TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be presented with a context passage, a question about that paragraph, and a possible answer to that question. The task is to check the validity of the answer. Answer with "Yes" or "No".
PROBLEM: Electronic theft by foreign and industrial spies and disgruntled employees is costing U.S. companies billions and eroding their international competitive advantage. That was the message delivered by government and private security experts at an all-day conference on corporate electronic espionage. "Hostile and even friendly nations routinely steal information from U.S. companies and share it with their own companies," said Noel D. Matchett, a former staffer at the federal National Security Agency and now president of Information Security Inc., Silver Spring, Md. It "may well be" that theft of business data is "as serious a strategic threat to national security" as it is a threat to the survival of victimized U.S. firms, said Michelle Van Cleave, the White House's assistant director for National Security Affairs. The conference was jointly sponsored by the New York Institute of Technology School of Management and the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, a joint industry-government trade group. Any secret can be pirated, the experts said, if it is transmitted over the air. Even rank amateurs can do it if they spend a few thousand dollars for a commercially available microwave receiver with amplifier and a VCR recorder. They need only position themselves near a company's satellite dish and wait. "You can have a dozen competitors stealing your secrets at the same time," Mr. Matchett said, adding : "It's a pretty good bet they won't get caught." The only way to catch an electronic thief, he said, is to set him up with erroneous information. <sep>Who does the government and private security experts say is committing electronic theft?<sep>Information Security Inc.,

SOLUTION: No

PROBLEM: After the disruption of the plot in Amman, it had not escaped notice in Washington that Hijazi had lived in California and driven a cab in Boston and that Deek was a naturalized U.S. citizen who, as Berger reminded President Clinton, had been in touch with extremists in the United States as well as abroad. Before Ressam's arrest, Berger saw no need to raise a public alarm at home- although the FBI put all field offices on alert. Now, following Ressam's arrest, the FBI asked for an unprecedented number of special wiretaps. Both Berger andTenet told us that their impression was that more Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretap requests were processed during the millennium alert than ever before. The next day, writing about Ressam's arrest and links to a cell in Montreal, Berger informed the President that the FBI would advise police in the United States to step up activities but would still try to avoid undue public alarm by stressing that the government had no specific information about planned attacks. At a December 22 meeting of the Small Group of principals, FBI Director Louis Freeh briefed officials from the NSC staff, CIA, and Justice on wiretaps and investigations inside the United States, including a Brooklyn entity tied to the Ressam arrest, a seemingly unreliable foreign report of possible attacks on seven U.S. cities, two Algerians detained on the Canadian border, and searches in Montreal related to a jihadist cell. The Justice Department released a statement on the alert the same day. Clarke's staff warned, "Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks in the US are likely." Clarke asked Berger to try to make sure that the domestic agencies remained alert." Is there a threat to civilian aircraft?"he wrote. Clarke also asked the principals in late December to discuss a foreign security service report about a Bin Laden plan to put bombs on transatlantic flights. The CSG met daily. Berger said that the principals met constantly. Later, when asked what made her decide to ask Ressam to step out of his vehicle, Diana Dean, a Customs inspector who referred Ressam to secondary inspection, testified that it was her "training and experience." It appears that the heightened sense of alert at the national level played no role in Ressam's detention. There was a mounting sense of public alarm. The earlier Jordanian arrests had been covered in the press, and Ressam's arrest was featured on network evening news broadcasts throughout the Christmas season. The FBI was more communicative during the millennium crisis than it had ever been. <sep>On what date did the warning "Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks in the US are likely." take place?<sep>Christmas day

SOLUTION: No

PROBLEM: According to the radar reconstruction, American 77 reemerged as a primary target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known position. The target remained in Indianapolis Center's airspace for another six minutes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center's airspace at 9:10. As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft, two managers and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and southwest along the flight's projected path, not east-where the aircraft was now heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center to turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77. In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C. By 9:25, FAA's Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters knew two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center. They knew American 77 was lost. At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New England Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said "we have some planes." Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount. A manager at the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to order a "nationwide ground stop." While this was being discussed by executives at FAA headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25. The Command Center kept looking for American 77. At 9:21, it advised the Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for primary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controllers "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed" and notified Reagan National Airport. FAA personnel at both Reagan National and Dulles airports notified the Secret Service. <sep>How long did American 77 stay on the Indianapolis Center Radar?<sep>36 minutes

SOLUTION:
No