In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, the Supreme Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (allowing school officials to conduct warrantless searches of student property without probable cause); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74,
Holding statements: (A) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (B) holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct (C) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (D) holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause (E) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause

Output: holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable

Input: Consider Input: claim because "she was not diligent in preserving her legal rights"); Felty, 818 F.2d at 1129 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.") (quoting Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)); United States ex rel. Cogifer, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., Civ. A. No. 86-183-NN, 1987 WL 19932, at *4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 15, 1987) (unpublished). 11 . See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990). 12 . See, e.g., Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 896 (finding equitable estoppel where surety reneged on promise to pay after statute of limitations had run). 13 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 436 F.2d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Atlas Erection Co. v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (B) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (C) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (D) holding that estoppel applied where surety repeatedly responded to subcontractors threats to sue with answers which assured them that amicable settlement was just around the corner (E) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety

Output: holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation

Input: Consider Input: Assa'ad-Faltas's claim regarding the University's refusal to give her a certificate of completion for the residency program was previously challenged by Assa'ad-Faltas without success. See Assa'ad-Faltas v. Univ. of S.C., No. 96-2159(L), 1998 WL 792209 (4th Cir. Nov.16, 1998) (unpublished), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 922, 120 S.Ct. 285, 145 L.Ed.2d 239 (1999). Thus, this claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir.1991). This is so even though the pri- or action was dismissed with prejudice based on Assa'ad-Faltas's failure to comply with discovery and her abusive demeanor during a deposition, rather than on the merits of her claims. See Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 403 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the claim is barred by the
Holding statements: (A) holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata (B) holding that an unappealed contempt order by a bankruptcy court is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (C) holding in res judicata context that final judgment on the merits is synonymous with dismissal with prejudice (D) holding that an unappealed order is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes (E) holding that the parties stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment
Output: holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata