instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
in a 3-2 decision does not settle the intent issue, because Honkanen did not consider the difference between intent to injure or inflict pain and intent to correct. Additionally, Honkanen's rationale may be outdated in light of the 2001 amendments to NRS 48.061, which expand the use of bad-act evidence in domestic violence cases, 2001 Nev. Stat., ch. 360, 1, at 169; see NRS 33.018(1)(a) (defining "domestic violence" to include battery on an accused's minor child), and Bigpond, which recognizes that character evidence can be admissible so long as it has a credible, non- propensity purpose, such as explaining the relationship dynamics between a domestic-violence victim and the accused. 128 Nev. at 111, 270 P.3d at 1246; see also Harris v. State, 195 P.3d 161, 182 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Cherry, J., concurring in part and dissenting
Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper (B) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (C) recognizing that the holding in harvey v state 604 p2d 586 590 alaska 1979 a case similar to honkanen had been abrogated by the amendment of alaskas rule 404b to allow admission of prior incidents of domestic violence as an exception to the general rule against admitting such evidence (D) recognizing general rule (E) recognizing this as the general rule
answer:
holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper

question:
the effect that the code-fendant's confession must be disregarded in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence is ineffective and cannot overcome the prejudicial effect of the incriminating statement on the jury. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. As such, the trial court's curative instruction in the instant case was insufficient to cure the erroneous admission of Hertz's statement to Hathcock. Nonetheless, this Court has also recognized that a Bruton violation does not automatically require reversal of an otherwise valid conviction but, rather, is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Farina v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1155 (Fla.1996) (citing Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, (1969)); see also Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1322 (Fla.1997) (<HOLDING>); Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 644-45
Holding statements: (A) holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause violation in that case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not require the conviction to be overturned (C) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (D) holding confrontation clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus upholding firstdegree murder conviction (E) holding that testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was cumulative
answer:
holding that confrontation clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in part because it concerned the limitation of crossexamination of the prosecutions key witness

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Equivalents. As a jury has been demanded, only a jury can resolve the conflicting views of the experts in this non-obvious and extremely complicated patent dispute. "Summary judgment is as available in patent cases as in other areas of litigation." See Continental Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., .948 F.2d 1264, 1265 (Fed.Cir.1991) (citation omitted); see also Bayer AG v. Elan Pharmaceutical Research Corporation, 212 F.3d 1241 (Fed.Cir.2000); Vivid Techs., Inc. v. American Science & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795 (Fed.Cir.1999). However, I tend to agree with those of my confreres who have held that, in general, summary judgment is appropriate only in cases where the technology at issue is relatively simple and straightforward. See Amhil Enterprises, Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554 (Fed.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969
Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if there is a genuine dispute about a material fact (C) holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care (D) holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment since the physical evidence and unrebutted expert testimony left no genuine issue of material fact (E) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate
answer:
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment