In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
next argues that the standstill agreement initially executed on January 24, and repeatedly extended until March 26, tolled the running of the sixty-day cure period provided in the Distribution Agreement, and that because the parties entered into the initial standstill agreement four days before the end of the cure period, Innomed was entitled to four additional days to cure the breach beyond the expiration of the last standstill agreement on March 26, 2001. We agree with the district court, however, that the language of the standstill agreement unambiguously indicates that the parties agreed simply to postpone the date on which the termination would become effective, rather than to toll the running of the cure period. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 629 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations
Holding statements: (A) holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law (B) holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law (C) holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties (D) holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established (E) holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper

Ex Output:
holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law

Ex Input:
a favorable decision, by which we mean that the "prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too speculative." In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys' fees is an "egregious and illegal use of tax dollars." NMCGA's Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to
Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim

Ex Output:
holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties

Ex Input:
investigation. Disclosure of this information, Durney declares, "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety" of such persons, see 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(F), and "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," see id. 552(b)(7)(C), since release of such information would expose them to the risk of physical harm, harassment, and identity theft. Durney Decl. the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government on its Exemption 7(A) claim and this court issued its order in August's first appeal. In light of the substantiation of the important third-party interests at stake, it seems quite likely that the Government's failure to invoke Exemptions 7(C ted States Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903-04 (D.C.Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); Schanen v. United States Dep't of Justice,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court erred in refusing to grant the secret services fedrcivp 60b motion to rehear arguments about the applicability of foia exemptions 7c and 7d in light of the secret services belatedly proffered proof of a promise of confidentiality noting that the case was not the ordinary one since it involves not only the interests of the secret service but that of a third party whose identity and information are expressly protected by foia (B) holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation (C) holding that it was impossible for the court to say that the information met the definition of a trade secret because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the information derived economic value from an element of secrecy that is known only to plaintiff and its employees (D) holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents (E) holding that the burden of establishing the true existence of a trade secret and its value to the owner remains on the claimant who must submit evidence relating to the six factors that texas law considers for trade secret status

Ex Output:
holding that disclosure of trade secret without protection of express confidentiality agreement was not fatal to trade secret protection where disclosure occurred during sale negotiation