In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

an alcohol concentration of .22. The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Gergen's driving privileges, and the district court affirmed. ISSUES 1. Where a district court determines that a person arrested for driving while intoxicated did not make a good faith effort to contact an attorney, is the driver's right to counsel vindicated even though the telephone provided by the arresting officer is blocked from dialing 800-numbers? 2. Did the police officer violate Minn.Stat. 481.10? ANALYSIS I. A person arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) has a limited right to consult an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing, provided the consultation does not unreasonably delay the testing. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>); see Minn. Const. art. I, 6 ("In all
Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law (B) holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga 405671 (C) holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (E) holding that right to counsel under implied consent statute is limited because of the evanescent nature of alcohol
(E)

speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
(E)

599 (1976) (stating that School Board would be entitled to release from decree upon district court making factual finding of compliance); Florida Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 246 F.3d at 1299 ("[I]f the defendants take the position that the consent, decree in this case is no longer justified, they should make an appropriate motion to the .district court on remand to have the decree either modified or terminated."); United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1505-07 (11th Cir.1993) (explaining that decision to terminate class action employment discrimination decree should address both compliance intended to remedy consequences of past discrimination and whether objective of eliminating illegal discrimination has been met); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 961 (6th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>); Vazquez v. Carver, 18 F.Supp.2d 503, 507
Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to make repeated objections is not ineffective when such objections would not have been sustained (B) holding that district court could not dissolve decree without considering objections to dissolution (C) holding that when defendants only timely filed objections to expert report were that two statements were speculative defendant waived all other objections (D) holding that a party waived its objections on appeal to an affidavit presented in support of a motion for summary judgment by failing to raise its objections to the trial court (E) holding that because generic objections do not afford a sentencing court sufficient notice such objections are inadequate to preserve specific claims of sentencing error
(B)