In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: potentially to have lost contact with family, friends, or each other. But that consequence is not "serious harm" and warning of such a consequence is not a "threat" under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In applying the Act, we must distinguish between "Dimproper threats or coercion and permissible warnings of adverse but legitimate consequences." United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 151 (1st Cir.2004), judgment vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101, 125 S.Ct. 2543, 162 L.Ed.2d 271 (2005); cf. Dann, 652 F.3d at 1170 (Act aims at serious trafficking and threats of dire consequences). This case involves the latter. A church is entitled to stop associating with someone who abandons it. Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). A church may also warn that it will stop
Holding statements: (A) holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause (B) holding that the free exercise clause protects the practice of shunning explaining that when the members of a cjhurch no longer want to associate with someone who has abandoned them those members are free under the first amendment to make that choice (C) holding that shortterm and sporadic interference with free exercise rights does not violate the first amendment (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) recognizing serious harm results when members of the legal profession engage in criminal acts which give rise to a lack of confidence by members of the public in those who are officers of the court
[A]: holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause

[Q]: Brown's argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on "any person"). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown's conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no
Holding statements: (A) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (B) holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen (C) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (D) holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct (E) holding police officer is a public official
[A]: holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel

[Q]: of the state. Our interpretation today is consistent with previous decisions construing the same phrase. In determining the state departments and agencies that are entitled to sovereign immunity, this Court has never restricted the defense or its waiver to entities with the words "department" or "agency" in their title. Instead, we have held that the terms apply to state political subdivisions and governmental entities, including the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia and counties. Likewise, we have held that the phrase in the 1991 amendment does not apply to municipalities or local hospital authorities because they are neither the state nor a department or agency of the state. Based on the language and legislative history of the 19 217 Ga. 712 (124 SE2d 733) (1962) (<HOLDING>); State Ports Auth. v. Arnall, 201 Ga. 713 (41
Holding statements: (A) holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act (B) holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government (C) holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act (D) holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board (E) holding that two entities were a single employer and therefore that their gross receipts could be totaled together to establish jurisdiction under the national labor relations act
[A]:
holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act