In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: guidelines; and (4) that the special conditions of Neffs supervised release were beyond the limits described in 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied in all respects. I. BACKGROUND On April 29, 1992, Anthony Neff was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated by Nassau County Police who found in his possession a receipt from a licensed firearms dealership. The receipt indicated that on April 23, 1992, he had purchased a 12 gauge shotgun. Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") interviewed the owner of the firearms dealership and discovered that Neff, who was then on parole for a 1989 attempted burglary conviction, had not revealed that he was a convicted felon when he executed ATF form 4473, a necessar 3 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although this language appears broad in
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (B) holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant according to the states sentencing guidelines

Answer: (A)

Question: an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov't Code 311.023(5); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon's alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>). C. Negligence Per Se Because our holding that
Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that tex loc govt code 51075 abrogated city of texarkana v city of new boston 141 sw3d 778 texapptexarkana 2004 (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction (E) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision

Answer: (B)

Question: seeks damages that is, those entered into with Safeco, Provident and Manulife. (See Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n at 34, 92 Doc. 484-1 at 51, 109.) In the opinion of the Court, all of the Safeco, Provident and Manulife annuities, except the QPA-2, are variable annuities not entitled to the exemption provided for by section 3(a)(8). (1) The Safeco Annuities The QPA-2 was a traditional fixed annuity with a guaranteed interest rate. (PL's Ex. 358 at Safeco 00127, Doc. 456-3 at 1.) All deposits were held in Safeco's general fund, not a separate account. (PL's Ex. 360 at Safeco 00115, Doc. 456-4 at 2.) Safeco bore all of the risk as it had to meet minimum interest payments. As such, it falls within the exemption provided by section 3(a) (8), 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(8). See Otto I, 814 F.2d at 1131-32 (<HOLDING>). The Resource Variable Account A was an
Holding statements: (A) holding railroad rate exempt from state regulation (B) holding that the trustee did not breach its fiduciary duty when its actions were consistent with the trust instrument (C) holding that insurance instrument was fixed annuity exempt from securities regulation because the instrument provided a guaranteed return of four percent 4 (D) holding that the gravamen of the offense is the physical adaptation of the instrument (E) holding that the deferential standard of review of a plan interpretation is appropriate only when the trust instrument allows the trustee to interpret the instrument and when the trust ee has in fact interpreted the instrument

Answer:
(C)