In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1980). We are faced with precisely such circumstances here. In their July 30 telephone conversation, Garcia negotiated with Papo for the purchase of heroin. He also instructed Papo to deliver the heroin to DeJe-sus, a direction that Papo clearly intended to carry out. Garcia's instructions to Papo and Papo's evident assent are independently admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 803(3). Under that rule, hearsay statements reflecting a declarant's intentions or future plans are admissible to prove subsequent acts. Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee note. Accordingly, the July 30 Garcia-Papo conversation is admissible to prove that Papo and Garcia intended to carry out a narcotics transaction in which DeJesus would serve as a middleman. See United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d at 104 (<HOLDING>). The July 30 conversation also is arguably
Holding statements: (A) holding coconspirators hearsay statements independently admissible under fedrevid 8033 to show declarants intent to engage in illicit drug transaction (B) holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care (C) holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay (D) holding evidence of prior drug use admissible to show motive and the nature of the defendants relationship with coconspirators (E) holding that evidence of prior drug transactions was admissible under rule 404b to show inter alia intent to enter into the drug conspiracy and knowledge of the conspiracy

Ex Output:
holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care

Ex Input:
of the debtor. This distinction appears immaterial under the language of sec. 409.402(7), Stats. 7 In other contexts, a security interest properly perfected at one time may later become unperfected through creditor inaction. See, e.g. sec. 409.103(l)(d)l, (2)(b), (3)(e), Stats, (four month grace periods preserving perfection in collateral removed from jurisdic tion); sec. 409.403(2) (lapse of financing statements after 5 years unless continued). 8 Interestingly, the Ansley court held that a filing under "the name Ansley Farms instead of the debtor's true name Emory Ansley is seriously misleading, making [the]. . . security interest unperfected.. . ." Id,., 467 F.Supp. at 55. Other cases reaching similar results are In Re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1296 (Bankr.W.D. Mich. 1972) (<HOLDING>); In Re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565 (D.C.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient (B) holding a filing under mccauleys reprographics and mapping insufficient to perfect a security interest in the assets of the debtor corporation (C) holding that the reservation of a claim need not name a defendant but only identify the type of claim the debtor seeks to retain (D) holding a filing under wishart equipment co insufficient to identify the debtor horace wishart (E) holding a filing under john and mayella lintz insufficient to identify the debtor corporation

Ex Output:
holding that the filing of notice without motion is insufficient

Ex Input:
vague standard. See, e.g., id. (describing the "reasonable belief" standard as one that "appears to be roughly comparable to the reasonable 'ar-ticulable suspicion' standard applied by the Supreme Court" in "stop and frisk" cases, and directing that "doubtful cases [should] be resolved in the defendant's favor_") (emphasis added). 12 . See, e.g., Test, supra, 420 U.S. at 30, 95 S.Ct. 749 (recognizing that without discovery, "a party almost invariably would be unable to determine whether he has a potentially meritorious jury challenge."); United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019, 1025 (1st Cir.1996) (''[A] litigant need only allege that he is preparing a motion to challenge the jury selection process."). 13 . See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 824 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (7th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098,
Holding statements: (A) holding district court could not declare jury advisory in action triable of right by a jury and even if no right to jury trial existed in case it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury advisory after both sides rested but before jury was instructed (B) recognizing the right to waive a jury trial (C) holding death qualification of jury prior to guilt phase of bifurcated capital trial did not violate defendants sixth amendment right to impartial jury representative of fair crosssection of the community (D) holding that district court could not decide after jury returned verdict to treat jury verdict as advisory on issue not triable of right by jury but which was tried by consent of parties to nonadvisory jury (E) holding that defendant had unqualified right to the jury list but not the jury qualification questionnaires without some demonstration of necessity

Ex Output:
holding district court could not declare jury advisory in action triable of right by a jury and even if no right to jury trial existed in case it would be abuse of discretion to declare jury advisory after both sides rested but before jury was instructed