In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: )4 mile away. Fifth, also at this time, a vehicle registered to Nelson pulled in and parked next to Miller's car. Sixth, the note at the boat ramp informed Kaplan that he was being watched. Seventh, Miller and Nelson both left the lake at the same time Kaplan left. Eighth, Nelson arrived at the same McDonald's immediately after Kaplan arrived. Ninth, a passenger from Nelson's car approached Kaplan's vehicle and peered into Kaplan's vehicle from a distance of 10 feet away. Tenth, Nelson drove home from the McDonald's using what would normally be described as counter-surveillance techniques. Finally, Miller changed his story as to why he was at the lake that day at that time. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289-90, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348
Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence (B) holding that the conspiratorial agreement may be proved by circumstantial evidence including the acts and conduct of the coconspirators and the inferences that may be drawn from their acts (C) holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence (D) recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence (E) holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: an alcohol concentration of .22. The Commissioner of Public Safety revoked Gergen's driving privileges, and the district court affirmed. ISSUES 1. Where a district court determines that a person arrested for driving while intoxicated did not make a good faith effort to contact an attorney, is the driver's right to counsel vindicated even though the telephone provided by the arresting officer is blocked from dialing 800-numbers? 2. Did the police officer violate Minn.Stat. 481.10? ANALYSIS I. A person arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) has a limited right to consult an attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing, provided the consultation does not unreasonably delay the testing. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn.1991) (<HOLDING>); see Minn. Const. art. I, 6 ("In all
Holding statements: (A) holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law (B) holding that the implied consent warning given to the defendant was not misleading or coercive because the validity of the implied consent notice is not contingent upon other administrative aspects of ocga 405671 (C) holding that officers not required to give implied consent warnings where statute did not apply (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel (E) holding that right to counsel under implied consent statute is limited because of the evanescent nature of alcohol
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: request with a statement that counsel has examined these issues and found them to be without merit. Specifically, Coleman asserts that: (1) the Government violated 18 U.S.C.A. 201 (West 2000), by presenting the testimony of witnesses who were presumably testifying in the hopes of obtaining a sentence reduction; (2) the district court erred at sentencing in converting the value of a half of a kilogram of cocaine powder into crack; and (3) his attorney provided ineffective assistance. Our review of these issues leads us to agree with counsel's determination on issues (1) and (2). As to issue (3), a direct appeal is not the proper forum in this instance, because ineffective assistance is not clear on the face of the record. United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). In light of the above determinations, we
Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner did not procedurally default his ineffective assistance of counsel claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal (B) holding that defendant may raise claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal only if ineffective assistance is conclusive from the record (C) holding that to the extent defendants claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel it is not cognizable on direct appeal and rule 2915 is the exclusive procedure by which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be advanced (D) holding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failure to raise as basis for appeal of conviction ineffective assistance of trial counsel where basis for the latter claim was inadequate (E) recognizing a constitutional claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
[EX A]:
(B)