In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

were convicted of conspiring to use, carry, or possess a firearm in furtherance of, inter alia, a conspiracy to violate the Neutrality Act and a conspiracy to provide services to the Taliban. 18 U.S.C. 924(c),(o); J.A. 3223. Both Count Five and Count Eleven, in other words, expressly allow one conspiracy to serve as the predicate for another conspiracy. Nothing about this statutory framework is unconstitutional, improper, or even unusual. Courts have recognized that one conspiracy can serve as the predicate for another conspiracy when the "[overarching] conspiracy and the predicate conspiracy are distinct offenses with entirely different objectives." United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3rd Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2nd Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208,
Holding statements: (A) holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman (B) holding that congress intended to allow multiple punishments for rico conspiracies and conspiracies to commit the underlying predicate offense even though the offenses were the same under the blockburger test (C) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (D) holding that judge erred in not explaining to jury that it could consider predicate acts listed in relation to substantive rico count when deciding whether defendants had also conspired to violate rico (E) recognizing money laundering as a predicate act under rico
holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman

375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther's theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts "a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman." White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther's termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender
Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law
recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling. 79 . Vine St. Exhibit 104 (J. Keeling 07/12/05 Dep. at 28). 80 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling; Vine St. Exhibit 40 at 001947. 81 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling; Vine St. Exhibit 104 (J. Keeling 07/12/05 Dep. at 38-39, 58). 82 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling; Vine St. Exhibit 104 (J. Keeling 07/12/05 Dep. at 62, 67). 83 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of James Keeling. 84 . Id.; Vine St. Exhibit 104 (J. Keeling 7/12/05 Dep. at 64-65, 67-78). 85 . Mar. 20, 2006 Trial Test, of 589, 596 n. 12, 598 (S.D.Tex.1996) (indicating but not directly holding that the arranger need not have owned or possessed the substance); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 1432, 1451 (E.D.Cal.1995) {"Iron Mountain I") (<HOLDING>). 100 . New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant had standing to challenge the seizure of a box regardless of who owned it because it was in a house owned and possessed by defendant (B) holding without discussion that a cercla arranger must own or possess the hazardous substance at issue (C) holding authority to control limits duty to control (D) holding that defendant was potentially liable as an arranger when it discharged hazardous substances into a river (E) holding that an arranger must have owned or possessed or had the authority to control or duty to dispose of the hazardous materials at issue
holding that defendant had standing to challenge the seizure of a box regardless of who owned it because it was in a house owned and possessed by defendant