In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district "in which [the case] might have been brought," according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should "sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed." PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. "There is no valid reason for reading the words 'where it might have been brought' to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both
Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of 1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business
(C)

as here, where officers were attempting to handcuff an individual who had been resistant. See Rodriguez v. Farrell, 294 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir.2002) (finding no excessive force, and noting that an officer need not credit an arrestee's claims of pain, especially when the arrestee is in the process of being handcuffed); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650-53 (9th Cir.2001) (finding no excessive force where plaintiff suffered a fractured finger after officer pushed plaintiff to the ground for purpose of handcuffing her despite being told of preexisting back and shoulder injuries, and where plaintiff had earlier posed a threat to officers' safety and ability to control a crowd); Huang v. Harris County, No. 00-20806, 2001 WL 822534, at *10 (5th Cir. June 22, 2001) (<HOLDING>); Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285, 1288, 1293
Holding statements: (A) holding that force was reasonable where officer broke resisting arrestees thumb by twisting her wrist in an effort to prevent her from kicking him and place her in handcuffs (B) holding that conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive where the female plaintiffs supervisor frequently tried to get plaintiff to date him using many direct as well as indirect propositions for sex including following her into the restroom repeated attempts to touch her breasts place his hands down her pants and pull off her pants and enlisting the assistance of others to hold her while he attempted to grope her (C) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (D) holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim (E) holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment
(A)

L.Ed.2d 604 (2007). 50 . See In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., 246 F.R.D. 428, 432 (S.D.N.Y.2007). 51 . See DCL 270-281. See also Drenis, 452 F.Supp.2d at 428. 52 . 452 F.Supp.2d at 428 (quoting Shelly v. Doe, 249 A.D.2d 756, 671 N.Y.S.2d 803, 805 (3rd Dep't 1998)). 53 . See Club Protector, Inc. v. Peta, No. 01 Civ. 0337, 2002 WL 1020782, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2002). 54 . See BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 10 Civ. 8630, 2011 WL 3847376, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011). 55 . See Countered. 38 ("Coleman is the inventor and true owner of United States Patent Number D616-635 as well as trademark rights related to the subject matter of the '635 patent"). 56 . See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 8 N.Y.3d 283, 292, 832 N.Y.S.2d 873, 864 N.E.2d 1272 (2007) (<HOLDING>). 57 . In re Chateaugay Corp., 156 B.R. 391,
Holding statements: (A) holding that electronic records may be subject to a claim for conversion (B) holding that plaintiff could state a claim for conversion of confidential information (C) recognizing that refinement of rule governing confidential court records was a necessary step in providing the public electronic access to court records (D) holding that where defendant retained possession of and deprived plaintiff access to business records a claim for conversion was properly stated (E) holding complaint was not based on a conversion claim but was a declaratory judgment action thus not governed by conversion statute of limitations
(A)