In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

while the parties informally agreed to extend the discovery deadline in order to allow further expert depositions, we do not regard this arrangement as a waiver by plaintiffs of their right to receive documents of such volume and complexity in a sufficiently timely manner to allow an effective response. We recognize, of course, the normal tendency for preparations to intensify as trial approaches and, thus, suggest no general bar to material produced seasonably and in good faith. See Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 266 (1st Cir.1993). In this case, however, we believe that, if Ford intended to rely on this evidence at trial, it should have made more diligent efforts at its timely production. Cf. Glover v. Grace Pac. Corp., 86 Hawai'i 154, 164, 948 P.2d 575, 585 (App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, nevertheless, distinguished
Holding statements: (A) holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates (B) holding the record which included the opinion of several physicians was sufficient for the alj to arrive at a decision (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded an expert who failed to arrive at his final opinion before the discovery cutoff date (D) holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates (E) holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates
holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates

types of property which do not pass to the trustee under Section 70 of the Act. See, Comment, The Growth of Procedural Due Process into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property" ... in our Economic System, 66 N.W.U.L.Rev. 502, 525-532 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., supra, 395 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. 1820; Lines v. Frederick, supra, 400 U.S. at 19, 91 S.Ct. 113. The Supreme Court has recently held, in what is a logical corollary to the notion of specialized property, that at times a trustee has too tenuous a relationship to a given claim to have standing to assert that claim on behalf of the bankrupt estate. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416, 92 S.Ct. 1678, 32 L.Ed.2d 195 (1972) (<HOLDING>). In view of these evolving federal policies of
Holding statements: (A) holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses (B) holding that the relevant indenture agreement allowed the trustee to bring tort and fraud claims on behalf of the bondholders (C) holding that a chapter 7 trustee was the only person with authority to bring a cause of action after the appointment of a trustee (D) holding that a trustee does not have standing to sue a thirdparty on behalf of debenture holders (E) holding that a trustee in a proceeding under chapter x of the bankruptcy act did not have standing to assert on behalf of the holders of debentures issued by the bankrupt in reorganization various negligence claims against an indenture trustee
holding that the indenture trustee has a separate contractual claim for its fees and expenses

recognized the "exceptional" nature of deific-command delusions, 200 N.J. at 249-50, 979 A.2d 312, and cited a few examples. See Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1272 (10th Cir.2007) (observing that a defendant could be found legally insane if "mental illness caused him to believe that he had a warrant from the President or a command from God to kill the victim"), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1079, 128 S.Ct. 2875, 171 L.Ed.2d 812 (2008); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 140 (Colo.1992) (determining that the insanity defense may be estab lished where "the defendant's cognitive ability to distinguish right from wrong with respect to the act has been destroyed as a result of a psychotic delusion that God has decreed the act"); State v. Cameron, 100 Was A.2d 520, 674 F.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In considering the deific-command situation
Holding statements: (A) holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal (B) holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to argue the trial court committed fundamental error in giving the thenstandard jury instruction for manslaughter by act even though controlling precedent in the district had approved the instruction when the instruction had been found fundamentally erroneous in another district and conflict between the two districts would have allowed defendant to seek relief in the supreme court (C) recognizing the need for amplification beyond the right and wrong instruction where the defendant claimed to have killed under the command of god (D) recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence (E) holding that it was not error for the court to give a substantive new instruction to the jury after deliberations began where the instruction was given in court with the defendant and his counsel present
holding the state failed to meet its burden of showing the erroneous jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not address the issue on appeal