In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
of the state action is sought. First, federal courts handling in personam cases have generally limited their decisions to enjoin state court proceedings to MDLs or complex national class actions. "Under an appropriate set of facts, a federal court entertaining complex litigation, especially when it involves a substantial class of persons from multiple states, or represents a consolidation of cases from multiple districts, may appropriately enjoin state court proceedings in order to protect its jurisdiction." Diet Drugs I, 282 F.3d at 235. In fact, several courts have declined to enjoin state court proceedings specifically because the federal action did not involve an MDL or a certified class action. See Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1103 (9th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>); Gooch, 589 F.3d at 330-31 (declining to
Holding statements: (A) holding that there was no record of a hearing about settlement objections (B) holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable (C) holding that the commissions approval of a nonunanimous settlement agreement did not violate intervenors due process rights because the record shows that the appellant presented arguments in opposition to the settlement during the agenda conference in which the appellant was allowed thirty minutes to present its views in opposition to the settlement agreement (D) holding a settlement privilege exists as to thirdparty discovery of settlement negotiations (E) holding that an injunction was inappropriate because this was not an mdl case discovery was not complete no class settlement was imminent in fact as far as the record shows no serious settlement progress had been made

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
erred by failing to instruct the jury that a confidential informant's testimony must be corroborated, in conformity with article 38.141. We agree. Our holding that there was some "other evidence" to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement does not eliminate the need for an instruction. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (noting court "might disagree" with court of appeals's holding that there was no evidence ten o the trial court's failure to charge the jury on the requirements of article 38.141 here, but asserts that the trial court's error resulted in harm under the "egregious harm standard" of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (applying egregious harm analysis to unobjected-to charge error). See Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 (<HOLDING>); Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692 (holding
Holding statements: (A) holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony (B) holding egregious harm resulted from erroneous jury instruction authorizing conviction based on legally inadequate theory (C) holding that it was prejudicial error to fail to give such a cautionary instruction even where the defendant did not object at trial to the lack of such an instruction when the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated (D) holding that where appellant failed to present either expert or lay testimony as to the appropriate standard of care to be used appellant failed to present any evidence indicating the existence of an issue of fact thus summary judgment was proper (E) holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
duty of loyalty. Only the second subparagraph of that Rule specifically deals with confidentiality. The Second Circuit made clear in In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability Litig., 800 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.1986), that "an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to his client" and that "[tjhese obligations do not necessarily end when the attorney-client relationship ends." Id. at 17. See also Arifi v. de Transport du Cocher, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y.2003) ("The duty of loyalty that runs from an attorney to a client does not necessarily end when the formal attorney-client relationship ends because the attorney owes a 'duty of continuing loyalty' to his former client." (internal citations omitted)); Schwed v. General Electric Co., 990 F.Sup t'l Inc.), 222 B.R. 401, 408 (Bankr.D.Conn.1998) (<HOLDING>); Kassis v. Teacher's Ins. and Annuity Assoc.,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an attorney has a duty of loyalty to his client (B) holding that attorneys should be disqualified where the substantial relationship test is met in order to assure that the confidentiality of the attorneyclient relationship and the loyalty between attorney and client are preserved (C) holding that the substantial relationship test also concerns the duty of loyalty to a former client (D) holding that the substantial relationship test embodies a broader concept than the rule of confidentiality that of continuing fidelity to a former client a duty of loyalty (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client

Ex Output:
(D)