In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: other court's construal of the statute. See Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 622-23; J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co. v. Estes, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied); Poole v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., No. 14-99-00740-CV, No, 14-99-01056-CV, 2000 WL 1721150, at *1, 2000 Tex.App. LEXIS 6825, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 12, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); Vondergoltz, 14 S.W.3d at 331. Finally, this argument is contrary to the prevailing view among state courts outside of Texas as well, which have held that an order vacating an award and directing a rehearing (without denying confirmation) is not final and appealable. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 31, 582 So.2d 162, 162-63 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991) (<HOLDING>); Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70, 71
Holding statements: (A) holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable (B) holding that a rehearing order was not final or appealable (C) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (D) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable

Output: holding that the ordering of a rehearing caused the judgment to not be final and appealable

Input: Consider Input: if a defendant's will has been overborne, we must assess "the conduct of the law enforcement officials in creating pressure and the suspect's capacity to resist that pressure"; "[t]he defendant's personal characteristics as well as his prior experience with the criminal justice system are factors to be considered in determining [the defendant's] susceptibility to police pressures." Jackson, 562 So.2d at 1380-81 (citations omitted). The evidence does not indicate that McLeod was threatened with physical intimidation or psychological pressure. The evidence does not show that the interrogation lasted for an extraordinary length of time or that he was deprived of either food or sleep for an unexplained and prolonged time. See, e.g., Pardue v. State, 695 So.2d 199 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (<HOLDING>). Further, the evidence does not show that
Holding statements: (A) holding that a confession obtained by interrogating the defendant for approximately 78 hours was involuntary (B) holding involuntary a confession obtained by prison psychologist because the defendant reasonably understood that his communications would remain confidential (C) holding that mental coercion led to an involuntary confession (D) holding that under elstad the first question that must be answered when determining whether a subsequent confession is tainted by an earlier confession is whether the initial confession was obtained in violation of the defendants fifth amendment rights ie whether it was involuntary or whether the confession was voluntary but obtained in technical violation of miranda (E) holding that impermissible police procedures rendered confession involuntary

Output: holding involuntary a confession obtained by prison psychologist because the defendant reasonably understood that his communications would remain confidential

Input: Consider Input: money judgment can be satisfied out of any of the defendant's assets." Billman, 915 F.2d at 920 (citing United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 800-03 (7th Cir.1985)). Consequently, after a conviction on a forfeiture count, the district court may order forfeiture of the defendant's substitute assets. The Billman Court then examined the question of whether substitute assets could be restrained pending trial and ruled in the affirmative. 915 F.2d at 920-21. With an eye to the remedial purposes of the forfeiture statute, the court read the provision allowing for a restraining order in connection with the substitute assets provision as calling for the preservation and restraint of substitute assets pending trial. Id. at 921; see also United States v. Skiles, 715 F.Supp. 1567 (N.D.Ga.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Circuit in Billman relied on
Holding statements: (A) holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use (B) holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute (C) holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule (D) holding in the drug trafficking context that the government is allowed to restrain additional assets pretrial to ensure sufficient assets for forfeiture (E) recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking
Output: holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use