In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

F.3d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1996)). We conclude that, although the district court erroneously determined that the principles of Daubert did not apply to the re-creation and Agent Constantino's testimony, the district court did not err in admitting the evidence. Under Daubert, the district court conducts a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2796; see Fed.R.Evid. 702 . This "gate-keeping" obligation on the part of the district court applies to all types of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (<HOLDING>). Many factors may bear on this inquiry,
Holding statements: (A) holding that dauberts basic gatekeeping obligation applies to all expert testimony (B) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (C) recognizing the basic principle of contract law that the obligation of good faith is an implied condition in every contract (D) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (E) holding that a request for funds for expert testimony must show inter alia that the testimony is crucial and is subject to varying expert opinions
holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive

claims); see also Stewart, 104 N.M. at 748, 726 P.2d at 1378 ("An insurance policy is a contract and is generally governed by the law of contracts, and the rights and duties of the parties are to be determined by its terms." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, we held that 8.75% was the proper interest to be assessed on the contract damages. {40} Like the trial court in Teague-Strebeck, the trial court in our case awarded damages based on the insurance contract $100,000 in UM coverage. See 1999-NMCA-109, 63-64, 127 N.M. 603, 985 P.2d 1183 (observing that the plaintiff "was awarded the benefit of its bargain, the extent of insurance coverage promised by [the defendant's agent]"); cf. Ellis v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999-NMSC-034, 1, 128 N.M. 54, 989 P.2d 429 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that 8.75% is the
Holding statements: (A) holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract (B) holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional (C) holding that sixyear statute of limitations in 65314 is applicable to violations of 7202 (D) recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act (E) holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy
holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract

in the most nefarious negotiating tactics possible, force a lockout to put pressure on the employees, and then attempt to clean up-fhe mess with good-faith, post-lockout bargaining. Horsehead cannot retroactively "cure" its prior negotiating tactics with post-lockout bargaining, and evidence regarding these activities has no relevance to pre-lockout activities. B. Lockout Because the majority determined that Horsehead did not bargain in bad faith, it found that the lockout was lawful. I contend that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Horsehead engaged in bad-faith bargaining, and I believe the lockout was an outgrowth of this activity. Lockouts are. not per se unlawful. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318, 85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965) (<HOLDING>). A lockout can, however, be unlawful if it is
Holding statements: (A) holding that where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent the successor employer must bargain with the incumbent union (B) holding a lockout unlawful when utilized to enable the employer to implement its own bargaining position without genuine impasse (C) holding that employer violates neither 8a1 nor 8a3 when after a bargaining impasse has been reached he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining position (D) holding that an employee is guilty of misconduct connected with his work when he deliberately violates a company rule reasonably designed to protect the legitimate business interests of his employer or when his acts or omissions are of such a nature or so recurrent as to manifest a willful disregard of those interests and the duties and obligations he owes his employer (E) holding that petitioners remedy under title vii of the civil rights act was in addition to remedies available under the collective bargaining agreement in force between his employer and his union
holding that where the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified bargaining agent the successor employer must bargain with the incumbent union