In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: is knowing and voluntary, when there is a factual foundation to support it, when the state has agreed to it, then the discretion has ended and the plea must be accepted." Id. at 1041. We noted, however, that this rule applied only to "unconditional and unqualified" guilty pleas, not to negotiated pleas where the State has agreed to a particular sentence or to the disposition of particular charges, or where the State opposes the plea. Id. at 1041-42 (on motion for rehearing). Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) provides: "A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved." See State v. Ashby, 245 So.2d 225 (Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). A trial judge has wide discretion to refuse
Holding statements: (A) holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review (B) holding that a defendant in a criminal case might plead no contest conditioned on the right to preserve for appellate review a question of law (C) holding that the defendant failed properly to preserve assignment of error for appellate review because the trial court had no opportunity to consider the defendants contention as presented on appeal (D) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (E) holding that under state procedural law a timely objection is necessary to preserve a batson question for appellate review
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: June 1993 was being denied. Katz asserts that he never received the letter and, therefore, until March 27, 1995, when he received the notice of the denial of coverage, Colonial had led him to believe that his policy covered registered nursing care provided at a general hospital. As the dispute as to whether Katz actually received the letter cannot be resolved at this juncture, I now consider whether, if he did not receive the letter, Colonial should be estopped from denying coverage for the October/November private nursing care. In order to prevail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Katz must show (1) a material representation, (2) reasonable reliance upon that representation, and (3) damage resulting from that representation. Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Katz asserts that Colonial's failure to
Holding statements: (A) recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa 514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing the cause of action (E) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: days after the beginning of discovery. Noting that it could nevertheless grant Vig's motion if he showed good cause, the district court refused to do so, because he had not alleged any previously unavailable facts and had not been diligent in pursuing the newly asserted causes of action. The district court correctly ruled that Vig had not shown good cause. He pointed to no new evidence to support his proposed second amended complaint, and there.is no reason that he could not have alleged, in an earlier pleading, the new claim it attempted to raise. Vig's untimeliness and failure to show good cause amount to a "substantial reason" to deny him leave to amend, meaning the district court did not abuse its discretion. See Shipner v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 401, 406-07 (11th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). Vig's second contention is that the district
Holding statements: (A) holding that although district courts have discretion to deny leave to amend they may only do so for a substantial reason (B) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (C) recognizing several reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint (D) recognizing that although leave to amend generally should be freely granted that decision is left to the district courts discretion and as in the present case not only was there no abuse of discretion it appears that appellants never properly requested an opportunity to amend in the district court (E) holding that a court may deny leave to amend when the moving party had the opportunity to amend earlier but waited after judgment to do so
[EX A]:
(A)