instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
602 F.Supp. 859, 864 (D.N.J.1985); Tedesco v. U.S. Po esentation against the Government. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). Further, the FTCA requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to adjudication in a federal court, all claims to first be brought before the appropriate agency-here, the USPS's Tort Claims Examiner. See 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). It is undisputed that Mr. Foster did not bring his claims to the USPS before initiating this suit. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. II Mr. Foster also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration and its denial of sanctions against USPS. We review these determinations for abuse of discretion. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gary v. The Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive (B) holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions (E) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit
answer:
holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive

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in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code"); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor's estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past' but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor's ability to make a fresh start"). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as
Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate
answer:
holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code

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(1874), the equitable tolling doctrine provides that "where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and 'remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.' " Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-397 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946), quoting from Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. at 348. "This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation." Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 396-397, 66 S.Ct. at 585. One court has held that equitable tolling does not apply to 727(e)(2). See Johnson, 187 B.R. at 986-989 (<HOLDING>). The Court based its holdings on two grounds,
Holding statements: (A) holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose (B) holding that statute of repose was not subject to toiling provision applicable to statute of limitations because among other reasons it would ignore fundamental distinctions between ordinary statutes of limitations and statutes of repose (C) holding that a statute of repose sets absolute parameters of any action (D) holding that statute was one of repose because it embodies the most distinctive characteristic of a statute of repose the barring of the right to bring an action rather than the remedy prescribed (E) holding that 727e is a statute of repose and an essential prerequisite to the proceeding
answer:
holding that provision has the characteristics of a statute of repose