In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Statement. They were, however, obtained prior to this Court's actual approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement, which occurred on December 19, 2008 (i.e. at the joint hearing on approval of the Amended Disclosure Statement and the Amended Plan). Although typically a disclosure statement should be approved before the proponent solicits votes for the plan, here the premature solicitation was harmless and, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia, a harmless failure to comply with 1125's solicitation requirements "is not necessarily fatal to the success of a Chapter 11 reorganization." In re N.W. Recreational Activities, Inc., 8 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr.D.Ga.1980); see also First Am. Bank of N.Y. v. Century Glove, Inc., 81 B.R. 274, 278-80 (D.Del.1988) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105(d)(2)(B)(vi),
Holding statements: (A) holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when upon being notified that the debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan the court dismissed their case (B) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding hearing in chambers was not per se a violation of due process (E) holding that a plan proponents failure to obtain court approval of solicitation materials is not per se fatal to the confirmation process

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because "the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[ ] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc."); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been
Holding statements: (A) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (B) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (C) holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analysts report can be meaningfully crossexamined on the general risk of error in forensic testing (D) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (E) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
therefore is not owed Chevron deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."); see also Wilderness Soc'y v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) ("If, under these canons, or other traditional means of determining Congress's intentions, we are able to determine that Congress spoke clearly ..., then we may not defer to the[agency's] contrary interpretation."). Moreover, the Secretary's regulation conflicts with NAGPRA's plain language and so is invalid for that reason. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
Holding statements: (A) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law (B) holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency (C) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (D) holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation (E) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority

Ex Output:
(B)