In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, the Supreme Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (allowing school officials to conduct warrantless searches of student property without probable cause); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74,
Holding statements: (A) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (B) holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct (C) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (D) holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause (E) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause

Output: holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable

Input: Consider Input: contractual obligation." Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 123 F.Supp.2d at 65. See Belgrave v. City of N.Y., 1999 WL 692034, *45 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (Gleeson, J.)(dismissing the plaintiffs breach of contract claim where employee claimed that employer failed to follow its procedures for providing equal opportunity to employees); Mutua v. Tex. Roadhouse Mgmt. Corp., 753 F.Supp.2d 954, 968-69 (D.S.D.2010) (Schreier, J.Xgranting summary judgment on a breach-of-contract claim seeking to enforce the anti-discrimination provisions in the employer's employee handbook, because the employer already must abide by Title VII and a promise to perform a legal duty is not consideration for a return promise); Byra-Grzegorczyk v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 572 F.Supp.2d 233, 254 (D.Conn.2008) (Kravitz, J.)(<HOLDING>); Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 F.Supp.2d 199,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea (B) holding that an administrative agency or a state courts finding that an employer had just cause to terminate a plaintiff is not preclusive with regard to the plaintiffs discrimination claim against the employer (C) recognizing that an antidiscrimination policy does not indicate that an employer is undertaking any contractual obligations towards the employee rather it requires the employer to comply with federal and state antidiscrimination laws (D) holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration (E) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work

Output: recognizing that idea is simply not an antidiscrimination statute so that pure discrimination claim was not barred by parents failure to exhaust remedies under idea

Input: Consider Input: has only raised the spectre that Euler, was aware of the Nature's Own scheme, but has not produced adequate evidence on which the types of fraud requiring knowledge could be proven. In sum, MBFG has not met its burden to produce evidence on which a reasonable juror could find that Euler knew any of its alleged representations concerning Nature's Own were false or reckless when-made, that Euler failed to disclose any similar facts from MBFG, or that Euler had actual knowledge that Nature's Own was engaged.in a fraudulent scheme. Accordingly, MBFG cannot prove an element essential to its claims for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment and aiding and abetting a fraud. Euler is therefore entitled to summary judgment on those claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (<HOLDING>); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at
Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 56c requires summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys ease and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial (B) holding that the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case (C) recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case (D) holding that movant is entitled to summary judgment when party with burden of proof fails to establish genuine fact issue (E) holding that rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial
Output: holding that rule 56c requires summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that partys ease and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial