TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: before section 362(b)(3) can come into play. An act that both creates and perfects a lien postpetition cannot so qualify. See, e.g., Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist. v. Excel Eng'g, Inc. (In re Excel Eng'g, Inc.), 224 B.R. 582, 589-90 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (refusing to recognize validity of postpetition creation and perfection of mechanic's hen because creditor had no lien at the time debtor filed for bankruptcy); Water-vliet Paper Co. v. City of Watervliet (In re Shoreham Paper Co.), 117 B.R. 274, 281-83 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1990) (finding postpe-tition creation and perfection of property tax lien barred by automatic stay because no prepetition interest existed); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Ballentine Bros. (In re Ballentine Bros.), 86 B.R. 198, 201 (Bankr. D.Neb.1988) (<HOLDING>); North Side Lumber Co. v. Indus. Indem. Co.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations (B) holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor (C) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (D) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (E) holding that creation of a postpetition tax levy based on a prepetition assessment was barred by the automatic stay

SOLUTION: holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations

PROBLEM: that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble's intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble's reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by 301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted

SOLUTION: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by 301

PROBLEM: and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); see also Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). We must therefore decide whether Mothershed's claims fall within the Rook-er-Feldmandoctrine's narrowed scope. A Under Rooker-Feldman, lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions, and state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. 149 (<HOLDING>); Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87, 103 S.Ct. 1303
Holding statements: (A) holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar (B) holding that a federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that effectively sought review of an indiana state courts decision (C) holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case (D) holding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs complaint to the extent they sought review of the district of columbia court of appeals denial of their petitions (E) holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review a final state court decision in a particular case

SOLUTION:
holding that the federal district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to review the courts denial of a particular application for admission to the district of columbia bar