In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: its concern with Plaintiffs' lack of proof of causation and specific damages when the court entered summary judgment against them on their injurious falsehood/business disparagement and wrongful interference with business relations claims, and Plaintiffs' testimony at trial failed to further illuminate their assertion that Petta's statements caused them special damages. Plaintiffs' testimony about special damages was unsupported by any documentary evidence, including any business operations analysis, tax returns or similar exhibits, or expert testimony, and Plaintiffs' own con-clusory statements provided little quantifiable evidence of their claimed damages, leaving the jury to speculate regarding special damages. See Gilmore v. Cohen, 95 Ariz. 34, 36-37, 386 P.2d 81, 82-83 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 43 Furthermore, the evidence presented does
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not entitle a person to a federal remedy for every breach of contract by a state thus unless every breach of every public contract is to be actionable as a violation of constitutional rights it is necessary to distinguish between mere contract rights and constitutional property rights internal citations and quotation marks omitted (B) holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) recognizing in a breach of contract ease that the plaintiff in every case should supply some reasonable basis for computing the amount of damage and must do so with such precision as from the nature of his claim and the available evidence is possible citations omitted (E) holding that one method of computing damages for a breach of contract is the contract price less the reasonable cost of completion
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that Ms. Toomer offers, no evidence of Ms. Stiger's threat other than her own self-serving assertions and that such unsupported, self-serving assertions do not give rise to a triable issue of fact. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (when scrutinizing motions for summary judgment courts "examine the facts in the record and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but do not accept bare conclusory allegations, as fact") (internal citations omitted); Ward v. District of Columbia, 950 F.Supp.2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) ("[S]elf-serving assertions are not sufficient to create an issue of material fact."); Musgrove v. Gov't of the District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 158, 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Even if unsupported, self-serving assertions
Holding statements: (A) holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment (B) holding that evidence of alleged limitations obtained soon after accident was without more insufficient to survive summary judgment (C) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient (E) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: battery is to make "physical contact" without causing injury, and that physical contact does not have to be violent in nature. See, e.g., Illinois v. Peck, 260 Ill.App.3d 812, 198 Ill.Dec. 760, 633 N.E.2d 222, 223 (1994) (explaining that 720 ILCS 5/12-3 defines battery as making offensive contact with a victim "by any means," which encompasses spitting at a peace officer). Moreover, a simple battery involving nonviolent physical contact can become "aggravated" by the addition of facts that have nothing to do with physical force. A battery can be aggravated because it causes "great bodily harm," 720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), or because, as here, the victim is a "peace officer," 720 ILCS 5/12 4(b)(6) (2003); see Illinois v. Hale, 77 Ill.2d 114, 32 Ill.Dec. 548, 395 N.E.2d 929, 931-32 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Illinois v. McBrien, 144 Ill.App.3d 489, 98
Holding statements: (A) holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery (B) holding that aggravated battery of peace officer encompasses both insulting or provoking contact and battery resulting in bodily harm (C) holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated battery when the bodily member that is lost or rendered useless in the battery is a tooth (D) holding that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense of manslaughter (E) holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two
[EX A]:
(B)