TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: quantity function as elements by increasing the maximum penalty a defendant may receive, are they elements of an aggravated offense or are they sentencing factors with heightened due process requirements? See id. at 573, 575 (Hug, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority's apparent conclusion that the penalty provisions of 841(b) are not elements of the offense). The district court correctly interpreted Buckland as holding that drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense, but rather are material facts that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Buckland opinion emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not whether a penalty provision is an element, but rather whether it exposes the defendant to a longer sentence than woul (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so (B) holding jury is entitled to accept the states version of the facts and reject appellants version or reject any of the witnesses testimony (C) holding that biased on buckland we must reject valensias contention that the sentencing provisions of 841 create separate crimes (D) holding that under the crimes code conspiracy and the completed substantive offense are separate crimes (E) holding the crimes merge where the jury was not asked to determine whether two assaults occurredeventhough the evidence may have been sufficient to support separate crimes

SOLUTION: recognizing that sentencing judges have the discretion to reject any sentencing guideline but no judge is required to do so

PROBLEM: While Zadvydas does not explicitly mention bond, the opinion does cite to a regulation 8 C.F.R. 241.5 (promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to his power under 8 U.S.C. 1103) which does allow the conditioning of release upon the posting of bond. See 8 C.F.R. 241.5(b) ("An officer authorized to issue an order of supervision may require the posting of a bond in an amount determined by the officer to be sufficient to ensure compliance with the conditions of the order, including surrender for removal."). Given this language in Zadvydas, we hold that conditioning a post-removal-order immigrant's release upon the posting of a bond is permissible. The one circuit court to have considered this question reached the same conclusion. Doan v. INS, 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). C. A post-removal-order bond must be
Holding statements: (A) holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute (B) holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed (C) holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond (D) holding that a bond is well within the kinds of conditions contemplated by the supreme court in zadvydas and noting that although the statute authorizing terms of supervision 8 usc 1231a3 and 6 does not expressly authorize a bond it does not exclude such a condition (E) recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest

SOLUTION: holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute

PROBLEM: constitutional responsibility for their actions." S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544, 107 S.Ct. 2971, 97 L.Ed.2d 427 (1987). Any increase or decrease in taxing or spending necessarily affects private behavior. To hold that such an effect necessarily creates a "close nexus" would be to hold that nearly any action in an industry that receives government funding constitutes state action, in contravention of Supreme Court authority. As the Court stated in Blum, "[m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the state responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1005, 102 S.Ct. 2777; see also S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 546, 107 S.Ct. 2971 (<HOLDING>). That is precisely what happened here:
Holding statements: (A) holding that establishing the existence of an understanding among private parties and state actors for 1983 conspiracy purposes is really nothing more than another way to show state action by alleging a private partys connection to a state actor (B) holding that foster parents are not state actors (C) holding that a private actors conduct was not state action just because the government failed to supervise that partys conduct (D) holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability (E) holding that massachusetts statute did not create a sufficiently close nexus between private hospital and the state to warrant labeling private actors state actors

SOLUTION:
holding that establishing the existence of an understanding among private parties and state actors for 1983 conspiracy purposes is really nothing more than another way to show state action by alleging a private partys connection to a state actor