In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. (3) If the board arbitrarily and capriciously violates section 7(9), the board shall he subject to the penalties prescribed in the freedom of information act, 1976 PA 442, MCL 15.231 to 15.246. B If "a statute gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only." Monroe Beverage Co, Inc v Stroh Brewery Co, 454 Mich 41, 45; 559 NW2d 297 (1997) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, "[w]hen a statute provides a remedy for enforcement of a common-law right, the statutory scheme is merely cumulative and not exclusive." Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 201; 729 NW2d 898 (2006) (<HOLDING>). At common law there has always been a remedy
Holding statements: (A) holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration (B) holding that the plaintiffs claims for unjust enrichment were not barred by the availability of relief under the public works bonding act mcl 129201 et seq because a plaintiff enjoyed the right at common law to recover in quantum meruit from a defendant who had been unjustly enriched (C) recognizing that action for quantum meruit relief exists to avoid unjust enrichment (D) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed
[A]: holding that because the federal arbitration act 9 usc 1 et seq preempts michigans lemon law mcl 2571401 et seq the plaintiffs lemon law claim should have been resolved through binding arbitration

[Q]: The Court is not at liberty to follow the law of other Circuits if it contradicts -the law of this Circuit. Plaintiffs' other argument relies on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 743 F.2d 852 (11th Cir. 1984) which stated that Summit Office Park applies only when a Plaintiff without standing adds a new party and a new cause of action. Delta Coal Program, 743 F.2d at-857, n.6. ("Here, by contrast, the operative facts and the cause of action are not changed, but only the formally named plaintiff."). Delta Coal Program, however, does not apply to the present case. First, the district court there permitted the substitution of new plaintiffs, and it was within the court's discretion to do so. Delta Coal Program v. Libman, 743 F.2d 852, 856 (11th Cir. 1984) (<HOLDING>). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs did not ask
Holding statements: (A) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties (B) holding that when district court has continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over sapcr matter judge of another district court in same county may rule in matter so long as record is clear that judge is acting on behalf of court with continuing and exclusive jurisdiction (C) holding that the district court has broad authority to take jurisdiction over a matter even when that matter is not brought by a real party in interest (D) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (E) holding that the state law of preclusion must be followed even when federal jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim is exclusive
[A]: holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties

[Q]: that the Constitution prohibits under the rubric of contemporary conscience shocking substantive due process. State tort law is, instead, a proper source of any remedy. Plaintiffs rely on several cases from other jurisdictions, which they contend support a contrary conclusion. After reviewing those decisions and many others, we are satisfied that they only illustrate that the sheriffs alleged conduct here (with the exception of his physical conduct toward Ms. Springer) does not rise to a "sexual assault" in violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. See, e.g., Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir.1997) (facts showing school superintendent forced teacher to perform fellatio supported substantive due process violation); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 589 (5th
Holding statements: (A) holding that forcible rape of a suspect by a police officer may constitute a violation of the substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm (B) holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights (C) holding forcible extraction of the contents of defendants stomach shocks the conscience and violates due process (D) recognizing that an officers forcible rape of a woman violates her substantive due process rights (E) recognizing 1983 substantive due process claim
[A]:
holding that forcible rape of a suspect by a police officer may constitute a violation of the substantive due process right under the fourteenth amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm