In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Holland had been given the authority to review the allegations against Vickers and make the ultimate decision to keep her or fire her. Without more than what Vickers has offered as evidence, we cannot- see how a reasonable jury might find a retaliatory motive at work in Holland's decision. Vickers' retaliation claim is further undermined by the fact that even though it was Holland who fired her, Bedwell was the focus of her discrimination claims. Vickers failed to put on any evidence to show that Holland's decision was in any way influenced by Bedwell, who had retired before Vickers' refusal to sign the releases in April 2001 that triggered her firing. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor can Vickers' Title VII claims draw
Holding statements: (A) holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision (B) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (C) holding that subordinates bias is only relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinates influence (D) holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant (E) holding that the relevant question is whether the courts decision deprived the petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment

Ex Output:
holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision

Ex Input:
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated
Holding statements: (A) holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action

Ex Output:
holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury

Ex Input:
had been reviewed "extensively and with finality" by the state courts and therefore there was no pending or ongoing state action. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir.2006). Of course, after receiving an unfavorable decision from the state courts on appeal, the Younger doctrine would not bar Plaintiffs from bringing their claims to federal court because there would be no pending state action. Id. 14 . In United Artists, Justice Alito pointed out that the decision to apply the "shocks the conscience" test put the Third Circuit "in line" with other Courts of Appeals that declined to find substantive due process violations in cases involving land-use disputes: See, e.g., Chesterfield Development Corp. v. City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se (B) holding that allegations that the city arbitrarily applied a zoning ordinance were insufficient to state a substantive due process claim and stating in dicta that the decision would be the same even if the city had knowingly enforced the invalid zoning ordinance in bad faith a badfaith violation of state law remains only a violation of state law (C) holding seniorhousing zoning ordinance invalid as applied (D) holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law (E) holding that the city was not estopped from enforcing a zoning ordinance when a zoning department employee mistakenly stamped the plaintiffs application for a license to operate a laundromat to indicate compliance with the ordinance

Ex Output:
holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se