Input: The dermis is the inner layer of skin. The dermis has blood vessels and nerve endings. The nerve endings explain why your skin is sensitive. You can sense pain, pressure, and temperature. You cut your finger and it starts to bleed. What has happened? If your skin bleeds, it means you have cut the dermis layer and damaged blood vessels. The cut really hurts. It hurts because of the nerve endings in this skin layer. The dermis also contains hair follicles and two types of glands. Hair follicles are structures where hairs originate. Each hair grows out of a follicle. Hair passes up through the epidermis. It then extends above the skin surface. Oil glands produce an oily substance. The oil is secreted into hair follicles.

Does the response "Because it presses down too hard" correctly answer the question "Why do I feel pressure when someone pokes me?"?

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Output: no

Input: It is not enough to describe some objects by their location. We may also need to know its direction. For example, a wind blows a storm over your school. Where is that storm coming from? Where is it going? How can we describe a direction? The most common way is by using a compass. A compass is a device with a floating needle (Figure 2.1). The needle is a small magnet. The needle aligns itself with the Earth's magnetic field. The compass needle always points to magnetic north. If you have a compass and you find north. You can then know any other direction. See the directions, such as east, south, west, etc., on a compass rose. The Earth has two poles. It has a magnetic north pole. It also has a geographic north pole. These two poles are close to each other but not the exact same place.

Does the response "so that we can chase it with our car." correctly answer the question "Why might it be helpful to know direction of a moving object, such as a storm, in addition to its location?"?

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Output: no

Input: Even after Bin Laden's departure from the area, CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was still set up. The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity. On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and Bin Laden. Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA. When the former Bin Laden unit chief found out about Clarke's call, he questioned CIA officials, who denied having given such a clearance. Imagery confirmed that less than a week after Clarke's phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site was deserted. CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt, were irate." Mike" thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possible site for targeting Bin Laden. The United Arab Emirates was becoming both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem. From 1999 through early 2001, the United States, and President Clinton personally, pressed the UAE, one of the Taliban's only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and enforce sanctions, especially those relating to flights to and from Afghanistan. These efforts achieved little before 9/11. In July 1999, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid threatened to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Laden. The Taliban did not take him seriously, however. Bin Zayid later told an American diplomat that the UAE valued its relations with the Taliban because the Afghan radicals offered a counterbalance to "Iranian dangers" in the region, but he also noted that the UAE did not want to upset the United States.

Does the response "In July 1999" correctly answer the question "When and why did the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid threaten to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Laden?"?

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Output: yes

Input: The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money.

Does the response "$215 million" correctly answer the question "In 1999 the president decided to apply the same designations of freezing assets of the Taliban held in the United States and it resulted in how much money being frozen?"?

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- no
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Output:
no