In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: matter. When it is clear, however, from the relevant parts of the contract taken together and considered with the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement, that the obligation in question was within the contemplation of the parties or was necessary to effect their intention, then such obligation may be implied and enforced. But when the contract between the parties speaks to the obligation sought to be implied, the courts will not write that implied obligation into the contract. Stated conversely, there may be an implied covenant on the part of the lessee (in the absence of any expressed on the subject as in the lease).[ ] Id. (citations, alterations, and quotation omitted). See also Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 123 N.M. 526, 943 P.2d 560, 569 (1997) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in accordance with New Mexico law, any
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions (B) holding that courts cannot imply covenants which are inconsistent with express provisions (C) holding that state courts may not enforce racially restrictive covenants (D) holding that the restrictive covenants at issue are unenforceable as a matter of public policy (E) holding that the law will not imply a contract where there is an existing express contract covering the same subject matter

Output: recognizing that endorsement would prevail if inconsistent with policy provisions

Input: Consider Input: individual has breached a duty of reasonable care. Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 443, 386 S.E.2d 76 (1989), aff'd, 327 N.C. 464, 396 S.E.2d 323 (1990). Sudden emergency does not change or reduce the standard of reasonable care. It is simply one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a person acted reasonably under the circumstances. Id. The sudden emergency doctrine permits the court to call to the attention of the jury that an emergency faced by the actor may influence its determination of whether specific conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of sudden emergency is not a legal defense which operates to bar an action. Id. But cf. Hinson v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 661, 343 S.E.2d 284, rev. denied, 318 N.C. 282, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986) (<HOLDING>). External forces that have been found to
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency (B) holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead (C) recognizing that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense a party must plead and prove (D) holding that a claim of exemption is an affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded (E) holding that to avoid an affirmative defense a plaintiff must plead specifically matters of affirmative avoidance pursuant to rule 5508

Output: holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency

Input: Consider Input: definition was first approved by the Supreme Court in 1907, Victor, supra, at 9, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 92, 27 S.Ct. 456, 51 L.Ed. 722 (1907), and widely adopted by state courts, although it later met with criticism in various states. Id. at 9, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (citing) People v. Brigham, 25 Cal.3d 283, 157 Cal.Rptr. 905, 599 P.2d 100, 106-121 (1979)). Nevertheless, the jury instruction at issue in Cage represents a clear break from the past insofar as the Court criticized one form of jury instruction in which "reasonable doubt" was defined, in part, as "moral certainty," Cage, supra, at 41, and is retroactively appl ies the prejudice requirement for establishing federal habeas jurisdiction. Cf. Restrepo v. Kelly, 178 F.3d 634, 640-41 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). As such, Mercer has satisfied both the cause
Holding statements: (A) holding in context of sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel based on asserted failure of counsel to file appeal established prejudice per se for purpose of establishing habeas review jurisdiction as if proven such failure constitutes denial of a fundamental constitutional right (B) holding that failure to file brief on appeal to bia constitutes ineffective assistance but affirming the denial of habeas because petitioner could not show prejudice (C) holding that an attorneys conflict of interest gives rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment and establishes prejudice per se (D) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (E) holding on appeal from a habeas corpus denial that counsel was not ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal because of defendants escape
Output: holding that failure to file brief on appeal to bia constitutes ineffective assistance but affirming the denial of habeas because petitioner could not show prejudice