In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: from the OSHA inspection after this incident were for repeat offenses, the repeat offense that appears pertinent to this ease was the failure to mark a container of hazardous chemicals so as to identify the chemical. The prior citation for such an offense is not in the record, and we are unable to determine whether the "repeat" aspect of the citation pertains only to the type of citation or to the particular location of the offending container. In any event, our supreme court has not yet held that OSHA citations are evidence that compels the conclusion that a coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur. In fact, in two cases involving OSHA citations, the court has held that such citations would not support that finding. See Ex parte Martin, 733 So.2d at 396 (<HOLDING>), and Harris v. Simmons, 585 So.2d 906, 908
Holding statements: (A) holding that witnesss testimony was sufficient to support the trial courts finding that defendant committed battery that resulted in bodily injury (B) holding postaccident citation not sufficient to support finding that coemployee was substantially certain that injury or death would occur (C) holding that preaccident citation would not support a finding that coemployees were substantially certain that injury or death would occur (D) holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned (E) holding governments position substantially justified where sufficient support existed in precedent

Output: holding that witnesss testimony was sufficient to support the trial courts finding that defendant committed battery that resulted in bodily injury

Input: Consider Input: [u]nder [28 U.S.C.] 2254(d)(l)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court's inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O'Neal ("O'Neal"), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause

Output: holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause

Input: Consider Input: Appraiser to correct the assessment of their property. We agree with the trial court that the fundamental nature of the appellant's lawsuit is a challenge of an assessment and, thus, it is governed by the sixty day non-claim statute. See 194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). As the court explained in Department of Revenue v. Stafford, 646 So.2d 803, 805 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), regardless of how the complaint is couched, when a taxpayer is challenging the assessment on grounds that it was "unjust, capricious, arbitrary and illegal," the action is cognizable only under the strictures of section 194.171, which allows a suit to be filed only within 60 days from the date the assessment roll is certified for collection. See also Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.2d 814 (Fla.1988)(<HOLDING>); State, Dept. of Revenue v. Gerald Sohn, P.A.,
Holding statements: (A) holding the 60day claim period applicable to a constitutional challenge of an assessment and of the statute authorizing the assessment (B) holding that court can exercise equity jurisdiction over taxpayers challenge that property assessment system is unconstitutional facially or asapplied (C) holding that a notification letter dated 10 days before the expiration of the 60day period was timely and ignoring the date of receipt (D) holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day (E) holding that the 60day rule under the wisconsin controlled substances act is mandatory and that failure to set the hearing within that period deprived the trial court of jurisdiction
Output: holding that court can exercise equity jurisdiction over taxpayers challenge that property assessment system is unconstitutional facially or asapplied