In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

and the weapons charge, for which he was sentenced to a concurrent term of five years' imprisonment. Jackson appealed to this court. LAW/ANALYSIS I. Exclusion of Evidence Jackson argues the trial court erred in excluding his testimony about his personal knowledge of Felder's violent history. We disagree. The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion, and an appellate court may only disturb a ruling admitting or excluding evidence upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice. State v. Douglas, 369 S.C. 424, 429, 632 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (2006). Generally, the failure to make a proffer of excluded evidence will preclude review on appeal. State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 163, 634 S.E.2d 23, 29 (Ct.App.2006) (<HOLDING>). Where no proffer of excluded testimony is
Holding statements: (A) holding that objection to testimony at trial on grounds that testimony was irrelevant highly prejudicial and below the threshold requirement of admissibility does not preserve appellate challenge that testimony constitutes inadmissi ble victimimpact testimony (B) holding the excluded testimony was relevant to whether a signature was that of a deceased party and since a statement regarding the issue was the only testimony that could be given by the witness no offer to prove was necessary because the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context of the question asked (C) holding that we could not weigh the prejudice suffered as a result of the exclusion of plaintiffs testimony because we had no way of knowing what the plaintiffs testimony would have been (D) holding a proffer of testimony is required to preserve the issue of whether testimony was properly excluded by the trial judge and an appellate court will not consider error alleged in the exclusion of testimony unless the record on appeal shows fairly what the excluded testimony would have been (E) holding that the trial courts statement it would deny the defendants request to make a bill at this time did not discharge the appellants duty to proffer the excluded testimony for preservation of error
(D)

is correct. We will also assume that the court's erro umed error prejudiced him is that other evidence supports the finding that he was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy. In the district court, Vasquez did not object to the PSR's statement that he "recruited Wornick and Sella" into the conspiracy. Although the district court did not explicitly find that Vasquez recruited two of his co-conspirators, "[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a[PSR] admits those facts for sentencing purposes." United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir.2006). And we have held many times that a defendant's recruitment of co-conspirators supports a 3B1.1 enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1355 n. 2 (11th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1304
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer leader manager or supervisor under 3bllc in part because the defendant actively recruited two individuals to transport drugs (B) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was a manager or supervisor under 3bllb in part because he recruited accomplices (C) holding that trial court did not err (D) holding that a trial court did not clearly err in finding that an attorney fees clause materially altered a contract (E) holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer or leader under 3blla in part because he recruited coconspirators
(E)

fact that the fielding of payments was one of the services that ICTS chose to provide to the shippers for whom it consolidated. Its provision of that service in no way indicates that it was acting as Hawkspere's collection agent. See Strachan Shipping Co., 701 F.2d at 486 (refusing to infer agency from fact that carrier initially directed its collection efforts to cargo consolidator). The Shippers next point out that they both "presented unrefuted testimony, that each reasonably believed that ICTS was acting for Hawkspere and relied on that." Appellants' Br. at 20. Under United States law, however, the Shippers' subjective beliefs are irrelevant to the inquiry; only evidence of Hawkspere's conduct can prove agency. See Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 259, 266-67 (D.C.Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Auvil v. Grafton Homes, 92 F.3d 226, 230 (4th
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that statements made by agent on behalf of principal to principals attorney may be protected by principals attorneyclient privilege (B) holding that it is the principals conduct attitude and knowledge that determines whether an agent had apparent authority (C) holding that agency is provable only by principals conduct and not by subjective beliefs of those dealing with alleged agent (D) holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal (E) holding that the lack of evidence of the alleged principals control over the alleged agent precludes the finding of an agency relationship
(C)