In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: issue, we need not consider the second argument raised. 7 . In a dissent to Smith, Judge Friedman, joined by Judges Pellegrini and Kelley, objected to following the Miller/Lewis/Selan line of cases which automatically equated the refusal to sign a hospital consent form with a refusal to submit to chemical testing. The dissenting judges expressed preference for the other line of caselaw, particularly Conrad, and noted that because Smith orally agreed to the blood test and only refused to sign the hospital consent form, which was a pre-test procedure linked to the test, although not required by section 1547, Smith did not make a knowing and conscious refusal to submit to chemical testing. 8 . Wheatley v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 104 Pa.Cmwlth. 171, 521 A.2d 507 (1987) (<HOLDING>). 9 Although Renwick does not expressly
Holding statements: (A) holding refusal to sign hospital waiver of liability form is not a refusal under section 1547 (B) holding that refusal to consent to search cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion (C) holding that refusal to submit to breathalyzer test did not result from custodial interrogation (D) holding that a refusal to sign an implied consent form is not a refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test for purposes of section 1547 (E) holding that a district court did not clearly err in crediting agents testimony that a defendant had orally consented despite his refusal to sign consent form

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: filed, is the verdict, and a showing that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself." (punctuation omitted)). 19 See former OCGA 17-9-41 ("The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict."); Fulton County v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 65, 65 (16 SE 260) (1892) (syllabus by the court) ("According to repeated rulings of this court, the affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain, but not to impeach, their verdict."); see also former OCGA 9-10-9 (providing the same rule in civil procedure). 20 See generally OCGA 24-1-2 (e) ("Except as modified by statute, the common law as expounded b tate, 323 Ga. App. 15, 17 (2) (747 SE2d 99) (2013). 34 Freeman, 264 Ga. at 278; see Wade v. State, 261 Ga. 105, 107-08 (6) (401 SE2d 701) (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 503
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that upon objection to the form of the verdict trial court did not err in returning jury for further deliberations (E) holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: Third, the Kimmell court did not actually address whether future projections were actionable, but merely assumed that they were based on the procedural posture of the case and the issues addressed on appeal. Id. Finally, the Second Circuit noted that, "although the Appellate Division in Kimmell [implicitly] found that future prediction/projeetions could qualify as the basis for a negligent misrepresentation claim ..., that finding is contrary to the great weight of authority." Id. The Court agrees with the Second Circuit's analysis. The inquiry does not depend on whether the omission itself relates to a past or present fact. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the failure to disclose renders an existing statement of fact false or misleading. Cf. Metropolitan, 532 F.Supp.2d at 1290 (<HOLDING>). If this were not the case, almost any
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that an omission claim could not be maintained where plaintiff did not point to previous statements that were misleading without further disclosures (C) holding that a duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading (D) holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading (E) holding that a cause of action based on an omission requires the plaintiff to show how an alleged omitted fact negates the truth of or renders misleading the statements actually made
Output: (E)