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SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ''Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act of 2001''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Purpose.
Sec. 3. Reduction in number of warheads in arsenals of United States
and
Russia.
Sec. 4. Reduction in alert status of nuclear weapons of United States
and
Russia.
Sec. 5. Acceleration of programs to prevent diversion of nuclear
weapons,
materials, and expertise from Russia.

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this Act is to decrease substantially the likelihood
of the intentional use of nuclear weapons, or their unintentional use
as a result of accident, miscalculation, unauthorized action, or
terrorist activity.

SEC. 3. REDUCTION IN NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN
ARSENALS OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

(a) Repeal of Prohibition Against Reductions.--Section 1302 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law
105-85) is repealed.
(b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
reduce the number of nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons delivery
systems of the United States and Russia, through bilateral agreements
between the United States and Russia, to the lowest possible number
consistent with the national security of the United States. Any
bilateral agreement for purposes of that policy shall provide for
transparency, predictability, and verification of the reductions.
(c) Implementation of Reductions.--In effecting any reduction in
the number of nuclear warheads of the United States, it shall be the
policy of the United States--
(1) that such reductions be intended as permanent
reductions in the United States nuclear weapons force, in
keeping with the purposes and objectives of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty;
(2) that if the President makes unilateral reductions in
the United States nuclear weapons force, such reductions should
be intended to facilitate bilateral agreement with Russia, and
the President should undertake diplomatic efforts to convince
Russia to undertake parallel or commensurate reductions in its
nuclear weapons force; and
(3) that the President should (A) offer enhanced
consultation and cooperation by the United States with Russia
in making such reductions, and (B) pursue enhanced transparency
and other confidence-building measures to ensure predictable
and stable strategic relations between the two nations.
(d) Policy Regarding Warheads Removed From Weapon Systems.--(1) It
is the policy of the United States to ensure through formal agreements
with Russia that any nuclear warhead removed from a weapon system by
either nation as part of reductions in the number of warheads or
systems pursuant to the policies in this Act--
(A) be kept safe and secure;
(B) be accounted for; and
(C) eventually be destroyed or eliminated in a manner that
is verifiable by the other nation.
(2) Any such formal agreement shall be entered into either through
the agreement referred to in subsection (b) or other agreement between
the United States and Russia.

SEC. 4. REDUCTION IN ALERT STATUS OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS OF UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA.

(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
pursue with Russia formal arrangements to remove as many nuclear
weapons of those two nations as possible from immediate, launch-ready
(or ''high alert'') status, consistent with United States national
security, beginning with those weapons earmarked for downloading,
dismantlement, or elimination under the START II treaty. Such
arrangements should seek to ensure that any change in the alert status
of such weapons of either nation be transparent and verifiable.
(b) Implementation of Reduction in Alert Status.--If the President
makes unilateral changes to the alert status of weapons in the United
States nuclear arsenal, such changes should--
(1) be consistent with the national security of the United
States; and
(2) be pursued as part of a broader United States effort to
persuade Russia to enter into arrangements as called for in
subsection (a).
(c) Security and Verifiability.--Any formal arrangement that
results from subsection (a) should include measures to ensure that--
(1) weapons, including their warheads, that are removed
from high alert status are secure and accounted for throughout
the process by which they are removed from that status; and
(2) such accountability measures are verifiable by both
nations.

SEC. 5. ACCELERATION OF PROGRAMS TO PREVENT DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, MATERIALS, AND EXPERTISE FROM RUSSIA.

