You might want to know how cold it is. You may need to know how fast the wind is blowing. Maybe it rained last night? Do you know how much? Does it feel humid to you? You have heard all these questions before. To answer these questions, we need data. That data comes from special tools. These tools collect data about the weather. You can see some of the common tools listed below: A thermometer measures temperature. An anemometer measures wind speed. A rain gauge measures the amount of rain. A hygrometer measures humidity. A wind vane shows wind direction. A snow gauge measures the amount of snow.

Question: "What are some common tools?"

Response: "Oscilloscope"

A: no

Iwasaki's careful respect for the Long Beach program and its lawyers earned him the political capital he needed to complete his takeover in a matter of weeks. "The Long Beach program had strong support in the community so in a situation like that, one has to recognize that it's not like a takeover where I have all the answers and I know best," Iwasaki said. "The people in the community who are working there have the contacts and the knowledge that will allow service to continue." Things have gone less smoothly across town. There, Dudovitz, a longtime poverty lawyer and executive director of the San Fernando Valley's 36-year-old legal aid program, continues to struggle with his hostile takeover of the neighboring San Gabriel-Pomona Valleys service area one year after it was accomplished. On the bright side, Dudovitz has extended his respected program to clients in the San Gabriel-Pomona Valley, and he now operates on a much larger budget, $6.5 million last year. However, his clash with the old San Gabriel program resulted in litigation, bitter feelings and a mission that some say is not clearly focused on serving poor people. "It was a difficult situation that was probably mishandled by everyone," a longtime observer of the public interest community said of the San Fernando Valley-San Gabriel-Pomona Valley merger. "There are very few people who come out as the heroes. Personalities got involved when they shouldn't have. Things were said that caused bad feelings and couldn't be unsaid." Iwasaki's merger with the smaller, 48-year-old Long Beach program was friendly and fast, and no one - not even Long Beach board members - lost a job. When it was over, Iwasaki had $1 million more in federal dollars and two new offices. Long Beach clients regained services they had lost years ago when federal budget cuts and dwindling grants reduced the staff of 15 lawyers to five and cut immigration and consumer law programs. Iwasaki said, "[I judged the transition] better than I could have hoped for."

Question: "How many people were fired in order for Long Beach clients to regain services?"

Response: "$1 million"

A: no

Bin Laden and his aides did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America. The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters. KSM provided his operatives with nearly all the money they needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters' tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time. The origin of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9/11. General Financing As we explained in chapter 2, Bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses in Sudan. Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time. The CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations. For many years, the United States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda's expenses through a vast personal inheritance. Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S. government discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through 1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year-a significant sum, to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad. Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Usama's share of the family company in 1994. The Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale. This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune. Nor were Bin Laden's assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda. When Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses and other assets.

Question: "What did U.S. government erroneously believe about Bin Laden's ji-had?"

Response: "For many years, the United States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda's expenses through a vast personal inheritance"

A:
yes