In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant subsequently gave a statement. Id. 476. The court held that the detective's statements at the jail cell did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 479-480. The court further determined that the defendant, by stating that he wanted to tell his side of the story, " 'initiated' further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word." Id. at 480. Similarly, in Bunch v Thompson, 949 F2d 1354, 1361 (CA 4, 1991), the court held that a defendant's statement was not the product of "police-initiated interrogation" where it followed an inquiry that "amounted to nothing more than an effort to ascertain if Bunch had changed his mind about wanting an attorney." See also McCall v State, 501 So 2d 496, 500 (Ala Crim App, 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v Acquin, 187 Conn 647, 669-670; 448
Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (B) holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (C) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (D) holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity (E) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation
Example Output: holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime

Example Input: defendant's activities fall outside the FDCPA's general provisions); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv0274-DFHTAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (recognizing majority position that party whose activities are limited to enforcement of security interests is not subject to all FDCPA requirements, and stating, "[i]f a person invokes judicial remedies only to enforce the security interest in property, then the effort is not subject to the FDCPA (other than 1692f(6) and 1692i(a))[,] [b]ut if the person is also seeking additional relief, such as a personal judgment against the borrower, then the FDCPA applies.") (collecting cases); Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, Civ. No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 2695795, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 12, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV761 ORL28DAB,
Holding statements: (A) holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure pro ceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 (B) recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of 1692a6 a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to 1692f6 (C) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (D) holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note by filing a lawsuit in state court (E) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa
Example Output: recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of 1692a6 a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to 1692f6

Example Input: factors," the resulting sentence is procedurally reasonable. Geiner, 498 F.3d at 1114. As long as the court takes into account all of the relevant considerations, the order in which it does so is unimportant. We do not suggest that a heartland comparison is sufficient, by itself, to satisfy the district court's responsibility to weigh all the relevant factors. When the Guidelines were mandatory, a court could not depart from the recommended range unless the case was exceptional. If the court determined that the case was within the heartland, then its analysis was effectively over. Now that the Sentencing Guidelines are only advisory, there are no mandatory requirements as to when a district court may sentence a defendant to an above- or below-Guidelines sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 595 (<HOLDING>) Even in routine, heartland cases, the district
Holding statements: (A) holding that sentence within guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness (B) holding sentencing courts decision to impose a sentence six years longer than advisory guidelines range was reasonable because district court employed 3553based reasoning to justify the variance (C) holding that we may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range (D) holding that requiring extraordinary circumstances to justify a variance comes too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the guidelines range (E) holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range
Example Output:
holding that sentence within guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness