In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: assumed the illegible stamp was the certification. We are not persuaded by Mr. Grynberg's argument that because the certification was illegible on the e-filed copy, L & R Venture's copy of the judgment did not comply with the Act. The flegibility created by the electronic filing process did not transform L & R Venture's properly authenticated judgment into an unauthenticated one. And, contrary to Mr. Grynberg's assertion, L & R Venture's counsel's presentation of the original copy at the hearing was not to correct an improper filing, but rather to prove that the original filing was properly authenticated. See C.R.C.P. 44(c) ("This Rule does not prevent the proof of official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any method authorized by law."); cf. Griggs, 754 P.2d at 784-85 (<HOLDING>). It may be, however, as Mr. Grynberg contends,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court lacked authority to enforce a foreign judgment where the plaintiff filed only an affidavit describing the foreign judgment and not a certified copy of the judgment itself in the first instance (B) holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular (C) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: constructive, or judicially imposed lien, or (4) asserted against real or personal property. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 51.903; Cardenas v. Wilson, 428 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that 51.903 inquiry into mechanic's lien determines only that mechanic's lien is provided by Texas law, not whether the underlying mechanic's lien was valid). If the motion requires greater inquiry, then it is a motion for declaratory judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 37.004(a) (West 2015); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) ("We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it."); Nguyen, 2016 WL 2343893, at *2 (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *2-3 (<HOLDING>)). A motion for declaratory judgment must be
Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding motion requesting more relief than section 51903 provides was motion for declaratory judgment (C) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: Plaintiff asserts that his right to the foreshore did not derive from a grant from the State, but instead from a colonial grant from Thomas Dongan, the Governor of Staten Island. Even if the court were to consider Plaintiffs post-trial submissions, including the Dongan grant and the Caleb Ward deeds, the court would find that Plaintiff did not own the foreshore. The Dongan Grant transferred to Christopher Billopp approximately 1600 acres of property on Staten Island and designated that the foreshore was included in the boundary of the property. Pl.Ex. Bl. New York courts have found, under the public trust doctrine, that large grants of land to private individuals are ultra vires and void. See Marba Sea Bay Corp. v. Clinton St. Realty Corp., 272 N.Y. 292, 296, 5 N.E.2d 824 (1936) (<HOLDING>); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 406, 39 N.E. 400
Holding statements: (A) holding where plan language can be interpreted both to grant discretion and not to grant discretion plan does not unambiguously grant discretion (B) holding that a state has subject matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce if one of the spouses is domiciled in the state (C) holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion (D) holding that a report relied upon by agency in determining whether or not to award a grant had not been adopted as there is no indication in the record that in funding the grant the agency expressly adopted the reasoning of the report (E) holding in reference to an eleven mile grant of the foreshore that neither the king nor the state could grant away for private purposes so much of the publics rights in the lands under water
[EX A]:
(E)