In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: includes a determination of the significance, if any, of the TNRC's involvement. When the EPA in 1990 shifted from a "strict" to "substantial compliance" standard for private parties, it did so "to encourage private parties to perform voluntary cleanups of sites, and to remove unnecessary obstacles to their ability to recover their costs from the parties that are liable for the contamination." 55 FecLReg. at 8792-93. The EPA expressly recognized that requiring private parties to adhere to a set of mechanical rules would impede this objective. Thus the list of public comment provisions identified in 40 C.F.R. 300.700(c)(6) is only a "universe of requirements which are potentially relevant," and should "not be c Ry. Co. v. Gee Co., 2002 WL 31163777, at *30 (N.D.Ill. Sept.30, 2002) (<HOLDING>); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Amcast Int'l Corp., 177
Holding statements: (A) holding that government involvement must be accompanied by public comment because a purpose of ncp is to ensure that those responsible for the cleanup receive citizens input regarding environmental conditions in the community (B) holding that public participation requirement was satisfied in part because the ncp policy is to allow potentially responsible parties an opportunity to comment before costs are incurred and no prps were denied an opportunity to comment (C) holding five day public comment period on a portion of an ea insufficient remanding for further public comment (D) holding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial based on a comment that the defendant was in prison where the comment provided the jury with little detail (E) holding that meetings with representatives of various affected parties were insufficient to meet public participation requirement because there was never an opportunity for the public at large to comment on the plan without explaining why such opportunity was necessary

A: (B)
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Q: case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet are inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the
Holding statements: (A) holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability (B) holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade (C) recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim (D) holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title (E) holding that void deed is neither title nor color of title

A: (B)
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Q: which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tor-tious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby."). 14 . Although we have cited 302B several times in dicta, this court has never invoked that section as a source of liability. See Bryson v. Banner Health Sys., 89 P.3d 800, 805 n. 11 (Alaska 2004) (quoting almost identical language in Prosser and Keeton on Torts for the proposition that a special relationship may yield a duty to protect another from a third party); Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 471 n. 67 (Alaska 2001) (citing 302B for the proposition that "a reasonably foreseeable occurrence cannot be an intervening/superseding cause if the actor has a duty to prevent that occurrence"); Wil 011) (<HOLDING>); Kim v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 143
Holding statements: (A) holding that a prior conviction for abusive sexual contact under 18 usc 2244a3 was a per se crime of violence within the meaning of the application notes and declining to consider application of the residual clause (B) holding that defendants constitutionally protected privacy interest began at the door to his room not at the door to the rooming house (C) holding that violence was not the foreseeable result of opening the door to an abusive and upset exhusband while a new boyfriend was over (D) holding that opening the door in response to a police demand and then failing to object when officers entered was not voluntary consent (E) holding that arrest by the back door of defendants house was unlawful

A:
(C)
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