In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: This Court has reviewed these decisions and is in agreement with their reasoning and conclusions that the public policy exception does not give rise to a protected property interest in continued employment in this case. Likewise, the implied covenant is not the source of a protected property interest. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment and affords an employee the right to be dealt with fairly and in good faith. See Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 191 P.3d 205, 213-14 (2008). Breach of the covenant may give rise to an action for wrongful termination but it does not convert at-will employment to term employment nor form the basis for a protected property interest. See Hollister v. Forsythe, 22 F.3d 950, 952-52 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate (B) recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract (C) holding an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was insufficient to create a property interest in continued employment under montanas statutory scheme for at will employment (D) holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to performance under a contract (E) recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages

A: recognizing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by all parties in the performance of a contract for the sale of real estate
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Q: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court's order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants' arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment

A: holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied
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Q: 8 . See, e.g., Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir.2012); Pacific Dunlop Holdings v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir.1993); Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1244 (5th Cir.1988); Penturelli, 779 F.2d 160 at 166; Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 354 (10th Cir.1970); Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 880, 883 (D.C.1967); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F.Supp. 1314, 1346 (S.D.N.Y.1982). 9 . Interpreting the same language, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois observed that Congress intended "to specifically include as securities 'only that form of splitting up of mineral interests which had been most utilized for speculative purposes.' " Fearneyhough v. McElvain, 598 F.Supp. 905, 907 (C.D.Ill.1984) (<HOLDING>). 1 The Lenau [Appellants] signed the
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that it is an unusual challenge to a sale that does not distort the validity of the sale and that the exception likely has meaning only when collateral issues are challenged (B) holding that an assignment or sale of rights in the invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention within the meaning of section 102b (C) holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the instrument (D) holding that the sale of the entire leasehold interest in the oil and gas rights in plaintiffs land does not constitute the sale of a security within the meaning of the 1933 and 1934 acts notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs retained an overriding oneeighth 18 royalty interest (E) holding that the amount of water rights appurtenant to the land is the amount that is being used thereon before and at the time of the sale

A:
recognizing that it is an unusual challenge to a sale that does not distort the validity of the sale and that the exception likely has meaning only when collateral issues are challenged
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