instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of serious physical harm," Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict" and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict" have been replaced by the single term "judgment as a matter of law." 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: "Furthermore, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation
answer:
(E)

question:
February 8, 2011 probation extension order failed to extend his probation period because the October 26, 2005 restitution order was improperly delegated to the probation officer, rather than determined by the circuit court as required by Code 19.2-305.1(D), thus any subsequent order is invalid. In relevant part, Code 19.2-305.1(D) states that "[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall determine the amount to be repaid by the defendant and the terms and conditions thereof." The amount of restitution to be paid by the defendant is within the sole province of the circuit court to determine and that determination may not be delegated to another department of government. See Code 19.2-305.2; see also McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 811, 815, 568 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the circuit court's October 26,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing (B) holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge (C) holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses
answer:
(B)

question:
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963. Although not defined by the Bankruptcy Code, the Fifth Circuit defines a claim as contingent if the debt "is one which will be called upon to pay only upon the occurrence or happening of an extrinsic event that will trigger the liability of the debtor to the alleged creditor." Beaumont v. Durkay (In Matter of Ford), 967 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir.1992). While a claim may not have yet accrued under state law, it may nonetheless be treated as a contingent claim within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Olin Corp. (In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp.), 225 B.R. 862, 866 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1998) aff'd, 209 F.3d 125 (2d Cir.2000); see also Hassanally v. Republic Bank (In re Hassanally), 208 B.R. 46, 50 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (<HOLDING>). Among the circuits, several approaches have
Holding statements: (A) holding that federal law determines definition of executory contract but that state law determines whether a material breach of the contract could occur (B) holding that while state law determines the existence of a claim federal law determines when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes (C) holding that state law determines when an interest is perfected when interpreting the preference avoidance provision of the bankruptcy act (D) holding for 1983 actions that although state law determines the limitations period federal law determines when the claim arises (E) holding that state law determines when perfection occurs for purposes of the preference avoidance provision of the bankruptcy code
answer:
(B)