In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: other than delay. The same is true of Mr. Leland's contention that he was not adequately kept informed by his attorney as the case progressed, that Mr. Largay failed to undertake requested actions, and that he relied too heavily on the prospect of a dramatic change in the legal landscape following Blakely up to Booker. But, there is no factual specificity to any of these arguments. Mr. Leland nowhere suggests what an evidentiary hearing would reveal to justify the relief he has requested. If the 2255 petitioner wishes an evidentiary hearing, he must at a minimum present a plausible basis to conclude that the evidence would lead to a different result. Here, Mr. Leland has asserted no factual basis for such a conclusion. Cf. Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 61 (1st Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge's
Holding statements: (A) holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on 2255 petitioners mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit (B) holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because the petitioners allegations were not implausible and a final determination of the merits of petitioners claim would be best served by greater development of the facts many of which the government disputes (C) holding that review under 2254d1 is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits rejecting the petitioners claim that the federal habeas court could consider evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing (D) holding that the state courts rejection of the petitioners ineffective assistance of counsel claim was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence before the state court (E) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the bia to fail to consider the merits of a petitioners claim
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: immunity exists. In Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984), the fifth circuit held that when a probation officer erroneously prepared a motion for revocation of appellant's probation, she was only entitled to qualified immunity. The court distinguished its earlier case of Spaulding v. Nielsen, supra: We find Spaulding not controlling in the case at hand. Whereas in Spaulding the probation officer was acting at the direction of the court during the presen-tence report process, in the immediate case the probation officer acted at her own initiative and at a different phase of the criminal process less intimately associated with the judiciary. Galvan, at 215. See also Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We note also third circuit decisions,
Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (B) holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity (C) holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law (D) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (E) holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: that he or she possesses all the constitutional and statutory requirements of the office for which the candidate has filed. Subsection (2) clearly requires the petition to be sworn to by the candidate and not less than two registered voters. Subsection (3) requires, by its plain language, the candidate to swear that he meets the requirements for the office. We do not believe the statute should be interpreted as requiring the registered voters to also swear that the candidate meets the requirements of the office. Such interpretation is inconsistent with the language of subsection (3) and does not reflect a liberal interpretation in favor of allowing the candidate (Waterman) to continue on the ballot under these circumstances. See Heleringer v. Brown, Ky., 104 S.W.3d 397 (2003) (<HOLDING>). Rather, we interpret subsection (2) as merely
Holding statements: (A) holding that courts should liberally construe the requirements of rule 3 (B) holding that coas should be construed liberally (C) recognizing the rule of statutory interpretation that laws are to be liberally construed so as to reach a substantially correct result and the court should to every reasonable extent interpret such provisions as directory rather than mandatory (D) holding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to render any of its provisions nugatory (E) holding that election laws should be liberally interpreted so as to allow the candidate to stand for election
[EX A]:
(E)