In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: search a premises, Weston, 67 M.J. at 393 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988), I do not believe that case to be controlling. Matlock was arrested on the front lawn of the house, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988, and placed in a nearby police car. Id. at 179, 94 S.Ct. 988 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The arresting officers subsequently approached the house, spoke with a resident who shared a bedroom with Matlock, and received permission to search that bedroom. Id. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988. The police did not ask Matlock for his consent to search the bedroom, nor did he offer it. Id. The Supreme Court recognized the consent of the cotenant may be valid against a eotenant who has not objected. Id. at 170, 94 S.Ct. 988; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-80, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (<HOLDING>). This case differs from Matlock and Rodriguez
Holding statements: (A) holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises (B) holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez (C) holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises (D) holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises (E) holding that there is no violation of the fourth amendment when the government reasonably believed that the individual giving consent to the search had authority to do so
[EX A]: holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez

[EX Q]: the justifiable use of deadly force to specific circumstances, such as when the actor "reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another." Id. 776.012(1). As discussed at length above, Lieutenant Weippert's conduct was objectively reasonable and he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Penley posed a threat of great bodily harm to the lieutenant and others. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert's use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable. See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (<HOLDING>); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768
Holding statements: (A) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle (B) holding that expert testimony on what constitutes deadly physical force and whether the use of force was justified should have been excluded (C) holding that after being chased by a carfull of angry men it would have been reasonable for mr rivera a private citizen to believe that deadly force was necessary even if only a single unarmed pursuer had approached his nowstopped car because the pursuer and his friends had already threatened riveras life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a highspeed chase and throwing deadly missiles namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna (D) holding that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure (E) holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where appellant was aware of the decedents violent history decedent had a gun in his car and appellant used force only after decedent had made an attempt to approach his car
[EX A]: holding that instruction on use of deadly force was required where complainant was armed with a coke bottle

[EX Q]: pauperis on appeal. But we remind him of his obligation to pay the filing fee in full. * After examining the brief and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . At the outset, Gillings suggests that the district court erred in sua sponte invoking the statute-of-limitations defense. See Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995) (<HOLDING>). But here, the district court "issue[dj a show
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived (B) holding sua sponte dismissal of civil rights complaint was error where complaint was treated as habeas corpus petition and dismissed on nonexhaustion grounds although nonexhaustion was waivable defense and not jurisdictional (C) holding that where plaintiffs claims are timely on the face of the allegations of the complaint a court should strike the affirmative defense of statute of limitations (D) holding that district court improperly dismissed pro se prisoners civil rights complaint by sua sponte raising statute of limitations defense that was neither patently clear from the face of the complaint nor rooted in adequately developed facts (E) recognizing that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to serve after notice to the plaintiff
[EX A]:
holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived