In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to pay the purchase price. 3.Pursuant to the Securities Purchase Agreement, dated September 2, 2004, Mer-vyn's Holdings purchased 100% of the interests in Holdings I and Holdings II for $429,746,414,84. At the closing, Mervyn's Holdings used these funds to pay the purchase price. (Am.Compl.$ 58). 5 . Brandt v. Trivest II, Inc. (In re Plassein Int'l Corp.), 352 B.R. 36, (Bankr.D.Del.2006) ("Accordingly, the Court joins with those decisions that have (either implicitly or explicitly) evaluated fraudulent transfer complaints using Rule 8(a)(2)'s notice pleading standard") Id. at 40-41. See. e.g., Giuliano v. U.S. Nursing Corp. (In re Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc.), 339 B.R. 570, 574-75 (Bankr.D.Del.2006) (applying "liberal notice pleading standard"); AstroPower, 335 B.R. at 333 (<HOLDING>); Official Comm, of Unsecured Creditors v. DVI
Holding statements: (A) holding despite collective allegations in complaint the complaint was not deficient under rule 8a because it stated with sufficient particularity facts establishing a causal connection between the defendants actions and the constitutional deprivation (B) holding that a fraudulent transfer complaint need only set forth the facts with sufficient particularity to apprise the defendant fairly of the charges made against him (C) holding that the fraud claims against the defendant should not have been dismissed as the complaint provided him with fair notice of the claims made against her (D) holding that the information must set forth each element of the crime that it charges as well as fairly inform a defendant of the charge against which he must defend (E) holding that a criminal defendant is entitled to know the charges against him and to be tried solely upon the charges against him internal quotation marks and citation omitted
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court's conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that "typically involve[s] purposeful, 'violent,' and 'aggressive' conduct." United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that "[t]he phrase
Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: time for filing objections to discharge, see In re Gaines, 932 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.1991)are not final. See, e.g., In re Rebear, 89 B.R. 314 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1988)(incidental procedural matters not immediately appealable). Those orders pose much less risk of leaving the bankruptcy estate with unwarranted assets or liabilities, or of denying creditors their lawful rights. C. The Finality of the Order in this Case Given the understanding of finality developed above, it is clear that the bankruptcy court's denial of the motion to convert this ease from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is not a final order for purposes of 158(a)(1). See Stewart v. Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. Unit A1981); In re Hebb, 53 B.R. 1003, 1005 (D.Md.1985); In re Klein/Ray Broadcasting, 100 B.R. 509 (9th Cir. BAP 1987)(<HOLDING>). An order denying a motion to convert does not
Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy courts decision to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case is a matter within its discretion (B) holding denial of motion to convert from chapter 11 to chapter 7 is interlocutory (C) holding that a bankruptcy court is given wide discretion to convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 for cause and an order for conversion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a debtors right to convert his or her chapter 7 case is not absolute
[EX A]:
(B)