In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: of discretion standard. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994). Statements stemming from a state actor's custodial interrogation of a defendant are not admissible unless he is warned of his Fifth Amendment "right to remain silent" and that "anything said can and will be used against [him] in court." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 19 The State concedes here that Appellant was in police custody when Nurse Geyer questioned him at the hospital. Even if a defendant is in custody, however, Miranda warnings are required when a med ical professional conducts an interrogation only if that medical professional is a state actor. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial (B) holding that phrase i know i have the right to remain silent together with phrase and knowing that anything i say may be used against me substantially complied with article 3822 warnings even though warnings failed to advise accused that his statement could be used against him at his trial or in court because it advised him his statement could be used against him in any type of context not just those mentioned in article 3822 subsection 2a1 and 2 (C) holding that a defendants jailhouse statements to a courtappointed psychiatrist could not be used against him in the penalty phase of a murder trial because the psychiatrist failed to give the defendant miranda warnings (D) holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda (E) holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial
[A]: (C)

[Q]: purposes of nonclient standing] is a question of fact."). Neither party argues that Mark and Marie share some type of legally recognizable confidential relationship, and Marie offered no evidence to the district court that Mark acquired any privileged, confidential information from Marie. In Brown, this court concluded that "disqualification is not warranted absent proof of a reasonable probability that counsel actually acquired privileged, confidential information." 116 Nev. at 1202, 14 P.3d at 1267 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the context of familial relationships, other courts have declined to disqualify counsel absent proof that counsel actually acquired confidential information from a family member. See, e.g., Addam v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 2004) (<HOLDING>); DCH Health Services, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
Holding statements: (A) holding in a marital dissolution action that a sibling relationship between a husbands attorney and a wifes former physician was insufficient to disqualify the attorney and explaining that the attorneys brother presumably possesses confidential information relating to the wife but there is no evidence that he disclosed any such information to his sister (B) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted (C) holding that in order to determine whether disqualification of plaintiffs attorney is appropriate because of a previous attorneyclient relationship he had with the defendant the court must determine whether confidential information was passed from client to attorney (D) holding that a wife is not liable simply by virtue of the marital relationship for her husbands fraudulent acts (E) holding that a corporate insider must abstain from trading in shares of his own corporation unless he has first disclosed the material information known to him not because of the relationship between the buyer and seller but because of the relationship of trust and confidence between the shareholders and the insider who obtained the confidential information by reason of his position with that corporation that relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the need to prevent the insider from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders
[A]: (A)

[Q]: the court held that the discretion of the trial court to impose such sanctions has constitutional limitations. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917. When a trial court dismisses a ease based on a claimant's conduct during discovery, it adjudicates the claimant's cause of action without regard to the merits of the case. Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate a party's claims unless that party's conduct justifies a presumption that his claim lacks merit. Id. at 918. The court further explained that "[s]anctions which are so seve d 167, 171 (Tex.1993) (death-penalty sanctions held inappropriate where nothing in the evidence suggested Remington's argument lacked merit, a finding necessary to a justify death-penalty sanction); Koepp v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 833 S.W.2d 514 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>). Denton failed to appear for his deposition
Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no question that the full and fair opportunity element was met where there was no indication that such an opportunity was unavailable (B) holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where party inadvertently failed to comply with courts order and nothing in the record even approaches the flagrant bad faith or abuse necessary for the imposition of such sanctions (C) holding deathpenalty sanctions inappropriate where plaintiff refused to name coworkers who used drugs and was late in answering interrogatories because of attorneys illness because there was no indication of bad faith (D) holding that without a demonstration of bad faith on the part of the attorney in question sanctions pursuant to this statute are inappropriate (E) holding that it was error for the trial court to refuse to permit plaintiff to amend his complaint to include a new affidavit and report complying with section 2622 where there was no indication that the plaintiffs failure to file the report earlier in the litigation was in bad faith
[A]:
(C)