TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: in Bowman were appointed by the court to make educational decisions for children who were wards of the district, so that the advocates effectively acted as "parents" under the IDEA. See id. Accordingly, even though they were licensed attorneys, they could not recover fees as educational advocates because they were not acting in an attorney-client capacity. See id. Pressley distinguishes from this scenario because she was employed by the Chris Anwah Law Firm, instead of being appointed by the court as an advocate. See Adewusi Deck 1. Furthermore, Pressley's work on this matter was similar to that performed by the billing attorneys. See PL's Mot., Ex. B. Yet because she is not a member of the D.C. Bar, Pressley is not entitled to attorney rates. See Dickens, 724 F.Supp.2d at 120 (<HOLDING>); Agapito v. District of Columbia, 477
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (B) holding that the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in considering the prevailing hourly rates in the southern district of new york when awarding attorneys fees (C) holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees (D) holding that attorneys not admitted to the dc bar are not entitled to reimbursement but awarding fees at paralegal rates as equitable relief (E) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees

SOLUTION: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees

PROBLEM: victim's undisputed injuries, this court held that the statute required proof that the bodily injury was a foreseeable, rather than intentional, result of the rights-violating conduct. Woodlee, 136 F.3d at 1405. At no point did this court even consider the possibility that the statute might not require proof of foreseeability at all, i.e., that the statute, imposed strict liability .on a defendant for bodily .injury resulting from his conduct. Because there is no logical distinction between the statutory language at issue in Woodlee and the language of 841(b)(1)(E) that we are now tasked with interpreting, I believe that we are bound by Woodlee to interpret 841(b)(1)(E) as incorporating a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, (10th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). To conclude otherwise creates an
Holding statements: (A) holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel (B) holding that a panel may not reconsider issues decided earlier in the same case by the en banc court (C) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (D) holding that only intervening law from the supreme court or this court sitting en banc can overrule a prior panel decision (E) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc

SOLUTION: holding that in the absence of an intervening supreme court decision only the en banc court may overrule a decision by a threejudge panel

PROBLEM: claim was procedurally barred because the state court had rested its decision on an independent and adequate state ground failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection ruleand because cause and prejudice were not shown. On appeal, Mercado challenges the district court's finding. He concedes the procedural default, but asks this Court to find cause and prejudice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (requiring a showing of "cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law"). He identifies the court's interference with his trial counsel's efforts to make a contemporaneous objection as "cause" for the default. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (<HOLDING>). We find no such interference, and no other
Holding statements: (A) holding that exclusion of defense witness does not violate sixth amendment where defendant failed to comply with discovery rule requiring that witnesses be identified before trial (B) holding that failure to comply with state contemporaneous objection rule bars federal review absent a showing of cause and prejudice (C) holding that consideration of a claim in a petition for habeas corpus can be barred by failure to comply with state procedural rules (D) holding that the district court properly allowed the defendant who asserted the disputed defense as a contested issue of law in the joint pretrial order to pursue the defense despite the defendants failure to comply with rule 8c (E) holding that cause exists where some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsels efforts to comply with the states procedural rule

SOLUTION:
holding that exclusion of defense witness does not violate sixth amendment where defendant failed to comply with discovery rule requiring that witnesses be identified before trial