In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

rule may be outdated, we have also recognized that "it is uniquely a province of the legislature to change it." Reiter v. Yellowstone County (1981), Mont., 627 P.2d 845, 849, 38 St.Rep. 686, 690. In Reiter, we noted that because of the operation of section 39-2-503, MCA, the at-will employee was not employed on a "discharge for cause only" basis. We stated, "assuming arguendo that appellant had an implied contract with an implied covenant of good faith, the employer did not act in bad faith because its conduct was statutorily permissible." 627 P.2d at 849-850, 38 St.Rep. at 690. In other words, under section 39-2-503, MCA, an employer or employee could terminate employment for any or all reasons, provided the reasons or manner of termination did not 7), 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (<HOLDING>); and Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. (1974), 114
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a contract action when employee terminated in order not to receive earned bonuses or commissions (B) holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions (C) recognizing contract action and limiting damages to those for breach of contract when employee terminated for refusal to date foreman (D) holding um did not act under color of state law when it terminated an employee (E) recognizing a tort action for wrongful discharge when employee was terminated because he refused to commit a criminal act
holding employee not terminated in bad faith because no evidence suggested that employer discharged employee in order to retain em ployees previously earned sales commissions

how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity " 'substantially affecting interstate commerce.' "). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing
Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference
holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference

violation is one of federal law, a different result obtains. In fact, the Court of Appeals has held that UCL claims may be based on federal statutes, unless the federal statute completely preempts the action. See Lippitt, 340 F.3d at 1042. Defendant does not contend that plaintiffs UCL claim is preempted. Moreover, it has not tendered any evidence that by its amendment of 12 U.S.C. 2604(c), Congress intended to bar pri vate enforcement for failure to provide a GFE under 24 C.F.R. 3500.7(b)(1). Because Wells Fargo has failed to tender any evidence that it ensured that a GFE was provided to plaintiff, its conduct violated RESPA, which constituted an unlawful business practice under the UCL. See McKell v. Washington Mut., Inc., 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1471-1472, 49 Cal. Rptr.3d 227 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs motion is therefore granted on
Holding statements: (A) holding that a loan transaction is a business practice under the ucl (B) holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan (C) holding out admission to practice law when not admitted to practice (D) holding that where parties to an oral loan agreed that the loan would be repaid on demand the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date plaintiff demanded repayment of the loan (E) holding that fraudulent loan transaction exposed financial institutions to risk of loss even though loan was secured
holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan