In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated
Holding statements: (A) holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action

Ex Output:
holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury

Ex Input:
to intervene" as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer's unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were
Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since 951 requirements were satisfied

Ex Output:
holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim

Ex Input:
addressed in Devlin and City of San Benito applies to shareholders who object to the settlement of a derivative suit in the trial court, deeming them to be parties who may appeal. In City of San Benito, the supreme court explained that an appellant is a deemed party under the doctrine when it meets three requirements: (1) it is bound by the judgment; (2) its privity of estate, title, or interest appears from the record; and (3) there is an identity of interest between the appellant and a party to the judgment. 109 S.W.3d at 755. The supreme court went on to recognize that the most important consideration is whether the appellant is bound by the judgment. Id,.; cf. BASF FINA Petrochem. Ltd. v. H.B. Zachry Co., 168 S.W.3d 867, 870-71 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Here, Lapiner meets all three requirements of
Holding statements: (A) holding that appellant complied with rule 3as requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was clear from the face of the notice of appeal which judgment appellant sought to appeal (B) holding that appellant waived the issue on appeal by not raising it in its opening brief even though the lower courts decision was based on that point (C) holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial (D) holding the nonparty had standing to appeal because it was bound or adversely affected by an injunction (E) holding that appellant had standing to appeal because it was bound by the judgment even though it did not meet the second requirement

Ex Output:
holding that appellant complied with rule 3as requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was clear from the face of the notice of appeal which judgment appellant sought to appeal