instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
Accordingly, the second Olano prong is satisfied: the error, both as to the absence of a jury determination on an essential element of the offense and the failure to include that element in the indictment, was indeed "plain." c. Did the plain error affect Thomas's substantial rights? An error affects a defendant's "substantial rights" if it is "prejudicial" and it "affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." Gore, 154 F.3d at 47. "Though 'prejudice' is also required to show that an error is not 'harmless,' pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a), the important difference of plain error prejudice [in most cases] is that '[i]t is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of pers , 2001), with United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100-01 3d Cir. (2001) (en banc) (<HOLDING>), and United States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65,
Holding statements: (A) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (B) holding that constitutional error cannot be premised on error in a charge unless the error violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the fourteenth amendment (C) holding that sentencing error is harmless if the error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed (D) holding at the governments urging that a similar error was an error in both the trial and sentencing (E) holding that error in method by which interest from damages award was calculated was an error in substantive law not a clerical or mathematical error
answer:
(D)

question:
as defined by Section 30-31-2(M), his acts of cultivating or growing mushrooms, even if by artificial means, are not prohibited by Section 30-31-20(A)(1). To interpret Section 30-31-20(A)(1) otherwise, as the State suggests, would require us to read language into the statute that is not there. See Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, 10, 13, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801 (refusing to read a personal use exception into the CSA, reasoning that to do so "would impermissibly read language into a statute that makes sense as written"). {11} Our holding is also supported by an analysis of the federal counterpart to Section 30-31-20(A)(1), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (2000) of the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (federal act). See State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 760, 626 P.2d 292, 297 (Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction (C) recognizing a reliance on federal jurisprudence for the interpretation of louisianas arbitration statutes (D) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (E) recognizing that the csa is patterned after the federal act and relying on federal interpretation to the extent that the statutes are similar
answer:
(E)

question:
401 F.3d at 1228 n. 2 ("[W]hen an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned."). To avoid removal under the Convention Against Torture, "[t]he burden of proof is on the applicant ... to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal." 8 C.F.R. 208.16(c)(2). As under the INA, this burden of proof for the applicant is higher than the burden imposed on an applicant for asylum. Therefore, an applicant like Prado, who cannot show that he has a well-founded fear of persecution, also cannot show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1303; Zheng, 451 F.3d at 1292; Forgue v. United States Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1288 n. 4 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Substantial evidence supports the BIA's
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each (B) holding that if an applicant fails to meet the standard for asylum he a fortiori fails to meet the requirements for withholding of removal and relief under the cat (C) recognizing that withholding of removal and cat claims necessarily fail if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same (D) recognizing that withholding of removal claims must fail if petitioner is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the claims are based on the same factual predicate (E) holding that where a petitioner fails to establish a claim for asylum on the merits his claims for withholding of removal under the ina and cat also necessarily fail
answer:
(E)