TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: (1993). This privilege has been given an "expansive reach" by California courts, as recognized by the California Supreme Court. See Rubin, 4 Cal.4th at 1194, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. This privilege affords absolute immunity against tort liability arising out of such a communication, regardless of attempts by the "plaintiff' to "plead around" this "absolute barrier." See id. at 1201-02, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. Thus, the immunity applies regardless of the particular label given to the cause of action (e.g., unfair competition). Section 47(b) protects participants in judicial proceedings from derivative tort actions based on communications in or regarding the judicial proceeding. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781-83, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1996) (<HOLDING>). A "communication[ ] preparatory to or in
Holding statements: (A) holding that letter to possible coclaimants seeking support for filing of suit was covered by the privilege (B) recognizing privilege (C) holding that voluntary testimony by spouse is not covered by husbandwife privilege (D) holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated (E) holding that the initial disclosure of a crime to one spouses without more is covered by the marital communications privilege

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: improperly determined that the "neither expected nor intended" language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an "occurrence." 21 The CGL policy's core provision defines "occurrence" by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was "neither expected nor intended." This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured's expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an "occurrence" and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). 22 Here the District Court found that Ribi
Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: Theft. Defense: Excuse me. I'll object to that. That's outside the record. The trial court sustained the objection and further instructed the jury to disregard. In general, to constitute proper argument, counsel's closing arguments must fall within the areas of: (1) a summation of the evidence; (2) a reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) an answer to an argument from opposing counsel, or (4) a plea for law enforcement. See Melton v. State, 713 S.W.2d 107, 114 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Here, because the prosecutor's argument is not reasonably related to one of the enumerated areas, it was improper. Therefore, the trial court correctly sustained appellant's objection and instructed the jury to disregard. See Faulkner v. State, 940 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref'd) (<HOLDING>). Mistrials should be granted only when an
Holding statements: (A) holding almost any improper argument may be cured by an instruction to disregard (B) holding improper admission of extrinsic evidence may be cured by adequate limiting instruction (C) holding that the prejudicial effect of a direct reference to an accuseds failure to testify normally cannot be cured by an instruction to disregard (D) holding that any misstatements of law during closing argument are presumed cured by final instruction (E) holding that instruction to disregard cured error from prosecutors improper comment during voir dire

SOLUTION:
(A)