In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 199 F.3d at 248 n. 6. Moreover, when the plaintiff declares the sufficiency of his pleadings and makes no attempt to amend his complaint in response to the defendant's challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper when the plaintiffs allegations fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Spiller v. City of Texas City, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir.1997). In addition, a plaintiff should not be granted leave to amend after being afforded repeated opportunities to do so. See Wilkins, 173 F.Supp.2d at 614; accord United States ex rel. Adrian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir.2004) (noting that "pleading review is not a game where the plaintiff is permitted to file serial amendments until he finally gets it right"); Willard, 336 F.3d at 387 (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, "where a proposed amendment
Holding statements: (A) holding leave to amend was properly denied where the relator had previously filed two amended complaints (B) holding that dismissal with leave to amend should be granted even if no request to amend was made (C) holding district court properly denied leave to amend where application was four months late and appeared to be futile (D) holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court (E) holding that the trial court properly refused to consider allegations in the disallowed amended complaints
[A]: (A)

[Q]: background nor his current offense can support the conclusion that he is a worst offender. The maximum sentence was therefore not justified. In deciding to impose the maximum sentence, Judge Michalski relied primarily on his conclusion that Skrepich was incapable of rehabilitation and could not personally be deterred. The judge thus gave primary emphasis to the need to protect the public by isolating Skrepich from the community. While the judge also indicated that a lengthy sentence would serve the sentencing goals of general deterrence and community condemnation, it seems clear that these goals could not, in themselves, support the imposition of a maximum, ten-year term for a first offender convicted of a class B felony. See Pears v. State, 698 P.2d 1198, 1204-05 (Alaska 1985) (<HOLDING>). The appropriateness of the maximum term
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts failure to explain the effect of supervised release was harmless where the maximum term of incarceration under the actual sentence of imprisonment and supervised release less than six years as well as his worstcase scenario less than nine years was less than the maximum term of incarceration twenty years al lowed by law (B) holding that a defendant may be convicted of felony murder when the death of his accomplice was a reasonably foreseeable result of their commission of a felony (C) holding that first and seconddegree intentional murder verdicts are consistent with a felony murder verdict because lack of intent is not an element of seconddegree felony murder (D) holding that a term of substantially less than twenty years would serve the objectives of general deterrence and community condemnation in the case of a first offender convicted of seconddegree murder an unclassified felony (E) holding that twenty years was not excessive for second felony offender convicted of simple burglary
[A]: (D)

[Q]: when there has been neither agreement nor adjudication of the fact. In that situation, the question is one of historical fact, which, until decided, cannot have anything to do with the child's best interest. A different situation is presented, however, after paternity has been determined, whether by agreement or adjudication. Then, the best interest of the child necessarily is involved. The historical fact of parentage no longer stands alone; now it is intertwined with the interests of the child and no longer is capable of separation. Once paternity is established, 5-1029 has no further role to play in that arena. The amendment to 5-1038 does not change that, in my view, without, as there is not in this case, an amendment making it so. Contrary to the majorit , 1083 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the best interest of the child was the proper standard to apply in determining whether blood tests should be conducted (B) holding the best interest of the child standard does not violate federal constitutional principles (C) holding that the best interest of the child standard should be used in deciding whether to grant a paternity petition (D) holding that the best interest of the child is the paramount concern in determining whether to order blood tests to determine paternity (E) holding court properly applied best interest of child standard when determining whether placement goal should be changed
[A]:
(C)