instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
reasons for his back problems, reasons that Anderson, given his attitude toward work and pain, apparently accepted without question. Considering the evidence as a whole, I conclude that substantial evidence does not support a conclusion that Anderson did know or should have known he had a compensable injury which needed to be reported to Frontier until Drs. Gallagher and Pinto provided reports to Anderson's attorney in April or May 2009. It was these reports that first established a relationship between Anderson's injury and his work for Frontier. Therefore, I would hold that the letter sent by Anderson's attorney on May 13, 2009, constituted timely notice to Frontier under the statute and our case law. 1 . Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 320-22, 101 N.W.2d 200, 205-06 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A worker may qualify for social security
Holding statements: (A) holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act (B) recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury (C) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (D) recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought (E) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable
answer:
holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act

question:
hearing are binding on the appellate courts if supported by competent evidence. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994). A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 97, 555 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001). In the present case, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact: that on or about July 6, 2004 . . . Officer Henderson, a 27 year veteran of the Burlington Police Dept, had received a call of a suspicious activity at Coy's Exxon on the comer of Graham-Hopedale Rd. and N. Church St. That location has had numerous calls for shopliftingy fights[,] and other activity. Also there is numerous gang and graffiti act S.E.2d 412, 418 (2004), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 283, 610 S.E.2d 208 (2005) (<HOLDING>). The State argues " [i]t is clear from the
Holding statements: (A) holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support an investigatory stop of a vehicle where the defendant and driver were observed loitering at a closed shopping center shortly before midnight no other vehicles were in the parking lot and the two men abruptly and hurriedly returned to their vehicle which was parked out of general public view (B) holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes (C) holding that officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when confidential informant personally observed the vehicle provided a description of the vehicle and its direction detailed the basis for her suspicion that the vehicle was engaged in illegal activity and had previously given reliable information that led to the successful apprehension of individuals engaged in various criminal activity (D) holding reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support the investigatory stop of a vehicle in view of the time of day and the officers prior knowledge of reports of criminal activity in the area (E) holding that a mere parking violation justified the investigatory stop of choudrys vehicle
answer:
holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes

question:
While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation 8 C.F.R. 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. 1103) which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. 241.5(b) ("An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal."). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant's release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be
Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc 1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest
answer:
holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute