TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: jurisdiction to exercise its discretion to treat the matter before it as a petition for a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., In re Temporary Custody of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 777 P.2d 901 (1989). In light of the far reaching consequences of the issues presented, we are confident the district court would have exercised that discretion for the same reasons we have exercised our discretion to review the instant original petition. 3 Nev. Const, art. 6, 8. 4 NRS 4.370(3). 5 State of Nevada v. Justice Court, 112 Nev 803, 919 P.2d 401 (1996). 6 See generally NCJC Canon 2. 7 Nev. Const, art. 6, 8; NRS 4.370(3). 8 NRS 189.120; State v. Shade, 110 Nev. 57, 867 P.2d 393 (1994). 9 See Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 937, n.8, 10 P.3d 836, 841-42 n.8 (2000). 10 40 Nev. 228, 161 P. 737 (1916) (<HOLDING>). 11 106 Nev. 203, 789 P.2d 584 (1990) (holding
Holding statements: (A) holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters (B) holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court (C) holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent (D) holding that a municipal court had no constitutional or statutory authority to rule on the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed on attorneys practicing within the city limits (E) holding that a blakely challenge fell within the defendants waiver of his right to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the guidelines

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing." Id. at 12, 112 S.Ct. 1715. It appears, however, that AEDPA overruled the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception, and that at this time, district courts cannot order evi-dentiary hearings unless the requirements of 2254(e)(2) are met. See Shumate v. Newland, 75 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1084, 1098-99 (N.D.Cal.1999) ("AEDPA, however, has 'reduced considerably the degree of the district court's discretion' by imposing threshold requirements that must be met before a request for an evidentiary hearing may be entertained.") (quoting Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir.1999)); Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1054-55 (D.Colo.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the aedpa statute of limitations is not jurisdictional (B) holding that evidentiary hearing not necessary where proposed administrative action is based on undisputed material facts (C) holding that aedpa did not codify keeney but instead significantly curtails the availability of evidentiary hearings to develop material facts (D) holding that when a state has given petitioner a full and fair hearing on a claim and he has failed to develop material facts to support it he is not entitled to develop further facts in a federal habeas evidentiary hearing unless he demonstrates either cause for the failure and prejudice resulting therefrom or a fundamental miscarriage of justice (E) holding that an evidentiary hearing may be used to develop the factual basis of a prisoner complaint

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: actions or otherwise) to award a share of retired pay."). Further, the federal regulations implementing the 1990 Amendment confirm Congress' intent to prohibit dividing military benefits that were not expressly treated in a pre-1981 divorce decree. See 32 C.F.R. 63.6(c)(7) (1998) ("For court orders issued before June 26, 1981, subsequent amendments [to property division] after that date to provide for a division of retired pay as property are unenforceable under this part."). Although McDougall may have had a right to part of Havlen's military retirement pay before the 1990 Amendment, her failure to exercise this right at the time the Act specified has foreclosed her ability to partition Havlen's retirement benefits now. Accord Delrie v. Harris, 962 F.Supp. 931, 935 (W.D.La.1997) (<HOLDING>). Because McDougall did not assert her right to
Holding statements: (A) holding that a wife obtained a vested interest in her portion of the retirement benefits as of the date of the divorce decree and any act of the military spouse that unilaterally decreases the nonmilitary spouses vested interest is an impermissible modification of a division of marital property and a violation of the final decree of divorce (B) holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits (C) holding that although disability benefits cannot be included as part of the marital estate a court may consider the waiver of retirement pension benefits in favor of disability benefits in determining whether there has been a material change in circumstances which would justify modification of an alimony award to a former spouse who was previously awarded a fixed percentage of the retirement pension benefits (D) holding that although a spouse may have had a right to apportion military retirement benefits at one time the act requires the spouse to assert that right before entry of a finalized divorce decree or waive the right to the benefits (E) recognizing the right of a former spouse to seek contribution for payment of community debts not allocated by the divorce decree

SOLUTION:
(D)