After more than a year of effort, attorneys with Northwest Justice Project earlier this week told 25 families in a mobile home park here that they can keep their homes and no longer need to fear eviction. The East Wenatchee City Council has entered into an Interlocal Agreement with the Wenatchee Housing Authority authorizing the Authority to purchase and maintain the Mobile Park Plaza mobile home park. Located just north of the Wenatchee Valley Mall, the park had been threatened with closure for more than a year. "We cannot say enough about how relieved we are that this is over," said Manuel Luna, one of the residents of Mobile Park Plaza. "We were afraid that no solution would be found, and that our families would have no place to go. We are very grateful for the help of our attorneys. Without them, we would not have saved our homes. We are also thankful for the help of the Housing Authority, the City Council and Mayor Steve Lacy." Formerly owned by local businessman Dan Jennings, Mobile Park Plaza had been home to 45 low-income families, many of them Latino farm workers. In October 2000 Jennings gave the park residents notice of his intent to close the park effective November 30, 2001. While some park residents decided to move, others, including 25 families, organized an informal association to relocate or save their homes. Unable to afford private legal counsel, the families asked for help from legal services attorneys at the Northwest Justice Project and Columbia Legal Services. In the succeeding months, these attorneys worked with representatives of the Greater Wenatchee Housing Authority, the state Office of Community Development, Chelan County, the City of East Wenatchee, state legislators, Jennings and others to secure funding and find a solution. "There seemed to be a never-ending set of obstacles," said Patrick Pleas, an attorney with Northwest Justice Project. "Mr. Jennings had financial considerations, the City had growth and economic development considerations, and the State and Housing Authority had their own concerns. Thankfully, hard work and good will from all parties allowed us to find a solution that works for everyone." Northwest Justice Project and Columbia Legal Services are non-profit organizations that provide civil legal assistance to low-income individuals and families throughout Washington state. Members of the state's Access to Justice Network, these organizations work with thousands of volunteer attorneys to ensure that justice is available to those who face critical legal problems and can't afford private legal counsel.

Question: "What park did Dan Jennings intend to close on November 30, 2001?"

Answer: "The plaza formerly owned by local businessman Dan Jennings"

Response: yes

On his return to Nuremberg in 1495, Durer opened his own workshop (being married was a requirement for this). Over the next five years his style increasingly integrated Italian influences into underlying Northern forms. Durer's father died in 1502, and his mother died in 1513. His best works in the first years of the workshop were his woodcut prints, mostly religious, but including secular scenes such as The Men's Bath House (ca. 1496). These were larger and more finely cut than the great majority of German woodcuts hitherto, and far more complex and balanced in composition. It is now thought unlikely that Durer cut any of the woodblocks himself; this task would have been performed by a specialist craftsman. However, his training in Wolgemut's studio, which made many carved and painted altarpieces and both designed and cut woodblocks for woodcut, evidently gave him great understanding of what the technique could be made to produce, and how to work with block cutters. Durer either drew his design directly onto the woodblock itself, or glued a paper drawing to the block. Either way, his drawings were destroyed during the cutting of the block.

Question: "Durer was able to create larger and more complex woodcuts relative to the majority of other German's because of Durer's experience working where?"

Answer: "An artist's studio"

Response: no

As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

Question: "When did the operatives who were assigned to planes arrive in the US?"

Answer: "Late 1999"

Response: no

Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to Arlington, Virginia, to the Pentagon. Across the Potomac River, the United States Congress was back in session. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began to line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush went for an early morning run. For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a safe and pleasant journey. Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine. Boston: American 11 and United 175. Atta and Omari boarded a 6:00 A.M. flight from Portland to Boston's Logan International Airport. When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security measures. Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta's selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft. This did not hinder Atta's plans. Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later, Atta apparently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague who was at another terminal at Logan Airport. They spoke for three minutes. It would be their final conversation.

Question: "On what day did Atta and Omari board a 6:00 A.M. flight from Portland to Boston's Logan International Airport?"

Answer: "Tuesday, September 11, 2001"

Response:
yes