In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, "the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice." Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay's affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh'g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case
(C)

justification was pretextual." Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C.Cir.2005) (quoting Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C.Cir.2005)). The court should assess the plaintiffs challenge to the employer's explanation in light of the totality of the circumstances of the case. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291. The strength of the plaintiffs prima fa-cie case, especially the existence of a causal connection, can be a significant factor in his attempt to rebut the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289 n. 4 (stating that "a prima facie case that strongly suggests intentional discrimination may be enough by itself to survive summary judgment"); Laurent v. Bureau of Rehab., Inc., 544 F.Supp.2d 17, 23 n. 5 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Meadows v. Mukasey, 555 F.Supp.2d 205, 211-13
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because she was unable to present evidence that she was qualified for the position (B) holding that the plaintiff demonstrated pretext in part by establishing a causal connection (C) holding that to establish a causal connection plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action against him knew of the employees protected activity (D) holding that to show a causal connection the plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship between the misconduct and the plaintiffs injury (E) holding that the plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection
(E)

of the collateral caused by market forces. Second, Onua argues that various mortgage payments made by him to the banks in furtherance of the scheme, as well as certain other "credits and offsets," were not properly deducted from the overall amount of restitution. We hold that Onua forfeited this argument, by failing to object to either the District Court's calculation of restitution at sentencing or to the Government's proposed Final Order of Restitution, which adopted the District Court's calculation. Because the District Court's calculation of restitution did not constitute plain error, see United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir.2001), we affirm the District Court's judgment as to the amount of restitution. See also United States v. Coriaty, 300 F.3d 244, 252 (2d Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we hold that Onua's objections
Holding statements: (A) holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented to the district court (B) holding that the district court properly considered the moisture content in the calculation of the weight of the marijuana for sentencing purposes (C) holding that where the government has not presented evidence at the hearing concerning the appropriate amount of restitution the imposition of the restitution order constitutes plain error (D) holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding (E) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not
(A)