Input: (CNN) -- Japan's prime minister conceded defeat in parliamentary elections Sunday, signaling the return to power of the Liberal Democratic Party and ending the brief rule of the disappointing upstart Democratic Party of Japan. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda pledged to step down as party president after exit polls showed a smashing loss in lower house voting. The party, once seen as a breath of fresh air in Japanese politics, came to be regarded as increasingly ineffective. "We got a regrettable result," Noda said. "The result is everything in the politics. The biggest responsibility lies on me. I will quit as the partly leader of DPJ." The move clears the way for the return to power of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the current leader of the conservative-leaning Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP. "The Japanese people will be keenly looking whether the LDP can meet with their expectations," Abe said in interviews after the polling. The LDP ruled the country almost continuously since its establishment in 1955 until it was forced from power three years ago by the DPJ. Public broadcaster NHK said the LDP and its coalition partner, the new Komei party, gained at least 302 seats in the 480-seat lower house. CNN's main affiliate, TV Asahi, reports the LDP/Komei coalition gained at least 312 seats. The official count is expected to be released Monday. The LDP is inheriting a struggling economy, regional tensions and questions over Japan's role in Asia. "The economy is at the bottom. It's our first mission to turn it around," Abe said.

Does the response "Pledged to concede his loss" correctly answer the question "What did Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda pledge to do after conceding defeat in parliamentary elections"?

OPTIONS:
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Output: no

At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten. Bolten watched the exchanges and, after what he called "a quiet moment,"suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President and confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the President was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he had not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President. The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a twominute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, the President's press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that at 10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircraft if necessary. Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvania. Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant to this authorization. At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of another hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. Believing they had only a minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization to "engage or "take out" the aircraft. At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat conference call: "I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there's an inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out. The Vice President's guidance was we need to take them out." Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of the inbound aircraft. In the apt description of one witness, "It drops below the radar screen and it's just continually hovering in your imagination; you don't know where it is or what happens to it." Eventually, the shelter received word that the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter. Transmission of the Authorization from the White House to the Pilots The NMCC learned of United 93's hijacking at about 10:03. At this time the FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command. The NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House.

Question: "Where was the President at 10:18 when the Vice President called him?"

OPTIONS:
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Answer: ""White House""

Response: yes

Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. We had to live there." Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles.

Question: "What option did Zinni deny blocking?"

Response: "Attacking Afghan civilians"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A:
no