In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: on CRiminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). In 1997, the legislature amended the child pornography statute to eliminate a loophole in the existing statute that impeded prosecution of individuals for possession or promotion of child pornography depicted or distributed by computer. Id.; House Comm, on CRiminal JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). There is nothing in these materials to suggest that the legislature intended to prohibit anything other than pornography depicting actual children. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas child pornography statute prohibits only the possession of visual materials depicting real children. Because the Texas statute only prohibits pornography depicting actual children, the sta App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also contends that the statute is
Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (D) holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute (E) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography

Output: (B)

Input: Consider Input: Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hagemeister v. Vanity Fair Properties, 508 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1973, writ dism'd). Thus, collateral estoppel dictates that venue of any subsequent suit involving the same subject matter and the same parties as the initial suit be governed by the venue determination in the initial suit. See Orozco, 681 S.W.2d at 245-46; Pinney, 558 S.W.2d at 36. First, Miller II involves the same parties as the Windsor suit. Both State & County and Windsor were parties to the Windsor suit. Although Ledbetter and Curtiss were not named in the Windsor suit, as officers of State & County, they were in privity with a party; thus, collateral estoppel would apply to them as well. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos. v. Getty
Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (B) holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (E) holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties

Output: (E)

Input: Consider Input: states to provide worker compensation protection to maritime workers. See, e.g., Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 44 S.Ct. 302, 68 L.Ed. 646 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917). The Act created a worker compensation Scheme that provided coverage to injured employees with out regard to employer liability, see 33 U.S.C. 904, but that also was apparently intended to be an exclusive remedy, see 33 U.S.C. 905(a) (1988) (stating that "[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive"). But see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 530-31, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 2546, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983) (<HOLDING>). In 1972, Congress substantially amended the
Holding statements: (A) holding that an employer who commits an intentional tort against his employee cannot claim that the act was accidental so that workers compensation is the employees exclusive remedy (B) holding that title vii did not provide exclusive remedy for sex discrimination in public employment claim could also be brought under equal protection clause (C) holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation (D) holding that under 1972 amendments 904 worker compensation is not exclusive remedy under lhwca where employer also happens to be vesselowner (E) holding that once the workers compensation act provides a remedy it is exclusive and the employee has no right to bring an action in commonlaw negligence against his employer
Output: (D)