Input: We need natural resources for just about everything we do. We need them for food and clothing, for building materials and energy. We even need them to have fun. Table 2.1 gives examples of how we use natural resources. Can you think of other ways we use natural resources? Use Vehicles Resources Rubber for tires from rubber trees Steel frames and other metal parts from minerals such as iron Example iron ore Electronics Plastic cases from petroleum prod- ucts Glass screens from minerals such as lead lead ore Use Homes Resources Nails from minerals such as iron Timber from trees Example spruce timber Jewelry Gemstones such as diamonds Minerals such as silver silver ore Food Sunlight, water, and soil Minerals such as phosphorus corn seeds in soil Clothing Wool from sheep Cotton from cotton plants cotton plants Recreation Water for boating and swimming Forests for hiking and camping pine forest Some natural resources are renewable. Others are not. It depends, in part, on how we use them.

Does the response "Some are, some aren't, depending on how we use them" correctly answer the question "Are natural resources renewable?"?
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Output: yes

Input: The Bush administration did not develop new diplomatic initiatives on al Qaeda with the Saudi government before 9/11. Vice President Cheney called Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5, 2001, to seek Saudi help in preventing threatened attacks on American facilities in the Kingdom. Secretary of State Powell met with the crown prince twice before 9/11. They discussed topics like Iraq, not al Qaeda.U.S.-Saudi relations in the summer of 2001 were marked by sometimes heated disagreements about ongoing Israeli- Palestinian violence, not about Bin Laden. The confirmation of the Pentagon's new leadership was a lengthy process. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was confirmed in March 2001 and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in July. Though the new officials were briefed about terrorism and some of the earlier planning, including that for Operation Infinite Resolve, they were focused, as Secretary Rumsfeld told us, on creating a twenty-first-century military. At the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton did not recall much interest by the new administration in military options against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He could not recall any specific guidance on the topic from the secretary. Brian Sheridan-the outgoing assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC), the key counterterrorism policy office in the Pentagon-never briefed Rumsfeld. He departed on January 20; he had not been replaced by 9/11. Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in terrorism, which came up often in his regular meetings with Tenet. He thought that the Defense Department, before 9/11, was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with new threats like terrorism. But his time was consumed with getting new officials in place and working on the foundation documents of a new defense policy, the quadrennial defense review, the defense planning guidance, and the existing contingency plans. He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that engaged his attention before 9/11, other than the development of the Predator unmanned aircraft system. The commander of Central Command, General Franks, told us that he did not regard the existing plans as serious. To him a real military plan to address al Qaeda would need to go all the way, following through the details of a full campaign (including the political-military issues of where operations would be based) and securing the rights to fly over neighboring countries. The draft presidential directive circulated in June 2001 began its discussion of the military by reiterating the Defense Department's lead role in protecting its forces abroad.

Does the response "Sheridan" correctly answer the question "Whose time was consumed with getting new officials in place"?
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Output: no

Input: After the disruption of the plot in Amman, it had not escaped notice in Washington that Hijazi had lived in California and driven a cab in Boston and that Deek was a naturalized U.S. citizen who, as Berger reminded President Clinton, had been in touch with extremists in the United States as well as abroad. Before Ressam's arrest, Berger saw no need to raise a public alarm at home- although the FBI put all field offices on alert. Now, following Ressam's arrest, the FBI asked for an unprecedented number of special wiretaps. Both Berger andTenet told us that their impression was that more Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) wiretap requests were processed during the millennium alert than ever before. The next day, writing about Ressam's arrest and links to a cell in Montreal, Berger informed the President that the FBI would advise police in the United States to step up activities but would still try to avoid undue public alarm by stressing that the government had no specific information about planned attacks. At a December 22 meeting of the Small Group of principals, FBI Director Louis Freeh briefed officials from the NSC staff, CIA, and Justice on wiretaps and investigations inside the United States, including a Brooklyn entity tied to the Ressam arrest, a seemingly unreliable foreign report of possible attacks on seven U.S. cities, two Algerians detained on the Canadian border, and searches in Montreal related to a jihadist cell. The Justice Department released a statement on the alert the same day. Clarke's staff warned, "Foreign terrorist sleeper cells are present in the US and attacks in the US are likely." Clarke asked Berger to try to make sure that the domestic agencies remained alert." Is there a threat to civilian aircraft?"he wrote. Clarke also asked the principals in late December to discuss a foreign security service report about a Bin Laden plan to put bombs on transatlantic flights. The CSG met daily. Berger said that the principals met constantly. Later, when asked what made her decide to ask Ressam to step out of his vehicle, Diana Dean, a Customs inspector who referred Ressam to secondary inspection, testified that it was her "training and experience." It appears that the heightened sense of alert at the national level played no role in Ressam's detention. There was a mounting sense of public alarm. The earlier Jordanian arrests had been covered in the press, and Ressam's arrest was featured on network evening news broadcasts throughout the Christmas season. The FBI was more communicative during the millennium crisis than it had ever been.

Does the response "Yes" correctly answer the question "Is Clarke's staff part of the Justice Department?"?
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Output:
yes