In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: litigation. The district court can correct any abuses at the fees for fees stage under the "reasonableness" standard. The presumptive cap mostly takes away the discretion afforded to the district court in the statute. See 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs... ."). , Congress knows how to set caps on fee applications and has done so in other contexts, yet it did not do so in 1988. See, e.g., Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2158, 2165, 192 L.Ed.2d 208 (2015) (concluding that a fee-shifting provision in the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for "[t]ime spent litigating a fee application"); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (<HOLDING>); cf. Kaseman v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment (B) holding that time entries such as preparation for hearing or preparation for school visit were too vague and reducing overall fee award by twentyfive percent (C) holding that fee application must be sufficiently detailed to allow court to make an independent evaluation as to what fees are actual and necessary and finding that failure to keep contemporaneous records does not automatically result in denial of the fees but the lack thereof justifies a reduction of the fee to the level proven (D) holding that attorneys fees for the preparation of the fee application are compensable (E) holding that the independent counsel reauthorization act does not permit fees claimed for the preparation of a fee application

Answer: holding that the countys permit fee violated the first amendment

Question: even if the 1993 judgment was final and appealable, they may challenge the merits of the 1993 judgment in this appeal from the 1995 order. This appeal is untimely only if the District Court's 1993 decision which ordered only that ISP submit a plan to remedy the constitutional flaws in its policy was a final judgment, appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We believe that the District Court's 1993 order was no more final under 1291 than the one at issue in Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist., 814 F.2d 538 (8th Cir.1987), which held that a district court order to a school district to submit a plan to remedy an unconstitutional atmosphere of racial hostility was not an appealable final judgment. Id. at 539; see also Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The November 1995 judgment is, therefore, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (B) holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under 1292a1 (C) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (D) holding injunction ordering prison to submit plan for reformation of unconstitutional prison conditions not appealable as interlocutory order under 28 usc 1292a1 (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable

Answer: holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable

Question: (suggesting, without citing supporting legal authority, that there is a "distinction between a religious practice which is a positive expression of belief and a religious commandment which the believer may not violate at peril of his soul" in the context of prisoners' free exercise claims). 33 . In 1990, a divided panel of our Court suggested in dictum in a case that did not involve a Free Exercise Clause claim, and without citing Widmar that public schools have "a compelling interest in maintaining the appearance of religious neutrality" in their classrooms, and that this interest, even if not required by the Establishment Clause, might outweigh public employees' free exercise right to wear religious garb. United States v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882, 889 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The opinions cited in support of this
Holding statements: (A) holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to 706 of title vii 42 usc 2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc 1981 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that the doctrine of qualified immunity does not protect a government official who is sued in an official capacity under title vii because title vii does not impose personal liability (D) holding that title vii does not require public schools to allow teachers to wear religious garb as this would impose an undue hardship on the schools under 42 usc 2000ej (E) holding that plaintiffs claims under 42 usc 1981 are also governed by the special venue provision of title vii

Answer:
holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to 706 of title vii 42 usc 2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc 1981