In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr.D.Mass.1987); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 332-34 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). And, although 105 "does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law," Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, n. 1; "[b]ankruptcy courts ... enjoy inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct." Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.1996). This inherent power authorizes federal courts "to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities." Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)(<HOLDING>); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process (D) recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process (E) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process
[EX A]: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it

[EX Q]: victim's undisputed injuries, this court held that the statute required proof that the bodily injury was a foreseeable, rather than intentional, result of the rights-violating conduct. Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1405. At no point did this court even consider the possibility that the statute might not require proof of foreseeability at all, i.e., that the statute, imposed strict liability .on a defendant for bodily .injury resulting from his conduct. Because there is no logical distinction between the statutory language at issue in Woodlee and the language of 841(b)(1)(E) that we are now tasked with interpreting, I believe that we are bound by Woodlee to interpret 841(b)(1)(E) as incorporating a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). To conclude otherwise creates an
Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel (B) holding that a panel may not reconsider issues decided earlier in the same case by the en banc court (C) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (D) holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision (E) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc
[EX A]: holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel

[EX Q]: TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. ANN. art. 18.06(a) (Vernon 1977); see Swanson v. State, 113 Tex.Cr.R. 104, 18 S.W.2d 1082 (1929). The State asserts that the warrant could not have been signed and issued on March 20, 1987, because (1) according to the complaint, the affiant did not receive the informant's report until March 25, 1987; (2) the complaint for the search warrant was filed on March 25, 1987; (3) the warrant did not "come to hand" until March 25, 1987; and (4) the warrant was executed on March 25, 1987. The State concludes that the March 20 dates are clerical errors which do not affect the validity of the search warrant. The State argues that courts must interpret affidavits and warrants in a common sense and realistic fashion. Faulkner v. State, 537 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (<HOLDING>). We agree. However, there is no reason, other
Holding statements: (A) holding that court must use common sense in interpreting warrant containing grammatical error (B) holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court (C) holding that in interpreting a contract the actual purpose and intent of the parties must be derived (D) recognizing fraud in the inducement as defense under federal common law interpreting erisa (E) holding that common knowledge and common sense of one skilled in the art must be considered in determining obviousness
[EX A]:
holding that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing any claims that have not been exhausted in state court