In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: state witnesses regarding their credibility during the course of the trial in chief. Angela Sweat had negotiated with state prosecution involving armed robbery charges, the facts of the plea agreement for impeachment was not permitted by the trial court. This witness was the sole evidence against the petitioner and had the jury known of her motive to lie they would have found me not guilty of the armed robbery charges. This was a denial of my right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the jury would have found me not guilty. Generally, federal courts should not review a state trial judge's rulings with respect to the admissibility of evidence. Shaw v. Boney, 695 F.2d 528, 530 (11th Cir.1983). Even if the trial court' h Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). Evidentiary rulings are within the broad
Holding statements: (A) holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge (B) holding that defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for presenting a diminished capacity defense as opposed to a defense of legal insanity (C) holding that denigrating insanity defense was inappropriate (D) holding that where the sole defense was insanity excluded testimony was material a crucial critical and highly significant factor (E) holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense
[EX A]: holding that insanity is a complete defense to the criminal charge

[EX Q]: only as part of the presentations to a group, or whether appellees had any conversations with Hoagland, and, if so, the content of those conversations. Appellees merely stated they did not make misrepresentations to Hoagland in Texas regarding the business transaction made the basis of the captioned case. We conclude these statements are unsupported factual and legal conclusions. See Ennis, 164 S.W.3d at 703-04 (affirming trial court's exclusion of nonresident's statements that he did not have a substantial connection with Texas, plaintiffs' claims did not result from and were not related to any of affiant's activities in Texas, affiant did not have any continuing or systematic contacts with Texas, and affiant did not commit any tort in Texas); see also Wright, 137 S.W.3d at 250 n. 8 (<HOLDING>). Kassoffs affidavit is similarly concluso-ry.
Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute (B) holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law not arizona law should be applied (C) holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in houston texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute for plaintiffs claims of various forms of fraud and negligent misrepresentation (D) recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas (E) holding nonresidents statement that he had committed no torts in texas was properly excluded as conclusory
[EX A]: holding plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed torts in texas was sufficient to bring defendants under the longarm statute

[EX Q]: penalty would not be administered in an arbitrary or random manner"). Permitting the jury to consider the disparate sentences pursued against equally guilty defendants would also be in keeping with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), which held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that capital juries not be precluded from considering, as mitigating factors, any aspects of a defendant's character or of "the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Although the Ninth Circuit has held that a trial court does not violate Lockett by failing to permit consideration of co-defendant sentences as a mitigating factor, it did so in a case where the defendant facing the death penalty 4 (<HOLDING>). Where the prosecution has conceded that it
Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencer must not be precluded from considering any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers (B) holding that juries may not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers emphasis in original (C) holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (D) holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor (E) holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded
[EX A]:
holding that a sentencer must not be precluded from considering any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers