In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

not contest Alaimalo's actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo's actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider "(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner's claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner's claim after that first 2255 motion." Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must "effect a material change in the applicable law" to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the supreme courts decision in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that accessability of a firearm was enough to support an inference that a firearm was used in a drug crime whereas bailey required active employment of the firearm (B) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used (C) holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc 924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review (D) holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used

of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a "watershed rule," falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262,
Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review
holding apprendi is not retroactive

exclusion states: "If you have asked us to exclude any person from coverage under this policy, then we will not provide coverage for any claim arising from an accident or loss involving a motorized vehicle being operated by that excluded person." We agree with the insurer that this sentence, at least when considered in isolation, clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for Scott's UIM claim. The word "you" is defined in the policy as the person shown as the named insured on the declarations page. For this policy, that person is Rhonda. There is no dispute that Rhonda asked the insurer "to exclude [a] person from coverage under this policy" and that person was Scott. It is also undisputed that the UIM claim asserted by Scott arose from an accident involving a 10 (Okla.Civ.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). We turn now to the plaintiffs' contention
Holding statements: (A) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (B) holding similar exclusion excluding coverage for any loss was clear and unambiguous and excluded coverage for um claims even though such claims were not expressly mentioned in the exclusion (C) holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver (D) holding location of named driver exclusion in endorsement did not make it ambiguous exclusion applied to all coverage afforded by the policy including the um coverage (E) holding nearly identical named driver exclusion was plain and unambiguous and excluded claim brought under um coverage
holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy