TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court's conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that "typically involve[s] purposeful, 'violent,' and 'aggressive' conduct." United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that "[t]he phrase
Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: voters of the political subdivision or subdivisions whose combined territory composes the territory of a district shall be qualified voters of the district. The nomination and election shall be by separate nonpartisan ballot. The term of each member of the board thus elected shall be six years and until his successor is elected and qualified. (Emphasis added.) No definition of a "qualified voter" is provided in SDCL Chapter 49-36. Thus, we must turn to the definition of "voter" as provided under SDCL Title 12, and the South Dakota Constitution as to what qualifies a person as a "voter" within the meaning of Chapter 49-36. See SDCL 12-1-1. [44.] Our state affords great protection to a citizen's voting franchise. SD Const, art. 6, 19; Duffy v. Mortenson, 497 N.W.2d 437, 439 (S.D.1993) (<HOLDING>). A court must strictly adhere to the
Holding statements: (A) holding that a fair referendum assuring the equal right to vote under 101a1 includes the right of members to have the vote scheduled at a time when they can exercise their vote and the right to be free from intimidation or fear of reprisal (B) holding constitutional a tax on a private citizens interest in housing on government property received as part of the private citizens compensation (C) holding it is not the policy of the state of south dakota to disenfranchise its citizens of their constitutional right to vote (D) recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state (E) holding that the right to vote is fundamental

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: or that the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition." Id. at 835. The dispositive issue in the instant case is whether, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs have pled sufficient allegations to show that drag racing is a "dangerous condition" as that term is used in 537.600.1(2). See Johnson v. City of Springfield, 817 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Mo.App.1991). In Missouri, three major lines of case authority define the term "dangerous condition" as found in 537.600.1(2). See parallel discussions in Johnson, supra. In the first line of case authority, "dangerous condition" has a narrow meaning and refers to defects in the physical condition of a public entity's property. Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 835; Chase v. City of St. Louis, 781 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Mo.App.1989) (<HOLDING>); Zubcic v. Mo. Portland Cement Co., 710 S.W.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that damage to building and personal property as a result of fire negligently caused by defendant was to be measured by reasonable cash market value of the property at the time it was destroyed by the fire or if it was not totally destroyed by the diminution in its fair market value before and after the fire (B) holding that the land contract vendor was entitled to fire insurance benefits when the fire occurred after a judgment for possession was obtained by the vendor pursuant to summary forfeiture proceedings (C) holding that petition failed to allege fire hydrants were physically defective where fire hydrants did not work and plaintiffs decedent was killed in fire (D) holding that the relationship between fire insurance regulation and rating fire loss fire prevention and fire investigation is rational and reasonable (E) holding where the defendants conduct in setting a fire was a proximate cause of a fire fighters death the death occurred in course of and in furtherance of the arson

SOLUTION:
(C)