) holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions (B) holding that the federal false claims act is an antifraud statute to which rule 9bs heightened pleading requirements apply (C) holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements (D) holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim (E) holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 1983

Ex Output:
(B)