In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: designs. Moreover, we also note that the similarity of the products need not be identical, as Exmark seems to argue, because the similarity may be defined in terms of the defect and any differences among the products may merely go to the weight of the evidence and not its discoverability or admissibility. See Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1082-88 (5th Cir.1986); see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire, 977 S.W.2d at 341; Davidson Oil Country Supply, Inc. v. Klockner, Inc., 908 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir.1990). We note that many other decisions from courts around the nation reject the notion that discovery in a strict product liability case is uniformly limited to the specific product at issue. See, e.g., In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Brownlow v. General Motors Corp., No.
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs work environment was not affected by comments and conduct of which she was not aware (B) recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available (C) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (D) holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant had exclusive knowledge as the manufacturer did not support claim that defendant was aware of a defect (E) holding that discovery on other tires was not overbroad where plaintiffs alleged that defendant was aware of tread separation problem
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: campus is a limited public forum. Def. Br. 12. The Court agrees with the defendants' assessment. The Court begins by recognizing that "the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public forum." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has noted, "[s]ome portions of a public college's campus may be a public forum." Davis v. Stratton, 360 FedAppx. 182, 184 (2d Cir.2010). Significant to the analysis, however, is that these areas may constitute a designated public forum only to the extent they are "intentionally openfed]" to First Amendment activities. Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir.2004); see also Ochshom, 645 F.3d at 540 (<HOLDING>); Hotel Emps., 311 F.3d at 545 (noting that a
Holding statements: (A) holding that a high school is not a public forum thus precluding free airing of religious views (B) holding that a public high school newspaper was a limited public forum not a traditional or designated public forum because there was no evidence that the school permitted indiscriminate use by the general public quoting hazelwood sch dist v kuhlmeier 484 us 260 267 108 sct 562 98 led2d 592 1988 (C) holding that a public school did not create a public forum by allowing commercial advertising on a baseball field fence (D) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public (E) recognizing that government is not required to retain open nature of designated public forum
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: Mr. Muniz contends that, because Colorado defendants typically assert ineffective assistance claims upon collateral review, a collateral proceeding is effectively the first tier of review and counsel must be provided. Although, as Mr. Muniz notes, Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005), extended the right to counsel to a class of discretionary direct appeals, Halbert did not overrule clearly established Supreme Court precedent that individuals have no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Id. at 2591-92. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) ("[T]here is no right to counsel in state collateral proceedings."); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 13, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557,
Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings (B) holding no right to counsel for capital defendants in state habeas proceedings (C) holding that even capital prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel in habeas cases (D) recognizing the common practice of substituting specialized capital counsel for habeas petitions filed by capital defendants (E) holding that a parents statutory right to counsel in termination proceedings guarantees the right to effective counsel
[EX A]:
(B)