In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702-703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today's majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea soning in Justice Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter's opinion, I respectfully dissent. 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630
Holding statements: (A) holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a 106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution (B) holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin state environmental reclamation order (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs

Output: holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a 106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution

Input: Consider Input: this petition for prohibition. Petitioner is mistaken in an essential respect. Although he characterizes his challenge as involving subject matter jurisdiction, he is mistaken. There can be no dispute that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving dissolution of marriage. See 26.012(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006) (circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all actions at law not cognizable in the county courts). The fact that petitioner wishes to dispute in the pending dissolution action is whether there was any marriage at all to dissolve. An attack on the validity of an alleged marriage has nothing to do with subject matter jurisdiction but is simply an issue to be determined in the dissolution action. See Marden v. Marden, 276 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (<HOLDING>). It is true that a petition for a writ of
Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that standing existed (C) holding that in an action brought by alleged wife for permanent alimony suit money attorneys fees and restraining order an issue of fact existed concerning whether a commonlaw marriage existed thus precluding summary judgment (D) holding that material issue of fact existed concerning whether employer orally promised to discharge employee only for cause (E) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to deny an award of attorneys fees to the wife

Output: holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment

Input: Consider Input: portions of Cavnar. Sisters of Charity v. Dunsmoor, 832 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex.App.Austin 1992, writ denied). However, the amendment adding section 6 was not effective until September 2, 1987. Any action commenced before this date is governed by the applicable law in effect before the effective date of the amendment. Tex. Rev.Civ.StatANN. art. 5069-1.05 historical note (Vernon Supp.1993) [Act of Sept. 2, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 3, 1, 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws. 51, 52], The law in effect prior to the effective date of section 6 was Cavnar, and since appellants filed this suit on April 9, 1987, prior to the effective date of the amendment, Cavnar is controlling on the issue of prejudgment interest. See Granite Const. Co. v. Mendoza, 816 S.W.2d 756, 766 (Tex.App.Dallas 1991, no writ) (<HOLDING>); O'Reilly v. Grafham, 797 S.W.2d 399, 401
Holding statements: (A) holding that provision in wrongful death act that allowed parents to recover exemplary damages was invalid under art 16 26 since legislature could not enlarge on exemplary damages (B) holding that prejudgment interest in suit filed before september 2 1987 not governed by article 5069105 section 6 (C) holding plaintiff could not recover prejudgment interest on exemplary damages because suit was filed on april 161987 and thus governed by cavnar and not article 5069105 (D) holding the eighth amendment inapplicable to an award of exemplary damages (E) holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award
Output: holding that provision in wrongful death act that allowed parents to recover exemplary damages was invalid under art 16 26 since legislature could not enlarge on exemplary damages