instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
of purely legal questions, such as whether a given set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs would demonstrate a constitutional violation. 4 . We note that the record contains no indication that the OSHP employs explicit racial criteria or admits to racially-motivated decision making. If such a showing could be made, the plaintiffs would not need to establish the existence of a similarly situated class that was not investigated. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir.2000) ("[I]t is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an express, racial classification."), cert. denied, U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 44, 151 L.Ed.2d 16 (2001); cf. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1104-05 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). "In its more recent pronouncements on laws
Holding statements: (A) holding that it is unnecessary for criminal defendant to establish threeprong test for discrimination in grand jury selection where there is direct evidence of exclusion based upon race (B) holding that a defendants guilty plea forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury (C) holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment (D) holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge (E) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant
answer:
(A)

question:
yet a third time under the discussion of 'why.' 934 S.W.2d at 457 (emphasis added). Finally, the court of appeals properly applied the Kraus factors and explained why the evidence supported the punitive damages award. Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals' factual sufficiency review of the punitive damages award, despite the court's occasional misleading language, was proper. IY. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD-RECALCULATION Mobil also argues that the court of appeals erred by including, sua sponte, the estate's actual damages in its punitive damages calculation, thereby adding $91,555.58 to the punitive damages award. We agree. A court of appeals cannot modify a judgment without a point of error asking it to do so. See Texas Nat'l Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.1986)(<HOLDING>). Here, the jury charge asked the jury to
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees (B) holding merely that the evidence was sufficient to support the award of attorneys fees (C) holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees (D) holding that oncors request for the trial judge rather than the jury to determine the reasonableness of its attorneys fees and the failure to submit the question of attorneys fees to the jury resulted in a waiver of oncors claim for the recovery of attorneys fees (E) holding that the court of appeals erred in modifying the judgment to include attorneys fees when the trial courts refusal to grant attorneys fees was not the subject of a point of error
answer:
(E)

question:
relief in all circumstances in which a judgment fails to conform to the statute. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), a court may relieve a party from a judgment that is based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," but only on a motion made within one year of entry of the judgment. In the instant case, as the district court admitted and as seems readily apparent, the error was based on inadvertence. Thus, Rule 60(b)(1), with its one year time limitation, clearly applied. The district court attempted to circumvent the apparent harshness of the one year limitation by reading Rule 60(b)(6) as permitting nd Procedure 2864 (1973). Therefore, because Rule 60(b)(1) plainly applied, and because the motion for relief came over one year after the entry of judgment h Cir.1959) (<HOLDING>). Finally, we adamantly reject appellees'
Holding statements: (A) holding no coercion where counsel told movant his conviction was likely because movant stated he understood full range of punishment and no one threatened him to plead guilty (B) holding that once movant established right to summary judgment burden shifts to nonmovant to demonstrate otherwise (C) holding that in order for the movant to prevail on a summary judgment motion movant must either factually refute the affirmative defenses or establish that they are legally insufficient (D) holding that where interest was supposed to have run from the date of judgment but movant never asked for it and had accepted full payment of the judgment without it movant had forever waived his right to receive it (E) holding that in a traditional motion for summary judgment the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a fact issue after the movant has facially established its right to judgment as a matter of law
answer:
(D)