In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
--------
Question: of serious physical harm," Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict" and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict" have been replaced by the single term "judgment as a matter of law." 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: "Furthermore, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation

Answer: (E)

Question: CBL claim that if the merger is effected, the public will be harmed because Sparrow Hospital will no longer provide late re at the incipiency and block the merger. This court does not find irreparable injury will result from not enjoining the merger because this court sees a very minimal probability that a divestiture would ever be warranted in the future. For reasons that will be explained infra, this court is of the opinion that plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits. Also, plaintiffs claim that if the merger is not enjoined they may lose standing to challenge it, thereby suffering irreparable harm. This court finds no merit in this contention. In making this argument, plaintiffs rely on the case of Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) (<HOLDING>). For instance, as described above, GLASCCO and
Holding statements: (A) holding that an antitrust injury is a necessary element of a 2 claim (B) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (C) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (D) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing (E) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit

Answer: (E)

Question: H.D.'s initial removal from respondent's custody and respondent's entry of the consent order granting guardianship to petitioners, we conclude that the requirements set forth by N.C. G admission of hearsay "was highly prejudicial." This general argument is not sufficient to establish that the admission of the alleged hearsay evidence prejudiced him. Further, the court's findings and conclusions here are supported by evidence other than the evidence challenged as hearsay. Respondent's own testimony, and that of respondent's father, contained competent evidence to support the findings that grounds existed for termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-llll(a)(2). See In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 411, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Further, there is a presumption in a bench
Holding statements: (A) holding that in a bench trial it is presumed that the judge as trier of fact is able to distinguish between competent and incompetent evidence and consider only that evidence which is admissible (B) holding that while remand is appropriate where the record may contain substantial competent evidence to support findings as to the rowe factors reversal is required where the record is devoid of any evidence to support the award of attorneys fees (C) holding that findings of fact are conclusive if supported by clear and convincing competent evidence even where the evidence might support contrary findings (D) holding that where there is competent evidence to support the courts findings the admission of incompetent evidence is not prejudicial (E) holding that the trial courts classification of property will not be disturbed as long as there is competent evidence to support that determination

Answer:
(D)