instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is "whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is 'reasonably necessary' to protect that public's right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands"). Plaintiffs' taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83
Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary (C) holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality (D) holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws (E) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public
answer:
holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege

question:
[u]nder [28 U.S.C.] 2254(d)(l)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, ... a federal habeas [corpus] court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Applying these standards to the present case, the court's inquiry must be whether the uit Court of Appeals case for the proposition that the application of a statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms does not violate the ex post facto clause because it is a protective measure and does not impose any new or different punishment. See United States v. O'Neal ("O'Neal"), 180 F.3d 115, 124-25 (4th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) (criticizing Davis). Additionally, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause (B) holding that revocation of medical license does not violate the ex post facto clause (C) holding north carolina felony firearms act did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was a measured public safety provision and its applicability to previously convicted felons was eminently reasonable (D) holding that the ex post facto clause did not apply because the civil contempt citation was not punitive (E) holding that the alaska sex offender registration act did not violate the ex post facto clause
answer:
holding that state statutory bans against employment of convicted felons in certain jobs did not impose punishment under ex post facto clause

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search at the police station, a small amount of marihuana was recovered from the defendant's back pocket. In support of his decision to deny the defendant's motion to suppress the gun and marihuana, the judge found that Clinton reasonably concluded, after he saw the pipe with a bore, that the object was a gun. This finding was supported by the evidence. Clinton was entitled to apply his experience of twenty years as a Boston police officer to draw conclusions from his observations, and the judge, in turn, was entitled to consider such experience in making his factual findings. Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 407 (1974). It was proper for Clinton to assume that Ferguson was carrying the gun without a license. See Commonwealth v. Ferrioli, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 492 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406
Holding statements: (A) holding that the searchincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to an officers search of the defendants vehicle where the officer while subsequently arresting the defendant for druglaw violations based upon that search never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search but rather only issued a citation and reasoning that the rules underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all respectively in the context of a traffic citation (B) holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof (C) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time (D) holding that an arresting officer who had made a warrantless search of the defendants person on the basis of information from a reliable source that the defendant was armed could properly assume that the defendant did not have a license to carry a firearm (E) holding that the encounter between an officer and the defendant did not rise to the level of a terry stop until the defendant gave the officer his license and the officer informed the defendant that he was going to be given a patdown
answer:
holding that the searchincidenttoalawfularrest rule does not apply to an officers search of the defendants vehicle where the officer while subsequently arresting the defendant for druglaw violations based upon that search never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search but rather only issued a citation and reasoning that the rules underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all respectively in the context of a traffic citation