In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: the B-side breakers were cross-phased caused transformer B to fail, and the failure of transformer B necessitated its testing, removal, oil disposal, repair and reinstallation. No additional link in the causal chain was necessary to bring about the injury or damages. The parties can be "conclusively presumed to have foreseen" that Powell's substandard performance would result in the failure of the transformer and that failure of a transformer would require HP to incur costs associated with repairing it. Cf. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816. We are not persuaded otherwise by Powell's argument that direct damages in this case should be limited to the cost of uncrossing the wrongfully crossed cables or the difference between the value of Powell's actual services and the value of t *8-9 (<HOLDING>). Powell asserts that these provisions refer to
Holding statements: (A) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury (B) holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site (C) recognizing the rights of third parties who were not signatories to a construction contract (D) holding that construction safety manuals and codes were properly admitted as objective standards of safe construction (E) holding that whether clause in construction contract providing that no damages would be available for delay was enforceable was a factual question where there was evidence that damages resulted from unreasonable delay beyond the contemplation of the parties

Output: (B)

Input: Consider Input: 339 (2005)). As to appellant's assertion of error by the court in permitting the cautionary instruction to include the additional language, appellant's claim is not cognizable in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. Generally, a petition under Rule 37.1 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised at trial or argued on appeal. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). To fall within the very limited exception to that rule, the ground must be one so basic that it renders the judgment a complete nullity, such as a lack of jurisdiction, a violation of double jeopardy, or the right to a twelve-member jury. Id. at 26-27, 238 S.W.3d at 32. Appellant did not raise an issue in this claim that falls within the exception. See Phavixay v. State, 373 Ark. 168, 282 S.W.3d 795 (2008) (<HOLDING>). In appellant's fifth point on appeal, he
Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation (B) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission that is at issue in the case (C) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper

Output: (C)

Input: Consider Input: are deemed removable because they were convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. See INA 242(a)(2)(C) [8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) ] (precluding jurisdiction where alien is removable pursuant to 237(a)(2)(A)(ii)). In addition, we lack jurisdiction to review purely discretionary decisions, see INA 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) [8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) ], such as the "manner in which the BIA balanced the various positive and negative factors which typically inform the exercise of its discretion under" INA 240A. Cruz-Camey v. Gonzales, 504 F.3d 28, 29 (1st Cir.2007). Despite these jurisdiction-stripping provisions, we may review "constitutional claims and questions of law presented in petitions for review of fin scretion. See Paredes v. Att'y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the
Holding statements: (A) holding that all convictions remain valid for immigration purposes (B) holding that the oneyear statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of petition for certiorari to the united states supreme court seeking review of denial of state postconviction relief (C) holding pendency of postconviction judicial proceedings relevant to immunity determination (D) holding that regulations that permitted an immigration official to reinstate removal orders violated the immigration and nationality act (E) holding that the pendency of postconviction motion does not negate the finality of convictions for immigration removal purposes
Output: (E)