In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because "the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[ ] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc."); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been
Holding statements: (A) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (B) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (C) holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analysts report can be meaningfully crossexamined on the general risk of error in forensic testing (D) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (E) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion

A: (C)
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Q: likely causes of the engine failure are related to components of the oil delivery system, components of the cylinder assembly, cracked crankcase or an oil leak in general, etc." As such, the Court finds that Mr. Klepacki's opinion regarding the more likely causes of engine failure should be excluded. Plaintiffs Expert Donald Sommer Even assuming, without deciding, that Mr. Sommer is qualified to testify as an expert on piloting and accident reconstruction, including engine failure analysis, the Court must still find that the process he used in forming his expert opinion is suffi ciently reliable under Daubert and its progeny. See Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc., 326 F.3d at 1342 (stating that "one may be considered an expert but still offer unreliable testimony"); cf. McCorvey, 298 F.3d at 1257 (<HOLDING>). The Court must also find that the testimony
Holding statements: (A) holding that federal rules of evidence require trial courts to hold hearingsreferred to as daubert hearingsto determine reliability of scientific expert testimony before admission at trial (B) holding that once an expert has passed rule 702s threshold of admissibility lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the experts conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility (C) holding that experts causation opinion based on statements made by plaintiff was not inherently unreliable (D) holding that daubert does not create a new framework for analyzing proffered expert testimony based upon technical or other specialized knowledge (E) holding that rjulings on admissibility under daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered experts methodology

A: (E)
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Q: immunity and sent the plaintiff to pursue her claim in tribal court. See 436 U.S. at 58-59, 98 S.Ct. 1670; see also Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1461 (10th Cir.1989) (noting the Santa Clara Pueblo distinction between a substantive constraint and an abrogation of sovereign immunity). Absent explicit and unequivocal language to the contrary, the imposition of substantive constraints upon a tribe's sovereignty cannot be interpreted as an abrogation of its sovereign immunity. We must determine for ourselves whether anything in the Thirteenth Amendment or the 1866 Treaty worked an abrogation of the Cherokee Nation's sovereign immunity. Again, we will only acknowledge such an abrogation if the text is express and unequivocal. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (<HOLDING>); Fla. Paraplegic, Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe,
Holding statements: (A) holding that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a tribes membership requirements violated icra and noting that a tribes right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community (B) holding the icra not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity because nothing on the face of title i of the icra purports to subject tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts in civil actions for injunctive or declaratory relief (C) holding the copyright act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity where nothing on the statutes face could be so construed (D) holding the americans with disabilities act not to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and declaring congress abrogates tribal immunity only where the definitive language of the statute itself states an intent either to abolish indian tribes common law immunity or to subject tribes to suit under the act (E) holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity

A:
(B)
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