In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the State argued that Wright and Jackson were the two shooters at the trials of Wright, Oglesby, and Jackson. The State denies that it presented mutually exclusive, false, or misleading evidence. It contends that the evidence permits two factual scenarios: the shooters were either Jackson and Wright or Jackson and defendant. This is not a case where the prosecutor destroyed the credibility of one witness to convict one defendant and then used that same witness to convict a co-defendant for the same crime. See, e.g., Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor improperly argued facts that were unsupported by the evidence. Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 75 (S.D.Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), habeas corpus denied, sub nom, Nichols v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal (B) holding that where trial court is trier of fact and has made an affirmative deadly weapon finding it retains discretion to enter finding in judgment (C) holding that although trial courts oral opinion may be used as a reference in the interpretation of its written findings of fact it is not a finding of fact (D) holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal (E) holding in case in which defendant challenged his murder conviction and death sentence on ground that states conflicting theories in the trial of his accomplice constituted a denial of due process that state may be constitutionally estopped from obtaining a fact finding in one trial and seeking and obtaining an inconsistent fact finding in another trial

Ex Output:
holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal

Ex Input:
motion at which Pritchett would be represented by counsel or at which the court would determine that Pritchett knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Ex parte Pritchett, 117 So.3d at 362. In the instant case, the circuit court immediately appointed new counsel to represent Trimble after Trimble gave his oral notice of appeal. Despite having newly appointed counsel who could file a motion for a new trial attacking his trial counsel's alleged deficiencies, Trimble elected to file a pro se motion for a new trial. Therefore, unlike the defendant in Pritchett, Trimble had the benefit of newly appointed appellate counsel who represented him and who could file a motion for a new trial on his behalf. See King v. State, 613 So.2d 888 (Ala.Crim.App.1993)
Holding statements: (A) holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage (B) holding that posttrial motion for new trial is critical stage requiring counsel or valid waiver (C) holding postindictment lineup is critical stage of trial at which defendant is entitled to presence of counsel (D) holding that the filing of a motion for a new trial is a critical stage of the prosecution and that an indigent defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel at that stage (E) holding that sentencing is a critical stage of criminal proceedings and the offer of counsel must be renewed at each critical stage where the defendant appears without counsel

Ex Output:
holding that a valid waiver of counsel at an early stage of the proceeding does not continue in effect through a subsequent stage

Ex Input:
in the sanction proceedings, the court's prior factual findings in this matter require the court to impose an additional sanction against the Esso Defendants and their former counsel. Having canvassed the literature, both commentary and case law, concerning sanctions, the court has identified few alternatives to the routine monetary sanction of fee shifting. Nevertheless, the court is undeterred from its mission of fashioning an appropriate sanction and is willing to adopt a novel, innovative approach. See, Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-45. Pursuant to its inherent powers, the court has considered both the imposition of a fine on the Esso Defend al Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 40 L. Ed. 2d 703, 94 S. Ct. 2157 (1974) (same); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 974 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1992) (<HOLDING>); Titus, 695 F.2d at 749 n. 6 (recognizing the
Holding statements: (A) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (B) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process (C) recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions on parties (D) recognizing the federal courts ability to impose inherent power sanctions to the lawyers firm or employer (E) recognizing the inherent power of the courts to issue warrants

Ex Output:
recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals