In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court's factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th
Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes 46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
[A]: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard

[Q]: but clear, as a matter of law, that the "military exception" applies only to the person who served in the armed forces not his or her children. As I read Cuevas-Gaspar, no one in that case, much less the mother whose residency status was imputed, served in the United States military. The principle behind the Cuevas-Gaspar imputation rule is to avoid separating children from their permanent resident parents with whom they have resided for a significant period of time in the United States. See Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at 1024 ("[W]e are instructed ... that our immigration statutes and regulations are replete with provisions 'giving a high priority to the relation between permanent resident parents and their children.' "); see also Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). The so-called "military exception" of 8
Holding statements: (A) holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child (B) recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children (C) recognizing that because the state has cognizable interests in the safety of children in its jurisdiction neglectful parents may be separated from their children (D) recognizing parents fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children (E) holding in the primary case on which cuevasgaspar relied imputation of a parents residency status to a child may be justified where deportation would sever the bonds between parents and their children who had resided legally in the united states for the better part of their lives
[A]: holding that the evidence did not support a finding that the parents intentionally abandoned their child

[Q]: or tortured if returned to Guatemala due to his desertion from the army. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4)(B). Although Ramos-Orella-na argues that the agency improperly discredited his evidence of country conditions and placed excessive reliance on the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in Guatemala ("Country Reports"), the task of resolving conflicts in the record evidence lies "largely within the discretion of the agency." Jian Hui Shao v. Mulcasey, 546 F.3d 138, 171 (2d Cir.2008). In evaluating Ramos-Orellana's evidence of country conditions, the agency reasonably noted that the more recent Country Reports do not indicate that former army deserters are targeted for persecution or death. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 164 (2d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks omitted). Lastly,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a report from the state department is usually the best available source of information on country conditions (B) holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible (C) holding that the state department country report constituted substantial evidence to support the agencys finding of changed country conditions in guatemala (D) holding that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions the bia compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below (E) holding state department country report on fairness of liberian judicial system admissible
[A]:
holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible