Input: In Meadowvale , California , on June 9 , 1970 , three babies are born at the height of a total eclipse . Due to the sun and moon blocking Saturn , which controls emotions , the babies develop into children who are heartless and uncaring , with no feelings of remorse for their awful offences . Ten years later , in 1980 , Curtis , Debbie and Steven begin to kill the adults around them and are able to escape detection because of their youthful and innocent fa ades . However , when Timmy and Joyce discover their crimes , they find themselves as the targets of the evil children . Their attempt to warn their neighbors about them are ignored . Soon enough , Beverly discovers Debbie 's horrible secret with the newspaper clippings as evidence as proof and learns that she , Curtis and Steven were responsible for the murders . She realizes that Joyce and Timmy were telling the truth all along and confronts her sister for it . Beverly and Mrs. Brody forbids Debbie from hanging out with Curtis and Steven . Debbie responds by killing her older sister in retaliation with a bow and arrow . They soon attempt to murder Joyce and Timmy . However , they fight back and manages to capture Steven and Curtis . While Timmy calls the police from a neighbor 's house , Debbie manages to escape from the backyard and gets inside her mother 's car . She manages to lie about Curits and Steven trying to set her up to take the fall for the attacks . At the end , Curtis and Steven are arrested by the police much to the shock and anger of the town .
"Why did the neighbors ignore Timmy and Joyce's warnings?" is "They didn't believe them"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output: no

Input: And William Martinez, 28, who cut his medical school studies short because he couldn't afford the $39,000 in loans after two years of graduate school and four years of college. Martinez works two jobs as a physician's assistant and supports his elderly parents and 8-year-old son. Uncommon Good has a 22-member board of doctors, lawyers and representatives of Christian groups and is recruiting mentors. One goal is to get the state Legislature to pass a law to provide loan forgiveness to medical professionals and lawyers who work with the poor. Mintie said she hopes her organization can be a national model for other professions. She is trying to bring legal aid services to the Inland Valley -- the closest legal aid office is in El Monte and represents 700,000 poor people throughout the San Fernando, San Gabriel and Inland valleys. "Unless the legal aid is in the community, you can't say you are serving the poor," Mintie said. Neal Dudovitz is the executive director of Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County, the legal aid office in El Monte. He sees attorneys new to poverty law leave all the time because they can't afford the salary with their law school debt. "She's really opened a lot of eyes in terms of having people understand how the educational debt is limiting and reducing the services that are available to low-income communities," Dudovitz said. "Nancy is light years ahead of the curve on this stuff. Very little is being done practically to solve it." Mintie, her colleagues say, could have made a lot of money in private practice. "She's very kind and pleasant," said Julius Thompson, 45, an attorney at Inner City Law Center and an Uncommon Good recipient. "But she's also a woman on a mission. When she sets her sights on something, she's a formidable force."

Does the response "An attorney at Inner City Law Center" correctly answer the question "Who said, "She's a formidable force."?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
***
Output: yes

Problem: After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Question: "Which U.S. agency failed to connect the dots collected by a number of field offices concerning al Queda fundraising?"

Answer: "Congress"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer:
no