In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
(Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080.) Although Calero-Toledo did not involve the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, the Court in that case emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding is brought against the instrumentality of a crime, rather than against the offender himself. The Calero-Toledo Court noted that the object of the forfeiture is " 'primarily considered as the offender ***. [T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand^] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.' " (Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 468, 94 S. Ct. at 2092, quoting The Palmyra (1827), 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-16, 6 L. Ed. 531, 535-36 (<HOLDING>).) The Calero-Toledo Court also noted,
Holding statements: (A) holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding (B) holding that a judgment set forth in a separate document is not a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction where the parties assumed that there was a final judgment (C) holding that a conviction for piracy was not a prerequisite to a proceeding to forfeit a ship allegedly engaged in piratical aggression (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding jeopardy had not attached because the district court was without power to enter a judgment of conviction in a pretrial proceeding

Ex Output:
holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding

Ex Input:
the public interest and '[considerations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system' require that the district court defer to local government administrators." Id. In Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1166, the Sixth Circuit was very clear that, where "decisional law has changed so that the enjoined behavior, which once might have been a violation of federal law, is no longer a matter of federal law at all" the injunction must be vacated. In light of the fact that no federal right underpins the 1974 decree as well as the fact that the "local government administrators" in this case appear to favor vacating the decree the court can identify no reason that the 1974 consent decree should remain in effect. Cf. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (<HOLDING>); Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act (B) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because the challenged provisions of the decree had expired (C) holding that a motion to terminate a consent decree was moot because there was no consent decree left to be terminated (D) holding that a court errs when it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of changes in statutory or decisional law (E) holding that statutory authority to modify does not contemplate fundamental changes

Ex Output:
holding that a consent decree should be vacated under rule 60b in light of amendments to the railway labor act

Ex Input:
may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances. Regardless of whether Booker's right was obvious or "manifestly apparent" from broader principles in the decisional law, we find that it was clearly established based on a robust "consensus of persuasive authority." The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all recognized in published decisions that inmates possess a right, grounded in the First Amendment's Petition Clause, to be free from retaliation in response to filing a prison grievance. T r. 2006) ("First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government for a redress of grievances are violated when a prisoner is punished for filing a grievance.... "); Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 584-85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (<HOLDING>). Even more, the Third, Fifth, and Tenth
Holding statements: (A) holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials (B) recognizing that prisoners undoubtedly exercise first amendment petition right when filing grievances and stating that prison officials may not retaliate against prisoners for filing grievances (C) holding no first amendment right to file frivolous grievances (D) holding that administrative remedies are unavailable if prison officials fail to respond to prisoners grievances (E) recognizing first amendment petition right where inmate alleged retaliation for filing grievances

Ex Output:
holding that an inmate has a first amendment right to file grievances against prison officials