In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

completed his nine month term of incarceration and was released from custody on Jply 28, 2017. Any challenge to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his term' of confinement is thus moot. See United States v. Probber, 170 F.3d 345, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing as moot an appeal from a judgment revoking supervised release where defendant had already completed his term of confinement). However, because defendant would still be entitled to a reduction of his term of supervised release if the court were to find such a reduction appropriate, we will analyze whether, as defendant claims, the supervised release component of the District Court's sentence was either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Mazza Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). Defendant contends that the District Court
Holding statements: (A) holding substantive reasonableness sentencing challenge to be moot when defendant had completed prison sentence but addressing challenge to supervised release conditions (B) holding that where trial court did not inform defendant of supervised release term during plea colloquy but did advise defendant of term in presentence report and at sentencing defendants sentence stands (C) holding that a statute requiring a threeyear term of supervised release did not eviscerate the district courts discretion to adjust the term of supervised release pursuant to 3583e (D) holding that a completed term of confinement did not render a challenge to the reasonableness of a sentence moot where defendant could receive a reduced term of supervised release (E) holding defendant convicted under 841b1a may receive lifetime term of supervised release
(D)

case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet are inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the
Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title
(B)

allows an award of costs and attorney's fees from the petitioners to the debtor. Here, Focus also asks us to order the disgorgement of attorney's fees previously paid out of Focus' estate to the petitioning creditors' attorneys. To clear the way for the relief Focus seeks, we would have to return control of the business to Focus, discharge the trustee and dismiss the involuntary petition. See Semel v. Dill (In re Dill), 731 F.2d 629, 632 (9th Cir.1984) ("An award of attorney's fees under 11 U.S.C. 303(i) depends upon dismissal of the petition."). Because we could fashion these equitable remedies, effective relief is available to Focus, and this case is therefore not moot under the first type of mootness. See Spirtos v. Moreno (In re Spirtos), 992 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Neither are we persuaded that we should
Holding statements: (A) holding that plan participants in a defined benefit pension plan have no claim to the plans surplus assets (B) holding that distributions from an inter vivos trust do not qualify as bequests and 541a5a does not operate to bring such distributions into the bankruptcy estate (C) holding that postconfirmation income that is not necessary to the fulfillment of the plan of reorganization does not become part of the bankruptcy estate (D) holding confirmation vested property in the debtor and therefore properly of the estate was not liable for postconfirmation taxes incurred by debtor (E) holding appeal not moot when court could order debtor to return to the estate postconfirmation distributions of pension plan assets
(E)