In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant subsequently gave a statement. Id. 476. The court held that the detective's statements at the jail cell did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 479-480. The court further determined that the defendant, by stating that he wanted to tell his side of the story, " 'initiated' further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word." Id. at 480. Similarly, in Bunch v Thompson, 949 F2d 1354, 1361 (CA 4, 1991), the court held that a defendant's statement was not the product of "police-initiated interrogation" where it followed an inquiry that "amounted to nothing more than an effort to ascertain if Bunch had changed his mind about wanting an attorney." See also McCall v State, 501 So 2d 496, 500 (Ala Crim App, 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v Acquin, 187 Conn 647, 669-670; 448
Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (B) holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (C) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (D) holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity (E) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation

A: holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime
****
Q: (1986) (relying on section 45(1) and comment a). 24 . See e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) ("railroad [retirement] benefits are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any time"); Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 173 F.3d 94, 103 (2nd Cir. 1999) (a claim to vested welfare benefits is contradicted by the ... unambiguous reservation in the plan documents of its right to amend the plan"); International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Amer. v. BVR Liquidating Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1999) ("the inclusion of a 'reservation of rights' provision establishes that there was no intent for benefits to vest"); McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefit
Holding statements: (A) holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed (B) recognizing that generally with supposed unilateral contracts if the offeror expressly reserves the power to revoke the offer until the offerees performance is complete then the offer is illusory and cannot give rise to a unilateral contract but noting exceptions (C) holding that the offerors signature on the offerees conditional acceptance bound the offeror to all the terms therein (D) holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell (E) holding that a written offer accepted by parol may constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract provided the person making the offer is the party to be charged

A: holding that performance of employment services constituted acceptance of the offer of participation in bonus plan and a binding unilateral contract was thereby formed
****
Q: of the writ, the CCA examines the substance of the claim to see if it establishes a prima facie case of retardation, and only upon deciding that question can the state court decide whether remand is appropriate."). 10 . Brown v. Dretke, 419 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir.2005). 11 . 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). 12 . Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-17, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). 13 . In re Hearn, 418 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.2005). 14 . Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 & nn. 24-25 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (citing American Association of Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992)). 15 . See Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 361-63 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); see also Bri-seno, 135 S.W.3d at 9 ("[T]he
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court did not err (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant suffered from significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and related limitations in adaptive functioning (C) holding that a district court did not clearly err in finding materiality where the prior art reference at issue had been considered material by examiners in related foreign patent applications (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that superior court did not clearly err in finding that the parent had not remedied the problematic conduct

A:
holding that trial court did not err
****