In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity " 'substantially affecting interstate commerce.' "). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing
Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference
[EX A]: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference

[EX Q]: even if the 1993 judgment was final and appealable, they may challenge the merits of the 1993 judgment in this appeal from the 1995 order. This appeal is untimely only if the District Court's 1993 decision which ordered only that ISP submit a plan to remedy the constitutional flaws in its policy was a final judgment, appealable to this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1291. We believe that the District Court's 1993 order was no more final under 1291 than the one at issue in Sherpell v. Humnoke School Dist., 814 F.2d 538 (8th Cir.1987), which held that a district court order to a school district to submit a plan to remedy an unconstitutional atmosphere of racial hostility was not an appealable final judgment. Id. at 539; see also Hendrickson v. Griggs, 856 F.2d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The November 1995 judgment is, therefore, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable (B) holding that the modification or dissolution of an injunction in a limitation of liability proceeding is appealable as a matter of right under 1292a1 (C) holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable (D) holding injunction ordering prison to submit plan for reformation of unconstitutional prison conditions not appealable as interlocutory order under 28 usc 1292a1 (E) holding that a rehearing order is interlocutory and not appealable
[EX A]: holding that an order of consolidation is interlocutory and not immediately appealable

[EX Q]: peculiar positions as state actors, leaving a discrete plaintiff vulnerable to foreseeable injury." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). We, as well as other appellate courts, have held that the state-created danger theory is a viable mechanism for establishing a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208; see also Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir.1993); Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1993); Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir.1990). We are aware of no court of appeals which has recognized the constitutional validity of the state-created danger theory in the context of an immigration case. But see Builes v. Nye, 239 F.Supp.2d 518 (M.D.Pa.2003) (<HOLDING>). We decline to do so here, and hold that the
Holding statements: (A) holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture (B) holding that despite petitioners inability to establish habeas relief under cat because evidence did not support finding that colombian government would acquiesce to torture by drug cartel petitioner was entitled to relief under statecreated danger exception (C) holding that errors in state law cannot support federal habeas relief (D) holding that a negative credibility finding for the purposes of an asylum claim does not preclude relief under cat where documented country conditions corroborate a claim of torture (E) holding petitioner not entitled to habeas relief on claim state court improperly used petitioners prior federal offense to enhance punishment
[EX A]:
holding it improper to deny cat relief based on adverse credibility finding where objective documentary evidence establishes likelihood of torture