The CIA's senior management saw problems with the armed Predator as well, problems that Clarke and even Black and Allen were inclined to minimize. One (which also applied to reconnaissance flights) was money. A Predator cost about $3 million. If the CIA flew Predators for its own reconnaissance or covert action purposes, it might be able to borrow them from the Air Force, but it was not clear that the Air Force would bear the cost if a vehicle went down. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz took the position that the CIA should have to pay for it; the CIA disagreed. Second, Tenet in particular questioned whether he, as Director of Central Intelligence, should operate an armed Predator." This was new ground,"he told us. Tenet ticked off key questions: What is the chain of command? Who takes the shot? Are America's leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command and control? Charlie Allen told us that when these questions were discussed at the CIA, he and the Agency's executive director, A. B." Buzzy" Krongard, had said that either one of them would be happy to pull the trigger, but Tenet was appalled, telling them that they had no authority to do it, nor did he. Third, the Hellfire warhead carried by the Predator needed work. It had been built to hit tanks, not people. It needed to be designed to explode in a different way, and even then had to be targeted with extreme precision. In the configuration planned by the Air Force through mid-2001, the Predator's missile would not be able to hit a moving vehicle. White House officials had seen the Predator video of the "man in white." On July 11, Hadley tried to hurry along preparation of the armed system. He directed McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Richard Myers to deploy Predators capable of being armed no later than September 1.

Question: "Why did the CIA want the Airforce to pay if a Predator was downed?"

Response: "Predator"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A: no

Problem: The Bush administration did not develop new diplomatic initiatives on al Qaeda with the Saudi government before 9/11. Vice President Cheney called Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5, 2001, to seek Saudi help in preventing threatened attacks on American facilities in the Kingdom. Secretary of State Powell met with the crown prince twice before 9/11. They discussed topics like Iraq, not al Qaeda.U.S.-Saudi relations in the summer of 2001 were marked by sometimes heated disagreements about ongoing Israeli- Palestinian violence, not about Bin Laden. The confirmation of the Pentagon's new leadership was a lengthy process. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was confirmed in March 2001 and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in July. Though the new officials were briefed about terrorism and some of the earlier planning, including that for Operation Infinite Resolve, they were focused, as Secretary Rumsfeld told us, on creating a twenty-first-century military. At the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton did not recall much interest by the new administration in military options against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He could not recall any specific guidance on the topic from the secretary. Brian Sheridan-the outgoing assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC), the key counterterrorism policy office in the Pentagon-never briefed Rumsfeld. He departed on January 20; he had not been replaced by 9/11. Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in terrorism, which came up often in his regular meetings with Tenet. He thought that the Defense Department, before 9/11, was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with new threats like terrorism. But his time was consumed with getting new officials in place and working on the foundation documents of a new defense policy, the quadrennial defense review, the defense planning guidance, and the existing contingency plans. He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that engaged his attention before 9/11, other than the development of the Predator unmanned aircraft system. The commander of Central Command, General Franks, told us that he did not regard the existing plans as serious. To him a real military plan to address al Qaeda would need to go all the way, following through the details of a full campaign (including the political-military issues of where operations would be based) and securing the rights to fly over neighboring countries. The draft presidential directive circulated in June 2001 began its discussion of the military by reiterating the Defense Department's lead role in protecting its forces abroad.

Question: "What did the Secretary of State and the Crowned Prince talk about before 9/11?"

Answer: "President"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer: no

Question:
When 74-year-old Penny Sweat was evicted from the HUD-subsidized Glendale Senior Housing in Salt Lake City last month, she moved to a nonsubsidized apartment at five times her previous rent because she was unaware of her rights. It turns out the manager of the seniors complex, its attorneys and government overseers were unaware, too. Lee Kemp, a hearing-impaired World War II disabled vet, also was evicted, but he contacted Utah Legal Services and was told to stay put. Attorney Marty Blaustein then notified Utah Nonprofit Housing Corp., the building's owner, that Kemp's eviction was not legal and that he had a right to a hearing. That didn't stop Utah Nonprofit Housing's attorneys from then sending Kemp a summons to show cause why he had not moved out. Meanwhile, Sweat's granddaughter called Salt Lake City housing officials, federal housing officials, state officials and several agents of Utah Nonprofit Housing to find out about her grandmother's rights. Nobody knew. Blaustein then took Sweat's case along with Kemp's and demanded her ousting be rectified. Utah Nonprofit Housing President Marion Willey returned from an out-of-town trip and learned HUD procedures were not followed. The eviction was activated because of ongoing personality conflicts among seniors in the complex, he said, and the new building manager decided the problems were with Sweat and Kemp. Several tenants blame other neighbors as perpetrators of the rift, however. Willey said when his building manager called attorneys retained by the company, they erroneously told her she could go ahead and kick out the tenants. When she called HUD to make sure, the inquiry got bogged down in bureaucracy and nobody called her back. Willey says he has offered Sweat and Kemp apartments in another complex operated by his company at their old rates. He also is retaining new attorneys. After reading the above, is "Marion Willey" the correct answer to the question "Who were the two tenants that were being evicted?"? OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer:
no

Input: The Venetian artist Jacopo de' Barbari, whom Durer had met in Venice, visited Nuremberg in 1500, and Durer said that he learned much about the new developments in perspective, anatomy, and proportion from him. De' Barbari was unwilling to explain everything he knew, so Durer began his own studies, which would become a lifelong preoccupation. A series of extant drawings show Durer's experiments in human proportion, leading to the famous engraving of Adam and Eve (1504), which shows his subtlety while using the burin in the texturing of flesh surfaces. This is the only existing engraving signed with his full name. Durer made large numbers of preparatory drawings, especially for his paintings and engravings, and many survive, most famously the Betende Hande (English: Praying Hands, c. 1508 Albertina, Vienna), a study for an apostle in the Heller altarpiece. He also continued to make images in watercolour and bodycolour (usually combined), including a number of still lifes of meadow sections or animals, including his Young Hare (1502) and the Great Piece of Turf (1503, both also Albertina).

Does the response "Lifes of meadow" correctly answer the question "What sort of subjects were in Durer's artworks?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
***
Output:
no