In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: an insurer to await the filing of a complaint against its insured will force insurers to defend claims that are unlikely to result in a duty to indemnify. We recognize the reality of Patrons's concerns. We conclude, however, that the rationale supporting the comparison test outweighs those concerns. See Dingwell, 414 A.2d at 227. "We have always recognized that the application of the comparison test will occasionally requ dgment action before the injured claimant filed an action against the insured. Dolley, 669 A.2d at 1321. Rather than rejecting the action on ripeness grounds, we determined the insurer's duly to defend vel non on the basis of what the corn-plaint might have alleged, in view of the parties' stipulation. Id. at 1323. 5 . See State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d at 38 (<HOLDING>); Perreault v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 568
Holding statements: (A) holding insurers duty to defend is determined by allegations in the petition (B) holding that insurance company could sue in insureds name following assignment of insureds interest against tortfeasor (C) holding that an insurers duty to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint against the insured (D) holding insurers right to subrogation arises only upon the insurers showing that the sum of the insureds recovery from the insurer and from persons legally responsible for the injury exceeds the insureds loss (E) holding that insureds criminal convictions were sufficient to preclude relitigation of the issue of the insureds subjective intent for purposes of evaluating the insurers duty to defend
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: rely on a warrant to search a house where the warrant affidavit stated that there was marijuana growing near the house and that there was a road from the house to the marijuana). Of course, the information in the affidavit does not eliminate the possibility that the marijuana came from somewhere else. The affidavit states that the trash was found at the end of a lane that dumped out into a rural highway. Admittedly, the trash could have been flung out the window of a passing car, or it could have fallen off the back of a garbage truck. However, when it comes to probable cause, the name says it all; certainty is never required, only a fair probability. When the issue is one of good-faith reliance, even less is necessary. See United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). The affidavit must simply bear some indicia
Holding statements: (A) holding that magistrate must have substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists (B) holding that plaintiff was required to plead and prove the absence of probable cause to support his bivens claim (C) holding that the existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a first amendment retaliation claim under the doctrine of qualified immunity (D) holding that the existence of probable cause in a 1983 case is a jury question (E) holding that leon requires a less demanding showing than the substantial basis threshold required to prove the existence of probable cause in the first place
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: readily ascertainable." (internal citation omitted)). Because Minnesota's waiver rule was neither firmly established nor regularly applied in the courtroom closure context when it was applied to Crawford, I respectfully dissent. 6 . It should be noted unpublished appellate decisions in Minnesota are not precedential. See Minn.Stat. 480A.08. 7 . Since Crawford, the Minnesota' Court of Appeals has continued to apply the waiver rule as it was articulated in Bashire. See State v. Delacruz, No. A03-129, 2004 WL 193058, at *4 (Minn.Ct.App. Feb. 3, 2004) (unpublished) (finding no waiver where the defendant failed to object to a courtroom closure but did not explicitly agree to the closure); State v. Campbell, No. A06-539, 2007 WL 1121284, at *1 (Minn.Ct.App. April 17, 2007) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>). These cases are irrelevant to our inquiry,
Holding statements: (A) holding appellant waived his challenge to statute as vague as applied because he did not specifically object at trial (B) holding that the defendant waived the issue on appeal when he failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of such evidence at trial (C) holding the defendant waived any claim of error by both failing to object at trial and affirmatively agreeing to a limited closure (D) holding the defendant waived his courtroom closure challenge because he both failed to object to the limited closure and agreed to the closure through his attorney (E) holding that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice and so the court need not require petitioner to prove that his counsels failure to object to the trial closure was actually prejudicial
Example Output:
(D)