In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: in that the timely filing of such claims is both mandatory and jurisdictional. That limitation derives from the proposition of sovereign immunity. It is well established that a claim against the United States is barred absent waiver of sovereign immunity, " 'and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' " United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)). A waiver of immunity cannot be implied; it must be "unequivocally expressed in the statutory text." Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The United States has expressly consented to
Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (D) holding that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the united states or one of its agencies absent a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: and reimbursement claim based on the plan. Looking to FEHBA's legislative history, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the purpose of FEHBA was to establish health insurance for federal employees and that insurance carriers "help the government fulfill the basic task of establishing a health benefits program for federal employees." Id. at 1233. The Jacks court concluded that OPM "has direct and extensive control over these benefit contracts under the FEHBA." The court determined that even though the plan "allows the carrier the discretion to pursue subrogation," that "does not foreclose the application of the federal officer removal statute" because "the subrogation provision is necessarily a product of the benefit payment pro F.Supp.2d 848 (W.D.Mo.2011) (<HOLDING>); Van Horn v. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue
Holding statements: (A) holding that health insurer contracted with fehba was not acting under a federal agency within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute (B) holding that the fact that the insurance carrier voluntarily entered into a mutually agreed upon contract with the opm to administer healthcare benefits to federally employed enrollees does not rise to the level of a relationship defined as acting under a federal officer (C) holding that a health plan insurer contracting with a government agency under a federal benefits program is considered a person acting under a federal officer (D) holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school (E) holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: 96, 98 (2) (561 SE2d 382) (2002). 12 Id. (punctuation omitted). 13 Id. (citation and punctuation omitted); see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 207 (II) (107 SC 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987); Bruton, 391 U. S. at 135-36. 14 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2); see Bruton, 391 U. S. at 135-36. 15 481 U. S. 200 (107 SC 1702, 95 LE2d 176) (1987). 16 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2) (punctuation omitted); see Richardson, 481 U. S. at 208. 17 Moss, 275 Ga. at 98 (2); see Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135, 137-38 (6) (485 SE2d 783) (1997) ("For the admission of a co-defendant's statements to constitute a Bruton violation the statements standing alone must clearly inculpate the defendant." (punctuation omitted)); Garlington v. State, 268 Ga. App. 264, 267-68 (1) (a) (601 SE2d 793) (2004). 18 See Moss, 275 Ga. at 99 (2) (<HOLDING>); Thomas, 268 Ga. at 137-38 (6) (holding that
Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of statement with references to we or they which did not directly implicate defendant did not violate defendants confrontation rights (B) holding that admission of nontestifying oodefendants statement to police that murder defendant came to his apartment and went in bathroom and stayed there for awhile did not violate bruton rule because statement standing alone did not clearly incriminate defendant but only became incriminating when linked with other evidence (C) recognizing the chance that the jury will credit a nontestifying codefendants incriminating statement and conclude that the statement pointed to the objecting defendant as the offender even though he could not crossexamine the declarant (D) holding that two or three references to everyone and they in testimony about confession did not violate bruton because testimony did not implicate the defendant expressly nor was it incriminating on its face (E) holding that the introduction of a jointly tried nontestifying codefendants statement violates the sixth amendment confrontation clause if the statement contains incriminating evidence concerning a defendant
[EX A]:
(B)