In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: with our ability to review the sentence imposed by the district court for substantive reasonableness because, on review, we must compare the sentence imposed with the correctly calculated Guidelines sentencing range. He contends the relevant Guidelines sentencing range is the post-departure Guidelines sentencing range. But it is the pre-departure Guidelines sentencing range that the district court must correctly calculate and that we must use when we review a sentence for substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir.2006) ("[W]e elect to review the district court's application of the advisory sentencing guidelines only insofar as they do not involve departures."); see also United States v. Tankersley, 537 F.3d 1100, 1114 n. 11 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). We used the pre-departure sentence for
Holding statements: (A) holding lack of prejudice to the defendant is not good cause (B) holding that a fee application based on claims that were interrelated nonfrivolous and raised in good faith may still be excessive where the applicant achieved only partial or limited success (C) holding forbearance to sue is a good consideration for a promise founded thereon and it is only essential that the claim be asserted in good faith (D) holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law (E) holding mohamed is still good law
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: Cordova's final policymaking authority concerning the termination or transfer of employees. For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude summary judgment should enter against Singer on the 1981 and 1983 claims against the School District. B. Liability of Cordova under 1981. I have concluded the School District is not liable to Singer under 1981. I consider Defendants' additional argument concerning the 1981 claim since it remains of relevance to Singer's 1981 claim against Cor-dova. Defendants argue 1981 does not apply to religious discrimination and the claim should be dismissed insofar as it is based on such discrimination. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Singer cites the holding in Shaare Tefila
Holding statements: (A) holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination (B) holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex (C) holding that a violation of 1981 requires purposeful race discrimination (D) holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort (E) holding 1981 is directed to racial discrimination although not necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of race but does not apply to sex or religious discrimination
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: that the district court's mention of having considered the "entire lengthy record" indicates that the court, in concluding that amendment would be both untimely and futile, relied in part upon the overall history of the dispute, including the ease CBS had previously initiated in Florida. Whether the court meant to encompass that history within the reason for its decision is not clear,- however; the "lengthy record" in question may well refer only to the present litigation, which alone had been going on for more than three years at the time. In either event, the district court erred; the prolonged nature of a case does not itself affect whether the plaintiff may amend its complaint. See, e.g., Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Kevin Tucker & Assoc., Inc., 64 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Buder v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to amend when the opposing partys case for prejudice is stated only in the most conclusory of terms and no particular witnesses or documents are identified to support the argument that a delay would prejudice a party (B) holding that district court had not abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion to amend complaint (C) holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add count when no prejudice resulted from two and onehalf year delay and facts underlying new and old counts were similar (D) holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add claim when party opposing motion made no showing of prejudice from delay (E) holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend after a delay of eight months
[EX A]:
(D)