In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: WTT Project area as defined by the Corps. NEF contends that we need not consider the State's argument because the State failed to raise this argument in its initial motion to clarify, instead raising it for the first time in its Rule 59(e) motion. "Rule 59(e) motions are 'aimed at reconsideration, not initial consideration.' " FDIC v. World Univ., Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611, 616 (1st Cir.1990)). In World University, this Court held that the defendant's argument, which it raised for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion, was barred where there was no reason why the defendant could not have presented its argument prior to its motion to alter or amend the judgment. Id.; see also Engler, 146 F.3d at 374 (<HOLDING>). This rule, however, does not cover the facts
Holding statements: (A) holding that the appellant waived an argument listed only in his summary of the argument (B) holding that a party in a habeas case waives an argument by failing to raise it before the district court (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that an argument was barred where the movant could have but did not raise its argument before the district court ruled in the original motion (E) holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: of serious physical harm," Gamer, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, to Ponseti, or to others if the suspects were allowed to flee. Because Pon-seti could have reasonably believed that the suspects posed an imminent, deadly threat, we conclude that he was justified in using deadly force. Conclusion We therefore conclude that the magistrate judge erred in denying Ponseti's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the judgment below is REVERSED. 1 . The woman was struck once in the right side of her abdomen. 2 . Under the current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, the terms "directed verdict" and "judgment notwithstanding the verdict" have been replaced by the single term "judgment as a matter of law." 3 . But see Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . Smith also observes: "Furthermore, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that section 1983 actions based on violation of the fourth amendment may not rest on violation of state law (B) holding that a violation of the wellestablished rule of brignoniponce constituted an egregious violation of the fourth amendment (C) holding that the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment so that evidence seized in violation of the constitution could no longer be used in state courts (D) holding that the notice requirement found in rule 41d is not required by the fourth amendment (E) holding that the significant injury requirement of johnson v morel 876 f2d 477 5th cir1989 a case involving a fourth amendment violation is no longer valid in the wake of hudson v mcmillianus 112 sct 995 117 led2d 156 1992 in which the supreme court held that a showing of a significant injury was not required to prove an eighth amendment violation
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: 84 (3d Cir.1999) ("[W]hen parents unilaterally withdraw their children from public school, absent mitigating circumstances, they are not entitled to reimbursement for private school tuition until they request review proceedings.") (citing Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 156-58 & n. 14 (3d Cir.1994)); Marissa F. v. The William Penn Sch. Dist., 2005 WL 2304738, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 20, 2005) (barring plaintiffs from receiving reimbursement for any time student was in private school before their request for due process). 16 . Although not clear, to the extent the State is arguing that Loveland was inappropriate because it did not meet the IDEA'S requirements, the argument fails. See Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Warren G., 190 F.3d at 84 (rejecting argument
Holding statements: (A) holding that section 12a2 did not apply to a private placement memorandum which was subject to a section 42 exemption (B) recognizing that parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board but concluding that the ideas mainstreaming requirement remains a consideration that bears upon a parents choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate (C) holding that when a private placement of securities purported to be exempt under rule 506 rjegardless of whether the private placement actually complied with the substantive requirements of regulation d or rule 506 the securities sold to plaintiffs are federal covered securities because they were sold pursuant to those rules (D) holding that protective placement statute unconstitutionally deprived individuals of an automatic periodic reexamination of the need for continued protective placement (E) holding that a private alternative placement need not meet the criteria of a fape
Example Output:
(E)