Input: Tokhtakhounov, whose age was given by Comey as 53 or 62, is a "major figure in international Eurasian organized crime," Comey said. Born in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and now a Russian citizen, he is known as Taivanchik, or Little Taiwanese, for his Central Asian ethnic background. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, he has been implicated in arms trading and Russian art smuggling, and in the Russian news media he was accused of complicity in a plot to extort $10 million from the head of a Russian sports foundation. He appears to have moved to France in 1989, according to news media reports, and is reported to have Israeli citizenship also. Comey said Tokhtakhounov had three residences in Italy: Forte dei Marmi, Rome and Milan. The complaint against Tokhtakhounov's traces his contact with figure skating to 2000, when he proposed to Gailhaguet the creation of a professional hockey team in Paris that would provide revenue for the French Skating Federation. ( Gailhaguet and Anissina are not referred to by name in an accompanying FBI agent's affidavit, but by their descriptions their identities are obvious.) In return, Gailhaguet told the FBI on Feb. 23 as the Olympics were taking place, Tokhtakhounov asked for Gailhaguet's help in renewing his French visa, which was about to expire. But when Gailhaguet sought guidance from a French government official, he was told that "Tokhtakhounov's money is bad," the affidavit said. The federal complaint offers many details of the alleged conspiracy, including excerpts from a transcript of the Italian wiretaps. later suspended Le Gougne and Gailhaguet for three years. The federal complaint did not describe the possibility of a wider conspiracy or any contact between Tokhtakhounov, or his unnamed co-conspirators, with Le Gougne. "We have alleged no connection between this man with any officials other than with Russian federation officials," James B. Comey, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, said at a news conference. He said that Tokhtakhounov "reached out to a co-conspirator, somebody connected to the Russian Skating Federation, who did the legwork for him."
"Did Comey say the FBI believes Tokhtakhounov is connected to the Russian Skating Federation?" is "Formerly"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output: no

Input: In March 2001, Rice asked the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan. Rice's recollection was that the idea had come from Clarke and the NSC senior director for intelligence, Mary McCarthy, and had been linked to the proposal for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Rice described the draft document as providing for "consolidation plus," superseding the various Clinton administration documents. In fact, the CIA drafted two documents. One was a finding that did concern aid to opponents of the Taliban regime; the other was a draft Memorandum of Notification, which included more open-ended language authorizing possible lethal action in a variety of situations. Tenet delivered both to Hadley on March 28. The CIA's notes for Tenet advised him that "in response to the NSC request for drafts that will help the policymakers review their options, each of the documents has been crafted to provide the Agency with the broadest possible discretion permissible under the law." At the meeting, Tenet argued for deciding on a policy before deciding on the legal authorities to implement it. Hadley accepted this argument, and the draft MON was put on hold. As the policy review moved forward, the planned covert action program for Afghanistan was included in the draft presidential directive, as part of an "Annex A" on intelligence activities to "eliminate the al Qaeda threat." The main debate during the summer of 2001 concentrated on the one new mechanism for a lethal attack on Bin Laden-an armed version of the Predator drone. In the first months of the new administration, questions concerning the Predator became more and more a central focus of dispute. Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afghanistan as soon as weather permitted, hoping that they still might provide the elusive "actionable intelligence" to target Bin Laden with cruise missiles. Learning that the Air Force was thinking of equipping Predators with warheads, Clarke became even more enthusiastic about redeployment. The CTC chief, Cofer Black, argued against deploying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes. He recalled that theTaliban had spotted a Predator in the fall of 2000 and scrambled their MiG fighters. Black wanted to wait until the armed version was ready. "I do not believe the possible recon value outweighs the risk of possible program termination when the stakes are raised by the Taliban parading a charred Predator in front of CNN," he wrote.

Does the response "Clarke" correctly answer the question "Who did Rice recall had the idea of asking the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
***
Output: yes

Problem: Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. Other governments in the region, such as those of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and even Libya, which were targets of some of these groups, added their own pressure. At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. Though Turabi had been its inspirational leader, General Omar al Bashir, president since 1989, had never been entirely under his thumb. Thus as outside pressures mounted, Bashir's supporters began to displace those of Turabi. The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. Bin Laden also began to have serious money problems. International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. Saudi pressures on the Bin Laden family also probably took some toll. In any case, Bin Laden found it necessary both to cut back his spending and to control his outlays more closely.

Question: "Why did several Libyan members of al Qaeda renounce all connections with Bin Laden?"

Answer: "Because he told them he could not protect them"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer:
yes