In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: appeals from the district court's order denying his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion for reconsideration challenging the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2253, and we affirm. Henderson contends that the district abused its discretion by denying his motion, which we construe as a motion for relief from final judgment based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir.1989). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Henderson's motion because his almost two-year delay before filing the motion was not reasonable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c) ("A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.... "); In re Hammer, 940 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not
Holding statements: (A) holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to find an unexcused twoyear delay unreasonable (C) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (E) holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable

A: (B)
****
Q: Ms. Goren bases her statement of facts on her second amended complaint. That complaint, however, is not before this court. On September 3, 1997, the district court entered a judgment dismissing Ms. Goren's complaint. Ms. Goren subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend judgment to permit filing of a second amended complaint. Ms. Goren attached her proposed second amended complaint to that motion. On October 23, 1998, the court entered an order denying Ms. Goren's motion. In her opening brief, Ms. Goren devoted nearly her en tire argument to the district court's decision dismissing her amended complaint. Indeed, there is no "Issue Presented" or meaningful argument regarding the district court's denial of Ms. Goren's 93) (<HOLDING>). 5 . At oral argument, Ms. Goren's counsel
Holding statements: (A) holding that a prisoner did not engage in protected conduct when he threatened to file a frivolous grievance (B) holding that attorney who allegedly prepared false private placement memoranda regarding limited partnership did not conduct affairs of enterprise because he did not direct the legal entities he represented to engage in particular transactions (C) holding that appellant forfeited his complaint regarding his sentence because he did not object at trial (D) holding that the defendant had abandoned any possessory or privacy interest in bags found in the truck he was driving where he stated that he did not own the bags did not know who did and did not know what was in them (E) holding that harold fine did not have direct and independent knowledge because he did not personally conduct the audits that led to the public disclosures

A: (B)
****
Q: the district court's instruction to the jury, that New York law as to a gratuitous licensee might have operated as a bar to recovery, was in error, and that the admiralty rule as to damages should have applied. Notably, it stated that prejudicial error would have occurred "if the maritime law imposed upon the shipowner a standard of care higher than" that which existed under New York law. 358 U.S. at 629, 79 S.Ct. at 409. Thus,- state law is not permitted to significantly change the maritime law applicable in such cases. The inferior federal courts in numbers of cases have also refused to apply state laws to actions governed by federal maritime tort law where to do so would alter the rights and liabilities of the parties. See, e.g., Preston v. Frantz, 11 F.3d 357, 358 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>), cert. dismissed, U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 31, 129
Holding statements: (A) holding that wrongful death actions asserted under admiralty jurisdiction lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties and are not limited to standards of liability created by state law (B) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (C) holding that application of connecticut wrongfuldeath law is precluded by general federal maritime wrongfuldeath law (D) holding that the general rule of maritime law that parties bear their own costs coupled with the need for uniformity in federal maritime law precludes the application of state attorneys fee statutes such as texas civ prac remcode 38001 to maritime contract disputes (E) recognizing products liability concepts as part of general maritime law

A:
(C)
****