In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: as she has failed to show that a majority of the arbitrators deliberately disregarded the law. (See id.) Although the award in this case is general, it does not appear that the panel deliberately disregarded the law. Both parties made viable legal arguments to the arbitration panel regarding equitable remedies and defenses including the voluntary payment doctrine, which the panel says it considered. Although the voluntary payment doctrine could preclude Olde's recovery, it is not applicable in all situations and there are exceptions to the doctrine. For example, courts have found that if a mistake of fact is alleged, then the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply. See Kane-Miller Corp. v. Lakeview Trust & Sav. Bank, No. 88 C 7561, 1989 WL 13295, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.13, 1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Best Buy Co. v. Harlem-Irving Cos.,
Holding statements: (A) holding that attorneys fees under adea may not be recovered against a defendant who was not an employer of the plaintiff (B) recognizing that a mistake of fact may constitute a valid defense (C) holding that applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine and the mistake of fact exception raises questions of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss (D) holding that money paid under mistake of fact may be recovered regardless of the negligence of the payor (E) holding the general rule is that money paid to another under a mistake of fact may be recovered because the money belongs in equity and good conscience to the person who paid it
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: industry is constitutional." Reply [# 29] at 3. Defendants maintain that "the Court may not rely on a federal regulation (9 C.F.R. 2.126) or on the Guide to conclude that the Fourth Amendment right at issue is clearly established." Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Defendants further argue that even if the Court considered the regulation and the Guide, they do not limit the APHIS' powers of inspection or set policy. Id. at 5. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they are not challenging the statutory scheme governing the USDA's warrantless searches, but rather are challenging the application of that statutory scheme by the Inspector Defendants on May 7, 2013 at Big Cats. See, e.g., LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 268-69 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). In LeSueur, the Fourth Circuit closely
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (C) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (D) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (E) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: IS TEMPORALLY REMOTE FROM ALLEGED WHISTLEBLOWING Plaintiffs claim has a serious temporal problem: he alleges that he was not reappointed in late 2007 for events that took place in late 2003 and early 2004. Our courts have taken pains to stress that the length of time between an alleged whistleblowing and an adverse employment action is not dispositive of retaliation when those two events are close in time (i.e., days, weeks, or a few months apart). If whistleblowing and retaliation that occur close in time are not sufficient to find causation under the WPA, whistleblowing and retaliation that occur far apart in time are certainly not sufficient to support causation and, in fact, weigh against finding causation. See Fuhr v Hazel Park Sch Dist, 710 F3d 668, 675-676 (CA 6, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Here, there is an enormous temporal gap
Holding statements: (A) holding in the context of a title vii retaliation claim that a twoyear gap between the plaintiffs protected activity and the claimed retaliatory act proves fatal to plaintiffs assertion that there is a causal connection (B) holding that failure to demonstrate a causal connection is fatal to a 1983 cause of action (C) holding that there must be a causal connection between the advertising activity and the injury alleged in the underlying complaint (D) holding that a temporal proximity of one month between the plaintiffs protected activity and adverse employment action was sufficient to establish a causal connection (E) holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim under title vii must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that she engaged in a protected activity that she was subjected to an adverse employment action by her employer and that there was a causal link between the two
[EX A]:
(A)