TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation 8 C.F.R. 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. 1103) which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. 241.5(b) ("An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal."). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant's release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be
Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc 1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

SOLUTION: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute

PROBLEM: in which this Court's authority to review criminal convictions was greatly circumscribed." Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629, 122 S.Ct. 1781. It could examine constitutional errors in a criminal trial only on a writ of habeas corpus, and only then if it deemed the error "jurisdictional." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "The Court's desire to correct obvious constitutional violations led to a 'somewhat expansive notion of jurisdiction.Id. (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 25 . A charging instrument may be so deficient that a court does not have jurisdiction over the case; for instance, if the charging document was never filed. See State v. Kaulia, 128 Hawai'i 479, 491, 291 P.3d 377, 389 (2013) (<HOLDING>). Without deciding the matter, a charge that
Holding statements: (A) holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted (B) holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction (C) holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal on a restraining order and the district court retained jurisdiction to proceed with the trial (D) holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review state disciplinary proceedings against attorney (E) holding that because the state failed to properly file the complaint the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial

SOLUTION: holding that although that the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing the appellate court may nonetheless proceed to consider the district courts determination that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted

PROBLEM: [u]nder [28 U.S.C.] 2254(d)(l)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court's inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O'Neal ("O'Neal"), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause

SOLUTION:
holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause