In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: purpose of this Memorandum is to explain why the Court declined to do these things. As disclosed by plaintiff in its ex parte motion, the sale of decoding devices like those defendants are claimed to have offered and sold is prohibited by federal criminal statute, see 47 U.S.C. 553(b), as well as by Illinois criminal statute, see 720 ILCS 5/16-10(a)(4). Under the circumstances, information disclosing defendants' purchases and sales of the devices, the revenues obtained from those sales, the assets they now have that may have been derived from those sales, and the locations where they keep their records and other descrambling devices is, without question, information that might tend to incriminate the defendants. See, e.g., FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>); SEC v. Rehtorik, 755 F.Supp. 1018, 1019
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government (B) holding the same with respect to violations of the fifth amendment (C) holding that abrogating the right to sell endangered eagles feathers did not implicate the fifth amendment (D) holding that the statement ill take the fifth was an assertion of the fifth amendment privilege (E) recognizing that preliminary injunction requiring defendant to disclose records might implicate fifth amendment
[A]: holding that the fifth amendment did not apply to tribal government

[Q]: the prescribed five working days after the registrant's birthday is not a defense. Barker, 34 Cal.4th at 350, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507 ("forgetting the mandatory registration requirement of section 290 is simply not a legitimate defense to the charge of willfully failing to register"). As a result, it is possible that Gonzalez violated 290(a)(1)(D) through ordinary negligence by forgetting to register during the mandated five working day period. Because the record suggests that Gonzalez made a good faith effort to comply with the registration law, we find that little or no moral culpability attaches to his violation of 290(a)(1)(D). 11 . Gonzalez's sentence is also a high multiple of the plea offers he received. See Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 969 n. 9 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282, 100
Holding statements: (A) holding that plea offers are relevant to determining whether a three strikes sentence is grossly disproportionate to the triggering offense (B) holding that penalty clauses are enforceable unless they are found to be grossly unreasonable (C) holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue (D) holding that sentencing court could consider whether the applicable guidelines were outdated and disproportionate but that imposing sentence based on the guidelines did not render sentence substantively unreasonable (E) holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense
[A]: holding that penalty clauses are enforceable unless they are found to be grossly unreasonable

[Q]: Kodak Co., 98 F.Supp.2d 141, 147 (D.Mass.2000) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Arruda v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 310 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir.2002). 123 . See id. at 46-47 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1298, at 625-26 (2d ed.1990)). 124 . Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 228. 125 . See Cal. Gov't Code 12651(a)(1) & (2); Del.Code Ann. tit. 6, 1201(a)(1) & (2); D.C.Code 2-308-14(a)(1) & (2); Fla. Stat. 68.082(2)(a) & (b); Haw.Rev.Stat. 661-21(a)(1) & (2); 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.175/3(a)(1) & (2); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 5B(1) & (2); Nev.Rev.Stat. 357.040(1)(a) & (b); Tenn.Code Ann. 71-5-182(a)(1)(A) & (B); Tex. Hum. Res.Code Ann. 36.002; Va.Code Ann. 8.01-216.3(A)(1) & (2). 126 . Cf. Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 227-28 (<HOLDING>). 127 .Id. at 232. 128 . See id. at 225
Holding statements: (A) holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions (B) holding that the federal false claims act is an antifraud statute to which rule 9bs heightened pleading requirements apply (C) holding that the group pleading doctrine survives the pslra as to rule 9bs particularity requirements but does not apply to the pslras scienter requirements (D) holding that rule 9bs heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of mail and wire fraud used as predicate acts for a rico claim (E) holding that a court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual pleading requirements of rule 8 in civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 1983
[A]:
holding that heightened pleading standards do not apply to defamation actions