In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

45 U.S.C. 56, and 46 U.S.C. 30106, are essentially identical, stating that the action must be "commenced" or "brought" within the three year period. The Supreme Court in Burnett specifically found that the state court suit had been properly "commenced" although it was filed in an improper venue. 380 U.S. at 426, 85 S.Ct. at 1053. Furthermore, because the principle of uniformity that drove the Burnett decision applies with equal force to a general maritime action, other courts have correctly held that Burnett applies in general maritime cases. See, e.g., Prejean, 721 So.2d at 1276 (citing 1 Martin J. Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries 5:10 (4th ed.1990)); Davis, 659 F.Supp. at 156-157; People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co., 289 F.Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.La.1968) (<HOLDING>). Defendant's second argument for distinction
Holding statements: (A) holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries (B) holding that uniformity is as important in maritime survival actions as it is in maritime wrongful death actions (C) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (D) holding that burnett and its justification of uniformity is equally applicable to admiralty actions (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures
holding that feres doctrine is equally applicable to family member claims derivative of a service members injuries

initially stopping the truck for failing to illuminate the rear license plate in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1706(e). See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) ("An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment ... if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). Wilson also does not dispute that the smell of alcohol on VanHouden together with VanHouden's admission that he had been drinking justified the further detention of the truck and its occupants in order for Deputy Watkins to conduct field sobriety tests on VanHouden. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52
Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding detection of alcohol on a drivers breath during a routine traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion
holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops

was in control of the premises when and where the accident occurred. McCraney v. Gibson, 952 N.E.2d 284, 288 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Yates v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 888 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)), trans. denied. This rule is meant to impose liability upon the party who could have known of any dangers on the land and could have acted to prevent any foreseeable harm. Id. (quoting Beta Steel, 830 N.E.2d at 70). Although duty usually presents a question of law, whether a duty exists in premises liability cases may depend upon resolution of underlying facts by the trier of fact, including questions regarding who controlled the property at the time and place of an accident. Id. (quoting Yates, 888 N.E.2d at 847); see also Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ind.2004) (<HOLDING>). Whether there has been possession and control
Holding statements: (A) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (B) holding that plaintiff failed to show genuine issue of material fact on equitable estoppel claim (C) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (D) holding there was genuine issue of material fact to be decided by jury as to who controlled property at time and place of accident for purposes of premises liability duty (E) holding that unsupported allegations or denials are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment
holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment