In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
(citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul's store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation's borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held
Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction (B) recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (E) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization

Ex Output:
holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction

Ex Input:
the common level ratio. The Board may hold a hearing to consider the objections, but it may also decide the objections have merit and adjust its calculations. If not satisfied with the outcome of the hearing, the taxpayer may "appeal de novo such ratio determination to the Commonwealth Court." Id. It has long been established that "[wjhere a remedy is provided by an act of assembly, the directions of the legislation must be strictly pursued and such remedy is exclusive." Lurie v. Republican Alliance, 412 Pa. 61, 63, 192 A.2d 367, 369 (1963). This Court has explained that "where a statutory remedy exists, it is exclusive unless the jurisdiction of the courts is preserved thereby." Lashe v. Northern York County School District, 52 Pa.Cmwlth. 541, 417 A.2d 260, 264 (1980) (emphasis added) (<HOLDING>). Where the statutory remedy is an
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa (B) holding that a litigant could not avoid the procedure prescribed by statute in favor of a class action in equity (C) holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action (D) recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice (E) holding that district court in making class certification decision should avoid focusing on merits of underlying class action

Ex Output:
holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa

Ex Input:
his equal protection rights by irrationally excluding some nonviolent felonies from the class of exempted crimes listed in 921(a)(20)(A). See Baer v. Wauwatosa, 716 F.2d 1117, 1125 (7th Cir.1983) ("People are not allowed to challenge statutes or ordinances because of the consequences of applying them to other peo-ple_"). Even without the standing problems, Jester's second claim flies in the face of precedent. This Court has once before rejected a similar challenge that the exemptions to 922(g)(1) violated the Fifth Amendment by "too narrowly defining the class of application". United States v. Weatherford, 471 F.2d 47, 51 n. 6 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972, 93 S.Ct. 2144, 36 L.Ed.2d 695 (1973); see also United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Also in this context, the Second Circuit has
Holding statements: (A) recognizing this rule (B) recognizing continuing validity of the butner decision (C) holding that shepard did not affect the continuing validity of almendareztorres (D) recognizing the continuing validity of negligence as a separate basis for employer liability in action in which employee alleged supervisor harassment (E) recognizing the continuing validity of weatherford on this point

Ex Output:
recognizing this rule