In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 39:4-88(b), the mandate to drive within a single lane to the extent practicable applies, whether or not a deviation from that lane imposes a risk to another driver. The statute's second clause addresses a related, but discrete, mandate of the Code. It requires a driver to ascertain the safety of switching lanes before conducting a lane change. N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b). Unlike the violation described in the first clause of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b), the violation described in the second clause is avoided if a driver, in a roadway with multiple lanes traveling in the same direction, first determines that departure from a lane may be conducted safely. The Appellate Division's limitation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-88(b) to the violation identified in the statute's second clause would render t .App.1998) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the courts of our sister states,
Holding statements: (A) holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness (B) holding that tex transp code ann 545060a describes one offense (C) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (D) holding that an indictment charging one offense during the commission of another crime need not allege the elements of the latter offense (E) holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods

A: holding that due regard describes a standard between ordinary care and recklessness
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Q: indorsers, and other persons conditionally liable also receive benefits from payment of the debt. If called on to pay, guarantors and the like would have been creditors; the "benefit" to them is that extinguishing the primary debt means that they receive a larger percentage of their claim than they would have had they paid and been converted to general creditors of the bankrupt. Cases under the 1898 Act routinely held that unless a person escapes an obligation to pay and so reaps a larger portion of his claim than do other creditors, he has not received a statutory "benefit". E.g., Mayes v. Palmer, 208 F. 97 (8th Cir.1913); Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 F. 850 (5th Cir.1924); Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F.2d 614 (8th Cir.1930). See also Bonded Financial, 838 F.2d at 895-96 (<HOLDING>). The Liquidator has not identified, and we
Holding statements: (A) holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a (B) holding that transferee and beneficiary are mutually exclusive categories (C) holding trial court is sole and exclusive judge of witnesses credibility (D) holding that the remedies are exclusive (E) recognizing that 1983 and 2254 proceedings are mutually exclusive so that if a claim can be properly raised in one of those proceedings it cannot be raised in the other type of proceeding

A: holding that subparagraphs a and b are mutually exclusive and thus any travel between work and home even if it is also for a dual purpose must be analyzed exclusively under paragraph a
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Q: marriage, the wife is still young and able to find suitable employment. The relatively equal distribution of the couple's limited assets does not create a circumstance requiring permanent alimony." [C.O.] 580 So.2d at 813-14. Similarly, in Childers v. Childers, 640 So.2d 108, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), we held an award of permanent alimony is inappropriate where the spouse is young, educated, and comparatively healthy. The duration of marriage being less than 10-years makes this a short term marriage. See Iribar v. Iribar, 510 So.2d 1023, 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (10 year marriage is short term). In short term marriages where the partners are still young and able, the presumption is for rehabilitative alimony rather than permanent. Reeves v. Reeves, 821 So.2d 333, 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (<HOLDING>); Green v. Green, 672 So.2d 49, 51 (Fla. 4th
Holding statements: (A) holding that guidelines create a rebuttable presumption (B) recognizing presumption (C) recognizing that 1132g1 creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs and fees to the prevailing party but characterizing that presumption as modest and rebuttable (D) recognizing a rebuttable presumption of reliance in rule 10b5 (E) holding that in case of a short term marriage a presumption against awarding permanent alimony arises but such presumption is rebuttable

A:
holding that guidelines create a rebuttable presumption
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