In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 285 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (quotation omitted). B. Crush Analysis Testimony Yergin was apparently planning to testify about estimated speeds of the F-250 and the Hyundai based on the amount of "crush" to the Hyundai. Although Yer-gin testified in front of the jury that there was probably a difference in speed between the two vehicles of 10 to 20 miles per hour, she never stated at any time what speeds she estimated the vehicles to be traveling. Nor did appellant's counsel explain to the court what speeds Yergin concluded the vehicles were traveling. This information would be crucial to understanding what testimony was excluded and whether the exclusion was harmful. See id. A general statement that she would testify about the vehicles' speeds is insufficient. See id. at 891 (<HOLDING>). Further, appellant's trial counsel explained
Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of impaired mental functioning is inherently mitigating and that a defendant is not required to demonstrate a nexus between his mental capacity and the crime committed (B) holding defendant was not required to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee because the employee did not apprise defendant that she suffered from a mental impairment (C) holding that counsels performance was deficient for failing to investigate readily available evidence of mental impairment (D) holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold (E) holding that a general statement about how the defendant wanted to introduce evidence of medical or mental impairment to show that the defendant lacked the proper mental state was an insufficient offer there must be some meat of the actual evidence

A: (E)
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Q: and Defendants, therefore, terminated her employment without notice and an opportunity to be heard. A 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process has three elements: "(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process." Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003). Thus, the Due Process Clause protects one's job only where one has a property right in that job. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was a non-probationary employee in Alabama's classified service and, therefore, had a property interest in her position. See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1133-35 (Ala.2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution (B) holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment

A: (E)
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Q: ... to certify the goods or services of any person who meets the standards and conditions which the mark certifies." In re University of Mississippi, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1909, 1911, 1987 WL 123808 (T.T.A.B.1987). That the owner of a certification mark "cannot refuse to license the mark to anyone on any ground other than the standards it has set," 3 McCarthy at 19.96, is an important distinction between the policies embodied in trademarks and certification marks. It is true that certification marks are designed to facilitate consumer expectations of a standardized product, much like trademarks are designed to ensure that a consumer is not confused by the marks on a product. See, e.g. Institut Nat'l Des Appellations d'Origine v. Brown-Forman Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875, 1889-90 (T.T.A.B.1998) (<HOLDING>). But the certification mark regime protects a
Holding statements: (A) holding that same likelihood of confusion test applied in the context of trademarks also applies to certification marks (B) holding that the likelihood of confusion resulting from the defendants adoption of a trade dress similar to the plaintiffs the touchstone test for a violation of 1125 (C) holding that plaintiff was likely to succeed on merits of 349 claim premised on likelihood of confusion between marks (D) holding that concurrent use of same mark on similar product was sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion (E) holding that even several isolated incidents of actual confusion are insufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion

A:
(A)
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