In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: on the conditions stated in the publicly-filed limited partnership certificate. We affirm the appellants' liability under 106(l)(b). The certificates of limited partnership for TSG, TMG, and TSG 80 all state that, if necessary to satisfy the partnership's recourse obligations, each limited partner has agreed, upon demand, to make an additional capital contribution of up to three times the limited partner's original investment. These certificates were recorded publicly in New York County. Accordingly, the capital of the Limited Partnerships upon which creditors properly could rely included the limited partners' stated ob ligation to make additional capital contributions. See Arno Management Corp. v. 115 East 69th Assocs., 173 A.D.2d 258, 260, 569 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1st Dept.1991) (<HOLDING>). Section 106(l)(b) explicitly provides a means
Holding statements: (A) holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest (B) holding that appellate jurisdiction is limited to the issues contained in the certificate of appealability (C) recognizing partnership by estoppel only with respect to claims by persons who have reasonably relied upon outward representations of partnership (D) recognizing that same principle applies where defendant is general partner of limited partnership which in turn is general partner of limited partnership with contacts with state (E) holding that the information contained in the certificate of limited partnership binds the partnership and the partners with respect to third parties
[A]: holding that limited partner does not have standing to sue for injuries to partnership that merely diminish value of that partners interest

[Q]: the defendant's applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment)." Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its
Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures and thus them ultimate sentences were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not 2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under 3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline
[A]: holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures and thus them ultimate sentences were based

[Q]: both SORNA was enacted, and the Interim Order was promulgated. As a result, this case is distinguishable from those cases in which Courts have found that the Ex Post Facto Clause was violated, which are limited to circumstances in which the offender failed to register after the passage of SORNA, but prior to the date of the Interim Order. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette, supra at 533 (finding that SORNA was ex post facto as to the defendant whose failure to register as a sex offender predated both the passage of SORNA, and the promulgation of the Interim Order); United States v. Aldrich, 2008 WL 427483 at *5 (D.Neb., February 14, 2008); United States v. Kent, 2008 WL 360624 at *10 (S.DAla., February 8, 2008); United States v. Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462 at *5 (E.D.Mo., July 26, 2007)(<HOLDING>). For these reasons, we find that SORNA is not
Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the attorney generals decision as to timeliness of an asylum request pursuant to 8 usc 1158a3 the attorney generals decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances such that the time limit should be waived is not reviewable by any court (B) holding that sorna is only unconstitutional when applied to those previouslyconvicted persons who traveled before the attorney generals rule (C) holding attorney general could not contract on behalf of the state to employ an assistant attorney beyond the attorney generals own term (D) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (E) holding that sorna was made retroactive by the attorney generals february 28 2007 interim rule
[A]:
holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the attorney generals decision as to timeliness of an asylum request pursuant to 8 usc 1158a3 the attorney generals decision regarding whether an alien complied with the oneyear time limit or established extraordinary circumstances such that the time limit should be waived is not reviewable by any court