In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

phrase "periodical ly review and monitor the agent" is untested. Thus, the unanswered question before us is how much reviewing and monitoring is required by a trustee to satisfy the mandates of R.C. 1339.59(A)(3)? The plain meaning of the operative words are (1) review "to go over or examine critically or deliberately" and (2) monitor "to watch, keep track of, or check usually for a special purpose." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed.2003) 1067, 801. However, secondary legal authority on this point is scarce and wide ranging: If in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the trustee discovers conditions adversely affecting the security of the investment, it is bound to er (1987), 152 Ariz. 527, 528, 733 P.2d 1110, citing Restatement of the Law 2d, Trusts (1959) 227 (<HOLDING>); Estate of Miller (1964), 230 Cal.App.2d 888,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a trustee who lacks investment experience must seek expert advice regarding investing trust assets while exercising his own judgment (B) holding that a trust beneficiarys state law claims concerning investment of trust assets in affiliated mutual funds satisfied the in connection with a purchase or sale of security requirement of slusa (C) holding that a third party who receives trust property on inquiry notice that a trustee has misappropriated trust funds is also liable for breach of trust (D) holding that although a trustee is not required to watch the ticker as a speculator would the question of the quality of judgment in holding or disposing of trust assets coupled with evidence of failure to review or monitor the trust estate and refusal to meet with cotrustees presents a jury question on whether or not the trustee breached his duty (E) holding that a trustee properly withheld trust payments owed to a prior trustee who had misappropriated trust funds
holding that a trust beneficiarys state law claims concerning investment of trust assets in affiliated mutual funds satisfied the in connection with a purchase or sale of security requirement of slusa

comprehensive plan nor its land use regulations prohibited the development of so-called non-jurisdictional wetlands. On August 17 or 18, 2006, Rish began to clear and fill his property. The neighbors, including Johnson, protested to the County, but to no avail. On August 21, 2006, these parties filed a complaint seeking in-junctive relief alleging that the clearing violated Gulf County's comprehensive plan because it failed to maintain a 50-foot buffer for the wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006). The trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that Johnson and the other neighbors did not possess standing to seek relief under section 163.3215. This court reversed. Johnson v. Gulf County et al., 965 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (<HOLDING>). Throughout this litigation, Rish proceeded to
Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in dismissing the case without allowing appellants an opportunity to amend (B) holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention (C) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case
holding trial court abused its discretion when it struck the appellants intervention

Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 834 (citing Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 472, 55 Tex. B.J. 520, 521 (1992)). But we suggested that disqualification is required if the firm and nonlawyer fail to ''strictly adhere " to an effective screening process. Phoenix Founders, 887 S.W.2d at 834 (citing ABA Comm, on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 1526 (1988)) (emphasis added). A law firm that directs a nonlaw-yer employee to work on a forbidden case and that reasonably should know about the conflict of interest is not strictly adhering to a screening process. When this happens, the threat that confidences will be shared becomes unduly high, and disqualification is required. See Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 467-68. This holding is in line with our previous opinions. See Grant, 888 S.W.2d at 468 (<HOLDING>); Am. Home, 985 S.W.2d at 76 (holding that
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff was otherwise qualified for position where he had worked for defendant employer for approximately twentyeight years (B) holding that a plaintiff could not show that she engaged in protected activity because she did not present evidence that she informed her employer that her complaints were based on race or age discrimination (C) holding that disclosure was required where the current employer permitted the paralegal to work on the same litigation she had worked for at her prior firm even after becoming aware that she had previously worked on the case (D) holding that under title vii a temporary employee was employed by both her temp agency and the business at which she worked on a temporary basis (E) holding that admission of one defendants deposition was proper where she was present at the deposition even though she was represented at the time by the same counsel as her codefendants
holding that plaintiff was otherwise qualified for position where he had worked for defendant employer for approximately twentyeight years