instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,-, 117 S.Ct. 832, 838, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that ERISA preempts state common law tort and contract causes of action asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an insured employee benefit plan. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57. The detailed provisions of ERISA 502(a) set forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that "would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA." Id. at 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549. Similarly, we have held that state law tort and contract claims as well as violations of a state insurance statute are preempted by ERISA. Tingey, 953 F.2d at 1131 (<HOLDING>). In a factually similar case, we held that
Holding statements: (A) holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations (B) holding plaintiffs causes of action for breach of contract breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing intentional infliction of emotional distress and violations of the arizona insurance code were preempted by erisa (C) holding that erisa 514a preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (D) holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it was based on the same conduct as a preempted claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (E) holding that the plaintiffs state common law causes of actions for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing as well as a statutory cause of action for unfair insurance practices under the california insurance code were preempted by erisa
answer:
holding that erisa preempts claims for breach of contract breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing and negligent misrepresentations

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to the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Penn s to avoid the appearance of impropriety is a worthy standard for professional conduct, a criminal defendant's constitutional right to due process does not entitle him to a prosecution free of such appearances. Cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (stating that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated when his lawyer has a "possible" or "potential" conflict of interest). Instead, a criminal defendant is denied due process only when his former counsel joins a Commonwealth's Attorney's office and is not effectively screened from contact with the Commonwealth's attorneys who are handling the defendant's case on a related matter. See Thompson, 246 So.2d at 763 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Goot, 894 F.2d 231, 236-37
Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding than an attorney who serves as a mediator cannot subsequently represent anyone in a substantially related matter without the consent of the original parties because mediators routinely receive and preserve confidences in much the same manner as an attorney and where the mediator was privy to confidential information the applicable ethical rules impose the same responsibility as the rules relating to any attorneys subsequent representation of a former client (C) holding that defendants right to due process was not violated by the employment of his former counsel in the us attorneys office where the former counsel recused himself and was screened from the prosecution of defendants case (D) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (E) holding that a defendants due process rights are violated only if his former lawyer prosecutes him on a matter related to the representation or discloses client confidences to other prosecutors
answer:
holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person

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otherwise. City of Bellevue v. Kravik, 69 Wn. App. 735, 743, 850 P.2d 559 (1993). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed a single jury to decide this case. CONCLUSION We hold that the "fairly and knowingly made" standard applies only to personal injury releases when the injured party claims unknown injuries, so the trial court should not have used that standard in this case. But, under general contract principles, questions of material fact remain regarding whether the release may be avoided. We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Becker, C.J., and Schindler, J., concur. Reconsideration denied June 23, 2003. 1 In determining whether a release was fairly and knowingly made, courts are 19 (1929) (<HOLDING>). Some jurisdictions have also distinguished
Holding statements: (A) holding that release did not bar plaintiffs claim because plaintiff had no ground to suspect that act complained of had taken place when giving release (B) holding question of fact existed regarding fraud where release signed by plaintiff not understanding english language and defendant failed to cause release to be explained in plaintiffs language (C) holding that exculpatory clause in release plaintiff signed as part of a health club membership agreement was not specific enough to release club from negligence liability (D) holding that release discharges only persons named in or sufficiently described by terms of release (E) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release
answer:
holding that release did not bar plaintiffs claim because plaintiff had no ground to suspect that act complained of had taken place when giving release