In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: remanded for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED 1 . In the original petition in the Sullivan Suit, Ms. Sullivan averred that she was represented by a power of attorney appointing Mr. Ban-daries as her attorney in fact and caregiver and granting him "full power and authority and in her name and behalf" to "conduct, man .2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair). But see Marleau v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 333 Or. 82, 37 P.3d 148, 156 (2001)
Holding statements: (A) holding that under south carolina law slander is actionable per se where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery (B) holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under missouri law (C) recognizing that slander per se is actionable without a showing of actual or special damages (D) holding that statement made to plaintiffs neighbors that plaintiff committed adultery was not slander per se because adultery is no longer a crime under oregon law (E) holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under louisiana law

A: (D)
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Q: Court held that a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except upon a "showing of bad faith, har-rassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief." Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. at 754-55. In later cases, the Court has held that the Younger doctrine is "fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S his lower court view, at least by negative inference. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 237-39, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2327-29, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Since the Commonwealth began this eminent
Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated (C) holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits (D) holding that younger abstention was not appropriate because eminent domain proceeding had not yet begun when plaintiffs began their federal court action (E) holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded

A: (D)
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Q: Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117 (quoting Landry v. State, 706 S.W.2d 105, 112 (Tex. Crim.App.1985)). A finding of inherent prejudice is reserved for extreme situations. Id. This determination is to be made on a case-by-case basis. Landry, 706 S.W.2d at 112. In none of the cases which discuss potential effects that external influences may have on a jury do the courts appear to enumerate which factors might be "impermissible," or what degree of risk is "unacceptable." See, e.g., Howard, 941 S.W.2d at 117; Landry, 706 S.W.2d at 112. In general, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for mistrial if the trial court has instructed the jury to disregard the assault. See Williams v. State, 651 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] ur W. 852, 854 (1923) (<HOLDING>). "We will not lightly assume the jury
Holding statements: (A) holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel implied during opening statement that witness had fabricated her testimony (B) holding no injury to guse shown by statement from audience member that contradicted guses testimony because statement was irrelevant to defense presented (C) holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony (D) holding that anonymous statement was admissible as a statement by a partys agent under rule 801d2d and noting that a district court should be presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who is alleged to have made the damaging statement is in fact a party or an agent of that party (E) holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent

A:
(B)
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