In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 558, 563, 564 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2002). DISCUSSION Moody argues the circuit court erred in granting Dairy-land's motion for summary judgment, asserting Dairyland did not make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage because it failed to offer coverage in amounts less than the statutory minimum limits. We disagree. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature." Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, 353 S.C. 31, 40, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003).. Moreover, "[w]here the terms of the statute are clear, [this Court] must apply those terms according to their literal meaning." Brown v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002); see also Rowe v. Hyatt, 321 S.C. 366, 369, 468 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In relevant part, section 38-73-470 provides
Holding statements: (A) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding when interpreting a statute words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statutes operation (D) holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation (E) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning

A: holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning
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Q: appealed the judgment of the Court of Veterans Appeals to this court. On appeal the Secretary contends that the Court of Veterans Appeals erred by not deferring to the Department's reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions governing claims for accrued benefits. The Secretary also disputes Mrs. Jones's assertion that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. ANALYSIS I. Jurisdiction to hear appeals from final decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals is conferred upon this court by 38 U.S.C. 7292 (1994). Under the express terms of that statute, however, we "may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case." 38 U 625, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 2663-64, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district courts remand order effectively invalidating certain regulations of the secretary of health and human services was an immediately appealable order (B) holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding that the denial of a motion to remand is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (E) holding such denial to be an immediately appealable collateral final order

A: holding sanctions order pursuant to district courts inherent powers not immediately appealable
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Q: CMI customers pay up to $15,000 to attend "trust academies" run by TES. (Aldridge Trial Tr. at 1287-88, 1295; T. Galley Dep. at 28; S. Galley Decl. 8-9). At these trust academies, customers set up a collection of trusts for the purposes of holding title to customers' assets and paying their expenses, thereby allowing customers to deduct most of their personal expenses. (RFA 18, 22). CMI and defendant represent that these trusts will allow conversion of up to 97% of income to a tax shelter with "full disclosure to the IRS." (S. Galley Decl. 14, 22; RFA 16; Fields Dep. at 41-42). The IRS may disregard an entity for tax purposes where such entity lacks economic substance. Richardson, 509 F.3d at 741; see also Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To determine whether a trust has sufficient
Holding statements: (A) holding that the economicsubstance doctrine is a judicial tool for effectuating the underlying congressional purpose that despite literal compliance with the statute tax benefits not be afforded based on transactions lacking in economic substance (B) holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law (C) recognizing that an issuer has the primary obligation to pay on letter of credit such that literal compliance with the letter of credits terms for payment is all that is required (D) holding that equitable considerations did not toll the statute of limitations under the tort claims act where plaintiffs conduct was not in strict compliance with congressional waiver of immunity (E) recognizing that the purpose of the setoff doctrine is to prevent circuity of judicial actions

A:
holding complete prohibition on use of crime or accident reports for purpose of soliciting clients too broad a means of effectuating the intended purpose of the law
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