In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word "claimant" in subsection four. Under the plurality's view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word "claimant" in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of "prevailing party." This is because, in order for the word "claimant" in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from
Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
was allegedly violated on each date, despite the fact that the EOP contained several different provisions referring to various types of acts. Be cause the Counts in the Complaint merely alleged that Corder "did intentionally or knowingly violate the [EOP] issued in FC-DA No. 05-1-1551 on August 2, 2006[,]" without designating which conduct and sections within the EOP were violated, "the nature and cause of the accusation [could not] be understood by a person of common understanding from a reading of the Complaint itself." Israel, 78 Hawai'i at 71, 890 P.2d at 308 (internal quotations marks omitted). The Complaint did reference in its caption (as opposed to in the charges) Police Report No. 07-016631 with respect to Count I, Police Report No. 07-021001 with respect t 1078, 1081 (1980) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, the Complaint was defective. II.
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the hrpp does not permit a broad and freeranging discovery in criminal cases (B) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (C) holding that discovery under the federal rules of civil procedure is broad in scope and freely permitted (D) recognizing that the facts that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hrpp rule 7a and that other discovery rules are limited in scope might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position (E) recognizing the fact that a bill of particulars is discretionary with the judge pursuant to hawaii rules of penal procedure hrpp rule 7a and the fact that other discovery rules given to the defendant are limited might prevent a defendant from discovering the states position

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
the Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits that actual innocence applies to a sentencing enhancement. Even assuming it does, courts applying actual innocence for non-capital sentencing have noted that for purposes of the actual innocence exception, " 'actual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604. Thus, some circuits have held that "for the actual innocence exception to apply in the noncapital sentencing context, a movant must show that he is factually innocent of the conduct or underlying crime that serves as the predicate for the enhanced sentence." McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1198-99 (11th Cir.2011) (involving career offender guidelines). See also United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 284 (4th Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>); cf. Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 381-82
Holding statements: (A) holding that the actual innocence exception applies to a sentencing enhancement in a noncapital sentence (B) holding that no complete innocence exception to the doench doctrine exists (C) holding under acca that the actual innocence of sentence exception applies in the context of habitual offender provisions only where the challenge to eligibility stems from factual innocence of the predicate crimes and not from the legal classification of the predicate crimes (D) holding that as to each predicate act the plaintiff must allege the time place and contents of the misrepresentations (E) holding that presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard are constitutionally required in criminal cases

Ex Output:
(C)