TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. As a matter of first consideration, any court has the duty to determine, sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Welch v. McDougal, 876 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). As material to this question, section 65.023(b) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code requires that an application for an injunction to stay proceedings in a suit or execution on a judgment must be tried in the court in which the suit is pending or the judgment was rendered. This requirement is jurisdictional and does not relate merely to venue. See Butron v. Cantu, 960 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Home Sav. Ass'n v. Ramirez, 600 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (<HOLDING>). Because the Gard-ners seek to challenge
Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court (B) holding that a judgment is subject to collateral attack where the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree as where the court exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions (C) holding that a dis trict court has no authority to issue injunction restraining enforcement of judgment of the county court where as here the judgment solely resolves who is entitled to immediate possession (D) holding that motion to dismiss should not be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve and that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law (E) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state

SOLUTION: holding that the denial of a postjudgment motion without a hearing thereon is harmless error where 1 there is no probable merit in the grounds asserted in the motion or 2 the appellate court resolves the issues presented therein as a matter of law adversely to the movant by application of the same objective standard of review as that applied in the trial court

PROBLEM: century context. We hold, therefore, that a plaintiff may not recover for mental anguish for a potential injury to her unborn child that is wholly unsupported by any physical suffering during and after the incident in question and that explicitly has been ruled out by routine medical diagnostics. We are mindful of the fact, however, that pregnancy and childbirth continue to pose great mysteries that escape complete comprehension and control, and that carry risks with them, which, despite the latest advancements in medical research and technology, cannot be fully assessed. This has led some of our sister states to sustain their holdings in cases involving mental anguish suffered by pregnant women in recent decisions. See, e.g., Simons v. Beard, 188 Or.App. 370, 72 P.3d 96 (2003) (<HOLDING>). We emphasize that in an appropriate case this
Holding statements: (A) holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident (B) holding that a pregnant woman whose baby died just before being born as a direct result of defendantdoctors negligence was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension about the childs wellbeing before death after she learned that the baby was in a transverse position across the upper part of the birth canal and defendant did not undertake any steps to correct the position until after the baby had died (C) holding female supervisors alleged comments that she did not want to add stress to the baby were sufficient direct evidence in a pregnancy discrimination mixed motives case (D) holding woman who claimed she was terminated after giving birth because she became pregnant was part of the protected class (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the victim suffered before she died based on numerous bruises on her forearms that appeared to be defensive wounds and the large amount of blood found at the scene of the crime indicating that many of the wounds were inflicted before the victim died

SOLUTION: holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident

PROBLEM: It is not the Court's function to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial; instead, the Court must merely determine whether the complaint is legally sufficient. Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.1985). Thus, the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true, and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Koppel v. 4987 Corp., 167 F.3d 125, 127 (2d Cir.1999); Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.1998); LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991). 2. Rule 9(b) Rule 9(b) provides that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b). See also Plount v. American Home Assurance Co., Inc., 668 F.Supp. 204, 206 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has held that allegations
Holding statements: (A) holding that the rico bar applies even where the plaintiff does not have standing to bring a securities fraud action (B) holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over rico claims and that plaintiffs federal rico claim was barred by res judicata since he failed to bring his rico claim along with his state fraud claims in prior state court action (C) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (D) holding that plaintiffs must provide more than conclusory allegations to satisfy rule 9bs requirement that circumstances of fraud be pleaded with particularity (E) holding that because civil rico is penal in nature illinois twoyear statute of limitations for actions based on a statutory penalty applies to civil rico claims

SOLUTION:
holding that the rico bar applies even where the plaintiff does not have standing to bring a securities fraud action