In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550, 63 S.Ct. 727, 87 L.Ed. 959 (1943); In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38, 39, 44 (2d Cir.1979); Matter of Tilco, Inc., 558 F.2d 1369, 1372 (10th Cir.1977). Indeed, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has referred to the decision to reject or assume an executory contract as within the "discretion" of the trustee. Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257, 260 (1st Cir.1963). It is to be noted that Collazo dealt with the rejection of an agreement for the sale of real estate. Although Collazo was decided prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress has given no indication that the "business judgment test" should not continue to apply under the present Code. In re A.J. Lane & Co., Inc., 107 B.R. 435, 440 (Bankr.D.Mass.1989) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, in confronting the question of
Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney approval clause in a contract for the sale of real estate was a part of that contract and would have to be satisfied for the underlying contract to be enforceable (B) holding that the business judgment test applies to the determination of whether a trustee should be allowed to reject an executory contract for the sale of real estate under 365 (C) holding that the validity of a contract for a commission for the sale of real estate is determined by the law of the state where the contract is made (D) holding prospectively that a vendees interest in a real estate contract constitutes real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statute (E) holding the real estate sale proceeds
[A]: (B)

[Q]: in that the timely filing of such claims is both mandatory and jurisdictional. That limitation derives from the proposition of sovereign immunity. It is well established that a claim against the United States is barred absent waiver of sovereign immunity, " 'and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' " United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)). A waiver of immunity cannot be implied; it must be "unequivocally expressed in the statutory text." Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The United States has expressly consented to
Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (D) holding that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the united states or one of its agencies absent a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
[A]: (D)

[Q]: of Mishawaka I, Church Park Apartments, Willow Creek Apartments, and Riverside Village Apartmentshad twenty-year prepayment eligibility dates that occurred during the period that LIHPRHA was in effect. Defendant argues that plaintiffs' claims accrued on each property's twenty-year prepayment eligibility date. Plaintiffs, relying principally on Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed.Cir.1994), wherein the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") explained that "property owners cannot sue for a temporary taking until the regulatory process that began it has ended," contend that their claims accrued in 1996 when the HOPE Act ended the regulatory process that began the temporary taking. Cf. Greenbrier v. United States, 75 Fed.Cl. 637, 642 (2007) (<HOLDING>). The court concludes that plaintiffs' claims
Holding statements: (A) recognizing some dispute over the accrual date for temporary taking claims based on elihpalihprha mortgage payment restrictions (B) holding that where payment toward judgment was for less than the total amount of principal and interest owed that payment then did not terminate the accrual of interest on the remaining principal (C) holding that the date of sale for an installment contract was the date of contract formation not the date of the last payment due (D) holding erisas accrual date for limitations period controlled despite contrary language in policy (E) holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action
[A]:
(A)