TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to establish eligibility-triggering factors: Though Ia-beled as "sentencing factors," those factors are more appropriately considered as elements of a capital offense. This logic applies equally to the establishment of any sentencing factors necessary to expose a defendant to a higher maximum penalty in the noncapital context. As discussed supra, Fields's Confrontation Clause challenge relates only to evidence that the government introduced relevant to the jury's ultimate selection decision. The applicability of the Confrontation Clause to the establishment of eligibility-triggering factors is therefore not a question squarely presented by this case, and we decline to resolve it definitively. 19 .See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 385, 106
Holding statements: (A) holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment (B) holding that there is no sixth amendment right to jury sentencing (C) holding that if a jury is to be provided the defendant at capital sentencing regardless of whether the sixth amendment requires it the jury must stand impartial and indifferent to the extent commanded by the sixth amendment (D) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (E) holding the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment

SOLUTION: holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of sixth amendment

PROBLEM: face," id. at 61, 90 S.Ct. 1555, it held that the exception for any portrayal that "does not tend to discredit [the] armed force[s]" impermissibly restricted expression on the basis of viewpoint. See id. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. 1555. Here, as in Schacht, defendants may be constitutionally permitted to prohibit all fraternal organizations from marching in uniform. But it does not follow from this premise that defendants have the seemingly lesser included authority to ban only some organizations from marching in uniform. Under Schacht, and under other Supreme Court cases involving selective prohibitions on expression, defendants' selectivity must itself pass constitutional muster. Cf. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 425-28, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct.
Holding statements: (A) holding that cincinnati could not ban commercial newsracks from public property while allowing noncommercial newsracks even if the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property (B) holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content (C) holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property (D) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (E) holding not only does cincinnatis categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech but in this case the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted

SOLUTION: holding ban on newsracks to be contentbased because determining whether a newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publications content

PROBLEM: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

SOLUTION:
holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241