instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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bar, of rule 32:1.3 for dilatory handling of estates despite notices and inquiries from beneficiaries). Johnson's failure to respond to Neefs phone calls and requests for information, failure to notify Neef of what progress had or had not been made on the case, and failure to provide notice of termination, contact information, return of paperwork, or a return of unearned fees violated rules 32:1.4 (duty to keep client informed) and 32:1.16(d) (duty to protect client's interests upon termination of representation). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Iowa 2010) (finding attorney's neglect of client's legal matters and failure to keep clients informed about their cases violated rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4, and 32:1.16(d)); Earley, 774 N.W.2d at 307-08 (<HOLDING>). Johnson also violated rule 32:8.4(c) (duty
Holding statements: (A) holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests (B) holding an attorney violated his duty of candor to the tribunal by changing his clients interrogatory answers without the clients knowledge (C) holding attorney violated rules 3214 and 32116d when he failed to keep his clients informed about the status of their cases failed to communicate with his clients after their repeated requests for information and failed to account for or return client money from retainer fees (D) holding that a law firm receiving funds for a client was not an initial transferee because the firms role with respect to the received money was to accept the funds in settlement of its clients case deposit the money in trust keep as fees only what the the clients agreed to and pay the rest to the bank on behalf of the clients in satisfaction of their loan (E) holding that equitable tolling applied when the attorney informed his client there was no such thing as a oneyear filing deadline and consistently lied to his client and the clients wife
answer:
holding that the attorney violated mlrpc 13 when he did not prosecute his clients claim after filing a complaint or protect against expiration of the statute of limitation for his clients complaint and caused discovery sanctions to be filed for his failure to respond to discovery requests

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the prescribed five working days after the registrant's birthday is not a defense. Barker, 34 Cal.4th at 350, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507 ("forgetting the mandatory registration requirement of section 290 is simply not a legitimate defense to the charge of willfully failing to register"). As a result, it is possible that Gonzalez violated 290(a)(1)(D) through ordinary negligence by forgetting to register during the mandated five working day period. Because the record suggests that Gonzalez made a good faith effort to comply with the registration law, we find that little or no moral culpability attaches to his violation of 290(a)(1)(D). 11 . Gonzalez's sentence is also a high multiple of the plea offers he received. See Reyes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 964, 969 n. 9 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). 12 . See, e.g., Rummel, 445 U.S. at 282, 100
Holding statements: (A) holding that plea offers are relevant to determining whether a three strikes sentence is grossly disproportionate to the triggering offense (B) holding that penalty clauses are enforceable unless they are found to be grossly unreasonable (C) holding that in determining whether a crime is a continuing offense the court must focus on the nature of the substantive offense and not on the specific characteristics of the conduct in the case at issue (D) holding that sentencing court could consider whether the applicable guidelines were outdated and disproportionate but that imposing sentence based on the guidelines did not render sentence substantively unreasonable (E) holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense
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holding that penalty clauses are enforceable unless they are found to be grossly unreasonable

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case in Mitchell. < See id. As in Mitchell,: considering the deed as a whole, the parties clearly intended that the mineral rights in the land be reserved to the grantors. Id. at 274, 243 P.2d at 415; see also Gibson v. Pickett, 256 Ark. 1035, 512 S.W.2d 532, 537-88 (1974) (giving effect to a mineral reservation within a deed's habendum clause even though the deed failed to mention the reservation in its granting clause); Jones v. Am. Ass'n, 120 Ky. 413, 86 S.W. 1111, 1112 (1905) ("[Rleservations or exceptions are enforced, although contained in the habendum clause of the deed, as fully as if set out in the granting clause, when on the whole instrument the intention of the parties is sufficient ly expressed to be enforced."); Price v. Johnson, 78 N.M. 123, 428 P.2d 978, 980-81 (1967) (<HOLDING>). T23 Based on Mitchell and other authorities
Holding statements: (A) holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury (B) recognizing that a clause in an insurance policy was susceptible to a construction in favor of the insured but that such a construction would be unreasonable absurd and produce results never intended or contemplated by the parties (C) holding that an insurance contract should be construed as a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it and that if the language used in the policy is reasonably susceptible to different constructions it must be given the construction most favorable to the insured (D) holding that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party (E) recognizing that where a deed is susceptible to alternative construction the construction most favorable to the grantee will be adopted but still finding that in light of the modern rule the reservation in the habendum at issue was not void for repugnancy
answer:
holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury