In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: conversion should have an opportunity to reassert objections to exemptions. Indeed, Rule 1019(2) specifically addresses time period for actions after conversion, and provides for the re-running of times allowed for filing a claim, objecting to discharge and objecting to dischargeability. There is no new time period, however, for the trustee to assert objections to exemptions. "If a new time period for objections to exemptions began to run upon conversion of a case, one would expect to see it mentioned in Rule 1019(2), [and][i]t is not there." In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995). Where the statute is clear, it is not appropriate to look to policy arguments. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109-S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>), and none of the policy arguments are
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that pursuant to 28 usc 2254d1 if the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry (E) holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end

A: recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear
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Q: to intervene" as a linguistic tool to highlight how little personal participation the defendant had in the arrest in that particular case. The passage shows how far below the required minimum level of involvement that particular defendant exhibited. Read in whole, Brown more accurately shows that personal participation in an arrest, or supervisory control over the arresting officer, is required in order to establish liability for unlawful arrest mere presence is not enough. However, even assuming Plaintiffs are correct, and that law enforcement officers have a duty to intervene in other officer's unlawful arrests, it cannot be said that the Canine Handlers or Alma Officers violated clearly established law in this case. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). The Canine Handlers and Alma Officers were
Holding statements: (A) holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim (B) holding that an officer could be held liable for failing to intervene in preventing an unlawful strip search (C) holding that a military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive force suit when he objectively reasonably believed that he used reasonable force (D) holding that while case law generally indicates that an officer can be held liable for failing to intervene in another officers use of excessive force the absence of authority from the supreme court or the eleventh circuit dealing with similar circumstances supported granting qualified immunity to a defendant (E) holding that a police officer was not liable for use of excessive force since 951 requirements were satisfied

A: holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim
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Q: removal was untimely, and thus, this cause should be remanded to state court. The notice of removal must be filed "within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based ..." 28 U.S.C.A. 1446(b) (West Supp.1991). When, as here, removability can be determined from the face of the original state court petition, the thirty day removal period runs from the date the defendant receives the petition. Harding v. Allied Products Corp., 703 F.Supp. 51, 52-53 (W.D.Tenn.1989) (relying on plain language of 1446(b), which says "receipt by defendant, through service or otherwise ... "); Uhles v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 715 F.Supp. 297, 298 (C.D.Cal.1989) (<HOLDING>). See also Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
Holding statements: (A) holding that thirty day period began to run when defendants inhouse counsel received copy of complaint and engaged in settlement negotiations (B) holding that removal under the second paragraph of 1446b did not apply and defendants therefore had removed outside of the thirty day time period triggered at the time of service of the complaint (C) recognizing that while defendants may freely amend their notice of removal within thirty days of service they may not add new grounds for removal after the thirty day period has expired (D) holding that the thirty day time limit was mandatory but not jurisdictional (E) holding that the statute of limitations began to run when the plaintiff first received notice of an alleged deficiency from the irs not when he received a final determination of tax liability

A:
holding that removal under the second paragraph of 1446b did not apply and defendants therefore had removed outside of the thirty day time period triggered at the time of service of the complaint
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