In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
by [the motorist]." Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that "it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow." 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas's argument, this court observed that "procedural due process requires that a person have an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas
Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action

Ex Output:
holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

Ex Input:
intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions "could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited." Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) ("We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse's liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void."). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years

Ex Output:
holding that such provisions are valid

Ex Input:
decision); id. at 451-52 (rejecting the argument that removal violated the Equal Protection Clause because of a difference in the timing and location of proceedings); id. at 452 (finding an argument based on international law waived). Rather, he contends that "summary decision on this case would result in overlooking legal arguments" that were not presented in Salazar-Regino. The relief Petitioner seeks would require us to act contrary to prior precedent. However, one panel of this court cannot overrule a prior panel decision. See id. at 448 (court obliged to follow the panel decision in Hernandez-Avalos); Dahl v. Akin, 630 F.2d 277, 282 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980) ("[I]n this Circuit, one panel cannot overrule another"); Williams v. Blazer Fin. Servs., Inc., 598 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Because we are obliged to follow
Holding statements: (A) holding ajbsent en banc reconsideration we are bound by prior decisions of this circuit (B) recognizing that a later en banc court may overrule an earlier en banc opinion (C) holding that we are bound by prior panel opinions until they are overruled or abrogated by the supreme court or this court sitting en banc (D) holding that one panel of this court is bound by the precedent of an earlier panel absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the supreme court (E) holding that circuit court decisions bind circuit unless and until overturned by the court en banc or by higher authority

Ex Output:
recognizing that a later en banc court may overrule an earlier en banc opinion