In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
676 F.2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982); Carty v. Schneider, 986 F. Supp. 933, 38 V.I. 213 (D.V.I. 1997). In contrast, a fine is a criminal contempt sanction if the amount of the fine is fixed and imposed unconditionally as a punishment for past disobedience. See Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632-33 ("An unconditional penalty is criminal in nature because it is solely and exclusively punitive in character." (citations and quotations omitted)); see also Latrobe Steel Co., 545 F.2d at 1343 ("[T]he penalties arising out of adjudications of criminal contempt are generally an absolute fine of a specific amount . . . ."). Criminal fines are retroactive, and may not be avoided by purging the contemptuous conduct. See Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590, 67 S. Ct. 918, 921, 91 L. Ed. 1117 (1947) (<HOLDING>). Here, the June 13, 2006, order was phrased in
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that because a district courts determination of the appropriate fine involves factual issues including the defendants ability to pay the fine imposedthe district courts calculation of the fine is entitled to deference and can be reversed on appeal only for clear error (B) holding that where the language of the statute required the imposition of both confinement of which a portion could not be suspended and a fine the court had the ability to impose a fine and then suspend it (C) holding that a flat unconditional fine for 50 was a criminal sanction because the contemnor had no subsequent opportunity to reduce or avoid the fine through compliance (D) holding that a fiftytwo million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except through a jury trial (E) holding that the failure to impose a mandatory fine requires that the matter be remanded for imposition of that fine

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
669 (1971). Although Plaintiff requests resolution of seemingly unsettled State law questions, the issues at bar fall squarely within the Burford parameters: Plaintiff has presented difficult issues of state law, gaming is arguably an area of important state policy in Texas, and the Texas Lottery Commission (TLC) provides the unified State enforcement mechanism for some aspects of gaming law in Texas. Moreover, both the TLC and Office of the Attorney General provide an administrative procedure for organizations and individuals to request advisory opinions regarding the legality of proposed gaming actions. Certification to the Texas Supreme Court to answer the state law question at issue here would be ideal. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974)(<HOLDING>). However, under the Texas Constitution,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the district court (B) holding that certification of a remand order divests federal court jurisdiction (C) holding that the decision to transfer rests within the sound discretion of the court (D) holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services (E) holding that certification to the state supreme court rests in the sound discretion of the federal court and that certification in the long run saves time energy and resources as well as helps to build a cooperative judicial federalism

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2002) (failure to exhaust ineffective assistance claim does not create procedural bar in light of CPL 440.10(3)(c)); Marchese v. Senkowski, No. 97 Civ.2055, 1999 WL 731011, at *6 n. 4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1999) (same)); accord Affser v. Murray, No. 04 CV 2715, 2008 WL 2909367, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008) ("But those claims [of ineffective assistance of trial counsel] are not necessarily defaulted. Petitioner could raise them in yet another motion to vacate, and under 440.10(3)(c) the state court could, in its discretion, review the claims on their merits despite petitioner's failure to assert them in his previous motion to vacate."); see also Reyes v. Phillips, 02 Civ. 7319, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19488, *14-18, 2005 WL 2173812, *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (<HOLDING>); but see Caicedo v. Garvin, No. 95 CV
Holding statements: (A) holding that the lower court was not required to hold a hearing on a motion to transfer (B) holding that because section 440103b was discretionary the court was not prepared to hold that petitioner could not return to file a second section 44010 motion (C) holding premagwood that where a first 2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second 2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive 2255 motion where the movant failed to obtain authorization to file the motion from this court

Ex Output:
(B)