In this task, you are given the abstract of a research paper. Your task is to generate a summary of this abstract. Your summary should not be very short, but it's better if it's not more than 30 words.

Ex Input:
Metric embeddings are immensely useful representations of associations between entities (images, users, search queries, words, and more). Embeddings are learned by optimizing a loss objective of the general form of a sum over example associations. Typically, the optimization uses stochastic gradient updates over minibatches of examples that are arranged independently at random. In this work, we propose the use of {\em structured arrangements} through randomized {\em microbatches} of examples that are more likely to include similar ones. We make a principled argument for the properties of our arrangements that accelerate the training and present efficient algorithms to generate microbatches that respect the marginal distribution of training examples. Finally, we observe experimentally that our structured arrangements accelerate training by 3-20\%. Structured arrangements emerge as a powerful and novel performance knob for SGD that is independent and complementary to other SGD hyperparameters and thus is a candidate for wide deployment.

Ex Output:
Accelerating SGD by arranging examples differently

Ex Input:
In this paper we use the geometric properties of the optimal transport (OT) problem and the Wasserstein distances to define a prior distribution for the latent space of an auto-encoder. We introduce Sliced-Wasserstein Auto-Encoders (SWAE), that enable one to shape the distribution of the latent space into any samplable probability distribution without the need for training an adversarial network or having a likelihood function specified. In short, we regularize the auto-encoder loss with the sliced-Wasserstein distance between the distribution of the encoded training samples and a samplable prior distribution. We show that the proposed formulation has an efficient numerical solution that provides similar capabilities to Wasserstein Auto-Encoders (WAE) and Variational Auto-Encoders (VAE), while benefiting from an embarrassingly simple implementation. We provide extensive error analysis for our algorithm, and show its merits on three benchmark datasets.

Ex Output:
In this paper we use the sliced-Wasserstein distance to shape the latent distribution of an auto-encoder into any samplable prior distribution.

Ex Input:
Neural networks trained only to optimize for training accuracy can often be fooled by adversarial examples --- slightly perturbed inputs misclassified with high confidence. Verification of networks enables us to gauge their vulnerability to such adversarial examples. We formulate verification of piecewise-linear neural networks as a mixed integer program. On a representative task of finding minimum adversarial distortions, our verifier is two to three orders of magnitude quicker than the state-of-the-art. We achieve this computational speedup via tight formulations for non-linearities, as well as a novel presolve algorithm that makes full use of all information available. The computational speedup allows us to verify properties on convolutional and residual networks with over 100,000 ReLUs --- several orders of magnitude more than networks previously verified by any complete verifier. In particular, we determine for the first time the exact adversarial accuracy of an MNIST classifier to perturbations with bounded l- norm =0.1: for this classifier, we find an adversarial example for 4.38% of samples, and a certificate of robustness to norm-bounded perturbations for the remainder. Across all robust training procedures and network architectures considered, and for both the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, we are able to certify more samples than the state-of-the-art and find more adversarial examples than a strong first-order attack.

Ex Output:
We efficiently verify the robustness of deep neural models with over 100,000 ReLUs, certifying more samples than the state-of-the-art and finding more adversarial examples than a strong first-order attack.