In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: or even every valid governmental purpose, is an appropriate reason for breaching grand jury secrecy." Id. at 480, 103 S.Ct. 3164. It goes without saying that the district court's inherent authority does not include the power to contravene or circumvent an "express grant of or limitation on the ... court's power contained in a rule or statute." Dietz v. Bouldin, U.S.-, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1892, 195 L.Ed.2d 161 (2016); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426, 116 S.Ct. 1460, 134 L.Ed.2d 613 (1996) ("Whatever the scope of [the court's] 'inherent power,' ,,. it does not include the power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Rule 6(e) is an express limitation on the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the substantial rights inquiry of federal rule of criminal procedure 52b mirrors rule 52as harmless error inquiry except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice (B) holding that a district court cannot invoke its inherent authority to circumvent the harmlesserror inquiry required by rule 52a of the federal rules of criminal procedure (C) holding that a shotgun pleading is in no sense the short and plain statement of a claim required by rule 8 of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that rule 33 of the federal rules of criminal procedure is an inflexible claimprocessing rule that may be waived if not raised (E) recognizing the inherent common law authority of courts to promulgate rules of practice and procedure
[A]: (B)

[Q]: of discretion standard. See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 603, 886 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1994). Statements stemming from a state actor's custodial interrogation of a defendant are not admissible unless he is warned of his Fifth Amendment "right to remain silent" and that "anything said can and will be used against [him] in court." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 19 The State concedes here that Appellant was in police custody when Nurse Geyer questioned him at the hospital. Even if a defendant is in custody, however, Miranda warnings are required when a med ical professional conducts an interrogation only if that medical professional is a state actor. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (<HOLDING>). See also State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a public safety exception to the requirement that miranda warnings be given in order to use a suspects statement as evidence against him at trial (B) holding that phrase i know i have the right to remain silent together with phrase and knowing that anything i say may be used against me substantially complied with article 3822 warnings even though warnings failed to advise accused that his statement could be used against him at his trial or in court because it advised him his statement could be used against him in any type of context not just those mentioned in article 3822 subsection 2a1 and 2 (C) holding that a defendants jailhouse statements to a courtappointed psychiatrist could not be used against him in the penalty phase of a murder trial because the psychiatrist failed to give the defendant miranda warnings (D) holding that the warnings in their totality satisfied miranda (E) holding that the government cannot use postarrest silence against a defendant because miranda warnings give implicit assurances that silence will not be used against a person and accordingly it would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process to allow a defendants silence to be used to impeach him at trial
[A]: (C)

[Q]: results when an extraneous matter is so intertwined with the State's proof of the charged offense that avoiding reference to it would make the State's case incomplete or difficult to understand. Id. at 732. The evidence at trial indicated that Appellant pulled the brass knuckles from his pocket as Gary initially approached him in the parking lot. The evidence was relevant to Appellant's intent and was arguably part of an indivisible criminal transaction. We conclude the evidence was admissible as same transaction contextual evidence because the events are so interwoven that avoiding reference to Appellant's retrieval of the brass knuckles would make the State's case incomplete or difficult to understand. See Amaya v. State, 759 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1988, pet. refd) (<HOLDING>). The trial court did not abuse its discretion
Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial courts erroneous instruction on the nonexistent included offense of attempted reckless manslaughter was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the jury reached a unanimous guilty verdict as to the charged offense of attempted murder in the second degree (B) holding that although the investigation of the traffic offense that served as the basis for the stop was complete when the officer issued the citation the officers continued detention of the appellant thereafter for a canine search was lawful because during the investigation of the traffic offense the officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed a drugrelated offense (C) holding attempted theft that preceded the charged shooting offense was relevant to the motivation for the ensuing violent confrontation between appellant and the theft victims older brothers because the facts of the two incidents were so interwoven as to necessitate admission of evidence of both for a full contextual evaluation of the indicted offense by the jury (D) holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense (E) holding that the offense of sexual battery requires the state prove the victims lack of consent regardless of the victims age and charge the jury on the same
[A]:
(C)