Input: Registration fees for Illinois lawyers could jump as much as $49 a year if lawmakers adopt two separate measures to bolster pro-bono services and support for lawyers with drug and alcohol problems. The Illinois Supreme Court is pushing for legislation that would allow it to dedicate money raised through the fee hikes to legal services to the poor. The justices are floating a $42 increase to shore up financing for pro-bono work, as the normal funding mechanism for legal services has fallen short in recent years. Currently, support for non-profit legal aid groups comes from interest generated on the Lawyers' Trust Fund, which pools clients' money that attorneys hold for such matters as escrow funds. But low interest rates and a sagging economy mean there is less money being generated. After hours of discussion, the high court agreed that raising the registration fees would be the best way to address the declining revenues, Chief Justice Moses W. Harrison II said. The judges were reluctant to raise those fees but eventually decided that supporting probono services was important enough "and lawyers had a responsibility to contribute" to the cause, Harrison said. Last year, the high court raised the base fee for active attorneys to $180 from $140. Lawyers in their first three years of practice or who are inactive pay $90, and retired lawyers pay nothing. Legislation circulated by the high court's lobbyist specifies that the hike would apply to attorneys "paying full annual registration fees." In 2001, there were 57,392 active attorneys in Illinois and 74,311 on the full roll, according to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The hike would raise roughly $2.4 million. Last year, interest on the trust fund totaled $4.5 million, but service and handling fees consumed $538,000 of that amount. This year's returns are projected to be anywhere between $700,000 and $1 million short of that mark, said Ruth Ann Schmitt, the executive director of Lawyers Trust Fund of Illinois. Harrison said the fee hikes are designed only to counter the shortfall in interest income, not add to the total amount available. "Our legal services are already stretched to the breaking point," Schmitt said. "We have a tough time raising enough money to properly fund services that our clients need." Neither the Illinois State Bar Association nor The Chicago Bar Association has taken a stance on the proposed hikes.

Does the response "74,311 attorneys on roll and hike would generate 2.4 million dollars" correctly answer the question "As of 2001 , how many attorneys where on full role and how much money would the hike generate?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
***
Output: yes

Bin Laden and his aides did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America. The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters. KSM provided his operatives with nearly all the money they needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters' tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time. The origin of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9/11. General Financing As we explained in chapter 2, Bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses in Sudan. Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time. The CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations. For many years, the United States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda's expenses through a vast personal inheritance. Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S. government discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through 1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year-a significant sum, to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad. Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Usama's share of the family company in 1994. The Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale. This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune. Nor were Bin Laden's assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda. When Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses and other assets.

Question: "How did the tradecraft of each of the 9/11 plotters go to fund the terrorist activities of 9/11?"

OPTIONS:
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Answer: "They moved, stored, and spent their money in different ways"

Response: yes

On to the Twentieth Century: The British extended their control over the peninsula by putting together the whole panoply of colonial administrationcivil service, public works, judiciary force, police force, post office, education, and land regulationwith teams of British administrators, teachers, engineers, and doctors to go with it. At the same time, the tin industry, dominated by Chinese using labor-intensive methods in the 19th century, passed increasingly into Western hands, who employed the modern technology of gravel pumps and mining dredges. Petroleum had been found in northern Borneo, at Miri, and in Brunei, and the Anglo-Dutch Shell company used Singapore as its regional depot for its oil supplies and exports. But the major breakthrough for the Malay economy was the triumph of rubber, when Singapore's new garden director, Henry Ridle ("Rubber Ridley" to his friends, "Mad Ridley" to all doubting Thomases) had developed new planting and tapping methods and painstakingly spread his faith in rubber around the peninsula. World demand increased with the growth of the motor-car and electrical industries, and sky-rocketed during World War I. By 1920, Malaya was producing 53 percent of the world's rubber, which had overtaken tin as its main source of income. The Malay ruling class again took a back seat. Together with effective control of the rubber and tin industries, the British now firmly held the reins of government. The sultans were left in charge of local and religious affairs, content with their prestige, prosperity, and security. The census of 1931 served as an alarm signal for the Malay national consciousness. Bolstered by a new influx of immigrants to meet the rubber and tin booms of the 1920s, non-Malays now slightly outnumbered the indigenous population. The Great Depression of 1929 stepped up ethnic competition in the shrinking job market, and nationalism developed to safeguard Malay interests against the Chinese and Indians rather than the British imperial authority. Though hampered by the peninsula's division into the States and the Straits Settlements, relatively conservative Muslim intellectuals and community leaders came together at the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress in Kuala Lumpur in 1939. In Singapore the following year, they were joined by representatives from Sarawak and Brunei. Teachers and journalists urged the revival of the common Malay-Indonesian consciousness, split by the Anglo-Dutch dismemberment of the region in the 19th century. This spirit became a factor in the gathering clouds of war.

Question: "Who was joined by representatives from Sarawak and Brunei in Singapore?"

Response: "Muslim intellectuals"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A:
yes