In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: failed to complete the assignment and warranty of title to H & L on the same certificate. See Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-32(a) (Supp. 1988). Winn is still listed on the certificate as the registered owner, and under Georgia law, the certificate is prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on it. Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 40-3-25(c) (1985). Although our reading of the Georgia statutes yields the conclusion that ownership of the Buick did not pass to the dealership or to H & L since the certificate of title was not properly assigned, it appears that Georgia courts interpreting the same statutes would reach a different conclusion. See, e.g., American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 149 Ga. App. 280, 253 S.E.2d 825 (1979); Mote v. Mote, 134 Ga. App. 668, 215 S.E.2d 487 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Winn's evidence regarding the sale of
Holding statements: (A) holding that a seller could enforce an arbitration provision against a buyer even though only the buyer had signed the provision (B) holding that ownership of vehicle later involved in accident passed to buyer even though assignment of title not completed (C) holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes (D) holding that a purchaser of a vehicle was a buyer in the ordinary course of business even though the car dealer did not provide the certificate of title at the time of the sale (E) holding that delivery of possession of vehicle without delivery of certificate of title did not transfer ownership even though full payment had been received

A: (B)
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Q: carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the 924(c) offense. Thus, because 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant's offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of 924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for 924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a 924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a 924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by 924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting when it applied an increase under 2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating 924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants 924c conviction

A: (D)
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Q: to an in-state transaction, even if the claim did not "arise from" that transaction. See e.g., George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 363 N.E.2d 551, 554 (N.Y. 1977) (concluding there was jurisdiction over a Massachusetts resident for breach of an employment contract entered into in New York); Singer v. Walker, 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965) (sustaining jurisdiction because plaintiffs personal injury claim resulting from the use of a defective hammer arose from "the purposeful activities engaged in by [defendant]" in New York "in connection with the sale of its products in the New York market"). On the other hand, New York courts have also held that jurisdiction is not justified where the relationship between the claim and the transaction is too attenuated. See e.g., Talbot, 522 N.E.2d at 1027 (<HOLDING>); Ward, 829 N.E.2d at 1203 (concluding that
Holding statements: (A) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (B) holding that the nexus between a coachs defamation action and a former students pursuit of a college degree in new york was insufficient to support jurisdiction (C) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action (D) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (E) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york

A:
(B)
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