In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: reasons for his back problems, reasons that Anderson, given his attitude toward work and pain, apparently accepted without question. Considering the evidence as a whole, I conclude that substantial evidence does not support a conclusion that Anderson did know or should have known he had a compensable injury which needed to be reported to Frontier until Drs. Gallagher and Pinto provided reports to Anderson's attorney in April or May 2009. It was these reports that first established a relationship between Anderson's injury and his work for Frontier. Therefore, I would hold that the letter sent by Anderson's attorney on May 13, 2009, constituted timely notice to Frontier under the statute and our case law. 1 . Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 320-22, 101 N.W.2d 200, 205-06 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A worker may qualify for social security
Holding statements: (A) holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act (B) recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury (C) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (D) recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought (E) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable

A: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act
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Q: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability "from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik's] attendance" it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik's attendance at the gym in essence all of Sydlik's claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with
Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release

A: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release
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Q: the County acknowledges that Barrett involved litigation costs rather than attorney's fees, it contends that this is a distinction without a difference and that it would not make sense to permit reimbursement of one and not the other given that both have their foundation in Section 440. Moreover, the County argues that It would be inequitable to force it to bear the costs of attorney's fees where it had'a reasonable basis for its contest, and that Parker's counsel will be unjustly enriched if the erroneously awarded fees are not disgorged. In this regard, the County observes that courts have frequently utilized equitable principles when interpreting provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Kiebler v. WCAB (Specialty Tire of America), 738 A.2d 510 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Roadway Express Inc. v. WCAB (Alien), 152 Pa.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant (B) holding claimant was not entitled to agencys mistaken application of statutory provision (C) holding that the equitable principle of unjust enrichment allowed an employer to recapture a mistaken overpayment made to the claimant (D) holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant (E) holding that where employer paid benefits under group disability policy to employee under mistaken belief that his condition resulted from illness rather than injury arising out of and in course of employment employees acceptance of such benefits did not bar him from benefits to which he was entitled under workers compensation law and employer was properly allowed credit for payments made under disability policy

A:
holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant
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