In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and 1981 the exclusive remedies for employment discrimination by a municipality and its employees, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss Johnson's 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (<HOLDING>). 3 .We review de novo a question of law
Holding statements: (A) holding that 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in 1981 by state governmental units (B) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (C) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (D) holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution (E) holding that 1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law
[A]: holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment

[Q]: of the debt itself that is the key factor in determining dischargeability." 21 B.R. at 912. Therefore, in determining whether a debt to a former spouse is in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support, the court must look behind the designation assigned by a state court, or by the parties themselves, as to whether or not a particular obligation was in the nature of support or a property settlement, and to determine the true nature of the obligation. Parisi v. White, 26 B.R. 572, 574 (Bankr.R.I.1983). With this test in mind, we turn to the relevant factors in determining wheth er payments are m the nature of support. Whether the payments are made contingent upon conditions reflecting a need for support is one relevant factor. Cf. Warren v. Taff, 10 B.R. 101, 104 (Bankr.Conn.1981) (<HOLDING>). In the present case the child support
Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding that the failure to condition a transfer on death or remarriage of the wife was a factor showing that the transfer was not in the nature of alimony (C) holding transfer restriction granted right of first refusal in event of voluntary or involuntary transfer of stock (D) holding that a denial of transfer was not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff asserted only that the transfer would allow him to work closer to home (E) holding that oneyear period commences on date of discovery of the fraudulent nature of the transfer
[A]: holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court

[Q]: at 513, and we certainly do not find it helpful to the decision at hand. Nor are we persuaded by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Family Services Division, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 1976). In Wilson, the Utah court held that a grandmother who had nothing more than a biological relationship with her grandchild was nonetheless entitled to a hearing on her adoption petition. Id. at 230-31; see also State v. Wulffenstein, 571 P.2d 1319, 1321-22 (Ut.1977) (similar). Although it is not clear whether the Utah Court based its decision on the federal or state constitution, we think its conclusion flowed from a sense that a grandparent's wish to adopt her grandchild was an aspiration worthy of protection by the courts. But cf. Browder v. Harmeyer, 453 N.E.2d 301, 308-09 (Ind.App.1983) (<HOLDING>). Although we do not dispute that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody (B) recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection (C) holding that grandmother who had intermittent custody of her grandchild had no protected liberty interest in the continued custody of the child (D) holding that juvenile court that determined child was not dependent had no jurisdiction to thereafter determine custody of child (E) holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody
[A]:
holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody