In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: any meaning at all, I do not think that [the defendant's statement that he had a .357 magnum and that no one would get hurt if she put the money in the bag] can reasonably be said to constitute an 'express threat of death,' U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). What was conveyed here was, at most, an implicit threat of serious bodily injury or death."). We agree with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, and views of Judges Easterbrook and Arnold that to satisfy the qualifier "express," a defendant's statement must distinctly and directly indicate that the defendant intends to kill or otherwise cause the death of the victim. Because four of the five examples in Application Note 6 do not, they are not controlling. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993)(<HOLDING>). Similarly, reliance on the commentary's
Holding statements: (A) holding that commentary in sentencing guidelines that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the guideline it interprets (B) recognizing the guidelines commentary is authoritative (C) holding that sentencing guidelines commentary must be given controlling weight unless it violates the constitution or a federal statute or is plainly inconsistent with the guidelines itself (D) holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative (E) holding that where the commentary to a guideline is at odds with another provision of the guidelines the guideline prevails
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: further hold that the district court did not commit any procedural error or abuse its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (assuming sentencing decision is procedurally sound, appellate court considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant's proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied, U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1309, L.Ed.2d - (2010); United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). Having reviewed the record independently
Holding statements: (A) holding district court committed no significant procedural error despite departing downward from the guideline range for multiple reasons without explaining the weight it was attributing to each reason (B) recognizing that a party has not preserved a claim of procedural error if the party did not raise it in a manner sufficient to alert the district court to the specific error (C) holding that reviewing court first ensures that district court committed no significant procedural error then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence describing factors demonstrating procedural error (D) holding that a reviewing court must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error (E) holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide an indication of what facts it relied on to make a significant variance from the advisory guidelines range
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: until her date last insured, nor did it mention how frequently Claimant's MS symptoms arise. (Id.) The fact that the ALJ indicated it was "difficult to determine the exact period of time covered by Dr. Russell's opinion" reveals the presence of an ambiguity that the ALJ was required to resolve. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1512(e)(1) (2010). The time-frame the letter covers is especially important, as the record shows Claimant suffered a serious, five week long MS flare-up from February to March 2006 mere weeks before her insured status lapsed. (R. at 14, 18); SSR 96-2p. Likewise, the ALJ made no effort to recontact Dr. TothRussell to explain the ambiguity surrounding the frequency and severity of Claimant's MS flare-ups. (R. at 20); see Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>). Had the ALJ done so, Dr. Toth-Russell could
Holding statements: (A) holding that a domestic plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to more deference than a foreign plaintiffs (B) holding that because the alj did not have the plaintiffs entire prior record he could not have constructively reopened the prior applications (C) holding that a plaintiffs belief that a product could fail in the future is not without more a legal injury sufficient to support plaintiffs claim (D) holding that plaintiffs are not required to have asked for the precise form of relief that the district court may ultimately grant (E) holding that the alj should have contacted the plaintiffs doctor and asked for more detail regarding the fre quency of plaintiffs seizures
[EX A]:
(E)