In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: read to give these words effect in light of the law in certain states, under the plain meaning rule, Green Tree's position must fail. Herrin, 2007 WL 1975573, at *3. The debtor's position is also supported by the leading commentators on the Bankruptcy Code. Collier on Bankruptcy states, "[o]nly if a mobile home or cooperative is real property under applicable non-bankruptcy law would the limitations on modification apply, even though the mobile home or cooperative is considered the debtor's principal residence." 8 Collier on Bankruptcy 1322.06[1][a][ii] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. Revised 2005). Moreover, ignoring the term "real property" within 1322(b)(2) is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation. See Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) This Court does not believe that the result in
Holding statements: (A) recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous (B) holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous (C) holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute (D) holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute (E) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute

A: recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous
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Q: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

A: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241
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Q: S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1992, no pet.); Freeman v. State, 786 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.). The order approving the revisions to the Texas Rules of Evidence stated that the amended rules take effect clusion by arguing that the retroactive application of current Rule 606(b) disturbs his substantive right to appellate review of his complaint. Although the defendant has a vested, substantive right to legislatively-granted appellate review, he has no vested right in the procedural mechanisms for reviewing his conviction or punishment. See Fowler v. State, 991 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (procedural mechanisms for reviewing conviction not a vested and substantive right); Montez v. State, 975 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the trial court's application of
Holding statements: (A) holding rules of appellate procedure are obviously procedural in nature (B) holding that procedural rules are presumptively nonretroactive (C) recognizing appellate courts are not free to rewrite rules (D) holding rules of procedure interpreted in same manner as statutes (E) holding that new rules of criminal procedural are generally not retroactive

A:
holding that procedural rules are presumptively nonretroactive
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