In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA's substantive claim. See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) ("[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were 'waters of the United States,' is merely an element of the United States' Clean Water Act case under section 301."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a consent decree "is an agreement
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) recognizing the existence of the special relationship (C) recognizing existence of two tests (D) recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements (E) holding that one of the essential elements of an abuse of process claim is the existence of an ulterior motive

Output: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional

Input: Consider Input: to the section 924(c) jury instruction, we review it for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1066 (8th Cir.1996). Although the pre-Bailey instruction was given to the jury (because Bailey had no rovide a defendant, upon their motion, any statement or report made by a government witness that relates to the subject matter of the direct testimony of that witness. 18 U.S.C. 3500. The government need not provide the statement, however, until after the witness testifies on direct examination. 18 U.S.C. 3500(a). 6 . The district court's ruling was essentially a discovery matter, which we review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Byrne, 83 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Phillips, 854 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the fbi informants file contained no brady material not already provided to the defendant in a summary (B) holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation (C) holding that an fbi agents rough notes of an interview of the defendant were not brady material because there was no independent showing that they contained evidence that was material to the defendants guilt or innocence (D) holding a trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require disclosure of an informants name (E) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment

Output: holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation

Input: Consider Input: amended its order to disqualify Camenisch on March 27, 1998. 6 . Attorney Camenisch represents Mrs. Wagner on appeal because, he explained at oral argument, the trial court's disqualification order did not extend to this court a question we decline to address. 7 . The Wagners contend that there is a question of fact as to when Sellinger was terminated, suggesting it was later than July 21. That contention has no merit. Mrs. Wagner stated in her second amended complaint that she terminated the relationship "on or about July 21, 1994." She retained Mr. Camenisch on July 31, 1994. Despite Sellinger's failure to withdraw his appearance, the record makes clear that he did not continue to serve as Mrs. Wagner's counsel after July 21, 1994. 8 . This July 25, 1994 motion was , 1219-20 (1986) (<HOLDING>); Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Fabricating,
Holding statements: (A) holding that negligently allowing a statute of limitations to run does not constitute an ethical violation (B) recognizing that the statute of limitations for a survival action began to run on the date of the decedents injury as though he was bringing his own lawsuit (C) holding that limitations period began to run when flooding occurred not when plaintiffs learned city had been on notice of flooding potential and had fraudulent motive (D) holding statute of limitations began to run when plaintiffclient learned attorney negligently drafted contract not later when plaintiff lost on merits defending contract in lawsuit (E) holding that the date on which the plaintiff learned of the defendants denial of tenure not the date on which the plaintiff became unemployed was when the statute of limitations began to run
Output: holding that negligently allowing a statute of limitations to run does not constitute an ethical violation