In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: and Waste Control Specialists. LLC v. Sierra Club, appellate cause number. 03-12-00335-CV. 4 . See Sierra Club v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, cause number D-l-GN-12-001586. 5 .Despite this, the trial court issued a written order denying the motion twenty days after the deadline for ruling on the motion had passed. The order though included in the record on appeal is of no effect. Jain v. Cambridge Petroleum Grp., Inc., 395 S.W.3d 394, 396 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) ("The trial court's signing the order denying the motion [to dismiss pursuant to the Act] after it was already denied by operation of law is legally of no effect because the motion to dismiss was already denied."); reran v. Fryer, 586 S.W.2d 699, 700 (Tex.Civ.App.-Cor-pus Christi 1979, writ ref'd) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Appellees also insist that Sierra Club
Holding statements: (A) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (B) holding court lost jurisdiction to enter its order after thirty days and the motion was denied by operation of law (C) holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying motion for new trial by operation of law because motion was not properly presented even though a notice of presentment was filed and the docket sheet contained an entry for the motion having been filed (D) holding that a district courts order of dismissal with prejudice was a nullity because the court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that an order purporting to overrule a motion for new trial that had already been overruled by operation of law was a nullity
[A]: holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions

[Q]: 42-217. If, based on the proof submitted by the applicant and the field examination, the Department "is satisfied that the law has been fully complied with and that the water is being used at the place claimed and for the purpose for which it was originally intended, the [Department shall issue to such user or users a license confirming such use." I.C. 42-219(1). On the other hand, "[i]n the event that the [Department shall find that the applicant has not fully complied with the law and the conditions of permit, it may issue a license f ls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753, 118 P.3d 78, 85 (2005) (finding that "a party is not entitled to vested rights in a water right by virtue of filing a permit application"); Hardy v. Higginson, 123 Idaho 485, 491, 849 P.2d 946, 952 (1993) (<HOLDING>). However, this Court has never considered the
Holding statements: (A) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (B) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (C) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested (D) holding that permits only give the applicant an inchoate or contingent right to put the water to a beneficial use (E) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use
[A]: holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate

[Q]: court about Buividas's availability for trial, Sunkett's objection might reasonably be taken as objection to a violation of N.J. RPC 3.3(a)(1). The Rules of Professional Conduct can supply a clear mandate of public policy under CEPA. See Weiss v. Carpenter, Bennett, & Morrissey, 143 N.J. 420, 442, 672 A.2d 1132, 1144 (1996)(citing Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980)). While there is no direct evidence that Sunkett in fact believed that an ethical violation was taking place at the time he objected, a reasonable jury could infer as much from his long career as a practicing attorney, and his presumed familiarity with the Rules of Professional Conduct. Cf. Regan v. City of New Brunswick, 305 N.J.Super. 342, 356, 702 A.2d 523, 530 (App.Div.1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, given the remaining factors I discussed
Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine (C) holding that court could properly infer that veteran officer believed there was a violation of the law based on his long experience with law enforcement (D) holding there was no evidence a reasonably prudent employee in similar circumstances would have believed facts reported by plaintiff were a violation of law (E) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had
[A]:
holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law