In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: substantial rights. Mares, 402 F.3d at 520. The district court made no comments suggesting it would have imposed a lesser sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir.2005) (stating the issue as "whether [the defendant] has demonstrated that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result had it sentenced [the defendant] under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one"), cert. denied, U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 264, 163 L.Ed.2d 238 (2005) (No. 05-5535). Therefore, Tovar fails to demonstrate plain error. Tovar contends for the first time on appeal that the statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. 841, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As he concedes, however, this issue is
Holding statements: (A) holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that ojther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt
[A]: (C)

[Q]: although incorporated or approved in the decree, is not merged therein, the parties may enforce it by s clear that "jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events." Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957) (citation omitted). 18 . Courts in this district have long recognized that "a coiporation is an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action suit." See Gibson v. BoPar Dock Co. Corp., 780 F.Supp. 371, 373 (W.D.Va.1991) (citing Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 33 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir.1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 607, 50 S.Ct. 157, 74 L.Ed. 650 (1930)); Bates v. Cekada, 130 F.R.D. 52, 59 (E.D.Va.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Taylor v. Swirnow, 80
Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation (B) recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands (C) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (D) holding that a shareholder who disposes of his shares loses standing to bring a derivative action no longer a shareholder in the corporation the defendant cannot maintain a derivative action on its behalf (E) recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action
[A]: (E)

[Q]: Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890))). The Eleventh Amendment protects un-consenting states from suits in federal court brought by citizens of other states, see U.S. Const. Amend. XI, and consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of sovereign immunity additionally protects unconsenting states from suits brought by its own citizens in its own state courts, see Hans, 134 U.S. at 18-19, 10 S.Ct. 504; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that sovereign immunity, as an a priori concept, extends beyond the explicit language of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan,, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Hans, 134 U.S. at 15, 10 S.Ct. 504 (<HOLDING>). Even so, sovereign immunity is not absolute.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment protects a state from suit by its own citizens (B) holding an exception to eleventh amendment immunity inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law (C) holding that sovereign immunity barred a federal question suit against a state brought by one of its own citizens even though the text of the eleventh amendment only addresses suits brought by citizens of another state (D) holding state immune from suit brought by its own citizens (E) holding that utah did not waive its eleventh amendment immunity with respect to a suit brought in federal court because state statute provided for exclusive original jurisdiction in its own courts
[A]:
(A)