In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a "line of ... cars" for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: 285 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (quotation omitted). B. Crush Analysis Testimony Yergin was apparently planning to testify about estimated speeds of the F-250 and the Hyundai based on the amount of "crush" to the Hyundai. Although Yer-gin testified in front of the jury that there was probably a difference in speed between the two vehicles of 10 to 20 miles per hour, she never stated at any time what speeds she estimated the vehicles to be traveling. Nor did appellant's counsel explain to the court what speeds Yergin concluded the vehicles were traveling. This information would be crucial to understanding what testimony was excluded and whether the exclusion was harmful. See id. A general statement that she would testify about the vehicles' speeds is insufficient. See id. at 891 (<HOLDING>). Further, appellant's trial counsel explained
Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence of impaired mental functioning is inherently mitigating and that a defendant is not required to demonstrate a nexus between his mental capacity and the crime committed (B) holding defendant was not required to make a reasonable accommodation for an employee because the employee did not apprise defendant that she suffered from a mental impairment (C) holding that counsels performance was deficient for failing to investigate readily available evidence of mental impairment (D) holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state because there was no evidence the defendant knew where the product would be sold (E) holding that a general statement about how the defendant wanted to introduce evidence of medical or mental impairment to show that the defendant lacked the proper mental state was an insufficient offer there must be some meat of the actual evidence
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: property owners and others to open their lands to recreational users. The Ward court found, under the agreement, the landowner did not delegate to the defendant the power to control entry to the land. Holding that "[a] grant of immunity to the [defendant] would not serve the underlying purpose of the recreational use statute," the court concluded the defendant was not an occupant under the act. Id., 890 P.2d at 1147. While discussing other jurisdictions' decisions, the Ward court emphasized that "[t]he relationship of an entity to the premises, not the length and stability of its presence, should primarily determine whether the entity 'occupies' the premises" under the statute. Id., 890 P.2d at 1148. See also Tennyson v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 73 Wash.App. 550, 872 P.2d 524 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 191
Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that where a coworker commits an intentional tort not related to the interests of the employer the policies behind the act would not be served by immunizing the coemployee (C) holding prior act testimony admissible to establish the identity behind an alias (D) holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act (E) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective
Example Output:
(D)