In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir.1983) (requiring the defendant to shave); United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310, 1316 (10th Cir.1978) (same); United States v. Murray, 523 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1975) (requiring the defendant to wear a wig); United States v. Roberts, 481 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir.1973) (requiring the defendant to put on a stocking mask worn during the robbery). If a defendant who is compelled to don clothing before the jury does not "testify" for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause, it would seem to follow, a fortiori,' that the Self-Incrimination Clause also provides that a defendant who voluntarily dons clothing before the jury may not be required to subject himself to cross-examination. See United States v. Bay, 762 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that a physical
Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted (B) holding that the district court correctly declined to instruct the jury that the government was required to prove as an element of the offense that the defendant did not intend to establish a life with his wife (C) holding that a district court did not err in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a downward departure due to his status as an alien subject to removal (D) holding that the district court erred in concluding that a defendant was required to take the stand to display his tattoos because the government may compel a defendant to display such physical characteristics (E) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered
holding that district court did not err in concluding after an evidentiary hearing that the immunity agreement between defendant and the government did not extend to the charge being prosecuted

of record rather than the alien. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also favor notice of counsel of record rather than actual notice of the client. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) (stating that "whenever service under these rules is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court"). Case precedent also indicates that actual notice of an alien is not required under the INA. See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 669 n. 6 (3d Cir.1990) (noting in dicta that notice to attorney comprised actual notice to alien); Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 502-3 (D.C.Cir.1989) (finding actual knowledge of attorney constitutes reasonable notice); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193, 1194 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Anin received notice as required by the INA.
Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (D) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (E) holding that notice to original attorney not formally withdrawn comprised proper notice
holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city

discs to also take a license to Lagadec, an allegedly-nonessential Sony patent. Tying arrangements have a long history in both the patent misuse and antitrust contexts. Much of the Supreme Court's early patent misuse doctrine was developed in cases involving a challenge to some form of tying arrangement. In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 490-91, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 L.Ed. 363 (1942), for example, the Court held that a tying arrangement where the patent license was conditioned upon the purchase of a separate, staple product amounted to patent misuse, because in such a case "the patent is used as a means of restraining competition with the patentee's sale of an unpatented product." Id. at 493, 62 S.Ct. 402; see also III. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45-46, 126 S.Ct. 1281 (<HOLDING>). Likewise, the early antitrust cases found
Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorneys negligence alone does not qualify for such relief (B) holding that a patent alone does not confer market power necessary to show unlawful tying (C) holding that the mere delivery of documents does not confer jurisdiction (D) holding that the flsa does not confer jurisdiction over ambulance services (E) holding that the due process clause does not generally confer affirmative rights to governmental aid even where such aid may be necessary to secure life
holding that an attorneys negligence alone does not qualify for such relief