In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
motion at which Pritchett would be represented by counsel or at which the court would determine that Pritchett knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Ex parte Pritchett, 117 So.3d at 362. In the instant case, the circuit court immediately appointed new counsel to represent Trimble after Trimble gave his oral notice of appeal. Despite having newly appointed counsel who could file a motion for a new trial attacking his trial counsel's alleged deficiencies, Trimble elected to file a pro se motion for a new trial. Therefore, unlike the defendant in Pritchett, Trimble had the benefit of newly appointed appellate counsel who represented him and who could file a motion for a new trial on his behalf. See King v. State, 613 So.2d 888 (Ala.Crim.App.1993)
Holding statements: (A) holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage (B) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver (C) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (D) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (E) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel

Ex Output:
holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage

Ex Input:
a work-related injury, taking into account such factors as age, education, training, and mental capacity." Id. at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and social environment, ... [and] permanent impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quotation marks omitted)). 120 The fact that an employee returned to work for some period of time following his industrial injury does not automatically preclude him from claiming permanent total disability benefits at a later date if he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to the point that he is no longer able to maintain regular employment. See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28 (<HOLDING>). See generally Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n,
Holding statements: (A) holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits (B) holding that an employee who returned to work for six years following his workrelated injury could nevertheless obtain permanent total disability benefits and observing that it may be years before the effect of an injury is felt (C) holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury (D) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability (E) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence

Ex Output:
holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits

Ex Input:
not a proximate-cause witness. Specifically, counsel stated: { 33} "Your Honor, we are not going into long-term care of how this patient is going to be managed forever. We are going to go into standard of care. We are going to go into standard of care for an emergency physician." { 34} Ultimately, the trial court made its evidentiary ruling based on MVES's proffer of Dr. Galan as a standard-of-care witness only. Since standard of care is never viewed in hindsight, the court properly ruled to limit Dr. Galan's testimony to only that information known to Dr. Jackson when he treated Darlene. See Grabill v. Worthington Industries, Inc., 98 Ohio App.3d 739, 744-745, 649 N.E.2d 874, quoting Hetrick v. Marion-Res. Power Co. (1943), 141 Ohio St. 347, 358-359, 25 O.O. 467, 48 N.E.2d 103 (<HOLDING>). { 35} MVES insists that even if we find that
Holding statements: (A) holding that a grant of equitable relief requires diligence by the claimant (B) holding that foresight not retrospect is the standard of diligence (C) holding that rule 16bs good cause standard focuses on a partys diligence (D) holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met (E) recognizing implied obligation to use reasonable diligence

Ex Output:
holding that a grant of equitable relief requires diligence by the claimant