In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.
Example: SECTION 1. LIABILITY OF BUSINESS ENTITIES PROVIDING USE OF FACILITIES
TO NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Business entity.--The term ''business entity'' means a
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint
venture, or other form of enterprise.
(2) Facility.--The term ''facility'' means any real
property, including any building, improvement, or appurtenance.
(3) Gross negligence.--The term ''gross negligence'' means
voluntary and conscious conduct by a person with knowledge (at
the time of the conduct) that the conduct is likely to be
harmful to the health or well-being of another person.
(4) Intentional misconduct.--The term ''intentional
misconduct'' means conduct by a person with knowledge (at the
time of the conduct) that the conduct is harmful to the health
or well-being of another person.
(5) Nonprofit organization.--The term ''nonprofit
organization'' means--
(A) any organization described in section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from
tax under section 501(a) of such Code; or
(B) any not-for-profit organization organized and
conducted for public benefit and operated primarily for
charitable, civic, educational, religious, welfare, or
health purposes.
(6) State.--The term ''State'' means each of the several
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern
Mariana Islands, any other territory or possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision of any such State,
territory, or possession.
(b) Limitation on Liability.--
(1) In general.--Subject to subsection (c), a business
entity shall not be subject to civil liability relating to any
injury or death occurring at a facility of the business entity
in connection with a use of such facility by a nonprofit
organization if--
(A) the use occurs outside of the scope of business
of the business entity;
(B) such injury or death occurs during a period
that such facility is used by the nonprofit
organization; and
(C) the business entity authorized the use of such
facility by the nonprofit organization.
(2) Application.--This subsection shall apply--
(A) with respect to civil liability under Federal
and State law; and
(B) regardless of whether a nonprofit organization
pays for the use of a facility.
(c) Exception for Liability.--Subsection (b) shall not apply to an
injury or death that results from an act or omission of a business
entity that constitutes gross negligence or intentional misconduct,
including any misconduct that--
(1) constitutes a crime of violence (as that term is
defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code) or act
of international terrorism (as that term is defined in section
2331 of title 18) for which the defendant has been convicted in
any court;
(2) constitutes a hate crime (as that term is used in the
Hate Crime Statistics Act (28 U.S.C. 534 note));
(3) involves a sexual offense, as defined by applicable
State law, for which the defendant has been convicted in any
court; or
(4) involves misconduct for which the defendant has been
found to have violated a Federal or State civil rights law.
(d) Superseding Provision.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2) and subsection
(e), this Act preempts the laws of any State to the extent that
such laws are inconsistent with this Act, except that this Act
shall not preempt any State law that provides additional
protection from liability for a business entity for an injury
or death with respect to which conditions under subparagraphs
(A) through (C) of subsection (b)(1) apply.
(2) Limitation.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
supersede any Federal or State health or safety law.
(e) Election of State Regarding Nonapplicability.--This Act shall
not apply to any civil action in a State court against a business
entity in which all parties are citizens of the State if such State
enacts a statute--
(1) citing the authority of this subsection;
(2) declaring the election of such State that this Act
shall not apply to such civil action in the State; and
(3) containing no other provision.
Example solution: Shields a business entity from civil liability relating to any injury or death occurring at a facility of that entity in connection with a use of such facility by a nonprofit organization if: (1) the use occurs outside the scope of business of the business entity; (2) such injury or death occurs during a period that such facility is used by such organization; and (3) the business entity authorized the use of such facility by the organization.
Makes this Act inapplicable to an injury or death that results from an act or omission of a business entity that constitutes gross negligence or intentional misconduct, including misconduct that: (1) constitutes a hate crime or a crime of violence or act of international terrorism for which the defendant has been convicted in any court; or (2) involves a sexual offense for which the defendant has been convicted in any court or misconduct for which the defendant has been found to have violated a Federal or State civil rights law.
Preempts State laws to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this Act, except State law that provides additional protection from liability. Specifies that this Act shall not be construed to supersede any Federal or State health or safety law.
Makes this Act inapplicable to any civil action in a State court against a business entity in which all parties are citizens of the State if such State, citing this Act's authority and containing no other provision, enacts a statute declaring the State's election that this Act shall not apply to such action in the State.
Example explanation: This Bill focuses on shielding business entities from civil liability relating to an injury or death depending on the conditions of injury, hence the generated summary is correct.

Problem: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''Taiwan Security Enhancement Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United
States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both
societies.
(2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a major political
transformation, and Taiwan is today a true multiparty democracy
with a political system separate from and totally unlike that
of the People's Republic of China.
(3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free market
principles and is separate and distinct from the People's
Republic of China.
(4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United States
Government withdrew diplomatic recognition of the government on
Taiwan as the legitimate government of China, neither at that
time nor since has the United States Government adopted a
formal position as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than
to state that status must be decided by peaceful means. Any
determination of the ultimate status of Taiwan must have the
express consent of the people on Taiwan.
(5) The government on Taiwan no longer claims to be the
sole legitimate government of all of China.
(6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) states
that--
(A) peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area
are in the political, security, and economic interests
of the United States and are of international concern;
(B) the decision of the United States to establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China rests upon the expectation that the future of
Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
(C) the United States would consider any effort to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful
means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the
peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of
grave concern to the United States;
(D) the United States will maintain the capacity to
resist any form of coercion that jeopardizes the
security, or the social or the economic system, of the
people on Taiwan; and
(E) the preservation and enhancement of the human
rights of all the people on Taiwan are objectives of
the United States.
(7) On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan Relations
Act establishes on the part of the United States a continuing
connection with and concern for Taiwan, its people, and their
ability to maintain themselves free of coercion and free of the
use of force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of forces
adequate for defense and deterrence is in the interest of the
United States in that it helps to maintain peace in the Taiwan
Strait area.
(8) Since 1954, when the United States and Taiwan signed
the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States and Taiwan have
maintained a defense and security relationship that has
contributed greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan
and the East Asia and Pacific regions.
(9) The United States and Taiwan no longer conduct joint
training missions, have no direct military lines of
communication, and have only limited military-to-military
contacts. This lack of communication and interoperation between
the United States and Taiwan hinders planning for the defense
of Taiwan and could prove detrimental in the event of future
aggression against Taiwan.
(10) Since 1979, the United States has continued to sell
defensive weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan
Relations Act, and such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its
autonomy and freedom in the face of persistent hostility from
the People's Republic of China. However, pressures to delay,
deny, and reduce arms sales to Taiwan have been prevalent
since the signing of the August 17, 1982, communique with the People's
Republic of China. Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions
could prevent Taiwan from maintaining a sufficient capability for self-
defense.
(11) As has been affirmed on several occasions by the
executive branch of Government, the provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act take legal precedence over any communique with
the People's Republic of China.
(12) The People's Republic of China has consistently
refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and has
repeatedly threatened force against Taiwan, including implied
threats by unnamed People's Republic of China officials on
January 10, 1999, who warned Taiwan not to participate in the
development of theater missile defense capabilities with the
United States.
(13) The missile firings by the People's Republic of China
near Taiwan in August 1995 and March 1996 clearly demonstrate
the willingness of the People's Republic of China to use
forceful tactics to limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.
(14) As most nations in East Asia reduce military spending,
the People's Republic of China continues a major and
comprehensive military buildup.
(15) This military buildup includes the development of
advanced ballistic and cruise missiles that will incorporate
precision guidance capability and the construction of new
imaging, radar, navigation, and electronic intelligence
satellites that will help target and guide ballistic and cruise
missiles. According to the Department of Defense report
entitled ''The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait'',
submitted to Congress in February 1999, the size of the missile
force of the People's Republic of China is expected to grow
substantially and, by 2005, the People's Republic of China will
possess an ''overwhelming advantage'' in offensive missiles
vis-a-vis Taiwan. The Department of Defense has also noted that
the People's Republic of China may already possess the
capability to damage satellite optical sensors with lasers, is
researching advanced anti-satellite lasers that could blind
United States intelligence satellites, and is procuring radio
frequency weapons that disable electronic equipment. These
missile and anti-satellite capabilities pose a grave threat to
Taiwan.
(16) This military buildup also includes the construction
or procurement from abroad of advanced naval systems, including
Russian Kilo submarines that are difficult to detect, Russian
technology to assist the development of new nuclear-powered
attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class destroyers armed
with supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, a new long-
range, all-weather naval attack aircraft called the JH-7, and
new indigenous land-attack cruise missiles that could be
launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack aircraft.
These naval capabilities pose a grave threat of blockade to
Taiwan.
(17) This military buildup also includes the improvement of
air combat capabilities by procuring and co-producing hundreds
of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, seeking to purchase Russian
Su-30 all-weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with
advanced air-to-air missiles such as the Russian R-77 missile
and other precision guided munitions, constructing the
indigenously designed J-10 fighter, and seeking advanced
airborne warning and control systems from abroad. These
capabilities pose a grave airborne threat to Taiwan.
(18) Because of the introduction of advanced submarines
into the Taiwan Strait area by the People's Republic of China
and the increasing capability of the People's Republic of China
to blockade Taiwan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered
submarines in order to maintain a capability to counter a
blockade, to conduct antisubmarine warfare training, and for
other purposes.
(19) Because of the democratic form of government on Taiwan
and the historically nonaggressive foreign policy of Taiwan, it
is highly unlikely that Taiwan would use submarines in an
offensive manner.
(20) The current defense relationship between the United
States and Taiwan is deficient in terms of its capacity over
the long term to counter and deter potential aggression against
Taiwan by the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the
military departments should make every effort to reserve
additional positions for Taiwan officers at the National
Defense University, the senior war colleges, and the military
academies; and
(2) the Secretary of State should, when considering foreign
military sales to Taiwan--
(A) take into account the special status of Taiwan;
and
(B) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan has
full and timely access to price and availability data
for defense articles and defense services.

SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.

(a) Increase in Technical Staff of the American Institute in
Taiwan.--Upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
the President shall use funds available to the Department of Defense
under the Arms Export Control Act for the assignment or detail of
additional technical staff to the American Institute in Taiwan.
(b) Annual Reports.--Beginning 60 days after the next round of arms
talks between the United States and Taiwan, and annually thereafter,
the President shall submit a report to Congress--
(1) detailing each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of
defense articles and defense services during the one-year
period ending on the date of the report;
(2) describing the defense needs asserted by Taiwan as
justification for those requests; and
(3) describing any decision to reject, postpone, or modify
any such request that was made during the one-year period
ending on the date of the report, the level at which the final
decision was made, and a justification for the decision.

SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.

(a) Maintenance of Sufficient Self-Defense Capabilities of
Taiwan.--Congress finds that any determination of the nature or
quantity of defense articles or defense services to be made available
to Taiwan that is made on any basis other than the defense needs of
Taiwan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982, Communique signed with
the People's Republic of China, or any similar executive agreement,
order, or policy would violate the intent of Congress in the enactment
of section 3(b) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).
(b) Plan.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall develop a plan for the
enhancement of programs and arrangements for operational
training and exchanges of personnel between the armed forces of
the United States and Taiwan for work in threat analysis,
doctrine, force planning, operational methods, and other areas.
The plan shall provide for exchanges of officers up to and
including general and flag officers in the grade of O-10.
(2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a
report to Congress, in classified or unclassified form,
containing the plan required under paragraph (1).
(3) Implementation.--Not later than 30 days after the date
on which the report described in paragraph (2) is submitted or
required to be submitted, the Secretary of Defense shall
implement the plan contained in the report.
(c) Communications Between United States and Taiwan Military
Commands.--Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall establish secure direct
communications between the United States Pacific military command and
the Taiwan military command.
(d) Missile Defense Equipment.--Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at
reasonable cost, theater missile defense equipment and related items,
including--
(1) ground-based and naval-based missile defense systems;
and
(2) reconnaissance and communications systems, as may be
necessary to target and cue missile defense systems sold to
Taiwan.
(e) Satellite Early Warning Data.--Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at
reasonable cost, satellite early warning data.
(f) Air Defense Equipment.--Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at
reasonable cost, modern air-defense equipment, including the following:
(1) AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.
(2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne warning and
control systems (AWACS).
(3) Equipment to better defend airfields from air and
missile attack.
(4) Communications infrastructure that enables coordinated
joint-force air defense of Taiwan.
(g) Naval Defense Systems.--Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at
reasonable cost, defensive systems that counter the development by the
People's Republic of China of new naval capabilities, including defense
systems such as--
(1) diesel-powered submarines;
(2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne systems,
capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced Chinese nuclear
submarines;
(3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis destroyers,
capable of defeating Russian supersonic anti-ship missiles; and
(4) communications systems that better enable Taiwan to
conduct joint-force naval defense operations.
(h) Relation to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in this section
supersedes or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms Export
Control Act to the sale of any defense article or defense service under
this section.
Solution: Expresses the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should, when considering foreign military sales to Taiwan, take into account Taiwan's special status and make every effort to ensure it has full and timely access to price and availability data for defense articles and defense services.
Directs the President, upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to use Department of Defense funds for the assignment of additional technical staff to the American Institute in Taiwan.
Directs the President to report annually to Congress with respect to Taiwan's defense needs.
Directs the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan for the enhancement of programs for operational training and exchanges of personnel between U.S. armed forces and Taiwanese armed forces for work in threat analysis, doctrine, force planning, operational methods, and other areas. Directs the Secretary of Defense to establish secure direct communications between the U.S. Pacific military command and the Taiwan military command.
Authorizes the President, subject to the Arms Export Control Act, to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, theater missile defense equipment and related items, satellite early warning data, modern air-defense equipment, and naval defense systems.