Input: But I think it is certain that most of the early Christians understood these words of our Lord's ascension and coming again in glory. They believed that He was coming again in a very little while during their own life-time, in a few months or years, to make an end of the world and to judge the quick and the dead. And as they waited for His coming, one generation after another, and yet He did not come, a sadness fell upon them. Christ seemed to have left the world. The little while that He had promised to be away seemed to have become a very long while. Hundreds of years passed, and yet Christ did not come in glory. And, as I said, a sadness fell on all the Church. Surely, they said, this is the time of which Christ said we were to weep and lament till we saw Him again--this is the time of which He said that the bridegroom should be taken from us, and we should fast in those days. And they did fast, and weep, and lament; and their religion became a very sad and melancholy one--most sad in those who were most holy, and loved their Lord best, and longed most for His coming in glory.
"Who waited for hundreds of years for Christ to come in glory?" is "Early hindus"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output: no

Input: The factory is highly automated and designed to shift flexibly to produce many different kinds of chips to suit demand. "The diversity is the big difference with this plant," said Richard Doherty, president of Envisioneering, a research firm. "It gives IBM the capability to make so many different kinds of custom chips, and the world is going to custom chips." The 140,000-square-foot plant is a testament to advanced manufacturing technology. The 300-millimeter silicon wafers -- about the size of a standard pizza -- are shuttled around the facility in enclosed plastic pods, which ride on overhead tracks. They drop down from wires automatically into machines, sheathed in stainless steel and glass, for each stage of processing and fabrication. Throughout the 500 processing steps, which typically last 20 days, the wafers are not touched by human hands. The circuits etched into the chips are less than one thousandth the width of a human hair. Human operators are there to monitor the systems, catch errors and fine-tune the production process for maximum efficiency. Because each of the hundreds of processing machines is self-enclosed, and essentially airtight, the uniforms operators wear are less constricting than in the previous generation of chip plants, which looked like space suits. The operators at the East Fishkill factory wear light nylon uniforms, light blue shoe coverings and translucent hair nets made of paper. They look more like workers in a bakery. Yes, said Richard Brilla, director of the new facility, "but the donuts are a lot more costly here." Each wafer, holding hundreds of chips, is worth $6,000 to $10,000 apiece, depending on what insulation, circuitry and materials are used.

Does the response "300 mm" correctly answer the question "How big are the wafers that are not touched by human hands?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
***
Output: yes

Early in chapter 5 we introduced, along with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, two other men who became operational coordinators for al Qaeda: Khallad and Nashiri. As we explained, both were involved during 1998 and 1999 in preparing to attack a ship off the coast of Yemen with a boatload of explosives. They had originally targeted a commercial vessel, specifically an oil tanker, but Bin Laden urged them to look for a U.S.warship instead. In January 2000, their team had attempted to attack a warship in the port of Aden, but the attempt failed when the suicide boat sank. More than nine months later, on October 12,2000, al Qaeda operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Cole. The blast ripped a hole in the side of the Cole, killing 17 members of the ship's crew and wounding at least 40. The plot, we now know, was a full-fledged al Qaeda operation, supervised directly by Bin Laden. He chose the target and location of the attack, selected the suicide operatives, and provided the money needed to purchase explosives and equipment. Nashiri was the field commander and managed the operation in Yemen. Khallad helped in Yemen until he was arrested in a case of mistaken identity and freed with Bin Laden's help, as we also mentioned earlier. Local al Qaeda coordinators included Jamal al Badawi and Fahd al Quso, who was supposed to film the attack from a nearby apartment. The two suicide operatives chosen were Hassan al Khamri and Ibrahim al Thawar, also known as Nibras. Nibras and Quso delivered money to Khallad in Bangkok during Khallad's January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok. In September 2000, Bin Laden reportedly told Nashiri that he wanted to replace Khamri and Nibras. Nashiri was angry and disagreed, telling others he would go to Afghanistan and explain to Bin Laden that the new operatives were already trained and ready to conduct the attack. Prior to departing, Nashiri gave Nibras and Khamri instructions to execute the attack on the next U.S.warship that entered the port of Aden.

Question: "On October 12, 2000 attacked a US navy destroyer, how many people on the destroyer were injured?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "About 30"

Response: no

Problem: Bin Laden and his aides did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America. The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters. KSM provided his operatives with nearly all the money they needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters' tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time. The origin of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9/11. General Financing As we explained in chapter 2, Bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses in Sudan. Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time. The CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations. For many years, the United States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda's expenses through a vast personal inheritance. Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S. government discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through 1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year-a significant sum, to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad. Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Usama's share of the family company in 1994. The Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale. This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune. Nor were Bin Laden's assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda. When Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses and other assets.

Question: "How much money did al Qaeda use to fund the 9/11 attacks?"

Answer: "300 million"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer:
no