In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: charge for each item or items. The Trial Court, however, refused to admit the last page of the bill that contained only a description of miscellaneous and a corresponding charge. Plaintiff had no testimony or other evidence to explain to the jury anything about the charge listed on the last page of the bill. The Trial Court stated such a description would force the jury to speculate regarding what supplies were encompassed within the charge for these miscellaneous items. A jury may not engage in speculation. Stringer v. Cooper, 486 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tenn.Ct.App.1972) (stating "we understand the holding in those cases and many more like them to be that a jury may not speculate as to cause when one is not shown.... "); Moon v. Johnston, 47 Tenn.App. 208, 337 S.W.2d 464, 469 (1959) (<HOLDING>). Without any testimony or other evidence to
Holding statements: (A) holding where reasonable difference of opinion as to whether the defendants act was the or a proximate cause of the injury the matter is for the jury to decide (B) holding a jury is not permitted to speculate or guess as to proximate cause (C) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury (D) holding proximate cause almost always a question solely for the jury (E) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury

A: (B)
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Q: for a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2. Section 3B1.2 "authorizes a four-level reduction in offense level if the defendant is deemed a 'minimal' participant in the criminal activity! ] [and] a two-level reduction if he is deemed a 'minor' participant...." United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 783 (6th Cir. 2012). The difference between "minimal" and "minor" is "not just semantic," United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1991), and the standards are not interchangeable. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 cmt. n. 5 (defining a "minor participant" as "a defendant ... who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal") (emphasis added); United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Both Griffith and the Government focus their
Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) holding that the district court improperly used the two different standards under ussg 3b12 interchangeably thus blurring the distinction between section 3b12a and b (E) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel

A: (D)
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Q: summary judgment of obviousness. However, Perricone did move for summary judgment of nonobviousness in 2001. See Dkt. #216. The issue of obviousness being fully briefed by the parties (see Dkt. # # 417, 419, 421) the Court finds that it is appropriate to consider the issue on summary judgment, rather than conducting a trial in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The Court further finds that Medicis' motion relies only on prior art otherwise disclosed to Perricone during discovery, and that there is no prejudice to Perricone from the nature of Medicis' discovery responses. Thus, the Court grants leave to file the 2006 motion for summary judgment, and renews the 2001 motions for summary judgment. 8 . See e.g., Monaplastics, Inc. v. Caldor, Inc., 378 F.2d 20, 21 (2d Cir.1967) (<HOLDING>) Further, the Court notes that Perricone has
Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment of obviousness was appropriately granted despite lack of expert testimony because device would have been obvious to persons having ordinary skill in the plastics molding industry and would even have been obvious to ordinary laymen of modest intelligence (B) holding that counsels failure to move to suppress the defendants confession constituted ineffective assistance because it was obvious that the confession would have been suppressed (C) holding that the determination of whether a products dangers are obvious is made from the perspective of an ordinary user of the product rather than an ordinary person who is unfamiliar with the product (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that a trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert witness where the testimony would have been relevant to show that the defendant breached a duty of care

A:
(A)
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