We were cornered in a sort of way already. But these butchers up the cavern had been surprised, they were probably scared, and they had no special weapons, only those little hatchets of theirs. And that way lay escape. Their sturdy little forms--ever so much shorter and thicker than the mooncalf herds--were scattered up the slope in a way that was eloquent of indecision. I had the moral advantage of a mad bull in a street. But for all that, there seemed a tremendous crowd of them. Very probably there was. Those Selenites down the cleft had certainly some infernally long spears. It might be they had other surprises for us.... But, confound it! if we charged up the cave we should let them up behind us, and if we didn't those little brutes up the cave would probably get reinforced. Heaven alone knew what tremendous engines of warfare--guns, bombs, terrestrial torpedoes--this unknown world below our feet, this vaster world of which we had only pricked the outer cuticle, might not presently send up to our destruction. It became clear the only thing to do was to charge! It became clearer as the legs of a number of fresh Selenites appeared running down the cavern towards us.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: What are two reasons that the narrator decides the only option is to charge?

Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. Other governments in the region, such as those of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and even Libya, which were targets of some of these groups, added their own pressure. At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. Though Turabi had been its inspirational leader, General Omar al Bashir, president since 1989, had never been entirely under his thumb. Thus as outside pressures mounted, Bashir's supporters began to displace those of Turabi. The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. Bin Laden also began to have serious money problems. International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. Saudi pressures on the Bin Laden family also probably took some toll. In any case, Bin Laden found it necessary both to cut back his spending and to control his outlays more closely.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: How long after the failed attempt to assassinate Hosni Mubarak did the U.N. impose sanctions on Sudan?

Before the mysterious disappearance of one of its passenger jets this month, Malaysia wasn't a country used to finding itself dominating headlines around the world. Some of its Southeast Asian neighbors, including Indonesia and the Philippines, have suffered devastating natural disasters in recent years and are all too familiar with the media frenzy that accompanies a major crisis. But Malaysia has largely managed to stay out of the international spotlight since its independence from British colonial rule more than half a century ago. "It is one of these countries, because of its geography, that doesn't have earthquakes," said Ernest Bower, senior adviser for Southeast Asia studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It doesn't have tsunamis. It hasn't been tested with a disaster like this." The disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 has thrust the government into the dazzling glare of worldwide attention. And it hasn't emerged with very good grades. "I think on a stress test, they're failing," Bower told CNN's Jake Tapper, pointing to the government's coordination of different agencies and communication with other countries. China among critics Criticism and complaints have come from other countries involved in the search for the missing plane, including China and Vietnam, and from the relatives of passengers. Malaysian officials have created confusion by issuing contradictory statements on key aspects of the investigation. The majority of the people on board the plane were Chinese, and Beijing has increasingly voiced its displeasure with the search, especially after Malaysia announced over the weekend that evidence suggested the plane had been deliberately flown west into the Indian Ocean, away from its last confirmed location over the South China Sea. "The new information means the intensive search in the South China Sea for the whole past week was worthless and would never bear fruit," said a commentary published by China's state-run news agency Xinhua. "Even worse, the golden time for saving possible survivors, if any, was generously wasted."
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: Contradictory statements by the government of Malaysia have irritated what country involved with the investigation?

In March 2001, Rice asked the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan. Rice's recollection was that the idea had come from Clarke and the NSC senior director for intelligence, Mary McCarthy, and had been linked to the proposal for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Rice described the draft document as providing for "consolidation plus," superseding the various Clinton administration documents. In fact, the CIA drafted two documents. One was a finding that did concern aid to opponents of the Taliban regime; the other was a draft Memorandum of Notification, which included more open-ended language authorizing possible lethal action in a variety of situations. Tenet delivered both to Hadley on March 28. The CIA's notes for Tenet advised him that "in response to the NSC request for drafts that will help the policymakers review their options, each of the documents has been crafted to provide the Agency with the broadest possible discretion permissible under the law." At the meeting, Tenet argued for deciding on a policy before deciding on the legal authorities to implement it. Hadley accepted this argument, and the draft MON was put on hold. As the policy review moved forward, the planned covert action program for Afghanistan was included in the draft presidential directive, as part of an "Annex A" on intelligence activities to "eliminate the al Qaeda threat." The main debate during the summer of 2001 concentrated on the one new mechanism for a lethal attack on Bin Laden-an armed version of the Predator drone. In the first months of the new administration, questions concerning the Predator became more and more a central focus of dispute. Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afghanistan as soon as weather permitted, hoping that they still might provide the elusive "actionable intelligence" to target Bin Laden with cruise missiles. Learning that the Air Force was thinking of equipping Predators with warheads, Clarke became even more enthusiastic about redeployment. The CTC chief, Cofer Black, argued against deploying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes. He recalled that theTaliban had spotted a Predator in the fall of 2000 and scrambled their MiG fighters. Black wanted to wait until the armed version was ready. "I do not believe the possible recon value outweighs the risk of possible program termination when the stakes are raised by the Taliban parading a charred Predator in front of CNN," he wrote.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION:
Why did Cofer Black, argue against deploying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes?