Input: Tropical climates are found around the equator. These climates have warm temperatures year round. Tropical climates may be very wet or wet and dry. Tropical wet climates occur at or very near the equator. They have high rainfall year round. Tropical rainforests grow in this type of climate. Tropical wet and dry climates also occur near the equator. They receive less rainfall. Most of the rain falls in a single season. The rest of the year is dry. Few trees can withstand the long dry season. The main plants are grasses. Dry climates receive very little rainfall. They also have high rates of evaporation. This makes them even drier. Deserts can get less than 25 centimeters of rain per year. Thats less than 10 inches per year. How much rain do you get at your house?
"Do tropical wet and dry climates receive less or more rainfall than tropical wet climates?" is "More rain"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output: no

Input: Density is also an important physical property of matter. The concept of density combines what we know about an objects mass and volume. Density reflects how closely packed the particles of matter are. When particles are packed together more tightly, matter is more dense. Differences in density of matter explain many phenomena. It explains why helium balloons rise. It explains why currents such as the Gulf Stream flow through the oceans. It explains why some things float in or sink. You can see this in action by pouring vegetable oil into water. You can see a colorful demonstration in this video.

Does the response "The repelling of particles" correctly answer the question "What is density?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
***
Output: no

New Legitimacy: Organized crime was soon to have a formidable adversary in its bid to control Las Vegascorporate cash. Though Las Vegas had developed a powerful local economy, few major outside investments were made in the city, due primarily to mob infiltration and its inherent ties to illegal activities. That would change dramatically with the 1966 arrival of billionaire Howard Hughes. A legitimate businessman, Hughes was nonetheless eccentric and dramatic, a style suited to the Las Vegas ethos. True to the myth, the reclusive Hughes immediately cloistered himself in the Desert Inn's penthouse. Several weeks later he was askedthen orderedto vacate the room to make room for high rollers, whereupon he promptly bought the property and fired the management. Thus began Hughes' legendary three-year, $300-million Las Vegas buying spree. When it was over, Hughes owned six casinos, an airport, and an airline, along with numerous plots of land stretching from the Strip to the mountains. Hughes' actions would have beneficial repercussions, both immediate and lasting. Because of the new legitimacy Las Vegas acquired from Hughes' investments, established companies such as Hilton Hotels bought into the gaming business, and their influence helped draw a line in the desert sand between legitimate operations and mob casinos, where illegal skimming of profits was rampant. That, combined with the formation of the Nevada Gaming Control Board, would signal the beginning of the end for heavy mob influence in the city. Las Vegas with a Vision As corporations moved in and the mob was slowly pushed out, a new Las Vegas emerged. The legitimization of gambling led to its increased legalization across the US. What was once a sure thing became much more competitive. Casino operators had to reassess the nature of their business. The first to really do so was Steve Wynn, a Las Vegas resident and owner of the Golden Nugget. In the mid-1980s, Wynn began plans to reinvigorate Las Vegas with a new resort. He bought several Strip propertiesthe Silver Slipper and Castaways among themand demolished them to make way for a new kind of resortMirage which became an instant success.

Question: "What signified the ending of heavy mob influence in Las Vegas?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "Legitimate investors and businesses entering the market"

Response: yes

Problem: After the August missile strikes, diplomatic options to press the Taliban seemed no more promising than military options. The United States had issued a formal warning to the Taliban, and also to Sudan, that they would be held directly responsible for any attacks on Americans, wherever they occurred, carried out by the Bin Laden network as long as they continued to provide sanctuary to it. For a brief moment, it had seemed as if the August strikes might have shocked the Taliban into thinking of giving up Bin Laden. On August 22, the reclusive Mullah Omar told a working-level State Department official that the strikes were counterproductive but added that he would be open to a dialogue with the United States on Bin Laden's presence in Afghanistan. Meeting in Islamabad with William Milam, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Taliban delegates said it was against their culture to expel someone seeking sanctuary but asked what would happen to Bin Laden should he be sent to Saudi Arabia. Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mullah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Laden, the Taliban leader said no. Both sides shouted at each other, with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government. Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime. (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries that recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.) Crown Prince Abdullah told President Clinton and Vice President Gore about this when he visited Washington in late September. His account confirmed reports that the U.S. government had received independently. Other efforts with the Saudi government centered on improving intelligence sharing and permitting U.S. agents to interrogate prisoners in Saudi custody. The history of such cooperation in 1997 and 1998 had been strained. Several officials told us, in particular, that the United States could not get direct access to an important al Qaeda financial official, Madani al Tayyib, who had been detained by the Saudi government in 1997.67Though U.S. officials repeatedly raised the issue, the Saudis provided limited information. In his September 1998 meeting with Crown Prince Abdullah, Vice President Gore, while thanking the Saudi government for their responsiveness, renewed the request for direct U.S. access to Tayyib. The United States never obtained this access. An NSC staff-led working group on terrorist finances asked the CIA in November 1998 to push again for access to Tayyib and to see "if it is possible to elaborate further on the ties between Usama bin Ladin and prominent individuals in Saudi Arabia, including especially the Bin Laden family." One result was two NSC-led interagency trips to Persian Gulf states in 1999 and 2000. During these trips the NSC, Treasury, and intelligence representatives spoke with Saudi officials, and later interviewed members of the Bin Laden family, about Usama's inheritance.

Question: "Who told President Clinton that Riyadh had suspended relations with the Taliban regime?"

Answer: "Riyadh"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer:
no