In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther's theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts "a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman." White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther's termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender
Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law
[EX A]: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

[EX Q]: his first issue, Samba maintains that the immigration judge placed too little weight on the length of his sentence and the assistance he provided to federal agencies in determining that the offense was a particularly serious crime. We have previously determined that such a claim, "which amount[s] to an argument that the immigration judge 'abused [his] discretion in weighing the multiple desiderata made relevant by the [BIA's] definition of a particularly serious crime,' do[es] not present questions of law and therefore [is] not reviewable under section 1252(a)(2)(D)." Solorzano-Moreno v. Mukasey, 296 Fed.Appx. 391, 394 (5th Cir.2008) (third alteration in original) (quoting Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir.2006)); see also Sung v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). To the extent that the first issue challenges
Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a (B) holding that the source of the federal funds was not a relevant factor in determining the number of violations (C) holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider an argument not presented to the board in a motion for reconsideration (D) holding that the argument that the immigration judge did not consider all of the relevant factors in determining that his children would not suffer the requisite hardship was not a question of law under 1252a2d (E) holding that the family court is required to consider all relevant factors in determining alimony
[EX A]: holding that a sentencing judge would commit a statutory error if the judge failed to consider the applicable guidelines range as well as the other factors listed in section 3553a

[EX Q]: Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex.2004). 4 . Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex.2006). 5 . Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 328-29 (Tex.2006); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980). 6 . Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. 271.152 (Vernon 2005). 7 . Id. at 271.153(a). 8 . Id. at 271.153(b)(1), (b)(3). 9 . Id. at 271.151(2). 10 . Id. at 271.151(3)(C). 11 . See Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 328-29 (noting that sovereign immunity is waived only by clear and unambiguous language). 12 . See Tex. Water Code Ann. 49.001(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.2007). 13 . Id. 49.066(a). 14 . Bexar Metro. Water Dist. v. Educ. and Econ. Dev. Joint Venture, 220 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. filed); see also Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 342 (<HOLDING>)- 15 . Matheus v. Sasser, 164 S.W.3d 453, 459
Holding statements: (A) holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity (B) holding that the trustee alone has the capacity to sue and be sued (C) holding that sue and be sued provisions of agencies should be liberally construed and that authorization of suits against federal entities engaged in commercial activities may waive sovereign immunity from awards of interest as an incident of suit (D) holding that the words sue and be sued when used in a statute do not by themselves waive immunity (E) holding that plaintiffs do not lose their right to sue for damages sustained within statute of limitations period by failing to sue on earlier incidents in timely manner
[EX A]:
holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity