In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: 602 F.Supp. 859, 864 (D.N.J.1985); Tedesco v. U.S. Po esentation against the Government. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). Further, the FTCA requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to adjudication in a federal court, all claims to first be brought before the appropriate agency-here, the USPS's Tort Claims Examiner. See 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). It is undisputed that Mr. Foster did not bring his claims to the USPS before initiating this suit. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. II Mr. Foster also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration and its denial of sanctions against USPS. We review these determinations for abuse of discretion. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gary v. The Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive (B) holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions (E) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit

Answer: holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive

Question: No. 25. The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, "official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day"); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (B) holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations where inmates received a handbook alerting them that all telephone calls were recorded and were exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials (E) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company

Answer: holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth

Question: Ill 1997). AirTouch alleges that the City's denial will in effect prohibit it from providing personal wireless services because alternative sites leave "gaps" in its service or will be too costly to provide. a. Gap In Coverage AirTouch has presented evidence of a gap in coverage in its wireless services on the Fanita Drive-Highway 125 corridor from Navajo Drive to the Highway 52 Connector. (Tifft Decl. at 11.) Air-Touch argues that if a decision leaves "significant gaps" in wireless services, 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) has been violated. The City argues that a mere gap is not sufficient; there must be a general ban for that provision to apply. AirTouch is supported by recent decisions of the Second and Third Circuit. See Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d at 70 (3rd Cir.) (holding
Holding statements: (A) holding that 332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions (B) holding that determination of whether an official was acting on behalf of the state or the local government is determined by state law (C) holding that 332c7b iii does not apply only to general bans and stating that prohibiting only general bans would 1 require a court to wait for a series of denied applications and 2 lead to the untenable result that once personal wire services are available within the jurisdiction of a state or local government the state or local government could deny any further applications with impunity (D) holding that state bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional (E) holding that a district court cannot require a unit of state or local government to abide by a consent decree that does not serve any federal interest

Answer:
holding that 332c7biii applies only to blanket prohibitions and general bans or policies and not to individual zoning decisions