instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
would, in general, slow down the dispute resolution process." Id. at 946, 115 S.Ct. 1920. Moreover, it was rejected as "legally erroneous," for the "basic objective in this area is not to resolve disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties' wishes, but to ensure that commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, are enforced according to their terms and according to the intentions of the parties." Id. at 946, 115 S.Ct. 1920. C. In This Case, The Question Of Arbitrability Is For The Court The second question is whether the power to determine arbitrability resides with the court or the AAA Panel. The answer turns upon what the parties agreed to about that question in the Merger Agreement. First Option 543, 546-547, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, a disagreement about whether an
Holding statements: (A) holding that a court should decide whether an arbitration agreement survived a corporate merger and bound the resulting corporation (B) holding that a court should decide whether the arbitration contract bound parties who did not sign the agreement (C) holding trial court must decide whether to compel arbitration of personal injury claim of party who was not signatory to arbitration agreement (D) holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived (E) holding that a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause raises a question of arbitrability for a court to decide
answer:
(A)

question:
616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a "line of ... cars" for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
answer:
(C)

question:
knowledge of the rule or order, supports our adoption of the majority rule. "[Wjhere the legislature includes particular language in one section of the statute but omits it in another section of the same act, it is presumed that the legislature acted purposefully in including or excluding that particular subject." State v. Hawk, 170 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tenn.2005) (quoting Bryant v. Genco Stamping & Mfg. Co., 33 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tenn.2000)). By stating that the level of punishment for violations of the rules and regulations promulgated under the 1980 Securities Act is subject to a heightened knowledge requirement, the legislature sent a clear signal that such a requirement does not exist for violations of the Act itself. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir.1972) (<HOLDING>). Our adoption of the majority rule is also
Holding statements: (A) holding no violation of the travel act (B) holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law (C) holding that knowledge of the patent is required for willful infringement (D) holding knowledge of the bankruptcy petition and action taken thereafter was sufficient to find a willful violation of the stay (E) holding that the last sentence of 15 usc 78ffa which matches the second independent clause of section 409a of the 1956 uniform securities act makes it clear that the statute contemplates a willful violation by one who has no knowledge of the violated rule or regulation footnote omitted
answer:
(E)