In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the Title VII limitations period is an affirmative defense; rather, it referred to the filing period as something "like a statute of limitations" which "generally create affirmative defenses." See Gordon, 675 F.2d at 360. Furthermore, Gordon's discussion came in response to the defendant's (rejected) claim that the filing period was jurisdictional and did not purport to address, let alone decide, whether compliance with the filing deadline was condition precedent or an affirmative defense. 13 . Plaintiffs have not argued waiver, estoppel, or that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to cure their tardy filings, and based on the facts before us, we see nothing demanding their application. See, e.g., Biester v. Midwest Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Rather, each housekeeper who was told to
Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling of a statute of limitations may be triggered 1 where a plaintiff has actively pursued his judicial remedies by a filing a defective pleading during the statutory period or 2 where a plaintiff was induced or tricked by his adversarys misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass (B) holding that equitable tolling applied where insurance company statements and conduct lulled plaintiff and his attorney into believing that plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim was properly filed (C) recognizing equitable tolling in the title vii context where the plaintiff has been deceived lulled into inaction actively misled or has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights quotations and citations omitted (D) holding equitable tolling appropriate where a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights (E) holding title vii subject to equitable tolling

Output: (C)

Input: Consider Input: pre-trial release on April 12, 1985. Although this appeal has received expedited review, a decision has not yet been rendered by the Second Circuit. Thus a total of only fifty-six (56) non-excludable days have elapsed since Leon was arrested and detained (assuming that the filing of Elba Rodriguez's omnibus motion stopped the clock as to all the co-defendants). DISCUSSION Leon's first argument is based upon the interpretation of Section 3164(b) itself, which provides that, "[t]he periods of delay enumerated in Section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitations specified in this section." Leon argues that this sent C.Cir.1976) and United States v. Mejias, 417 F.Supp. 579 (S.D.N.Y.1976), aff'd. on other grounds, sub nom., United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.1976) (<HOLDING>). According to the House Report accompanying
Holding statements: (A) holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases (B) holding that a court examining if a law should be applied retroactively should consider whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment (C) holding that the first amendment definition should be applied by analogy in the franks setting (D) holding that factor 10 should not be applied when the victim is the only one at risk (E) holding that the exclusions should be applied

Output: (E)

Input: Consider Input: a limited right in the secured creditor to the sale proceeds of the licenses. Id. at 380. Her decision not to recognize even such a circumscribed right, therefore, was based upon an implicit assumption and in the bankruptcy court's view, an erroneous one that broadcasting licenses do not qualify as property of the estate. Id. We decline to adopt the rationale of Ridgely for two reasons. First, contrary to Ridgely's interpretation, Judge Crabb did not reject the notion that a broadcasting license may fall within the broad range of assets that qualify as property of the estate. Indeed, she expressly assumed that it did constitute property of the estate. See 138 B.R. at 576 (citing In re Fugazy Express, Inc., 114 B.R. 865 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 124 B.R. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a professionals license is a protected property interest (B) holding that a debtors interest in a tenancy by the entirety is property of the bankruptcy estate under section 541 because of debtors undivided present interests in the use possession income and right of survivorship of the property (C) holding that funds held in escrow are property of the estate only to the extent of the debtors independent right to that property (D) holding that the debtors interest in a broadcasting license constitutes property of the estate (E) holding that a broadcasting license was property of the estate but not subject to a security interest
Output: (D)