In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

perform work for Kiwi. Synergy alleges that Ms. Willis knew these statements were false when she spoke them. Synergy contends that her intent to induce Synergy to rely on these statements can be inferred by the benefit LHC stood to receive. Finally, Synergy offers documentation of advertising run on behalf of Kiwi as evidence of its damages. Assuming for purposes of this motion that Ms. Willis made the alleged statements, Synergy's fraud claim fails as a matter of law. First, statements by Ms. Willis as to Kiwi's financial condition constitute an opinion. In Georgia, statements of opinion will not support a claim for fraud. Simpson Consulting, Inc. v. Barclays Bank, PLC, 227 Ga.App. 648, 650, 490 S.E.2d 184 (1997); See also Miller v. Clabby, 178 Ga.App. 821, 822, 344 S.E.2d 751 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Synergy also alleges that Ms. Willis stated
Holding statements: (A) holding agency may not rely on expert opinion without disclosing hard data supporting opinion to the public (B) holding that sellers failure to disclose known soil conditions was not a scheme to defraud where seller did not affirmatively lie to buyer (C) recognizing that an expression of opinion about monetary value is not a representation of fact which gives rise to an action for fraud (D) holding that a buyer could not rely on a sellers mere expression of opinion (E) recognizing that a common illustration of an admissible opinion under rule 701 is an expression of opinion by a lay observer of a cars speed
(D)

IV, V, VI and XIV. See Answee, Docket # 8, Exh. A, pp. 13-14. In order to allow the state courts the opportunity to act on or correct the violations alleged, the Applicant must do more than just invoke the magic words "fair trial," or "due process," or make only cursory citation to the appropriate constitutional amendments. He must provide legal theory explaining how the admission of the statements or testimony violated these particular federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7-8, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (claim on direct appeal that jury instruction was reversible error did not fairly present due process challenge to instruction for habeas exhaustion purposes); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-77, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (<HOLDING>); see, also, Thomas v. Gibson, 218 F.3d 1213,
Holding statements: (A) holding in preaedpa case habeas applicant failed to fairly present federal claim to state court where despite presenting all necessary facts applicant failed to assert specific argument that he later tried to raise in federal court (B) holding that where defendant failed to raise defense of plaintiffs fraud in federal court defendant is barred from raising that issue in state court (C) holding that habeas petitioner scheduled to be executed in the state of virginia for capital murder could not raise claim of violation of his rights under the vienna convention on federal habeas review where he failed to preserve the claim by raising it in state court proceedings vienna convention does not trump subsequent federal statute requiring habeas petitioners who claim to be held in violation of treaties of the united states to develop factual bases for their claims in state court as a precondition of federal habeas review (D) holding applicants general state court claim was insufficient to exhaust his later more specific federal habeas claim (E) holding that a federal court may deny an unexhausted habeas petition on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim
(A)

"assault could have been prevented if there was a Corrections officer properly overseeing the tier." (Am. Compl. 5.) But, although Plaintiff avers that the corrections staff were generally aware of Wallace's disciplinary violations, Plaintiff pleads no facts to suggest that Doe 1 had any subjective awareness that his absence posed a substantial risk of serious harm. So his claim against Doe 1 alleges only negligence, not deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (defining deliberate indifference as requiring a subjective awareness, rather than the objective test of reasonableness under the negligence standard). And mere negligence does not support an Eighth Amendment claim. Hayes, 84 F.3d at 620; Johnson v. Smith, 354 Fed.Appx. 516, 516 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Thus, Defendants' motion to dismiss is
Holding statements: (A) holding that mere knowledge of a defect is not sufficient to amount to an eighth amendment claim defendant must also draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm exists (B) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (C) holding that the mere fact that rocco and kaplan were associated is not sufficient to support an inference by the jury that one imparted knowledge to the other (D) holding that a prison official may be held liable under the eighth amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it (E) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation
(A)