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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ''International
Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL
FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Statements of policy.
Sec. 104. Report.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations.

TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL
FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 1946, the United
States has believed that an increase in the number of countries
that possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such
weapons makes the world less secure and stable by increasing
the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A world in
which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure for all
concerned, and could well trigger a global arms race, as more
countries will be tempted to arm themselves with nuclear
weapons to prevent attacks by countries that possess nuclear
weapons.
(2) It is therefore in the general security interest of all
countries, and in the vital national security interest of the
United States, that the number of countries that possess a
nuclear weapons capability necessarily be kept to a minimum and
ultimately reduced.
(3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities produce nuclear material that can either be used for
peaceful purposes in electricity-generating reactors, or can be
used to produce uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As
such, these facilities are inherently a proliferation risk,
allowing their possessor to be just months away from the
production of a nuclear explosive device.
(4) It is also therefore in the general security interest
of all countries that the number of countries that operate
uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities also
be kept to a minimum, consistent with the global demand for
nuclear power reactor fuel.
(5) The financing and construction of additional uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities in additional
countries around the world is indefensible on economic grounds
alone, given current and future supplies of uranium and
existing providers of uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing services to the world market.
(6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-
fuel reprocessing facilities by additional countries,
therefore, is often based upon considerations other than
economic calculations. The possession of such facilities is
often elevated to a matter of national pride--a demonstration
to the world that the country that possesses this technology
has arrived at a level of technological development comparable
to that of the United States and other countries with advanced
civil nuclear power programs.
(7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and
spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a
demonstration of the developing world's independence from
technological domination by the more developed states. Article
IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST
483; commonly referred to as the ''Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty'' or the ''NPT''), recognizes that State Parties have an
''inalienable right . . . to develop research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination''. However, this is a qualified right
conditioned by a State Party acting in conformity with the
NPT's obligation for such countries not to acquire, possess, or
develop nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
(8) It has been long recognized that the proliferation of
national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of
new nuclear weapon states. Concerned governments,
nongovernmental organizations, and individual experts have for
decades recognized the need to address this problem through
multilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear
fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of nuclear energy, an
international fuel bank to provide fuel if the fuel supply to a
country is disrupted, and even multilateral participation in
international uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities, as a means of reducing incentives of countries to
develop and construct such facilities themselves.
(9) Until recently, such efforts have produced little more
than reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-
market in uranium enrichment technology and equipment, combined
with the attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess such
technology and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear
weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with a new
urgency.
(10) Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable
international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for
developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also
produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear
weapons.
(11) Several initiatives have been proposed over the last
year to address these concerns. The United States has proposed
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a
consortium of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities
providing nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery of
used fuel--to other countries that agree to employ nuclear
energy only for power generation purposes, without possessing
national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities.
(12) The United States also joined France, the Russian
Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on
May 31, 2006, in proposing a ''Concept for a Multilateral
Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel'' that would
facilitate or create new arrangements between suppliers and
recipients to provide fuel to countries with good
nonproliferation credentials in case of market failure.
(13) Any assurance of the supply of nuclear fuel should
meet the condition outlined by President George W. Bush on
February 11, 2004: ''The world's leading nuclear exporters
should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable
cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states
renounce enrichment and reprocessing.''.
(14) The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its
uranium enrichment facilities be placed under international
management and oversight, as part of a ''Global Nuclear Power
Infrastructure'' proposal to create international nuclear fuel
cycle centers.
(15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system
to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel at current market
prices, under appropriate safeguards and conditions, could
reassure countries that are dependent upon or will construct
nuclear power reactors that they will have an assured supply of
nuclear fuel at current market prices, so long as such
countries forgo national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing facilities and are committed to the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the ''Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable
Access to Nuclear Fuel'', proposed by the United States,
France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be
expanded upon at the earliest possible opportunity;
(2) the proposal by the Government of the Russian
Federation to bring one of its uranium enrichment facilities
under international management and oversight is also a welcome
development and should be encouraged by the United States;
(3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) of
$50,000,000 in funds to support the creation of an
international nuclear fuel bank by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) is also welcomed, and the United States
and other member states of the IAEA should pledge collectively
at least an additional $100,000,000 in matching funds to
fulfill the NTI proposal; and
(4) the governments, organizations, and experts currently
engaged in developing the initiatives described in paragraphs
(1) through (3) and other initiatives should seek to identify
additional incentives to be included in an international regime
for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at
current market prices, including participation in non-weapons-
relevant technology development and fuel leasing to further
persuade countries that participation in such a multilateral
arrangement far outweighs the temptation and expense of
developing national uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing facilities.

SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

(a) General Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United
States to support the establishment of an international regime for the
assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means under multilateral
authority, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.
(b) Additional Statement of Policy.--It is further the policy of
the United States to--
(1) oppose the development of a capability to produce
nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or
outside of the NPT;
(2) encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the
right to ''develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes,'' as described in Article IV of
the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by the
overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining
from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not
demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT
obligations, as determined by the International Atomic Energy
Agency; and
(3) strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines
concerning consultation by members regarding violations of
supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the
practice of a timely and coordinated response by Nuclear
Suppliers Group members to all such violations, including
termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that
discourage individual Nuclear Suppliers Group members from
continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a
consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.

SEC. 104. REPORT.

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate a report on the activities of the United States to
support the establishment of an international regime for the assured
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means at current market prices
under multilateral authority, such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency. The report shall include an assessment of the feasibility of
establishing an international fuel services center within the United
States.

TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY.

(a) Voluntary Contributions Authorized.--The President is
authorized to make voluntary contributions on a grant basis to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (in this section referred to as the
''IAEA'') for the purpose of supporting the establishment of an
international nuclear fuel bank to maintain a reserve of low-enriched
uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible countries in the case
of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by normal market
mechanisms.
(b) Requirements.--Voluntary contributions under subsection (a) may
be provided only if the President certifies to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate that--
(1) the IAEA has received pledges in a total amount of not
less than $100,000,000 and is in receipt of not less than
$75,000,000 of such pledges for the purpose of supporting the
establishment of the international nuclear fuel bank referred
to in subsection (a);
(2) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in
subsection (a) will be established within the territory of a
non-nuclear weapon state, and will be under the oversight of
the IAEA, only if--
(A) the non-nuclear weapon state, among other
things--
(i) has a full scope safeguards agreement
with the IAEA and an additional protocol for
safeguards in force;
(ii) has never been determined by the IAEA
Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with
its IAEA full scope safeguards agreement and
its additional protocol for safeguards; and
(iii) has effective enforceable export
controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear
technology and other sensitive materials
comparable to those maintained by the United
States; and
(B) the Secretary of State has never determined,
for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)),
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of law, that
the government of the non-nuclear weapon state has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism;
(3) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in
subsection (a) will provide nuclear reactor fuel to a country
only if, at the time of the request for nuclear reactor fuel--
(A) the country is in full compliance with its IAEA
safeguards agreement and has an additional protocol for
safeguards in force;
(B) in the case of a country that at any time prior
to the request for nuclear reactor fuel has been
determined to be in noncompliance with its IAEA
safeguards agreement, the IAEA Board of Governors
determines that the country has taken all necessary
actions to satisfy any concerns of the IAEA Director
General regarding the activities that led to the prior
determination of noncompliance;
(C) the country agrees to use the nuclear reactor
fuel in accordance with its IAEA safeguards agreement;
(D) the country has effective and enforceable
export controls regarding nuclear and dual-use nuclear
technology and other sensitive materials comparable to
those maintained by the United States;
(E) the country does not possess uranium enrichment
or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities of any scale; and
(F) the government of the country is not a state
sponsor of terrorism for purposes of section 6(j) of
the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2405(j)), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of
law;
(4) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in
subsection (a) will not contain uranium enrichment or spent-
fuel reprocessing facilities; and
(5) the nuclear reactor fuel referred to in paragraph (3)
will be provided to a country referred to in such paragraph
only at current market prices.
(c) Waiver.--The President may waive the requirement of
subparagraph (F) of subsection (b)(3) if the President--
(1) determines that it is important to the national
security interests of the United States to do so; and
(2) transmits to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate a report that contains the basis of the
determination under paragraph (1).
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to authorize voluntary contributions under subsection (a) to
support subsidization of the price of nuclear reactor fuel whose supply
would be assured by the United States, the IAEA, or any other state or
international entity covered by this section.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the
President $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 to carry out section 201.
(b) Availability of Appropriations.--Amounts appropriated pursuant
to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are
authorized to remain available until September 30, 2010.
International Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007 - States that it is U.S. policy to support the establishment of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means under multilateral authority, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Authorizes the President to make grant basis contributions to the IAEA for an international nuclear fuel bank to maintain a low-enriched uranium reserve of reactor fuel for eligible countries. Requires the President, prior to making such contributions, to certify to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that: (1) the IAEA has received specified monetary pledges for the international nuclear fuel bank; (2) the bank will be established in a non-nuclear weapon state under IAEA oversight; and (3) the bank will provide nuclear reactor fuel only to a country that is in full compliance with IAEA and other safeguards, agrees to use the nuclear reactor fuel in accordance with IAEA safeguards, does not operate uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, and is not a state sponsor of terrorism.