Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.

Question: "At what time Boston Center called the NEADS"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "AM"

Response: yes

Nine families displaced by a fire at Alamo Hills Apartments in March filed lawsuits Wednesday against the apartment complex. They allege that the complex could have done more to protect belongings they were forced to abandon in the aftermath of the blaze. Bernard Dempsey Jr., an attorney with Western Michigan Legal Services, the group that represents the tenants, said Alamo Hills gave the displaced families very limited opportunity to remove belongings. "They were given three days to get their stuff out, and if they couldn't get moved out in three days, their stuff was discarded," Dempsey said. "Alamo Hills just threw it out." Others, he said, lost possessions to looters after the March 23 blaze, which left 78 people temporarily homeless. According to the lawsuit, the tenants were prohibited from entering their apartments to retrieve possessions and were promised that the complex would provide security. A spokesperson for PM One, the company that manages Alamo Hills, could not be reached for comment. Nine separate suits were filed in 8th District Court, which handles civil claims of less than $25,000. "We're asking for the reimbursement of the value of their property and a small amount for stress -- $3,000 on top of their out-of-pocket expenses for their lost stuff," Dempsey said. "They're not looking to get rich off this. A lot of this is simply because they were treated so badly." Dempsey said most of the tenants who filed suits still live at the apartment complex, although many are trying to find homes elsewhere. "The new apartments (they were provided) were not in very good shape. That's actually one of the claims," he said.

Question: "Where did most of the tenants who filed the suits live following the event of the fire?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "Apartment complex"

Response: no

In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama Bin Laden and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting Bin Laden expelled from Afghanistan or possibly capturing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of Bin Laden's organization remained intact. President Clinton was deeply concerned about Bin Laden. He and his national security advisor, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on Bin Laden's reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about Bin Laden and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate-intended to avoid enhancing Bin Laden's stature by giving him unnecessary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors and of chemical and biological weapons. As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns-the Y2K scare. Some government officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such breakdowns. On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Bin Laden, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, "The time for training is over." Suspecting that this was a signal for Abu Hoshar to commence a terrorist operation, Jordanian police arrested Abu Hoshar and 15 others and informed Washington. One of the 16, Raed Hijazi, had been born in California to Palestinian parents; after spending his childhood in the Middle East, he had returned to northern California, taken refuge in extremist Islamist beliefs, and then made his way to Abu Zubaydah's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, where he learned the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. He and his younger brother had been recruited by Abu Hoshar into a loosely knit plot to attack Jewish and American targets in Jordan. After late 1996, when Abu Hoshar was arrested and jailed, Hijazi moved back to the United States, worked as a cabdriver in Boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters. After Abu Hoshar's release, Hijazi shuttled between Boston and Jordan gathering money and supplies. With Abu Hoshar, he recruited inTurkey and Syria as well as Jordan; with Abu Zubaydah's assistance, Abu Hoshar sent these recruits to Afghanistan for training.

Question: "In Nov. 1999 what intelligence agency intercepted a call and who did they arrest in an effect to stop a terrorist attack?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "Jordanian Intelligence intercepted the call and arrested Abu Hoshar"

Response:
yes