In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

in ways that create a substantial risk of producing or exacerbating personal injury to her child, to exercising too much or too little, indeed to engaging in virtually any injury-prone activity that, should an injury occur, might reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of the child. Such ordinary things as skiing or horseback riding could produce criminal liability. If the State's position were to prevail, there would seem to be no clear basis for categorically excluding any of those activities from the ambit of the statute; criminal liability would depend almost entirely on how aggressive, inventive, and persuasive any particular prosecutor might be. Kilmon v. State, 394 Md. 168, 177-78, 905 A.2d 306, 311-12 (Ct.App.2006). Additionally, the State's suggested con 0 (1992) (<HOLDING>); People v. Morabito, 151 Misc.2d 259, 580
Holding statements: (A) holding an unborn viable fetus is not a human being under the new mexico child abuse statute and the mothers use of cocaine during pregnancy was not child abuse (B) holding a criminal charge of endangerment of a child does not apply to a pregnant woman who ingests an illegal substance that results in the transmission of drugs to her child through the umbilical cord (C) holding ohios child endangerment statute does not apply to mothers who abuse drugs during pregnancy (D) recognizing the unique relationship between mother and child during pregnancy and birth and permitting mothers claim for emotional distress where the mothers emotional wellbeing and the birth of the child are inextricably intertwined (E) holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy
(C)

partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court's order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants' arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
(C)

citations and quotations omitted). Thus, the Court does not view evidence of racial discrimination in hiring practices at Budco as irrelevant to Wilson's claim that he was discriminated against by being transferred back to DCXOM and by not being hired for a job ultimately given to Page. 5. Many of the black temps within the company quit because they were discouraged with Budco's hiring practices. Defendants assert that the Court should strike paragraph 5 for lack of personal knowledge. In his supplemental affidavit, Wilson explained that he knew this information because he was told by the employees why they were quitting. Wilson lacks personal knowledge of information that he received from these employees. See Sperle v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 495-96 (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 526 n. 13
Holding statements: (A) holding that fourth amendment did not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to government authorities (B) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (C) holding that statements even when made to a third party which are appropriately determined to be threatening can constitute obstruction of justice (D) holding exculpatory statements by a third party should have been admitted in the punishment phase notwithstanding the hearsay rule (E) holding that plaintiffaffiant did not have personal knowledge of statements made to him by a third party
(E)