In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS's liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase "liabilities covered" in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not "covered," and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from "liabilities covered." See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once
Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage
(E)

having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 1 . We do not reach the question of whether it was proper for a Minnesota peace officer to go outside Minnesota's borders and attempt to compel a blood sample under Minnesota law. In this case, the sample was obtained using Wisconsin's procedure inside Wisconsin's borders and our holding is limited to these facts. 2 . Both parties make arguments regarding Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), and State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68 (Minn.1978). These cases, due to the natural exigency involved in obtaining blood-alcohol evidence, recognize the power of a peace officer to compel a blood sample from a dri Tex. 1995) (<HOLDING>); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co.,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a party waives the attorneyclient privilege when it voluntarily consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the communication in issue (B) holding that the michigan usury act mcla 43831 a statute setting forth the legal interest rate in michigan is preempted according to the explicit terms of hola (C) holding that the law of michigan rather than the forum applied to manufacturers claim of attorneyclient privilege in a products liability suit because the communication took place in michigan and therefore michigan had most significant relationship to communication (D) holding that litigating franchise dispute in michigan does not require that michigan law govern dispute as michigan franchise investment law does not expressly void choice of law provisions in franchise agreement (E) holding michigan friend of the court employees absolutely immune from suit under 1983
(C)

2011, the day after the 2011 amendments went into effect. See Act of June 17, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 690, 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1651, 1651-1653, 1655 (current version at Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a) (West Supp 2012)). In this opinion, we cite to Article 55.01(a) as it existed prior to September 1, 2011. 5 . Article 55.01(a)(2)(A) provides that the indictment was dismissed or quashed because of mistake, false information, or other similar reasoning indicating absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense or because it was void. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A). 6 . While DPS is the sole appealing agency, the relief granted is not limited to that agency. See Ex Parte Elliot, 815 S.W.2d 251, 251 (Tex.1991)
Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court must examine the entire course of criminal conduct in determining possession (B) holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession (C) holding that the reversal of a trial courts expunction order must encompass all persons and agencies in possession of relevant criminal records (D) holding reversal warranted where a permissive inference instruction on possession of a controlled substance contributed to the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors in defendants trial (E) recognizing innocent possession defense to a charge of criminal weapons possession
(C)