In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the "reasonableness" standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs... ."). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for "[t]ime spent litigating a fee application"); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application

Ex Output:
holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment

Ex Input:
Clause. 13. Respondent's main interest in this case is his right to run for elected office. In general, the federal courts have declined to hold that the right to run for elective office is "fundamental," a position that was applied in the seminal Clements decision. There, a plurality of the high court held that "[f]ar from recognizing candidacy as a fundamental right, we have held that the existence of barriers to a candidate's access to the ballot does not of itself compel close scrutiny." 457 U.S. at 963 405, 420 (W. Va. 2000) (concluding that constitutional provision forcing judges to vacate office before running for nonjudicial office was supported by "State's compelling and permissible interest"); Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Comm'n, 2003 WI 103, 78, 666 N.W.2d 816 (<HOLDING>). 16. Respondent's constitutional arguments
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (B) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (C) holding that states legitimate interests in enacting constitutional provision prohibiting judges from holding other public office far outweigh the burdens put upon the petitioners right to be a candidate for office (D) holding that a school superintendent does not have a constitutional right to actually hold his position and execute the duties of the office (E) holding constitutional provision selfexecuting if it grants right that can be put into operation without further legislative action

Ex Output:
recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights

Ex Input:
available only to that party; or (2) has such a relationship with one party as to effectively make him unavailable to the opposing party, regardless of actual physical availability. Tavarez, 626 F.3d at 905 (citing United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926 (7th Cir.1976)). The latter prong is also referred to as "pragmatic unavailability." See United States v. Christ, 513 F.3d 762, 773 (7th Cir.2008); Yumich v. Cotter, 452 F.2d 59, 64 (7th Cir.1971) (finding that the employment by the city of uncalled police officers who witnessed an altercation between officers and the plaintiff, as well as the officers' "strong personal interest in the success of the city's defense of their conduct ..." rendered them pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff); see also Mahone, 537 F.2d at 926-27 (<HOLDING>). In this case, Garibay was unquestionably
Holding statements: (A) holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction (B) holding that the same hearing officer as in this case erred in substituting his judgment for that of the pertinent school board in that case (C) holding that an officer who was involved in the arrest initiating case was pragmatically unavailable to the plaintiff because of his association with the united states in building its case as well as his interest in seeing his police work vindicated by a conviction of the defendant (D) holding that where the court records in the present case and the records in a previous conviction reflected the same name and date of birth as well as a signature and the defendant did not object that he was not the same person as had been previously convicted the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction (E) holding that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant based on his presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and his flight upon seeing police officers

Ex Output:
holding that the state could not under any circumstances be charged for the delay during the period the defendant was held after his arrest for and until his conviction on felony charges in another jurisdiction