In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
theory, once the police ... [make] a show of authority designed to produce a stop, the Fourth Amendment is implicated. If, in response to unjustified police actions, the suspect thereafter abandons the property he or she is carrying, then the property abandoned, be it illegal drugs, stolen goods, or other evidence, normally cannot be used against the accused. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What is a "Seizure" of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment? 27 AvlCRIm. L.Rev. 619, 648 (1990). It is undisputed that Johnson denied ownership of the gun when Silvers showed it to him. Tr. at 53, 71. He can thus be fairly said to have exhibited the requisite intent to abandon the gun. See United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Canady, 615 F.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding due process is not violated when failure to receive notice is the result of attorneys decision to abandon law practice (B) holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action (C) holding that a demal of ownership indicates intent to abandon (D) holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made (E) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent

Ex Output:
holding due process is not violated when failure to receive notice is the result of attorneys decision to abandon law practice

Ex Input:
the evidence of rape discussed above in Division 1, we conclude that the evidence at Martin's trial was sufficient to support the statutory aggravating circumstances found as to both murders. See OCGA 17-10-35 (c) (2) (requiring a review of the statutory aggravating circumstances foundby the jury);UAP Rule IV (B) (2) (providing that, in all death penalty cases, this Court will determine whether the verdicts are supported by the evidence). See also Ring, 536 U. S. 584; Jackson, 443 U. S. 307. 20. Considering both the murders for which Martin has been sentenced to death and Martin as a defendant, we find that the death sentences imposed in his case were not disproportionate punishment within the meaning of Georgia law. See OCGA 17-10-35 (c) (3); Gissendaner, 272 Ga. at 716-717 (<HOLDING>). The cases cited in the Appendix support this
Holding statements: (A) holding that this courts statutorily mandated proportionality review concerns whether a particular death sentence is excessive per se or is substantially out of line (B) holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial (C) holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment (D) holding such agreements to be per se illegal (E) holding that denial of access per se is noncompensable

Ex Output:
holding that the failure to hold a faretta hearing is per se reversible error and reversing the defendants conviction vacating his death sentence and remanding for a new trial

Ex Input:
may not use its powers to reward its friends or punish its enemies; thus, where a zoning authority is guilty of misconduct or bad faith in its dealings with the applicant for a use permit in accordance with the then existing zoning regulation or arbitrarily and unreasonably adopts a new regulation in order to frustrate the applicant's plans for development rather than to promote the general welfare, the new regulation may not be applied retroactively. 451 N.W.2d at 706-07. Because there was a genuine issue as to whether Lincoln acted arbitrarily, unreasonably or in bad faith by delaying the application, the court concluded that Lincoln was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 451 N.W.2d at 707. See Marmah, Inc. v. Town of Greenwich, 176 Conn. 116, 405 A.2d 63, 67 (1978) (<HOLDING>); Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 308 Minn. 52,
Holding statements: (A) holding that appellants could have amended as of right after they received the motion to dismiss and prior to the trial courts decision (B) holding that the trial court should conduct a hearing to allow the parties to be heard including the defendant in person and to allow presentation of additional evidence before sentencing (C) holding that the trial court properly struck the amended complaint when the plaintiff offered no reason to refute the trial courts finding that the new allegations in the amended complaint were based on facts the plaintiff had known since the beginning of the action (D) holding that pleadings could not be amended where no evidence offered during trial was outside the issues in the original complaint (E) holding it inequitable to allow amended zoning regulations to act as a bar where the trial court could reasonably conclude that the change was enacted primarily to prevent plaintiff from building the project

Ex Output:
holding that appellants could have amended as of right after they received the motion to dismiss and prior to the trial courts decision