In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: between cases brought under the federal law and those brought under Maine law. While the First Circuit does make a distinction, it ultimately holds that the negligence per se doctrine of Pratico is strictly limited to cases brought under FELA, and it strongly implies that the doctrine will not be expanded. Elliott v. S.D. Warren Co., 134 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998). 4 . Castine argues that the trooper testified at trial to matters that he had not previously indicated he would address, and therefore, it was unfairly surprised at trial. Generally, a continuance is the appropriate remedy when a party seeks to admit "surprise" evidence at trial. Because Castine did not seek a continuance, however, it may not now claim unfair surprise. See Pettitt v. Lizotte, 454 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Me.1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Because violation of a safety regulation
Holding statements: (A) holding the immigration judges denial of a continuance request did not constitute an abuse of discretion (B) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify (C) holding denial of continuance to be an abuse of discretion (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining expert witness was qualified to testify (E) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in allowing a defendants surprise fact witness to testify because the plaintiff did not request a continuance
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator's decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that "the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application." See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word "may" rather than "shall" allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the
Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: judgment to consider, as part of the sentence on the prior felony, a term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation of probation. Id. at 515. We held that because such a term of imprisonment is indeed part of the punishment for the prior felony conviction, the district court properly counted such prison term in determining the length of the "sentence imposed" on the prior conviction. Id. In reaching that conclusion, we reasoned that "[ujnder both federal and state law a sentence imposed upon revocation of probation is treated as a sentence on the original underlying offense. Such a sentence is not considered a sanction for the new conduct which constituted a probation violation." Id. at 516 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2nd Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Ex parte Weaver, 880 S.W.2d 855, 857
Holding statements: (A) holding that forfeiture is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction (B) holding that standard for revocation of probation is preponderance of the evidence (C) holding that a condition of probation requiring the defendant to spend up to one year in a halfway house at the discretion of the probation officer was lawfully imposed under as 1255100a5 because it was imposed as part of the original sentence (D) holding that prison term following revocation of probation is a modification and part of the actual sentence imposed for the original offense (E) holding that probation is not a sentence
Example Output:
(D)