After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: Who were on opposite sides of the idea to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center?

This is the story of a young girl and her dog. The young girl and her dog set out a trip into the woods one day. Upon entering the woods the girl and her dog found that the woods were dark and cold. The girl was a little scared and was thinking of turning back, but yet they went on. The girl's dog was acting very interested in what was in the bushes up ahead. To both the girl and the dog's surprise, there was a small brown bear resting in the bushes. The bear was not surprised and did not seem at all interested in the girl and her dog. The bear looked up at the girl and it was almost as if he was smiling at her. He then rested his head on his bear paws and went back to sleep. The girl and the dog kept walking and finally made it out of the woods. To this day the girl does not know why the bear was so friendly and to this day she has never told anyone about the meeting with the bear in the woods.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: Where was the bear when he went back to sleep?

Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possible hijacked aircraft. It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all. After the second World Trade Center crash, Boston Center managers recognized that both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan Airport. Remembering the "we have some planes" remark, Boston Center guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked. Boston Center called NEADS at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for Las Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA's Cleveland Center to watch Delta 1989. The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched it too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous reports of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the first; Delta 1989 was the second. NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircraft from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off its transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, and tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and landed in Cleveland. But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an aircraft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93. United Airlines Flight 93 FAA Awareness. At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, United 93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller. This was the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight. Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircraft in the vicinity heard "a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possible screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin." The controller responded, seconds later: "Somebody call Cleveland?"This was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION: Which flight never turned off its transponder?

In Colombia, the drug-financed guerrillas trying to seize the country and destroy democracy include M-19, which Castro has clearly backed. Robert Merkel, a former U.S. attorney handling drug indictments in Florida, doesn't think for a minute that Castro's much publicized trials of high officials engaged in the drug trade mean he has broken off with the Medellin drug cartel. "If the cartel succeeds in blackmailing the Colombian authorities into negotiations, the cartel will be in control and Fidel can exploit his past relationships with them," he told the Journal's David Asman recently. The struggle against the drug lords in Colombia will be a near thing. This week, the government arrested Jose Abello Silva, said to be the fourth-ranking cartel leader. He will probably be extradited to the U.S. for trial under an extradition treaty President Virgilia Barco has revived. Later, another high-ranking trafficker, Leonidas Vargas, was arrested and 1,000 pounds of dynamite seized. Mr. Barco has refused U.S. troops or advisers but has accepted U.S. military aid. President Bush has agreed to meet within 90 days with Mr. Barco, President Alan Garcia of Peru and President Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia to discuss the drug problem. It might not be a bad idea to do that sooner, rather than later. After the Panama fiasco, they will need some reassurance. Certainly, the Colombian press is much in need of that.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?

QUESTION:
Fidel Castro is said to have ties to what cartel in Columbia?