In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: constructive, or judicially imposed lien, or (4) asserted against real or personal property. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 51.903; Cardenas v. Wilson, 428 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that 51.903 inquiry into mechanic's lien determines only that mechanic's lien is provided by Texas law, not whether the underlying mechanic's lien was valid). If the motion requires greater inquiry, then it is a motion for declaratory judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 37.004(a) (West 2015); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) ("We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it."); Nguyen, 2016 WL 2343893, at *2 (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *2-3 (<HOLDING>)). A motion for declaratory judgment must be
Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding motion requesting more relief than section 51903 provides was motion for declaratory judgment (C) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: of the offense charged but convict on the included offense. However, the mere chance that a jury may reject uncontroverted testimony and convict on the lesser charge does not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser charge." People v. Ramires, 18 P.3d 822, 827 (Colo.App.2000) (internal citations omitted). 184 The offense of patronizing a prostituted child requires, as relevant here, "knowingly engaging in an act" where "a child perform[s] or offer[s] or agree[s] to perform ... any [sexual] act ... in exchange for money." 18-7-406(1)(a), 18-7-401(6). Based on the language of the statute, actual performance of a sexual act is not necessary; a mere offer or agreement to perform is sufficient, provided money has been promised. See supra Part V.A; Madden, 111 P.3d at 460 (<HOLDING>). 185 Here, because the uncontrovert-ed
Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (B) holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition (C) holding that a party invoking a 547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received (D) holding that patronizing a prostituted child requires some record evidence that the defendant attempted to give anything of value in exchange for sex (E) holding that under 11 usc 547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: ("[The use of the word 'shall in a statute usually is deemed to involve a mandatory connotation."); City of Colorado Springs v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 895 P.2d 1105, 1117-18 (Colo.App.1994) (finding that two provisions conflict when harmonization would effectively nullify one of them). Thus, to resolve this conflict, we consider the statute's legislative history to determine legislative intent. See Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo.1993) (looking to legislative history to determine legislative intent); People v. Carrillo, 2018 COA 3, 1 23, 297 P.3d 1028 (turning to "other statutory aids" when the plain text of statutes conflicts). b. Manifest Intent 120 The General Assembly's intent is "manifest" only when such intent is "clear and unmistakable." See Falls, 58 P.3d at 1142 (<HOLDING>). 121 In 2001, the General Assembly passed the
Holding statements: (A) holding that a general statute should not be interpreted as repealing a specific statute albsent clear and unmistakable legislative intent to the contrary (B) recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern (C) holding that a phrase should be interpreted consistent with the context of the statute in which it is contained (D) holding that specific statutes create exceptions to general statutes therefore if a provision of a specific statute is inconsistent with one in a general statute on the same subject the specific statute controls (E) holding the general rule is that in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary a law affecting substantive rights liabilities and duties is presumed to apply prospectively
[EX A]:
(A)