In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: a habeas petition, and since his administrative remedies are now exhausted, this claim can proceed. B. Fox's Notification Challenge is Properly Before The Court The second half of Fox's claim relating to the notification requirement of the statute, see 18 U.S.C. 4042(c)(2), is properly brought by him as a petition for a declaratory judgment. Notification claims do not relate to the fact or duration of confinement, therefore challenge to a notification requirement is not properly brought as a habeas petition. See Bunn v. Conley, 309 F.3d 1002, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2002) ("The notification scheme [under 18 U.S.C 4042(b) governing violent offender notification] in no way affects the duration, much less the fact, of confinement."); Henrikson v. Guzik, 249 F.3d 395, 397 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that a 2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (B) holding that because henrikson is not challenging the fact or duration of his confinement subject matter jurisdiction is not present under 28 us 2241 (C) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under 2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (D) holding that under the fsia personal jurisdiction depends upon the district court finding subject matter jurisdiction under 28 usc 1330a and proper service under 28 usc 1608 (E) holding that district courts have jurisdiction under 28 usc 2241 to review cat claims for errors of law including the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: 548 U.S. at 518, 126 S.Ct. at 2667 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that "compliance with 5 of the Voting Rights Act can be [a compelling state] interest ... [otherwise] a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause"). And we conclude that a plan will be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest when the race-based action taken was reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of the Act. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2490-91, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 1906, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (<HOLDING>); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that where the claimed interest is avoidance of liability under section 2 the legislative action must at a minimum remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored (C) holding that liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under 1983 where at best the plaintiff has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged violation but did not take appropriate action (D) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (E) holding that individual liability under 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: to restore a sense of fairness to lost-chance cases. A purely prospective application of Scafidi would clearly frustrate that purpose. VI Also at issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury an ultimate outcome charge. See Roman v. Mitchell, 82 N.J. 336, 413 A.2d 322 (1980). Defendant does not contest the proposition that in cases governed by Scafidi an ultimate outcome charge is generally appropriate. Instead, he asserts that any error in not giving the charge was harmless. We disagree. The primary justification for giving a jury an ultimate outcome charge is that it informs the jury about the impact of its decision. In Roman, supra, we stated "that a jury in a comparative negligence situation should be given an ultimate out . 518, 485 A.2d 338 (Law Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). In Scafidi, we acknowledged that the jury's
Holding statements: (A) holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages (B) holding that where the courts instructions caused a jury to consider erroneous criterion of liability plaintiff was prejudiced and new trial was warranted (C) holding that the seventh amendment does require that the jury also be allowed to determine the amount of any punitive damages awarded (D) holding that when a plaintiff files suit alleging that multiple tortfeasors are responsible for the plaintiffs injury any settlements are to be credited against the amount for which the liable parties as a whole are found responsible but for which only the nonsettling defendant remains in court (E) holding that ultimate outcome charge which would inform jury that any damages awarded to plaintiff in personal injury action would be molded to reflect only that percentage of liability which jury attributes to nonsettling defendant was warranted
[EX A]:
(E)