In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

objectively by a reasonable person. Cooper v. Albacore Holdings, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 238, 244-45 (Mo.App.E.D.2006). Here, the trial court found that the Employer's alleged conduct was not sufficient as a matter of law to objectively establish severe or pervasive hostility based on a disability. Whether "a reasonable person would objectively consider [an employer's] behavior towards [a claimant] severe enough to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment" is a question of fact. Cooper, 204 S.W.3d at 245; see also Howard, 149 F.3d at 840; 37 William C established, whether a reasonable person would similarly find the conduct offensive will generally be a question of fact for the jury. Cf. Meyerkord v. Zipatoni Co., 276 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo.App.E.D.2008) (<HOLDING>); Y.G. v. Jewish Hasp, of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding that whether misrepresentations would be highly offensive to a reasonable person are questions for a jury (C) holding that questions of proximate cause are within the exclusive domain for the jury and may only be removed when reasonable minds cannot differ (D) holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered (E) holding that whether an encounter is consensual hinges on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to disregard the police and go about his business
holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave

results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence. (b) Nothing in this section is intended to exclude from evidence statements made during a polygraph examination which are otherwise admissible. Under the plain language of this rule, the military judge's ruling was correct. By adding this Rule, the 1991 amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial restored the armed forces to the approach followed in the 1969 Manual. Cf. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 253 (C.M.A.1987)(2-1 decision holding that the trial judge has the discretion to admit the results of polygraph examinations); United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555, 558 (A.C.M.R.1994)(<HOLDING>). The concerns behind this rule include: that
Holding statements: (A) holding ban violated the sherman act (B) holding that the governments use of classified evidence in detentionpendingdeportation proceedings violated detainees due process rights and inter alia justified his release (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative (D) holding that the absolute ban on polygraph evidence violated due process and the right to present evidence citing inter alia chambers v mississippi 410 us 284 93 sct 1038 35 led2d 297 1973 (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material
holding ban violated the sherman act

Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 261, 92 S.Ct. 885, some of these factors are "not relevant" in suits for injunctive relief, Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 484, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986). But suits for injunctive relief, no less than suits for damages, require a plaintiff to demonstrate an "injury in fact." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Moreover, an antitrust plaintiff whether seeking relief in law or equity must demonstrate "antitrust injury," the more subtle details of which are not relevant here. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. at 113, 107 S.Ct. 484; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969) (<HOLDING>); Paycom Billing Servs., Inc. v. Mastercard
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws (B) holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit (C) holding that plaintiff must show antitrust injury meaning injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and which flows from defendants unlawful acts (D) holding that an activity which is exempt from the antitrust laws cannot form the basis of an antitrust investigation (E) holding that there must be a causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the antitrust injury for there to be antitrust standing
holding that a plaintiff must show antitrust injury in order to bring an antitrust lawsuit