Input: With a budget of $329 million, LSC provides civil legal assistance to low-income people in every county in America, Kleiman said. NLAP was created in 1968. A decade later, the agency used a $50,000 LSC grant to buy a building at 438 King St. in Charleston and $33,000 to buy a building at 201 King St. in Georgetown, according to Erlenborn's letter to Kaynard. In 1980, NLAP used $63,000 in LSC funds to buy property at 607 Main St. in Conway, the letter said. On Nov. 14, 2001, NLAP transferred title of the King Street building in Charleston to the Charleston County Bar Association, according to county property records. The local bar paid $5 for the building, which sits between a redeveloped office building and an antique shop. The local bar said it would maintain the building for "legal services to indigent residents of Charleston County and coastal South Carolina," the records said. The King Street building appears to be vacant. Notices at the entrance direct visitors to the equal justice center on West Montague Avenue in North Charleston. E. Douglas Pratt-Thomas, president of the local bar, was not available for comment. Charleston County has not appraised the King Street property because it is tax-exempt. But Randall Goldman, managing partner of Patrick Properties, which owns buildings from 440 to 456 King St., said he estimates 438 King St. would sell for between $700,000 and $900,000. "That building, which was purchased solely with federal legal aid dollars, should be used to provide legal services for poor people in South Carolina," Kleiman said. LSC wants the title to go to the equal justice center in Charleston or "we want 100 percent of the proceeds from the sale of the building to stay in Charleston. We are not contemplating taking that money out of South Carolina," he said. Kleiman said if the neighborhood legal program in Charleston "had honored their obligation, this would not be an issue."
"In what year did NLAP use a $50,000 grant to buy a building in Charleston?" is "2001"?
Output: no
Input: As his car slid downtown on Tuesday morning the mind of Arnold Thorndike was occupied with such details of daily routine as the purchase of a railroad, the Japanese loan, the new wing to his art gallery, and an attack that morning, in his own newspaper, upon his pet trust. But his busy mind was not too occupied to return the salutes of the traffic policemen who cleared the way for him. Or, by some genius of memory, to recall the fact that it was on this morning young Spear was to be sentenced for theft. It was a charming morning. The spring was at full tide, and the air was sweet and clean. Mr. Thorndike considered whimsically that to send a man to jail with the memory of such a morning clinging to him was adding a year to his sentence. He regretted he had not given the probation officer a stronger letter. He remembered the young man now, and favorably. A shy, silent youth, deft in work, and at other times conscious and embarrassed. But that, on the part of a stenographer, in the presence of the Wisest Man in Wall Street, was not unnatural. On occasions, Mr. Thorndike had put even royalty frayed, impecunious royalty, on the lookout for a loanat its ease. The hood of the car was down, and the taste of the air, warmed by the sun, was grateful. It was at this time, a year before, that young Spear picked the spring flowers to take to his mother. A year from now where would young Spear be? It was characteristic of the great man to act quickly, so quickly that his friends declared he was a slave to impulse. It was these same impulses, leading so invariably to success, that made his enemies call him the Wisest Man. He leaned forward and touched the chauffeur's shoulder. "Stop at the Court of General Sessions," he commanded. What he proposed to do would take but a few minutes. A word, a personal word from him to the district attorney, or the judge, would be enough.
"What is the name of the shy, silent stenographer about to be put in jail for theft?" is "Arnold"?
Output: no
Input: As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
"Where did money to fund the 9/11 plotters come from and where didn't it come from?" is "From KSM, Not from Al Queda"?
Output:
no