In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: in the petition no later than thirty days from the day on which the first defendant was served. Id. at 1262-63 (internal citations omitted). As a general premise, under the "first-served rule," defendants who are properly served within thirty days of the first defendant's service must join in the removal petition. The "failure to do so renders the petition defective." Id. at 1262. Under the facts of Getty, however, the application of the first-served rule did not produce an inequitable result. Nonetheless, recognizing the potential for harsh results, other decisions provide that exceptional circumstances may sometimes require relief from strict application of the rule in order to achieve equitable results. See Milstead Supply Co. v. Cas. Ins. Co., 797 F.Supp. 569, 573 (W.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 482 (5th
Holding statements: (A) holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties (B) holding that the defendants filing of a notice of removal before being served by plaintiffs did not render removal defective (C) holding that dismissal of some but not all of the defendants who had been served with complaint is not a final order (D) holding that joinder in or consent to the removal petition must be accomplished by only those defendants 1 who have been served and 2 whom the removing defendants actually knew or should have known had been served (E) holding that the defendants consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena
Example Output: holding that all properly served defendants must join in petition for removal except for nominal unknown or fraudulently joined parties

Example Input: that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble's intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble's reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by 301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted
Example Output: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by 301

Example Input: Reeves, 410 F.3d 1031, 1033-34 (8th Cir.2005). Smith's Blakely challenge falls within the scope of his appeal waiver. Relying on Blakely, Smith argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it included drug quantities not admitted by him or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in setting his sentence. Smith argues that his base offense level should have been 32 based on the admitted drug quantities rather than 34 based on additional drug quantities as found by the district court. This Blakely challenge is quintessential^ a constitutional challenge to the Guidelines and is expressly precluded by Smith's agreement not to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the Guidelines. See United States v. Young, 413 F.3d 727, 730, 2005 WL 1558486 (8th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Nor does Smith's appeal fall within the
Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants failure to object to the denial of his right peremptorily to challenge alternates constitutes a waiver of any right to appeal the issue (B) holding that a blakely challenge fell within the defendants waiver of his right to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the guidelines (C) holding that an express waiver of the right to appeal the sentence was invalid because the trial court had failed properly to advise the defendant and that the defendant therefore did not waive his right to appeal the legality of his sentence (D) holding that a municipal court had no constitutional or statutory authority to rule on the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed on attorneys practicing within the city limits (E) holding that waiver of right to appeal sentence unless its was an upward departure barred appeal of sentence within guidelines range
Example Output:
holding that a defendants failure to object to the denial of his right peremptorily to challenge alternates constitutes a waiver of any right to appeal the issue