Input: Plants also detect the daily cycle of light and darkness. Do you know how plants respond to these changes? Some plants open their leaves during the day. It is during these hours the plant can collect sunlight. At night, the plant closes its leaves to prevent water loss. Many plants respond to the change in the length of the day. As days grow shorter, some plants respond by going dormant. Dormant is when a plant suspends its growth. It does this in order to survive. Shorter days signal the coming of winter. Winter in most areas means extreme cold. It is also very dry in the winter months. As winter approaches, some plants respond by their leaves changing color. After the change in color, they fall off. This dormancy period helps trees. It allows them to survive the cold and dry winter. Plants only want to grow when conditions are right.
"Why do plants close their leaves at night?" is "To prevent water loss"?
Output: yes
Input: Former Long Beach Executive Director Toby Rothschild, now a policy wonk in Iwasaki's outfit, agreed. "To some extent, I did look at it and say, 'We are the littlest kid on the block, and we don't want to get beat up so we need a bigger protector,'" Rothschild said. "Once we got past that, it became a real positive for the Long Beach program and Long Beach clients." But to the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley legal aid program, the positives of merging with Dudovitz's program, San Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services, were never obvious. A meeting in late 1999 between Dudovitz and the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley program's board showed how little the two programs had in common and how difficult bridging the gap between their ideologies would be, Dudovitz recalled. Although no merger plans were discussed, board members at the smaller program knew of Dudovitz's preference for impact litigation over direct services. "We had a discussion about what our separate views were," Dudovitz said. "The message we got was that they wanted their program to stay as it was." Lauralea Saddick, former executive director of the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley program, said her board simply did not share Dudovitz's desire to spend money influencing social policy and participating in high-profile litigation over poverty-related issues. "Our board's philosophy was that the money given by the federal government was to help people with basic everyday needs," Saddick said. "It might take a little bit of humility to take those kinds of cases. Impact work is very important ... but what was the good of getting the law changed if no one is there to help the individual?" Before the San Gabriel program was subsumed by Dudovitz's group, it offered to merge with the Legal Aid Society of Orange County. The boards of both organizations eschewed impact litigation in favor of the 1960s model of providing direct client services. Supported by resolutions from the Pasadena, San Gabriel, Eastern and Foothill bar associations, the two programs drew up plans to merge and submitted them to the Legal Services Corp. Dudovitz won Iwasaki's backing to oppose the deal, and Legal Services Corp., the national funding source, overruled the proposed San Gabriel-Pomona Valley/Orange County merger. On Jan. 27, 2001, the federal agency awarded the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley service area to Dudovitz under the umbrella of an expanded San Fernando program, citing the location of both programs in Los Angeles, which would allow "better coordinated and more effective advocacy on county government policies." The San Gabriel-Pomona Valley program sued Legal Services Corp. to stop the takeover, claiming the federal program based the decision on favoritism for the politically active Dudovitz and the politically powerful Iwasaki. Though the federal suit accomplished little, it effectively suspended the end of the old program and the start of the new one for nearly a year.
"A meeting in late 1999 showed that which two programs had very little in common?" is "San Gabriel-Ponoma Valley program and Legal Aid Society of Orange County"?
Output: no
Input: After the August missile strikes, diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed no more promising than military options. The United States had issued a formal warning to the Taliban, and also to Sudan, that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans, wherever they occurred, carried out by the Bin Laden network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to it. For a brief moment, it had seemed as if the August strikes might have shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up Bin Laden. On August 22, the reclusive Mullah Omar told a working-level State Department official that the strikes were counterproductive but added that he would be open to a dialogue with the United States on Bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan. Meeting in Islamabad with William Milam, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Taliban delegates said it was against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary but asked what would happen to Bin Laden should he be sent to Saudi Arabia. Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mullah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Laden, the Taliban leader said no. Both sides shouted at each other, with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government. Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime. (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.) Crown Prince Abdullah told President Clinton and Vice President Gore about this when he visited Washington in late September. His account confirmed reports that the U.S. government had received independently. Other efforts with the Saudi government centered on improving intelligence sharing and permitting U.S. agents to interrogate prisoners in Saudi custody. The history of such cooperation in 1997 and 1998 had been strained. Several officials told us, in particular, that the United States could not get direct access to an important al Qaeda financial official, Madani al Tayyib, who had been detained by the Saudi government in 1997.67Though U.S. officials repeatedly raised the issue, the Saudis provided limited information. In his September 1998 meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, Vice President Gore, while thanking the Saudi government for their responsiveness, renewed the request for direct U.S. access to Tayyib. The United States never obtained this access. An NSC staff-led working group on terrorist finances asked the CIA in November 1998 to push again for access to Tayyib and to see "if it is possible to elaborate further on the ties between Usama bin Ladin and prominent individuals in Saudi Arabia, including especially the Bin Laden family." One result was two NSC-led interagency trips to Persian Gulf states in 1999 and 2000. During these trips the NSC, Treasury, and intelligence representatives spoke with Saudi officials, and later interviewed members of the Bin Laden family, about Usama's inheritance.
"During the two trips taken to the Persian Gulf, the NSC spoke to officials from what country?" is "Saudi Arabia"?
Output:
yes