In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court's factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th
Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes 46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
[A]: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard

[Q]: century context. We hold, therefore, that a plaintiff may not recover for mental anguish for a potential injury to her unborn child that is wholly unsupported by any physical suffering during and after the incident in question and that explicitly has been ruled out by routine medical diagnostics. We are mindful of the fact, however, that pregnancy and childbirth continue to pose great mysteries that escape complete comprehension and control, and that carry risks with them, which, despite the latest advancements in medical research and technology, cannot be fully assessed. This has led some of our sister states to sustain their holdings in cases involving mental anguish suffered by pregnant women in recent decisions. See, e.g., Simons v. Beard, 188 Or.App. 370, 72 P.3d 96 (2003) (<HOLDING>). We emphasize that in an appropriate case this
Holding statements: (A) holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident (B) holding that a pregnant woman whose baby died just before being born as a direct result of defendantdoctors negligence was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension about the childs wellbeing before death after she learned that the baby was in a transverse position across the upper part of the birth canal and defendant did not undertake any steps to correct the position until after the baby had died (C) holding female supervisors alleged comments that she did not want to add stress to the baby were sufficient direct evidence in a pregnancy discrimination mixed motives case (D) holding woman who claimed she was terminated after giving birth because she became pregnant was part of the protected class (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the victim suffered before she died based on numerous bruises on her forearms that appeared to be defensive wounds and the large amount of blood found at the scene of the crime indicating that many of the wounds were inflicted before the victim died
[A]: holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident

[Q]: to show that when viewing the evidence in such a manner, the trial court committed reversible error. Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689, 695, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2008). The question of whether a search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment is "a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo" on appeal. Id. at 694, 668 S.E.2d at 145. An appellate court independently reviews the trial court's application of relevant legal principles such as whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause supported a seizure. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 95, 712 S.E.2d 464, 466 (2011) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). In doing so, however, the Court is "bound by the trial court's factual findings unless those finding (<HOLDING>). Detective Fraser, a trained law enforcement
Holding statements: (A) holding that even if an officer has an ulterior motive that does not authorize him to conduct a traffic stop of a particular vehicle he may still lawfully execute the stop if he observes the driver violate a traffic law (B) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation (C) holding that a traffic stop is valid under the fourth amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring (D) holding that if an officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation he has probable causeand thus also the lesser included reasonable suspicionto stop that driver (E) holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver
[A]:
holding that even if an officer has an ulterior motive that does not authorize him to conduct a traffic stop of a particular vehicle he may still lawfully execute the stop if he observes the driver violate a traffic law