As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

Question: "What requirements was Al Qaeda able to meet by spring and summer of 2000?"

Answer: "Requirements to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation"

Response: yes

Dam Good Luck: From the beginning, Las Vegas was built to serve travelers. The railroad needed a way station, and Las Vegas was the place. Growth continued for ten years, and by 1915 the town had telephones, round-the-clock electricity, and a growing populationmany of whom worked in the railroad repair shop. But such heady progress would soon come to a halt. The growing competition in rail transport resulted in Union Pacific buying the Los AngelesSalt Lake line. Union Pacific then consolidated its operations, eliminating the Las Vegas repair facility. Additionally, Las Vegas had been made a part of Nevada's new Clark County in 1909, a year when the legislature also outlawed gambling. These unfortunate circumstances threatened to relegate Las Vegas to the status of a small desert community that could no longer support its 3000 residents. But the southwest's growing need for water, combined with Las Vegas's fortuitous proximity to the Colorado River, would give Las Vegas a second chance to achieve prosperity. Construction on Hoover Dam (originally Boulder Dam, subsequently renamed for the president who authorized the project) began in 1931 in a canyon 45 miles (72 km) southeast of Las Vegas. Providing an influx of $165 million to the southwestern economy, Hoover Dam played a major role in preventing Las Vegas from drying up, both financially and literally. Not only did it create jobs, but it also created Lake Mead, the massive reservoir that today provides water to all of southern Nevada. More Government Help: The construction of Hoover Dam did not single-handedly save Las Vegas, however. The state legislature helped as well, by legalizing gambling in 1931 and thus solidifying the future of the town, though legislators and residents could never have known this at the time. The hordes of people who attended Hoover Dam's 1935 dedication set the city's now-formidable public relations machine into action. They went to work on what has become one of the lengthiest citywide tourism campaigns ever attempted. It didn't take long for the city to establish itself as a wild-West town with an "anything goes" attitude. Vices outlawed or heavily controlled elsewhere were legal here, available any hour of any day (or night).

Question: "What town had telephones, round-the-clock electricity, and a growing population by 1915?"

Answer: "Lake Mead"

Response: no

After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Question: "What type of center did Clarke push funding for?"

Answer: "Intelligence"

Response:
yes