In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: in the context of an election case, even in the absence of a class action, and concluding that the case was not moot); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n. 5, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973) (concluding that plaintiffs' class action challenge to New York's Election Law was capable of repetition yet evading review, although primary election had passed and the petitioners would be eligible to vote in the next primary); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (in challenge to a provision of Tennessee's election law, concluding that, although plaintiff would be eligible to vote in the next election, the controversy was capable of repetition yet evading review); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We adopt the approach of the former cases,
Holding statements: (A) holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added (B) holding that although the 1972 election had long since passed the case was not moot because the statute under review would apply to other candidates in the future (C) holding that election case was not moot after election because there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining parties would be subject to that same action in the future (D) holding that issues as to whether declaratory relief should be granted had become moot and would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but that under hallman the entire appeal was not moot because there still was a live controversy as to whether appellee was entitled to recover attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act and therefore issues regarding attorneys fees were not moot and would be decided (E) holding that plaintiffs claims were not moot although the election was over because the same issues would affect minorparty candidacies in the future but failing to address whether fulani herself would be affected

A: holding that appeal was not moot despite the fact that the election had passed because there would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar future controversy emphasis added
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Q: the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor "reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another." Id. 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert's conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert's use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768
Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car

A: holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle
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Q: has admitted in this and prior proceedings that he committed intentional torts against Ms. Lewis, and, therefore, cannot deny an intent to injure. Such an admission, regardless of its characterization, is not sufficient to show the intent required by section 523(a)(6) because such intent may be present in some, but not all intentional torts. For example, under Virginia law, conduct that is intentional or reckless is all that is required to establish the intent requirement of intentional infliction of emotional distress (an intentional tort). Almy v. Grisham, 273 Va. 68, 639 S.E.2d 182, 189 (2007). Yet, intentional or reckless conduct is not sufficient to establish the intent required under section 523(a)(6). See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998) (<HOLDING>). Even if the Court were to consider the
Holding statements: (A) holding that 523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury (B) holding that the word willful in a6 modifies the word injury indicating that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury (C) holding that there must be proof of both a willful act and malicious injury to establish nondischargeability under section 523a6 (D) holding that a mere deliberate or intentional act that causes injury is not sufficient to establish willfulness in the context of 11 usc 523a6 (E) holding that the debtors knowing act of failing to obtain workers compensation insurance so that the employer owed an employee a debt after the employee suffered a workplace injury was not the sort of willful and malicious injury required for nondischargeability under 523a6 because it cannot not be said that the employer intended for the employee to suffer a fall or that there was an unbroken chain of events leading from the employers intentional act to the employees physical injury

A:
holding that 523a6 requires the actor to intend the injury not just the act that leads to the injury
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