In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
acts of sexual harassment by the plaintiffs co-workers, about which defendants' supervisors neither knew nor should have known, does not give rise to a cognizable sexual harassment claim and will not revive an otherwise stale sexual harassment claim. See Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) ("[Because no harassment event occurring during the violation period was ever brought to the attention of [the employer] while [the plaintiff] was still employed, there is no violation during the limitation period that can serve as the anchor for the earlier conduct."). Additionally, the plaintiff cannot rely on the continuing violations doctrine, because there is no nexus between the conduct of the coworkers in 1994 and the earlier incidents going back to 1992. See Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, there being no dispute as to
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur (B) holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated to coworker to whom she compared herself (C) holding that the plaintiff could not rely on the continuing violations doctrine because she had failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between alleged touching incidents by a supervisor and the later conduct of fellow employees (D) holding that a constitutional claim against nongovernment entities only lies where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself (E) holding that plaintiff cook at a nursing home had sufficiently pled requisite public policy and a close fit where she alleged she was fired for expressing concerns that a fellow employee was contaminating the area where she was preparing food

Ex Output:
holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur

Ex Input:
first, that under New Jersey law a plaintiff assumes the risk of voluntarily participating in a sporting activities, citing Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959) and Pona v. Blvd. Arena, 35 N.J.Super. 148, 113 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1955), and that Buglioli voluntarily participated in a "cat and mouse game." These cases provide no defense. First, the court knows of no decision after New Jersey adopted its comparative negligence statute interposing "assumption of risk" as a complete defense in a negligence action. To the contrary, a recent case arising from a contact sport accident formulated an appropriate rule by adjusting the standard of care, not by finding "assumption of risk." See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 257 N.J.Super. 374, 608 A.2d 465 (1992) (<HOLDING>). Second, the court finds no New Jersey case
Holding statements: (A) holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety (B) holding no evidence of reckless disregard for safety of others when officer entered intersection without stopping and witness did not hear brakes being applied (C) holding that an unlawful act committed with the intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death is involuntary manslaughter and that criminal liability is imposed in the latter instance because although the defendants acts are not inherently wrong the defendant has acted or failed to act with awareness of the risk to safety and in wilful disregard of the safety of others (D) holding in actions arising from a contact sport accident plaintiff must show defendant acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others or intentionally (E) holding that cjulpable negligence is negligence of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless disregard for the safety of others

Ex Output:
holding prison official must have acted with reckless disregard for the inmates safety

Ex Input:
to further his own goals and sexual gratification; (5) divulged confidences to Linda; and (6) disregarded "all indicia of the transference and countertransference phenomena which normally occurs in the course of psychotherapy." We note, initially, that each of these allegations is based, in part, on an underlying allegation of fraud. The trial judge has permitted the plaintiff to replead a separate fraud count, the allegations of which essentially duplicate the ones above. Fraud is a distinct cause of action in Illinois. To that extent, we do not believe the allegations of fraud are germane to a count alleging professional negligence, be it that of a psychotherapist or a cleric. Cf. Williams v. Chicago Osteopathic Health Systems, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1048, 654 N.E.2d 613 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we address the count for
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner (B) recognizing differing elements and standard of proof between medical malpractice and fraud (C) holding that plaintiffs could not sue attorneys for legal malpractice so long as underlying medical malpractice action out of which legal malpractice claim arose was still pending on appeal (D) holding that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applicable in fraud actions does not apply to the proof of misrepresentations under ors 743612 (E) holding the provisions of a comprehensive medical malpractice act unconstitutional

Ex Output:
recognizing that even when a prisoner files suit under section 1983 alleging medical malpractice against prison medical officials medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner