In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: The State, by contrast, argues that because the court's summary denial of Pinholster's claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court's denial of Pinholster's petition for writ of habeas corpus "on the substantive ground that it is without merit," Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that "the California Supreme Court's denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims" (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: adopted by this court. Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 926 (9th Cir.2003). On this record, the district court did not err when it determined that Roberts had not offered evidence that the monitor was defective. Roberts presented only circumstantial evidence that the monitor was defective. Nevada courts have never directly held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove a defect, yet some Nevada cases have relied on circumstantial evidence to establish the existence of a defect. See Van Duzer v. Shoshone Coca Cola Bottling Co., 103 Nev. 383, 741 P.2d 811, 812-14 (1987) (finding that a bottle was unreasonably dangerous and defective based on supermarket customer's testimony); Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 100 Nev. 443, 686 P.2d 925, 928 (1984) (<HOLDING>). In this case, even if circumstantial evidence
Holding statements: (A) holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for district court to allow a mechanical engineer to give expert testimony about a machine with which the engineer had no design experience (B) holding that drivers and witnesses testimony about car steering malfunction could be proof of defect without establishing the mechanical cause of the malfunction (C) holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial (D) holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony (E) holding that a cause of action does not arise in negligence when a product malfunctions or is defective and the malfunction or defect results in damage only to the product itself and produces only economic loss
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: its inability to agree, the law must afford defendant the benefit of the final non-unanimous verdict that might have been returned absent the coercion. Having erroneously been deprived of a substantial opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment rather than death, the defendant may not be subject to another capital sentencing proceeding. We recognize that any reversible error in a capital case may be said in some sense to have deprived a defendant of the opportunity to receive a jury verdict resulting in imprisonment, and that nevertheless the usual and proper remedy for such errors is reversal of the death sentence and a retrial of the sentencing proceeding in which the defendant may again face the death penalty. See State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 67 (<HOLDING>). But a Czachor error is critically different
Holding statements: (A) holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants (B) holding that leaning towards the death penalty is not the same as an automatic vote for the death penalty (C) holding that defendant may be subject to death penalty on resentencing (D) holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at resentencing even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error (E) holding that resentencing is required
[EX A]:
(C)