TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: subpoena does not fit within the statutory language. The question surrounding the subpoena's validity in no way relates to any information that Star Bank would be required to disclose under FCRA, even assuming that FCRA's requirements apply to Star Bank. {See 15 U.S.C. 1681a(f) for the definition of a "consumer reporting agency.") The Hahns' claimed reliance on whatever Bonynge said regarding the subpoena therefore provides them with no basis to toll the two year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Hahns have failed to demonstrate that the wilful misrepresentation tolling exception applies to their case. We therefore hold that all of their claims raised under FCRA are barred by the statute of limitations. See Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). We find no inequity in reaching this result.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim (B) holding that equitable tolling is available to avoid time limitations in the statutory provisions governing veterans benefits (C) holding that parents were not entitled to use infancy tolling provisions and that the statute of limitations barred their claims (D) holding that an ohio tolling statute violated the commerce clause because it gave nonresident corporations the choice between being subject to general jurisdiction in the state by appointing an instate agent for service of process or being subject to a tolling of the statute of limitations on claims against them (E) holding that a plaintiff must fit within the precise wording of the tolling exception to avoid being barred by fcras statute of limitations provision

SOLUTION: holding that the uccs fouryear statute of limitations provision which barred an action by the plaintiff did not bar a thirdparty contribution and indemnity claim

PROBLEM: reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts." Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker's May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker's May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay
Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police

SOLUTION: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police

PROBLEM: the terms so used to be effective, wherefore an interpretation of a statute which gives a word, phrase or clause thereof no function to perform, or makes it, in effect, a mere repetition of another word, phrase or clause thereof must be rejected as being unsound, if it be possible so to construe the statute as a whole, as to make all of its parts operative and effective. 4 . This Court recognized that a tort action for wrongful death could be brought on behalf of a viable unborn child in Syllabus Point 1 of Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W.Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428 (1971). 5 . Contrary to the majority of states, South Carolina and Alabama have held an unborn child is a child, person, or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution. See Ankrom v. State, 152 So.3d 373 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (<HOLDING>); Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777
Holding statements: (A) holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute (B) holding an unborn child is a child for purposes of prosecuting chemical endangerment of a child (C) holding that an unborn child is not a dependent for purposes of the neglect statute (D) holding a mothers ingestion of a controlled substance while pregnant does not constitute child abuse as an unborn child is not a person for purposes of criminal prosecution (E) holding an unborn child is not a child for purposes of criminal prosecution of mistreatment of a child

SOLUTION:
holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute