In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: reviews de novo the application of the law to those facts." Mungin v. State, 982 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). A. Stipulating to Evidence for the Motion to Suppress Parker's May 7, 1982, Statement In this claim, Parker contends that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the evidence used to decide whether his May 7, 1982, statement was admissible. Parker's May 7 statement was admitted during the resentencing proceeding through the testimony of Detective Powers. Because Parker had invoked his right to counsel prior to making the May 7 statement, the admissibility of that statement under United States Supreme Court precedent turns on whether Parker initiated the May 7 contact with law enforcement. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (<HOLDING>). The stipulated evidence included hearsay
Holding statements: (A) holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (B) holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (C) holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications (D) holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police (E) holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police
Example Output: holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police

Example Input: venue, the propriety of venue is fixed in the county chosen by the plaintiff. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. 15.063 (Vernon 1986); Tex.R.Civ.P. 86-1. If a defendant objects to the plaintiffs venue choice and properly challenges that choice through a motion to transfer venue, the question of proper venue is raised. Tex.R.Civ.P. 86. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. Id. 87-2(a). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the trial court must transfer the lawsuit to another specified county of proper venue. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. 15.063(1) ("The court ... shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if ... the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county...."); Tieuel, 654 S.W.2d at 775 (<HOLDING>). If the plaintiff meets the burden, the trial
Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county (C) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (D) holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed (E) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue
Example Output: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings

Example Input: for the Court), this Court declared, "[b]y this ruling, we wish to make clear that the Court has relaxed the strict pleading requirements of common law." Again, just last year, in State v. Barney, 986 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tenn.1999) (Birch, J., writing for the Court), this Court noted, "[i]n conclusion, we wish to emphasize once again the fact that the Court has moved away from the strict pleading requirements of common law." Relaxation of the strict pleading requirements of the common law is also apparent from recent decisions of this Court holding that an indictment which references the statute defining the offense is sufficient and satisfies the constitutional and statutory requirements of Hill. See State v. Sledge, 15 S.W.3d 93, 94 (Tenn.2000) (Holder, J., writing for the Court) (<HOLDING>); State v. Carter, 988 S.W.2d 145, 148
Holding statements: (A) holding an indictment alleging that the defendant did unlawfully kill the victim during the perpetration of aggravated robbery in violation of tca 3913202 sufficient because it contained a specific reference to the statute which was sufficient to place the accused on notice of the charged offense (B) holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense (C) holding that it is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself (D) holding that an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and within reasonable time limits proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient (E) holding that reference to the appropriate statute was sufficient in felony murder indictments alleging that the defendant did unlawfully kill the victims during the perpetration of aggravated robbery in violation of tca 3913202
Example Output:
holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense