In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: (applying Tennessee law); see also Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1969). Most other courts, however, have set a lower bar. For example in Mondido v. Cory Corp., 483 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the plaintiff was injured when the glass carafe from her coffee pot broke. The carafe itself was manufactured by Corning, but it was converted into a coffee decanter and sold by Cory, a separate company. Id. at 27. After both companies were found liable, Corning moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to support the jury's determination that the carafe was defective when it left Coming's plant. Id. The court rejected the motion, noting the plaintiffs evidence that Cory converted the 1967) (<HOLDING>); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed (B) holding that plaintiff had successfully traced the defective condition to the manufacturer where there was no evidence of tampering by the retailer (C) holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers (D) holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether a defendant who applied a sprayon fireproofing material was an agent for the manufacturer of the material and thus whether plaintiff is in privity with the manufacturer (E) holding a manufacturer strictly liable in tort for injury to plaintiff caused by defective power tool

Output: holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed

Input: Consider Input: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability "from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik's] attendance" it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik's attendance at the gym in essence all of Sydlik's claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with
Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release

Output: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release

Input: Consider Input: and that he relied on the informant's statements that he purchased the drug from Banks. The informant did not appear at the May 2013 hearing, and neither the officer nor counsel for the Government knew of his whereabouts. The revocation hearing resumed in June 2013. Based on the officer's hearing testimony, the district court revoked Banks' supervised release and sentenced him to five months' imprisonment and nineteen months of supervised release. On appeal, Banks argues that the district court improperly relied on evidence admitted in violation of Fed. R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) (providing that a releasee "is entitled to ... question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear") and Dos-well, 670 F.3d at 530-31 (<HOLDING>) in revoking his supervised release.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule requires a district court to balance the releasees interest in confronting an adverse witness against any proffered good cause for denying confrontation prior to admitting hearsay evidence in a revocation hearing and emphasizing that reliability is a critical factor in the balancing test (B) holding that judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability including reliable hearsay in a probation revocation hearing (C) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (D) holding that it was reversible error for a district court to fail to applying a balancing test before admitting oral hearsay testimony recounting a third partys allegations of sexual assault by the probationer (E) recognizing that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the confrontation clause because confrontation clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis
Output: holding that judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability including reliable hearsay in a probation revocation hearing