In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: District Court Executive is directed to: (a) File this Order; (b) ENTER JUDGMENT consistent with this Order; (c) Provide copies of this Order and the Judgment to counsel; and (d) CLOSE THIS FILE. 1 . These facts can be found in the parties' Statements of Material Facts, submitted with briefing on the pending Motions pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 56.1. The Court deems admitted any material fact asserted by a party and not rebutted by the opposing party. The parties agree on the facts recited in this section, except where otherwise noted. 2 . Several courts have held that Title III applies only to actual places, and that membership organizations are not subject to Title III. See, e.g., Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F.Supp. 217, 223 (E.D.Mo.1996) (<HOLDING>); Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAmerica Bicycle
Holding statements: (A) holding that hockey organization was not sufficiently linked to a place so not subject to ada (B) holding ada claim was discharged (C) holding that title ii of the ada is not applicable to the federal government (D) holding that national football league was not a place and therefore not subject to ada (E) holding that group organizing bike race was not subject to ada

Output: holding ada claim was discharged

Input: Consider Input: reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. In determining the purpose of section 13-21-101, it is appropriate to look to legislative history as indicative of the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Willer, 817 P.2d at 519-20. The 1982 amendment to section 13-21-101 created the distinction between judgments which the judgment debtor appeals and those which the judgment debtor does not appeal. The General Assembly intended that the amendment, and its market-determined interest rate, apply only to judgments which the judgment debtor appeals. See Act of March 25, 1982, ch. 39, 1982 Colo. Laws 227 (entitled "An Act Concerning Interest Payable on Appealed Money Judgments in Civil Actions" (emphasis added)); see City of Ouray v. Olin, 761 P.2d 784, 789 (Colo. 1988) (<HOLDING>). The statements of the bill's sponsors also
Holding statements: (A) holding analogous circumstances conclusive of legislative intent (B) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (C) holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period (D) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs 37869 as an example of such legislative intent (E) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent

Output: holding analogous circumstances conclusive of legislative intent

Input: Consider Input: include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, unless the possession was of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)." 4B1.2 app. n. 1. A shotgun modified so that it "has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length" is a firearm described in 5845(a). See 26 U.S.C. 5845(a). As Lipscomb's instant offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not have the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force as an element and is not an enumerated offense, the issue here is whether Lipscomb's present offense "otherwise involves conduct presenting a serious risk of injury to another" under the residual clause of 4B1.2(a)(2). See United States v. Serna, 309 F.3d 859, 862 & n. 6 (5th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). A. Applicability of the Categorical Approach
Holding statements: (A) holding that north carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline (B) holding a defendant could not receive an enhanced sentenced under the residual clause of 4b12a2 following johnson (C) holding that the texas offense of possession of a prohibited weapon could only qualify as a crime of violence under the residual clause of 4b12a2 (D) holding that california residential burglary is categorically a crime of violence under the residual clause of ussg 4b12a2 which requires the criminal conduct to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another (E) holding that possession of a weapon is not in an of itself a crime
Output: holding that north carolina crime of larceny from the person was a crime of violence under the residual clause of the career offender guideline