In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: reasoning of these cases. Moreover, we believe that declaratory relief is also moot when the challenged acts have already "irretrievably occurred." Accordingly, we apply the teachings of N.J. Tpk. Auth., that the claim for injunctive relief had become "academic by reason of these changed circumstances .... " Id. at 27. Here, as in N.J. Tpk. Auth., the challenged action awarding the contracts has already occurred, and the work required by them has already been performed. There is no longer a " 'subject matter upon which the judgment of the court can operate' to make a substantive determination on the merits." Id. at 30 (quoting Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 20 S.Ct. 673, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)); see also Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co. v. State of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 36 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). II. For Appellants to be prevailing parties
Holding statements: (A) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot (B) holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc 1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action (C) holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred
[A]: holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot

[Q]: in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code"); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor's estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past' but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor's ability to make a fresh start"). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as
Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate
[A]: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code

[Q]: the interests of and pursue relief on behalf of an alleged victim in a criminal matter). We also conclude that J.W. fails to show the existence of a reasonable expectation that she will be subject to the same order compelling the gynecological examination again. Jason Wilson entered a guilty plea, and J.W. simply does not articulate why it would ever be necessary for the state court to order her to submit to another examination. Additionally, although J.W. maintains that the issues presented in her lawsuit will recur in West Virginia's criminal justice system and continue to affect other victims of sex crimes, these concerns have no bearing on this case because it was not brought as a class action. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Further, although J.W. makes note of the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory (B) holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification (C) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (D) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent (E) holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint
[A]:
holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory