In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: the only issues to be determined by the reviewing court were whether the Commission acted within the scope of its authority and whether the order complained of is reasonable and not arbitrarily made. See, In re Proposed Amend. to Title 291, 264 Neb. 298, 646 N.W.2d 650 (2002); In re Application of E. Neb. Non-stock Trucking Coop, 243 Neb. 662, 501 N.W.2d 712 (1993). The district court should have addressed those issues in this case. We do so here. The fact that 75-110 gives the Commission authority to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations which it "deems necessary to regulate persons within the commission's jurisdiction" does not require the Commission to exercise such authority in any given instance. See In re Application No. C-1889, 264 Neb. 167, 647 N.W.2d 45 (2002) (<HOLDING>). Under 84-907.08, the Commission could
Holding statements: (A) holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate (B) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure (C) holding statutory authority of commission to promulgate rules to interpret law does not impose affirmative rulemaking requirement (D) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (E) recognizing that commission is not bound by statutory or common law rules of evidence
Example Output: holding some competitive rules clearly related to ratemaking power and thus within commissions constitutional authority to promulgate

Example Input: statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated
Holding statements: (A) holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action
Example Output: holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury

Example Input: "is one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable' ". The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on whether the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Additionally, a determination of whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate or reasonable entails a balancing of interests. Id. 620 A.2d at 1118 (Citations omitted). Here, Mr. Cass obviously meant to keep the contents of his locker private from the public. Mr. Cass' locker was locked, and this fact would indicate that he meant to keep the contents private. Simply because he did not own the locker does not preclude him from having an actual expectation of privacy. See, Bnmdidge supra (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 433 Pa.Super. 157,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest (B) holding that a hotel guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his room during the period of time for which the room is rented (C) holding that an overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his hosts home (D) holding that defendant had reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room rented by relatives when he had a key to the room and permission to use the room at will (E) holding that a visitor to a hotel room for purposes of distributing drugs failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room
Example Output:
holding that a dog sniff of the area outside the door of a hotel room is not a search under the fourth amendment or the texas constitution because the dogs sniff does not explore the details of the hotel room and the sniff reveals nothing about the room other than the presence of cocaine in which there is no legitimate privacy interest