In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: offense; the maximum sentence is 10 years for each offense, which must run concurrently under Hale. By enhancing only one count and running it consecutively to the second count, appellant was sentenced to 12 years. This sentence exceeds the statutory maximum if both sentences had been enhanced under section 775.084 and run concurrently, or if neither had been enhanced and run consecutively. As such the appellant's sentence violates Hale. Although appellant was not sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 5 years for the second offense, as explained in State v. Hill, 660 So.2d 1384 (Fla.1995), the requirement that sentences run consecutively is not limited to only the minimum mandatory portion of. a total sentence: The State argues that Hale and its predecessors, Palmer v. State A 1997) (<HOLDING>). Here appellant was sentenced as an habitual
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies (B) holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory (C) holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence (D) holding hfo mandatory minimum sentence for robbery must run concurrently with sentences imposed for nonhfo first degree murder convictions (E) holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment

Output: holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies

Input: Consider Input: 924(c) conviction is invalid after Bailey and Bousley, it argues we are prohibited from reaching the merits of his claim because Abdullah did not present his Bailey/Bousley challenge on direct appeal or in the 2255 proceedings below. Alternatively, the government argues the claim is barred by AEDPA's one-year limitations period. We assume for purposes of this appeal that Abdullah did not procedurally default his Bailey claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. Notwithstanding such an assumption, we conclude the claim is barred because Abdullah failed to adequately raise the issue before the district court in this 2255 proceeding. Generally, a habeas claim cannot be raised by a petitioner for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Petty v. Card, 195 F.3d 399, 400 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 78, 148
Holding statements: (A) holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court (B) holding that the convention claim was procedurally defaulted (C) holding that court may address procedurally defaulted claim on the merits where it is more efficient to do so (D) holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted (E) holding that an argument not raised before the district court is procedurally defaulted

Output: holding that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time before this court

Input: Consider Input: 50 provides in part that "any person," convicted of bribery of a public official "shall, as part of the punishment thereof, be forever disfranchised and disqualified from holding any office of trust, or profit, in this State." According to Judge Friedman's treatise, such punishment "may not be subject to pardon[,]" although "[tjhere are no appellate opinions to suggest whether [that] interpretation is correct." Dan Friedman, The Maryland State Constitution 119 (2011). 14 . When Jones v. State, 247 Md. 530, 532, 233 A.2d 791 (1967), was decided, capital punishment was still a legal sentence upon a conviction for rape. Although that is obviously no longer true, as a matter of federal constitutional law, see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (<HOLDING>), the Court of Appeals' statements, in Jones,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the punishment of death for a defendant convicting of raping a child (B) holding the death penalty excessive punishment for the crime of rape (C) holding that an offenders death sentence for the rape of a child who did not die is unconstitutionally disproportionate (D) holding that a death sentence for a conviction for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in death of the victim was barred by the eighth amendment (E) holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child
Output: holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the punishment of death for a defendant convicting of raping a child