In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: health, education, and family comfort are also acceptable. See Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920). However, a debtor's homestead was held to be abandoned when a debtor moved to New Hampshire and attempted to sell his property in Fort Myers, Florida. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992). In Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), 183 B.R. 968 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995), the Bankruptcy Court held that Chapter 7 debtor's property did not qualify for homestead exemption since, in placing property on the market for sale or lease, debtor abandoned his intent to use and occupy property as permanent place of residence. Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), supra. But cf., In re Herr, 197 B.R. 939 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1980)
Holding statements: (A) holding that no abandonment of property as homestead was shown merely because after house located on property was destroyed in hurricane debtor had quit premises allowed property to become overgrown with weeds and posted a for sale sign (B) holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property (E) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate

A: holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead
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Q: read to give these words effect in light of the law in certain states, under the plain meaning rule, Green Tree's position must fail. Herrin, 2007 WL 1975573, at *3. The debtor's position is also supported by the leading commentators on the Bankruptcy Code. Collier on Bankruptcy states, "[o]nly if a mobile home or cooperative is real property under applicable non-bankruptcy law would the limitations on modification apply, even though the mobile home or cooperative is considered the debtor's principal residence." 8 Collier on Bankruptcy 1322.06[1][a][ii] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. Revised 2005). Moreover, ignoring the term "real property" within 1322(b)(2) is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation. See Discover Bank v. Vaden, 396 F.3d 366, 369 (4th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) This Court does not believe that the result in
Holding statements: (A) recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous (B) holding courts must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous (C) holding that effect must be given if possible to every clause and word of a statute (D) holding that courts must give effect to every word when interpreting a statute (E) holding principle of statutory construction is to give effect to every clause and word of a statute

A: recognizing courts must interpret statutes to give effect to all language used rendering no portion meaningless or superfluous
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Q: concluding "the clarity of the exclusions in question" supported the conclusion "a reasonable person could not have understood coverage would exist"). Goodwin does not identify in his affidavit any way in which he misunderstood the policy exclusion. He merely quotes the insuring clause from the policy and then states that he "expect[ed] that this language means just what it says." But insurance policy provisions are not interpreted in isolation. See Thomas, 749 N.W.2d at 682; Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 494 N.W.2d 690, 692 (Iowa 1993), called into doubt on other grounds by Corrigan, 697 N.W.2d at 113 n. 1. The insuring clause must be read in conjunction with the policy exclusions. Cf. Harlan v. Valley Ins. Co., 128 Or.App. 128, 875 P.2d 471, 472-73 (1994) (<HOLDING>). If the policy is not considered as a whole,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave (B) holding in determining whether driver was insured under terms of policy exclusion of person using vehicle without a reasonable belief person was entitled to do so must be considered (C) holding that to be convicted under dwi statute a person must be driving or in actual physical control of the vehicle but motion of the vehicle is not necessary (D) holding that a lookout is not using a vehicle entitled to liability coverage under an insurance policy (E) holding that unlicensed driver who was driving vehicle with permission of owners permittee could reasonably believe that permittee had authority to permit him to drive vehicle and thus driv er was entitled to liability coverage notwithstanding auto policy exclusion for any person using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that person is entitled to do so driver could have reasonable belief that he was entitled to use vehicle even though he was unlicensed where he was doing so at specific request of permittee and actual owner never instructed driver not to drive vehicle nor instructed permittee not to allow others to drive vehicle

A:
holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave
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