In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: While R.E. concerned the use of retrospective testimony by DOE to support a finding that it provided a child a FAPE, the court's rejection of E.Z.-L.'s substantive challenge introduced doubt about whether parents could prospectively challenge their child's educational placement without first enrolling the child in the recommended placement school. DOE argued that R.E. foreclosed all such prospective challenges on the basis that they are inherently speculative. The argument found some acceptance. See, e.g., E.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 6709, 2014 WL 4332092, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014) (rejecting prospective challenge as "impermissibly speculative and premature"); P.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 13 Civ. 4772, 2014 WL 3673603, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (<HOLDING>). But most courts did not adopt this hardline
Holding statements: (A) holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student (B) holding that a students private school tuition should be reimbursed where parent did not unilaterally place student in private school because the school district tacitly consented to the private school attendance before proposing a different placement (C) holding that the sro correctly concluded that a challenge tothe does choice of school is improper where the student never attended the school (D) holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school (E) holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that Ms. Toomer offers, no evidence of Ms. Stiger's threat other than her own self-serving assertions and that such unsupported, self-serving assertions do not give rise to a triable issue of fact. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (when scrutinizing motions for summary judgment courts "examine the facts in the record and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but do not accept bare conclusory allegations, as fact") (internal citations omitted); Ward v. District of Columbia, 950 F.Supp.2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) ("[S]elf-serving assertions are not sufficient to create an issue of material fact."); Musgrove v. Gov't of the District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 158, 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Even if unsupported, self-serving assertions
Holding statements: (A) holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment (B) holding that evidence of alleged limitations obtained soon after accident was without more insufficient to survive summary judgment (C) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient (E) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: the court explained: We note at the outset that 724(b)(2) expressly limits the amount distributable to 507(a) claimants to the "amount of such allowed tax claim that is secured by such tax lien." In light of this qualification, it is clear that administrative and priority claimants are able to prime a tax lienholder under 724(b)(2) only to the extent of the tax lien; if, as in this case, the sum of administrative and priority claims exceeds the amount of the tax lien, the excess amount is relegated to 721(b)(6) status and paid in accordance with 726. To hold otherwise would render meaningless the limiting language in 724(b)(2). (Emphasis added.); see also King v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfax County (In re A.G. Van Metre, Jr., Inc.), 155 B.R. 118, 123 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1993) (<HOLDING>); Hargrave v. Township of Pemberton (In re
Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not the taxpayers responsibility to pursue the different tax units to which the illegally levied county tax was proportioned as the taxpayer was entitled to recover the full amount of the tax from the county the collecting entity (B) holding that state property tax liens are not entitled to the states statutory interest rate as a matter of law rather the appropriate rate of interest is determined by the equities of each case (C) holding that priority unsecured claimants are entitled to payment only to the extent of the amount of the tax hens then if such claims happen to equal or exceed the amount of statutory tax liens the statutory tax hens are paid behind the claims of junior consensual henholders (D) holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full (E) holding that two federal tax liens had priority as a matter of law over the competing claims for fees and costs of a stakeholderbank
[EX A]:
(C)