In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
separate recording of the trust or declaration of trust. As there is no evidence on the face of the deeds indicating a. contrary intent, the Personal Representatives, pursuant to their fiduciary responsibilities, seek a declaration that, pursuant to section 689.07(1), Norman held fee simple title to the properties on the date of his death. These allegations are clearly sufficient under the plain language of the statute. See Raborn, 974 So.2d at 328 (stating that under section 689.07(1), a deed that simply refers to grantee as "trustee" conveys a fee simple estate, and applying the statute to find that deed at issue fell under "contrary intention" exception such that grantee held mere legal title as trustee); One Harbor Fin, Ltd. v. Hynes Props., LLC, 884 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>); Heiskell v. Morris, 182 So.3d 714 (Fla. 1st
Holding statements: (A) holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title (B) holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence (C) holding that trial court erred by granting surviving spouse fee simple title to estates exempt property (D) holding that trial court correctly applied section 689071 to find that grantee who held title as trustee owned property in fee simple absolute (E) holding that where individual held title to property as trustee but gave mortgage to bank in her individual capacity a title reference on the mortgage to the deed into her as trustee provided constructive notice that the mortgage was supposed to be from the individual as trustee or at the least that the holder of a subsequent interest would not be a bona fide purchaser

Ex Output:
holding that where grantee was named as trustee without identification of the beneficiaries or the nature and purposes of the trust and no trust agreement of record was identified the grantee received fee simple title

Ex Input:
township in the RLCWA's district took on a different status simply by virtue of its annexation by another township in the RLCWA's district. Second, the federal anti-curtailment statute specifically anticipates that a city will use its annexation of property located within the service area of a rural water association as a basis to provide service to that property, and expressly prohibits such provision of service while the water district is indebted to the federal government. See 7 U.S.C. 1926(b). Third, case law shows that a municipality's annexation of property located within a rural water association does not, of itself, remove it from the water district for 1926(b) purposes. See, e.g., Glenpool Util. Serv. Auth. v. Creek County Rural Water Disk, 861 F.2d 1211 (10th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>); Bell Arthur Water Corp. v. Greenville Util.
Holding statements: (A) holding that article x 2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially (B) holding that 1926b prohibited munici pality from using its annexation of territory within rural water district as springboard for providing its own water service to residents (C) holding municipal condemnation of water associations facilities and certificate violative of 1926b (D) holding substantial completion had occurred because water district took possession of all the lines filled them with water and began using them to serve the customers of the water district (E) holding that village could not condition provision of water services on annexation where prospective customer was within a rural water associations service area and the water association was federally indebted

Ex Output:
holding that article x 2 of the california constitution dictates the basic principles defining water rights that no one can have a protectible interest in the unreasonable use of water and that holders of water rights must use water reasonably and beneficially

Ex Input:
at the time in question, we see no useful purpose in pursuing[the first step of Saucier]." The majority's reasoning is deficient in the context of qualified immunity. The first step of Saucier asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the allegedly injured party, the record establishes a constitutional violation. 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Nothing about this inquiry requires this court to resolve factual disputes in the record. In fact, the Supreme Court has clarified that the first step of the Saucier inquiry in no way requires courts to assume a fact-finding capacity; rather, a court generally just adopts the version of the facts set forth by the party challenging immunity. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n. 8, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Thus, contrary to the majority's reasoning,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts (B) holding that the dispositive question in the first step of saucier whether those facts establish a constitutional violation is a pure question of law (C) recognizing but finding inapplicable pure question of law exception to doctrine of exhaustion (D) holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact (E) holding that the question of whether an existing constitutional right is infringed is strictly a question of law

Ex Output:
recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts