In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: include the element that elevates the crime to a higher level." As we noted in State v. Bean, 153 N.H. 380 (2006), "[i]n Glanville, the State, although not required to do so under Johnson, attempted to charge the defendant with a specific variant of the crime allegedly attempted, but failed to accurately set forth that variant in the indictment." Bean, 153 N.H. at 384; see Johnson, 144 N.H. at 178. Indeed, Glanville recognized that all that was required "[t]o charge the defendant with attempted armed robbery, class A felony, [was for] the indictment ... to allege that the defendant (1) with a purpose to commit armed robbery, (2) committed acts constituting a substantial step toward the commission of that crime." Glanville, 145 N.H. at 634 (emphasis added); cf. Casanova, 164 N.H. at 566 (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the indictment in this case
Holding statements: (A) holding that because statutory variants of an underlying crime are not elements of an attempt to commit the underlying crime jurors are not required to unanimously find which specific statutory variant the defendant intended to commit it is sufficient that they unanimously conclude that the defendant intended to commit any of the applicable statutory variants (B) holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred (C) holding that firstdegree murder is one crime although the defendant can commit the crime in several ways (D) recognizing that entrapment is a statutory defense rooted in the notion that congress could not have intended to criminally punish those who commit elements of crime but are induced by the government to commit the acts and that outrageous conduct defense is rooted in constitutional law (E) holding that an individual cannot attempt to commit murder of the second or third degree because the crime of attempt is a specific intent crime and an attempt to commit second or third degree murder would require proof that the individual intended to perpetrate an unintentional killing which is logically impossible
[A]: holding that an employer who caused his agent to commit a crime in another county was deemed to have been personally present where the crime occurred

[Q]: states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) ("[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew's evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding."). But see Klein v. Comm'r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) ("A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence."); Calcutt v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness
Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action
[A]: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial

[Q]: 18 to dictate that sentencing courts should not include the weight of the liquid solvent in liquid LSD when determining a defendant's base offense level. Amendment 484 demonstrates the Commission's intention that not all materials that are combined or "mixed" with controlled substances should be included in the weight of the drug for sentencing purposes. The liquid solvent thus may not be included in the definition in Amendment 484 of "mixture or substance" given that, although wholesale traffickers use the solvent to apply the drug to ingestible carrier media, consumers do not "use" the solvent because it evaporates from the carrier media before the media are ingested. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 457, 111 S.Ct. at 1923. But cf. United States v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128, 131 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we thus remand
Holding statements: (A) holding under plain error standard that basing sentence on lsd and water in which it was dissolved did not violate due process (B) holding that omission was not plain error (C) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (D) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (E) holding that the courts review is conducted under the plain error standard
[A]:
holding that omission was not plain error