In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Eighth Circuit and a pair of nonprece-dential decisions from this court, all of which assume that lying to a supervising probation officer is a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a), a felony. See United States v. Wagner, 573 Fed.Appx. 598, 598-99 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Quillman, 409 Fed.Appx. 18, 21 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grimes, 54 F.3d 489, 491-92 (8th Cir. 1995). But Grimes was decided before Congress amended 1001 to exempt from its coverage any false statement made to a "judge or magistrate" by a party in a "judicial proceeding," 18 U.S.C. 1001(b), and we haven't yet considered whether, or to what extent, that exemption covers lies made to a probation officer by a person under supervision, compare United States v. Horvath, 492 F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>), with United States v. Vreeland, 684 F.3d 653,
Holding statements: (A) holding that probation is not a sentence (B) holding that defendants lies to probation officer preparing presentence report fall within 1001b exception if probation officer must include particular statement in report (C) holding defendants statement that presentence report was correct did not constitute admission to the nature and cireumstances of the crime reflected in the report (D) holding that if the government fails to object to the presentence report the district courts reliance on the report is reviewed for plain error (E) holding that the defendants statements to the probation officer were insufficient to satisfy the safety valves fifth requirement the probation officer is for purposes of 5c12 not the government
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: CURIAM: Carlo Junior Seneeharles appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He raises three issues on appeal, which we address in turn. After review, we affirm Sen-echarles's con earm and ammunition had traveled through interstate commerce before the offense was committed, the Government established a minimal nexus between Senecharles's firearm and ammunition and interstate commerce, and the statute was constitutional as-applied to him. See United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (<HOLDING>). B. Armed Career Criminal Act Senecharles also
Holding statements: (A) holding 922g is not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who possessed a firearm only intrastate when the government demonstrated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce (B) recognizing scarborough holding that commerce nexus satisfied upon showing that possessed firearm had traveled at some time in interstate commerce (C) holding that a defendant possessed a firearm in connection with a crime when the firearm was kept in a car across the street from where the defendant was selling drugs (D) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: 51 L&A's reasoning is deeply flawed and should be soundly rejected by this court. First, L&A erred in reasoning that "default" must mean a material breach justifying termination rather than the failure to fulfill a contractual obligation. The subcontract itself defines "default," and the meaning of "default" must also be read in light of the purpose of the bond, which is to guarantee the "prompt and faithful" performance of the subcontract. Obviously, a subcontract has not been promptly and faithfully performed when the principal has breached its contractual obligations, whether the breach is serious enough to justify termination or not. "[I]t is axiomatic that the very purpose of a performance bond is 'to assure completion of the contract.' " U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 369 F.3d at 67 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371
Holding statements: (A) holding that cleanup costs incurred pursuant to a consent decree were not incurred voluntarily and must be sought through a 113f contribution action (B) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (C) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety (D) holding that bankruptcy court could not enter judgment for 7402564 under 107a for incurred costs when such costs had not been incurred (E) holding that a surety must pay all the costs of completion not simply those incurred after a declaration of default
[EX A]:
(E)