Input: When American 11 struck the World Trade Center at 8:46, no one in the White House or traveling with the President knew that it had been hijacked. While that information circulated within the FAA, we found no evidence that the hijacking was reported to any other agency in Washington before 8:46. Most federal agencies learned about the crash in New York from CNN. Within the FAA, the administrator, Jane Garvey, and her acting deputy, Monte Belger, had not been told of a confirmed hijacking before they learned from television that a plane had crashed. Others in the agency were aware of it, as we explained earlier in this chapter. Inside the National Military Command Center, the deputy director of operations and his assistant began notifying senior Pentagon officials of the incident. At about 9:00, the senior NMCC operations officer reached out to the FAA operations center for information. Although the NMCC was advised of the hijacking of American 11, the scrambling of jets was not discussed. In Sarasota, Florida, the presidential motorcade was arriving at the Emma E. Booker Elementary School, where President Bush was to read to a class and talk about education. White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card told us he was standing with the President outside the classroom when Senior Advisor to the President Karl Rove first informed them that a small, twin-engine plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. The President's reaction was that the incident must have been caused by pilot error. At 8:55, before entering the classroom, the President spoke to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who was at the White House. She recalled first telling the President it was a twin-engine aircraft-and then a commercial aircraft-that had struck the World Trade Center, adding "that's all we know right now, Mr. President." At the White House, Vice President Dick Cheney had just sat down for a meeting when his assistant told him to turn on his television because a plane had struck the NorthTower of the World Trade Center. The Vice President was wondering "How the hell could a plane hit the World Trade Center" when he saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower. Elsewhere in the White House, a series of 9:00 meetings was about to begin. In the absence of information that the crash was anything other than an accident, the White House staff monitored the news as they went ahead with their regular schedules.
"Where were the President and Vice President when the aircraft hit the Twin Towers on 9/11?" is "Emma E. Booker Elementary School"?
Output: yes
Input: IBM opened a sprawling and sophisticated semiconductor factory here on Wednesday that cost more than $2.5 billion to build and equip, the largest single capital investment the company has ever made. The factory, which opens as the computer chip business is in a slump, is a costly and risky move for IBM. But it is also an expression of confidence by the company that it can remain a technology leader in the highly competitive global semiconductor industry, and a commitment that the best place to execute that strategy is in upstate New York. IBM is an exception among computer makers in that it still invests heavily in research to advance the design, manufacture and materials used in semiconductor chips. It is spending more than $500 million a year on semiconductor research and development. The factory will produce a wide range of specialized semiconductors used in everything from the largest mainframe computers to cell phones and video-game consoles. The new plant is part of IBM's push to gain a strong lead in chip-making beyond the personal computer business, where Intel and East Asian chip producers hold the advantage. "The core of our strategy is to lead in technology and attack the high-performance segments of the market," said John Kelly, senior vice president in charge of IBM's technology group. An advantage to having the semiconductor fabricating factory here, Kelly explained, was that it was very close to its research laboratories in nearby Westchester County, N.Y. To stay ahead in advanced chip technology, he said, moving innovations out of the labs and into the factory as fast as possible is crucial. "What we call the lab-to-fab time should be as close to zero as possible," Kelly said. "If our strategy were anything but to be on the leading edge, we'd have put the plant in Asia." The new factory, which will begin normal production early next year, will employ about 1,000 people.
"What will IBM be producing in upstate NY?" is "Hard drives"?
Output: no
Input: Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. We had to live there." Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles.
"Why were the AC 130's never deployed?" is "They did not have enough in supply"?
Output:
no