In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 23 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point. In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (<HOLDING>); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104
Holding statements: (A) holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where finding that the defendant initiated the conversation was implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion (B) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence (D) holding that although defendant was a deputy sheriff miranda warnings were required irrespective of defendants knowledge of his fifth amendment rights (E) holding that although miranda required the suppression of testimonial statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights the state court is free of course to consider this harmless error question upon remand

Output: holding that waiver of miranda rights was valid where finding that the defendant initiated the conversation was implicit in the district judges denial of the suppression motion

Input: Consider Input: was pending on, AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 (3d Cir.1997). "Because the District Court relied entirely upon the state court record and did not hold an evidentiary hearing, our review [of the District Court's decision] is plenary." Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir.1997)). Like the District Court, we must presume all state court factual findings to be correct, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), but we "exercise plenary review over state court conclusions on mixed questions of law and fact and pure issues of law." Hassine, 160 F.3d at 947; see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 105, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)(<HOLDING>); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (B) holding that the jones act provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction (C) holding that subject matter questions may be but are not necessarily decided before questions of personal jurisdiction (D) holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law (E) holding that while subsidiary factual questions are subject to 2254ds presumption the ultimate legal question of confessions constitutional voluntariness is a matter for independent federal determination

Output: holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review

Input: Consider Input: entitlement claims. The VA's new rule had the effect of reinterpreting 1318 to prohibit hypothetical entitlement claims. See Tarver, 1373-74. In Rodriguez and Tarver, we applied the three-part test outlined in Princess Cruises to determine that 3.22 could be applied retroactively to bar 1318 claims based on a hypothetical entitlement theory. See Rodriguez, 511 F.3d at 1156 (finding that all three Princess Cruises factors weighed in favor of retroactive application of 3.22, as amended in 2000, to claims for DIC benefits filed by survivors before the amendment took effect); Tarver, 557 F.3d at 1374-77 (finding that retroactive application of 3.22 was permissible in a case "distinguishable from Rodriguez only . v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Ms. Kernea argues that because 3.10(f)(3),
Holding statements: (A) recognizing hixs holding that hypothetical entitlement claims were permitted under 1311a2 (B) holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the fda (C) recognizing hardship where plaintiff alleged it was being deprived of statutory entitlement (D) holding the state law claims were not preempted (E) holding that the husbands failure to argue his entitlement to attorneys fees under a prenuptial agreement at a hearing held on the issue of entitlement to attorneys fees constituted an abandonment of that claim
Output: holding that plaintiffs state claims were not preempted because defendant failed to show that these claims rested on standards other than those permitted by the fda