In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122
Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review
Example Output: holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed

Example Input: to commit himself to such an alternative to a federal sentence. 2 . Defendant also raises two additional arguments: (1) that the district court improperly based its sentence on the defendant's refusal to waive his constitutional and statutory rights to oppose his deportation; and (2) that the district court failed to appreciate the scope of its authority to consider, as a mitigating circumstance upon which to base a departure, defendant's vulnerability and susceptibility to abuse in prison due to his physical condition. Both arguments lack merit. As to the first argument, the conditioning of a downward departure on the surrender of a statutory right to a deportation hearing would not have offended due process. See United States v. Galvez-Falconi, 174 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). See generally United States v.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart (B) holding that district court had authority to grant section 5k20 downward departure despite governments opposition (C) holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward (D) holding that a circuit court has no jurisdiction to review a district courts discretionary decision not to depart downward from the guidelines but would have jurisdiction if the district court based its decision on the belief that it did not have the authority to depart (E) holding that where a defendant malees a showing that the act of consenting to deportation carries unusual assistance to the administration of justice district court has authority under ussg 5k20 to depart downward in absence of the governments consent
Example Output: recognizing that a defendant may appeal a district courts refusal to depart downward if the sentence was imposed in violation of law because the district court misconstrued its authority to depart

Example Input: 991, at 146 (1956). Similarly, another treatise explains: "The personal representative may require a receipt or a release as a condition precedent to payment of a legacy or distributive share, which receipt or release discharges the representative from further liability, in the absence of impeaching circumstances such as fraud or mistake." 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators 656. Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have found that a personal representative is entitled to a release prior to making a distribution. See Ford v. Wilson, 85 A. 1073, 1077 (Del.Ch. 1913) (personal representative had a right to require a release from a distributee prior to making the final settlement of an estate); Sterrett v. Nat'l Safe Deposit, Savings & Trust Co., 10 App.D.C. 131, 139 (1897) (<HOLDING>); First Midwest Bank v. Dempsey, 157 Ill.App.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that even if a thirdparty administrator is not a fiduciary under erisa such an administrator still has standing pursuant to 1331 (B) holding that payment made in reasonable belief that it was required by an insurance contract was involuntary (C) recognizing that the administrator was amply protected if it made a distribution but nonetheless was entitled to exact releases upon payment of distributions (D) recognizing that an employer had a dual role as administrator of plan and as employer and only the role of administrator was held to a fiduciary standard (E) holding that it was not essential to an action by a supplier on a payment bond under the miller act that a demand be made on the general contractor for payment although there was evidence in the case from which it could be found that the materialman looked to the general contractor for payment since the statute does not require a demand for payment but merely requires written notice of the claim
Example Output:
holding that even if a thirdparty administrator is not a fiduciary under erisa such an administrator still has standing pursuant to 1331