In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
2d 266, 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the
Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where it appears that the court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
nonetheless entitled to claim derivative asylum relief based on the possibility that their citizen child would be subjected to FGM. In so assuming, the majority's remand is illusory. Although the practice of FGM is considered persecution under our law, there is no threat here since a United States citizen child cannot be deported to the country of her parents' birth, and the parents cannot claim an unrecognized form of derivative relief when they themselves cannot establish entitlement to asylum. By usurping the prerogative of Congress, which alone has the power to create a new basis for cancellation of removal, the majority violates the separation of powers doctrine and creates an unnecessary conflict with the Seventh Circuit. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). Like the petitioner in Oforji, Mr. and Mrs.
Holding statements: (A) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (B) holding that an alien parent may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to potential hardship to the aliens united states citizen child in the event of the aliens deportation (C) holding that inconsistencies in the aliens statements must go to the heart of the asylum claim to justify an adverse credibility finding (D) holding that the failure to notify aliens counsel of an order to appear for deportation violated the aliens statutory right to counsel (E) holding that the crime of bringing aliens to the united states is complete when the initial transporter who brings the aliens to the united states ceases to transport them

Ex Output:
(B)

Ex Input:
added)). 3 . The district court "preliminarily" found statutory jurisdiction to be proper. Because it believed statutory jurisdiction to be an element of an offense under United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.2002), the court then submitted the question of consent to the jury. The district court need not have taken this second step since consent was uncontested. 4 . We do not require nexus for stateless vessels. See Perlaza, 439 F.3d at 1161; United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 334 F.3d 819, 829 (9th Cir.2003). 5 . The First and Fifth Circuits have rejected the position that nexus is required for foreign vessels when the flag nation has consented to the application of United States law to the defendants. See United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 627-28 (5th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548,
Holding statements: (A) holding that by the introduction and admission of the delawares as part of the cherokee nation they became a part of the people of such nation and bound in common with the cherokees by the political power of the nation (B) holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature (C) holding gwaltney limited to jurisdictional question and does not prohibit recovery of past penalties in citizen suit if jurisdictional requirements met (D) holding that as a matter of law the embassy of a sovereign nation is a foreign state (E) holding that jurisdictional requirements were met because the flag nation consented to the enforcement of the mdlea over the foreign vessel

Ex Output:
(E)