In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

did not present any evidence before the district court to meet his burden of showing that the affidavit, which directly corroborates Johnson's testimony before the magistrate judge, is false or unreliable. Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the district court erred, we readily conclude that any error was harmless. B. Credibility of Witnesses The district court's findings of fact at a revocation hearing are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir.1993). "The credibility of a witness is in the province of the factfinder and this court will not ordinarily review the factfinder's determination of credibility." United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). We defer to the lower court's credibility
Holding statements: (A) holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony (B) holding jury is sole judge of witness credibility and may believe some witnesses and refuse to believe others (C) holding jury as judge of credibility may believe all some or none of the testimony (D) holding in the context of a criminal trial that a courts choice of who to believe is conclusive unless the judge credits exceedingly improbable testimony (E) holding that where testimony is inherently improbable the court may choose to disregard it
holding that an immigration judge may base a credibility determination on the lack of corroborating evidence if the judge also encounters inconsistencies in testimony contradictory evidence or inherently improbable testimony

(Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080.) Although Calero-Toledo did not involve the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, the Court in that case emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding is brought against the instrumentality of a crime, rather than against the offender himself. The Calero-Toledo Court noted that the object of the forfeiture is " 'primarily considered as the offender ***. [T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand^] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.' " (Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 468, 94 S. Ct. at 2092, quoting The Palmyra (1827), 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-16, 6 L. Ed. 531, 535-36 (<HOLDING>).) The Calero-Toledo Court also noted,
Holding statements: (A) holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding (B) holding that a judgment set forth in a separate document is not a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction where the parties assumed that there was a final judgment (C) holding that a conviction for piracy was not a prerequisite to a proceeding to forfeit a ship allegedly engaged in piratical aggression (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding jeopardy had not attached because the district court was without power to enter a judgment of conviction in a pretrial proceeding
holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding

trustee which would be property of the estate. See generally In re Si Yeon Park, Ltd., 198 B.R. 956 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1996). Such a turnover requirement may undermine the Barton Doctrine to some degree. Neither statutory provision, however, is germane to this proceeding. As mentioned above, the former statute is inapplicable because it is limited to receivers that operate businesses. The trustee concedes that Mr. Freeman was appointed solely as a liquidating receiver. The latter statute is inapplicable because its directives are addressed to "custodians" a term defined by section 101(11) to include receivers whose duties involve controlling property of the debtor for the benefit of the debtor's creditors. See Matter of Miami General Hosp., Inc., 1111 B.R. 363, 366 (S.D.Fla.1990) (<HOLDING>); see generally Matter of Cash Currency
Holding statements: (A) holding that the receiver of assets not the subsequent purchaser of the assets retained all liabilities not specifically enumerated in a similar purchase and assumption agreement (B) holding that a receiver of insurance policies did not have standing because it failed to prove it was the assignee of the policyholders claims (C) holding that the receiver for a corporation had no standing to sue for inter alia receipt of funds fraudulently obtained fraud and unjust enrichment even though he was appointed on behalf of all the creditors because those were claims of the creditors not of the corporation (D) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors (E) holding that a receiver appointed for the parent corporation of the debtor was not a custodian of the debtorsubsidiary because the receiver was not appointed to take control of the debt ors assets for the benefit of the debtors creditors
holding that the receiver of assets not the subsequent purchaser of the assets retained all liabilities not specifically enumerated in a similar purchase and assumption agreement