TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of not more than 15 years, and it similarly concluded as follows: If a sentence under this paragraph provides for imprisonment, the sentence shall include a special parole term of not less than three years in addition to such term of imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1). The language of 841(b)(1)(A) and 960(b)(1) thus squarely contradicts Walberg's contention, for each stated that the special parole term shall be a minimum of a certain number of "years in addition to [the] term of imprisonment." Accord United States v. Mack, 509 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir.1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct. 1578, 43 L.Ed.2d 783 (1975); Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir.1975). Cf. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 388, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the Act and the
Holding statements: (A) holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc 848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc 848c (B) holding that no special parole term was authorized for a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 usc 846 which mentioned only fine and imprisonment and not special parole and emphazing the in addition to language of 21 usc 841b1b (C) holding that in order for a trial court to determine which of the three graduated penalty subsections of 21 usc 841b applies to defendants convicted of a 846 drug conspiracy the jury must be instructed to determine the threshold quantity of drugs attributable to each conspiracy defendant on trial (D) holding that the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 usc 846 do include an overt act requirement (E) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc 841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc 80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state

SOLUTION: holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc 848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc 848c

PROBLEM: alleged prejudice stems from the unavailability of witnesses, the Fourth Circuit explained in Jones what type of evidence is typically required: "[Cjourts have generally required that the defendant identify the witness he would have called; demonstrate, with specificity, the expected content of that witness' testimony; establish to the court's satisfaction that he has made serious attempts to locate the witness; and, finally, show that the information the witness would have provided was not available from other sources." 94 F.3d at 908; see also U.S. v. Cornielle, 171 F.3d 748, 752 (2nd Cir.1999) (recognizing that actual prejudice "is commonly demonstrated by the loss of documentary evidence or the unavailability of a key witness"); U.S. v. Scoggins, 992 F.2d 164, 167 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Sabath, 990 F.Supp. at 1014 (finding
Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case (B) holding that death of potential alibi witness did not cause actual prejudice because defendant failed to relate the substance of the testimony of the missing witness in sufficient detail and to show witness testimony not available from other sources (C) holding that defendant is under an obligation to give the government notice of an alibi witness even if defendant is unable to locate the witness (D) holding that promises made by the prosecution to a witness in exchange for that witness testimony relate directly to the credibility of the witness (E) holding that the trial courts admonition of a witness even though detailed and strongly stated did not coerce the witness because the court did not threaten or badger the witness and the court provided the witness with her own counsel to ensure that the decision was voluntary

SOLUTION: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case

PROBLEM: of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated." Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir.1996). For example, in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir.1975), the defendant produced "Grotrian-Steinweg" pianos and the plaintiff produced the world-renowned "Steinway" pianos. The court explained: The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway or that Grotrian had some connection with Steinway and Sons. The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the "Grotrian-Steinweg" name and thinking it had some connection with "Steinway", would consider it on that basis. The "Grotrian 3 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc.,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the underlying principles of nominative fair use (B) holding that the nominative fair use factors replace the traditional sleekcraft factors for likelihood of confusion where nominative fair use is at issue (C) recognizing nominative fair use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement (D) holding that nominative fair use is an affirmative defense to a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion similar to the fair use defense (E) holding that nominative fair use involves questions of fact whose resolution is inappropriate on a motion to dismiss

SOLUTION:
holding that the nominative fair use factors replace the traditional sleekcraft factors for likelihood of confusion where nominative fair use is at issue