In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
complaint nor any facts relating to VBCJ's General Order support an argument that Waters received less procedural due process than what is constitutionally required in the circumstances. Therefore, VBCJ's fee program does not violate Waters' right to procedural due process. C. Legitimate Penological Interest Finally, Waters' complaint, broadly construed, alleges that Virginia's one dollar per day room and board fee is not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest. This claim also plainly fails, as there are several conceivable rationales to support the finding that VBCJ's fee program is " 'reasonably related' to promoting a legitimate penological interest." Sample v. Angelone, 173 F.3d 425 (Table), 1999 WL 52347, *1 (4th Cir. Feb.5 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Section 53.1-131.3 provides as follows:
Holding statements: (A) holding that in a prisoners eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay person (B) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (C) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that deliberate indifference standard for imposing supervisory liability based on an eighth amendment violation is consistent with iqbal and collecting cases (E) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation

Ex Output:
holding that in a prisoners eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay person

Ex Input:
to the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Penn s to avoid the appearance of impropriety is a worthy standard for professional conduct, a criminal defendant's constitutional right to due process does not entitle him to a prosecution free of such appearances. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (stating that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated when his lawyer has a "possible" or "potential" conflict of interest). Instead, a criminal defendant is denied due process only when his former counsel joins a Commonwealth's Attorney's office and is not effectively screened from contact with the Commonwealth's attorneys who are handling the defendant's case on a related matter. See Thompson, 246 So.2d at 763 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 236-37
Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding than an attorney who serves as a mediator cannot subsequently represent anyone in a substantially related matter without the consent of the original parties because mediators routinely receive and preserve confidences in much the same manner as an attorney and where the mediator was privy to confidential information the applicable ethical rules impose the same responsibility as the rules relating to any attorneys subsequent representation of a former client (C) holding that defendants right to due process was not violated by the employment of his former counsel in the us attorneys office where the former counsel recused himself and was screened from the prosecution of defendants case (D) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (E) holding that a defendants due process rights are violated only if his former lawyer prosecutes him on a matter related to the representation or discloses client confidences to other prosecutors

Ex Output:
holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person

Ex Input:
in digging a ditch, guiding a barge, or programming a computer. The plaintiffs in this case already are employees of the PCC, and most have worked there since before 1976, -all the while doing work that otherwise would "qualify" for the preference. The PCC has never suggested, let alone shown, that plaintiffs' job performance has suffered in any way because of their citizenship status. Indeed, the PCC's own policies make clear that the timing of citizenship is not a work-related qualification. As noted in Part I, from 1984 to 1989 four plaintiffs received the PCC's equity adjustment package; yet there is no claim that their work was less acceptable than that of employees with earlier citizenship who also received the package during the same time period. See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1421 (<HOLDING>); cf. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 91 S.Ct. 849
Holding statements: (A) holding that the intentional tort exception to employer immunity includes an objective standard to measure whether the employer engaged in conduct which was substantially certain to result in injury (B) holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision (C) holding that a promissory estoppel claim failed where the plaintiff provided no evidence that the employer defendant did not follow the employment manuals requirements (D) holding that it is not (E) holding that fivemonth period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a minimum objective qualification and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it satisfies the bedrock requirements of jobrelatedness

Ex Output:
holding that the intentional tort exception to employer immunity includes an objective standard to measure whether the employer engaged in conduct which was substantially certain to result in injury