In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: (second factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the [private] insurer and the insured"). Finally, despite the MSP provision that the United States can pursue "any entity" for reimbursement, see id. (third factor is "whether the [regulated] practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry''), the MSP provision limits reimbursement to recoveries from "primary plans," whose definition lists only entities which are clearly "within" the insurance industry. See 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(2)(A) ("primary plan" means "a group health plan or large group health plan, ... a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan ... or no-fault insurance"); cf. Kachanis, 844 F.Supp. 877 (D.R.I.1994) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Finally, the Fund raises a puzzling
Holding statements: (A) holding 1012 applicable to feca provision allowing united states to recover from any third party (B) holding that the secretary of the interior breached the united states duty of loyalty despite the absence of any applicable treaty or statutory provision (C) holding that a states entitlement to indemnification from a third party does not vitiate the states sovereign immunity against a money judgment (D) holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant (E) holding that an ancillary forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 usc 853n is a civil action for the purpose of allowing a third party to recover attorneys fees
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: period under IAD never commenced); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. 1997) (rejecting prisoner's substantial compliance argument and recognizing that court is bound by Fex); State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 581-82 (Ind. 1996) (requiring strict compliance with IAD procedures and recognizing that procedures are "not mere technicalities"); Pinto v. Warden, C.A. No. 972412, 1999 WL 49378, at *7 (Conn. Super. Jan. 20, 1999) (stating that "[wjhile it is true that earlier decisions of courts were split on when the 180 day period begins, the majority of courts ... have held that the period begins to run once the request is actually received by the appropriate court and prosecutor"); Commonwealth v. Flores, C.A. No. 91-493, 1998 WL 792466, at *3 (Mass. Super. Nov. 6, 1998) (<HOLDING>). 48 . 1993 WL 138993, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr.
Holding statements: (A) holding that a pro se prisoner complaint is deemed filed as of the date the prisoner gives the complaint to prison officials to be forwarded to the court (B) holding that an noa filed by a pro se prisoner is deemed filed on the date that the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for mailing (C) holding that the language of the statute and the courts duty to apply the statute as written requires the court to interpret the statute to apply when the prisoner is sentenced without regard to the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated after the sentencing (D) holding that the iad as construed by fex requires that a prisoner must be tried within 180 days of the date when his request for disposition is actu ally received by the state in which the charges are pending not when the prisoner provides that request to his custodial authorities (E) holding time begins when the prisoner knows the important facts not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: 1069 (5th Cir.1981). In Sessions, the Fifth Circuit barred a plaintiffs Section 1981 employment discrimination action against a state hospital. The court ruled that the hospital was an arm of the state, and that Section 1981 did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity: "[u]nlike Title VII, Section 1981 contains no congressional waiver of the state's eleventh amendment immunity." Id. The facts in the instant case do not present a distinguishable situation. The Office of the Attorney General is an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity. See Tex. Const, art. IV, 22. Therefore, the court is without jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs Section 1981 claim against the state of Texas. See also Loya v. Tex. Dep't of Corrections, 878 F.2d 860, 861-862 (5th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). While conceding that Defendant is immune from
Holding statements: (A) holding that the department of corrections was entitled to eleventh amendment immunity from suit under section 1981 (B) holding that the eleventh amendment applies in 1981 litigation (C) holding that pennsylvanias judicial districts are entitled to immunity from suit under the eleventh amendment (D) recognizing that claims against a state under 1981 are barred by the eleventh amendment (E) recognizing that section 1981 claims against a state agency are barred by the eleventh amendment
Example Output:
(A)