In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: venture" (FAC 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) ("[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... "); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) ("Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.") cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants
Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc 216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc 1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc 1106a (C) holding under 29 usc 216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc 203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc 203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc 1108 from 29 usc 1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision

Output: holding under flsa 29 usc 216c

Input: Consider Input: nonetheless entitled to claim derivative asylum relief based on the possibility that their citizen child would be subjected to FGM. In so assuming, the majority's remand is illusory. Although the practice of FGM is considered persecution under our law, there is no threat here since a United States citizen child cannot be deported to the country of her parents' birth, and the parents cannot claim an unrecognized form of derivative relief when they themselves cannot establish entitlement to asylum. By usurping the prerogative of Congress, which alone has the power to create a new basis for cancellation of removal, the majority violates the separation of powers doctrine and creates an unnecessary conflict with the Seventh Circuit. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Like the petitioner in Oforji, Mr. and Mrs.
Holding statements: (A) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (B) holding that an alien parent may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the aliens united states citizen child in the event of the aliens deportation (C) holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding (D) holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel (E) holding that the crime of bringing aliens to the united states is complete when the initial transporter who brings the aliens to the united states ceases to transport them

Output: holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review

Input: Consider Input: idea. 6 . As a preliminary matter, we note that counsel for Lower Merion has submitted a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), in which he contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) renders the ADEA inapplicable to Lower Merion. This contention is meritless. In Kimel, the Supreme Court held "only that, in the ADEA, Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity to suits by private individuals." Lower Merion, however, is not a state or an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and therefore is not entitled to sovereign immunity. See Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 870-71 (3d Cir.1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 923, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991)(<HOLDING>)(citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Holding statements: (A) recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts (B) holding that school districts do not share in the commonwealth of pennsylvanias eleventh amendment sovereign immunity because they are not alter egos of the commonwealth (C) holding that school boards in alabama counties were not arms or alter egos of the state for purposes of eleventh amendment immunity (D) holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment (E) holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity
Output: recognizing application of sovereign immunity to school districts