Problem: Porky is looking all over the big city for a hotel room , but due to a convention there are no vacancies . Porky takes the only available vacancy at one hotel , but will have to share with Daffy Duck , who is a very loud , obnoxious and annoying sort . Daffy introduces his invisible kangaroo friend '' Hymie '' , but Porky wo n't believe that . Daffy spends the rest of the night annoying Porky : pestering him with questions , shaking the bed , spilling water from a glass , hogging the blanket and finally literally sending the both of them flying off the bed when Daffy kicks , and startles , Porky with his literally frozen feet . Fed up with his antics , Porky stuffs Daffy in a pillow case and drops him out of the window . As Porky goes back to bed , Daffy returns bandaged , but shakes them off and prepares to get revenge . Daffy tricks the half-asleep pig into stepping out of a window thinking he 's boarding a train . Daffy hides the window saying it 's '' too gruesome '' to watch . Suddenly he hears train noises , and behind the shade , sees the still-drowsy Porky pulling away on an actual train and waving at Daffy . Daffy finds this silly . Then he bounces all around the room , '' Hoo-Hoo ! '' - ing wildly .

Question: "What caused Porky to put Daffy Duck inside a pillowcase?"

Answer: "He wanted him to be comfortable"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer: no

Question:
At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically again. Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers were Middle Easterners, naming three of their seat numbers. One spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English. The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit, and she did not know how. The aircraft was in a rapid descent. At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under the impression that there was a routine medical emergency in first class. Other flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong and Sweeney were reporting the events. At 8:41, in American's operations center, a colleague told Marquis that the air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and "think he's [American 11] headed toward Kennedy [airport in New York City]. They're moving everybody out of the way. They seem to have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is descending." At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward, "Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent . we are all over the place." Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see if she could determine where they were. After reading the above, is "There was no reason to panic" the correct answer to the question "What important information was Marquis told in the American Operations center by a colleague at 8:41?"? OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer:
no

Input: Clarifying the Record The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly. More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.
"What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/11" is "The FAA's ability to notify the military in a timely and useful manner was overstated"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output:
yes