In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: venture" (FAC 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) ("[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... "); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) ("Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.") cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants
Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc 216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc 1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc 1106a (C) holding under 29 usc 216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc 203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc 203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc 1108 from 29 usc 1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision

Answer: holding under flsa 29 usc 216c

Question: P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997) (providing that a party seeking to change custody must establish that circumstances have substantially changed since the most recent custodial order, and that any events that took place before the prior proceedings cannot be used to show changed circumstances). Although we will not substantively review the decree's child custody arrangement because of mootness, we note, in passing, that a district court, faced with evidence that one parent is attempting to disrupt the other parent's 8 (1993); see also NRS 125.480(1) (providing that the sole consideration in awarding custody of a child is the best interest of the child). 11 84 Nev. 710, 447 P.2d 664 (1968). 12 Id. at 711, 447 P.2d at 665. 13 Cf. Hopper v. Hopper, 113 Nev. 1138, 1143, 946 P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 14 Most v. Most, 477 A.2d 250, 263 (Me. 1984)
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that conduct that preceded the prior custody determination cannot be admitted to show a change in circumstances (B) holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (E) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child

Answer: holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances

Question: prolonged; and (4) the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. Alpert, 816 F.2d at 964, citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). DiGiovanni's continued investigation after issuing the warning was entirely reasonable in light of these factors. First, any detention incident to that investigation was of limited duration. The encounter between Rodriguez and law enforcement personnel, from the moment he was pulled over until the currency's discovery, lasted approximately forty minutes. Under these circumstances, even if Rodriguez's detention occupied that entire time interval, it might not suggest a Terry Stop of unreasonable scope. See United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188, 1194 (4th Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the alleged detention here only
Holding statements: (A) holding that where officers had reasonable suspicion of a drug offense seizing defendants luggage for 38 minutes under terry did not mature into an unlawful arrest (B) holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest (C) holding that a defendants response to even an invalid arrest or terry stop may constitute independent grounds for arrest (D) holding that a seizure was unlawful because certain facts had dispelled the officers reasonable suspicion (E) holding that totality of circumstances supported reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs and therefore officer was justified in seizing truck

Answer:
holding suspect for 20 minutes constituted an arrest