In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther's theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts "a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman." White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther's termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender
Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law
[A]: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

[Q]: reasonably necessary. We affirm. Jurisdiction in the district court was proper based upon 18 U.S.C. 3231. Jurisdiction in this court is proper based upon 28 U.S.C. 1291. The notice of appeal was timely filed pursuant to Fed. it.App. P. 4(b). Background In the underlying criminal matter, defendant was indicted on August 22, 1995, on one count of possession of materials involving the sexual exploitation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The indictment was based on three sexually explicit photographs, found in defendant's home, which he had taken of his twelve-year-old stepdaughter. Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty. On appeal, this court vacated the conviction based upon an evidentiary issue. United States v. Heidebur, 122 F.3d 577 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On remand, defendant pled guilty. On January
Holding statements: (A) holding that district courts admission of evidence that defendant had sexually molested his stepdaughter was improper because it showed propensity and was not probative of his knowing possession of the photographs (B) holding improper admission of hearsay evidence is reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice (C) recognizing trial courts discretion in weighing the allegedlyimproper prejudicial aspects of photographs of victims against the photographs probative value (D) holding that evidence of violent crimes and other illegal activities of defendants gang was not unduly prejudicial because defendant was not directly implicated and the evidence was probative of elements of the crimes that the defendant was charged with (E) holding that district courts findings were not clearly erroneous where there was sufficient evidence that the defendants waiver of his rights was knowing and intelligent
[A]: holding improper admission of hearsay evidence is reversible error only when the admission causes prejudice

[Q]: for [her] employer! ] to operate efficiently and effectively." Id. at 418-19, 126 S.Ct. 1951. The point of this inquiry, then, is "both to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their im portant public functions." Id. at 420, 126 S.Ct. 1951. With that premise as a backdrop, the Supreme Court held that "when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." Id. at 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951; see also Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364-65 (6th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Garcetti and its Sixth Circuit progeny
Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern (B) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (C) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (D) holding that garcetti barred claims involving speech not necessarily required by the plaintiffs job duties but nevertheless related to his job duties (E) holding that when protected speech is inextricable from unprotected speech the court will treat the entire message as protected
[A]:
holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern