In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

are complete and present within the proscribed state statute of limitations. Id. at 393-94, 127 S.Ct. 1091. Plaintiff argues that because Wallace dealt with a false arrest and not a search and seizure, its analysis is inapplicable. (D.E. 8, Plaintiffs Response). However, the general rule of Wallace soundly applies to a search and seizure scenario, as noted by the Sixth Circuit and several Kentucky district courts. See Harper, 293 Fed. Appx. at 391 n. 1 ("Wallace also clarified that Heck does not delay the accrual of an otherwise complete and present cause of action when judgment in the plaintiffs favor 'would impugn an anticipated future conviction .... ' Harper's claims thus accrued on July 31, 2003, the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure."); Kenney, 2011 WL 1582125 at *6 (<HOLDING>); Lovins v. Hurt, No. 11-216-JBC, 2011 WL
Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiffs 1983 claim accrued on the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure (B) holding that a ruling on preindictment motion that search and seizure were legal collaterally estopped defendant from later moving to suppress evidence claiming that search and seizure were illegal (C) holding that section 1983 action for unlawful search and seizure accrued on dates of seizures rather than date on which state court declared the acts illegal (D) holding that the plaintiffs cause of action accrued on the date of the repealer statute not on the date the wrong occurred despite the federal courts ruling as to the statutes unconstitutionality (E) holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale
(A)

de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence." Teffeteller v. State, 495 So.2d 744, 745 (Fla.1986). In noncapital cases, too, we have concluded that "resentencing entitles the defendant to a de novo sentencing hearing with the full array of due process rights." Trotter v. State, 825 So.2d 362, 367-68 (Fla.2002); see also Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 525 (Fla.2007) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) ("We have consistently held that resentencing proceedings must be a 'clean slate,' meaning that the defendant's vacated sentence becomes a 'nullity' and his 'resentencing should proceed de novo on all issues bearing on the proper sentence.' " (citation omitted)); Walker, 988 So.2d at 8 (Altenbernd, J., concurring specially) ("Generally, courts have held that once a def A 1998) (<HOLDING>); Baldwin v. State, 700 So.2d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that at resentencing the state must present evidence on an enhanced sentencing factor despite having done so at the prior sentencing hearing (B) holding that the state had the burden of proving the defendants two prior convictions in order to obtain the felony dui conviction (C) holding that at a resentencing the state must again prove the basis for an enhanced sentence even though such evidence was produced at the original sentencing (D) holding that even though the defendant did not challenge his prior convictions at the original sentencing lawofthecase principles do not insulate the state from proving them at resentencing (E) holding that at resentencing on violation of probation trial court may revise guidelines scoresheet to reflect prior convictions mistakenly omitted from the original through no fault of the defendant
(D)

on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 [103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275] (1983) (per curiam) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 [104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317] (1984). Furthermore, this court has held that a restraint on liberty which would constitute a seizure under the doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] (1968), does not necessarily place the seized person in custody for Miranda purposes. Mcllwain v. United States, 568 A.2d 470, 472-73 (D.C.1989); see Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 439-40 [104 S.Ct. 3138], E.A.H., 612 A.2d at 838 (footnote omitted); see also Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1216 (D.C.1999) (<HOLDING>). As we noted in Mcllwain, "[t]he comparatively
Holding statements: (A) holding that an applicant who had been detained for 36 hours and suffered a beating by the police but without serious injury had not been persecuted (B) holding that even if a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the police station to which morris had been taken for questioning and where he had been for more than four hours and even if morris had thus been detained the restraint was not the equiva lent of a formal arrest and morris was not in custody for miranda purposes when he made an incriminating admission (C) holding in the context of a prosecution for second degree escape that although defendant was not handcuffed he had nonetheless been placed under arrest had had his liberty restrained in that he was not free to leave and at that point the first step in the process of transporting him to the police station had begun consequently the defendants arrest was complete and he was in custody (D) holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave and did in fact freely leave the interview (E) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
(B)