In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: a favorable decision, by which we mean that the "prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too speculative." In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys' fees is an "egregious and illegal use of tax dollars." NMCGA's Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to
Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim
[EX A]: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties

[EX Q]: in the record of any possible medical treatment that Monroe County or the individual defendants could have provided to save the life of the Decedent. Phillips argues in her brief that it is not necessary for her to prove chemotherapy would have saved the Decedent's life. First, she refers to the fright and anxiety both she and the Decedent suffered because of the delay in chemotherapy. In this regard, Phillips confuses the causation issue. In a survival action, damages for the Decedent's physical suffering and mental anxiety as a result of the alleged deprivation of medical care would have been appropriate. In a wrongful death context, however, no damages are available until the plaintiff has cleared the causation hurdle. See Wilks v. Am. Tobacco Co., 680 So.2d 839, 842 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). Second, Phillips suggests that she need only
Holding statements: (A) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (B) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (C) holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother (D) holding that a failure to include a beneficiary in a wrongful death action is a defect because the wrongful death act restricts plaintiffs to a single action (E) holding that mississippis wrongful death statute creates an independent cause of action
[EX A]: recognizing cause of action for wrongful death

[EX Q]: with the same deficiency the court should strike his pleading or, depending on the circumstances, dismiss his case and consider the imposition of monetary sanctions."). We are not, however, convinced that the instant case was one with respect to which a dismissal with prejudice was appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover, a complaint so long as it is minimally sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the claims against him will not fail for mere surplusage. See United States ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir.2003) ("Surplusage can and should be ignored. Instead of insisting that the parties perfect their pleadings, a judge should bypass the dross and get on with the case."); Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). We have recognized that "[pleading facts not
Holding statements: (A) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony (B) holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion (C) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (D) holding that it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a complaint merely because of the presence of superfluous matter (E) holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny funds
[EX A]:
holding it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony