In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: failed to complete the assignment and warranty of title to H & L on the same certificate. See Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-32(a) (Supp. 1988). Winn is still listed on the certificate as the registered owner, and under Georgia law, the certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-25(c) (1985). Although our reading of the Georgia statutes yields the conclusion that ownership of the Buick did not pass to the dealership or to H & L since the certificate of title was not properly assigned, it appears that Georgia courts interpreting the same statutes would reach a different conclusion. See, e.g., American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 280, 253 S.E.2d 825 (1979); Mote v. Mote, 134 Ga. App. 668, 215 S.E.2d 487 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Winn's evidence regarding the sale of
Holding statements: (A) holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision (B) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed (C) holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes (D) holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale (E) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received
[A]: (B)

[Q]: determination under the reasonableness test as clearly erroneous, we perceive no error. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 1 . Appellees' original complaint was filed before the bylaw amendment was passed. 2 . The lobby, which per Paragraph 7(c) of the Ridgely Declaration is explicitly characterized as a common element, was refurbished in 1990 out of common funds consisting of contributions from each unit owner. To deny the use of the lobby to clients of the commercial owners constitutes an ultra vires taking of a portion of their percentage interest in the common areas in derogation of the Ridgely Condominium declaration as well as certain provisions of the Maryland Condominium Act. Paragraph 8 of the Ridgely Declaration, in pertinent part, provid 495, 500 (1991) (<HOLDING>). See also Jarvis v. Stage Neck Owners Ass'n,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants presence in a dark alleyway at six oclock in the morning behind a closed business in an exclusively commercial area supported the investigative stop and explaining that knowledge of recent burglaries in an area is a relevant circumstance to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an officers suspicion because knowledge of the character of the area is part of an officers expertise (B) recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common (C) holding that the requirement of explicitly and prominently was intended by the legislature to ensure that the declaration give unequivocal notice to the project unit owners of the authorization for such use (D) holding that the grant of exclusive use to one unit owner of a common area is sufficient to change the relative interest of the unit owners in that common area (E) holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest
[A]: (D)

[Q]: 718, 725 (8th Cir.2001) (employer's statement that "[t]wenty years is too long. You should have moved five years ago[,]" was not direct evidence of age discrimination absent showing that length of tenure was being used as a proxy to accomplish age discrimination). Rather, for the Board's 2010 discussion to constitute direct evidence of age discrimination, Dunn would need to show that the Board used the term "retire" as a proxy for age to articulate a discriminatory attitude. Scott, 182 Fed.Appx. at 526; Erickson, 271 F.3d at 725. Dunn has made no such showing, but is asking for this Court to speculate and thereby to infer the existence of direct evidence based on the term "retire." The Board's discussion does not directly reflect a discriminatory attitude. Erickson, 271 F.3d at 725 (<HOLDING>). Even if the Board had expressed a
Holding statements: (A) holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference (B) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent (C) holding that employers statement was not direct evidence where accepting statement as evidence of age animus depended on an inference (D) holding that a prior inconsistent statement was admissible and the defendant failed to ask for a limiting instruction that the jury could not use the statement as substantive evidence (E) holding that the statement at your age i dont believe you could pass the test is not direct evidence of age discrimination
[A]:
(C)