instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
is limited in applicability to only cases, like this one, in which the total noneconomic damages awarded by the jury were in excess of both of the $250,000 caps and in excess of the $500,000 combined total of both applicable caps; the jury here awarded $1,725,000 in noneconomic damages. 29 . Chesser argues that because a jointly and severally liable defendant possesses a right of contribution, the statutory provisions at issue do not conflict. A right of contribution, however, presupposes that the defendant has actually paid the damages that is, has already been civilly liable for noneconomic damages in excess of the $250,000 cap applicable to that defendant, in violation of the express language of section 74.301(b). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. 33.015(a), (b) (West 2008) (<HOLDING>). 30 . Appellees concede that Hospital remains
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a right to contribution (B) recognizing that prior to 1949 when the statute permitting contribution among joint tortfeasors was enacted no right of contribution existed between jointtortfeasors in delaware (C) recognizing contribution in the appropriate case (D) recognizing in both subsections a right of contribution when a defendant has paid a percentage of damages greater than his percentage of responsibility (E) recognizing right of contribution against joint tortfeasor where release is obtained on his behalf
answer:
(D)

question:
the Title VII limitations period is an affirmative defense; rather, it referred to the filing period as something "like a statute of limitations" which "generally create affirmative defenses." See Gordon, 675 F.2d at 360. Furthermore, Gordon's discussion came in response to the defendant's (rejected) claim that the filing period was jurisdictional and did not purport to address, let alone decide, whether compliance with the filing deadline was condition precedent or an affirmative defense. 13 . Plaintiffs have not argued waiver, estoppel, or that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply to cure their tardy filings, and based on the facts before us, we see nothing demanding their application. See, e.g., Biester v. Midwest Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 14 . Rather, each housekeeper who was told to
Holding statements: (A) holding that equitable tolling of a statute of limitations may be triggered 1 where a plaintiff has actively pursued his judicial remedies by a filing a defective pleading during the statutory period or 2 where a plaintiff was induced or tricked by his adversarys misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass (B) holding that equitable tolling applied where insurance company statements and conduct lulled plaintiff and his attorney into believing that plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim was properly filed (C) recognizing equitable tolling in the title vii context where the plaintiff has been deceived lulled into inaction actively misled or has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights quotations and citations omitted (D) holding equitable tolling appropriate where a party is prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights (E) holding title vii subject to equitable tolling
answer:
(C)

question:
(2012) (punctuation omitted); accord Custer, 293 Ga. App. at 319 (2). 8 Stennette v. Miller, 316 Ga. App. 425, 428 (1) (b) (729 SE2d 559) (2012) (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Kringle v. Elliott, 301 Ga. App. 1, 2 (686 SE2d 665) (2009); Durham v. Mooney, 234 Ga. App. 772, 773 (1) (507 SE2d 877) (1998). 9 Durham, 234 Ga. App. at 773 (1); accord Torrance v. Brennan, 209 Ga. App. 65, 67 (2) (432 SE2d 658) (1993). 10 See Kringle, 301 Ga. App. at 2 ("[I]n order to infer the requisite knowledge!,] there must be at least one incident that would cause a prudent person to anticipate the actual incident that caused the injury." (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied)); Durham, 234 Ga. App. at 773 (1) ( ng that there was a jury question regarding whether the dog owne 96 (1) (<HOLDING>); Huff v. Dyer, 297 Ga. App. 761, 763 (1) (678
Holding statements: (A) holding that an animal clinic was entitled to summary judgment in a personalinjury action in which the plaintiff was bitten by one of its dogs when it was undisputed that the dog had never bitten or harmed anyone before the relevant incident (B) holding that a county was entitled to summary judgment where the claims against the individual defendants had failed (C) holding that dog owners were entitled to summary judgment either under the premisesliability or dangerousanimalliability theories when the dog that bit the plaintiff had never previously attacked or bitten a human and the owners had no superior knowledge of the dogs propensity to bite (D) holding that the owner of a dog who bit the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment when although the dog had previously jumped on the plaintiff in an aggressive manner the dog did not attempt to bite or scratch and the plaintiff conceded that she was unaware of any prior instance when the dog had bitten a person (E) holding that when there was no surprise and no prejudice defendant was entitled to rely on defense of accord and satisfaction in its summary judgment motion even though it was not included in the pleadings
answer:
(A)