TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be presented with a context passage, a question about that paragraph, and a possible answer to that question. The task is to check the validity of the answer. Answer with "Yes" or "No".
PROBLEM: Earthquakes seemed to outline a special feature of earth's crust. Earthquakes let scientists know where the crust was moving. This led to the discovery that the Earths crust was broken up into regions, or plates. Earthquakes happen most often along these plate boundaries. This was evidence that continents can move. The movements of the plates are called plate tectonics. The Earths crust is divided into plates. There are about a dozen large plates and several small ones. Each plate is named for the continent or ocean basin it contains. Scientists know he plates are in motion. They now know the direction and speed of this motion . Plates dont move very fast. They move only a few centimeters a year. This is about the same rate fingernails grow. So you might wonder, what could cause this motion? What supplies the energy to cause this change? <sep>How fast do plates move?<sep>A few centimeters a year

SOLUTION: Yes

PROBLEM: Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. We had to live there." Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles. <sep>Which countries were thought to have dictatorial governments<sep>Neighboring countries like Washington

SOLUTION: No

PROBLEM: Bin Laden began delivering diatribes against the United States before he left Saudi Arabia. He continued to do so after he arrived in Sudan. In early 1992, the al Qaeda leadership issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Western "occupation" of Islamic lands. Specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack, the language resembled that which would appear in Bin Laden's public fatwa in August 1996. In ensuing weeks, Bin Laden delivered an often-repeated lecture on the need to cut off "the head of the snake." By this time, Bin Laden was well-known and a senior figure among Islamist extremists, especially those in Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. Still, he was just one among many diverse terrorist barons. Some of Bin Laden's close comrades were more peers than subordinates. For example, Usama Asmurai, also known as Wali Khan, worked with Bin Laden in the early 1980s and helped him in the Philippines and in Tajikistan. The Egyptian spiritual guide based in New Jersey, the Blind Sheikh, whom Bin Laden admired, was also in the network. Among sympathetic peers in Afghanistan were a few of the warlords still fighting for power and Abu Zubaydah, who helped operate a popular terrorist training camp near the border with Pakistan. There were also rootless but experienced operatives, such as Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who-though not necessarily formal members of someone else's organization-were traveling around the world and joining in projects that were supported by or linked to Bin Laden, the Blind Sheikh, or their associates. In now analyzing the terrorist programs carried out by members of this network, it would be misleading to apply the label "al Qaeda operations" too often in these early years. Yet it would also be misleading to ignore the significance of these connections. And in this network, Bin Laden's agenda stood out. While his allied Islamist groups were focused on local battles, such as those in Egypt, Algeria, Bosnia, or Chechnya, Bin Laden concentrated on attacking the "far enemy"-the United States. After U.S. troops deployed to Somalia in late 1992, al Qaeda leaders formulated a fatwa demanding their eviction. In December, bombs exploded at two hotels in Aden where U.S. troops routinely stopped en route to Somalia, killing two, but no Americans. <sep>Was Usama Asmurai one of Bin Laden's subordinates?<sep>He was one of Bin Laden's peers.

SOLUTION:
Yes