In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav

Output: (E)

Input: Consider Input: also admitted he personally observed that Gretillat had trouble walking long distances. Indeed, Priske excused Gretillat from making rounds of the facility due to Gretillat's difficulty walking long distances. In April of 2004, Priske admitted that Gretillat's forced resignation arose out of Gretillat's problems with standing and "ambulating." See, e.g., Cannice v. Norwest Bank Iowa N.A., 189 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir.1999) (finding "ample evidence" that employee alerted employer to the existence of disability where employee told employer about disability, gave employer information about the ADA, requested an unmonitored telephone line to talk with his "support network," and displayed symptoms of the disability at work); see also Miller, 61 F.3d at 630 (quoting Hedberg, 47 F.3d at 934) (<HOLDING>). Because Care Initiatives was apprised of
Holding statements: (A) holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada (B) holding that if all of an employees coworkers knew that he had a heart condition such knowledge would not amount to notice to the employer that the employee was so limited by a disability as to require special accommodations (C) holding that an employer cannot be held liable under the ada if it had no knowledge of the employees alleged disability (D) holding that an employee who claims to have been terminated by her employer for having exercised her right to disability benefits raised a cognizable claim under 510 of erisa notwithstanding the fact that she received the benefits from her employer prior to termination (E) recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability

Output: (E)

Input: Consider Input: be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered -with reference to the whole instrument." Id. Here, we believe the policy at issue can be given a definite legal meaning and is not reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning; therefore, we hold the policy is unambiguous as a matter of law. The policy specifies SLIC will provide Wink a defense against claims arising from negligent errors or omissions resulting in civil violation of "[a]ny federal, state or local Truth-in-Lending statute." We see nothing in the policy's language that would limit Wink's coverage to actions based on alleged violations of the federal TILA and its specific state or local counterparts. See Fredericks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Or.App. 269, 915 P.2d 472, 476 (1996) (<HOLDING>). We therefore hold the policy's plain language
Holding statements: (A) holding the same where the plaintiff alleged breach of a contract provision that incorporated federal law by reference and breach of a new york statute by failing to provide uniform rates allegedly required by federal law (B) holding policy provision promising defense costs for an alleged violation of any federal state or local truth in lending law was unambiguous and required a defense whenever a cause alleged facts that could be a violation of any law that has as its purpose the same objectives as the federal truthinlending act tila and its state and local counterparts (C) holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation (D) holding that the state law contract claim alleged the same conduct as in the erisa claim and was therefore preempted (E) recognizing that plaintiff failed to prove a violation of the law of the land clause in the north carolina constitution because pjlaintiffs were unable to establish a federal due process violation and the constitutional claims state and federal are analyzed the same way
Output: (B)