In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: traceable to the shock or disturbing effect on the nerves of the patient, and that in turn, the irritation of the nerves caused functional disorders, and, that whether the disability resulted from nervous reaction or from auto-suggestion set in motion by memory of the accident, the result was the same to the injured person. Id. at 209, 13 S.E.2d at 293. The Supreme Court pointed out in Burlington Mills Corp. that the claimant's disability was occasioned by an injury which "may be fairly traced" to a risk which arose out of and in the course of her employment. There was a direct causal relation between the electric flash and the irritated condition of her nervous system. Id. at 210, 13 S.E.2d at 293; see also E.C. Womack, Inc. v. Ellis, 209 Va. 588, 592-93, 166 S.E.2d 265, 268-69 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Imperial Trash Service v. Dotson, 18 Va.App.
Holding statements: (A) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (B) holding injuries suffered on trip for business and pleasure were compensable (C) holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets (D) holding that psychiatric symptoms resulting in disability from work flowed from injuries received in primary accident and were compensable (E) holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident
[A]: holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable

[Q]: [u]nder [28 U.S.C.] 2254(d)(l)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court's inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O'Neal ("O'Neal"), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
[A]: holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause

[Q]: in this case do not present such issues. The recording of IP address information and similar routing data, which reveal the existence of connections between communications devices without disclosing the content of the communications, are precisely analogous to the capture of telephone numbers at issue in Smith. That is why the orders here fit comfortably within the language of a statute drafted with the earlier technology in mind. The substitution of electronic methods of communication for telephone calls does not alone create a reasonable expectation of privacy in the identitie s no expectation of privacy in "subscriber information provided to an internet provider," such as an IP address (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 432
Holding statements: (A) holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records (B) holding that prisoners do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells (C) holding that telephone users have no expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers because they voluntarily expose such information to the service provider (D) holding that computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their bulletin board subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person (E) holding that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of stored email
[A]:
holding that individuals have no expectation of privacy in their license registration or insurance documents and citing outofstate cases that have held that individuals do not have a privacy interest in their registration records