In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 397 So.2d 874, 874-75 (Miss.1981)). However, in McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc., 626 So.2d 603 (Miss.1993), the Mississippi Supreme Court carved out "a narrow public policy exception" to the employment-at-will doctrine, holding that regardless of whether the employment is at-will, (1) an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal act as in Laws [v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F.Supp. 342 (N.D.Miss.1987) ], shall not be barred by the common law rule of employment at will from bringing an action in tort for damages against his employer; (2) an employee who is discharged for reporting illegal acts of his employer to the employer or anyone else is not barred by the employmen ming Wheeler); Hammons v. Fleetwood Homes of Mississippi, Inc., 907 So.2d 357, 360 (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (<HOLDING>). As plaintiffs have presented no evidence to
Holding statements: (A) holding the mcarn exception requirefs that the acts complained of warrant the imposition of criminal penalties as opposed to mere civil penalties (B) recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc 842c (C) holding that a claim for civil damages based on alleged violation of criminal statute under which criminal penalties result was properly dismissed because criminal violations are brought not in the name of the individual party but rather by and on behalf of the state of ohio or its subdivisions (D) holding that a judgment that requires the performance of an act is enforceable by civil and criminal contempt penalties emphasis omitted (E) holding double jeopardy clause applicable to civil penalties under the false claims act
[A]: recognizing district courts discretion in assessing civil penalties under 21 usc 842c

[Q]: Privileges and Immunities Clause. The final interest advanced by Defendants to justify Section 470 is the availability of the remedy of attachment against nonresident attorneys. See Def. Mem. Supp. S.J. at 7 (citing Matter of Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.Div.1972); Matter of Fordan, 5 Misc.2d 372, 158 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surrogates Ct.N.Y.Co.1956)). The remedy of attachment is a disciplinary measure involving a seizure on a defendant's property in order to secure the enforcement of a money judgment. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6201 (McKinney 2011). Under Section 470's current construction, however, an attorney need only maintain an "of counsel" relationship with an in-state office to satisfy the office requirement. Austria v. Shaw, 143 Misc.2d 970, 542 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989) (<HOLDING>). Based on this standard, the remedy of
Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee (B) recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole (C) holding that the district where the defendant attorneys office was located was the proper venue because the defendants omissions related to their failure to communicate from their office in savannah the details of the ongoing case (D) holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid (E) holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement
[A]: holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee

[Q]: fall within the range of 216 to 240 months. The 240-month sentence is the statutory maximum for first-degree aggravated robbery, and the 216-month sentence is equivalent to a double departure of the 108-month presumptive sentence for the kidnapping. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 1 . This statute went into effect August 1, 1998, before Neal was sentenced, but after the date of his offense. The previous dangerous-offender statute, Minn.Stat. 609.152, subd. 2, was repealed August 1, 1998. See Act effective August 1, 1998, ch. 367, art. 6, 7, 1998 Minn. Laws 731, 735. The district court erred in using the 1998 dangerous-offender statute because it went into effect after the date of Neal's offense, July 14, 1998. See State v. Murray, 495 N.W.2d 412, 413 (Minn. 1993) (<HOLDING>). However, the criteria for sentencing a
Holding statements: (A) holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction (C) holding that some of the sex offender conditions imposed on defendant as part of his sentence for possessing a firearm were unreasonable where defendants sole sex offense was over a decade old at the time of sentencing (D) holding that the defendant could not be sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute if his offense occurred before the statute became effective (E) holding that while a defendant is not entitled to be sentenced as a youthful offender on any new offense he or she may have committed the trial court cannot revoke a defendants youthful offender status on offenses for which that defendant has already been sentenced citation omitted
[A]:
holding minnesotas patterned sex offender senfence enhancement statute unconstitutional as applied to one defendant and noting our doubts as to whether the statute could ever be constitutionally applied