In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 386-87 (6th Cir.1992). The district court below also acknowledged this interest as a substantial one. TSSAA's other two justifications, however, are very much in dispute. Brentwood, for example, argues that there is no support in the record for the proposition that student athletes need protection from exploitation. The district court agreed. It concluded that TSSAA offered no proof that exerting undue influence on middle school athletes to recruit them for athletic purposes actually harms those students. Proof of actual harm, however, is not required in order to recognize a state actor's interest in preventing reasonably anticipated harm. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, Ohio, 240 F.3d 553, 565-66 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Finally, TSSAA's newly asserted interest in a
Holding statements: (A) holding that the village could regulate doortodoor solicitation based on a fear of an anticipated harm without proof of actual harm (B) holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer (C) recognizing 1951 includes fear of economic harm (D) holding that because persecution cannot be based on a fear of psychological harm alone petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal based on the psychological harm she would suffer if her us citizen daughter were to undergo fgm (E) holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm
[A]: (A)

[Q]: v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 35 . Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 36 . Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 37 . Kimmelman v. Monison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 38 . Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 39 . The Court notes that the state standard for determining ineffectiveness of counsel applied by the state parallels the federal standard as stated in Strickland. See Baker v. State, 243 Kan. 1, 755 P.2d 493 (1988); Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 694 P.2d 468 (1985). 40 . Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). 41 . Id. at 753, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 42 .Id. at 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308. 43 . Id. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308 ("Legal 2005) (<HOLDING>). 46 . Moreover, the Court finds no error in
Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel was not deficient for failing to make an objection that lacked merit (B) holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel (C) holding counsel deficient because she could have had no reasonable basis for not objecting to certain inadmissible evidence despite no evidence of counsels strategy (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to present a meritless argument (E) holding counsel was not deficient in not objecting to testimony that was permissible within state rules of evidence
[A]: (E)

[Q]: Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). For citizens who are not in the custody of the slate, however, this right does not include the right to state protection from private violence. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). The "state created danger" cases based upon this right to personal security do not recognize a right that is implicated here because they do not involve situations where the risk created is justified by the state's pursuit of a legitimate public interest. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.1989). 26 . Compare Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1834, 134 L.Ed.2d 938 (1996) (<HOLDING>). 27 . While it is clear that deprivation of a
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that warrantless arrests with probable cause do not give rise to 1983 claims (B) holding that state statutes which merely establish procedures and do not mandate any particular substantive result do not give rise to a statecreated liberty interest (C) holding that texas parole statutes do not create a protected liberty interest under an older statutory scheme (D) recognizing that nevada statutes do not confer a legitimate expectation of parole release and therefore do not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process (E) holding that a prison grievance procedure is not a substantive right and does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the procedural protections envisioned by the fourteenth amendment
[A]:
(B)