In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: unconstitutionally forecloses meaningful access to our state courts by not providing for de novo review by a district court following an adverse arbitration award. The right of access to the courts is one aspect of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and also is protected by the provisions protecting due process of law, as set out in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and in Article II, Section 18, of the New Mexico Constitution. Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 696, 763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (1988); Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 426, 659 P.2d 311, 312 (1983); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing fundamental fairness requires criminal defendants be granted a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense (B) holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner (C) holding that the constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that constitution requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case

Output: (E)

Input: Consider Input: background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: evidence in the record that union funds were used to create or facilitate distribution of these lists, Section 401(g) appears to be inapplicable on these facts. 21 . The majority of courts presented with this issue have similarly recognized the inflexibility of Section 402's mandate with respect to the statutory remedy for established violations of LMRDA. See Usery v. Dist. 22, United Mine Workers of America, 543 F.2d 744 (10th Cir.1976) (citing Wirtz and the "mandatoiy language" of Section 402 in reversing district court's decision not to order new elections following a finding that the defendant had violated Section 401); see also Marshall v. American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 486 F.Supp. 79, 85 (D.D.C.1980); Wirtz v. Local Union No. 1622, 285 F.Supp. 455, 456 (N.D.Cal.1968) (<HOLDING>); Brock v. Local 630, Int'l Brotherhood of
Holding statements: (A) holding that in light of the established violation of section 401 and the supreme courts decision in wirtz the court has no discretion as to whether or not to order new elections (B) holding that the section is unconstitutional as applied to private individuals in nonfederal elections in light of supreme court precedent (C) holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous (D) holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states (E) holding that the balancing test established by the united states supreme court was still appropriate to determine the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of a new decision
Output: (A)