In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

did not present any evidence before the district court to meet his burden of showing that the affidavit, which directly corroborates Johnson's testimony before the magistrate judge, is false or unreliable. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we readily conclude that any error was harmless. B. Credibility of Witnesses The district court's findings of fact at a revocation hearing are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir.1993). "The credibility of a witness is in the province of the factfinder and this court will not ordinarily review the factfinder's determination of credibility." United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We defer to the lower court's credibility
Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others (C) holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony (D) holding in the context of a criminal trial that a courts choice of who to believe is conclusive unless the judge credits exceedingly improbable testimony (E) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it
holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony

No. 25. The'government asserts that "defendants-were put on notice and consented to having their phone calls monitored, recorded and divulged," citing DOC's written policies on inmate phone calls, and thus have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the calls. Gov't's Reply at 5-6. The vast weight of authority supports the government's position that, even assuming the defendants in this case subjectively believed that their calls were private, any such belief was unreasonable. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962) (in jail setting, "official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the day"); United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 389-90 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 2877, 186 L.Ed.2d 902 (2013) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Monghur, 588 F.3d 975,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth (B) holding inmates and those with whom they converse have no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations where inmates received a handbook alerting them that all telephone calls were recorded and were exposed to a document hanging in the common areas that notified prisoners that their calls might be monitored and recorded (C) holding that a nonprisoner had no reasonable expectation of privacy when speaking to a prisoner on the telephone because as a frequent visitor to the prison she was well aware of the strict security measures in place and that the code of federal regulations puts the public on notice that prison officials are authorized to monitor prisoners telephone calls (D) holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in a prison visitor room where conversations took place between brothers and were surreptitiously recorded by state officials (E) holding that a customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in dialed telephone numbers which were conveyed to the telephone company
holding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth

1, 6 (1st Cir. BAP 2006) (discussing shifting burdens); Mountain Dairies, Inc., 372 B.R. at 633 ("the petitioning creditor must first establish a prima facie case that no bona fide dispute exists"); In re Mylotte, David & Fitzpatrick, Bky. No. 07-11861, 2007 WL 2033812, at *6 (Bankr. E.D.Pa. Jul. 12, 2007) (same); In re Graber, 319 B.R. 374, 377 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2004) ("The initial burden lies with the petitioner to establish a prima facie case that there is no bona fide dispute."). The Petitioning Creditor alleges that her Claim is derived from the Proposed Debtor's failure to repay a loan in the amount of $850,000. To provide prima facie evidence of her Claim, the Petitioning Creditor must provide evidence of the alleged loan. In re VitaminSpice, 472 B.R. 282, 291 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2012) (<HOLDING>); In re Taub, 439 B.R. 261, 274-75
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that loan documents introduced by petitioning creditors were sufficient to establish prima facie validity of claims (B) recognizing confusion caused by prima facie language (C) holding to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination a plaintiff must show he 1 (D) holding that close temporal proximity is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation (E) holding that numbers alone are not sufficient to establish or negate a prima facie ease
recognizing confusion caused by prima facie language