In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a "line of ... cars" for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
[A]: holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language

[Q]: good or replace the loss caused by the wrong or injury * * Black's Law Dictionary 390 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) Torts 903 (defining compensatory damages as "damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him"); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 463 (3rd ed. 1961) (defining compensatory damages as "damages awarded to make good or compensate for an injury sus tained distinguished from punitive damages "). When civil rights plaintiffs seek "damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts." Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (<HOLDING>). "Punitive damages aside, damages in tort
Holding statements: (A) holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages (B) holding that punitive damages which are based on the same underlying action justifying nondischargeability of compensatory damages are likewise nondischargeable (C) holding that when compensatory damages are nominal a much higher ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages can be contemplated (D) holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under civil rights act of 1871 (E) holding that damages based on the abstract value or importance of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases
[A]: holding that punitive damages are available in an intentional discrimination action even if the jury does not assess compensatory damages

[Q]: old. He claimed that he was "singled out and targeted for firing" and that "[n]o younger people were terminated for similar allegations." Appellees moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the only proper defendant in an employment discrimination lawsuit against the United States government is the head of the agency, sued solely in his official capacity, and that Lynn's claim for punitive damages should be dismissed as punitive damages cannot be sought against the federal government or an agency. Over Lynn's objections, the District Court agreed, dismissing all defendants save the Secretary of Defense, as the head of the DLA, and dismissing Lynn's claim for punitive damages. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976) (<HOLDING>); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (stating that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that physician was an independent contractor and thus could not sue hospital under title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 (B) holding that surgeon with surgical privileges was not an employee of hospital and thus could not bring suit under either the age discrimination in employment act or title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 (C) holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies (D) holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment (E) recognizing title vii does not provide the exclusive remedy for all employment discrimination claims even if the title vii and section 1983 claim factually overlap
[A]:
holding that physician was an independent contractor and thus could not sue hospital under title vii of the civil rights act of 1964