In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia's onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts "Where there is no material connection between the district and'the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action." Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 'When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made." Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether
Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action

A: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership
****
Q: of class members with only Purchase Claims are represented by class representatives with Purchase Claims, and the settlement provides up to $250,000 for these claims. Moreover, class members with only Purchase Claims do not receive less value for identical claims asserted by other class members. Objectors contend inadequate representation is demonstrated in the settlement's allocation terms, which designate the vast majority of the fund to Injury Claims, while Purchase Claims are capped at $250,OOO. But varied relief among class members with differing claims in class settlements is not unusual. See Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.1999) ("[Ajlmost every settlement will involve different awards for various class members."); see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 289-90 (<HOLDING>). Such differences in settlement value do not,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (B) holding the court was not required to decide the issue of whether the district court properly certified a rule 23b2 class because the court already concluded that the district court appropriately certified the class under rule 23b3 citing authority for the proposition that a court need only find that a class action may be maintained under any of the three subdivisions (C) holding that once district court entered order approving the settlement of class claims it could not alter the class in the absence of egregious error (D) holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed (E) holding the district court properly certified a national settlement class in a circumstance in which the class was comprised of policyholders who allegedly were the victims of several different types of fraudulent and misleading sales practices and the settlement created an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to determine the kind and amount of relief to be granted

A: recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members
****
Q: CURIAM. Carl Headley Chambers appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. 2241 (1994) petition. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Chambers v. Brooks, No. CA-01-1389-AM (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 11, 2001; entered Oct. 12, 2001); see also United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 201-02 (4th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 937, 121 S.Ct. 1393,
Holding statements: (A) holding that apprendi does not apply to a judges exercise of sentencing discretion within a statutory range so long as a defendants sentence is not set beyond the maximum term specified in the substantive statute (B) holding that almendareztorres remains binding despite apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 (C) holding that apprendi does not apply to judges exercise of sentencing discretion within statutory range so long as defendants sentence is not set beyond maximum term specified in substantive statute (D) holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 does not apply to a judges exercise of discretion within a statutory range so long as a defendants sentence is not set beyond the maximum term specified in the substantive statute (E) holding that apprendi v new jersey 530 us 466 120 sct 2348 147 led2d 435 2000 was not violated where the sentence did not exceed the applicable statutory maximum

A:
holding that apprendi does not apply to a judges exercise of sentencing discretion within a statutory range so long as a defendants sentence is not set beyond the maximum term specified in the substantive statute
****