instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
conversion should have an opportunity to reassert objections to exemptions. Indeed, Rule 1019(2) specifically addresses time period for actions after conversion, and provides for the re-running of times allowed for filing a claim, objecting to discharge and objecting to dischargeability. There is no new time period, however, for the trustee to assert objections to exemptions. "If a new time period for objections to exemptions began to run upon conversion of a case, one would expect to see it mentioned in Rule 1019(2), [and][i]t is not there." In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995). Where the statute is clear, it is not appropriate to look to policy arguments. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109-S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>), and none of the policy arguments are
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that pursuant to 28 usc 2254d1 if the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry (E) holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end
answer:
recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear

question:
clause could be vitiated based on evidence of fraud "relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause." 228 Mich.App. 486, 498, 579 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1998). The plaintiffs have not alleged fraud in the merger clause itself. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants fraudulently induced them to buy investment properties in Detroit. The plaintiffs' allegations of fraud in the inducement do not save their breach of contract claim because the remedy for fraud in the inducement is to void the contract, not reform it. See UAW-GM, 228 Mich.App. at 508, 579 N.W.2d at 418 ("Fraud ... makes a contract voidable at the instance of the innocent party.") (quoting 3 Corbin, Contracts, 580, p. 431); Star Ins. Co., 392 F.Supp.2d at 929 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs' argument conflates their tort
Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable (B) holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law (C) holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insureds fraudulent inducement claim (D) holding that making of agreement to arbitrate was not called into question by general allegation that entire contract was void because of fraudulent inducement (E) holding that fraudulent inducement renders a contract void or voidable
answer:
holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable

question:
prior weapons conviction to support an enhanced sentence for a subsequent weapons conviction, double jeopardy principles precluded the State from introducing evidence on remand to support imposition of the same enhanced sentence). 3 . In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a retrial of the penalty phase of a capital case, when the penalty phase was tried before a jury, in a process identical to a trial on criminal liability, The Court reasoned that in that circumstance, the jury's decision not to impose the death penalty bears the hallmarks of an acquittal. The Mange Court maintained that exception. 4 . Scott asserts that Almendarez-Torres and Monge. are no longer good law be 3 (2008) (<HOLDING>), implicitly overruling State v. Hennings, 100
Holding statements: (A) holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy (B) holding based on monge that floridas double jeopardy clause does not preclude granting the state a second opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant meets the criteria for habitualization (C) holding that under monge double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes (D) holding that resentencing hearing in capital case is not barred by double jeopardy when appeals court rejects sole aggravating factor found by sentencer failure of sentencer to find other alleged aggravating factors is not an acquittal of these factors for double jeopardy purposes (E) holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted
answer:
holding that a sua sponte dismissal of the charges during trial was not an acquittal that barred retrial based on double jeopardy