In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: give several reasons for their decision to terminate the plaintiff; namely, that he was over-extended, refused to delegate work, failed to share information, had poor people management skills, and treated 010 employees in an abusive manner. As the "proverbial straw that broke the camel's back," defendants also point to, and plaintiff concedes, his use of profanities and abusive language during the phone conversation with Clark. (Doc. 41 at 25.) Defendants were concerned that plaintiffs behavior would result in a lawsuit by Clark or potentially lawsuits by other employees. An employee's inappropriate behavior toward other employees is a legitimate business reason for termination in the context of a close corporation. See Priebe v. O'Malley, 89 Ohio App.3d 8, 12, 623 N.E.2d 573 (1993) (<HOLDING>). The record demonstrates that defendants acted
Holding statements: (A) holding that unless a shareholder can show personal cause of action and personal injury claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty belong to the corporation and not the shareholder (B) holding that shareholder could not prevail on breachoffiduciaryduty claim against other shareholder because alleged mishandling of funds did not result in any injury to the corporation (C) holding that majority shareholders had legitimate business reasons for terminating a shareholder which included the reason that the shareholder was not working well with other employees (D) holding that sole shareholder could recover on behalf of company but not in individual capacity for former shareholder and officers misappropriation of corporate assets (E) holding that corporate officer and majority shareholder could be held liable for acting in a manner that served his interests at the expense of the other shareholders because his interests and the corporations were not necessarily aligned

A: (C)
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Q: the terms of the agreement as to the status of the donor in writing. After the mother and her partner ended their relationship, the sperm donor filed suit to adjudicate his parental rights. The court looked to the plain language of the Texas statute and determined that the sperm donor lacked standing to pursue the paternity action. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. 160.702 (Vernon Supp.2006) ("A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction."). The "do-it-yourself" manner in which the artificial insemination was conducted does not alter the fact that B.O.C. was a sperm donor under section 742.14. The statute does not require that the artificial insemination be performed in a clinical setting to apply. Compare McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or.App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 639
Holding statements: (A) holding that where the donor nonpaternity statute did not explicitly reference physician involvement the statute applied even though the sperm was not provided to a physician (B) holding that writ was explicitly abolished by statute (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause

A: (A)
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Q: or similar indicium recognizing the corporation's controlling position. Johnson, 78 T.C. at 891 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). [ 12] In Johnson, the taxpayer was a professional basketball player who had contracted to provide his services to a corporation. Id. at 883-84. The Tax Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the contract gave the corporation a right to control the taxpayer's services, and thus determined that the first prong was satisfied. Id. at 891-92. The Tax Court, however, concluded that the taxpayer could not meet the second prong of the test because the basketball team he played for "refused to sign any contract or agreement with any person or entity other than [the taxpayer]." Id. at 893; but see Sargent v. Comm'r, 929 F.2d 1252, 1258-61 (8th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). [ 18] In this case, the court applied the
Holding statements: (A) holding that professional hockey players personal service corporations were the taxable entities when the players entered into bona fide arms lengths employment agreements with their respective corporations and the team paid the corporations rather than the players (B) holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context fall under the faa (C) holding that the critical issue is not ownership in the first instance but rather the parties respective control over the disposal of hazardous substances (D) holding that if the contract involves the exercise of the municipal corporations business or proprietary powers it is binding on successor bodies if at the time the contract was entered into it was fair and reasonable and necessary or advantageous to the municipality (E) holding that the statements by the court went well beyond a mere rejection of the agreements and explanation for it they suggested at the very least the agreements that would be acceptable

A:
(A)
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