Input: American Airlines Flight 11: FAA Awareness. Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane's failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft. At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft. The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look for American 11. At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11: American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport. The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words "we have some planes." The next transmission came seconds later: American 11: Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane.

Does the response "There was no response" correctly answer the question "When The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft what further steps by America 11 alarmed them?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
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Output: no

For much of the world, the Algarve is synonymous with Portugal, yet the Portuguese will tell you the exact opposite: the region has little in common with the rest of the country. The southern stretch of coast is more reminiscent of a North African landscape than a European one. It has no cosmopolitan cities, like Lisbon and Porto, which are farther north. Most of Portugal is known for quaint towns, medieval castles, and grand palaces. The Algarve is more recognizable for impenetrable blocks of tourist apartments, hotels, and meticulously manicured golf courses. And beaches. Think Algarve and the mind pictures long, glorious stretches of golden sands, secluded coves framed by odd ochre-colored rock formations, and deep green waters. With about 160 km (100 miles) of coastline, Portugal's southern province is one of Europe's premier beach destinations. The occasionally chilly ocean is the Atlantic, but the Algarve has a sultry Mediterranean feel. Its consistent climate is the best in Portugal, and one of the kindest in the world: more than 250 days of sunshine a yearmore than almost any other international resort area. The moderating effect of the Gulf Stream produces a fresh springtime breeze throughout winter, and in late January and February, white almond blossoms blanket the fields. In summer the heat is intense but rarely unbearable, and regardless, beautiful beaches and innumerable pools are always just a dive away. Magnificent year-round weather has made the Algarve a huge destination for sporting vacations. Superb golf facilities aboundseveral with tees dramatically clinging to cliffs and fairways just skirting the edge of the oceanand horseback riding, tennis, big-game fishing, sailing, and windsurfing are immensely popular. Sports, beaches and hospitable weathernot to mention easily organized package vacationsare surely the reasons the Algarve receives as many visitors as the rest of Portugal in its entirety. But it's not just international tourists that descend on the Algarve; many Portuguese from Lisbon and elsewhere in the north have holiday homes and spend their summer vacations here. The coast is neatly divided into the rugged Barlavento to the west and the flat beauty of Sotavento to the east. West is where you'll find the famous orange cliffs and surreal eroded rock stacks.

Question: "Which division of the Algarve coast has the orange cliffs and rock stacks?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "Barlavento"

Response: yes

Magnetism is the ability of a material to be attracted by a magnet. It also include the ability for some material to act like a magnet. No doubt youve handled refrigerator magnets. You can see some in Figure 1.28. You probably know they stick to a metal refrigerator. This is what holds your homework up. Maybe your little sisters drawings are hung on the fridge in this manner. Do magnets stick to all materials? Of course not. You have probably checked and they do not stick to other surfaces. They do not stick to wooden doors or glass windows. Wood and glass are not attracted to a magnet. Obviously, only certain materials are attracted to magnets.

Question: "Can you stick your sister's drawings to a wooden cupboard with a magnet?"

Response: "No, magnets do not stick to wood"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A: yes

As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

Question: "Who do they believe did NOT give the terrorist money?"

Response: "Al Qaeda"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A:
no