The film is set in Igloolik in the Eastern Arctic wilderness at the dawn of the first millennium . http://atanarjuat.com/legend/legend_film.php The wind is blowing over a bleak snowy landscape while a man tries to herd away some marauding dogs . We hear the voice of an old man singing a childish song . Inside a stone house a strange shaman by the name of Tungajuaq , who comes from up north , is singing playfully to the gathered community and camp leader Kumaglak . But among the spectators there are some mistrustful faces . Flash forward to another day . Qulitalik is bidding goodbye to his sister Panikpak , wife of Kumaglak , promising to come if she calls for help in her heart . She gives him her husband's rabbit's foot for spiritual power . Qulitalik tells his sister , '' Tulimaq is the one they 'll go after now . '' It seems that Qulitalik is leaving to escape a threat , and the hope is that one day he will return to help . As Panikpak watches him leave , we hear a voice-over from a woman : '' We never knew what he was or why it happened . Evil came to us like Death . It just happened and we had to live with it . '' Flash back to the original scene in the stone house . The visitor and the camp leader Kumaglak are in a '' friendly '' spiritual duel involving binding in leather thongs . But Panikpak is startled when the stone lamp in front of her breaks in half , and , to the horror of those present , Kumaglak falls over dead . The visitor removes the leader's walrus-tooth necklace from Kumaglak's body , and , passing by Tulimaq , he puts the necklace around the neck of Sauri , the son of the murdered leader Kumaglak , saying , '' Be careful what you wish for '' .

What was one of Kumaglak's tiltes?

Military Notification and Response. Boston Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked: FAA: Hi. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a problem here. We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York, and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s or something up there, help us out. NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise? FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test. NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call. At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr. After ordering the Otis fighters to battle stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commanding general of the First Air Force and NORAD's Continental Region. Marr sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold later recalled instructing Marr to "go ahead and scramble them, and we'll get authorities later." General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report. F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base.

How much time passed between Boston's first attempt of contact and when the fighters were scrambled?

Bin Laden and his aides did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America. The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters. KSM provided his operatives with nearly all the money they needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters' tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time. The origin of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9/11. General Financing As we explained in chapter 2, Bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses in Sudan. Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time. The CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations. For many years, the United States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda's expenses through a vast personal inheritance. Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S. government discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through 1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year-a significant sum, to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad. Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Usama's share of the family company in 1994. The Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale. This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune. Nor were Bin Laden's assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda. When Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses and other assets.
How was Usama cut off from the funds of the Bin Laden family?