TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: rights by initiating criminal proceedings against Mr. Pitt without probable cause. After trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on these claims. The court held that it is not "clearly established" that malicious prosecution is a violation of constitutional rights, and. thus the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm. Section 1983 creates a cause of action to remedy certain deprivations of federal rights, but it is not a source of substantive rights. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (noting that "[section 1983] is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United State 16 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217,
Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution (B) holding that the fourth amendment right implicated in a malicious prosecution action is the right to be free of unreasonable seizure of the person (C) holding sbm is not a violation of the defendants fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (D) holding that there is no fourteenth amendment substantive due process right to be free from malicious prosecution and suggesting that such a cause of action might lie under the fourth amendment (E) recognizing that an alleged deprivation of the right to be free from prosecution without probable cause might be judged under the fourth amendment

SOLUTION: holding that there is no substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment to be free from malicious prosecution

PROBLEM: provider in the course of treatment. In cases involving successive tortfeasors whose separate causal contributions to the plaintiff's harm can be measured, the doctrine of joint and several liability applies only to the enhanced portion of the injury. See Keeton et al. 52, at 352 (discussing distinction between original tortfeasor's liability, which encompasses entire injury, and treating physician's liability, which extends only to negligent treatment); Restatement (Second) of Torts 433A cmt. c. 17. Even though the original tortfeasor may be held hable for both the original and the enhanced injury, the imposition of entire liability is only temporary. The original tortfeasor, whose duty is of a different character and who is not in pari delicto with a successive 35, 42 (1985) (<HOLDING>). Thus liability for the enhanced injury may be
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor (B) holding that contribution will lie where no statute precludes recovery from the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought (C) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because it was not an innocent party (D) recognizing a right to contribution (E) holding original tortfeasor had no right to indemnification because claim properly was for contribution

SOLUTION: recognizing the right under federal maritime law to contribution or indemnity from another tortfeasor

PROBLEM: court's decision did not address it. [ 12] In Matter of Boschee, 347 N.W.2d 331, 334-35, we said in appeals from administrative agency decisions, courts may consider only those grounds identified in specifications of error under N.D.C.C. 28-32-15, and the grounds specified must come within the provisions of N.D.C.C. 28-32-19. See Dodds v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 354 N.W.2d 165, 169 n. 4 (N.D.1984); Cf., Application of Otter Tail Power Co., 354 N.W.2d 701, 702-04 (N.D.1984) (stating under certain circumstances constitutional issue may be raised for the first time on appeal of administrative agency decision). Clyde did not raise this issue in his specifications of error to the district court. Vetter v. NoHh Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 451, 453-54 (N.D.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, he has not postured his argument in
Holding statements: (A) holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power (B) holding that because the scope of review of agency matters is confined to the administrative record discovery in the form of depositions from agency officials was improper and irrelevant (C) holding that a party who had demonstrated an injury sufficient to confer standing to appeal from an agency decision could raise any relevant question of law in respect of the order of the agency (D) holding specifications of error in appeal from administrative agency decision must be reasonably specific and calculated to identify the matters truly at issue sufficient to fairly apprise the agency other parties and the court of the particular issues claimed (E) holding that the court must find that the agency entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or the decision is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise

SOLUTION:
holding that the power of any administrative agency to reconsider its final decision exists only where the statutory provisions creating the agency indicate a legislative intent to permit the agency to carry into effect such power