In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: defendant's activities fall outside the FDCPA's general provisions); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv0274-DFHTAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (recognizing majority position that party whose activities are limited to enforcement of security interests is not subject to all FDCPA requirements, and stating, "[i]f a person invokes judicial remedies only to enforce the security interest in property, then the effort is not subject to the FDCPA (other than 1692f(6) and 1692i(a))[,] [b]ut if the person is also seeking additional relief, such as a personal judgment against the borrower, then the FDCPA applies.") (collecting cases); Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, Civ. No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 2695795, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 12, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV761 ORL28DAB,
Holding statements: (A) holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure pro ceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 (B) recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of 1692a6 a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to 1692f6 (C) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (D) holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note by filing a lawsuit in state court (E) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa

A: recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of 1692a6 a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to 1692f6
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Q: with a total of 8.3 grams of cocaine in them was consistent with both an intent to sell and with personal use. Id. at 631. We noted that the police did not find any money or drug paraphernalia on the defendant and there were "no other facts which would suggest an intent to sell." Id. The packaging and weight of the drugs in this case is similar to that in Valentin, giving rise to similar conclusions about Alleyne's intent. The state attempts to distinguish Valentin in two ways. First, there was no money found on Valentin, while Alleyne had $36 in his pocket and another $20 found in the paper bag with the marijuana. However, neither the amount of money found, nor the denominations of it were inconsistent with personal use. See Williams v. State, 569 So.2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (<HOLDING>). Second, while the arresting officer in
Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding no unfair prejudice from admission of conviction for possession of 50 to 200 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute as evidence of intent to distribute cocaine (C) holding that evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction of front seat passenger of possession with intent to distribute marijuana in paper bag in foot well of volkswagen on passengers side near gearshift in presence of marijuana smoke (D) holding that evidence consisting of 10 pieces of cocaine marijuana rolling paper 72 and a weapon was not sufficient to prove intent to sell (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence of intent to sell or deliver where the defendant was in possession of one large cocaine rock and eight smaller rocks

A: recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell
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Q: are plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence." Malbrough, 275 Va. at 168, 655 S.E.2d at 3. Moreover, "we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). A law enforcement officer has a legitimate constitutional basis for seizing a person if the officer has either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe, "based on objective facts, that the [person] officers had probable cause to arrest the appellant for the earlier offense of reckless driving, thereby also meeting the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant to investigate that same offense. See United States v. Lopez, 911 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind.
Holding statements: (A) holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion (B) holding that a conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of a vehicle was subsumed within the trial courts ruling that the officer had probable cause for the stop (C) holding that although officers observation and stop of the defendants vehicle occurred outside of the officers geographical jurisdiction the officer still had jurisdiction where the officer was requested by a state trooper to stop the suspects vehicle (D) holding that probable cause to stop a vehicle was supported by the fact that the defendant had previously been arrested for illegally transporting liquor (E) holding that circumstances created reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop

A:
holding this framework applies whether the traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion
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