In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated
Holding statements: (A) holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action
holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury

the evidence of Robertson's alleged prior threat to his ex-wife as Williams rule evidence, the State cannot rely on the law of impeachment to introduce the same evidence through the back door by asking an impermissible question regarding an alleged prior crime. Finally, we address whether the admission of this collateral-crime evidence constitutes reversible error. This Court has held that the erroneous admission of irrelevant collateral crimes evidence "is presumed harmful error because of the danger that a jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demon strated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged." Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 115 (Fla.1989) (quoting Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903, 908 (Fla.1981)); accord Czubak v. State, 570 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>). In this case, given the highly inflammatory
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted (B) holding that counsel did not admit the defendant was guilty of a crime when counsel noted that if the evidence established the commission of any crime that crime was voluntary manslaughter not murder (C) holding that where court informed jurors that the defendant had escaped from custody the trial judge acted within his judicial capacity and did not testify (D) holding collateral crime evidence that defendant was an escaped convict was presumptively harmful (E) holding it is fundamental error to convict a defendant of crime not charged and which is not a lesser included offense of the charged crime
holding that a district court may not rely on a charging document without first establishing that the crime charged was the same crime for which the defendant was convicted

court was entirely foreseeable, bringing BPC before the bar of a Puerto Rico-based court in respect to litigation arising out of the financing agreement is neither unreasonable nor fundamentally unfair. It follows, therefore, as night follows day, that Puerto Rico's long-arm statute reaches this dispute, and the lower court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over BPC is both legally and constitutionally supportable. Having III. THE FINANCING AGREEMENTS We turn now to the main event a series of questions involving the enforceability and interpretation of the financing agreements. In answering these questions, we look to th Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992) (same); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 239-40, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1225-26, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (<HOLDING>). A. Article 1425. We begin our expedition by
Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo (B) holding that a court of appeals should review de novo a district courts determination of state law (C) holding that we review a district courts interpretation of a statute de novo (D) holding that courts of appeals must review the statelaw determinations of district courts de novo (E) holding that we review agency determinations of law de novo
holding that the proper review for the trial courts application of the law is de novo