In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: century context. We hold, therefore, that a plaintiff may not recover for mental anguish for a potential injury to her unborn child that is wholly unsupported by any physical suffering during and after the incident in question and that explicitly has been ruled out by routine medical diagnostics. We are mindful of the fact, however, that pregnancy and childbirth continue to pose great mysteries that escape complete comprehension and control, and that carry risks with them, which, despite the latest advancements in medical research and technology, cannot be fully assessed. This has led some of our sister states to sustain their holdings in cases involving mental anguish suffered by pregnant women in recent decisions. See, e.g., Simons v. Beard, 188 Or.App. 370, 72 P.3d 96 (2003) (<HOLDING>). We emphasize that in an appropriate case this
Holding statements: (A) holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident (B) holding that a pregnant woman whose baby died just before being born as a direct result of defendantdoctors negligence was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension about the childs wellbeing before death after she learned that the baby was in a transverse position across the upper part of the birth canal and defendant did not undertake any steps to correct the position until after the baby had died (C) holding female supervisors alleged comments that she did not want to add stress to the baby were sufficient direct evidence in a pregnancy discrimination mixed motives case (D) holding woman who claimed she was terminated after giving birth because she became pregnant was part of the protected class (E) holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that the victim suffered before she died based on numerous bruises on her forearms that appeared to be defensive wounds and the large amount of blood found at the scene of the crime indicating that many of the wounds were inflicted before the victim died
[A]: holding that a woman who was six months pregnant at the time of the accident was permitted to recover damages for her apprehension that her child may be born dead or deformed as a result of striking her abdomen against the steering wheel in the accident

[Q]: District Attorney's Office to discriminate in the jury selection process. On April 26, 2007, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant relief and the instant appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claim: The lower court erred by limiting Appellant's hearing solely to proof of a policy or culture of discrimination by the Philadelphia District Attorney and further erred by denying Appellant the opportunity to develop and prove discrimination in his case. Before we proceed with a review of the merits of this issue, we must ascertain whether the PCRA court was correct in its conclusion that Appellant timely filed his fifth PCRA petition for, if he did not, we are without jurisdiction to address his claim. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1), any PCRA
Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts (C) holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding 2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed
[A]: holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed

[Q]: invites an error may not later challenge that error on appeal. Id. As a result, "[wjhere invited error exists, it precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule and reversing." Id. (quotation omitted). In this case, not only did appellant fail to object to the district court's imposition of a consecutive sentence, but his attorney agreed with the court that U.S.S.G. 7B1.3(f) directed the court to impose a consecutive sentence. In short, the invited error doctrine precludes our consideration of the first issue appellant raises. II. A district court commits Booker error if it applies the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (11th Cir.2005); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (<HOLDING>). While U.S.S.G. 7B1.3(f) states that any
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts use of the sentencing guidelines as a mandatory regime was harmless error because appellant could not receive a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum required by 2251d (B) holding that the mere mandatory application of the guidelines the district courts belief that it was required to impose a guidelines sentence constitutes error (C) holding that a district courts treatment of the guidelines as mandatory renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable (D) recognizing that if a guidelines error did not affect the district courts selection of the sentence imposed the sentence should be affirmed (E) holding that a sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court committed no significant procedural error such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating the guidelines range treating the guidelines as mandatory failing to consider the 3553a factors selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence emphasis added
[A]:
holding that the district courts use of the sentencing guidelines as a mandatory regime was harmless error because appellant could not receive a lesser sentence than the mandatory minimum required by 2251d