In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 979 P.2d 346, 351 (Utah 1999) (ruling that continuing denial of a benefit to which a party is entitled provides a basis for standing to obtain judicial review of an administrative rule). The plaintiffs claim that he would be "directly and immediately better off in the emphatically concrete sense that ... he would have more money in his pocket sooner if he could obtain relief through the Notice procedure ... without sacrificing a major portion of his claim," Pl.'s Opp'n at 5, is "[n]o reasonable mind could doubt ... a judicially cognizable injury sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact test for Article III standing," see Ontario Forest Industries Assoc. v. United States, 444 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1323-24 (CIT 2006) (<HOLDING>) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S.
Holding statements: (A) holding that declaratory judgment requiring party to pay a specific sum of money is properly characterized as a money judgment (B) holding that taking money from a victim offering the money out of fear of violence can be larceny from the person because there is no consent and the money was removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate pres ence viz the area within his control (C) recognizing that delay of refund deprives plaintiffs of the timevalue of money and may deprive plaintiffs of money (D) holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief (E) recognizing that an action will lie for conversion of money when its identification is possible and there is an obligation to deliver the specific money in question or otherwise particularly treat the specific money

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant's prior conviction's probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court's
Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap (C) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand (D) holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a (E) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote

Ex Output:
(B)

Ex Input:
in open court," Defendant's characterization is probably accurate. State v. Tollardo, 2003-NMCA-122, 10, 134 N.M. 430, 77 P.3d 1023. However, Rule 5-502(A)(l) does not exempt demonstrative evidence from a defendant's duty to disclose. To the contrary, it expressly applies to forms of evidence that are classically demonstrative, such as "tangible objects." Id. As such, we reject Defendant's suggestion that demonstrative evidence is subject to a blanket exemption from the general duty of disclosure. {42} Defendant may rely upon the distinction between the use of demonstrative material as an aid to cross-examination and the designation of such material as "evidence" that is fit for use as a formal exhibit. See State v. Gallegos, 92 N.M. 370, 379, 588 P.2d 1045, 1054 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>). However, even if we were to assume that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecution must disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession (B) holding that the district court erred in requiring the defense to disclose a report which the defense did not intend to introduce into evidence and which was merely designed to aid in the crossexamination of a witness for the state (C) recognizing the defense has a right to comment on the presentence report and may introduce evidence (D) holding that defendants failure to assert the defense in any pretrial motions did not waive defendants limitations defense because the assertion of a limitations defense in the answer preserved defendants right to raise the defense both during the first trial and before the second (E) holding that a defendant was not entitled to the affirmative defense where the evidence did not support his contention that he did not aid in the homicidal act

Ex Output:
(B)