In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
(emphasis added) (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720). 27 . Faust, 337 S.W.3d at 335 (emphasis added). 28 . Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex.1995). 29 . See Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 218. 30 . Synar v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 1299 00428-CV, 2001 WL 1263573, at *6 (Tex.App.-Tyler Oct. 17, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). 31 . See id. 32 . See Tex.R. Evid. 803(18); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556. 33 . C 545 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). 55 . See id. 56 . See Tex.R. Evid. 401; Nichols, 379 S.W.3d at 387-89. 57 . See Sw. Country Enters., Inc., 991 S.W.2d at 493-94; see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(B), 33.2; Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 58 . See Barraza v. Eureka Co., Inc., 25 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 59 . See Charter Oak Fire Ins. v. Perez, 446
Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that testimony of plaintiff and her coworkers regarding cause of her injury was pure conjecture (E) holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment

Ex Output:
holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed

Ex Input:
45 U.S.C. 56, and 46 U.S.C. 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be "commenced" or "brought" within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly "commenced" although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant's second argument for distinction
Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures

Ex Output:
holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries

Ex Input:
In Donaldson v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that the civil rules apply to an IRS summons proceeding, but they do not apply inflexibly. 400 U.S. 517, 528, 91 S.Ct. 534, 541, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971). Rather, "a district court, by local rule or by order, may limit the application of the rules in a summons proceeding ... so long as the rights of the party summoned are protected and an adversary hearing, if requested, is made available." Id. at 528-29, 91 S.Ct. at 541. The Court in Donaldson approved limiting the application of Rule 24(a)(2), governing intervention as of right, in a tax summons case. Id. Subsequent cases have approved other limitations of the civil rules in IRS summons-enforcement cases. See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 954 F.2d 1000, 1003-04 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281,
Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (C) holding that notice of judgment was insufficient (D) holding district court had discretion to modify the threeday notice requirement for default judgment by giving notice in a show cause order (E) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice

Ex Output:
holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city