In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: in a 3-2 decision does not settle the intent issue, because Honkanen did not consider the difference between intent to injure or inflict pain and intent to correct. Additionally, Honkanen's rationale may be outdated in light of the 2001 amendments to NRS 48.061, which expand the use of bad-act evidence in domestic violence cases, 2001 Nev. Stat., ch. 360, 1, at 169; see NRS 33.018(1)(a) (defining "domestic violence" to include battery on an accused's minor child), and Bigpond, which recognizes that character evidence can be admissible so long as it has a credible, non- propensity purpose, such as explaining the relationship dynamics between a domestic-violence victim and the accused. 128 Nev. at 111, 270 P.3d at 1246; see also Harris v. State, 195 P.3d 161, 182 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (<HOLDING>). Cherry, J., concurring in part and dissenting
Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper (B) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (C) recognizing that the holding in harvey v state 604 p2d 586 590 alaska 1979 a case similar to honkanen had been abrogated by the amendment of alaskas rule 404b to allow admission of prior incidents of domestic violence as an exception to the general rule against admitting such evidence (D) recognizing general rule (E) recognizing this as the general rule

Output: holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper

Input: Consider Input: State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444, 221 A.2d 521 (1966))); Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999). Our construction of N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b) is thus consonant with established principles of statutory construction. | IV. Applying statutes that are identical or very similar to the statute before the Court, courts of other states have reached varying conclusions. Several decisions have construed analogous statutes to describe two offenses, as this Court construes N.J.S.A 39:4-88(b). See People v. Butler, 81 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 146 Cal.Rptr. 856, 857 (Cal.Ct.App.1978) (construing Cal. Veh.Code 21658 to state "two affirmative duties placed upon the operator of a motor vehicle"); People v. Smith, 172 Ill.2d 289, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 215 P.3d 601,
Holding statements: (A) holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders (B) holding that plain language of 625 ill comp stat ann 511709 establishes two separate requirements for lane usage (C) holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning (D) holding that in context of motion for reconsideration or to reopen congress envisioned two separate timely petitions for review of two separate final orders (E) holding that the evidence supported two separate convictions and punishments for two attempted robberies of two different victims who suffered separate and distinct harms

Output: holding that congress envisioned two separate petitions filed to review two separate final orders

Input: Consider Input: employee of Chevron Products Company, not Chevron, and because Kehm provides no reason to ignore the corporate separateness of these two entities, Barnes's acts cannot be attributed to Chevron. See Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir.1980) ("The mere fact that a subsidiary company does business within a state does not confer jurisdiction over its nonresident parent, even if the parent is sole owner of the subsidiary.") (citation omitted). Moreover, the fact that Chevron sent Kehm a cease and desist letter does not rise to the level of purposeful availment for purposes of jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, since the letter expresses the goal not to do business in Pennsylvania. See Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) Accordingly, Kehm has not shown sufficient
Holding statements: (A) holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum (B) holding that the massachusetts longarm statute provides for jurisdiction over a nonresident personal representative when the decedent had sufficient contacts with the forum such that the decedent would have been subject to personal jurisdiction had he lived (C) holding that the effects of a tortious act cannot subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum where no other contacts exist (D) holding that personal jurisdiction is proper if party has sufficient minimum contacts (E) holding that a patentee does not subject itself to personal jurisdiction in a forum solely by informing a party who happens to be located there of suspected infringement as grounding personal jurisdiction on such contacts alone would not comport with principles of fairness
Output: holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum