TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered. Bridgewater, A.C.J., and Hunt, J., concur. 1 O'Connor later produced a valid concealed weapons permit. 2 Simple possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to deliver. State v. Harris, 14 Wn. App. 414, 418, 542 P.2d 122 (1975); see State v. Sims, 119 Wn.2d 138, 142, 829 P.2d 1075 (1992) ("Where one merely possesses a controlled substance without the statutory element of intent, one is guilty of simple possession under RCW 69.50.401(d), absent unwitting possession."); State v. Robbins, 68 Wn. App. 873, 877, 846 P.2d 585 (1993) (<HOLDING>). 3 It is not clear when he purchased the
Holding statements: (A) holding defendant could only be sentenced to a single offense under section 1244011 not both conspiracy with intent to deliver and possession with intent to deliver (B) holding second simple possession conviction was not an aggravated felony because it was not prosecuted as recidivist possession (C) holding that possession with intent to distribute and simple possession are the same offense under blockburger (D) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession (E) holding that the defendants prior drug conviction for simple possession did not constitute a controlled substance offense because the plain language of 4b12b requires that the prior conviction involve possession with intent to distribute

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: matter, Moton requested that the trial court poll the jury, and the court agreed to do so. The first four jurors questioned all indicated that they freely and voluntarily agreed with the guilty verdict. The court ing that evidence showed that trial court's refusal to afford defendant first offender treatment was based on deliberate consideration of the case and sentencing options and, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion); Graydon, 313 Ga. App. at 581 (same). 15 Geiger v. State, 295 Ga. 648, 651 (3) (763 SE2d 453) (2014). 16 Graham v. State, 107 Ga. App. 332, 333 (1) (130 SE2d 166) (1963); see generally Boatwright v. State, 91 Ga. 13, 13 (16 SE 101) (1892). 17 Geiger, 295 Ga. at 651 (3) (punctuation omitted). 18 See Columbus v. State, 270 Ga. 658, 664-65 (4) (513 SE2d 498) (1999) (<HOLDING>). 19 Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 466 (602
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for a continuance when record showed that contrary to defendants contention state did not fail to comply with discovery duties and that defendant failed to show that denial resulted in harm to his case (B) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance motion to withdraw and motion for reconsideration and rehearing (E) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: the plaintiffs had, in a timely manner, performed what was required of them to initiate proceedings. Once they had initiated the proceedings by tendering their complaints, the time bar was no longer applicable; whatever needed to follow in completing the process of "filing" the pleadings at the clerk's office was no longer subject to the time bar. In the present case, Spotville initiated his proceedings properly by tendering to prison officials for mailing his habeas petition and application for IFP status, pursuant to the pre-AEDPA statutes, approximately nine months before the AEDPA went into effect. The decision regarding his IFP status, and any necessary subsequent action (the payment of the fee), did not change the set of rules pursuant to which Spotville tendered his petitio 82) (<HOLDING>). Our holding in Grissom v. Scott, 934 F.2d 656
Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (B) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim (C) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (E) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief

SOLUTION:
(D)