Mr. Neville ( ( ( Anthony Higgins , a young and arrogant artist and something of a Byronic hero , is contracted to produce a series of 12 landscape drawings of an estate by Mrs. Virginia Herbert for her absent and estranged husband . Part of the contract is that Mrs. Herbert agrees '' to meet Mr. Neville in private and to comply with his requests concerning his pleasure with me . '' Several sexual encounters between them follow , each of them acted in such a way as to emphasise reluctance or distress on the part of Mrs Herbert and sexual aggression or insensitivity on the part of Mr Neville . Meanwhile , whilst living on the estate , Mr. Neville gains quite a reputation with its dwellers , especially with Mrs. Herbert's son-in-law , Mr. Talmann . Mrs. Herbert , wearied of meeting Mr. Neville for his pleasure , tries to terminate the contract before all of the drawings are completed and orders Mr. Neville to stop . But he refuses to void the contract and continues as before . Then Mrs. Herbert's married , but as yet childless , daughter , Mrs. Talmann , who has apparently become attracted to Mr. Neville , seems to blackmail him into making a second contract in Which he agrees to comply with what is described as her pleasure , rather than his a reversal of the position in regard to her mother . A number of curious objects appear in Neville's drawings , Which point ultimately to the murder of Mr. Herbert , whose body is discovered in the moat of the house . Mr. Neville completes his twelve drawings and leaves the house .

Question: "Does Mr. Neville know anything about the murder of Mrs. Herbert?"

Response: "No he did not"

A: no

A government-sponsored coup last year made Bruce Iwasaki and Neal Dudovitz the kings of Los Angeles County's federally funded legal aid community. The two men emerged atop a changed landscape that resulted from a decade of begging for a share of shrinking public dollars doled out by an unsympathetic GOP-controlled Congress. That era was capped in 1998, when the Legal Services Corp. forced 275 legal aid providers nationwide to combine into 179. To comply with the orders from their main funding source, a new species of poverty lawyer emerged - a tech-savvy and button-down breed who swapped neighborhood walkin offices for toll-free phone lines, self-help kiosks and Internet access to legal advice. While some organizations made the dramatic change look effortless, for others, it did not come easy. And few programs provide more dramatic illustrations of the promise and pitfalls of government-funded legal services than Los Angeles County's two largest providers of federally funded services - Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles and Pacoima-based Neighborhood Legal Services of Los Angeles County. From his offices in Koreatown, Iwasaki, a soft-spoken former O'Melveny & Myers attorney, quietly engineered a merger between a much smaller Legal Aid Society of Long Beach and his program, the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles. The merger was completed peacefully within a year of the federal order. Today, the programs operate seamlessly, offering new innovations - including toll-free multilingual phone advisers, expanded hours for domestic-violence clinics, and renewed immigration and consumer aid - built on the foundations of the old program. The organization is Los Angeles' largest government-funded group, with a budget of $11 million leveraged into $40 million in legal services to the poor.

Question: "What was the result of the change in funding?"

Response: "The number of providers shrank and a new species of poverty lawyers emerged"

A: yes

After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Question: "Where were field offices opened to investigate al Qaeda funding?"

Response: "Boston"

A:
no