In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: for a mitigating role adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.2. Section 3B1.2 "authorizes a four-level reduction in offense level if the defendant is deemed a 'minimal' participant in the criminal activity! ] [and] a two-level reduction if he is deemed a 'minor' participant...." United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 783 (6th Cir. 2012). The difference between "minimal" and "minor" is "not just semantic," United States v. Lopez, 937 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1991), and the standards are not interchangeable. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 cmt. n. 5 (defining a "minor participant" as "a defendant ... who is less culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as minimal") (emphasis added); United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 60 (2d Cir. 1993) (<HOLDING>). Both Griffith and the Government focus their
Holding statements: (A) recognizing this distinction (B) holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements (C) recognizing distinction between two types of waiver (D) holding that the district court improperly used the two different standards under ussg 3b12 interchangeably thus blurring the distinction between section 3b12a and b (E) recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: 2d 266, 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the
Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where it appears that the court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

Output: (E)

Input: Consider Input: the interests of and pursue relief on behalf of an alleged victim in a criminal matter). We also conclude that J.W. fails to show the existence of a reasonable expectation that she will be subject to the same order compelling the gynecological examination again. Jason Wilson entered a guilty plea, and J.W. simply does not articulate why it would ever be necessary for the state court to order her to submit to another examination. Additionally, although J.W. maintains that the issues presented in her lawsuit will recur in West Virginia's criminal justice system and continue to affect other victims of sex crimes, these concerns have no bearing on this case because it was not brought as a class action. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Further, although J.W. makes note of the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory (B) holding that the mere existence of individualized factual questions with respect to the class representatives claim will not bar class certification (C) recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members (D) holding that it is error to certify class when named class representatives are not members of the class they purport to represent (E) holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint
Output: (C)