TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of the [Marion County] small claims court shall be taken to the superior court of the county and tried de novo." Retaining the identical language, the Legislature re-codified the statute in 2004 as Indiana Code section 33-34-3-15(a). 2 . Atlantic Coast sought interlocutory review of the trial court's order, which the Court of Appeals accepted. The Court of Appeals addressed this claim in the instant appeal. 3 . Atlantic Coast does not challenge the Court of Appeals' determination regarding the discovery order, and the Cooks do not challenge the determination that they waived appellate review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Delta Airlines on the Cooks' negligence claim. 4 . Compare, for example, Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3rd Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>), and O'Carroll v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation (B) holding that general maritime law preempts state law (C) holding that the flsa preempts certain state law claims (D) holding that federal common law of erisa preempts state law in the interpretation of erisa benefit plans (E) holding that federal law establishes the applicable standards of care in the field of aviation safety generally and thus preempts the entire field from state regulation

SOLUTION: holding federal law preempts state regulation of voip provider but expressing no opinion on applicability of state laws generally governing such companies including laws concerning taxation

PROBLEM: be dismissed even if a minute entry is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Rule 4(c), because the trial court judge did not sign the minutes as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-1-106. We disagree. The only page from the trial court minutes for August 28, 2006, that was filed with this Court was the page that included the entry regarding the defendant's case. While it is true that the particular page of the minutes extracted to supplement the appellate record does not bear the signature of the trial court judge, there is no proof that the judge did not sign the minutes on a subsequent page not included in the record before us, and we presume that the minutes were signed as required by section 16-1-106. See Hull v. Vaughn, 171 Tenn. 642, 107 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1937) (<HOLDING>) There is no proof in the record that rebuts
Holding statements: (A) holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body (B) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (C) holding that even in absence of proof that chancellor signed court minutes it must be presumed that he did so and noting that ejvery officer is presumed to have performed his duty (D) holding it immaterial that one charged with willfully selling unregistered securities had no actual knowledge that he was violating the law because he was presumed to have and is chargeable with knowledge of the laws under which he was undertaking to do business (E) holding that where the debtor did not act but merely had knowledge of and benefit from the fraudulent transfer he was not considered to have performed it

SOLUTION: holding that a son could be bound by a contract that he signed even though his fathers name and not his appeared in the body

PROBLEM: to which the benefits administrator must exercise discretion in the discharge of his duties is likewise a significant factor in determining a question of ERISA preemption because it is indicative of the complexity of the benefit program. See O'Connor, 251 F.3d at 267 ("The determination of what constitutes an ERISA plan thus turns most often on the degree of an employer's discretion in administering the plan."); Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323 (ruling that a plan requiring "case-by-case, discretionary application" of the terms required an administrative scheme, and thus brought the benefits plan within the scope of ERISA even though the term of the employer's obligation to pay was short and the number of participants was small); see also Rodowicz, 192 F.3d at 171; Belanger, 71 F.3d at 455 (<HOLDING>). As such, this factor relates to both the
Holding statements: (A) holding benefit program that entailed a purely mechanical determination of eligibility and did not require any discretionary judgment on the part of the administrator was not an erisa plan (B) holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage (C) holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan (D) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (E) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant

SOLUTION:
holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage