In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: paid with Vested Funds and Seized Funds. And while the majority of the ICE contract price was paid with DFI money, approximately $12 million, the record reflects that $8 million of the contract price was paid with Seized Funds. Thus, defendants have failed, with respect to either contract, to demonstrate that no "claim" was submitted within the meaning of the-FCA. And, accordingly, they are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. B. Presentment Before FCA liability will attach to a "claim" for payment under 3729(a)(1), the false or fraudulent "claim" must be "knowingly presented], or caus[ed] to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United Government or a member of the Armed Services of the United States." 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1); see also Totten II, 380 F.3d at 491 (<HOLDING>). This requirement ultimately presents no
Holding statements: (A) holding a statement in the motion for new trial entitled certificate of presentment in which appellate counsel stated the motion was handdelivered to the trial court insufficient to establish presentment (B) holding that presentment is a requirement of the fca (C) holding that the fca includes a materiality requirement (D) recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment (E) holding that certificate of presentment and docket entry noting filing of motion were insufficient evidence of presentment
[A]: (B)

[Q]: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word "claimant" in subsection four. Under the plurality's view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word "claimant" in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of "prevailing party." This is because, in order for the word "claimant" in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from
Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
[A]: (A)

[Q]: applies the law to New York residents who violate the law outside the state. Id. 298-a(2). That isn't this case either. Here, Schuler alleges that a New York company has committed a discriminatory act in New York, namely adopting, maintaining, and implementing a retirement and promotion policy that disadvantages a class of employees on the basis of age. Thus, nothing in the statute's plain text removes Schuler's charge from the NYHRL's reach or the NYSDHR's jurisdiction. PwC nonetheless urges us to set the plain terms of the statute aside and follow a string of New York federal district court eases construing the NYHRL to include an in-state impact requirement. See, e.g., Pearce v. Manhattan Ensemble Theater, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1535(KMW), 2007 WL 707068, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.6, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Lucas v. Pathfinder's Personnel, Inc., No. 01
Holding statements: (A) holding that new york law applies to this matter (B) recognizing the rule and surveying new york law (C) recognizing the time honored practice of applying new york city rates in calculating attorneys fees throughout the southern district of new york including in counties north of the city (D) recognizing a split of authority regarding whether the nyhrl like the new york city human rights law includes an instate impact requirement and holding that it does (E) holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued
[A]:
(D)