instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
Cote's bias, Hayat alleges, first, that Cote made "several inappropriate racial and religious comments during deliberations." Hayat presented evidence from Jurors L. and B., as well as from Juror H. via an affidavit by Ha-yat's private investigator, that Cote made a "racial" comment during deliberations. B. declared that "[d]uring the deliberation process, ... Cote[ ] made the statement they all looked the same when wearing a costume or when put in a costume. I believe Mr. Cote made this statement in connection with a discussion of witness Naseem Khan's claim that he had seen Ayman al-Zawahiri in Lodi." Similarly, L. stated that "[djuring deliberations Mr. Cote made racial slurs. As an example, on one occasion ... he said in front of the entire group that they a 236-39 (10th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Where, however, "a juror has been asked
Holding statements: (A) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (B) holding that rule 606b contains no exception for racially biased statements made during jury deliberations and expressing skepticism about whether constitutional concerns can ever override the rule (C) holding that federal rule of evidence 8034 the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not apply to statements made by doctors (D) recognizing rule (E) holding that the arkansas counterpart to cre 606b applies whether a verdict is reached or a mistrial declared and under the extraneous information exception allows jurors to testify about statements made during deliberations
answer:
(B)

question:
677 F.3d 519, 543 (3d Cir.2012). Under the specific circumstances presented in this case, Lewis did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversation with White. Lewis knew where White was incarcerated when White called Lewis, as he had agreed to send Shavers and White mail there. Furthermore, Lewis was previously incarcerated at the same prison. Thus, he would have received a handbook alerting him that all telephone calls were recorded and been exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded. In these circumstances, Lewis should have known that all outgoing prisoner telephone calls were monitored and recorded. See United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1329 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Harrison, 986 F.Supp. 280,
Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their prison cells (B) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (E) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials
answer:
(C)

question:
Ninth Circuit has extended this definition of "physical force" to other generic offense provisions (though not the Section 924(c)(3) force clause), including 18 U.S.C. 16(a) and U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, both of which define "crime of violence" using language that is identical or essentially identical to the language used in the ACCA force clause and the Section 924(c)(3) force clause). The Court finds it appropriate to do the same here. 3 . The text of Section 924(c)(3)(A) does not explicitly require that there be an intentional use of physical force in order for a crime to constitute a "crime of violence." Still, Wade cites Ninth Circuit authority holding that similar penalty-enhancing statutes implicitly require intent. See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) (<HOLDING>), However, the Supreme Court recently held that
Holding statements: (A) holding that those crimes with a mens rea of negligence or recklessness do not trigger the enhanced penalties mandated by the acca (B) holding that one can be convicted of attempted manslaughter under the subsections of section 765205 that require intentional conduct but not under the subsection that only requires the mens rea of recklessness (C) holding that bank robbery is a crime of violence because a defendants knowledge that his behavior is intimidating satisfies 924cs mens rea requirement (D) holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea (E) holding that neither recklessness nor gross negligence is a sufficient mens rea to establish that a conviction is for a crime of violence under section 16
answer:
(E)