TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: that subsequent extraneous offenses are admissible to show a defendant's intent as to an earlier offense. See U.S. v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 128 (2nd Cir.1998) (upholding admission of subsequent act under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show intent regarding charged offense and holding, "[t]he fact that the evidence involved a subsequent rather than prior act is of no moment"); U.S. v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C.Cir.) (construing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and holding that it "draws no distinction b Austin 1990, no pet.) (same). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Russell's contention that the Vogt Street offense was not admissible simply because it occurred after the Fast Freddy's offense. Cf. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 380 (<HOLDING>). Although, based on the authorities cited by
Holding statements: (A) holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court (B) recognizing that an appellate court reviews a trial courts decision whether or not to grant equitable relief only for an abuse of discretion (C) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (D) holding not an abuse of discretion to deny funds (E) recognizing that an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court acts without reference to any guiding principles or rules

SOLUTION: holding that the grant of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion but without deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court

PROBLEM: to intervene" as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer's unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were
Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since 951 requirements were satisfied

SOLUTION: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim

PROBLEM: Marine Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Minn.1986)) (emphasis added). Thus: When read together, these [business risk] provisions exclude coverage when there has been no physical injury to tangible property other than the insured's work. Standard Fire, 972 S.W.2d at 12 (emphasis added). In other words, there is coverage where there has been physical injury to tangible property that is not the insured's work. As we have pointed out earlier in this opinion, we agree with the district court's view that Love's tangible real property is not the insured's "work," and that it was physically damaged by having the construction debris from the road-widening project dumped on it. Therefore, this exclusion does not apply. See Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 159-60 (Minn.App.2001) (<HOLDING>), aff'd, 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn.2002). Cf. Dewitt
Holding statements: (A) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (B) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (C) holding that a similar exclusion denies coverage for property damage to the particular part of the real property that is the subject of the insureds work at the time of the damage if the damage arises out of those operations (D) holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for claim against insured by third party arising out of insureds damage to third partys property (E) holding that j5 exclusion did not bar coverage for damage to subcontractors work because damage did not arise from insureds performing operations on subcontractors work

SOLUTION:
holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured