In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 2d 266, 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the
Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where it appears that the court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

A: (E)
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Q: federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board's proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court's initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where "the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide"); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss
Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court

A: (B)
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Q: of the CLAM Sale were treated as distributions to Richard and Todd. The effect of these transactions was to transfer money from one Kitchin-controlled entity to pay the debts of another Kitchin-con-trolled entity resulting in harm to the Trust. On this basis, this Court finds that Richard exercised sufficient control over Kitchin LLC to satisfy the first prong of the Ashley test. Having established control, this Court also finds that the totality of the circumstances warrants piercing the corporate veil. Looking to the substance of the CLAM Sale and the CAP Payments, this Court recognizes that both Richard and Todd treated the debts of Chester Auto Parts and Kitchin LLC as indistinguishable. See Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 198 F.3d 107, 127 fn. 5 (3d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Neither Richard nor Chester Auto Parts
Holding statements: (A) holding that alter ego is shown from the total dealings of the corporation (B) recognizing that the corporate entity is disregarded to prevent fraud or an injustice not to inflict an obligation on an innocent corporation and that the fraud or inequity sought to be eliminated must be that of the party against whom the alter ego doctrine is invoked (C) holding jurisdiction over an individual may not usually be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation unless the corporation is the alter ego of the individual or when the individual perpetrates a fraud (D) holding an alter ego action could be brought by the debtor corporation under texas law (E) recognizing that pursuant to the traditional application of the alter ego doctrine corporate form may be disregarded when the corporation is the mere instrumentality or business conduit of another corporation or person

A:
(E)
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