In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

allege no physical harm resulting from Wells Fargo's voluntary undertaking of services. See Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex.2000) ("One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 323 (1965))) (emphasis added); see also Vodicka v. Lahr, No. 03-10-00126-CV, 2012 WL 2075713, at *6 (Tex.Ct.App. Jun. 6, 2012) (<HOLDING>). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for negligent undertaking because that tort requires proof of physical harm resulting from failure to exercise reasonable care in rendering services to another and plaintiffs had alleged only economic harm (B) holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself (C) holding that plaintiffs who alleged a subjective chill of their first amendment rights failed to establish specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an actionable tort
holding that economic loss rule precluded the plaintiffs tort claims because they only alleged injuries to the subject of the contract itself

by [the motorist]." Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that "it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow." 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas's argument, this court observed that "procedural due process requires that a person have an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas
Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action
holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

418.301(11). Unlike a'claim for benefits or medical services, however, the Act fails to specify a remedy for retaliation or even a means to enforce the right to be protected from retaliation. Cf. id. 418.1065 (specifying prohibition against retaliation for filing a claim under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act and also providing a detailed administrative scheme for remedying retaliation claims). But employees who suffer retaliation for exercising their rights under the workmen's compensation statute are not without a remedy. The Michigan courts have recognized a common law exception to Michigan's employment at will doctrine for discharges that violate public policy. See Suchodolski v. Mich. Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>) (citing Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App.
Holding statements: (A) holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law (B) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law (C) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge (D) recognizing cause of action for wrongful discharge (E) holding that an atwill employee may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the reason for a discharge was the employees exercise of a right conferred by a wellestablished legislative enactment
holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law