In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
602 F.Supp. 859, 864 (D.N.J.1985); Tedesco v. U.S. Po esentation against the Government. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). Further, the FTCA requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to adjudication in a federal court, all claims to first be brought before the appropriate agency-here, the USPS's Tort Claims Examiner. See 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). It is undisputed that Mr. Foster did not bring his claims to the USPS before initiating this suit. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. II Mr. Foster also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration and its denial of sanctions against USPS. We review these determinations for abuse of discretion. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gary v. The Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive (B) holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions (E) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit

Ex Output:
holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive

Ex Input:
the prescribed five working days after the registrant's birthday is not a defense. Barker, 34 Cal.4th at 350, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507 ("forgetting the mandatory registration requirement of section 290 is simply not a legitimate defense to the charge of willfully failing to register"). As a result, it is possible that Gonzalez violated 290(a)(1)(D) through ordinary negligence by forgetting to register during the mandated five working day period. Because the record suggests that Gonzalez made a good faith effort to comply with the registration law, we find that little or no moral culpability attaches to his violation of 290(a)(1)(D). 11 . Gonzalez's sentence is also a high multiple of the plea offers he received. See Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 969 n. 9 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282, 100
Holding statements: (A) holding that plea offers are relevant to determining whether a three strikes sentence is grossly disproportionate to the triggering offense (B) holding that penalty clauses are enforceable unless they are found to be grossly unreasonable (C) holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue (D) holding that sentencing court could consider whether the applicable guidelines were outdated and disproportionate but that imposing sentence based on the guidelines did not render sentence substantively unreasonable (E) holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense

Ex Output:
holding that penalty clauses are enforceable unless they are found to be grossly unreasonable

Ex Input:
and hiring. H.R.Rep. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630 (emphasis added). The fact that the Committee listed "discharge" along with "retaliation" shows that Congress intended to make not only retaliatory discharge but also retaliation in general actionable under 1981. In particular, the Committee Report indicates that Congress clearly intended 1981(b) to encompass retaliation against an employee for filing EEOC charges: In cutting back the scope of the rights to "make" and "enforce" contracts[,] Patterson also has been interpreted to eliminate retaliation claims that the courts had previously recognized under section 1981. See, e.g., Overby v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 884 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 5 WL 311911, at *5 (E.D.La. May 18, 1995) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. City of Chicago, 865 F.Supp. 445,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a claim of retaliation for filing eeoc charges is cognizable under 1981 (B) holding claim is not cognizable (C) holding claim is cognizable (D) holding that retaliation claims are not cognizable under 42 usc 1981 (E) holding that plaintiffs claim of reduction in work hours in retaliation for her filing of eeoc charge states a cause of action under 1981

Ex Output:
holding claim is not cognizable