In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

such entities from exercising their right of eminent domain. We disagree. The statute unambiguously prohibits any curtailment or limitation of an FmHA-indebted water association's services resulting from municipal annexation or inclusion. This language indicates a congressional mandate that local governments not encroach upon the services provided by such associations, be that encroachment in the form of competing franchises, new or additional permit requirements, or similar means. To read a loophole into this absolute prohibition, as Madison would have us do, and allow a city to do via condemnation what it is forbidden by other means, would render nugatory the clear purpose of 1926(b). See Moore Bayou Water Association, Inc. v. Town of Jonestown, 628 F.Supp. 1367 (N.D.Miss.1986) (<HOLDING>). Madison contends that this construction of
Holding statements: (A) holding that 1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (B) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (C) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted (D) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of 1926b (E) holding that because exclusion was not provided to certificate holder terms of the certificate controlled
holding that 1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents

plenary determination of jurisdiction over five landlocked canals); Weiszmann v. District Engineers, U.S. Army Corp, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.1976) (same outcome as in Sexton Cove in action brought by landowner); U.S. v. St. Bernard Parish, 589 F.Supp. 617 (E.D.La.1984) (plenary trial determining jurisdictional issue); U.S. v. Lambert 589 F.Supp. 366 (M.D.Fla.1984) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland; proof by preponderance of evidence was measure of government's burden of persuasion); U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.J.1984) (in action for preliminary injunction, court made own determination that property was a wetland); U.S. v. City of Fort Pierre, 580 F.Supp. 1036 (D.S.D.1983) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland) rev'd, 747 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Parkview Corp. v. Department of Army Corp of
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (B) holding property not a wetland (C) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (D) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate (E) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover
holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property

the doctrine was extended to include automobiles. See S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). In doing so, the court reasoned: The principles of common law do not permit the owner of an instrumentality that is not dangerous per se, but is peculiarly dangerous in its operation, to authorize another to use such instrumentality on the public highways without imposing upon such owner liability for negligent use. The liability grows out of the obligation of the owner to have the vehicle, that is not inherently dangerous per se, but peculiarly dangerous in its use, properly operated when it is by his authority on the public highway. Anderson v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975, 978 (1917). Therefore, the doctrine "imposes strict vicariou (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (<HOLDING>); Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So.2d 107,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a trailer is not a dangerous instrumentality notwithstanding the fact that it meets the statutory definition of a motor vehicle (B) holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling (C) holding that although it does not meet the statutory definition of a motor vehicle a forklift is a dangerous instrumentality (D) holding that a collision with the loading ramp of a trailer was not actual physical contact with a motor vehicle (E) holding that the sensible and popular understanding of what a motor vehicle accident entails necessarily involves the motor vehicle being operated as a motor vehicle
holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling