In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court's decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current]
Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement
[A]: (E)

[Q]: dominion and control over" the weapon. Id. at 126 (quoting Evans, 888 F.2d at 895). The case law in this circuit, then, clearly recognizes that under the statute an individual "carries" a firearm when it is within an accessible distance from that individual. Although this circuit has not addressed the definition of "carry" since the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, other circuits nave addressed the issue and continue to define "carry" broadly. Most circuits agree that a weapon must be accessible to the defendant in order to meet the definition of "carry." In United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2nd Cir.1996), a firearm located in a secret compa 4 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that firearm need not be accessible to be "carried"); United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity (B) holding that use of gun was attributable to defendant who aided and abetted armed robbery but never personally carried gun (C) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (D) holding that gun found in unreachable secret compartment in vehicle was carried (E) holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle
[A]: (D)

[Q]: no meritorious issues for appeal. After a Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 hearing at which Blackmon admitted his guilt and attested that his plea was knowing and voluntary, the district court sentenced Blackmon to the statutory minimum of life in prison based on prior convictions admitted to by him in his plea agreement. Because Blackmon did not dispute that he absconded for nearly three and a half years after entering his guilty plea, thereby triggering the imposition of the enhanced penalty pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement, his mandatory life sentence was appropriate. See United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir.2008) ("A statutorily required sentence ... is per se reasonable."); see also Burgess v. United States, U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 1577-80, 170 L.Ed.2d 478 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Although Blackmon purports to have withdrawn
Holding statements: (A) holding that no offense alleged where affidavit described offense as felony (B) holding that a felony drug offense is an offense punishable by more than one year as defined in 21 usc 80244 2000 regardless of whether the state of conviction classified the particular offense as a misdemeanor or felony (C) holding that for purposes of applying enhanced penalty in 841b1a felony drug offense includes any crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment regardless of whether it is classified as a felony or a misdemeanor (D) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc 841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc 80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state (E) holding that a prior nonarizona conviction to be used as a prior felony conviction under the statute must both be for an offense that would constitute a felony in arizona and be classified as a felony in the other jurisdiction
[A]:
(B)