In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia's onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts "Where there is no material connection between the district and'the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action." Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 'When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made." Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether
Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action

Output: holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership

Input: Consider Input: search a premises, Weston, 67 M.J. at 393 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988), I do not believe that case to be controlling. Matlock was arrested on the front lawn of the house, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988, and placed in a nearby police car. Id. at 179, 94 S.Ct. 988 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The arresting officers subsequently approached the house, spoke with a resident who shared a bedroom with Matlock, and received permission to search that bedroom. Id. at 166, 94 S.Ct. 988. The police did not ask Matlock for his consent to search the bedroom, nor did he offer it. Id. The Supreme Court recognized the consent of the cotenant may be valid against a eotenant who has not objected. Id. at 170, 94 S.Ct. 988; see also Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179-80, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (<HOLDING>). This case differs from Matlock and Rodriguez
Holding statements: (A) holding cotenants consent to search valid where rodriguez who was asleep inside the house was not asked for his consent if police reasonably believed the consenter possessed common authority over the premises (B) holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez (C) holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises (D) holding that consent to search premises includes consent to search washing machine on those premises (E) holding that there is no violation of the fourth amendment when the government reasonably believed that the individual giving consent to the search had authority to do so

Output: holding that the agents superficial and cursory questioning of the consenting party did not disclose sufficient information for the agent reasonably to believe that she had common authority over the premises and that further inquiry was required under rodriguez

Input: Consider Input: that the recipients of the devices used the devices for their intended purpose to receive unauthorized cable service offered on the plaintiffs system. Id. at 460. Similarly, the district court in DIRECTV Inc. v. McCool, 339 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1033 (M.D.Tenn.2004), found that a factual dispute existed for trial where defendant denied that he purchased and used an un-looper device, and plaintiffs evidence of unlawful interception of DIRECTV's satellite signal, "albeit circumstantial," showed "that an order was placed for the unlooper by someone using Defendant's credit card and e-mail address, and that the unlooper was shipped to Defendant's residential address." Id. at 1034; see also DirectTV, Inc. v. Griepsma, No. 03-CV-6243-CJS-JWF, 2005 WL 608250 at *7 (W.D.N.Y. March 11, 2005)(<HOLDING>). A genuine issue of material fact clearly
Holding statements: (A) holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence (B) holding that although there was no direct evidence of use of an unlooper by the defendant use could be inferred from the purchase and delivery of the unlooper to the defendant (C) holding that the use of a corset spring device was public although the use was by its nature not visible to the general public (D) holding that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and defendant because there was no evidence that the parties agreed that defendant would be acting primarily for the benefit of the plaintiffs (E) holding that direct proof of intent to defraud is unnecessary and that it may be inferred from the act of the parties and from all circumstances
Output: holding that fraud may be inferred from circumstantial evidence