In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority's opinion that the term "expenses" as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority's determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38
Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs
[A]: holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid

[Q]: as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Holland had been given the authority to review the allegations against Vickers and make the ultimate decision to keep her or fire her. Without more than what Vickers has offered as evidence, we cannot- see how a reasonable jury might find a retaliatory motive at work in Holland's decision. Vickers' retaliation claim is further undermined by the fact that even though it was Holland who fired her, Bedwell was the focus of her discrimination claims. Vickers failed to put on any evidence to show that Holland's decision was in any way influenced by Bedwell, who had retired before Vickers' refusal to sign the releases in April 2001 that triggered her firing. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor can Vickers' Title VII claims draw
Holding statements: (A) holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision (B) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (C) holding that subordinates bias is only relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinates influence (D) holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant (E) holding that the relevant question is whether the courts decision deprived the petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment
[A]: holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision

[Q]: F.3d 1348, 1353 (11th Cir.2012). Thus, Plasencia's claim is not proeedurally barred because the state court did not "clearly and expressly [state] that its judgment rests on a procedural bar." See Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1173. Furthermore, Plasencia exhausted his state court remedies because he presented his claim to the state's highest court in his motion for rehearing on direct appeal, and in his Rule 3.850 motion, which was affirmed per curiam by the Second District Court of Appeal. See Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir.2010) (stating to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must have presented the issues raised in the federal habeas petition to the state's highest court,' either on direct appeal or collateral review); see also Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla.1980) (<HOLDING>). II. BLAKELY ERROR Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d),
Holding statements: (A) holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts (B) holding new york could lawfully modify a florida custody decree because florida court had right under florida law to change the decree (C) holding a per curiam affirmance from a florida district court of appeal is not renewable by the florida supreme court (D) holding that where florida state court had not addressed choiceoflaw issues with regard to directors liability federal court could presume that florida court would follow the restatement second of conflict of laws based on the florida courts past reliance on the treatise (E) holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction
[A]:
holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts