TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Statement. They were, however, obtained prior to this Court's actual approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement, which occurred on December 19, 2008 (i.e. at the joint hearing on approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement and the Amended Plan). Although typically a disclosure statement should be approved before the proponent solicits votes for the plan, here the premature solicitation was harmless and, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a harmless failure to comply with 1125's solicitation requirements "is not necessarily fatal to the success of a Chapter 11 reorganization." In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.D.Ga.1980); see also First Am. Bank of N.Y. v. Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274, 278-80 (D.Del.1988) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105(d)(2)(B)(vi),
Holding statements: (A) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (B) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (E) holding that a plan proponents failure to obtain court approval of solicitation materials is not per se fatal to the confirmation process

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: arrest for a misdemeanor is permitted only when one of the statutory exceptions is met. See Tenn.Code Ann. 55-10-207©️ (2008). 5 . "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a 0 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that the duration of the stop was unreasonably extended where the officer admitted that, for thirteen minutes of the sixteen minute stop, he asked the defendant questions that were unrelated to the traffic violation); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172 73 (Del.2010) (concluding that the stop, during which the officer asked the defendant for identification and ran a background check, "did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop"); Bucalo v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-CA-000176-MR, 2012 WL 246245, at *5-7 (Ky.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mason, 173 Md.App. 414, 919 A.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that a traffic stop which lasted 105 minutes from the time of the initial stop until the defendant was arrested on drugrelated charges was unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for purposes of conducting a drug dog sniff because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was engaged in drugrelated activity (B) holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made (C) holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished (D) holding that an officer does not need reasonable articulable suspicion of drugrelated criminal activity prior to subjecting defendants car to a dog sniff subsequent to a lawful traffic stop (E) holding duration of stop was reasonable as it lasted under thirty minutes

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need b[e] advanced .... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.' " Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 n. 4, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (quoting Woodard v. State, 42 Ala.App. 552, 171 So.2d 462, 469 (1965)). See also Dingier v. State, 408 So.2d 530, 531 (Ala.1981) (same). In the case at hand, Clark entered into a "good behavior" stipulation that the State could prove a prima facie case of guilt. When Clark failed to comply with the terms of the agreement, he was adjudicated guilty based on his stipulation. During a hearing on Clark's motion for a new trial, the prosecutor described a "goo (Ala.Crim.App.1999), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Because Clark was adjudicated guilty based
Holding statements: (A) holding that based on the facts presented by the state and the defendants stipulation to the existence of a factual basis for his plea the court properly determined a factual basis for the plea existed (B) holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea (C) holding that court must decide case on basis of facts admitted unaffected by stipulation made by counsel (D) holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional (E) holding that a defendants strategic stipulation to certain facts of the crime was not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea where the defendants stipulation did not establish guilt

SOLUTION:
(E)