Problem: Comanche Indians have trapped the evil of their land in a monster made up of a mixture of other animals . The Comanche have placed a protective spear in the ground to contain the evil . A young boy pulls the spear from the ground while pocketing a rabbit foot talisman . He starts to play with the spear . A Comanche catches the boy , and startled , he runs away with the rabbit's foot . The Native American places the spear back , realizing too late that the rabbits foot is now gone . After that , white men come and start drilling for oil . Skip to current time , a divorced father , Mance Cashen , moves to the area with his new wife , baby , and his son from his first marriage , Willy ( played by ( ( Chris Miller , who is visiting . Willy notices something peculiar in the house and tries to warn his father and step-mother . They do not believe him . Willy is attacked while on a tire swing over a small water hole . The creature grabs his foot and Willy struggles , eventually getting away . He eventually befriends the local drunk , T. C. van Houten . A nice old man with some bad memories who knows something about the evil near the oil well and was in a situation similar to Willy's . In the meantime a Comanche Indian , Chief Sam John , comes to warn Mance of the evil and the need to keep it contained . Sam John informs Mance the evil was originally intended to stop the white man , but it is indiscriminate in whom it kills instead . Mance will have none of it . Willy eventually takes a spear he finds on his property to Sam John and tries to find out what is going on .

Question: "What made the white men to start drilling for oil?"

Answer: "The White Man"
Answer: no

Problem: Clarifying the Record The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly. More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.

Question: "Who coordinated the defense of US airspace on September 11?"

Answer: "Defenders"
Answer: no

Problem: (CNN) -- The photographer who took images of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto moments before her assassination Thursday told CNN he was "surprised" to see her rise through the sunroof of her vehicle to wave to supporters after delivering her speech. Getty Images photographer John Moore captured Benazir Bhutto waving, moments before he heard gunshots. "I ran up, got as close as I got, made a few pictures of her waving to the crowd," Getty Images senior staff photographer John Moore told CNN's online streaming news service, CNN.com Live, in a phone interview Thursday from Islamabad, Pakistan. "And then suddenly, there were a few gunshots that rang out, and she went down, she went down through the sunroof," he said. "And just at that moment I raised my camera up and the blast happened. ... And then, of course, there was chaos." Watch Moore describe Bhutto's final moments " Moore said he was about 20 yards away from Bhutto's vehicle when he took his photographs. Bhutto was rushed to Rawalpindi General Hospital, where she was pronounced dead. Moore said he had been following Bhutto's story since her return to Pakistan in October. He was present October 19 when a terror attack targeting her motorcade in Karachi killed 136 people. In the aftermath of that attack, "The rallies had been very small," because of high security, Moore said. However, the Rawalpindi rally was announced beforehand, he observed. "Whoever planned this attack -- they had time on their hands to plan everything properly, and you saw the results today," he said. Between 5,000 and 8,000 were at the Rawalpindi rally, which was held at a parkground, he said. "We [the news media] all expected it to be filled ... but there were less people there than most of us expected to see," he said. "When I talked with a number of people, they said that people were just afraid to come out, for the simple reason that they all remembered what happened in Karachi." Moore said he himself expected there could be another attack following the Karachi massacre. He said he stayed away from gates at the Rawalpindi parkground, where police were searching people, because he suspected that's where a bomb would go off.

Question: "What was the date of the attack that forced Benazir to keep his rallies small for security purposes?"

Answer: "October 9"
Answer:
no