Problem: Former Long Beach Executive Director Toby Rothschild, now a policy wonk in Iwasaki's outfit, agreed. "To some extent, I did look at it and say, 'We are the littlest kid on the block, and we don't want to get beat up so we need a bigger protector,'" Rothschild said. "Once we got past that, it became a real positive for the Long Beach program and Long Beach clients." But to the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley legal aid program, the positives of merging with Dudovitz's program, San Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services, were never obvious. A meeting in late 1999 between Dudovitz and the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley program's board showed how little the two programs had in common and how difficult bridging the gap between their ideologies would be, Dudovitz recalled. Although no merger plans were discussed, board members at the smaller program knew of Dudovitz's preference for impact litigation over direct services. "We had a discussion about what our separate views were," Dudovitz said. "The message we got was that they wanted their program to stay as it was." Lauralea Saddick, former executive director of the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley program, said her board simply did not share Dudovitz's desire to spend money influencing social policy and participating in high-profile litigation over poverty-related issues. "Our board's philosophy was that the money given by the federal government was to help people with basic everyday needs," Saddick said. "It might take a little bit of humility to take those kinds of cases. Impact work is very important ... but what was the good of getting the law changed if no one is there to help the individual?" Before the San Gabriel program was subsumed by Dudovitz's group, it offered to merge with the Legal Aid Society of Orange County. The boards of both organizations eschewed impact litigation in favor of the 1960s model of providing direct client services. Supported by resolutions from the Pasadena, San Gabriel, Eastern and Foothill bar associations, the two programs drew up plans to merge and submitted them to the Legal Services Corp. Dudovitz won Iwasaki's backing to oppose the deal, and Legal Services Corp., the national funding source, overruled the proposed San Gabriel-Pomona Valley/Orange County merger. On Jan. 27, 2001, the federal agency awarded the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley service area to Dudovitz under the umbrella of an expanded San Fernando program, citing the location of both programs in Los Angeles, which would allow "better coordinated and more effective advocacy on county government policies." The San Gabriel-Pomona Valley program sued Legal Services Corp. to stop the takeover, claiming the federal program based the decision on favoritism for the politically active Dudovitz and the politically powerful Iwasaki. Though the federal suit accomplished little, it effectively suspended the end of the old program and the start of the new one for nearly a year.

Question: "A meeting in late 1999 showed that which two programs had very little in common?"

Answer: "Dudovitz and the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley program's"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer: yes

Question:
Mechanical energy is a combination of the energy of motion or position. This type of energy describes objects that are moving or could move. A moving ball can have energy from motion. An arrow can also have the energy of motion. Both are types of mechanical energy. Can you think of some other examples? Where does the energy of motion come from? It comes from the energy created by position. This energy is stored energy. This means it is not moving yet, but it has the potential to move. How can you store energy? The arrow gains energy from the drawn bow. As the arrow is released, the bow releases its stored energy and puts the arrow into motion. Can you think of some other ways to store energy using position? After reading the above, is "Potential energy" the correct answer to the question "What kind of energy does a moving ball have?"? OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer:
no

Input: Relying on an animal to come by is risky. A flower may have to wait a long time for the right animals to come by. What if one never passes close enough to the flower? Hoping the wind will blow is also risky for a plant. What if the wind does not blow? What if the blowing pollen does not land on another flower? The wind could even blow the pollen over the ocean where it is wasted. Giving free nectar is costly. It is not a good use of the plants energy. A plant uses a lot of energy to produce nectar. Some animals may just drink the nectar. They may not carry off any pollen in return. To improve their chances, plants evolved special traits. For example, they developed ways to hide their nectar. Only certain animals were able to get at the plants hidden nectar. These specific animals might be more likely to visit only flowers of the same species. This was also a benefit for some animals. Animals also evolved special traits to get to the nectar.
"What are ways of transferring pollen?" is "Conduction"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output: no

Input: The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here." On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August. Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA personnel. We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them. We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.
"How many less hijackers were on United 93 than the other 3 commercial flights they hijackers?" is "1 less hijacker"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output:
yes