In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: and so require an interpretive step to determine the expressive elements of these processes. However, neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or the artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afforded. Although writing and painting can be reduced to their constituent acts, and thus described as conduct, we have not attempted to disconnect the end product from the act of creation. Thus, we have not drawn a hard line between the essays John Peter Zenger published and the act of setting the type. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The process of expression through a medium
Holding statements: (A) holding that dating is a type of association protected by the first amendment (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) holding that a tax on ink and paper burdens rights protected by the first amendment

Answer: (E)

Question: defense, or a development in the controlling law that foreclosed the claim. The record here betrays no significant change in circumstances prior to trial that reasonably should have caused the plaintiffs to conclude that their claims were no longer viable. In fact, the most notable development in the case prior to trial sent a contrary signal: the court denied the Mayor's post-discovery summary judgment motion as to the plaintiffs' central political discrimination claim. While the fact that a claim has survived summary judgment is not, on its own, "entitled to decretory significance," Foster, 943 F.2d at 144, it has some value in determining whether a claim was or became unreasonable or without foundation. See id.; Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1559 (11th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Jensen v. Stangel, 762 F.2d 815, 818 (9th
Holding statements: (A) holding that district court abused its discretion in finding suit unreasonable and groundless where inter alia the court had denied two prior summary judgment motions (B) holding district court abused its discretion in admitting state court findings of fact (C) holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto (D) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (E) holding district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on summary judgment motion where inter alia plaintiff had been given repeated notices court intended to rule on motion and it was plaintiffs burden to rebut defendants evidence

Answer: (A)

Question: people who are not government officials ("and other person acting under color of law") are "government," and thus proper defendants under RFRA, indicates that individual capacity suits must be permitted because no one who is not a government official has an "official capacity" in which to be sued. Moreover, Congress knows how to specify that a statutory provision applies to government officials only in their "official capacity" when it wants to, and has not done so here. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 1391(e), which provides, in part, "[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity ... may ... be brought in any judicial district," and Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 100 S.Ct. 774, 63 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The court also reads RFRA to allow for
Holding statements: (A) holding that since damage claims in an article 78 proceeding may only be asserted against individuals in their official capacities the plaintiff could not have recovered damages against the education officials in their individual capacities and therefore cannot be barred by res judicata (B) holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction (C) holding that such claims however cannot be brought directly against the state or a state agency but only against state officials in their official capacities (D) holding based in part on this statutory language that 1391e is not applicable to actions for money damages brought against federal officials in their individual capacities (E) holding suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief are permissible because they are in effect suits against the officials in their individual capacities

Answer:
(D)