You are given a paragraph, with numbered sentences, and a question. Write the numbers of the sentences needed to answer the given question. Separate multiple sentence numbers with a comma (", "). E.g. "1, 2" would be the correct response if Sent 1 and Sent 2 are needed to answer the given question (do not include sentences that contain no information that is necessary to answer the question). Sort the sentence numbers in an increasing order (i.e., '1, 2', instead of '2, 1'). Your answer should not contain anything than the sentence numbers separated by a comma (e.g. '1, 2, 3, 4'). The given question requires more than one sentence to answer. So, your answer must contain at least one comma (", ").

[Q]: Paragraph- Sent 1: Bin Ladin reportedly discussed the planes operation with KSM and Atef in a series of meetings in the spring of 1999 at the al Matar complex near Kandahar.
Sent 2: KSM's original concept of using one of the hijacked planes to make a media statement was scrapped, but Bin Ladin considered the basic idea feasible.
Sent 3: Bin Ladin, Atef, and KSM developed an initial list of targets.
Sent 4: These included the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.
Sent 5: According to KSM, Bin Ladin wanted to destroy the White House and the Pentagon, KSM wanted to strike the World Trade Center, and all of them wanted to hit the Capitol.
Sent 6: No one else was involved in the initial selection of targets.
Sent 7: Bin Ladin also soon selected four individuals to serve as suicide operatives: Khalid al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Khallad, and Abu Bara al Yemeni.
Sent 8: During the al Matar meetings, Bin Ladin told KSM that Mihdhar and Hazmi were so eager to participate in an operation against the United States that they had already obtained U.S. visas.
Sent 9: KSM states that they had done so on their own after the suicide of their friend Azzam (Nashiri's cousin) in carrying out the Nairobi bombing.
Sent 10: KSM had not met them.
Sent 11: His only guidance from Bin Ladin was that the two should eventually go to the United States for pilot training.
Sent 12: Hazmi and Mihdhar were Saudi nationals, born in Mecca.
Sent 13: Like the others in this initial group of selectees, they were already experienced mujahideen.
Sent 14: They had traveled together to fight in Bosnia in a group that journeyed to the Balkans in 1995.
Sent 15: By the time Hazmi and Mihdhar were assigned to the planes operation in early 1999, they had visited Afghanistan on several occasions.
Sent 16: Khallad was another veteran mujahid, like much of his family.
Sent 17: His father had been expelled from Yemen because of his extremist views.
Sent 18: Khallad had grown up in Saudi Arabia, where his father knew Bin Ladin, Abdullah Azzam, and Omar Abdel Rahman (the "Blind Sheikh").
Question: Whose father was expelled from Yemen?.
[A]: 16, 17.

[Q]: Paragraph- Sent 1: After the disruption of the plot in Amman, it had not escaped notice in Washington that Hijazi had lived in California and driven a cab in Boston and that Deek was a naturalized U.S. citizen who, as Berger reminded President Clinton, had been in touch with extremists in the United States as well as abroad.
Sent 2: Before Ressam's arrest, Berger saw no need to raise a public alarm at home- although the FBI put all field offices on alert.
Sent 3: Now, following Ressam's arrest, the FBI asked for an unprecedented number of special wiretaps.
Sent 4: Both Berger andTenet told us that their impression was that more Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretap requests were processed during the millennium alert than ever before.
Sent 5: The next day, writing about Ressam's arrest and links to a cell in Montreal, Berger informed the President that the FBI would advise police in the United States to step up activities but would still try to avoid undue public alarm by stressing that the government had no specific information about planned attacks.
Sent 6: At a December 22 meeting of the Small Group of principals, FBI Director Louis Freeh briefed officials from the NSC staff, CIA, and Justice on wiretaps and investigations inside the United States, including a Brooklyn entity tied to the Ressam arrest, a seemingly unreliable foreign report of possible attacks on seven U.S. cities, two Algerians detained on the Canadian border, and searches in Montreal related to a jihadist cell.
Sent 7: The Justice Department released a statement on the alert the same day.
Sent 8: Clarke's staff warned, "Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks in the US are likely."Sent 9: Clarke asked Berger to try to make sure that the domestic agencies remained alert."Sent 10: Is there a threat to civilian aircraft?"he wrote.
Sent 11: Clarke also asked the principals in late December to discuss a foreign security service report about a Bin Ladin plan to put bombs on transatlantic flights.
Sent 12: The CSG met daily.
Sent 13: Berger said that the principals met constantly.
Sent 14: Later, when asked what made her decide to ask Ressam to step out of his vehicle, Diana Dean, a Customs inspector who referred Ressam to secondary inspection, testified that it was her "training and experience."Sent 15: It appears that the heightened sense of alert at the national level played no role in Ressam's detention.
Sent 16: There was a mounting sense of public alarm.
Sent 17: The earlier Jordanian arrests had been covered in the press, and Ressam's arrest was featured on network evening news broadcasts throughout the Christmas season.
Sent 18: The FBI was more communicative during the millennium crisis than it had ever been.
Question: Following Ressam's arrest, which type of wiretap requests were being requested?.
[A]: 3, 4.

[Q]: Paragraph- Sent 1: While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds.
Sent 2: Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful.
Sent 3: As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists."Sent 4: In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban.
Sent 5: In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation.
Sent 6: Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy.
Sent 7: He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Ladin.
Sent 8: They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan."Sent 9: President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India.
Sent 10: The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan.
Sent 11: The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life.
Sent 12: Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit.
Sent 13: But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia.
Sent 14: His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969.
Sent 15: At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Ladin.
Sent 16: President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Ladin."Sent 17: I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Ladin and deal with another issue or two."Sent 18: The U.S. effort continued.
Question: On what subject did the State Department disagree with the Secret Service and the CIA?.
[A]:
10, 11.