In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
court, in addition to other disbursements allowed by law, the following costs: . . . For travel, such sum as the court may allow"); Mass.RCiv.P. 54(d) ("Except when express provision therefore is made either in a statute of the Commonwealth or on these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing pariy unless the court otherwise directs"). However, the Supreme Judicial Court cautioned that "(i]n taxing costs, courts do not seek to compensate litigants fully for the cost of litigation." Waldman v. American Honda Motor Co., supra, 413 Mass, at 322. Furthermore, the Supreme Judicial Court has advised that "where such costs are permitted, an award of costs is allowable only when based on 'specific affirmative authority.' " Demoulas v. Demoulas, 432 Mass. 43, 64 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 4.Travel Costs of Prevailing Party In
Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement (B) holding costs of service of subpoenas recoverable (C) holding that costs of daily transcripts during trial are not recoverable (D) holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered (E) holding that fees are not recoverable for work for which the client could not be charged

Ex Output:
holding that attorneys fees and court costs are recoverable under general hold harmless indemnity agreement

Ex Input:
initially stopping the truck for failing to illuminate the rear license plate in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1706(e). See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) ("An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment ... if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). Wilson also does not dispute that the smell of alcohol on VanHouden together with VanHouden's admission that he had been drinking justified the further detention of the truck and its occupants in order for Deputy Watkins to conduct field sobriety tests on VanHouden. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52
Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding detection of alcohol on a drivers breath during a routine traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion

Ex Output:
holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops

Ex Input:
judgment motion by mail does not implicate Rule 6(e), because Martin's deadline depended on the date that Akzo filed its summary judgment motion with the court. To the extent that Martin views his error as excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1), he is mistaken. Martin's ignorance of local rules or misconstruction of their applicability does not constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir.1993) ("Gross carelessness, ignorance of the rules, or ignorance of the law are insufficient bases for 60(b)(1) relief."). In addition, Martin's misinterpretation of the Rule 6(e) does not constitute the type of excusable neglect required to reopen a case under Rule 60(b)(1). Midwest Employers Casualty Co. v. Williams, 161 F.3d 877 (5th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Because Martin's misinterpretation of Local
Holding statements: (A) holding that the misinterpretation of rule 6e did not rise to the level of excusable neglect where the plaintiffappellee believed he had three additional days to file a motion for a new trial because the courts judgment was served by mail (B) holding that misplacing the notice of an appealable order was not excusable neglect (C) holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review (D) holding that a second motion to reconsider served within ten days of the denial of the first motion does not extend the time period for filing a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment (E) holding that jurisdiction in the district court was terminated by the trial courts order to close the case and that dss was required to file a new petition alleging neglect

Ex Output:
holding that misplacing the notice of an appealable order was not excusable neglect