In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: in the record of any possible medical treatment that Monroe County or the individual defendants could have provided to save the life of the Decedent. Phillips argues in her brief that it is not necessary for her to prove chemotherapy would have saved the Decedent's life. First, she refers to the fright and anxiety both she and the Decedent suffered because of the delay in chemotherapy. In this regard, Phillips confuses the causation issue. In a survival action, damages for the Decedent's physical suffering and mental anxiety as a result of the alleged deprivation of medical care would have been appropriate. In a wrongful death context, however, no damages are available until the plaintiff has cleared the causation hurdle. See Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So.2d 839, 842 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, Phillips suggests that she need only
Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (C) holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother (D) holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action (E) holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action

Output: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death

Input: Consider Input: the defendant's applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment)." Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its
Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures and thus them ultimate sentences were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not 2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under 3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline

Output: holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures and thus them ultimate sentences were based

Input: Consider Input: (S.D.Tex.2009). In Fisher, the plaintiffs deposed Keith Richard, a former employee of defendant Halliburton. Id. at *1. Richard's attorney instructed Richard not to answer questions concerning documents Richard reviewed in preparation for his deposition. Id. The Court declined to extend work product privilege to "the identity of the documents [the deponent] reviewed in preparation for his deposition," on the grounds that "imbuefing] ever compilation of documents reviewed by a witness before testifying at trial or at deposition with work product privilege protection would all but write Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence out of existence." Id. at *1-2; see also In re Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1240 (5th Cir.1982) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)) (<HOLDING>). Since the advent of the controversy involving
Holding statements: (A) holding that fedrcivp 26b3 does not require absolute protection for opinion work product and noting that these materials may be discovered and admitted when mental impressions are at issue in the case and the need for the materials is compelling (B) holding that although plaintiffs claims were masked in various legal theories they were premised on a single claim of product liability and therefore fell under north carolinas product liability statute (C) holding that materials prepared by an investigative audit committee were not work product because they were not the mental impressions conclusions opinions or legal theories of an attorney (D) holding opinion work product may be discovered when mental impressions are at issue and need for material is compelling (E) holding that cover letters from counsel to an expert that do not contain mental impressions opinions or conclusions of counsel are discoverable but written notes that contained the lawyers mental impressions were protected
Output: holding that fedrcivp 26b3 does not require absolute protection for opinion work product and noting that these materials may be discovered and admitted when mental impressions are at issue in the case and the need for the materials is compelling