Input: The letterhead on correspondence still bears the Bexar County Legal Aid name, even though the organization is no longer. Texas Rural Legal Aid - known for its fearless and sometimes controversial advocacy of the poorest of the poor - last week took over four other corporations serving the legal needs of the indigent in Southwest Texas, including the one in Bexar County. The new 68-county legal aid organization has yet to be named and stretches from El Paso to Corpus Christi, Harlingen to Austin. The leader for the super-sized law firm has big plans. "I'm more interested in looking at what we as advocates can do to address the serious problems of poverty than the number of cases we close," said David Hall, the TRLA executive director. In the Rio Grande Valley, Hall's attorneys set up separate groups to assist small-business owners and residents with low-interest loans and legal representation. They also operate a legal arm that assists migrant workers from Texas to Kentucky. Now, Hall said, he wants to make services to the poor more efficient by working with law students who will handle less complicated legal matters, allowing licensed attorneys to take more "high impact" cases to court. "What we need to do is handle cases as efficiently as we can, leveraging the amount of time of the lawyer that goes in there and maximizing the number of people that they can help at one time," Hall said. His plan is to place the 110 attorneys on staff in teams working on specialized legal issues. He wants to expand the law clinic it already has with St. Mary's University Law School to involve students at the University of Texas Law School. The law students at St. Mary's interview potential clients, assist them with filling out legal documents and answer the telephones for the legal hotline, freeing up TRLA lawyers to handle the complicated cases, Hall said. By the end of September, Hall said all the attorneys working with the poor in the 68county area will be placed on the same computer network so they can pass cases to the best available attorneys. Last year, board members on the former Legal Aid of Central Texas and Bexar County Legal Aid resisted the merger, saying that the mergers were done illegally and without the input of board members. They also argued that Hall's litigious style hampered their ability to garner funds from Congress. TRLA generated controversy in 1996, when its attorneys challenged the rights of 800 military personnel to vote in Val Verde County elections by absentee ballot after a former Ku Klux Klan member won a county commissioner post. Brendan Gill, the former executive director of the Bexar County group, said he has since come to see the merger as a positive move for South Texas. "I always knew there were good points to merging, just as I knew that there were bad points," Gill said.

Does the response "The legal Aid of Central Texas and Legal Aid of Bexar County because it made it hard to get funds from Congress" correctly answer the question "Who resisted the merge and why?"?
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Output: yes

Input: The after-action review had treated the CIA as the lead agency for any offensive against al Qaeda, and the principals, at their March 10 meeting, had endorsed strengthening the CIA's capability for that role. To the CTC, that meant proceeding with "The Plan," which it had put forward half a year earlier-hiring and training more case officers and building up the capabilities of foreign security services that provided intelligence via liaison. On occasion, as in Jordan in December 1999, these liaison services took direct action against al Qaeda cells. In the CTC and higher up, the CIA's managers believed that they desperately needed funds just to continue their current counterterrorism effort, for they reckoned that the millennium alert had already used up all of the Center's funds for the current fiscal year; the Bin Laden unit had spent 140 percent of its allocation. Tenet told us he met with Berger to discuss funding for counterterrorism just two days after the principals' meeting. While Clarke strongly favored giving the CIA more money for counterterrorism, he differed sharply with the CIA's managers about where it should come from. They insisted that the CIA had been shortchanged ever since the end of the Cold War. Their ability to perform any mission, counterterrorism included, they argued, depended on preserving what they had, restoring what they had lost since the beginning of the 1990s, and building from there-with across-the-board recruitment and training of new case officers, and the reopening of closed stations. To finance the counterterrorism effort, Tenet had gone to congressional leaders after the 1998 embassy bombings and persuaded them to give the CIA a special supplemental appropriation. Now, in the aftermath of the millennium alert, Tenet wanted a boost in overall funds for the CIA and another supplemental appropriation specifically for counterterrorism. To Clarke, this seemed evidence that the CIA's leadership did not give sufficient priority to the battle against Bin Laden and al Qaeda. He told us that James Pavitt, the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, "said if there's going to be money spent on going after Bin Laden, it should be given to him. My view was that he had had a lot of money to do it and a long time to do it, and I didn't want to put more good money after bad." The CIA had a very different attitude: Pavitt told us that while the CIA's Bin Laden unit did"extraordinary and commendable work," his chief of station in London "was just as much part of the al Qaeda struggle as an officer sitting in [the Bin Laden unit]." The dispute had large managerial implications, for Clarke had found Ailies in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Does the response "OMB" correctly answer the question "Who is considered the lead agency when dealing with Al Qaeda and what did it mean for the CTC?"?
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Output: no

Input: The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money.

Does the response "$215 million" correctly answer the question "In 1999 the president decided to apply the same designations of freezing assets of the Taliban held in the United States and it resulted in how much money being frozen?"?
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Output:
no