In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

nonetheless entitled to claim derivative asylum relief based on the possibility that their citizen child would be subjected to FGM. In so assuming, the majority's remand is illusory. Although the practice of FGM is considered persecution under our law, there is no threat here since a United States citizen child cannot be deported to the country of her parents' birth, and the parents cannot claim an unrecognized form of derivative relief when they themselves cannot establish entitlement to asylum. By usurping the prerogative of Congress, which alone has the power to create a new basis for cancellation of removal, the majority violates the separation of powers doctrine and creates an unnecessary conflict with the Seventh Circuit. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Like the petitioner in Oforji, Mr. and Mrs.
Holding statements: (A) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (B) holding that an alien parent may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the aliens united states citizen child in the event of the aliens deportation (C) holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding (D) holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel (E) holding that the crime of bringing aliens to the united states is complete when the initial transporter who brings the aliens to the united states ceases to transport them
(B)

677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir.2012). Under the specific circumstances presented in this case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with White. Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and White mail there. Furthermore, Lewis was previously incarcerated at the same prison. Thus, he would have received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded. In these circumstances, Lewis should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls were monitored and recorded. See United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrison, 986 F.Supp. 280,
Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (E) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials
(C)

clause is limited to legal impossibility because "Florida law construes force majeure clauses to exclude only those delays that are excusable under the doctrine of impossibility." To support that contention, Paradigm cites Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671, 675 (1944), but that decision does not shoulder the proposition. In Florida Power the delay was caused by a hurricane an act of God. Id. The court was concerned with only that kind of delay. That does not mean the court was narrowing the force majeure clause at issue (and all force majeure clauses in all Florida contracts) to cover only acts of God. It appears to us that force majeure clauses broader than the scope of impossibility are enforceable under Florida law. See Devco, 518 So.2d at 923 (<HOLDING>); St. Joe Paper Co. v. State Dep't of Envtl.
Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims (C) holding that the use of excessive force does not constitute a prison condition in the ordinary sense of the term (D) holding that excessive force claims are to be treated under the fourth amendment (E) holding that excessive rain excused delay under the contracts force majeure clause as a condition outside of the sellers control
(E)