TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Covenant Media of South Carolina, LLC v. City of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 421 (4th Cir.2007) (city regulation was revised during the litigation to include a time limit for reviewing permits; however the court still found standing because Covenant had suffered an injury by the City's application of the original unconstitutional ordinance that is redressable at least by nominal damages); Boulder Sign Co. v. City of Boulder City, Nevada, 281 Fed.Appx. 701 (9th Cir.2008) (City passed an ordinance banning all billboards while sign company was challenging size restrictions of the original ordinance; court found no standing because sign company's alleged injury cannot be redressed by a favorable decision.); Coral Springs St. Sys. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Granite State Outdoor Adven, Inc. v.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the zoning code of a homerule city is a legislative enactment (B) recognizing that code is speech (C) recognizing that source code is speech but not reaching the object code issue (D) holding that the challenge to the sign code is moot because the original code was repealed and superseded and there was no reasonable likelihood the city would reenact the old code (E) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law

SOLUTION: recognizing that the zoning code of a homerule city is a legislative enactment

PROBLEM: types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property" ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of
Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee

SOLUTION: holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses

PROBLEM: Child Hearsay Statute actually contemplates testimony from both the child and those witnessing the child's later reaction, even if the hearsay may be 'bolstering.' " (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ledford v. State, 313 Ga. App. 389, 391-392 (2) (721 SE2d 585) (2011) ("Any 'bolstering' can be explored by defendant in cross-examination." (citation and punctuation omitted)); see also Weathersby v. State, 262 Ga. 126, 128 (4) (a) (414 SE2d 200) (1992). Here, Laster does not assert that the statutory requirements were not met, and we have previously held that, under OCGA 24-3-16 (2012), the order of witnesses is irrelevant to the question of the admissibility of child hearsay evidence. See OCGA 24-3-16 (2012); Hilliard v. State, 298 Ga. App. 473, 477 (4) (a) (680 SE2d 541) (2009) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
Holding statements: (A) holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination (B) holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga 24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify (C) holding a social worker treating the child was permitted to testify to statements the child made about the abuse including the victims identification of the perpetrator because the statements were necessary to the treatment of ensuring the continued safety of the child (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who does not appear at trial are inadmissible under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the witness

SOLUTION:
holding that the confrontation clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless the witness was unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination