In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: Apr. 14, 2011). Accord Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 274 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissing a retaliation claim whose only causal basis was a letter that plaintiff wrote many weeks before the allegedly retaliatory acts, implicating officers other than named defendants). See also Def. Mem. at 11 ("[A] claim that one defendant took action against the plaintiff in retaliation for a complaint made against a different [officer] [should be] viewed with particular skepticism."). 40 . Def, Mem. at 17. 41 . See id. (citing exclusively to Eighth Amendment cases). 42 .Id. 43 . See Wright, 554 F.3d at 274. 44 . Def. Mem. at 18. 45 . Def. Mem. at 19. 46 . Davis, 320 F.3d at 353. 47 . Dawes, 239 F.3d at 493. 48 . Compare Hofelich v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 1369, 2010 WL 1459740, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2010) (<HOLDING>), with Rembert v. Cheverko, No. 12 Civ. 9196,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim (B) holding that a verbal threat of being fired is not an adverse employment action for purposes of title vii (C) holding that verbal threats if they are specific can constitute adverse action for retaliation purposes (D) holding that a suspension with pay may constitute materially adverse action for the purposes of retaliation claims depending on the facts of the case (E) holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action

A: holding that the plaintiffs placement on paid administrative leave constituted an adverse action for purposes of a first amendment retaliation claim
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Q: Dr. Brewer's reports addressed the conduct of OGA's employees, Drs. Jacobs and Gunn, the reports identified Dr. Gunn as OGA's employee, and McCoy's original petition alleged that OGA was vicariously liable for the conduct of Jacobs and Gunn under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the requirements of the Texas Professional Association Act. See Troeger v. Myklebust, 274 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (rejecting claim that conduct of dentist, who was sole defendant, was not implicated because her name was omitted from expert report and holding that dentist waived challenges to expert report by failing to raise objections within twenty-one days after service); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Dale, 188 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet) (<HOLDING>). In response, OGA disputes that its conduct
Holding statements: (A) holding that medical center was not required to be named in expert report addressing its residents conduct because plaintiffs alleged no directliability claims against it and noting that medical center was implicated in report and so waived all its objections when it failed to object to sufficiency of report within twentyone days after service (B) holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report (C) holding expert report requirement fulfilled in claim against nurse by providing expert report of nurse as to standard of care and expert report of medical doctor as to causation (D) holding that expert report addressing hospitals conduct was not required when plaintiffs sole theory against hospital was vicarious liability based on ostensible agency and explaining that the conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care these are principles of agency law on which no expert report is required (E) holding that a complaint that a report was not timely served was not subject to the twentyone day deadline to object to the sufficiency of a report under former section 74351a

A: holding that causation section of expert medical report was not eonclusory when read in context of entire report
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Q: at 573 (I960)). Thus, where a movant's sole claim is for monies paid based on a change in decisional law, the courts are hard pressed to find extraordinary circumstances or undue hardship under Rule 60(b)(6). For example, in In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 840 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir.1988), the court faced the question of "whether a final money judgment may be reopened [pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(6) motion] several years after the time for appeal has expired because of a favorable legal ruling in some other party's appeal." Finding that money judgments are inherently final and devoid of prospective application, the court denied relief. See id. at 194-95; but cf. Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Shalala (In re Blue Diamond Coal Co.), No. 3:93-CV-473, slip op. at 6-9 (E.D.Tenn. Nov. 4, 1998) (<HOLDING>). Under the Rule 60(b)(6) doctrine, a
Holding statements: (A) holding that the eastern enterprises decision was sufficiently extraordinary to warrant vacation of a final judgment (B) holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant (C) holding that such an order is not sufficiently final to be suitable for appellate review (D) recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment (E) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence

A:
holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant
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