In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict, we need not consider whether the District's failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith's case) further limits our review "to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice," Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury's verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy
Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under 1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc 1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc 1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior
[A]: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom

[Q]: WL 687033, at *1 (D.Md. Feb. 29, 2008) (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). Courts in the Fourth Circuit deny leave to amend a complaint past the deadline established by a scheduling order where the moving party has been careless in developing his claims or where he has failed to satisfactorily account for his failure to do so. Compare Whichard v. Specialty Restaurants Corp., 220 F.R.D. 439, 441 (D.Md.2004) (denying plaintiffs motion to join an additional defendant five months after the court imposed deadline because plaintiff had ample notice before the deadline that the original defendant might not be the right party) with Long v. Blair, No. 2:09-CV-00349, 2010 WL 1930220 (S.D.W.Va. May 12, 2010) (<HOLDING>). After a movant satisfies the good cause
Holding statements: (A) holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint (B) holding that a change in the theory of recovery and one prior amendment is not sufficient to deny a motion to amend the complaint where no evidence of bad faith existed (C) holding that denial of leave to amend was appropriate because the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint two years after filing his complaint on the eve of trial when discovery was complete (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion where it determined that plaintiffs failed to show good cause to amend complaint after dispositive motion deadline (E) holding that good cause existed where the plaintiff did not establish a sufficient evidentiary basis to support new claims until after the deadline for amending his complaint and moved to amend immediately after the new evidence came to light
[A]: holding that good cause did not exist where counsel waited months after filing of the pleadings to propound written discovery and did not take oral depositions of known key individuals to their claims until after the deadline for amending the complaint

[Q]: to three counts of aggravated sexual battery, see Va.Code Ann. 18.2-67.3 (LexisNexis Supp.2006); (2) in February 1985, Mills pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, see id.; and (3) in August 1990, Mills pleaded guilty to yet another count of aggravated sexual battery, see id. Based on these convictions, the district court at sentencing determined that Mills was subject to 18 U.S.C.A. 2252A(b)(l) (West Supp.2006), which requires a statutory minimum sentence of 15 years when the defendant "has a prior conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor." Accordingly, the court imposed a sentence of 180 months imprisonment. II. Mills 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (<HOLDING>). According to Mills, because the federal
Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction (B) holding that a court can look only to the statutory elements charging documents and jury instructions to determine whether an earlier conviction after trial qualified as a violent felony under the acca (C) holding that courts should look to the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individuals prior conviction to determine whether the crime qualifies as a violent felony under the acca (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that in determining whether a prior conviction is a violent felony a court generally must look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense
[A]:
holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction