TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 2009 SD 99, 33, 775 N.W.2d 221, 235 (2009) ("The community caretaker exception has been recognized only in the context of automobiles by the United States Supreme Court." (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973))); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (describing Cady as recognizing "a community caretaking function of law enforcement as a reasonable exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement" and acknowledging "the existence of the community caretaking function in Texas"); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363-65 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (upholding a "seizure" as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on the community caretaking doctrine); State v. Ford, 2010 VT 39, 11, 188 Vt. 17, 998 A.2d 684, 689 (2010) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Commonwealth, 61 Va.App. 297, 734
Holding statements: (A) recognizing emergency exception (B) recognizing exception (C) recognizing the community caretaking exception but holding it inapplicable to justify the police action at issue (D) recognizing that the community caretaking exception is distinct from the emergency aid or emergency assistance exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement (E) holding that community caretaker exception applied but citing and relying on cases discussing the emergency aid exception

SOLUTION: recognizing emergency exception

PROBLEM: acts of sexual harassment by the plaintiffs co-workers, about which defendants' supervisors neither knew nor should have known, does not give rise to a cognizable sexual harassment claim and will not revive an otherwise stale sexual harassment claim. See Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) ("[Because no harassment event occurring during the violation period was ever brought to the attention of [the employer] while [the plaintiff] was still employed, there is no violation during the limitation period that can serve as the anchor for the earlier conduct."). Additionally, the plaintiff cannot rely on the continuing violations doctrine, because there is no nexus between the conduct of the coworkers in 1994 and the earlier incidents going back to 1992. See Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, there being no dispute as to
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur (B) holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated to coworker to whom she compared herself (C) holding that the plaintiff could not rely on the continuing violations doctrine because she had failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between alleged touching incidents by a supervisor and the later conduct of fellow employees (D) holding that a constitutional claim against nongovernment entities only lies where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself (E) holding that plaintiff cook at a nursing home had sufficiently pled requisite public policy and a close fit where she alleged she was fired for expressing concerns that a fellow employee was contaminating the area where she was preparing food

SOLUTION: holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur

PROBLEM: That decision will not be disturbed on appeal even in cases in which the record does not reflect that the issue was ever considered by the parties or the trial court. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 671. As appellee points out, Wilson was a case in which the defendant appealed after the trial court denied his motion to suppress, and did not involve a State's appeal. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (noting at the time Wilson was decided that the State did not have the right to appeal the granting of a motion to suppress); Flores, 871 S.W.2d at 720. Although distinguishable in this respect, the reasoning of Wilson is still applicable to the instant case and the observations made in Wilson remain true regardless of which party originally initiates the appellate process. Cf. Wilson, 692 S.W.2d at 668 (<HOLDING>); State v. Brady, 763 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.App.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing though not relying upon the line of cases which hold the government may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal regardless of whether the motion to suppress was granted or denied (B) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (C) holding that standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal (D) holding that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal (E) holding defendants argument the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress was reviewable as a constitutional issue even though defendant failed to raise the issue in a written posttrial motion

SOLUTION:
holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal