TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: irrelevant, a respondent's awareness that his conduct will violate an ethical proscription is not itself material."). Simply because an attorney's conduct is intentional or dishonest does not by itself establish a dishonest or selfish motive. See In re Alcorn, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, 42, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (respondent violated his ethical duty of candor toward the tribunal, but selfish motive was not an aggravating factor). 43 In the past, we have held that dishonest or selfish motive is an aggravating factor when an attorney received some financial gain or made misrepresentations to cover his or her negligence. These previous holdings of dishonest or selfish motive involved private attorneys, not public sector lawyers. See, e.g., Arrick, 180 Ariz. at 143, 882 P.2d at 950 (<HOLDING>); Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 69, 876 P.2d at 565
Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (C) holding that lawyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to his client to conceal his negligence and improperly retained a fee from that client had a dishonest or selfish motive (D) holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client (E) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: the peremptory strike. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). In this case, we cannot say that the Florida state court's judgment was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, specifically the Supreme Court's holding in Bat-son. As for the State's strike of the first black prospective juror, the interaction between the parties and the state court (where, upon being challenged, the State revealed that it wished to strike this juror because two prosecutors had seen her sleeping during the jury selection process, and the trial court then moved onto the next juror) was adequate under Batson, so trial counsel was not ineffective in that respect. See Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n. 9 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, even assuming that Sneed's counsel
Holding statements: (A) recognizing this purpose albeit implicitly (B) recognizing that a trial judge can implicitly find a prosecutors proffered reasons credible (C) holding that the trial judge cannot simply rjubber stamp a prosecutors nonracial explanation no matter how whimsical or fanciful but in order to permit a questioned peremptory challenge must conclude that the proffered reasons are first neutral and reasonable and second not a pretext (D) holding that findings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate substantial and credible evidence (E) holding that state prosecutors agreements with defendant not binding on federal prosecutors

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: 65B.51, subd. 1 (2000). Therefore, we reverse the district court's grant of the motion for a determination of collateral source benefits and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. * Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI 10. 1 . The Minnesota Court of Appeals has interpreted the phrase "the date of the entry of the verdict" to mean the date of the entry of judgment. Wertish v. Salvhus, 555 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn.App.1997), rev'd on other grounds mem., 558 N.W.2d 258 (Minn.1997). 2 . A nonpublished case issued by this court in 1996 directly addressed the issue we must decide here. See Kissoondath v. Ammerman, No. C0-95-1346, 1995 WL 756840, at *5-*6 (Minn.App. Dec.26, 1995) (<HOLDING>), review granted (Minn. Feb. 12, 1996) and
Holding statements: (A) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the clean water act (B) holding that the limitation act does not apply to claims brought under the oil pollution act (C) holding that tenday deadline applies to motions for a reduction in a verdict brought under the nofault act (D) holding that 3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies (E) holding 3582 proceeding is criminal in nature and tenday appeal period applies and collecting cases

SOLUTION:
(C)