In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: we now reverse the decision of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur. 1 . We set forth additional facts in the companion case issued today, Dep't. of Revenue v. Adams, 762 N.E.2d 728 (Ind.2002). 2 . The CSET is a tax on the possession of certain narcotics. We discuss the tax and the procedures for collecting it in greater detail infra. 3 . All of the cocaine at issue in this case was discovered prior to the time the police served a valid search warrant. 4 . Ind.Code 35-48-4-1 (1998). 5 . Id. 35-48-4-6. 6 . United States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that the revenue officers' entry of Adam's home to collect the CSET assessment was a search. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Thomas v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue,
Holding statements: (A) holding that officers executing a search warrant for contraband have the authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted (B) holding that revenue officers conducted a search when they entered a cottage and seized records when levying on delinquent tax (C) holding that no search occurred when police officers entered an open business (D) holding search unreasonable when conducted on the highway in broad day light (E) holding that no jury could reasonably fail to find that it was objectively reasonable for the officers to take the actions they did when the only invasion of privacy that occurred was entry and an emergency sweep a search of the premises was not conducted until the magistrate informed of what the officers had learned on the scene prior to entry explicitly authorized a search of the third house
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: expenses related to the children's needs at the time of the hearing. The trial court made numerous, in-depth findings regarding the children's accustomed standard of living, the needs of the children, and the variance between the expenses incurred by defendant on behalf of the children and expenses incurred by plaintiff on behalf of the children. These findings are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the Pataky presumption was rebutted. Although in most cases, the custodial parent obtains an increase in child support, a court has discretionary authority to enter an order establishing child support in an amount less than the amount established by a separation or child support agreement. See Bottomley v. Bottomley, 82 N.C. App. 231, 234-35, 346 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1986) (<HOLDING>). We hold the trial court did not abuse its
Holding statements: (A) holding provision in contempt order void because it punished relator for violating order that trial court lacked authority to enter (B) holding that it was error for the trial court to determine the issue of child support without a child support guidelines worksheet (C) holding trial court had discretionary authority to enter order setting child support amount as less than that provided for in the parties separation agreement (D) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality (E) holding that an order that determines only the right to attorneys fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable nonfinal order
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: rather than the probate division of the common pleas court, R.C. 2311.04, rather than 2101.31, would have governed the proceedings at trial and would have mandated that the factual issues be tried to a jury. We are not persuaded, however, that R.C. 2311.04 would have conferred upon appellants a right to a jury trial on the factual issues presented in the complaint and in their counterclaims. As we noted above, R.C. 2721.10 and 2311.04 mandate a jury trial of factual issues arising in a declaratory judgment action instituted in the general division of the common pleas court if the action is construed to be "for the recovery of money only, or specific real or personal property." The right to a jury trial thereby (1983), 12 Ohio App.3d 113, 114, 12 OBR 420, 421, 467 N.E.2d 564, 566 (<HOLDING>). In its complaint, FNB sought declaratory
Holding statements: (A) holding that a cross claim or counterclaim for affirmative relief must be filed before the statute of limitations expires because a claim is not stripped of its character as an independent action by acquiring the label counterclaim (B) holding that the due process clause confers a right to direct a childs education (C) holding that a jury trial was not required when the money demand although specific was incidental and ancillary to the equitable relief requested and would ripen only if equitable relief were granted (D) holding that rc 231104 confers a right to a jury trial on a legal counterclaim that if true would extinguish the original equitable claim but confers no right on a legal counterclaim that is incidental or ancillary to the original claim (E) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc 1367a
[EX A]:
(D)