Enter the Shoguns: Japan's austere, ruthless, but statesmanlike new ruler, Yoritomo Minamoto, set up his government in Kamakura (just south of modern Tokyo), well away from the "softening" influence of court life that had been the undoing of his predecessor, Kiyomori. First of the national rulers to take the title of sei-i tai-shogun ("barbarian-subduing great general"), Minamoto expanded and consolidated his power by confiscating lands from some of the defeated Taira and redistributing them to his samurai vassals. Minamoto died in 1199, and the feudal structure passed intact to the tutelage of his widow's family, the Hojo, who were content to play regent to a figurehead shogun, in much the same way as the Fujiwara had done with the emperor. The fiction of Japanese imperial power had become infinitely extendable. The emperor at Kyotostill seconded by a Fujiwara regent at courtlegitimized a Minamoto who was himself a military dictator controlled by a Hojo regent. In a country where form and substance were inextricably interrelated, two things counted in politics: symbolic authority and real power. Neither could exist without the other. A thwarted Mongol invasion in 1274 weakened the Kamakura regime. The fighting brought none of the usual spoils of war that provincial warlords and samurai had come to expect as payment. And the treasury was empty after earthquake, famine, and plague had crippled the economy. Buddhist monasteries were using their private armies to support imperial ambitions to bring power back to Kyoto. Worst of all, the Kamakura warriors, resenting the way the Kyoto court referred to them as "Eastern barbarians," sought refinement in a ruinous taste for luxury: extravagant feasts, rich costumes, and opulent homes. Kamakura was falling apart.

Question: "How did the economy collapse?"

Response: "The fighting brought none of the usual spoils of war that provincial warlords and samurai had come to expect as payment. The treasury was empty after the earthquake, famine, and plague had caused the economy to be crippled"

A: yes

While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued.

Question: "On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA?"

Response: "Fixing Computers"

A: no

Tim had always a red bike. His birthday party was coming up and he hoped that his parents would finally get him the bike. When his friends came over for the party, Tim was very worried that he wouldn't get the bike. He looked at all the presents and none of them seemed big enough to have a bike in them. Tim was sad. When it was time to open the presents he opened them one at a time. The first present was not a bike. The second present was not a bike. The third present was the biggest one. Tim knew if the bike was going to be in any of the presents it was going to be in this box. Tim opened it and there was no bike inside. Just as Tim tried not to look too upset, his Dad brought in the biggest present of them all. His Dad had been hiding the present all along. Tim opened it and his new bike was inside the box. Tim put the bike together with his Dad's help.

Question: "What event was Tim at when he finally got his bike?"

Response: "A graduation"

A:
no