In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
other non-Virginia cases offer a compelling basis for adopting the per se rule Allied has proposed. In National City Bank v. Fleming, 2 Ohio App.3d 50, 440 N.E.2d 590, 599 (1981), for instance, the court said: It has long been the law of equity that a person who confers a benefit either directly or indirectly upon another in the course of performance of a contract with a third person is not entitled to compensation ... merely because of the failure of performance by the third party. However, where it appears from all the facts that the conferral of such benefit was the product of fraud, misrepresentation or bad faith by the party accepting and retaining such benefit, equity will imply an obligation to make payment therefor. See Costanzo v. Stewart, 9 Ariz.App. 430, 453 P.2d 526 (1969) (<HOLDING>), (emphasis added) (some citations omitted).
Holding statements: (A) holding that a hospital could not be an erisa beneficiary (B) holding that the thirdparty beneficiary theory did not apply (C) holding that a duty may be owed to a beneficiary of a consensual relationship akin to that of a thirdparty beneficiary of a contract where the professional has actual knowledge that the services being provided are in part for the benefit of such third persons (D) holding that a contract beneficiary may be liable in restitution where the beneficiary by his conduct induces the conferral of the benefit (E) holding change of beneficiary effective where city employee listed a new beneficiary for his group life insurance policy in an employee personal data form next to the words designated beneficiary even though this did not comply with the policy terms

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
failed to complete the assignment and warranty of title to H & L on the same certificate. See Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-32(a) (Supp. 1988). Winn is still listed on the certificate as the registered owner, and under Georgia law, the certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-25(c) (1985). Although our reading of the Georgia statutes yields the conclusion that ownership of the Buick did not pass to the dealership or to H & L since the certificate of title was not properly assigned, it appears that Georgia courts interpreting the same statutes would reach a different conclusion. See, e.g., American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 280, 253 S.E.2d 825 (1979); Mote v. Mote, 134 Ga. App. 668, 215 S.E.2d 487 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Winn's evidence regarding the sale of
Holding statements: (A) holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision (B) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed (C) holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes (D) holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale (E) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received

Ex Output:
(B)

Ex Input:
conspired to t rt erred by allowing the Government to present evidence of his prior convictions. The district court admitted evidence of the prior convictions for the sale of cocaine, the sale and delivery of a controlled substance, and numerous counts of possession of cocaine because they were probative of an intent to commit the offenses charged in the indictment. Brown argues that his prior convictions were too remote to be probative of intent. Accordingly, he argues that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). We review a district court's decision to admit idered highly probative of intent to commit current drug trafficking offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1343 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). The drug conspiracy at issue here began in
Holding statements: (A) recognizing possession of cocaine as a lesserincluded offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell (B) holding that a prior conviction for using a communications device to facilitate the distribution of cocaine was admissible under rule 404b to prove that the defendant had the requisite intent to distribute cocaine (C) holding that a prior conviction for transporting cocaine was probative of the intent required for participation in a separate plan to transport cocaine (D) holding that district court did not err in determining that cocaine base was crack cocaine based on chemical analysis identifying cocaine base together with competent lay testimony bridging the evidentiary gap between cocaine base and crack cocaine and refusing to require showing of smokeability ie water solubility or melting point for purposes of establishing crack cocaine under the guidelines since smokeability distinguishes cocaine base from powder cocaine not from crack (E) holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609

Ex Output:
(C)