In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: to the section 924(c) jury instruction, we review it for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1066 (8th Cir.1996). Although the pre-Bailey instruction was given to the jury (because Bailey had no rovide a defendant, upon their motion, any statement or report made by a government witness that relates to the subject matter of the direct testimony of that witness. 18 U.S.C. 3500. The government need not provide the statement, however, until after the witness testifies on direct examination. 18 U.S.C. 3500(a). 6 . The district court's ruling was essentially a discovery matter, which we review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Byrne, 83 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the fbi informants file contained no brady material not already provided to the defendant in a summary (B) holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation (C) holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence (D) holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name (E) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
[EX A]: holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation

[EX Q]: with intent to murder"; therefore, the two convictions did not violate double jeopardy. Id. In addition to comparing the statutory elements of an offense both in the abstract under Blockburger and as applied to the facts of the particular case under Duchac, courts consider other factors relevant to ascertaining legislative intent. These factors include the following: (1) whether there were multiple victims involved; (2) whether several discrete acts were involved; and (3) whether the evil at which each offense is directed is the same or different. As we noted in Goins, "generally, if a criminal episode involves several victims who have personally been victimized, the evidence could sustain multiple convictions." Goins, 705 S.W.2d at 651 (citing State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.1980)(<HOLDING>)). In Goins, however, we held that the multiple
Holding statements: (A) holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense (B) holding that it was plain error for trial court to allow more than one conviction of grossly negligent operation of a vehicle where more than one person was injured (C) holding that multiple convictions under 924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that killing more than one person in a single automobile accident justified multiple homicide convictions (E) holding that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses under 922g on the basis that he belonged to more than one prohibited class or that he simultaneously possessed more than one firearm
[EX A]: holding that a single transaction involving multiple obscene materials constitutes but one offense

[EX Q]: at issue, it was revocable at the pleasure of the grantor); Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301, 311 (1877) ("[A] user [that] has been by sufferance and permission only ... [is] but a license, revocable at pleasure, and ... confer[s] no right in the way. It simply relieve[s] the [party] from being a trespasser ...." (citation omitted)); Goss v. C.A.N. Wildlife Trust, Inc., 157 Md.App. 447, 457, 852 A.2d 996, 1002 (2004) (stating that "a license is merely a personal privilege to do some particular act ... on [another's] land without possessing any estate or interest therein, while an easement is an interest in land that grants the right to use that land for a specific purpose" (internal quotations omitted)); State ex rel. Shorett v. Blue Ridge Club, 22 Wash.2d 487, 156 P.2d 667, 671 (1945) (<HOLDING>). In conclusion, based on the record before us,
Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that a beach bordering on puget sound used extensively for public recreation was completely wild open vacant unoccupied and in its natural state and therefore public use was presumed to have originated by permission until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (C) holding that the public use exception was not applicable because the injury to the tenants employee occurred in an area of the leased premises that was not open to the public but was used only by employees (D) holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public (E) holding that because public use of a beach was permissive the public was a licensee and as such could be excluded from the whole area at any time by the title owner
[EX A]:
holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege