In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

the entirety ... to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety ... is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law." 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(3)(B). a. Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law for Entirety Property Exemption To determine whether the Condominium is exempt from process, the court will look to the law of the situs of the real property. In this case that is Florida. "Under Florida law, entireties property is exempt from process to satisfy debts owed to individual creditors of either spouse. Entireties property is not exempt from process to satisfy the joint debts of both spouses." See In re Monzon, 214 B.R. 38, 40-41 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1997) (citing Neu v. Andrews, 528 So.2d 1278, 1279 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) and Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843, 846 (1936) (<HOLDING>)). "Courts have generally recognized that
Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that an increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the efforts of one or both spouses during marriage is marital property (C) holding that a judgment debt against both spouses can be satisfied by selling the entireties property (D) holding that the irs may reach half of a nonliable spouses sole management community property to satisfy a liable spouses tax debt (E) holding that where one spouses arson destroyed the house which both spouses owned as tenants by the entireties the innocent spouse was entitled to recover under their fire insurance policy for her share of the loss
holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122
Holding statements: (A) holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed (B) holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice (C) recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds (D) holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review (E) holding that overlapping petitions do not affect tolling during the time petitioner is seeking one full round of review
holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed

Again, the trial judge's findings were supported by competent evidence and worked no injury to Needleman. Whistler Sportswear, supra. Needleman urges that the court erred in awarding damages in an assumpsit action in excess of the plaintiffs prayer for relief. In support of this proposition, Needleman cites House of Pasta v. Mayo, 303 Pa.Super. 298, 449 A.2d 697 (1982). Needleman's rebanee on House of Pasta is misplaced. House of Pasta discusses the trial judge's discretion to mold a jury verdict to conform to the jury's intent. In the present case, Needle-man was put on notice that the claim could exceed the stated amount by Bernhardt's prayer for "whatever other relief this court deems just and proper." See, e.g., Donlin v. J.J. Newberry Co., 319 Pa.Super. 310, 466 A.2d 174 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Needleman's argument on this
Holding statements: (A) holding that a request for injunctive relief was merely incidental to a prayer for damages where it was designed to facilitate and ensure the satisfaction of any monetary relief the court might award (B) holding prayer for general relief does not support award of attorneys fees (C) holding that loss of earnings was sufficiently encompassed by general prayer for relief (D) holding that in determining capacity in which defendant was sued it is appropriate to consider course of proceedings and allegations in complaint including caption section identifying parties claim for relief and prayer for relief (E) holding prayer for general relief does not support award of commonlaw prejudgment interest as element of damages
holding that a request for injunctive relief was merely incidental to a prayer for damages where it was designed to facilitate and ensure the satisfaction of any monetary relief the court might award