In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: State, after expressing its clear and accurate understanding of the ... issue ..., deliberately steer[s] the District Court away from the question and towards the merits of [the] petition." Wood v. Milyard, U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 182 L.Ed.2d 733 (2012) (internal citation omitted). In Wood, the state had assured the district court that it was "not challenging, but d[id] not concede, the timeliness of the petition." Id. at 1830. As in Wood, the state's words and conduct cannot be described as an inadvertent mistake or forfeiture of the exhaustion defense, as was the case in Day, but instead they clearly evidence an express intention to waive the exhaustion requirement. As the First Circuit said, "[t]hat was game, set, and match." Pike v. Guarino, 492 F.3d 61, 71-72 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Other circuits have also held this type of
Holding statements: (A) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal (B) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (C) holding that a waived issue ordinarily cannot be resurrected on appeal whereas a forfeited issue may be reviewed for plain error (D) holding statement that petitioner is correct in her assertion that the claims presented have been exhausted was unmistakably clear and could not be resurrected on appeal alteration in original (E) holding that complaint on appeal must be the same as that presented in the trial court
Example Output: holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal

Example Input: that it can be restored, as when a house suffers smoke and water damage in a fire, the tort-feasor is liable for the costs of restoring the property to its former condition, up to the total value of the property. Applying these rules to fire-damaged trees is problematic. Is it the loss of the tree that is permanent, or the loss to the real estate? A tree that has burned and is dead is permanently destroyed, but the land on which the tree was located can be restored, either immediately by bringing in a fully grown tree or by planting a sapling. The question of "permanent" versus "temporary" damage is ultimately less helpful than the question of how the trees were used and their intrinsic value to the property. See, e.g., Mosteller v. Naiman, 416 N.J. Super. 632, 638, 7 A.3d 803 (2010) (<HOLDING>). One legal encyclopedia explains the use-value
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that quantifying damages for trees is a complex subject that depends upon the evidence in the particular case (B) holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality (C) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (D) holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review (E) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis
Example Output: holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality

Example Input: the service of process here under consideration if it were held retroactive, and the Court considers that question separately, infra. First we address our attention to the effect to be given our construction of 24-113.1(b) by reason of the intervening amendment. It is obvious that the legislature had in its contemplation situations just like the one posed by the cases for decision today when it enacted 24-113.1 (c). The question raised by the amendment is this: Did the Georgia legislature feel that 24-113.1 (b) did not cover out-of-state negligence causing an in-state injury, and because of that feeling enact 24-113.1 (c) to fill the "gap", or was it simply confirming in more explicit terms the correctness of this Court's rea 7 Ga. 294, 13 S.E. 493, 14 L.R.A. 721 (1891) (<HOLDING>). We accepted the test in Pritchard as stating
Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is retroactive (B) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary (C) holding that retroactive application of amended guidelines provision is not plain error (D) holding that the act is not retroactive (E) holding retroactive application
Example Output:
holding that the act is retroactive