In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: immunity exists. In Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 949, 104 S.Ct. 2150, 80 L.Ed.2d 536 (1984), the fifth circuit held that when a probation officer erroneously prepared a motion for revocation of appellant's probation, she was only entitled to qualified immunity. The court distinguished its earlier case of Spaulding v. Nielsen, supra: We find Spaulding not controlling in the case at hand. Whereas in Spaulding the probation officer was acting at the direction of the court during the presen-tence report process, in the immediate case the probation officer acted at her own initiative and at a different phase of the criminal process less intimately associated with the judiciary. Galvan, at 215. See also Griffin v. Leonard, 821 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). We note also third circuit decisions,
Holding statements: (A) holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity (B) holding under facts presented that probation officer was entitled to at least qualified immunity (C) holding officials are entitled to qualified immunity for reasonable mistakes of law (D) holding that where defendant claiming qualified immunity relies on facts that are in dispute qualified immunity cannot be granted (E) holding that an officer applying for a warrant without probable cause may be entitled to qualified immunity but is not entitled to absolute immunity
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: of the statute, the FDA's regulations, the FDA's internal interpretation, and precedent all demonstrate that a sterilizer for dental hand-pieces is a "device" as that term is defined in 21 U.S.C. 321(h). That being so, both SteriSafe and its accessory SteriDot are within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA. Defendant nevertheless posits three reasons why SteriSafe and SteriDot are not devices. First, defendant argues that the government failed to prove that dental handpieces transmit disease and, thus, that SteriSafe actually prevents disease. Such proof is not required. Congress had two purposes in enacting' the FFDCA: (1) to regulate products that actually prevent disease, and (2) to regulate products that falsely claim that they prevent disease. Because of those d 1006 (9th Cir.1952) (<HOLDING>). Defendant next argues that the Steri-Safe is
Holding statements: (A) holding that because the doctor who submitted an expert report did not demonstrate knowledge of cancer treatment he was not qualified to offer an opinion that an earlier diagnosis could have produced a better outcome for the plaintiff (B) holding that a machine that allegedly eliminated lumps from womens breasts was governed by the ffdca even though expert witnesses expressed the unanimous belief that appellants instruments are useless for diagnosis or treatment of any human ailment (C) holding the expert witnesses were protected by witness immunity to ensure expert objectivity (D) holding in a case where there was no evidence that the expert was incompetent or that the petitioners lawyers had any reason to question the experts professional qualifications that it was objectively reasonable for trial counsel to rely upon the experts diagnosis (E) holding that the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by state law
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: that a contract which specifies the period of its duration terminates on the expiration of such period. See Shepard v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 210 Kan. 652, 653, 504 P.2d 228, 229 (1972); Bartlett & Co., Grain v. Curry, 1 Kan.App.2d 242, 247, 563 P.2d 1096, 1101 (1977) (citing 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts 486, p. 955). The general rule that an insurance policy lapses if the insured fails to pay the renewal premium before the policy expiration date may be modified by a statutory requirement of notice. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Tab Transp., Inc., 12 Cal.4th 389, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 159, 906 P.2d 1341, 1347 (1995) (finding that carrier statute prohibited lapse in particular case); Lopez v. New Jersey Auto., Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 239 N.J.Super. 13, 570 A.2d 994, 995 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Contractual requirements of notice may also
Holding statements: (A) holding negligent failure to notify regulatory body of lapse of insurance policy did not arise out of underwriting of insurance (B) holding that late notice of the bond did not excuse supplier from its obligation to comply with statutory notice requirements (C) holding that title automatically vests in the adverse possessor at the end of the statutory period if all the requirements are met (D) holding that even if statutory requirements are met courts must inquire into totality of the circumstances to determine if waiver was knowing and voluntary (E) recognizing that insurance policy may lapse if the statutory renewal notice requirements are met
Example Output:
(E)