In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: venture" (FAC 39) are similarly insufficient. See Cannon v. Douglas Elliman, L.L.C., No. 06-CV-7092, 2007 WL 4358456, at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2007) ("[Pjleading a joint venture does not trigger joint employer status because it is possible for joint ventures to separately employ different people .... "); Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., L.L.C., No. 08-CV-5430, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) ("Plaintiff joint employer allegations are insufficient because they are legal conclusions, not factual allegations, .... While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.") cf. Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 635-36 (11th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs arguments that these Defendants
Holding statements: (A) holding under flsa 29 usc 216c (B) holding that the authorization under 29 usc 1132a3 extends to a suit against a nonfiduciary party in interest to a transaction barred by 29 usc 1106a (C) holding under 29 usc 216c (D) holding that the finding that entities constitute a single enterprise under 29 usc 203r is separate and distinct from whether an entity is an employer under 29 usc 203d (E) holding that the defendant is in the best position to prove and should bear the burden of establishing its entitlement to an exemption under 29 usc 1108 from 29 usc 1106b erisas prohibited transactions provision

A: holding under flsa 29 usc 216c
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Q: to survive. See Plaintiffs' Brief, 9-10 citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (explaining that Rule 8(a)(2) general notice pleadings standard remains intact after Twombly) Because this question goes to the very heart of the matter, it must be addressed first. To recapitulate, this Court's April 2007 Opinion weighed the sufficiency of the "enterprise" allegations in accordance with the Third Circuit's ruling in Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir.1984). See 365 B.R. at 548. Seville stated that nothing more than general notice pleading was required for pleading a RICO enterprise. Seville relied, implicitly, on the long-standing rule regarding notice pleading first enunciated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (<HOLDING>) But two months after this Court's April 2007
Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (B) holding that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief (C) holding that dismissal is proper only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief (D) holding that a complaint will not be dismissed unless it appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim (E) recognizing the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief

A: holding that a court should not dismiss a complaint pursuant to rule 12b6 for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief
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Q: to him, Martinez has not adduced competent evidence that Hubbard intentionally discriminated against him because of his race. Though Martinez claims that Hubbard lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Acura, as I -noted .above* there is no genuine dispute that Hubbard discovered that, the Acura's license plates were stolen before pulling the vehicle over. Thus, it is undisputed that Hubbard had a non-discriminatory reason to initiate the stop. Courts have held that a plaintiffs equal protection claim may stand even if his arrest was valid and supported by probable cause when the plaintiff sufficiently alleged and provided evidence of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or another protected, class. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds, Harper v. Harris
Holding statements: (A) holding that the equal protection clause forbids the prosecution from challenging potential jurors solely on the basis of race or assumptions drawn from their race (B) holding that the equal protection clause forbids prosecutors from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race (C) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (D) holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender (E) holding that plaintiff stated viable equal protection clause claim where officer humiliated and harassed the plaintiff on basis of race prior to and during a lawful arrest

A:
holding that the equal protection clause forbids the prosecution from challenging potential jurors solely on the basis of race or assumptions drawn from their race
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