In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
UCL and CLRA. In considering whether the plaintiff in Bruno had standing to bring claims arising from the defendants' gelcap product, when the plaintiff had only purchased the defendants' liquid product, the court noted that "treatises and the vast majority of persuasive authority indicate that ... the issue of whether a class representative may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality and adequacy of representation." Id. at 530 (citing Greenwood v. Compucredit Corp., No. 4:08-cv-04878, 2010 WL 4807095, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 19, 2010); Arevalo v. Bank of Am. Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1017 (N.D.Cal.2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Holding statements: (A) holding that employers have standing to sue (B) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (C) recognizing associational standing when members would have standing in own right (D) holding that because plaintiff had standing to sue for injury arising from his own benefit plan his ability to represent class members with different benefit plans should be analyzed under rule 23 not standing (E) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
arrest for a misdemeanor is permitted only when one of the statutory exceptions is met. See Tenn.Code Ann. 55-10-207©️ (2008). 5 . "According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a 0 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that the duration of the stop was unreasonably extended where the officer admitted that, for thirteen minutes of the sixteen minute stop, he asked the defendant questions that were unrelated to the traffic violation); Loper v. State, 8 A.3d 1169, 1172 73 (Del.2010) (concluding that the stop, during which the officer asked the defendant for identification and ran a background check, "did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop"); Bucalo v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-CA-000176-MR, 2012 WL 246245, at *5-7 (Ky.Ct.App. Jan. 27, 2012) (<HOLDING>); State v. Mason, 173 Md.App. 414, 919 A.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that a traffic stop which lasted 105 minutes from the time of the initial stop until the defendant was arrested on drugrelated charges was unreasonable because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for purposes of conducting a drug dog sniff because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant was engaged in drugrelated activity (B) holding circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion to make a stop included that the defendant was on a comer on which recent multiple drugrelated arrests had been made (C) holding that reasonable suspicion is required to prolong a traffic stop after the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished (D) holding that an officer does not need reasonable articulable suspicion of drugrelated criminal activity prior to subjecting defendants car to a dog sniff subsequent to a lawful traffic stop (E) holding duration of stop was reasonable as it lasted under thirty minutes

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
reached, two were struck for cause, and two were seated on the jury. The prosecutor then argued that defense counsel had not shown a prima facie case of discrimination. The trial court overruled appellant's motion. After the jury was sworn and dismissed for the day, the prosecutor asked that she be allowed to explain on the record why she struck the contested jurors. Following the prosecutor's presentation, defense counsel stated why she thought the State's reasons were merely pretextual. Appellant claims the State waived its right to maintain that no prima facie showing of discrimination was made when it chose to give its reasons for striking jurors Delaney and Jones. See Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 297, 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992) (<HOLDING>). We disagree. The record shows that the State
Holding statements: (A) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review (B) recognizing that whether the employee uses the mcdonnell douglas framework or other evidence to create a prima facie case when the employer offers a legitimate nondiseriminatory reason for its adverse action the question is whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the employers action was taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons (C) holding that once prosecutor makes raceneutral explanation for peremptory challenge and trial court rules on question of intentional discrimination issue of prima facie case becomes moot (D) holding that without more the mere fact that the prosecutor used a high number of strikes to remove women from the venire is insufficient to establish a prima facie case (E) holding that when the prosecutor articulates reasons for strikes and the trial court makes a ruling on discriminatory intent the question of whether a prima facie case was made is moot

Ex Output:
(E)