Critics say that is not nearly enough compared with other prescribers, such as M.D. psychiatrists or nurse practitioners who have at least six years' medical education and clinical experience. Neither Davison nor most other RxP opponents doubt the efficacy of medications. Their greatest objection is to the notion of turning psychology into a prescribing profession. In a field that has struggled long and hard to prove that mind, mood and behavior can be studied empirically, the past decade, Davison says, has seen "exciting developments" that demonstrate the validity of various psychotherapeutic interventions and the psychosocial-behavioral models on which they are based. "The timing is peculiar to abandon psychological science or to convert it to a medical science," explains Elaine M. Heiby of the University of Hawaii, who chairs a committee of the 1,000-member American Association of Applied and Preventive Psychology that is concerned about the medicalization of psychology. "Making sure that practicing psychologists are giving patients interventions based on the best available psychological science should be the APA's priority," argues Emory University's Scott Lilienfeld, president of the Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology (SSCP). More than any philosophical betrayal of psychology, RxP opponents fear that the movement will undermine the science they love. They believe that if prescriptive authority becomes the norm, biomedical requirements will inevitably seep into the psychology curriculum, at the expense of traditional psychological science and methodology. Lilienfeld feels that many clinical psychologists already receive inadequate training in fundamentals such as research design and evaluation. RxP opponents charge the APA with pushing its prescription-privileges agenda without adequately assessing support for it in the field. The 300-member SSCP is the only group within the APA to have taken a formal stance against prescription privileges. The APA has scheduled 30 minutes at its meeting in August for an RxP debate, but its leadership believes it already has an accurate sense of support for its RxP policy. "Except for this small vocal minority, we have just not gotten a lot of groundswell against this from members," says APA president Philip G. Zimbardo of Stanford University. With prescription privileges now a reality in one state, some RxP opponents concede that it may be too late. This year four states besides New Mexico -- Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois and Tennessee -- have pending legislation for psychologist prescription privileges. Over the past decade, 14 state legislatures have considered such laws. Between 1991 and 1997, a U.S. Department of Defense psychopharmacology demonstration project involving two to four years' training produced 10 military psychologists who can write prescriptions.

Question: "What is the greatest objection of RxP opponents?"

Answer: "Their greatest objection is that psychologist will not allow to write prescription"

Response: no

The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money.

Question: "How much money was frozen after the President applied the same designation to the Taliban?"

Answer: "$500 million"

Response: no

Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.

Question: "Fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan intercepted a plane that took off from which airport?"

Answer: "Delta"

Response:
no