Instructions: In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.
Input: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ''Iraq Contingency
Planning Act''.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to require the President
to promptly inform Congress regarding what contingency plans are or
will be in place to respond to three scenarios regarding future
developments in Iraq as identified by the most recent National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds as follows:
(1) The United States initiated combat operations against
the Saddam Hussein regime on March 19, 2003, and concluded
those operations in April 2004 with the defeat of the Iraqi
military and the collapse of the Hussein regime.
(2) The Bush Administration had been warned that while
military action against the Hussein regime would likely
succeed, rebuilding Iraq and winning the peace would be more
difficult. In particular, intelligence reports from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's Joint Staff, the Department
of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Central
Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Council warned that
United States troops could face significant postwar resistance.
An Army War College report from February 2003 warned that
without an ''overwhelming'' effort to prepare for the United
States occupation of Iraq, ''The United States may find itself
in a radically different world over the next few years, a world
in which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow
of new problems of America's own making.''.
(3) Despite these warnings, the Bush Administration invaded
Iraq without a comprehensive plan in place to secure and
rebuild the country.
(4) United States Armed Forces personnel have remained in
Iraq since the beginning of combat operations, and in over
nearly four years of war, hundreds of thousands of members of
the Armed Forces have served with honor and distinction in
Iraq, over 3,100 members of the Armed Forces have died, and
over 22,500 members of the Armed Forces have been wounded.
(5) On January 10, 2007, after years of growing sectarian
violence in Iraq, President George W. Bush addressed the
American people to announce a plan entitled ''The New Way
Forward in Iraq'', consisting of the additional deployments of
at least 21,500 United States troops in Iraq.
(6) On January 16, 2007, the Secretary of Defense said that
''we expect in certain areas to be able to see whether the
Iraqi government is carrying out the commitments that it has
made and that are so critical to the success of this strategy .
. . within two or three months.''.
(7) On February 5, 2007, the President submitted a request
for supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2007, including
$5,600,000,000 to increase United States forces in the Iraqi
theater of operations to support the Government of Iraq with
21,500 United States ground forces and an expanded Naval
presence. At the same time, the President also submitted a
proposed budget for fiscal year 2008 which did not request
funding for these additional troops in Iraq.
(8) On February 1, 2007, the intelligence community
presented to the President the first National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iraq in nearly four years.
(9) The NIE, the most authoritative written judgment of the
Director of National Intelligence with respect to Iraq, states
that ''Iraqi society's growing polarization, the persistent
weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and
all sides' ready recourse to violence are collectively driving
an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political
extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show
measurable progress during ... the coming 12 to 18 months, we
assess that the overall security situation will continue to
deteriorate.''.
(10) The NIE states that as Iraq's security environment
worsens, three prospective security paths could emerge--
(A) chaos leading to partition;
(B) emergence of a Shia strongman; or
(C) anarchic fragmentation of power.
(11) Congress needs to know how the Administration expects
to respond to each of those possibilities, and what specific
plans are being taken and what specific plans are being
developed to be able to respond to such possibilities.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR IRAQ.

(a) Report Required.--Not later than June 30, 2007, the President
shall transmit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate a report detailing contingency plans for
how the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies of the
Federal Government will respond to the following three prospective
security paths in Iraq, as outlined in the 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Iraq:
(1) Chaos leading to partition.--Described by the NIE as
follows: ''A rapid deterioration in the capacity of Iraq's
central government to function, security services and other
aspects of sovereignty would collapse. Resulting widespread
fighting could produce de facto partition, dividing Iraq into
three mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this magnitude
would generate fierce violence for at least several years,
ranging well beyond the time frame of this estimate, before
settling into a partially stable end-state.''.
(2) Emergence of a shia strongman.--Described by the NIE as
follows: ''Instead of a disintegrating central government
producing partition, a security implosion could lead Iraq's
potentially most powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent
strength.''.
(3) Anarchic fragmentation of power.--Described by the NIE
as follows: ''The emergence of a checkered pattern of local
control would present the greatest potential for instability,
mixing extreme ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating
intra-group clashes.''.
(b) Additional Information.--The report shall include detailed
information regarding the proposed role of the United States Armed
Forces under each of the three prospective security paths referred to
in subsection (a), including a comprehensive analysis to identify and
justify the number of United States troops needed in each case, and the
proposed roles of other departments and agencies of the Federal
Government.
Output:
Iraq Contingency Planning Act - Requires the President by June 30, 2007, to report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees detailing U.S. and U.S. Armed Forces contingency plans to respond to the following three scenarios regarding future developments in Iraq as identified by the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq: (1) chaos leading to partition; (2) emergence of a Shia strongman; and (3) anarchic fragmentation of power.