In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney's fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART's unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are "receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another."). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART's claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P'ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for
Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
[A]: holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement

[Q]: County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Ban zure beyond its lawful duration, such theft violates the Fourth Amendment. See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1994). The remaining question is whether Colaprete's Fourth Amendment right against having his property converted following a search was clearly established when the alleged conversion occurred. The Seventh Circuit has held that the existence of this right is "[s]o obvious ... that we do not think the absence of case law can establish a defense of immunity." Id. We respectfully disagree. This court has never applied the Fourth Amendment in this manner, and Supreme Court precedent tilts slightly against the existence of any constitutional right against theft during the course of a search. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533(<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Sixth Circuit has held that the
Holding statements: (A) holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional (B) holding that doctrine does not violate due process (C) holding that theft by prison guards does not violate due process when postdeprivation remedy exists (D) holding that deprivation of property does not violate due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available and explaining that state tort actions are meaningful postdeprivation remedies (E) holding that a prison guards intentional destruction of a prisoners possessions did not give rise to a federal due process claim because state law provided an adequate postdeprivation tort remedy
[A]: holding postdeprivation remedy is adequate even when deprivation was intentional

[Q]: was notified of the first claims by O'Rourke. By that time, four of the underlying suits had been settled and many other suits were filed with the understanding that they would be settled in the near future. However, many of the suits against O'Rourke were not filed until after or shortly before Aetna filed its declaratory judgment action. Aetna cannot be found to have breached its duty to defend those cases in which Aetna sought declaratory judgment in a timely manner. Consequently, we find it necessary to remand to the trial court to determine in which cases Aetna breached its duty to defend. For those cases in which Aetna breached its duty to defend, Aetna . cannot raise defenses to coverage. See Central Mutual Insurance Co. v. Kammerling, 212 Ill. App. 3d 744, 571 N.E.2d 806 (1991) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Aetna is required to indemnify
Holding statements: (A) holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved (B) holding that when the insurer takes the position that the policy does not cover the complaint the insurer must 1 defend the suit under a reservation of rights or 2 seek a declaratory judgment that there is no coverage if the insurer fails to take either of these actions it will be estopped from later raising policy defenses to coverage (C) holding that the insurer was estopped from asserting coverage defenses when it waited to file a declaratory action until 10 months after it had notice of the claim and several months after it had notice of a potential settlement of the underlying litigation (D) holding that insurer that waited five months after being informed of occurrence and two months after being informed of suit against insured to deliver reservation of rights letter waived its noncoverage defense (E) holding that a petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling where he waited six months to file a federal petition after any state misconduct ended
[A]:
holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved