In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: removal of the access can result in a taking under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution, if the state's use is for a purpose other than a road purpose. But, in Judge Armstrong's view, any modification of a road for road purposes that denies a landowner's access does not give rise to a compensable taking. In so concluding, Judge Armstrong discounts as "dictum" the Supreme Court rationale in Burk that an abutter's right of access to a conventional Highway "can be divested only by condemnation of the easement appurtenant to the abutting property." 200 Or at 231. Judge Armstrong explains that the court's conclusion in Burk cannot be reconciled with the court's analysis in more recent cases in the context of regulations that affect road access. See, e.g., Schrunk, 242 Or at 73 (<HOLDING>). If, Judge Armstrong's concurrence reasons, a
Holding statements: (A) holding that inverse condemnation claim challenging as a regulatory taking the states placement of a guard rail that blocked former access was not ripe for adjudication where owners had failed to apply for permit for alternative approach and it therefore was not possible to assess whether a taking had occurred as a result of a deprivation of all reasonable access (B) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking (C) holding ripe a claim for a pre1987 taking because prior to first english california law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking through an action in inverse condemnation (D) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (E) holding that regulatory restrictions on abutting landowners right of ingress and egress are not compensable when landowner has adequate alternative means to access property
[A]: (B)

[Q]: in ways that create a substantial risk of producing or exacerbating personal injury to her child, to exercising too much or too little, indeed to engaging in virtually any injury-prone activity that, should an injury occur, might reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of the child. Such ordinary things as skiing or horseback riding could produce criminal liability. If the State's position were to prevail, there would seem to be no clear basis for categorically excluding any of those activities from the ambit of the statute; criminal liability would depend almost entirely on how aggressive, inventive, and persuasive any particular prosecutor might be. Kilmon v. State, 394 Md. 168, 177-78, 905 A.2d 306, 311-12 (Ct.App.2006). Additionally, the State's suggested con 0 (1992) (<HOLDING>); People v. Morabito, 151 Misc.2d 259, 580
Holding statements: (A) holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse (B) holding a criminal charge of endangerment of a child does not apply to a pregnant woman who ingests an illegal substance that results in the transmission of drugs to her child through the umbilical cord (C) holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy (D) recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined (E) holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy
[A]: (C)

[Q]: appeals from the district court's order denying his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion for reconsideration challenging the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2253, and we affirm. Henderson contends that the district abused its discretion by denying his motion, which we construe as a motion for relief from final judgment based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167, 1171-72 (9th Cir.1989). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Henderson's motion because his almost two-year delay before filing the motion was not reasonable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c) ("A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.... "); In re Hammer, 940 F.2d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (<HOLDING>). AFFIRMED. ** This disposition is not
Holding statements: (A) holding that an over twoyear delay without any excuse was unreasonable as a matter of law (B) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to find an unexcused twoyear delay unreasonable (C) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (D) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (E) holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable
[A]:
(B)