TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: the sophisticated user defense, a supplier has no duty to warn the ultimate user if it has reason to believe that the user will realize its dangerous condition. Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn.2004); see also Ritchie v. Glidden, 242 F.3d 713, 724 (7th Cir.2001) (stating, under Indiana law, that the sophisticated purchaser defense to a failure-to-warn claim brought under negligence or strict liability theories provides that product suppliers do not have a duty to warn employees or customers of knowledgeable industrial purchasers as to product-related hazards). In addition to limiting a supplier's duty, the "sophisticated user" concept also affects the element of proximate cause. Crook v. Kaneb Pipe Line Operating P'ship, L.P., 231 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strong, 667 F.2d at 688 ("Even if [the
Holding statements: (A) holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury (B) holding in a negligence action that the air traffic controllers failure to warn of an impending danger cannot be the proximate cause of an injury after the pilot himself discovered its presence appreciated the danger and decided to fly ahead into it (C) holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible (D) holding that if a user actually knows of the danger a failure to warn cannot be a proximate cause of the injury (E) holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir.1975). Anderson's condition at the time of the statement was described as excited, nervous and scared, and he appeared as if "he did not know what to do." Moreover, his statement directly related to an exciting event, the shooting. Thus, based on the evidence and circumstances known at the time of its ruling, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the exciting event witnessed by Anderson was the shooting itself. Accordingly, to the extent the trial court based its ruling on the fact that Anderson personally perceived the shooting, we find no abuse of discretion. We further note that the startling occurrence that triggers the excited utterance need not necessarily be the crime itself. See Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court could have found startling event or condition was declarants sustaining an injury or the pain she later experienced (B) holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unre lated prior condition satisfied the rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the plaintiffs claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or event unrelated to the defendants negligence (C) holding that a lower court properly admitted a fouryear olds hearsay statement although she made it 1215 hours after the startling event (D) holding that statement must be product of a startling event (E) holding a condition precedent is an act or event that must be performed or occur after the contract has been formed before the contract becomes effective

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: part by an officer's interest in ensuring his own' protection and preventing a suspect's flight during a Terry stop, most circuits today have approved police use of drawn weapons or handcuffs to restrain criminal suspects. Courts have' also permitted police to demand a suspect to lay prostrate on the ground during a stop and frisk search. In addition, .courts have allowed police to forcibly transport suspects (most notably to a patrol car) under a valid Terry stop. As a result, lower courts, while maintaining that Terry remains a limited exception, have authorized conduct similar to that associated with custodial arrest without converting that stop into a full-fledged arrest. Id. at 2805 (citations omitted); see also State v. Sheppard, 271 S,W.3d 281, 289 n. 28 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (<HOLDING>). 33 . See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,
Holding statements: (A) holding in the alternative that even if handcuffing a suspect did convert the detention into an arrest the arrest was justified by probable cause (B) holding that the limits of fourth amendment protection relate to the boundary between arrest and pretrial detention (C) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (D) holding that in 1983 claims for malicious prosecution the fourth amendment applies to those actions which occur between arrest and pretrial detention (E) holding a fourth amendment terry detention is not a custodial arrest and the use of handcuffs does not automatically convert a temporary detention into a fourth amendment arrest

SOLUTION:
(E)