In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: before section 362(b)(3) can come into play. An act that both creates and perfects a lien postpetition cannot so qualify. See, e.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Excel Eng'g, Inc. (In re Excel Eng'g, Inc.), 224 B.R. 582, 589-90 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (refusing to recognize validity of postpetition creation and perfection of mechanic's hen because creditor had no lien at the time debtor filed for bankruptcy); Water-vliet Paper Co. v. City of Watervliet (In re Shoreham Paper Co.), 117 B.R. 274, 281-83 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1990) (finding postpe-tition creation and perfection of property tax lien barred by automatic stay because no prepetition interest existed); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Ballentine Bros. (In re Ballentine Bros.), 86 B.R. 198, 201 (Bankr. D.Neb.1988) (<HOLDING>); North Side Lumber Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations (B) holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (E) holding that creation of a postpetition tax levy based on a prepetition assessment was barred by the automatic stay

A: holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations
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Q: Discipl. LEXIS 78, *9 (attorney disbursed all settlement proceeds to client less amount he retained for himself, after having been placed on notice that prior attorney claimed an in terest in any settlement funds in violation of Colo, RPC 1.15(b)). III. ANALYSIS OF SANCTION In both the Dunn and McCarthy matters, Rishel engaged in knowing conversion by obtaining funds from third parties for a stated purpose, failing to utilize the funds for that purpose, retaining the funds for an extended period of time after the third parties had withdrawn authorization, and failing to refund the amounts paid to the third parties despite their demand that he do so. The presumptive sanction for knowing conversion of the property of another is disbarment. People v. Dice, 947 P.2d 339, 340 (Colo.1997)(<HOLDING>); Motsenbocker; 926 P.2d at 577 (attorney
Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause (B) holding that a lawyers knowing misappropriation of funds whether belonging to a client or third party warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation (C) holding that an attorney should not be disbarred for misappropriation of client funds where there were no aggravating factors the attorneys clients did not suffer actual harm and the attorney established several mitigating factors (D) holding that permanent disbarment was appropriate for failure to remit 2000 in settlement funds to client and failing to answer the charges (E) recognizing that a lawyer hired by a third person to represent a client should exercise judgment on behalf of the client independent from the interests of the third person

A: holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search or seizure of property belonging to a third party even if the search was without probable cause
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Q: 3 . As noted previously, this presumption may be rebutted "where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the injury or disease existed before acceptance and enrollment and was not aggravated by such service." 38 U.S.C. 1111; see Horn, 25 Vet.App. at 235. 4 . Board findings regarding whether a claimant suffered from an injury or disease in service, and whether that in-service disease or injury is related to a current disability or one that preexisted service, are questions of fact to be reviewed by the Court under the "clearly erroneous" standard. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet.App. 79, 82 (2006) (Board's finding that a veteran suffered an in-service event, injury, or disease is reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard); Coghill v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 342, 345 (1995) (<HOLDING>); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 52
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (B) holding that boards finding of no relationship between any inservice injury and a current disability was not clearly erroneous (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) holding that when court applies the clearly erroneous standard court may not reverse boards finding of fact if after court reviews the record in its entirety the finding is supported by a plausible basis (E) holding bankruptcy courts finding of proximate causation not to be clearly erroneous

A:
holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record
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