In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: interests inferior to the unsecured creditors [and, t]hus there should be little difficulty with the absolute priority rule____"). Sweetwater does not dispute that general proposition, but argues that the insider claims in this case should be subordinated to it, and not receive or retain any property since Sweetwater's claim is not being paid in full. The Court disagrees. Several courts have expressed the opinion that the claim of an insider or equity holder may not be treated unequally unless the insider or equity holder used superior knowledge concerning the debtor's affairs in an unfair manner or equitable subordination principles otherwise apply. See e.g., In re ARN LTD. Ltd. P'ship, 140 B.R. 5, 13 (Bankr.D.D.C.1992), citing In re Ho-lywell Corp., 913 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Heritage Org., 375 B.R. at 301 (agreeing that
Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere fact that relevant evidence is shocking to the sensibilities does not make the admission of that evidence a violation of due process (B) holding that the mere fact that a claim is held by an equity security holder does not justify its subordination and insider claims may be equitably subordinated only based on evidence of unfair conduct (C) holding that direct evidence of a fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient but may also be more certain satisfying and persuasive (D) holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision (E) recognizing that mere passage of time does not make evidence irrelevant as it will also depend on the nature of the evidence and its relation to what is to be proven
[A]: (B)

[Q]: Defendants contend that the amount awarded was excessive and shocking, such as to raise an irresistible inference that passion, prejudice or other improper influence invaded the trial. Defendants initially make this argument on the grounds that the disparity between punitive damages assessed against the "passive wrongdoer" (AGF) is too large in contrast to the amount assessed against the "active wrongdoer" (Risser). We reject this argument for many reasons. First, it assumes that AGF should not have been found liable for negligent retention of an employee. Obviously, the jury disagreed with this assessment. Second, the legal basis for assessing punitive damages on respondeat superior grounds is well-established. Plains Resources, Inc. v. Gable, 235 Kan. 580, 682 P.2d 653, 665 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In the U.S. Supreme Court's recent deci sion,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that restatement second of torts 323 and 324a correctly state pennsylvania law (B) recognizing kansas courts adoption of restatement second of torts 909 1977 (C) recognizing that restatement second of torts 416 to 429 are often overlapping (D) recognizing tentative draft of restatement second of torts 652e (E) recognizing that kansas supreme court would accept the final draft of the restatement second of torts 652e adopted in 1977
[A]: (B)

[Q]: As an appellate court, we decline to review a cold transcript and draw our own factual inferences about the tone of voice, volume, and circumstances of Sgt. Norman's statement. See Lewisohn v. State, 433 A.2d 351, 354 (Me.1981). Because the trial court reasonably could have found that Sgt. Norman's comment constituted an order, we affirm the suppression order. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 1 . Title 29 M.R.S.A. 2411(1) was repealed and replaced by P.L. 2003, ch. 452 Q-77 to Q-83 (effective July 1, 2004), codified at 29-A M.R.S.A. 2411(1-A) (Supp.2004). 2 . Title 29-A M.R.S.A. 2412-A(1) was repealed and replaced by P.L. 2003, ch. 452 Q-84 to Q-85 (effective July 1, 2004), codified at 29-A M.R.S.A. 2412-A(1-A) (Supp.2004). Title 29-A M.R.S.A. 2412-A(3) was am pp.1993)
Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation (B) holding that because the law in this area is unclear an officer who shot a fleeing motorist was not unreasonable in believing that a potential threat to third parties would justify shooting the motorist (C) holding that the fourth amendment was not implicated when an officer asked for passengers identification to see if he could drive a vehicle because the driver had a suspended license (D) holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle (E) holding that officer did not seize motorist when he tapped on window and asked driver to roll it down
[A]:
(E)