In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority's apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of 841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes
recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so

rejected'this argument, holding that the allegations, even if true, did not amount to an -IDEA procedural violation. See 20 U.S.C. 1415 et seq. (setting forth the procedural safeguards afforded to parents when their child is in special education). 13 . It is worth noting that at least one state Massachusetts, as the IDEA permits, has enacted a more stringent standard. Specifically, children in Massachusetts who are eligible for special education services are entitled to IEPs that provide for their "maximum possible development.'' See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B 2 (emphasis added); Frank S. v. School Committee of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District, 26 F.Supp.2d 219, 226 (D.Mass.1998). 14 . See Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County, 118 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task (B) holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors (C) holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied (D) holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity (E) holding that it was pure speculation that if the preference payment had not been made the vendor would have been included as a critical vendor and the court would have approved it
holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors

probative value. The two-pronged test must also be met in order to introduce flight evidence. Austin v. State, 784 So.2d 186, 194 (Miss.2001) (citing Fuselier v. State, 702 So.2d 388, 390 (Miss.1997)). This means that Mississippi, unlike some jurisdictions, does not distinguish between the admissibility of flight evidence and the propriety of instructing the jury on the law of flight. Cf. U.S. v. Martinez, 681 F.2d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir.1982) ("Trial courts usually focus not upon the admissibility of flight evidence but upon the propriety of including a jury instruction highlighting already admitted flight evidence."); but see United States v. Register, 496 F.2d 1072, 1077 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied sub nom. Cochran v. U.S., 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975) (<HOLDING>). 28. Here, both prongs were met. 29. The
Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (C) holding that because the jury was given a proper flight instruction the federal district court did not err in allowing testimony from a teenage girl babysitting defendants child in defendants apartment in which the girl told the jury that after defendant was informed of drug raid defendant failed to return to his apartment the court of appeals found the flight evidence was admissible even though the drug raid was conducted by state officials on a different charge (D) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where the gun cash and a drug ledger were found in one apartment and the drugs were found in a different apartment in the same building (E) holding that statements by defendant and apartment manager that defendant lived in the apartment where drugs were found demonstrated his control over the apartment even though no documents personal effects or keys were found
holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present