In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: because of [the dealer's] precarious financial condition .... ... [W]e decline to hold BMW/NA negligent and liable for damages since it could not reasonably have anticipated the crimes committed by [the dealer's] principal, Eichler. Although BMW/NA may have been aware of [the dealer's] shaky financial condition, that knowledge alone gave BMW/NA no cause reasonably to anticipate that Eichler would either engage in any criminal activity or that he would abscond with customer funds. In fact, no amount of supervision by BMW/NA would have enabled it to foresee Eichler's thievery. Id. In other cases involving the franchisors of automobile dealerships, the courts have reached similar results. See Colson v. Maghami, No. CV 08-2150-PHX-MHM, 2010 WL 2744682, at *9-10 (D.Ariz. July 9, 2010) (<HOLDING>); DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Clemente,
Holding statements: (A) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (B) holding that a franchisor had no duty to supervise its automobile dealership or to warn a customer of the dealership who paid a substantial deposit for a limited edition lamborghini reventon and who did not receive either the car or the return of his deposit (C) holding that an automobile dealership had no duty to prevent the misconduct of the executives of another company who misappropriated company funds to make the purchase of several automobiles from the dealership (D) holding that where no evidence was designated to show that a car buyer knew that a sale violated the rights of the dealership that owned the car the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course of business for purposes of indcode 26112019 (E) holding that a car dealership could be held vicariously liable for the intentional tort of its employee who shot out the tires of the plaintiffs truck during a repossession attempt

Output: holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer

Input: Consider Input: of other courts have concluded, outside the RICO and Clayton Act context, that "by reason of" should be read to require only "but for" rather than proximate causation. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("The words 'because of' mean 'by reason of: on account of.' Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action 'because of age is that age was the 'reason' that the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. C.I.R., 600 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Spirtas Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 555 F.3d 647,
Holding statements: (A) holding that in 26 cfr 1263ale3i the language directly benefit or are incurred by reason of boils down to a butfor causation test (B) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support (C) holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid (D) holding that pursuant to the eaja courts may not award expenses of an attorney that are not incurred or expended solely or exclusively in connection with the case before the court (E) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc 4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc 4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc 4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc 4061a 4218a

Output: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support

Input: Consider Input: 746 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct.App.1987); see also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 20, 979 P.2d 799. Although we have cautioned against saddling defendants with a choice between ineffective counsel and no counsel at all, that is not the case presented here. As we have noted above, supra 15-17, Waterfield has not demonstrated that good cause such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict existed for substitution of counsel. Moreover, prior to the denial of substitute counsel, Waterfield had made two requests to proceed pro se and had informed the court that he was prepared to do so. On this record, we conclude that the district court could find that Waterfield's waiver was voluntary. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 20, 979 P.2d 799 (<HOLDING>). 28 The colloquy conducted by the district
Holding statements: (A) holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se (B) holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se (C) holding that a defendants decision to proceed pro se was voluntary despite having to choose between that course and proceeding with counsel with whom he had expressed dissatisfaction because the defendant had not shown good cause for substitution of counsel (D) holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial (E) holding that a defendants waiver was invalid where he was required to choose between proceeding with unprepared counsel or no counsel
Output: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se