In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to the registrations of any party to the action. Decrees and orders shall be certified by the court to the Commissioner, who shall make appropriate entry upon the records of the Patent and Trademark Office, and shall be controlled thereby. 15 U.S.C. 1119. 27. The legal issue in a cancellation proceeding is the right to register a mark and when a mark is not incontestable, a court may cancel the mark on any ground which would have prevented registration initially. International Order of Job's Daughters, 727 F.2d at 1091. 28. As noted, a mark "which does not fulfill the functions of a trademark, but, rather, serves essentially a utilitarian or functional purpose cannot be registered as a trademark." Id.; see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.2d 833, 834-35 (4th Cir.1928) (<HOLDING>). 29. Because Shakespeare's mark is a
Holding statements: (A) holding that automobile racing is not an ultrahazardous activity (B) holding that diamondshaped tread on tire which is a mechanically functional feature of an automobile tire cannot be registered (C) holding when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile he may as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest search the passenger compartment of that automobile (D) holding that owners and officers of automobile dealership who were neither consumers nor competitors in automobile market lacked standing to bring antitrust action against automobile manufacturer (E) holding that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his drivers license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the fourth amendment
[A]: (B)

[Q]: jurisdiction to exercise its discretion to treat the matter before it as a petition for a writ of certiorari. See, e.g., In re Temporary Custody of Five Minors, 105 Nev. 441, 777 P.2d 901 (1989). In light of the far reaching consequences of the issues presented, we are confident the district court would have exercised that discretion for the same reasons we have exercised our discretion to review the instant original petition. 3 Nev. Const, art. 6, 8. 4 NRS 4.370(3). 5 State of Nevada v. Justice Court, 112 Nev 803, 919 P.2d 401 (1996). 6 See generally NCJC Canon 2. 7 Nev. Const, art. 6, 8; NRS 4.370(3). 8 NRS 189.120; State v. Shade, 110 Nev. 57, 867 P.2d 393 (1994). 9 See Parsons v. State, 116 Nev. 928, 937, n.8, 10 P.3d 836, 841-42 n.8 (2000). 10 40 Nev. 228, 161 P. 737 (1916) (<HOLDING>). 11 106 Nev. 203, 789 P.2d 584 (1990) (holding
Holding statements: (A) holding a city liable for the unconstitutional firing of two clerks by a municipal judge when it was clear the city had delegated to him final administrative authority over employment matters (B) holding that a sentence imposed within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court (C) holding that the city had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute allowing certain communities within the same county as the city to incorporate as towns without the citys consent (D) holding that a municipal court had no constitutional or statutory authority to rule on the legality and constitutionality of a tax imposed on attorneys practicing within the city limits (E) holding that a blakely challenge fell within the defendants waiver of his right to appeal the constitutionality or legality of the guidelines
[A]: (D)

[Q]: of Fact No. 16]. Because Swayne held that the proceeds of an insurance policy take the place of the property loss, the settlement proceeds paid by TWIA therefore take the place of the property loss associated with the Debtor's homestead. Moreover, because a court may not limit the value of such proceeds under the homestead exemption, the Debt- or may exempt the entire settlement amount of $73,000.00. Nor does the fact that the State Court Lawsuit pleaded several causes of action change this conclusion. Texas case law discusses apportionment of settlement proceeds, holding that debtors do not have the initial burden of breaking down these awards into exempt proceeds and nonexempt proceeds for other state law claims. See, e.g., In re Harrington, 306 B.R. 172, 183 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003) (<HOLDING>)- In In re Harrington, the Chapter 7 trustee
Holding statements: (A) holding that the objector must not only show that the facts do not support the exemption but must also prove that the debtor knowingly deceived the trustee and the creditors at the time the exemption was made (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the trustee objector cannot escape the burden of proof assigned to an objecting party under rule 4003c because the exemption claim relates to a settlement agreement which fails to allocate damages into specif ic categories of recovery (D) holding that the burden of proof is initially placed upon the objector with respect to any objections he files and this burden does not shift to the debtor merely upon a showing that the debtor has failed to allocate the personal injury settlement into its various component parts (E) holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt
[A]:
(C)