In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ's improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA's ruling in March 2002, the application for 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman's argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218
Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina 212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for 212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina 212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina 212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of 212c relief
[A]: (C)

[Q]: or "plain error" exists. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). In the present case, or in any similar case, the only way that a defendant could challenge the constitutionality of section 78 331(6)(a) would be first to consent to a hearing by a commissioner and then to challenge the validity of that very consent. Such a procedure would likely be futile inasmuch as it would invariably result in the withdrawal of the consent, either by the defendant or by court order. Indeed, absent the approach taken by Ohms, it is unlikely that section 78-3-31(6)(a) would ever be subject to constitutional scrutiny. This is precisely the sort of exceptional circu Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). For example, a legislator cannot appoint
Holding statements: (A) holding that utah const art vi 1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others (B) holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes (C) holding that the contact clause reaches every form in which the legislative power of a state is exerted whether it be a constitution a constitutional amendment an enactment of the legislature a bylaw or ordinance of a municipal corporation or a regulation or order of some other instrumentality of the state exercising delegated legislative authority (D) holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body (E) holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated
[A]: (D)

[Q]: traceable to the shock or disturbing effect on the nerves of the patient, and that in turn, the irritation of the nerves caused functional disorders, and, that whether the disability resulted from nervous reaction or from auto-suggestion set in motion by memory of the accident, the result was the same to the injured person. Id. at 209, 13 S.E.2d at 293. The Supreme Court pointed out in Burlington Mills Corp. that the claimant's disability was occasioned by an injury which "may be fairly traced" to a risk which arose out of and in the course of her employment. There was a direct causal relation between the electric flash and the irritated condition of her nervous system. Id. at 210, 13 S.E.2d at 293; see also E.C. Womack, Inc. v. Ellis, 209 Va. 588, 592-93, 166 S.E.2d 265, 268-69 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Imperial Trash Service v. Dotson, 18 Va.App.
Holding statements: (A) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable (B) holding injuries suffered on trip for business and pleasure were compensable (C) holding that rico claims were personal and plaintiffs were therefore entitled to sue on their own because their injuries were distinct from the injuries to creditors in general resulting from the diversion of corporate assets (D) holding that psychiatric symptoms resulting in disability from work flowed from injuries received in primary accident and were compensable (E) holding that special damages must be shown to be reasonable and necessarily resulting from accident
[A]:
(D)