Input: The inhabited history of the Las Vegas Valley stretches to 23,000 b.c. , when much of the area was covered by a prehistoric lake. During this period, the indigenous people lived in caves, hunting the mammals that gathered at the shoreline. The landscape of the valley changed dramatically over the next 200 centuries. The glaciers feeding the lake melted away and the lake evaporated. Fossils tell an obscure story of man's slow and sporadic development. Around 3000 b.c. , native Archaic Indians began to develop a lasting hunting and gathering culture. By this time, the valley was in much the same geographic state as it exists in today, with one exceptionthe presence of artesian springs that bubbled to the surface in several areas. These springs fed a network of streams draining through the Las Vegas Wash to the Colorado River. The areas surrounding the springs were desert oases: sprawling collections of grasses, trees, and wildlife. Many springs lay in areas that would eventually become the center of the modern Las Vegas metropolis. For about 4000 years, the Archaics thrived in a culture that included many signs of early civilization. Signs of even more advancement appeared halfway through the first millennium a.d. , when the Anasazi Indians inhabited the valley. Far more progressive than the Archaics, the Anasazi utilized such formal agricultural techniques as irrigation to assist their harvest. This permitted the Anasazi to achieve a benchmark of advanced societythe ability to live in permanent shelters year-round without need to follow wildlife. Mysteriously, the Anasazi vanished from the valley around a.d.

Does the response "Archaics" correctly answer the question "Who was the most advance early civilization that disappeared in Las Vegas?"?
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Output: no

Input: The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money.

Does the response "The principals" correctly answer the question "Who recommended that the President designate Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act?"?
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Output: no

Input: Magnetism is the ability of a material to be attracted by a magnet. It also include the ability for some material to act like a magnet. No doubt youve handled refrigerator magnets. You can see some in Figure 1.28. You probably know they stick to a metal refrigerator. This is what holds your homework up. Maybe your little sisters drawings are hung on the fridge in this manner. Do magnets stick to all materials? Of course not. You have probably checked and they do not stick to other surfaces. They do not stick to wooden doors or glass windows. Wood and glass are not attracted to a magnet. Obviously, only certain materials are attracted to magnets.

Does the response "Glass" correctly answer the question "Give examples of materials to which magnets stick to and do not stick to."?
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Output: no

Input: In her storage room-turned-office, Jennifer Baum works under an expanding leak that is causing the ceiling to turn brown and crumble. Mold grows in the buckets positioned to catch the water. She shrugs it off. Outside her office she has taped up a clear plastic suit, and a sign that reads, "All employees must don protective gear before coming in." Such is life in limbo. Nearly a year after Sept. 11, the Legal Aid Society-the lawyers for New York's poor and homeless-remains, well, homeless. The nonprofit has been barred from returning to its 90 Church St. headquarters, across from the World Trade Center site, because of environmental concerns. Legal Aid has uncomfortable company. More than 11,500 New Yorkers continue to work out of temporary space, according to analysis by Manhattan-based real estate brokerage TenantWise.com Inc. and Crain's New York Business. That's 8% of the 137,000 workers who lost their offices or access to them when the Twin Towers collapsed. Legal Aid's 450 displaced attorneys and staffers have spent the past 12 months spread among previously unused spaces-some unused for good reason-in the nonprofit's other offices. It could be another year and a half before they return to their old desks. They have contended with difficult working conditions as demand for Legal Aid's services is on the rise because of Sept. 11 and the deteriorating economy. The civil division is spread among a few boroughs. Their papers and documents, some 20,000 boxes worth, are stuck in a storage facility in Linden, N.J. "I am counting the days till we can have all the parts back in one place," says Steven Banks, Legal Aid's associate attorney in chief. In the memories of the exiled workers, the old office has achieved mythical proportions. They say the wood paneling and rugs had the ability to cool emotions and lift spirits. The Legal Aid office on Montague Street in Brooklyn Heights, where 65 displaced workers have cobbled together space amid the faded and scratched walls, looks more like a bargain basement.

Does the response "In the bucket" correctly answer the question "What did Jennifer Baum shrug off?"?
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Output:
no