In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

of the statute before many petitioners would be able to identify, with reasonable certainty, the nature of the injury. Brice v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 36 Fed.Cl. 474, 477 (1996), aff'd on other grounds, 240 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir.2001). In Brice, we held that equitable tolling is not available for claims arising under 300-16(a)(2), reasoning that "the statute of limitations here begins to run upon the first symptom or manifestation of the onset of injury, even if the petitioner reasonably would not have known at that time that the vaccine had caused an injury." 240 F.3d at 1373; see also Sharpnack v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-983V, 1992 WL 167255, at *2 (Cl.Ct. Special Master June 29, 1992), aff'd, 27 Fed.Cl. 457 (1993), aff'd, 17 F.3d 1442 (Fed.Cir.1994) (table) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court, in Whitecotton,
Holding statements: (A) holding that absolute immunity protects judges so long as their acts are judicial in nature internal quotation omitted (B) holding substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance and consists of such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a eonclusion (C) holding that in many vaccine program cases the injuries are first manifest ed as subtle signs and seizures of less complicated nature eg seizures lasting less than 30 minutes or seizure activity so subtle as to be unrecognized at their onset (D) holding that the govemment is not liable under the federal tort claims act for injuries to service members where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service (E) holding that the united states is immune from monetary damages for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service
holding that absolute immunity protects judges so long as their acts are judicial in nature internal quotation omitted

by Ankeny should arise rarely and therefore would be unlikely to produce a swarm of cases involving excessive force searches. Also, officials and courts are far more competent to discern which extraordinary tactics constitute excessive force than to determine in the heat of the moment "what constituted] a reasonable wait time in a particular case" before entering' usually a matter of calculating, wholly subjectively the appropriate number of seconds. Id. at 2166 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In fact, without any difficulty, we have in the past in a case remarkably similar to the one before us struck down, as constituting excessive force, specific tactics such as the ones used in the case before us. See, e.g., Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on the cost side, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding officers punch of an inmate was not excessive force (C) holding that ordering police officers to use excessive force in bringing a lawyer into court was a judicial act (D) recognizing that the fourth amendment protects against the use of excessive force by police officers in carrying out an arrest (E) holding that officers had employed constitutionally excessive force by blindly throwing a flash bang grenade into an apartment occupied by five to eight individuals
holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim

887 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Ramirez, 770 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983). Because dangerous people do not differentiate between misdemeanors and felonies, the law should not either. It is a fact that many officers are killed during traffic stops for mere infractions. But, here's the rub: the facts are disputed, and the disputed facts here should have been submitted to the jury, even when qualified immunity from suit was an issue. Issues of credibility belong to the trier of fact. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution so requires. Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir.1997) makes this as clear as the proverbial bell. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317-18, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). As for LaLonde's claims of excessive force, I
Holding statements: (A) holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (B) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (C) holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision (D) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (E) recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue
holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate