In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: is narrowly crafted to get to the heart of the motion for summary judgment without allowing a lot of potentially unnecessary discovery. Montoya has said he did not show Wilks or Armijo his computer screen, or tell them Todd's crimes; if Wilks says othexwise, there will likely be a genuine issue of fact requiring .the Court to deny the motions and allow the parties to proceed to trial. It seems fundamentally unfair to dismiss Todd's case when a deposition of Wilks may make his case. Further, this deposition will not burden any government employees or entities. Accordingly, the Court finds that this limited discovery falls within the exceptions to disallowing discovery once the defense of qualified immunity has been raised. See Garrett v. C.A. Stratmen [Stratman], M.D., 254 F.3d at 953 (<HOLDING>). The Court does not believe this one
Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity governmental immunity public official immunity statutory immunity or any other type of immunity are not appealable under the maryland collateral order doctrine (B) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (C) recognizing that a discovery order in the context of qualified immunity is not immediately appealable when the defendants immunity claim turns at least partially on a factual question when the district court is unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of the facts and which are narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts needed to rule on the immunity claim are neither avoidable or overly broad (D) holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit (E) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
[A]: (C)

[Q]: of his experience' in detecting criminal activity") (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Based on the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the officers possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect an investigative detention of Mr. Hishaw as he left the apartment in the pickup. Even though the initial stop was justified, we must still assess the reasonableness of the subsequent pat-down search. In order to comport with the Fourth Amendment, that search must have been "reasonably related in scope" to the basis for the stop (i.e., the officers' suspicion that Mr. Hishaw was distributing drugs). See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In that regard, this circuit has concluded that an 169 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869, 873
Holding statements: (A) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (B) holding that like burglary car theft is a crime that often involves the use of weapons and other instruments of assault that could jeopardize police officer safety and thus justifies a protective frisk under terry to ensure officer safety (C) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (D) holding that when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs are in the vehicle the officer may in the absence of factors allaying his safety concerns order the occupants out of the vehicle and pat them down briefly for weapons to ensure the officers safety and the safety of others (E) holding that the officer had reasonable belief that the occupants of the vehicle were armed where the officer knew that drug dealers are frequently armed and therefore frisk of the vehicle was permissible
[A]: (D)

[Q]: her, the trial court could either strike the witness's direct testimony or declare a mistrial. Best v. Tavenner, 189 Or 46, 54, 218 P2d 471 (1950). More recently, the court has recognized that, although not required to do so, a trial cotut may strike a criminal defendant's testimony who refuses to submit to cross-examination. Mende, 304 Or at 21. The court has not had occasion until now to identify the principles that should guide a court's discretion when a party refuses to answer only some cross-examination questions. We turn to that question. A criminal defendant has both a statutory and a constitutional right to testify in his or her own defense. See ORS 136.643 (statutory right); State v. Lotches, 331 Or 455, 483 n 10, 17 P3d 1045 (2000), cert den, 534 US 833 (2001) (<HOLDING>). As the court has recognized, however, a
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) recognizing cause of action against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights (D) recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify (E) holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area
[A]:
(D)