In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: five years. The issue is thus whether the time Hartman served in prison after the IJ's improper decision should count toward the five-year bar. The Court holds that it should not count and thus, contrary to the BIA's ruling in March 2002, the application for 212(c) relief was not untimely when the IJ addressed the merits of that application on January 25, 2001. 1. The Statutory Five-Year Bar At the outset, the Court addresses Hartman's argument that the five-year clock stops upon filing an application for 212(c) relief, which, in this case, would be January 1997. The Court disagrees with that argument. The five-year clock of 212(c) does not stop when an alien, such as Hartman, files an application for a discretionary waiver. See Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Falconi v. INS, 240 F.Supp.2d 215, 218
Holding statements: (A) holding that a lawful permanent resident alien is entitled to seek relief under ina 212c (B) holding that the date of death is relevant date of inquiry for the applicability of section 541a5a (C) holding that the relevant date is not when petitioner filed for 212c relief (D) holding that we have jurisdiction to review an aliens legal eligibility for relief under former ina 212c (E) holding that iiriras repeal of ina 212c was not impermissibly retroactive because unlike st cyr the petitioner chose to proceed to trial instead of agreeing to a plea and therefore did not detrimentally rely on the availability of 212c relief
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: if the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary ..."); Douglas by Kelly v. Bd. of Edu., 127 Ill.App.3d 79, 82 Ill.Dec. 211, 468 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1984) (finding that where a school's window pane fell on plaintiff while she was sitting at her desk, plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict based on res ipsa loqui-tur); Moore v. Atchison, 28 Ill.App.2d 340, 171 N.E.2d 393 (1960) (finding that directed verdict for the plaintiff was proper where there was no direct evidence as to why two trains collided, even though the defendant showed that the equipment was properly inspected and in excellent working order, because the circumstances made the inference of negligence so strong that reasonable men could not reject it); Silvern v. Barbagallo, 195 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1959) (<HOLDING>); Richard Equipment Corp. v. Manhattan Indus.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the injured passenger of a cab was entitled to summary judgment against the driver because the prima facie proof is so convincing that the inference of negligence is inescapable (B) holding the standard of proof in summary judgment rulings is the same as it would be at trial (C) holding the plaintiff satisfies the burden of a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence (D) holding that because the plaintiff was not disabled for the purposes of the ada this court need not to address the other elements of the prima facie case (E) holding that a prima facie case is subject to independent review
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: threatened to use a firearm during the commission of the crime"; (2) where the defendant admitted to use or threatened use; and (3) where the court convened a special proceeding and found use or threatened use of a firearm. Or Laws 1979, ch 779, 2. The third option, action by the sentencing judge, could only occur if, before sentencing, the judge determined that the "conviction" did not necessarily establish use or threatened use of a firearm. That order of events "conviction" followed by sentencing indicates that the legislature intended the term "conviction" in ORS 161.610 to mean the finding of guilt as to the underlying criminal charge, and not that finding of guilt combined with the attendant criminal sentence. Compare State v. Isbell, 178 Or App 523, 527, 38 P3d 272 (2001) (<HOLDING>), and State v. Allison, 143 Or App 241, 246,
Holding statements: (A) holding that because any precedes the list of items a felon is prohibited from possessing double jeopardy precludes more than one conviction for possession of any of the items listed (B) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (C) holding that the term conviction means a finding of guilt and not a judgment where it refers to an event that precedes sentencing (D) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (E) holding that trial court may arrest judgment on conviction for possession with intent to deliver and enter judgment of guilt on simple possession
[EX A]:
(C)