TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: while the parties informally agreed to extend the discovery deadline in order to allow further expert depositions, we do not regard this arrangement as a waiver by plaintiffs of their right to receive documents of such volume and complexity in a sufficiently timely manner to allow an effective response. We recognize, of course, the normal tendency for preparations to intensify as trial approaches and, thus, suggest no general bar to material produced seasonably and in good faith. See Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 266 (1st Cir.1993). In this case, however, we believe that, if Ford intended to rely on this evidence at trial, it should have made more diligent efforts at its timely production. Cf. Glover v. Grace Pac. Corp., 86 Hawai'i 154, 164, 948 P.2d 575, 585 (App.1997) (<HOLDING>). The trial court, nevertheless, distinguished
Holding statements: (A) holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates (B) holding the record which included the opinion of several physicians was sufficient for the alj to arrive at a decision (C) holding that the trial court properly excluded an expert who failed to arrive at his final opinion before the discovery cutoff date (D) holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates (E) holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates

SOLUTION: holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates

PROBLEM: misconduct "that has affected the grand jury's charging decision and is brought to the attention of the trial court before the commencement of trial"). The defendant suggests that Benjamin should not be applied retroactively to bar her claim. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (setting forth a three-part test for determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively). We sympathize with the defendant's belief that retroactive application of Benjamin to preclude any appeal would "pro duce substantial inequitable results." Id. at 107, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1968)); cf. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 928, 93
Holding statements: (A) holding that a shortened statute of limitations should not be applied retroactively as to bar otherwise valid civil claims (B) holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void (C) holding amendment to statute of limitations was a procedural amendment to be applied retroactively in a medical malpractice case (D) holding statute that extended statute of limitations for certain criminal sexual conduct could not be applied retroactively to a prosecution commenced after the limitations statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense had expired (E) holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases

SOLUTION: holding that annulment of the automatic stay can be retroactively applied to validate proceedings that otherwise would be void

PROBLEM: at 1034-35, we are compelled by our precedent to decide the Eleventh Amendment issue first. See Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1126 (10th Cir.1999) ("Because the State's assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, the issue must be resolved before a court may address the merits of Martin's underlying ADA claim."), overruled on other grounds by Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001). Once effectively raised, the Eleventh Amendment becomes a limitation on our subject-matter jurisdiction, and we may not then assume "hypothetical jurisdiction" to reject a plaintiffs claim on the merits. Id.; cf. Fent v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 235 F.3d 553, 558-59 (10th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Some statutory questions are both logically
Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to allege plaintiffs citizenship in notice of removal amounted to defect in removal procedure under former version of 28 usc 1447c (B) holding that under 28 usc 1447c and d federal jurisdiction terminates once a section 1447c remand order has been mailed to the state court (C) holding that a proper eleventh amendment challenge strips the courts of jurisdiction for the purposes of the removal statute 28 usc 1447c (D) holding that the supreme court of pennsylvania is a state entity for purposes of the eleventh amendment (E) holding that a county is not an arm of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment

SOLUTION:
holding that failure to allege plaintiffs citizenship in notice of removal amounted to defect in removal procedure under former version of 28 usc 1447c