In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,-, 117 S.Ct. 832, 838, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that ERISA preempts state common law tort and contract causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57. The detailed provisions of ERISA 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that "would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA." Id. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Similarly, we have held that state law tort and contract claims as well as violations of a state insurance statute are preempted by ERISA. Tingey, 953 F.2d at 1131 (<HOLDING>). In a factually similar case, we held that
Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations (B) holding plaintiffs causes of action for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the arizona insurance code were preempted by erisa (C) holding that erisa 514a preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (E) holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa

Ex Output:
holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations

Ex Input:
susceptible to many meanings. Although there is no direct statement that Mooney failed to perform his duties with regard to assisting his clients with their investments, this is the clear import of the specific language used. "Only knew" clearly implies that Mooney knew nothing about anything else. What was implied in that statement is made express in the next "didn't know anything about investments." "Hated helping clients" also unambiguously indicates that Mooney was not interested in executing his duties to his clients. These statements embody a "pejorative implication" that a reasonable listener would perceive "as an assertion that the [plaintiff] failed to perform his duties as an advisor." Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 958 N.E.2d 598, 609 (Ohio Ct.App.2011); see Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707 (<HOLDING>). The statement "invested her in all of the
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (B) holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident (C) holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law (D) holding that though there was no express statement that the appellant had committed perjury the clear impact of the specific language in nine sentences was that the appellant lied while under oath which weighed in favor of an actionable statement (E) holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr 3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service

Ex Output:
holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement

Ex Input:
ted unwanted fondling and rubbing of plaintiffs breasts and buttocks and unwanted kissing on the cheek over a seven-month period, despite her protests on every occasion, was sufficiently severe or pervasive). In these cases, the pervasiveness of the alleged conduct was sufficient to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiffs employment. By contrast, Paul's sexual harassment claim relies exclusively on a single confrontation with Barattini, which, according to her brief, lasted a total of approximately a minute and a half. We therefore agree with the district court's finding that Barattini's alleged conduct was clearly not pervasive, and are left with the task of assessing its severity. This circuit's case law reveals that isolated incidents may form the , 328 (5th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Derouen v. Carquest Auto Parts, Inc., No.
Holding statements: (A) holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act (B) holding that three sexually suggestive comments over a three month period were not frequent enough nor severe enough to be unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs work environment (C) holding that conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive where over twoweek period a coworker stood behind the plaintiff to create physical contact surreptitiously looked at the plaintiffs genitals in the restroom and engaged in unwanted touching (D) holding that conduct of supervisor who grabbed plaintiff on the buttocks and made suggestive comments while she was conversing with another employee was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term or condition of plaintiffs employment (E) holding that sexually suggestive comments slapping plaintiff on the behind with a newspaper grabbing or brushing up against plaintiffs breasts and behind and attempting to kiss plaintiff did not qualify as severe

Ex Output:
holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act