In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: small pieces of the Walkway, or access to the Walkway, built upon it. See Def.-Int. Reply at p. 14 (noting that the second of two issues remaining for the Court to decide, given that the public trust doctrine gov erns a large portion of the land at issue, is "whether the state acted rationally in determining that access across the perpendicular paths and scattered small portions of the Walkway constructed on uplands is 'reasonably necessary' to protect that public's right of access to the remaining 88.7 percent of the Walkway that is situated on tidelands"). Plaintiffs' taking claims with respect to this small portion of the property at issue are governed by the reasonableness test enunciated in Matthews. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 326, 471 A.2d 355 (1984) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 93, 83
Holding statements: (A) holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege (B) holding that in order to exercise its rights under the public trust doctrine the public must be given both access to and use of privatelyowned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary (C) holding that the borough of deals dedication of a portion of a beach for use by its residents only was immaterial given the public trust doctrines requirement that the public be afforded the right to enjoy all dry sand beaches owned by a municipality (D) holding that under the public standing doctrine it is only necessary that the relator shall be a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws (E) recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public
[EX A]: holding that public use of a beach was presumed to have originated by permission and to have continued as a license until some act of the public or public official asserted the use to be exercised as a matter of right rather than privilege

[EX Q]: acted outside their jurisdiction. In sum, none of Pasiewicz's arguments show that Sandahl and Henning violated the Constitution when they arrested him. They and the other officers (Johnson in particular) certainly could have, and we think should have, proceeded with more caution. They get no commendation ribbons for the way they handled this case. Pasiewicz's claim against the forest preserve district (even assuming it's a suable entity) for failure to train or supervise its officers properly regarding the laws of search, seizure, and jurisdiction is a born loser. Because the officers did not violate Pasiewicz's constitutional rights, he did not suffer constitutional injury. Accordingly, under City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed. 1412 (D.D.C.1983) (<HOLDING>), it is worth pointing out that Ross involved
Holding statements: (A) holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure (B) holding that an arrest made by an officer outside his jurisdiction does not violate the fourth amendment (C) holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment (D) holding that a search incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding that the concept of reasonableness in the fourth amendment logically presupposes an exercise of lawful authority by a police officer
[EX A]: holding that knockandannounce principle is an element of the fourth amendment reasonableness inquiry because we have little doubt that the framers of the fourth amendment thought that the method of an officers entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search and seizure

[EX Q]: court had not resolved, on the merits, whether LaConsay and Wetzel were entitled to recover litigation expenses in the condemnation action. Upon dismissal of their October 2006 appeals, LaConsay and Wetzel properly returned to the probate court for a ruling on their still pending motions for litigation expenses. The probate court subsequently ruled upon those pending motions, awarding litigation expenses to LaConsay and Wetzel. Langley appealed that award to the circuit court, and LaConsay and Wet-zel cross-appealed; those second appeals were timely and properly filed. See 18-1A-283, AIa.Code 1975 (allowing parties to a condemnation action in the probate court 30 days in which to appeal to the circuit court for a de novo trial). See also Holman v. Bane, 698 So.2d 117, 120 (Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>); and Paulk v. McCarty, 855 So.2d 1123
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees (B) holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case (C) holding that correct way to perfect claim for attorney fees under 285 is through compliance with fedrcivp 54d2b which requires motions for attorney fees to be filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment (D) holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees (E) holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because it was filed before the final order awarding attorneys fees
[EX A]:
holding because an award of attorney fees is discretionary court may consider attorney fees in relation to the underlying equities in the case