In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir.1993) ("The purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions."); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 475 (9th Cir.1979) (purely financial interests are outside of NEPA's zone of interests). Accordingly, we have consistently held that purely economic interests do not fall within NEPA's zone of interests: "[A] plaintiff who asserts purely economic injuries does not have standing to challenge an agency action under NEPA." Nevada Land Action Ass'n, 8 F.3d at 716; see also Ranchers Cattleman v. United States Dep't of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1102 (9th Cir.2005) (an economic injury alone will not support a claim under NEPA); Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 903 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 475 (holding
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the cause of action (B) holding that a plaintiff whose only complaint was that agency action would cause economic harm asserted an interest outside nepas zone of interests (C) holding that the plaintiff did not have standing because it was not able to demonstrate how its economic interests fell within the zone of interests protected by the nhpa (D) recognizing cause of action (E) holding that the public interest in expression must be weighed against the plaintiffs economic and noneconomic interests

Output: (B)

Input: Consider Input: as defined by Section 30-31-2(M), his acts of cultivating or growing mushrooms, even if by artificial means, are not prohibited by Section 30-31-20(A)(1). To interpret Section 30-31-20(A)(1) otherwise, as the State suggests, would require us to read language into the statute that is not there. See Marshall, 2004-NMCA-104, 10, 13, 136 N.M. 240, 96 P.3d 801 (refusing to read a personal use exception into the CSA, reasoning that to do so "would impermissibly read language into a statute that makes sense as written"). {11} Our holding is also supported by an analysis of the federal counterpart to Section 30-31-20(A)(1), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (2000) of the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (federal act). See State v. Carr, 95 N.M. 755, 760, 626 P.2d 292, 297 (Ct.App.1981) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the presumptions applicability to federal statutes (B) holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction (C) recognizing a reliance on federal jurisprudence for the interpretation of louisianas arbitration statutes (D) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (E) recognizing that the csa is patterned after the federal act and relying on federal interpretation to the extent that the statutes are similar

Output: (E)

Input: Consider Input: court jurisdiction and its silence on the matter of federal jurisdiction"); Erienet, Inc. v. Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513 (3d Cir.1998) (accepting the holding oi International Science, supra, that the federal statute "intended to authorize private causes of action only in state court"); Foxhall Realty Law Offices, Inc. v. Telecommunications Premium Services, Ltd., 156 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir.1998) ("Congress intended to confer exclusive state court jurisdiction over private rights of action" under the Act); Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1289, modified 140 F.3d 898 (11th Cir.1998) ("Congress intended to assign the private right of action [under the Act] to state courts exclusively"); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). 6 . An earlier Texas intermediate appellate
Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no federal subject matter jurisdiction under the private cause of action provision of the act (B) holding there is no federal private right of action for borrowers under the nfia (C) holding veilpiercing claim does not state cause of action under erisa and cannot independently support federal subject matter jurisdiction (D) holding subject matter jurisdiction divested because federal cause of action had been dismissed without prejudice (E) holding that the elements of a cause of action were not subject matter jurisdictional simply because the statute that created the cause of action provided that district courts shall have jurisdiction of such actions
Output: (A)