In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: contract claims under general liability policies. See Keystone Filler & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. American Mining Ins. Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 432 (M.D.Pa.2002); Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. Int'l Ins. Co., 454 Pa.Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581 (1996) (en banc); see also Augenblick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 99-3419, 1999 WL 975118 (E.D.Pa. Oct.8, 1999). General liability policies provide the insured coverage for personal injury or property damage resulting from an "occurrence," and are intended "to protect the insured from liability fo e in Redevelopment Authority that there is no 'occurrence' if the underlying claim is one merely for breach-of-contract has been followed by numerous state and federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania.") (citing cases); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2, 5 (<HOLDING>). In contrast to those cases, U.S. Specialty's
Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that insureds breach of contract suit against insurer raised a coverage issue which was not settled by insurers payment of only part of what insured was claiming in breach of contract action (D) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract (E) holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident

A: holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer
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Q: types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property" ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of
Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee

A: holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses
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Q: the state could have elected to charge Reynolds with both burglary and theft and, upon conviction, would have been entitled to a separate sentence on both charges. Reynolds cannot complain that it was improper to deny an instruction on theft that would have permitted the jury to consider the offense only as a lesser alternative to burglary. Reynolds' conviction is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for a retrial in conformity with the views expressed herein. 1 . See Whitton v. State, 479 P.2d 302, 306-314 (Alaska 1970). 2 . See abo Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d 553, 558 (Alaska 1978) (citing Mead with approval in holding that offenses of grand larceny and theft from an airplane do not merge and are subject to separate punishment). 3 . Cf. State v. Occhipinti, 562 P.2d 348 (Alaska 1977) (<HOLDING>). 4 .Here, as in Mead, "we are presented with
Holding statements: (A) holding that as a matter of state law nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the state (B) holding that when the state prosecutes and obtains a conviction on separate charges as to which the rule of merger does not apply the state is entitled as a matter of law to a conviction and a separate sentence on each charge (C) holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case (D) holding the petitioners challenge of his conviction is not rendered moot by the expiration of the underlying sentence because collateral consequences flowing from the conviction give the petitioner a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him (E) holding defendant who voluntarily dismissed his appeal of one conviction based on plea agreement for separate charges was not entitled to outoftime appeal

A:
holding that as a matter of state law nonmutual offensive issue preclusion does not apply against the state
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