In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: The agency reasonably found that unfulfilled threats, which were the only individualized harm Yang alleged he had suffered, did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ci Pan v. United States Atty. General, 449 F.3d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.2006). This is so, even when considered in conjunction with his father's alleged beating, because, as the IJ noted, Yang did not allege that this incident resulted in any injuries to his father or caused Yang any continuing harm. See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir.2007) ("the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates that applicants can become candidates for asylum relief only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer"); see also Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141-42 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the agency did not err in finding
Holding statements: (A) holding that an asylum applicant cannot claim past persecution based solely on the harm that was inflicted on a family member on account of that family members political opinion or other protected characteristic (B) recognizing that an applicant may be able to demonstrate persecution based on persecution of family members where the applicant shares the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family member was in the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident citing jorgetzoc v gonzales 435 f3d 146 150 2d cir2006 (C) holding that absent a pattern of persecution linked to the applicant persecution of family members is insufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution (D) recognizing that the harm suffered by family members in combination with other factors would presumably only be persecution where the applicant not only shares or is perceived to share the characteristic that motivated persecutors to harm the family members but was also within the zone of risk when the family member was harmed and suffered some continuing hardship after the incident (E) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person
[A]: (D)

[Q]: 1 We note that the Supreme Court of Georgia recently vacated portions of the trial court's injunction order in Barham v. City of Atlanta, 292 Ga. 375 (738 SE2d 52) (2013). 2 Am. Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Mom & Pop Stores, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 1, 7 (3) (497 SE2d 616) (1998) (punctuation omitted). 3 Levine v. Sun Trust Robinson Humphrey, 321 Ga. App. 268, 275 (3) (740 SE2d 672) (2013) (punctuation omitted). 4 Am. Petroleum Prods., 231 G 215 SE2d 294) (1975) ("[When] the complaining party cannot legitimately claim surprise, either because he knew of the existence of the witness or had equal means of knowing, it is not error to fail to invoke the sanctions of postponement, mistrial, barring the witness, etc."). Cf. Malley Motors, Inc. v. Davis, 183 Ga. App. 599, 600 (1) (359 SE2d 394) (1987) (<HOLDING>). 18 See Hunter v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. of
Holding statements: (A) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (B) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care (C) holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness (D) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (E) holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony
[A]: (C)

[Q]: he would have requested, and the trial court would have granted, a mistrial. In this situation, then, "the denial of a significant procedural right ... is sufficient to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland." Ramsey, 323 F.Supp.2d at 39. Because the trial court has already made the requisite findings entitling Middleton to relief, we REVERSE and REMAND for a new trial. DAVIS, J., concurs, and THOMAS, J., concurs with opinion. THOMAS, J., concurring. I concur in the majority opinion, but write to explain that while we cannot determine whether Appellant will again be tried for first-degree murder, the possibility is not foreclosed by the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. If Appellant is tried for first-degree murder, he wil , 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (<HOLDING>). The Florida Supreme Court noted in State v.
Holding statements: (A) holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to seconddegree murder and agreed to testify against codefendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for firstdegree murder (B) holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law but conviction was later reversed neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty (C) holding on habeas corpus that claims regarding sentencing phase jury charges in a death penalty case are never barred by procedural default (D) holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error (E) holding that the defendants due process rights to notice were violated when a judge imposed a capital sentence even though the state took the position that it would not seek the death penalty
[A]:
(B)