In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
it was minor and that Zhang only had five years of education. The IJ reasonably found these explanations insufficient. Zhang also testified inconsistently regarding whether he was fired from his job after authorities arrested him in 2010, or simply did not return to work. Zhang argues that this inconsistency was "nonexistent" because there was more than one reason why he did not return to work. Zhang does not explain, however, why he did not state that he was terminated when he was first asked why he did not- return to work. The agency reasonably found that Zhang's failure to mention his termination until prompted by the IJ undermined his credibility, and that his explanation that he "did not listen clearly" was unpersuasive. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Finally, the agency reasonably found that
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court need not accept as true unwarranted factual inferences (B) holding that district court need not accept the governments recommendation of a minor role reduction (C) holding that a plaintiffs complaint need only establish a plausible entitlement to relief (D) holding that a reasonable factfinder would not be compelled to conclude that the petitioner would more likely than not be subjected to torture if removed to china based solely on the fact that she had illegally departed china without more particularized evidence (E) holding that ij need not accept plausible explanation for inconsistency unless reasonable factfinder would be compelled to do so

Ex Output:
holding that the court need not accept as true unwarranted factual inferences

Ex Input:
as Assistant Inspector General for Investigations, Holland had been given the authority to review the allegations against Vickers and make the ultimate decision to keep her or fire her. Without more than what Vickers has offered as evidence, we cannot- see how a reasonable jury might find a retaliatory motive at work in Holland's decision. Vickers' retaliation claim is further undermined by the fact that even though it was Holland who fired her, Bedwell was the focus of her discrimination claims. Vickers failed to put on any evidence to show that Holland's decision was in any way influenced by Bedwell, who had retired before Vickers' refusal to sign the releases in April 2001 that triggered her firing. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Nor can Vickers' Title VII claims draw
Holding statements: (A) holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision (B) holding that the relevant time is the time of the employment decision (C) holding that subordinates bias is only relevant where the ultimate decision maker is not insulated from the subordinates influence (D) holding that it is the conduct required to obtain a conviction rather than the consequences resulting from the crime that is relevant (E) holding that the relevant question is whether the courts decision deprived the petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment

Ex Output:
holding that a common employer and administrator does not necessarily influence the administrators decision

Ex Input:
Communications Co., 971 F.Supp. 302, 305-06 (W.D.Tenn.1997). Plaintiffs rebanee on these cases is misplaced for several reasons. None of these cases analyzed whether a court could ignore a federal consumer-protection regulation simply because a tariff was filed with the FCC. The MCI case dealt with whether federal courts have jurisdiction to hear billing-dispute cases arising out of long-distance contracts where the long-distance provider had filed tariffs with the FCC. The issue was one of jurisdiction and the case did not at all address the applicability of federal regulations. In Wegoland, the issue was whether plaintiffs could attack long-distance rates on the theory that the providers had engaged in fraud. Although the Second Circuit broadly reaffirmed the "filed tariff' doctrine (<HOLDING>), the court did not discuss whether federal
Holding statements: (A) holding that the respondents statelaw claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine (B) holding that under the filed rate doctrine a question regarding reasonable rates should be addressed to the department of insurance and that the rate plaintiff was charged is conclusively presumed reasonable under the filed rate doctrine (C) holding that suits against longdistance companies for unreasonable rates were barred if the defendant had filed a rate tariff with the fcc (D) holding that the filed rate doctrine barred private right of action for consumer fraud (E) holding that filed rate doctrine did not apply because pharmaceutical companies do not file rates with any agency

Ex Output:
holding that the respondents statelaw claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine