In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
2505. III. DISCUSSION A. No Private Cause of Action Under IGRA As an initial matter, the court dismisses all of plaintiffs claims against all defendants brought pursuant to alleged violations of IGRA. The court, following the majority of courts who have decided the issue, finds that IGRA provides no private right of action against the Tribe, the State, the federal government or any official or agency thereof. See, e.g., Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 63 F.3d 1030, 1049 (11th Cir.1995)(finding plaintiff failed to state a claim against tribe for alleged failure to comply with IGRA's licensing requirements because no implied cause of action in IGRA); American Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 146 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1053 (D.Ariz.2001)(citing 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(7)(A))(<HOLDING>); Jimi Dev. Corp. v. Ute Mountain Ute Indian
Holding statements: (A) holding that no private right of action exists (B) holding that there is no private right of action for any person under 13d (C) holding that the scope of section 541 is broad and includes all kinds of property including causes of action (D) recognizing private right of action (E) holding only three kinds of entities are expressly given causes of action under igraindian tribes states and the united statesand there is no implied private right to enforce igra

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
and misunderstanding of the local rules involving summar he district court abused its discretion in denying their Rule 60(b)(3) motion for relief from judgment. See Hesling v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir.2005). The Sangis did not provide the district court with clear and convincing evidence that FCC engaged in fraud or other misconduct or that any misconduct prevented them from fully and fairly presenting their case. See Gov't Fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir.1995). Rather the Sangis offered only allegations of fraud and misconduct. Nor have the Sangis shown exceptional circumstances to merit relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (<HOLDING>). IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the general rule that issues not raised in the lower court may not be addressed on appeal applies only to appellants (B) holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances (C) holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant (D) holding that cjredibility determinations are questions of fact and should only be overturned in extraordinary circumstances (E) holding that rule 60b6 only applies in extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless in the delay

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
those of Legal Defense Fund lawyers. The only material difference is that here employees must choose between the lawsuit and a conciliation offer while in Button there had been no conciliation and offer. The people attending the meetings held by the Legal Defense Fund lawyers in Button, however, did have to choose between initiating a lawsuit and not participating in a lawsuit. The type of choice the people would have to make here and in Button is not so different that the solicitation that could have occurred in this case was outside the scope of activity protected by Button. The characteristics of the solicitation that brought it within constitutional protection in Button are equally present in this case. See also Great Western Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F.Supp. 827 (N.D.I11.1979) (<HOLDING>). The continued vitality of Button was recently
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts findings under rule 52a are to be liberally construed in support of the district courts judgment (B) recognizing a similar exception to its rule with respect to corporations (C) holding rule similar to district courts order constitutionally inapplicable to nonprofit solicitation (D) holding that the majority of courts to address this issue have decided that the 100mile rule is inapplicable to parties and party officers (E) holding the carew rule to be inapplicable to claims of insurer bad faith

Ex Output:
(C)