In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence. (b) Nothing in this section is intended to exclude from evidence statements made during a polygraph examination which are otherwise admissible. Under the plain language of this rule, the military judge's ruling was correct. By adding this Rule, the 1991 amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial restored the armed forces to the approach followed in the 1969 Manual. Cf. United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 246, 253 (C.M.A.1987)(2-1 decision holding that the trial judge has the discretion to admit the results of polygraph examinations); United States v. Williams, 39 M.J. 555, 558 (A.C.M.R.1994)(<HOLDING>). The concerns behind this rule include: that
Holding statements: (A) holding ban violated the sherman act (B) holding that the governments use of classified evidence in detentionpendingdeportation proceedings violated detainees due process rights and inter alia justified his release (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence that other persons had a motive to kill the victims because inter alia such evidence was speculative (D) holding that the absolute ban on polygraph evidence violated due process and the right to present evidence citing inter alia chambers v mississippi 410 us 284 93 sct 1038 35 led2d 297 1973 (E) holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material
holding ban violated the sherman act

types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property" ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of
Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee
holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses

parameters of her administrative complaint." Def.'s Reply at 6. The plaintiff, however, included a hostile work environment claim in her EEO complaint filed in March 2005. Def.'s Mot., Ex. 8. Accordingly, the defendant has not met his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C.Cir.1985). 3 . Failing to provide notice or requiring a party to expend significantly more time, money or effort than reasonably expected may constitute undue prejudice. See, e.g., Marcoux v. Shell Oil Products Co. LLC, 524 F.3d 33, 43 n. 9 (1st Cir.2008) (determining that "defendants suffer undue prejudice as a result of delay or lack of notice''); Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 210 n. 5 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>) (internal citation omitted); Dzwonkowski v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that laches is an affirmative defense (B) holding that fair use is an affirmative defense (C) holding that unpleaded affirmative defense was properly considered by the district court where plaintiff had notice of the defense and an opportunity to respond (D) holding that a defendant avoids causing undue prejudice by providing the plaintiff with notice and the opportunity to challenge an affirmative defense (E) holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice
holding that laches is an affirmative defense