In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

between 1983 and 1986. Stanley's engineer, Hreha, was present throughout Powers' deposition. The Court revisits its ruling upon further contemplation of the purpose of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. In a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, there is no distinction between the corporate representative and the corporation. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C.1996) (noting that in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition "[t]he corporation appears vicariously through its designee"). "The Rule 30(b)(6) designee does not give his personal opinion. Rather, he presents the corpo ration's 'position' on the topic." Id. (citing cases). The designee testifies on behalf of the corporation and holds it accountable accordingly. See Starlight Int'l, Inc., v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 688 (D.Kan.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Audiotext Communications Network,
Holding statements: (A) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed (B) holding that a corporation has a duty under rule 80b6 to provide someone who is knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation (C) holding that an officer or director generally owes a fiduciary duty only to the corporation over which he exercises management authority and any breach of fiduciary duty claims arising out of injuries to the corporation in most cases may only be brought by the corporation itself or derivatively on its behalf (D) holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a (E) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation
(B)

do not apply in ... [piroceedings relating to probation." - Ind. Evidence Rule 101(c)(@2). A probation revocation hearing is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding. Cox v. State 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.1999) (citing Isaac v. State, 605 N.E2d 144, 149 (Ind.1992)). Rather, a revocation hearing is a narrow inquiry, and its procedures are more flexible than those of a criminal proceeding. Id. In revocation hearings, judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability, including expert testimony and scientific evidence. Carter v. State, 706 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ind.1999) (noting that it is beyond doubt that urinalysis has achieved a sufficient level of scientific reliability to be accepted into evidence); see also Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550 (<HOLDING>); of - Pitman v. State, 749 N.E.2d 557, 559
Holding statements: (A) holding hearsay admissible in revocation hearings (B) holding that certified charging informations and police reports are deemed admissible in revocation hearings (C) holding that it is clear that hearsay evidence is admissible in a hearing on a motion to suppress (D) holding that neither rule 11 nor the protections of boykin apply to probation revocation hearings and observing that less process is due in prison disciplinary proceedings than in probation revocation hearings (E) holding that because the rules of evidence including the rule against hearsay do not apply to sentencing hearings the district court did not err in relying on hearsay in ordering restitution
(A)

would allow for the award of attorney fees whenever a statute or contract provides for one side to pay expenses, even when such attorney fees were not contemplated. The majority opinion sets a dangerous precedent in this regard. Therefore, I do not join in the majority's opinion that the term "expenses" as used in section 13-7-4(d) includes attorney fees, but would hold that because that section does not specifically provide for an award of attorney fees, such award was improper here. For the reasons stated above, I concur in the majority's determination that the trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. However, I dissent rs of Am. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986); In re Olliff, 258 Ga. 157, 366 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1988) (<HOLDING>); Head v. Savage, Minn., 255 N.W.2d 32, 38
Holding statements: (A) holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid (B) holding that costs and expenses are to considerable degree synonymous (C) holding that the bankruptcy court properly disallowed fees when the bank could not demonstrate actual costs and expenses beyond its normal operating costs attributable to the debtors loan (D) holding that federal express costs telephone expenses and postage expenses did not qualify as taxable costs (E) holding that expenses refers to costs
(E)