In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

removed. Section 141(b) does not contemplate that a director's term could end through board shrinkage. A bylaw that seeks to achieve this result conflicts with Section 141(b) and is void. This interpretation of Section 141(b) comports with how our law has developed. Under the common law, "the voluntary assumption of management responsibility by the directors carried with it a concomitant vested right to serve out the full term for which they were elected unless there was cause for removal...." Drexler, supra, 13.01, at 13-2; see Roven v. Cotter, 547 A.2d 603, 608 (Del.Ch.1988) ("At common law a director had a vested right in his position arising from his duties and responsibilities to the corporation."); see also Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 857 (Del.Ch.1957) (Seitz, C.) (<HOLDING>). "Prior to 1967, the [DGCL] was silent as to
Holding statements: (A) holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders (B) recognizing common law authority of stockholders to remove a director for cause (C) recognizing common law privileges (D) recognizing the presidents authority to remove sec members for good cause despite governing statutes silence (E) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary
holding that a direct action could not be maintained because the declaration does not allege the violation of any right personal to plaintiff but only violation of rights common to all the stockholders

by [the motorist]." Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that "it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow." 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas's argument, this court observed that "procedural due process requires that a person have an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas
Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action
holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

Court in the intervening years. See Fairfield, 246 S.W.3d at 668 & n. 22 (citing with approval Milligan, Shaffer, Vanderlinden, and Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lichte, 792 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1990), writ denied per curiam, 825 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.1991)); see also id. at 683 (Hecht, J., concurring) (identifying Manriques v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 779 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied), a case relied on by Laine, as one of only two courts that "have concluded that punitive damages are damages for bodily injury covered by automobile policies," a position that "has been uniformly rejected in the context of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage"); Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>), overruled by Milligan, 940 S.W.2d 228 (citing
Holding statements: (A) holding business automobile policy issued to a corporation did not provide uninsured motorist coverage for owners son (B) holding that while the owner of several vehicles by paying a single premium for um coverage applicable to only one of them secures um coverage for himself and his family while occupying the uninsured vehicles as well as the insured vehicle the number of uninsured motorist coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of coverages for which uninsured motorist premiums were paid (C) holding that language requiring insurer to pay all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile includes recovery of exemplary damages under uninsured motorist provision of policy (D) holding that an insurer may assert as defenses the nonnegligence of the uninsured the contributory negligence of the insured and the lack of resulting damage all being matters of substantive law and legal defenses of the uninsured but it does not succeed to the rights of the uninsured motorist to interpose the latters procedural defense of statute of limitations (E) holding that a hit and run or unknown driver is deemed to be uninsured for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute
holding business automobile policy issued to a corporation did not provide uninsured motorist coverage for owners son