In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 106 S.Ct. at 2553. And if plaintiff cannot support each essential element of his claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. The Court reviews defendants' motion for summary judgment in light of the forgoing standard. DISCUSSION There is no question in this case of Brod-nicki's innocence. But, because "[t]he Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested," Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979), Brodnieki's innocence is irrelevant to the question of whether there was probable cause for his arrest. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (<HOLDING>). The issue before the Court is whether the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged (B) holding that a warrantless arrest does not violate the fourth amendment if at the time of the defendants arrest police had probable cause to believe that an offense has been is being or will be committed (C) holding that initial illegal detention does not call into question validity of arrest pursuant to valid warrant wjhere the police effectuate an arrest in an illegal manner but nonetheless have probable cause to make the arrest the proper fourth amendment remedy is to exclude only that evidence which is a fruit of the illegality (D) holding that where an arrest was premised on both legally and illegally obtained evidence the validity of the arrest would depend on whether the untainted information considered by itself establishes probable cause (E) holding that the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime the mere fact that the subject is later acquitted of the offense for which he is arrested is irrelevant to the validity of the arrest
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case "two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point" because they had declared parallel statutes of other States permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today's case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take
Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: not be quashed in light of the fact that the order did not appear to be final or appealable. In response, Appellants argued that the trial court's order was final and appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, and, alternatively, that the order was a collateral order subject to an appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 313. The Superior Court nevertheless quashed the appeal in a per curiam order dated April 10, 2015, concluding the trial court's order denying the petition to intervene was "not a final order in the custody matter and thus not final or appealable." K.C. and V.C. v. L.A., 499 EDA 2015, 1 (Pa.Super. filed 4/10/15) (order) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) ("A final order is any order that: (1) dis poses of all claims and of all parties"); G.B. v. M.M.B., Pa.Super. 133, 670 A.2d 714 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Boise Cascade Corp. v. East Stroudsburg
Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccja applied to a california child custody order granting temporary custody of two children to their father (B) holding that a temporary order granting emergency relief and temporary child custody under the domestic violence act is not immediately appealable (C) holding order awarding father temporary partial custody prior to custody hearing was not final and appealable under rule 341 (D) holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period (E) holding that temporary order completely transferred custody without setting further hearing writ action was fully terminated and final adjudication of custody was affected
[EX A]:
(C)