In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: right to additional BLM permits or approvals. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 456, 27 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1971); Angelina Holly Corp. v. Clark, 587 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.D.C.1984). They hold no more than an expectancy, the loss of which does not constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S.Ct. 446, 451, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 828 (D.C.Cir.1977). Their absence from the lawsuit does not preclude the district court from issuing the preliminary injunction. Compare Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). C. Exhaustion Mountain States asserts that
Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (B) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated (E) holding that contract with construction company rendered inequitable a preliminary injunction restraining the contractors from performing the contractual obligations
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: (1993). This privilege has been given an "expansive reach" by California courts, as recognized by the California Supreme Court. See Rubin, 4 Cal.4th at 1194, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. This privilege affords absolute immunity against tort liability arising out of such a communication, regardless of attempts by the "plaintiff' to "plead around" this "absolute barrier." See id. at 1201-02, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. Thus, the immunity applies regardless of the particular label given to the cause of action (e.g., unfair competition). Section 47(b) protects participants in judicial proceedings from derivative tort actions based on communications in or regarding the judicial proceeding. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781-83, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1996) (<HOLDING>). A "communication[ ] preparatory to or in
Holding statements: (A) holding that letter to possible coclaimants seeking support for filing of suit was covered by the privilege (B) recognizing privilege (C) holding that voluntary testimony by spouse is not covered by husbandwife privilege (D) holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated (E) holding that the initial disclosure of a crime to one spouses without more is covered by the marital communications privilege
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: 909, 435 P.2d 248, 249 (1967). The plain language of I.R.E. 201(d) requires specificity in identifying what documents or items the district court is requested take notice of. See, e.g., Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 835, 243 P.3d 642, 651 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court held that where a party is requesting that a court take judicial notice of a document or items, that party must state with particularity what he or she is asking the court to take notice of. Id. at 835, 243 P.3d at 652. Where a party does not meet this requirement, it is improper for a court to take judicial notice under I.R.E, 201(d). Taylor, 149 Idaho at 835, 243 P.3d at 652. If a party fails to specify which material from the underlying case he or she is requesting, judicial notice is not mandatory. See id. (<HOLDING>). Fortin argues that Taylor is not controlling
Holding statements: (A) holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice (B) holding that a notice to produce personal papers was unconstitutional and void and that the inspection by the district attorney of said invoice when produced in obedience to said notice and its admission in evidence by the court were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings (C) recognizing that the court may take judicial notice of its own docket (D) holding that where it was erroneous for the district court to take judicial notice it certainly cannot be said that such notice was mandatory and therefore ire 201d is inapplicable (E) holding statute requiring parties in tax suit to take notice of subsequent pleadings was not unconstitutional when city failed to take such notice
Example Output:
(D)