In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

a sergeant entered the house with her. 2 . Harris testified that he opened the door for the police: "I saw them coming, so I just opened the door." However, Officer Shepard testified that she knocked on the door and that after no one answered she entered the house through the door, which was unlocked. 3 . We decline to reach the question whether the warrantless entry and the search by the police officers were justified by exigent circumstances. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)(rejecting a "murder scene exception" created by the Supreme Court of Arizona to the requirement of obtaining a warrant). See also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984)(applying Mincey); Ex parte Usrey, 527 So.2d 732 (Ala.1987) (<HOLDING>); A.A.G. v. State, 668 So.2d 122, 128
Holding statements: (A) holding no liability existed under the circumstances (B) holding that once the scene was secure exigent circumstances no longer existed and the police were required to obtain a search warrant (C) holding that exigent circumstances were created by dissipation of bloodalcohol content in time needed to obtain a warrant (D) holding that exigent circumstances were present because evidence of bloodalcohol content could disappear during the time necessary to obtain a warrant (E) recognizing that exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant
(B)

efforts to persuade an Immigration Judge to exercise her discretion to grant him a deportation waiver the removal of that discretion would constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Furthermore, given that parole eligibility is "considered an integral part of any sentence," Shepard, 556 F.2d at 654; see also Warden, 417 U.S. at 658, 94 S.Ct. at 2535-36, I think that the availability and likelihood of a deportation waiver should also be so considered. In explaining the basis for its con- elusion that parole eligibility or gain time should be considered part of 86, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) ("It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe for the alien, is not a punishment."); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 608, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913) (<HOLDING>) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
Holding statements: (A) holding that the amount of sanctions is appropriate only when it is the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the undesirable behavior (B) holding that the determination that an alien is an undesirable person is not a conviction of crime nor is the deportation a punishment it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not want (C) holding that it is not (D) holding that for sentencing purposes the government does not need to allege a defendants prior conviction or prove the fact of a prior conviction where that fact is not an element of the present crime (E) holding that habeas review is for any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation
(B)

maximum, or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful, i.e., the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or pub-He reputation of judicial proceedings. Id, at 1327. Af noted' Martmez waived his rigbt to appeal any component of his conviction in the plea agreement Further> at the plea colloquy, the district court asked Martinez if he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal bofch his sentence and any comPonent of his conviction or sentence' and defendant said that he did derstand this' Tr' of Plea Hr'g' at 12' The appeal waiver did not provide any exception to the broad aPPeal waiver permitting him to challenge the denial of his motion to dismiss' Thus> this claim is ^thin the scope of the appeal waive1' See United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Further, Martmez has not met his burden of
Holding statements: (A) holding that defendan s appeid he denial of his motion to dismiss was ithin scope of his appeal waiver because the plea cements waiver provision did not reserve this issue as an exceptionto the waiver (B) recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary (C) holding that a plea agreement with a waiver of direct appeal rights does not include a waiver of collateral remedies because the government could have included a waiver of collateral rights in the plea agreement and chose not to do so (D) holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal (E) holding that a failure to file an appeal is within the scope of the waiver because the failure does not undermine the validity of the plea or waiver
(A)