In this task, you need to write an incorrect answer to the given question. Along with the question, you are also given the correct answer(s) and the associated paragraph. An incorrect answer should be closely related to the content of the paragraph and/or the question but will not truthfully answer the question. Your incorrect answers should be similar to the given correct answer such that it will pose a challenge for students to distinguish the two. A good incorrect answer should prevent those who skip the paragraph from answering the question. The incorrect answer should not be trivial, in the sense that they should not be easily eliminated without reading the paragraph.

Q: Paragraph- Sent 1: The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising.
Sent 2: The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances.
Sent 3: One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing.
Sent 4: On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Sent 5: This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system.
Sent 6: But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen.
Sent 7: In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden.
Sent 8: Here, OFAC had more success.
Sent 9: It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks.
Sent 10: Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen.
Sent 11: After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds.
Sent 12: Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding.
Sent 13: Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda.
Sent 14: Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations.
Sent 15: Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence.
Sent 16: This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions.
Sent 17: As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing.
Sent 18: Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money.
Question: What was a result of the Embassy bombings of 1998?.

A: It focused attention Al-Qaeda's finances.
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Q: Paragraph- Sent 1: The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising.
Sent 2: The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances.
Sent 3: One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing.
Sent 4: On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
Sent 5: This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system.
Sent 6: But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen.
Sent 7: In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden.
Sent 8: Here, OFAC had more success.
Sent 9: It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks.
Sent 10: Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen.
Sent 11: After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds.
Sent 12: Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding.
Sent 13: Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda.
Sent 14: Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations.
Sent 15: Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence.
Sent 16: This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions.
Sent 17: As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing.
Sent 18: Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money.
Question: How much money was frozen after the President applied the same designation to the Taliban?.

A: $215 million.
****
Q: Paragraph- Sent 1: As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.
Sent 2: The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country.
Sent 3: Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance.
Sent 4: Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding.
Sent 5: We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999.
Sent 6: It appears they supported themselves.
Sent 7: KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot.
Sent 8: After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money.
Sent 9: Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky.
Sent 10: According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States.
Sent 11: Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7.
Sent 12: Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm.
Sent 13: We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money.
Sent 14: The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements.
Sent 15: By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States.
Sent 16: Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
Question: How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot?.

A:
$10,000.
****