TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to recall the mandate discussed in Calderon, by comparison, seek the adjudication of constitutional claims; they do not constitute collateral attacks on the integrity of the court of appeals's judgment. Hence, they differ from true Rule 60(b) motions and must be denied. D. Having distinguished between SSHPs and Rule 60(b) motions, I nonetheless share the majority's general concern that petitioners will disguise the former as the latter to avoid AEDPA's restrictions. We must craft a holding that curtails this abuse. We do not write on a blank slate here, as virtually all of our sister circuits have addressed this issue. Some circuits have held that all Rule 60(b) motions are SSHPs, regardless of the nature of the claims presented. See Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975 (10th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Gee v. Shillinger, 1998 WL 43155, *1-*2, 1998
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred in failing to recharacterize a rule 60b motion as an sshp and reversing with the instruction to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (B) holding that defenses under rule 60b may be waived (C) holding without specifying exceptions that rule 60b motions are sshps under aedpa (D) holding without extended discussion that even if the district court should have construed the petitioners motion under 18 usc 3582c2 as a rule 60b motion the court would nonetheless have had to recharacterize the rule 60b motion as an sshp (E) holding without extended discussion that the peti tioners rule 60b motion was an sshp under aedpa

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: improperly determined that the "neither expected nor intended" language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an "occurrence." 21 The CGL policy's core provision defines "occurrence" by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was "neither expected nor intended." This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured's expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an "occurrence" and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). 22 Here the District Court found that Ribi
Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: 65, 71, 24, 961 P.2d 1013, 1019 (1998). Nevertheless, Arizona courts normally impose standing requirements as a matter of judicial restraint to ensure that their decisions are not moot or merely advisory, "and that the issues will be fully developed by true adversaries." Armory Park Neighborhood Ass'n v. Episcopal Community Servs., 148 Ariz. 1, 6, 712 P.2d 914, 919 (1985). A plaintiff may gain standing by alleging an injury resulting from the defendant's putatively unconstitutional conduct. Cf. Sears, 192 Ariz. at 70, 23, 961 P.2d at 1018. 13 US West intervened in the administrative proceedings resulting from the Commission's grant of CC & Ns to the Competitors, and it appears to have vigorously litigated the issues before us both in those proceedings an 9 P.2d 394, 397 (1997) (<HOLDING>). C. US West's Constitutional Issues 14 US
Holding statements: (A) holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city (B) holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent (C) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (D) holding that a city may be held liable on account of the unconstitutional conduct of city officials only if the citys policy or custom played a part in the violation (E) holding that the city had standing to challenge the formation of a water improvement district that might impede the citys expansion

SOLUTION:
(B)