In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: agreements and do not own their software outright under Regime 1. 19 . Though this court reviews orders imposing Rule 11 sanctions for an abuse of discretion, "[a] district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law_" Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 964 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990)). 20 . The Court extended this reasoning in Business Guides to apply the certification requirement of Rule 11 to represented parties who sign court papers, even where they are not required to do so. 498 U.S. at 543, 546-47, 111 S.Ct. at 930-31. 21 . Giebelhaus, 938 F.2d at 965; see also Pony Express Courier Corp. of Am. v. Pony Express Delivery Serv., 872 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Southeastern's argument that Lederman and
Holding statements: (A) holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction (B) holding that a city could not be held vicariously liable for the act of a magistrate who was immune from liability (C) holding that individual defendants may not be held liable for violations under title vii (D) holding that no judgment can be rendered against defendant who cannot be held liable (E) holding that cocounsel who did not sign the answer could not be held liable under rule 11 for its contents

A: holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction
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Q: intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions "could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited." Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) ("We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse's liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void."). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

A: holding that such provisions are valid
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Q: Union, Local 535, Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 609 F.2d 944, 949 (9th Cir.1979). The Court considers Defendants' arguments with respect to Edwards and her counsel separately. a. The Adequacy of Edwards as Named Plaintiff Defendants' argument that Edwards is inadequate is primarily based on Edwards's testimony in an unrelated bankruptcy proceeding. Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). This requirement ensures that the named plaintiff and his or her counsel will pursue each class member's claim with sufficient "vigor." Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir.1998); see also Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 487 (9th Cir.1994) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). As previously stated by this Court, however,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action (B) holding that the fair and adequate representation requirement was not satisfied because of litigation between plaintiff and defendant the antagonism between the parties and the lack of support plaintiff garnered in its claim (C) holding that ajdequate representation depends on the qualifications of counsel for the representatives an absence of antagonism a sharing of interests between representatives and absentees and the unlikelihood that the suit is collusive (D) recognizing that the number of class representatives is not significant under rule 23a (E) holding that awards of 2500 to majority of representatives and 5000 to deposed representatives were inappropriate where representatives had borne little risk by participating in litigation and provided services that could have been provided by any other class member

A:
holding that a class representatives ignorance of the case is not a bar to certification unless it impairs the representatives ability to vigorously prosecute the action
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