In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: until after the interview ended. Defendants therefore contend that we should ignore contrary testimony by Whalen and Connelly. On summary judgment, however, we do not merely accept the plaintiff's contentions as true. Instead, we must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovanfs favor. There is no requirement that inferences favorable to the plaintiff may only be based on evidence that she has submitted to us. Here, the justifiable inference favorable to plaintiff is that a question of fact exists regarding this issue. 6 . The Supreme Court's plurality decision in Al-bright casts some doubt on whether a plaintiff may state a claim for coercion of a confession under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See Albright,-U.S. at-,-,-, -, 114 S.Ct. at 813, 814, 817, 820-21 (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has stated that Albright
Holding statements: (A) holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under 1983 because it violates the fourth amendment (B) recognizing 1983 substantive due process claim (C) holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed (D) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding in five separate opinions that 1983 claim based on persons arrest cannot be brought under substantive due process where more specific constitutional provision fourth amendment applies
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: defendant to trust the advice of his counsel in weighing the immigration consequences of his decision. Petitioner's counsel advised him that he would "in all likelihood, receive a sentence of only one to three years' imprisonment." (Id.) The fact that this turned out to be true, buttresses the court's conclusion that it was reasonable for Petitioner to rely on his counsel's advice in making his immigration decisions. Second, and more importantly, however, case law before IIRIRA held that even an alien who received a sentence longer than five years might have maintained eligibility for 212(c) relief, provided that the alien had not served five years of his sentence at the time of his removal hearing. See Matter of Ramirez-Somera, 1992 WL 301623, 20 I. & N. Dec. 564, 566 (BIA 1992) (<HOLDING>). Thus, the fact that Petitioner could have
Holding statements: (A) holding that sentences of five years in prison followed by ten years probation were illegal sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for a thirddegree felony (B) holding that magistrate judge had jurisdiction to dismiss prison inmates action under 42 usc 1983 as frivolous without consent of defendants because defendants had not been served yet and therefore were not parties (C) holding that a potential prison sentence of up to five years was clearly serious (D) holding the same where the term conviction refers to a defendant who has been found guilty of a listed offense but has not yet been sentenced (E) holding that an immigrant defendant is eligible for 212c relief despite having been sentenced to a fifteen year prison term because he had not yet served five years of the sentence
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding, on these facts, that defendants were not entitled to a qualified immunity and, accordingly, in denying defendants' motion for a summary judgment. A Pratt Already Received Full Procedural Due Process. [ 18] The Superior Court found that "[b]y 1996, it was well established 'that a constructive discharge of a public employee without procedural due process constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property.' ... .Supp.2d 893, 906 (N.D.Cal.1997), aff'd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.2000) (stating that "Wasson, by acknowledging that she was placed on administrative leave, cannot claim that she was deprived of a property interest in her employment, as a matter of law"); Hunt v. Prior, 236 Conn. 421, 673 A.2d 514, 524 (1996) (<HOLDING>); Koelsch v. Town of Amesbury, 851 F.Supp. 497,
Holding statements: (A) holding that an employers statement that he did not feel that he could afford the unions proposals did not trigger a duty to disclose because the overall context of bargaining did not suggest an inability to pay (B) holding that the plaintiff was entitled to back pay for the differential between unemployment compensation received and the salary he would have earned if not terminated (C) holding that a suspension with pay did not carry consto tutional ramifications because plaintiff did not prove that he was entitled to anything but his salary (D) holding that even though the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered a meaningful injury he was nevertheless entitled to nominal damages for the defendants violation of his first amendment rights (E) holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act
[EX A]:
(C)