In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority's opinion that the term "expenses" as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority's determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38
Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs
[A]: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid

[Q]: up to $2,000, which would have set aside, in a literal sense, a discrete "amount . . . necessarily consumed for the support of' the taxpayer and his or her family. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 572. This description, made in reference to an income tax exemption, is not applicable to the question of whether an income tax assessed on gross rather than net income is unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate. Certainly nothing in that opinion suggested that such an exemption was necessary in order to render that tax constitutional. Where we have found that a tax was unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate, the constitutional deficiency has been of a much different character than the one the petitioners allege here. See Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 470-71 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 783-84
Holding statements: (A) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (B) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (C) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (D) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (E) holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge
[A]: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety

[Q]: Legal Texts 4 (2012) ("A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored."). This result also makes sense in the context of bankruptcy litigation. The lion's share of damages from violations of automatic stays are typically attorneys' fees. Most debtors are not in the financial position to afford an action to prosecute damages and, even if they could, limiting fees to those incurred in ending the stay violation would be too small to justify the expensive litigation that may follow. See Schwartz-Tallard, 803 F.3d at 1100. Rather than draining the limited funds in the bankruptcy estate and jeopardizing creditors' recoveries, the party wrongfully violating the automatic stay and causing the resulting damage 1th Cir. 1989) (<HOLDING>); see also Comm'r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154,
Holding statements: (A) holding that under the wpcl an employee who has prevailed on a claim for past wages due is entitled to attorneys fees as a matter of entitlement (B) holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc 1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal (C) holding that the plaintiff who prevailed in an ipra enforcement action was entitled to an award of damages fees and costs (D) holding that a district court may award attorneys fees while the merits are on appeal (E) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983
[A]:
holding that under the wpcl an employee who has prevailed on a claim for past wages due is entitled to attorneys fees as a matter of entitlement