TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: ... clearly does not rise to the level of constitutional error when the failure was correct as a matter of state law." 593 F.2d at 267. He noted also that "the highest court of Kentucky expressly held that the state trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested lesser included offense instruction." I do not find any error in this conclusion. Shortly after this court decided Pilon, however, the Supreme Court invalidated on due process grounds an Alabama law which forbade the jury to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser included offense in a capital case when the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). See also Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2052, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Beck was concerned with imposition of the
Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant was not entitled to entrapment instruction when there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction (B) holding that beck requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given when the evidence warrants such an instruction as a matter of due process in a capital case (C) holding that due process does not require a lesser included offense instruction of manslaughter where not requested (D) holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given (E) holding that a lesser included offense instruction might be constitutionally required in capital cases because of their unique nature

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: completed his nine month term of incarceration and was released from custody on Jply 28, 2017. Any challenge to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his term' of confinement is thus moot. See United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing as moot an appeal from a judgment revoking supervised release where defendant had already completed his term of confinement). However, because defendant would still be entitled to a reduction of his term of supervised release if the court were to find such a reduction appropriate, we will analyze whether, as defendant claims, the supervised release component of the District Court's sentence was either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Mazza Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that the District Court
Holding statements: (A) holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions (B) holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to 3583e (D) holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release (E) holding defendant convicted under 841b1a may receive lifetime term of supervised release

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: harm. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373; see United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining "threat" as an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on another), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990). The Edwards court specifically held that RCW 9.61.160 does not require proof of a true threat. Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 12. Rather, the court indicated that the statute prohibited fighting words. In its analysis, the court noted that RCW 9.61.160 proscribes some protected speech, stating that threats are protected by the First Amendment "unless they are likely to cause an immediate breach of the peace." Edwards, 84 Wn. App. at 17. But the court concluded, without elaboration, that the majority of threats proscribed under RCW 9.61.160 are likely t 276 (1988) (<HOLDING>); see also Knowles, 91 Wn. App. at 373-74
Holding statements: (A) holding that bomb threat statute is not overbroad because it can be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only nonprotected threats (B) holding that there can be only one final appealable order (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final (D) holding that it is not (E) holding the court should only apply the doctrine narrowly and only under exceptional circumstances

SOLUTION:
(A)