In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

filed, is the verdict, and a showing that the writing is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself." (punctuation omitted)). 19 See former OCGA 17-9-41 ("The affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach their verdict."); Fulton County v. Phillips, 91 Ga. 65, 65 (16 SE 260) (1892) (syllabus by the court) ("According to repeated rulings of this court, the affidavits of jurors may be taken to sustain, but not to impeach, their verdict."); see also former OCGA 9-10-9 (providing the same rule in civil procedure). 20 See generally OCGA 24-1-2 (e) ("Except as modified by statute, the common law as expounded b tate, 323 Ga. App. 15, 17 (2) (747 SE2d 99) (2013). 34 Freeman, 264 Ga. at 278; see Wade v. State, 261 Ga. 105, 107-08 (6) (401 SE2d 701) (1991) (<HOLDING>); see also Ingram v. State, 290 Ga. 500, 503
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that trial court did not err in declining to accept jurys first verdict when form stated that the jury found the defendant undecided and trial courts interpretation of the verdict form to mean that the jury was either not unanimous or had not decided yet whether defendant was guilty or not guilty was reasonable and thus trial court properly instructed jury to continue deliberating (C) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection (D) holding that upon objection to the form of the verdict trial court did not err in returning jury for further deliberations (E) holding that a district court did not err by submitting a special verdict form to the jury this particular verdict form did not specify a standard of proof
(D)

substantial rights. Mares, 402 F.3d at 520. The district court made no comments suggesting it would have imposed a lesser sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. See United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir.2005) (stating the issue as "whether [the defendant] has demonstrated that the sentencing judge would have reached a different result had it sentenced [the defendant] under an advisory scheme rather than a mandatory one"), cert. denied, U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 264, 163 L.Ed.2d 238 (2005) (No. 05-5535). Therefore, Tovar fails to demonstrate plain error. Tovar contends for the first time on appeal that the statute under which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. 841, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (<HOLDING>). As he concedes, however, this issue is
Holding statements: (A) holding any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that ojther than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that other than the fact of a prior conviction any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that other than fact of prior conviction any fact that increases penalty for crime beyond prescribed statutory minimum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond reasonable doubt
(C)

egregious harm from the trial court's error in submitting the lesser-included-offense charge. V. Conclusion We sustain appellant's third issue to the extent that it concerns whether the State was entitled to the lesser-included-offense charge under the first step of the Rousseau lesser-included-offense test. Given our disposition, we need not consider the remainder of appellant's third issue (concerning whether the State was entitled to the lesser-included-offense charge under the second step of the Rousseau lesser-included-offense test) or appellant's second issue (concerning the factual sufficiency of the evidence). We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with instructions to dismiss the indictment. See Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (<HOLDING>) (footnotes omitted); Konchar v. State, 938
Holding statements: (A) holding that the greater offense is by definition the same for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it (B) holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense (C) holding that court of appealss remedy on remand from reversal for harmful charge error based on failure to meet second step of rousseau lesserincludedoffense test was to remand for a retrial for the lesser offense because the jurys verdict that the appellant was guilty of the lesserincluded offense operates as an acquittal of the greater offense to which jeopardy had attached this prevents a retrial for the greater offense but not for the lesser offense (D) holding that where jury was instructed on both a greater offense and lesserincluded offense and the jury convicted on the lesserincluded offense the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense (E) recognizing that it is within our power to direct entry of judgment on a lesser included offense when vacating a greater offense if the commission of the lesser offense can be established from facts that the jury actually found citations omitted
(C)