In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Court procedures or under G.L.1956 16-19-1 and 16-19-6 as to the number of absences from school that were necessary to incur possible liability as a truant. However, the administrative order specifies a threshold number of ten days of absence before a child may be referred either to the Diversion Program or to the formal juvenile calendar. Indeed, administrative order 2010-2 states that "[t]he Intake Department may refer cases to the Truancy calendar if the petition: * * * [h]as at least 10 days of absences and/or states that a student is habitually late or absent from school." We are confident that a person of average intelligence need neither guess nor speculate about the number of absences that will result in a referral to the Truancy Diversion Program. See Moreau, 15 A.3d at 583 (<HOLDING>). Administrative order 2010-2 also details how
Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute defining drug paraphernalia and 564403cl were not unconstitutionally vague for want of certainty and definiteness because they give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden (B) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (C) holding that a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act accordingly (D) holding flag contempt statute unconstitutionally vague (E) holding that essentially equivalent is unconstitutionally vague

A: (C)
****
Q: for a rational jury to find that Defendant Cloud was a member of the conspiracy for which he was indicted. The evidence demonstrated that Defendant Cloud combined his money together with Hall to purchase large quantities of drugs on repeated occasions. Defendant Hall testified that they would pool their money together and buy an eighth or a quarter of a kilogram of crack cocaine "every day almost." In addition, Defendant Cloud sold drugs on repeated occasions to Collier, Felix, Wilson, Ralph Jones, Jermaine Jones, and Walker. Notably, Defendant Cloud's distribution to Jermaine Jones occurred two to three times per week over the period in question. This evidence clearly can establish more than a buyer/seller relationship; it suffices to establish a conspiracy. See Brown, 332 F.3d at 373 (<HOLDING>). 2. Defendant Abdullah The evidence is
Holding statements: (A) holding that a close relationship between alleged conspirators and repeated large volume transactions were sufficient to establish a conspiracy (B) holding that the defendants purchase or sale of a large volume of narcoticsin that case one kilogram of cocainecreates an inference that he is a willful member of the conspiracy (C) holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators (D) holding that while a simple buy and sell transaction is not sufficient for proof of a conspiracy repeated transactions for large quantities are sufficient to support an inference that the buyer and seller were engaged in a conspiracy (E) holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct

A: (A)
****
Q: his judgment and sentences for aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated fleeing to elude, possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver, and felon in possession of a firearm. He raises six points on appeal. We find no merit to his arguments with the exception of those raised in point'six regarding issues Jones preserved in his motion to correct sentencing errors filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). First, Jones correctly argues that the habitual felony offender sentencing statute e rida Statutes (2003), should also be stricken because the trial court did not make a finding on the record of Jones's ability to pay before imposing the fine. See Gonzalez v. State, 939 So.2d 224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (<HOLDING>). Jones also challenges the $65 cost imposed
Holding statements: (A) holding that court not required to find ability to pay before imposing criminal fine (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that the statute in effect at that time ie section 7750832b florida statutes 2003 required the court to conduct an inquiry into the defendants ability to pay the fine before imposing it (D) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (E) holding that competent substantial evidence did not support the trial courts conclusory finding that husband had the present ability to pay and noting that the presumption of section 61145a florida statutes is rebuttable

A:
(C)
****