In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Leak should not have been admitted, because, they say, 1) its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and 2) it was inadmissible under the general exclusionary rule. However, Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County did not object before the trial court based on these grounds. Because Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County failed to state these grounds for their objection, the alleged error was not preserved for appeal. Rule 103, Ala. R. Evid. The trial record shows that Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County based their objection to the testimony on a relevancy argument. They do not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence was relevant. Therefore, they have not presented any basis for appellate review on this issue. See Landreth v. State, 600 So.2d 440 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal (B) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered (C) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (D) holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal (E) holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal

Output: holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal

Input: Consider Input: would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority's opinion that the term "expenses" as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority's determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38
Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs

Output: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid

Input: Consider Input: Cordova's final policymaking authority concerning the termination or transfer of employees. For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude summary judgment should enter against Singer on the 1981 and 1983 claims against the School District. B. Liability of Cordova under 1981. I have concluded the School District is not liable to Singer under 1981. I consider Defendants' additional argument concerning the 1981 claim since it remains of relevance to Singer's 1981 claim against Cor-dova. Defendants argue 1981 does not apply to religious discrimination and the claim should be dismissed insofar as it is based on such discrimination. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Singer cites the holding in Shaare Tefila
Holding statements: (A) holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination (B) holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex (C) holding that a violation of 1981 requires purposeful race discrimination (D) holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort (E) holding 1981 is directed to racial discrimination although not necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of race but does not apply to sex or religious discrimination
Output: holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination