In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

that the people in the venire do not represent a fair and reasonable cross-section of the District of New Mexico. See United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1979)(stating that residents of counties, cities, and towns do not constitute a distinct, cognizable group for purposes of Sixth Amendment cross-section analysis); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 582 (10th Cir.1976)("Mere geographical imbalance, absent evidence that an identifiable and cognizable segment of the community has been systemically excluded or underrepresented by reason of such imbalance, does not violate the statutory and constitutional requirement that the jury panel represent a 'fair cross section' of the community."); United States v. Traficant, 209 F.Supp.2d 764, 780-81 (N.D.Ohio 2002)(<HOLDING>). Considering the foregoing, the Court will
Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group (B) holding that residents of a geograph ic area are not a distinct cognizable group and citing united states v test which made clear that a geographic area is not a distinct group for support (C) holding same and citing physicians multispecialty group (D) recognizing women as a distinct group (E) recognizing native americans as a distinct group
holding that the defendant did not prove that italianamericans are a cognizable group

[u]nder [28 U.S.C.] 2254(d)(l)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court's inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O'Neal ("O'Neal"), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause

(III) (B). 25 Jones v. State, 318 Ga. App. 26, 36 (5) (733 SE2d 72) (2012); see Kidwell v. State, 264 Ga. 427, 432 (10) (444 SE2d 789) (1994) ("Since the grant or denial of a motion to sever is left in the discretion of the trial court, its ruling will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion . . . .") (punctuation omitted). 26 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); accord McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 615 (3) (791 SE2d 69) (2016). 27 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); see Kidwell, 264 Ga. at 432 (10) ("The burden is on the defendant requesting the severance to 'make a clear showing of prejudice_' ") (punctuation omitted). 28 Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (punctuation omitted); see Kidwell, 264 Ga. at 432 (10). 29 See McClendon, 299 Ga. at 615 (3) (<HOLDING>); Jones, 318 Ga. App. at 36 (5) (holding that
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because codefendants defenses were not antagonistic (B) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to continue trial three months where although trial was complex and records were voluminous court had already granted two prior continuances and continuance of three weeks was sufficient to prepare for trial (E) holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because trial of three defendants would not create confusion
holding that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to sever because codefendants defenses were not antagonistic