In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: judge is provided for in Ind. P-C.R. 1, 4(b), it is not automatic as Barclay asserts. Instead, "the rule requires the judge to examine the affidavit, treat the historical facts recited in the affidavit as true, and determine whether these facts support a rational inference of bias or prejudice." Jackson v. State, 643 N.E.2d 905, 907 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied (citing State ex rel. Whitehead v. Madison County Circuit Court, 626 N.E.2d 802, 803 (Ind.1993)). Barclay's affidavit presents the fact that the trial court judge accepted his guilty plea without an adequate factual basis as his evidence of bias. Even taking this assertion as true, it does not support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. See Smith v. State, 613 N.E.2d 412, 414 (Ind.1993), reh'g denied, cert, denied (<HOLDING>); Jackson, 643 N.E.2d at 907 (holding that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that a judge had ruled against the defendant is not a basis for finding the judge prejudiced (B) holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion (C) holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself (D) holding that trial judge did not err in refusing to transfer to another judge defendants motion for substitution of judge for cause where defendants motion was not made in good faith (E) holding that counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to recuse the judge who presided at trial when the judge had also prosecuted a prior case that was used to enhance the current case
[A]: (C)

[Q]: 393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City's operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature "includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized." City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality's implied
Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality
[A]: (A)

[Q]: Id. at 1179. In Commonwealth v D'Entremont, 36 Mass App 474, 475; 632 NE2d 1239 (1994), the defendant was arrested for rape and placed in a jail cell after invoking his right to remain silent and to have counsel present. A detective subsequently interviewed the victim and then went to the defendant's cell. Id. The detective informed the defendant that she had interviewed the victim and that she knew the defendant had advised the police earlier that he did not want to talk, but if he changed his mind, then she would be willing to speak with him. The defendant informed the detective that he wanted to tell his side of the story. Id. The dete 163 (1982) (finding that inquiries about counsel do not constitute interrogation); Foster v Commonwealth, 8 Va App 167, 174; 380 SE2d 12 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In light of the foregoing authorities, we
Holding statements: (A) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation (B) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (C) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (D) holding that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel police may still legitimately inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (E) holding that the interrogation must cease once the suspect invokes his miranda right to counsel
[A]:
(D)