In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: for a rational jury to find that Defendant Cloud was a member of the conspiracy for which he was indicted. The evidence demonstrated that Defendant Cloud combined his money together with Hall to purchase large quantities of drugs on repeated occasions. Defendant Hall testified that they would pool their money together and buy an eighth or a quarter of a kilogram of crack cocaine "every day almost." In addition, Defendant Cloud sold drugs on repeated occasions to Collier, Felix, Wilson, Ralph Jones, Jermaine Jones, and Walker. Notably, Defendant Cloud's distribution to Jermaine Jones occurred two to three times per week over the period in question. This evidence clearly can establish more than a buyer/seller relationship; it suffices to establish a conspiracy. See Brown, 332 F.3d at 373 (<HOLDING>). 2. Defendant Abdullah The evidence is
Holding statements: (A) holding that a close relationship between alleged conspirators and repeated large volume transactions were sufficient to establish a conspiracy (B) holding that the defendants purchase or sale of a large volume of narcoticsin that case one kilogram of cocainecreates an inference that he is a willful member of the conspiracy (C) holding that in a conspiracy case venue lies where the conspiracy agreement was formed or in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed by any of the conspirators (D) holding that while a simple buy and sell transaction is not sufficient for proof of a conspiracy repeated transactions for large quantities are sufficient to support an inference that the buyer and seller were engaged in a conspiracy (E) holding that evidence of specific uncharged drug trafficking offenses were not extrinsic to prosecution for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine where the events occurred within the time period of the alleged conspiracy and were demonstrative of the conspirators conduct
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: of limitations have been held as not capable of waiver or subject to an estoppel, whether pled or not.") (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissenting opinion cites several re-, cent Supreme Court decisions in support of the proposition that the statute of limitations set forth at section 2501 is not jurisdictional, including Day v. McDonough, U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006), Eberhart v. United States, U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam), Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 124 S.Ct. 1856, 158 L.Ed.2d 674 (2004), and Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). None of the foregoing decisions address section 2501. Day, 126 S.Ct. at 1681 (<HOLDING>); Arbaugh, 126 S.Ct. at 1245 (addressing
Holding statements: (A) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final (C) holding that aedpas oneyear period of limitations does not support a delay of filing of habeas petition by capital defendant (D) holding that in a designation of a foreign terrorist organization under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 aedpa the governments use of classified information without permitting the organization to view the information did not violate the organizations due process rights (E) holding that neither the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 nor the illegal immigration reform act of 1996 repealed the district courts jurisdiction to review aliens habeas petitions
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: by Otay Mesa to date. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n.11, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (cautioning that "the government cannot litigate tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent by the plaintiff in response."). After the first appeal in this case, the only remaining issue before this Court was to determine the amount Otay Mesa should recover in just compensation, with interest, for the Government's taking of a permanent easement over Otay Mesa's property. Given the Government's stipulation, Otay Mesa is entitled to reimbursement for its reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in securing just compensation for the Government's taking, Cloverport Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 121, 127 (1986) (<HOLDING>). The Government stipulated to the taking of an
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the government stipulated to liability for a taking the uniform relocation act applied at that point and mandated the award of reasonable attorneys fees and expenses even though there was limited success on the merits and certainly not the results reached that the plaintiff had contemplated (B) holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error (C) holding that even though the complaint was dismissed without prejudice as a sanction for misconduct and even though the order of dismissal was therefore not an adjudication on the merits the defendants were nevertheless properly considered the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys fees (D) holding that the plaintiff had established an entitlement to relief on the merits of the claim and was therefore entitled to fees even though it was remanded to the agency for further action (E) holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal
[EX A]:
(A)