instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
acted outside their jurisdiction. In sum, none of Pasiewicz's arguments show that Sandahl and Henning violated the Constitution when they arrested him. They and the other officers (Johnson in particular) certainly could have, and we think should have, proceeded with more caution. They get no commendation ribbons for the way they handled this case. Pasiewicz's claim against the forest preserve district (even assuming it's a suable entity) for failure to train or supervise its officers properly regarding the laws of search, seizure, and jurisdiction is a born loser. Because the officers did not violate Pasiewicz's constitutional rights, he did not suffer constitutional injury. Accordingly, under City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed. 1412 (D.D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>), it is worth pointing out that Ross involved
Holding statements: (A) holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure (B) holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment (C) holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment (D) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding that the concept of reasonableness in the fourth amendment logically presupposes an exercise of lawful authority by a police officer
answer:
holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure

question:
to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As a matter of first consideration, any court has the duty to determine, sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). As material to this question, section 65.023(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that an application for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit or execution on a judgment must be tried in the court in which the suit is pending or the judgment was rendered. This requirement is jurisdictional and does not relate merely to venue. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Home Sav. Ass'n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because the Gard-ners seek to challenge
Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court (B) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that a dis trict court has no authority to issue injunction restraining enforcement of judgment of the county court where as here the judgment solely resolves who is entitled to immediate possession (D) holding that motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (E) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state
answer:
holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court

question:
claim was clearly insufficient to state a claim for breach of 9.4. The supposed "clarification" in his brief in opposition to judgment on the pleadings, which in fact presented an entirely new legal theory, did not cure the defective complaint. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202-03 (3d Cir.2007). Jang's proffer that he "would be prepared to amend" his complaint, App. at 559, does not change the analysis, because it cannot be construed as a motion for leave to amend. See Ranke v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc., 436 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir.2006). The District Court thus did not abuse its discretion in declining to address the 9.4 claim, nor in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). 2. Denial of Jang's Motion for
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (B) holding that in noncivil rights cases district courts have no obligation to offer leave to amend before dismissing a complaint unless the plaintiff properly requests it (C) recognizing several reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint (D) recognizing that one of those conditions for a district judge to grant leave to amend the complaint may properly be that claims contained in the original complaint but not included in the amended complaint be considered dismissed with prejudice (E) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court
answer:
recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court