In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: (Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies creates a jurisdictional bar to proceeding with the claim. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) ("[Njoncompliance [with Chapter 21's administrative procedures] deprives courts of subject-matter, jurisdiction."); Smith v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). A would-be Chapter 21 claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the civil rights division of the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. 21.201(a) .(stating that an aggrieved person "may file a complaint with the commission"); id. 21.0015 (defining "commission" as "the Texas Workforce Commission civil rights division"); Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486-88 (<HOLDING>). The complaint must be filed "not later than
Holding statements: (A) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent (B) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (C) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may (E) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional
[EX A]: holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent

[EX Q]: ... shall exist within the United States," U.S. Const, amend. XIII, 1, and empowers Congress to enforce its provisions, see U.S. Const, amend. XIII, 2. The Supreme Court has interpreted this grant of power broadly, finding that Congress can affirmatively enforce the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude, and enact legislation to erase "all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). Moreover, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), the Supreme Court opened the door to the inclusion of private acts of racial discrimination within the "badges and incidents of slavery" language as stated in the Civil Rights Cases. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (<HOLDING>). Although the Thirteenth Amendment was
Holding statements: (A) holding that 42 usc 1982 a provision of the civil rights act of 1866 which allows victims of racial discrimination to sue private defendants was a valid exercise of congress thirteenth amendment authority (B) holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation (C) holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc 1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims (D) holding that the retaliation provision of title vii is an adequate exercise of congress authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights
[EX A]: holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation

[EX Q]: OGA for breach of contract and conversion. The jury found for Hardi 4, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (permitting mother of deceased son to recover mental-anguish damages on her breach-of-contract claim against entity that improperly prepared son's body for burial); Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734-35 (Tex. 1993) (setting forth elements of IIED claim and holding that defendant's conduct was not outrageous as matter of law because defendant may assert its legal rights in permissible way, even if assertion causes mental anguish). The second is that mental anguish stemming from the birth and rearing of a health^ child is not a compensable injury. See Pressil v. Gibson, 477 S.W.3d 402, 410-11 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); cf. Delgado v. Methodist Hosp., 936 S.W.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff could recover both doubled damages under the state regulation of manufacturers distributors and dealers act and punitive damages in connection with the common law claim because the act expressly allows both types of damages (B) holding that a plaintiff could recover actual damages under the tcpa for loss of credit if the plaintiff submitted sufficient proof of the amount damages requested (C) holding that a plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages because he had failed to rebut the defendants prima facie showing that the alleged trespass was not attended by words or acts of insult or contumely (D) holding that plaintiff could not recover mentalanguish damages in connection with the birth of healthy children (E) holding that in order to recover damages under the lanham act plaintiff must prove that there was a violation that plaintiff has been damaged and that there is a causal connection between the violation and those damages
[EX A]:
holding that plaintiff could recover both doubled damages under the state regulation of manufacturers distributors and dealers act and punitive damages in connection with the common law claim because the act expressly allows both types of damages