In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: court failed to question any of the prospective jurors regarding their understanding and acceptance of the first Zehr principle, defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him. With regard to the second Zehr principle, the State's burden of proof, the circuit court questioned the prospective jurors as to whether they would sign the appropriate verdict form if the State had or had not met its burden of proof. This was a "general question concerning the juror's willingness to follow the law" (177 Ill. 2d R. 431, Committee Comments, at lxxix) which did not comply with the 2007 amended rule's requirement that the court question the prospective jurors regarding their understanding and acceptance of the State's burden. See also People v. Anderson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (2009) (<HOLDING>). The circuit court questioned the prospective
Holding statements: (A) holding that plan did not comply (B) holding that such a general question regarding the prospective jurors willingness to follow the law did not comply with the 2007 amended version of rule 431b (C) recognizing general rule (D) holding that the february 28 2007 interim rule was invalid because it failed to comply with the administrative procedure act (E) recognizing that jurors are presumed to follow instructions
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: the action should pro ceed among the existing parties or be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(b). Defendant neglected to offer any explanation for how and why Mr. Stroud is essential, other than that he was named in the underlying state court case. That is not enough. Mr. Stroud is not a necessary or indispensable party under Rule 19 because this Court can administer complete relief an order compelling arbitration among the existing parties and Mr. Stroud himself is not claiming an interest in this arbitration action that will be impaired by his absence. Although failing to dismiss this case may result in piecemeal litigation, that factor alone is not compelling enough to find Mr. Stroud to be an indispensable party. Cf. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 446 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). This Court therefore properly limits its
Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (B) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (C) holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation (D) holding that faa was inapplicable where parties involved in action are not parties to an arbitration agreement under which issues are referable to arbitration (E) holding that in determining whether diversity jurisdiction exists in petition to compel arbitration district court was correct in looking only to citizenship of parties in action before it parties who signed arbitration agreement and that nondiverse agents in underlying state case were not indispensable parties as any potential prejudice resulting from piecemeal litigation is overcome by faas strong bias in favor of arbitration
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: cable companies to provide telephone services"), cert. granted, No. 11SC669, 2012 WL 1940812 (Colo.2012); GTE North, Inc. v. Zaino, 96 Ohio St.3d 9, 770 N.E.2d 65, 69 (2002) (rejecting an ILEC's constitutional challenge to an Ohio law that provided for a much higher rate of assessment on certain personal property of ILECs and noting that ILECs "enjoy the advantage ... of being the default provider of intraLATA call service for customers who fail to take affirmativ 337, 346-47 (1967) (finding it unconstitutional under Idaho's uniformity clause to assess certain property at a higher ratio of full cash value), overruled by Simmons v. Idaho St. Tax Comm'n, 111 Idaho 343, 723 P.2d 887, 892-93 (1986); Inter Island Tel. Co., v. San Juan County, 125 Wash.2d 332, 883 P.2d 1380, 1382-83 (1994) (<HOLDING>). These cases are easily distinguishable,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the extension phone exemption applied to situations where a parent records his childs phone conversations from a phone extension within the parents home without any analysis of the recording partys purpose (B) recognizing that the government may seek a personal judgment specific property or substitute property (C) holding vendors right to receive payment under a land sale contract was personal property and a security interest representing that personal property right constituted realty paper and was subject to article 9 (D) holding that the utilities commission has the discretion to use a hypothetical capital structure in setting customer rates particularly where the utility is a whollyowned subsidiary of a holding company (E) holding it unconstitutional to assess a local phone company at a much higher rate than other utilities and personal property taxpayers
[EX A]:
(E)