In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 620, 622 (La.App.1967) (same). Takings of temporary easements are measured differently. A landowner must be compensated for the loss of use of property taken by a temporary easement and any impairment of access to the property during the period of construction. Miczek v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.App. Ct. 105, 108, 586 N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (1992) (involving temporary slope easement). Some courts have held that the damages are equal to the rental value of the property for the period of occupation. 4 Nichols at 12E.01. This is commonly measured by the rental value of the property as a whole. See Paddock v. Town of Durham, 110 N.H. 106, 108, 261 A.2d 438, 441 (1970); 4A Nichols at 14.2462. Cf. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 8, 69 S.Ct. 1434, 1439, 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949) (<HOLDING>). E. Miscellaneous Damages are to be measured
Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper measure of compensation in a temporary taking is the rental value that probably could have been obtained (B) holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market (C) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (D) holding that the proper measure of damages to repair defects for a building contract that has not been substantially performed is the contractually agreed upon measure of damages (E) holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed

A: holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market
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Q: conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and 1981 the exclusive remedies for employment discrimination by a municipality and its employees, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss Johnson's 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 3 .We review de novo a question of law
Holding statements: (A) holding that 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in 1981 by state governmental units (B) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (C) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (D) holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution (E) holding that 1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law

A: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment
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Q: that Major Anderson submitted to the Board, he apparently believed that he could waive any return to active duty and still be compensated. A.R. 66 ("I do not wish to be placed back on active duty, but instead compensated for the full monetary equivalence of that promotion."). Aside from this mistaken interpretation of law, Major Anderson has made no argument or showing that his request to the Board was anything other than informed and carefully contemplated. His mistaken interpretation of the law does not obviate the fact that Major Anderson apparently undertook a careful consideration of his career and circumstances prior to filing his appeal with the Board and making his request to be left in the Reserves. See Turnage v. Dep't. of Agriculture, 230 Ct.Cl. 799, 1982 WL 25186 (1982) (<HOLDING>). Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774,
Holding statements: (A) holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption (B) holding that an appeal waiver is valid when it is entered into knowingly and voluntarily (C) holding that an express waiver of the right to a hearing before an administrative board was a tactical decision made knowingly and voluntarily despite the plaintiffs misinterpretation of the applicable law and regulations (D) holding prelitigation waiver of jury trial must be made knowingly and voluntarily and courts will indulge in every reasonable presumption against a waiver of that right (E) recognizing initial burden of presenting prima facie evidence that jury waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made is on party seeking to enforce provision

A:
holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption
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