In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an "integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant's] crimef.]" The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005
Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal

Ex Output:
holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case

Ex Input:
and Waste Control Specialists. LLC v. Sierra Club, appellate cause number. 03-12-00335-CV. 4 . See Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, cause number D-l-GN-12-001586. 5 .Despite this, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion twenty days after the deadline for ruling on the motion had passed. The order though included in the record on appeal is of no effect. Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("The trial court's signing the order denying the motion [to dismiss pursuant to the Act] after it was already denied by operation of law is legally of no effect because the motion to dismiss was already denied."); reran v. Fryer, 586 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Cor-pus Christi 1979, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees also insist that Sierra Club
Holding statements: (A) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (B) holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law (C) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (D) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial that had already been overruled by operation of law was a nullity

Ex Output:
holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions

Ex Input:
will not suffice." 12 Moore et al., 60.24[2], The analysis of Virginia Lee's threshold showing of a meritorious claim or defense poses a somewhat unusual question. Whereas the more common application of Rule 60(b) requires the court to analyze the merit of a movant's claim or defense where there has been a default, as in Augusta es specifically contracted that the settlement document would be "governed by, and construed in accordance with the laws of the United States and, to the extent not preempted, the substantive law of the Commonwealth of Virginia." (Agmt. at 4.) Such a choice of law clause is presumptively valid, so long as it is not unreasonable. See Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir.1996); see also Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240, 242 (1919) (<HOLDING>). A binding settlement in Virginia is judged by
Holding statements: (A) holding that parties implicitly stipulated to choice of law (B) holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent (C) holding that settlement agreements like consent judgments are not given preclusive effect unless the parties manifest their intent to give them such effect (D) holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld (E) holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect

Ex Output:
holding that parties implicitly stipulated to choice of law