Problem: BODY: Good Morning, Due to a computer "bug" within AGA's systems, AGA will release their report TOMORROW, Thursday at 2:00 EST. Just a reminder to get your AGA estimates in by Noon EST (11:00 CST) TOMORROW. Last Year +77 Last Week +91 Thank You,
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A: SUBJECT: BNP PARIBAS Commodity Futures Weekly AGA Survey

Problem: BODY: As a member of the Enron Fleet Council, I wish to advise management of the following facts. Enron Fleet Council Members: Members BU Manufacturer Purchased Number Bruce Martin - Cheri ETS - EOTT DaimlerChrysler 200 Cheri Sublet ETS/EFS Ford 160 Randy Hardenbrook Wind Ford and DaimlerChrysler 50 Jeddy Beasley PGE GM 10 420 As you are aware, Enron realizes savings each year by stacking volumes with the manufacturer's. ETS and EFS will realize reduced costs by stacking volumes with the manufacturer's during 2002. Listed below is a breakdown of the difference in costs by manufacturer: If we purchased GM rather than DaimlerChrysler, ETS would pay an additional $524,000 for the same number of vehicles. If we purchased Ford rather than DaimlerChrysler, ETS would pay an additional $1,036,748 for the same number of vehicles. Enron Facility Service As indicated above, EFS will only allow the purchase of Ford's for their business unit. Because they also require most vehicles to be purchased as an emergency, they pay $2,000 to $3,000 per vehicle for "off the lot" purchases. Because EFS has made a decision to only purchase Ford, their business unit will pay an additional $950,000 to purchase the same number of Fords vs Dodges. I realize this is a business unit decision, but their choice effects Enron's bottom line. In addition to increased costs to EFS, all Enron business units suffer due to the reduction in stacked volumes with one manufacturer. Enron Wind Wind acquires vehicles utilizing a local Ford dealership in California. Although Wind has participated in the Enron Fleet Council and in some cases, followed the recommendations of the council, their major annual purchase is from Ford. PGE PGE is not an active participant in the Enron Fleet Council. Although they participated in past years, have always chosen to purchase GM. Their spend is relatively low, but effects the total units purchased within Enron. Maintenance Both PGE and Enron Wind utilize Enron staffed maintenance facilities. Although the Enron Fleet Council and prior strategic sourcing efforts have pointed out the high cost of these maintenance shops, little has been done toward outsourcing the light duty maintenance. (oil changes, minor maintenance, tune-ups and tire repair) Because Enron is now organized under EGS, we have an opportunity to support the recommendations of the Enron Fleet Council. As you are aware, the council recommended purchasing vehicles based upon the manufacturer's incentives and stacking volumes based on total Enron purchases. We only requested incentives from the manufacturers based on the 300 level because we have such a split of purchasing practices across the business units. Rather than the 300 level, we would be looking at 450 to 500 with even greater incentives. We have an opportunity to reduce Enron's overall fleet costs by making a decision to utilize one manufacturer, rather than splitting the purchases between all three manufacturer's. Because we are now organized under one CFO within Enron Global Services, this may be an opportunity to guide all Enron business units to take advantage of our purchasing power. This recommendation will be challenged by some business units, but under these challenging times within Enron, any savings in our costs effects the bottom line. The Enron Fleet Council will collectively offer additional savings based on sound fleet practices, during the next few weeks. If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to call. Regards,
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A: SUBJECT: Enron Fleet Council Recommendations VS Reality

Problem: BODY: Ben/David/Bill - Please see the what we have for the following policy excerpts at the end of= this message, and address the following: 1.=09Advisory Limit Setting - is it by the BOD or by the CEO? Our presenta= tion says CEO, but also specifies the trigger as 3.0 for P50 and 1.5 for P9= 9. If it's CEO level, we don't need to specify in the policy what the trig= ger limit is, as CEO can change. If it's in the Policy itself, it's consid= ered a Board approved limit.=20 a.=09Let's decide - if CEO level, let's change to say "a certain multiple o= f..." instead of 3.0 and 1.5 b.=09If at Board level, don't we need to specify a time horizon? If not, w= hy bother to specify the trigger - if one's going to be at CEO discretion a= nd consequently not specified in the policy itself, why not all of it? 2.=09Definitions in 3.4 excerpt below - Rick Buy wants these definitions ha= rd coded and clearly defined in the policy ?=09Future Available Cash -=20 ?=09Is this straight off a daily report from Accounting? What does this # = represent and what do we want in the policy? ?=09which individual is going to provide this daily, and when? =20 ?=09Borrowing Capacity -=20 ?=09I defined this by pulling terms straight from the slide in the Joint Au= dit/Finance Committee presentation - do you agree? ?=09who is going to calculate this daily and provide to RAC, and by when? ?=09Potential Future Cash Requirements - ?=09is this clear enough? any specific collateral assumptions given contra= ctual cash posting optionality? worst case assumption? 3.=09Does RAC really need to calculate this if GRMO is going to report it o= n the Executive Report Viewer, and the calculations are hard-coded above? = Seems like we could implement a process by which the 3 pieces of informatio= n get fed to GRMO to calculate and report, like all the other market risk m= etrics. Please call me in the morning so I can run through any required changes. Regards,
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SUBJECT: Liquidity Ratio Calculation and Definitions in Policy