In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: make a hearing unnecessary. These contentions have no merit. Although we retain jurisdiction to resolve the State's motion to dismiss this appeal, we first remand this matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing. We remand because whether Mr. Comer has expressly or impliedly consented to the filing of any pleadings in federal court is a critical question of fact that we believe the district court is in a better position to resolve. Indeed, we have previously recognized the general presumption that an attorney is authorized to act on his client's behalf. See, e.g., Nevius, 105 F.3d at 459; Lucky, 86 F.3d at 925; Deutscher v. Angelone, 16 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir.1994); cf. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, U.S. , , 120 S.Ct. 1029, 1040, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (<HOLDING>). When parties have challenged this
Holding statements: (A) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (B) holding that attorney lacked standing to file notice of appeal on behalf of client who couldnot be located because the client must make the ultimate decision regarding the appeal internal quotation marks omitted (C) recognizing that counsel have the authori ty to file an appeal on their clients behalf even when the client does not expressly give them his consent to do so (D) holding broker and clients agreed to arbitration where newaccount forms signed by clients expressly incorporated separate unsigned client agreement containing arbitration provision even if client agreement was not attached or read by clients because they were presumed to have read newaccount form which placed them on notice of client agreement (E) recognizing the right to counsel on appeal
[A]: (C)

[Q]: second and third elements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), the existence of a sufficient interest, and whether disposition of that interest would effectively impede the putative intervenors' ability to protect that interest. Among the interests that satisfy these criteria are injury to reputation, see Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 373, 392 (2d Cir.1981), need to protect the attorney-client privilege, see In re Katz (Jamil v. United States), 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1980), and need to protect the attorney work-product privilege. See United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1290-92 (D.C.Cir.1980), citing, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445, 84 S.Ct. 508, 511-12, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 735 F.2d 1330, 1331 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a district court should allow intervention by a client in the first instance as soon as the attorneyclient privilege issue is raised (B) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (C) holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal (D) recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges (E) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege
[A]: (A)

[Q]: the court house would be a profound miscarriage of justice. Id. Thus, in accordance with the legislative history, case law, and North Carolina public policy, the Court finds that the North Carolina Legislative did not intend the statute of repose clause in 1-52(16) to refer to latent diseases. Instead, latent diseases are only governed by the statute of limitations in 1-52(16), giving plaintiffs three years to file from when they should have reasonably have discovered the existence and cause of their illnesses. Constitutionality of 1-52(16) To interpret l-52(16)'s statute of repose as applying to latent diseases would likely render the statute unconstitutional under the North Carolina's Constitution's art. I, 18, known as the "open courts" provision. Th 5, 464 A.2d 288 (1983) (<HOLDING>); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416
Holding statements: (A) holding the twoyear period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery controls over the more general threeyear statute of limitations for tort actions (B) holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat 52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under 1983 (C) holding 12year period of repose and threeyear period of limitations contained in statute operated to eliminate a cause of action before wrong could reasonably be discovered were unconstitutional in consolidated product liability actions (D) holding that threeyear statute of limitations was not an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (E) holding that in connecticut the general threeyear personal injury statute of limitations period set forth in connecticut general statutes 52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions asserted under 42 usc 1983
[A]:
(C)