In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: to landslide, even though earth movement was the most immediate cause). We therefore conclude that this is a case of multiple causation. B. We must now determine whether the deterioration or the fungicide manufacturers' failure to warn is the "proximate efficient cause" of the damage to Berry's irrigation pipes. In Sabella, the California Supreme Court defined "proximate efficient cause" both as "the one that sets others in motion" and as "the predominating or moving efficient cause." Sabella, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 695, 377 P.2d at 895; see Garvey, 257 Cal.Rptr. at 296, 770 P.2d at 708 ("Sabella defined 'efficient proximate cause' alternatively as the 'one that sets others in motion' and as 'the predominating or moving efficient cause.'") (citations omitted); Howell, 267 Cal.Rptr. at 716 (<HOLDING>); Brian Chuchua's Jeep, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d at 445
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements (B) recognizing existence of two tests (C) recognizing first two exceptions (D) recognizing that the existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact (E) recognizing the existence of the special relationship

Answer: recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements

Question: small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is "whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is 'reasonably necessary' to protect that public's right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands"). Plaintiffs' taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83
Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary (C) holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality (D) holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws (E) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public

Answer: holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege

Question: this may be the case, the fact that Plaintiff Berrios knew about his rights under COBRA does not relieve Defendants from their obligations under the statute. Neither a plaintiffs actual knowledge of his rights under COBRA nor his prior COBRA-related job responsibilities, dispenses with a plan administrator's obligation to give the employee the notifications enumerated in 29 U.S.C. Section 1166(a). Rodriguez v. Int'l College of Bus. & Tech., Inc., 364 F.Supp.2d 40, 46 (D.P.R.2005); Torres-Negron v. Ramallo Bros. Printing, 203 F.Supp.2d 120, 124-25 (D.P.R.2002) (stating that even where the former employee's duties during employment included the distribution of COBRA notices, the plan administrator must provide COBRA notice); see Mlsna v. Unitel Communs., 41 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, on the record before the Court
Holding statements: (A) holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions (B) holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted (C) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant (D) holding an employees knowledge of his cobra rights does not relieve the plan administrator of its notification duties (E) holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review

Answer:
holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions