instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of other courts have concluded, outside the RICO and Clayton Act context, that "by reason of" should be read to require only "but for" rather than proximate causation. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("The words 'because of' mean 'by reason of: on account of.' Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action 'because of age is that age was the 'reason' that the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. C.I.R., 600 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Spirtas Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 555 F.3d 647,
Holding statements: (A) holding that in 26 cfr 1263ale3i the language directly benefit or are incurred by reason of boils down to a butfor causation test (B) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support (C) holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid (D) holding that pursuant to the eaja courts may not award expenses of an attorney that are not incurred or expended solely or exclusively in connection with the case before the court (E) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc 4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc 4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc 4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc 4061a 4218a
answer:
holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support

question:
states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) ("[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew's evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding."). But see Klein v. Comm'r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) ("A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence."); Calcutt v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness
Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action
answer:
holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial

question:
is clear." Investment Company Institute, 891 F.Supp.2d at 205. The appellants also assert that the agency improperly counted hypothetical benefits, but this assertion is incorrect. It was appropriate for CFTC to count the benefits flowing from its registration and disclosure requirements in 4.5 and 4.27, as the specifics of those requirements are finalized and not subject to the harmonization rule. The appellants further complain that CFTC failed to put a precise number on the benefit of data collection in preventing future financial crises. But the law does not require agencies to measure the immeasurable. CFTC's discussion of unquantifiable benefits fulfills its statutory obligation to consider and evaluate potential costs and benefits. See Fox, 556 U.S. at 519, 129 S.Ct. 1800 (<HOLDING>). Where Congress has required "rigorous,
Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys are not debt relief agencies (B) holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued (C) holding that agencies are not required to adduce empirical data that cannot be obtained (D) holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment (E) recognizing that administrative agencies are not bound by rules of evidence
answer:
holding that attorneys are not debt relief agencies