(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to
work cooperatively with Russia to prevent the diversion of nuclear
weapons, materials, and expertise from Russia. In furtherance of that
objective, the policy of the United States should include the
following:
(1) With respect to the nuclear weapons arsenal of Russia--
(A) ensuring that all the elements of that arsenal,
including delivery systems, are identified and
accounted for;
(B) identifying with Russia those elements of that
arsenal that are most susceptible to proliferation; and
(C) ensuring that the weapons in that arsenal and
their components are secured and safeguarded, placing
the highest priority on safeguards for those weapons
and components that are identified pursuant to
subparagraph (B) as being those most susceptible to
proliferation.
(2) With respect to Russia's stockpile of nuclear weapons
materials (other than materials in Russia's arsenal)--
(A) ensuring that all the elements of that
stockpile are identified and accounted for;
(B) identifying with Russia those elements of that
stockpile that are most susceptible to proliferation;
and
(C) ensuring that the elements of that stockpile
are secured and safeguarded, placing the highest
priority on safeguards for those elements of that
stockpile that are identified pursuant to subparagraph
(B) as being those most susceptible to proliferation.
(3) With respect to nuclear weapons expertise in Russia--
(A) identifying and accounting for the extent of
that expertise in cities in Russia referred to as
''Nuclear Cities'' and elsewhere in Russia;
(B) developing and pursuing programs that make
productive use of that expertise inside Russia and help
prevent the spread of that expertise outside of Russia;
and
(C) developing and pursuing initiatives to reduce
the Russian nuclear production capacity to a size
appropriate to its post-Cold War mission.
(4) Rendering permanently unusable for weapons purposes all
nuclear materials and weapons systems that Russia no longer
requires to support its arsenal and forces.
(b) Authorization of Appropriations.--To carry out activities under
this Act, cooperative threat reduction programs of the Department of
Defense under section 1501(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997 (50 U.S.C. 2362 note), and other cooperative
threat reduction, nonproliferation, and related programs, there are
authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2002 amounts as follows:
(1) For the Department of Defense $600,000,000.
(2) For the Department of Energy $1,200,000,000.
(3) For the Department of State, $200,000,000.
(c) Plan for Nonproliferation Programs With Russia.--
(1) In general.--Not later than April 15, 2002, the
President shall submit to Congress a plan--
(A) to secure and neutralize over the succeeding
eight years all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
nuclear material in Russia that Russia does not retain
in its nuclear arsenal; and
(B) to prevent the outflow from Russia of
scientific expertise that could be used for developing
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction,
including delivery systems.
(2) Content of plan.--The plan required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(A) Specific goals and measurable objectives for
the programs that are designed to carry out the
objectives specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of
paragraph (1).
(B) Criteria for success for those programs and a
strategy for eventual termination of United States
contributions to those programs and assumption of the
ongoing support of those programs by Russia.
(C) A description of the administrative and
organizational changes that the President plans to
take, or will have taken, in order to achieve the
direction and coordination of those programs that is
necessary for their effectiveness.
(3) Coordination with russia.--In developing the plan
required by paragraph (1), the President shall coordinate with
Russia to ensure that elements of the plan are practicable.
(4) Consultation with congress.--In developing the plan
required by paragraph (1), the President shall consult with the
majority and minority leadership of the appropriate committees
of Congress.
(d) Report on Debt-for-Security Program.--
(1) Study.--The President shall conduct a study of the
feasibility of creating a new source of funds for nuclear
nonproliferation programs in Russia through establishment of a
program providing for the forgiveness of international debt of
Russia in exchange for payments by Russia into an independent
fund that, under strict conditions, would support the
implementation of agreed-upon nuclear nonproliferation
programs.
(2) Consultation.--In the conduct of the study under
paragraph (1), the President shall consult with appropriate
representatives of Russia and other nations whose participation
in such a program the President determines to be necessary or
desirable.
(3) Report on presidential determinations.--Not later than
April 15, 2002, the President shall submit to Congress a report
on the study required by paragraph (1). The report shall
include the President's determinations, together with
supporting facts and reasoning, as to each of the following:
(A) The prospects for the participation of creditor
nations in addition to the United States in the program
of debt forgiveness.
(B) The extent to which payments by Russia into a
fund described in paragraph (1) should be made in
Russian currency.
(C) The appropriate ratio between the amount of
such payments and the amount of debt forgiven.
(D) The purposes for which amounts in the fund
should be permitted to be expended.
(E) The means for assuring that those amounts are
expended for those purposes.
(F) The feasibility of establishing such a program.
(4) Legislative proposal.--The report under paragraph (3)
shall include a legislative proposal for implementing any
program that the President recommends based on the
determinations under that paragraph.
Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 2001 - Repeals a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 which provides funding limits for retirement or dismantlement of the B52H bomber, Trident submarines, and Minuteman III and Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles. Declares it to be U.S. policy to: (1) reduce the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems of the United States and Russia, through bilateral agreements, to the lowest possible number consistent with national security, requiring any warhead removed to be kept safe and secure, accounted for, and eventually destroyed or eliminated in a verifiable manner; (2) pursue with Russia formal arrangements to remove as many nuclear weapons of the two nations as possible from immediate, launch-ready status, beginning with those weapons earmarked for downloading, dismantlement, or elimination under the START II Treaty; and (3) work cooperatively with Russia to prevent the diversion from Russia of nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise.Requires the President to submit to Congress a plan for nonproliferation programs with Russia, as well as a related study.