TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: on the foregoing, we conclude that Layman's and Sparks' sentences are inappropriate. Like Quiroz, ten years of Layman's sentence should be suspended to probation and five years of Sparks' sentence should be suspended to probation. IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence Lastly, Sparks argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his felony murder conviction because he did not enter the house. However, Sparks, whose cursory argument is less than a page long, cites no cases in support of his claim. Sparks has therefore waived this issue on appeal. See Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (stating that each argument must be supported by citations to authorities, statutes, and the appendix or parts of the record on appeal relied on); Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 202-03 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. Waiver notwithstanding, we
Holding statements: (A) holding that when an appellant fails to offer an argument on an issue that issue is abandoned (B) holding that a claim is waived on appeal when not supported by citation to relevant authority (C) holding that a party waives an argument if the party fails to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of the argument (D) holding when a party fails to provide arguments or supporting authority for his assertion the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue (E) holding that an issue is waived when a party fails to provide adequate citation to authority

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: involvement with five or more kilograms of cocaine, arguing that he had withdrawn before El Don organized the delivery of the intercepted 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011. Ortega argues that the sole evidence of a conspiracy existing at the time of the seizure of 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011 was the April 17, 2011 phone calls between Ortega and El Don. In that call Ortega had arranged for El Don to buy five kilograms of cocaine. Ortega's argument is unavailing. A conspiracy between Ortega and El Don having been established by the government, the burden rested with Ortega to prove that he affirmatively withdrew from it, not with the government to prove the nonexistence of withdrawal. See Smith v. United States, U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 714, 720, 184 L.Ed.2d 570 (2013) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Ortega has not met his
Holding statements: (A) holding that in passing 21 usc 846 congress left the common law burden of proving the affirmative defense of withdrawal on the defendant rather than requiring the government to prove nonexistence of withdrawal (B) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (C) holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea (D) holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea (E) holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: in all branches of the law for generations," and that it was sufficiently objective to save the ordinance from vagueness. Id. at 677, 683, 470 N.W.2d 296. Although there are cases to the contrary, see, e.g., Langford, 755 F.Supp. 1460, and Dupres v. City of Newport, 978 F.Supp. 429 (D.R.I.1997), anti-noise ordinances that incorporate a "reasonable person" standard have generally withstood constitutional scrutiny. Gruwell, supra, at 367; e.g., Howard Opera Assocs. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 322 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding noise ordinance prohibiting "unreasonable noise," defined as that which "disturbs, injures or endangers the peace or health of another or ... endangers the health, safety or welfare of the community"); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 386. (5th Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>); see also Jim Crockett Promotion, Inc. v. City
Holding statements: (A) holding that statute prohibiting conduct that obstruets or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to and from public buildings was not impermissibly vague (B) holding that term unreasonably loud is not impermissibly vague (C) holding factor b is not unconstitutionally vague (D) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (E) holding that term unreasonable noise was not vague

SOLUTION:
(B)