In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 26-7A, 26-8A, and 26-8C or of Title 27A shall control, and the provisions of this chapter are in all respects to be supplementary thereto. (emphasis added). Thus, where allegations of abuse and neglect serve as the grounds for the guardianship petition, as was the case here, the statutory provisions specifically relating to abuse and neglect proceedings, as well as the provisions relating to juvenile court, must control. See Martinmaas, 2000 SD 85 at 49, 612 N.W.2d at 611. [ 10.] Adjudication of abuse or neglect is done in juvenile court pursuant to SDCL chapters 26-7A and 26-8A. SDCL 26-7A-2 provides for exclusive juri 's interest, as parens patriae, in protecting the welfare of the child. SDCL 26-8A-1. See also Matter of N.J.W., N.G.B., and K.F.B., 273 N.W.2d 134, 137 (S.D.1978) (<HOLDING>). The State is the only party that may seek to
Holding statements: (A) holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right (B) holding state as parens patriae takes strong interest in care and treatment of children within its borders (C) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (D) holding that missouri has interest in providing a forum for victims injured as a result of activities conducted within its borders (E) recognizing that with respect to regulating or affecting conduct within its borders the place of the wrong has the predominant interest

A: (B)
****
Q: that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator's decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that "the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application." See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word "may" rather than "shall" allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the
Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan

A: (C)
****
Q: 1999-NMSC-016, 25, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A reviewing court's determination of what process is due in an administrative proceeding results from a balancing of (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. 26 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S nced against ABCWUA's and NMIEC's private interest in just and reasonable utility rates. See 62-3-1 (B) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we turn to the second prong of
Holding statements: (A) holding that a private invasion whether accidental or deliberate reasonable or unreasonable does not violate the fourth amendment because of its private character (B) recognizing the public interest exception (C) recognizing the private interest in reasonable and proper service at fair just and reasonable rates (D) recognizing that the extent of the protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private (E) recognizing private right of action

A:
(C)
****