In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity " 'substantially affecting interstate commerce.' "). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing
Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference

Ex Output:
holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference

Ex Input:
who have not returned their consents 30 days from the date notice is mailed as unnecessary. Plaintiff replies that reminder notice is necessary because potential class members work in remote locations far away from their homes for long periods of time. Plaintiff argues that reminder notice affects the broad remedial purposes of the FLSA and ensures that potential class members receive notice of their rights and potential claims. District courts are split as to whether reminder notices to potential class members are proper in FLSA actions. See Santinac v. Worldwide Labor Support of Illinois, Inc., 107 F.Supp.3d 610, 618-19, 2015 WL 3486971, *6 (S.D.Miss. June 2, 2015) (citing Garcia v. TWC Administration, LLC, Civil Action No. SA: 14-CV-985-DAE, 2015 WL 1737932 (W.D.Tex, April 16, 2015) (<HOLDING>)). Courts that have denied requests for
Holding statements: (A) holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts (B) recognizing that uniformity has at its heart the equalization of the ratio among all properties in the district (C) holding that a district courts findings under rule 52a are to be liberally construed in support of the district courts judgment (D) recognizing split among district courts (E) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence

Ex Output:
holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts

Ex Input:
court's January 29, 1991, decision from the bench. On January 29, 1991, the bankruptcy court explained that the IRS was not enjoined from proceeding lawfully to enforce debtor's outstanding tax liabilities not paid under her plan. See Tr. at 8 (Jan. 29, 1991). By enjoining the IRS from proceeding against debt- or, the bankruptcy court intended only to prevent future violations of the automatic stay in this bankruptcy proceeding. Id. (stating that a "clean lifetime letter" was not intended but that "[t]he sort of thing that has transpired again and again shall not continue"). 13 . Accord Small Business Admin. v. Rinehart, 887 F.2d 165, 169-70 (8th Cir.1989); Inslaw, 113 B.R. at 810; In re Lile, 103 B.R. 830, 835 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1989); see also In re Gustafson, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); cf. In re Pearson, 917 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th
Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs 5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc 362a (B) recognizing fdcpa claim for violation of bankruptcy codes automatic stay provision 11 usc 362 which explicitly provides private cause of action (C) holding that a state is immune by virtue of 11 usc 106c from money damages for violating the automatic stay provision of 11 usc 362a (D) holding that debtor did not prove that defendant creditors violated automatic stay under 11 usc 362a with respect to their actions in a state court lawsuit because the creditors actions involved a counterclaim that debtor asserted and were in response to that counterclaim (E) holding rule 11 sanction proceeding was exempt from automatic stay

Ex Output:
holding that the plaintiffs 5629 action against the defendant for alleged fraudulent transfers was subject to the automatic stay provision 11 usc 362a