instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district "in which [the case] might have been brought," according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should "sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed." PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. "There is no valid reason for reading the words 'where it might have been brought' to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both
Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of 1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business
answer:
(C)

question:
2505. III. DISCUSSION A. No Private Cause of Action Under IGRA As an initial matter, the court dismisses all of plaintiffs claims against all defendants brought pursuant to alleged violations of IGRA. The court, following the majority of courts who have decided the issue, finds that IGRA provides no private right of action against the Tribe, the State, the federal government or any official or agency thereof. See, e.g., Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 63 F.3d 1030, 1049 (11th Cir.1995)(finding plaintiff failed to state a claim against tribe for alleged failure to comply with IGRA's licensing requirements because no implied cause of action in IGRA); American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1053 (D.Ariz.2001)(citing 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(A))(<HOLDING>); Jimi Dev. Corp. v. Ute Mountain Ute Indian
Holding statements: (A) holding that no private right of action exists (B) holding that there is no private right of action for any person under 13d (C) holding that the scope of section 541 is broad and includes all kinds of property including causes of action (D) recognizing private right of action (E) holding only three kinds of entities are expressly given causes of action under igraindian tribes states and the united statesand there is no implied private right to enforce igra
answer:
(E)

question:
Doe, 120 F.3d at 1283; see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 105, 118 S.Ct. 488 ("To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders ... sanctions 'criminal' for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government's ability to engage in effective regulation .... "). Aggregate assessment Only two of the Mendozar-Martinez factors arguably indicate a punitive effect: the tie to criminal conduct and the excessiveness of the sanction relative to nonpunitive purposes. Neither one by itself is sufficient to overcome the legislature's nonpunitive intent. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101, 118 S.Ct. 488 (rejecting the Supreme Court's apparent prior elevation of the excessiveness factor to dispositive status); One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365-66, 104 S.Ct. 1099 (<HOLDING>); Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-50, 100 S.Ct. 2636
Holding statements: (A) holding that the accrual of attorneys fees alone is sufficient to establish cause (B) holding that a hearing on a motion to amend to allege punitive damages is not necessary (C) recognizing the financial position of the defendant as a factor in assessing a punitive damages award (D) holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent (E) holding that a punitive indication from the tietocriminalconduct factor does not alone establish the necessary clearest proof
answer:
(E)