In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

to preserve evidence exists between a third party and another in the absence of a special relationship, such as one created by contract or statute. Id. Under that analysis, this court will need to consider the primary purpose of the third-party here, Giant Eagle. (2) "Duty" of a third-party employer to its employee Pennsylvania courts have not directly considered whether the existence of an employer/employee relationship creates a duty on the part of a third-party employer to preserve evidence of a work-related accident for a potential products liability suit by an employee. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no such duty. See Wilson v. Beloit Corp., 725 F.Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D.Ark.1989); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 179 Mich.App. 136, 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241
Holding statements: (A) holding that neither common law nor workers disability compensation act imposed affirmative duty on employer to preserve evidence which might be used in employees thirdparty liability action (B) holding that a claim did not arise under a workers compensation law when it stated a right to relief in tort and sought common law damages distinct from statutory compensation scheme (C) holding that thirdparty tortfeasor has right to contribution from employer up to amount of employers workers compensation liability (D) holding that prohibition may not be used to raise affirmative defense of workers compensation immunity (E) holding that no independent commonlaw duty exists on the part of an employer to preserve evidence for an employees potential civil action against third parties
(A)

magistrate judge denied the motion, explaining that Mr. Schueller's subjective perceptions did not demonstrate judicial bias and his claims were not based on any extrajudicial source to support a bias or partiality challenge. We generally review the denial of a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. ClearOne Comm'cns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 1200, 1217 (10th Cir.2011). For the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's order denying recusal, we determine that recusal was not warranted and we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion to recuse. To the extent Mr. Schueller now claims that the district judge was biased against him, he did not raise this issue to the district court, so we do not address it. See Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1239 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Wells Fargo's motion for
Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs waived their bias argument on appeal because they failed to timely move for disqualification (B) holding that the defendant waived argument on appeal by failing to develop a cogent argument (C) holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal (D) holding argument not asserted before district court is waived on appeal (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
(A)

policy. (Dkt. No. 345, Ex. 1 at APP00005 6; Dkt. No. 349, Ex. 42 at APP00961-62, APP00973.) 13 . The plaintiffs also alleged a claim relating to an improper MDL Fund deduction, but later abandoned that claim. 14 . Even assuming that the O'Quinn Firm were entitled to coverage under the 2001 Primary Policy, it is highly doubtful that coverage under the 2001 Excess Policy would ever be triggered because under the terms of the O'Quinn Firm's settlement with National Union, National Union did not pay, did not admit liability, and was not held liable to pay the full amount of its indemnity under the 2001 Primary Policy. (Dkt. Nos. 380, 381 & 385). The plain language of the 2001 Excess Policy requires otherwise. See Citigroup Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 367 (5th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>) 15 . Lexington also argues that "any matter
Holding statements: (A) holding that insured was not required to suffer an excess judgment before it could sue its excess insurer and primary insurer for bad faith failure to settle where it was alleged the insurers arbitrarily refused to settle and insured was required to pay 1 million in settlement to avoid near certainty of larger judgment that would exceed all available coverage (B) holding that the excess carrier was liable only for the insureds deductible which was not covered by the primary insurer (C) holding that insurer was liable for amount in excess of policy limits because it breached its duty to defend (D) holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage (E) holding that excess coverage in four policies was not triggered until primary insurer satisfied the requirements necessary to trigger the excess insurers coverage and paid the full amount of its limits
(E)