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SECTION 1. CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

(a) Findings.--
(1) The critical electric infrastructure of the United
States and Canada has more than $1 trillion in asset value,
more than 200,000 miles of transmission lines, and more than
800,000 megawatts of generating capability, serving over 300
million people.
(2) The effective functioning of this infrastructure is
highly dependent on computer-based control systems that are
used to monitor and manage sensitive processes and physical
functions.
(3) These control systems are becoming increasingly
connected to open networks, such as corporate intranets and the
Internet. According to the Department of Homeland Security's
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (''US-CERT''),
this transition towards widely used technologies and open
connectivity exposes control systems to the ever-present cyber
risks that exist in the information technology world in
addition to control system specific risks.
(4) Malicious actors pose a significant risk to this
infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (''FBI'')
has identified multiple sources of threats, including foreign
nation states, domestic criminals and hackers, and disgruntled
employees.
(5) Intentional or naturally occurring Electromagnetic
Pulse (''EMP'') events also threaten critical electric
infrastructure. The Commission to Assess the Threat to the
United States from EMP Attack reported in 2008 that an EMP
attack could cause significant damage or disruption to critical
electric infrastructure and other critical infrastructure due
to the widespread use of Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (''SCADA'') systems. The National Academy of
Sciences also reported in 2008 that Severe Space Weather Events
could produce similar results.
(6) The Department of Homeland Security's Control Systems
Security Program is designed to increase the reliability,
security, and resilience of control systems to guard against
and enhance domestic preparedness for and collective response
to a cyber attack by a terrorist or other person. This is done
by developing voluntary cyber risk reduction products,
supporting the Department of Homeland Security's Industrial
Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team (''ICS-CERT'')
in developing vulnerability mitigation recommendations and
strategies, and coordinating and leveraging activities for
improving the Nation's critical infrastructure security
posture.
(7) According to recent news reports, the electronic
control systems of the electrical system in the United States
have been routinely penetrated and compromised. According to
current and former national security officials, cyber spies
from China, Russia, and other countries have penetrated the
United States electrical system in order to map the system, and
have left behind software programs that could be used to
disrupt and disable the system.
(8) In the interest of national security, and to enhance
domestic preparedness for and collective response to a cyber
attack by a terrorist or other person, a statutory mechanism is
necessary to protect the critical electric infrastructure
against cyber threats.
(9) In spite of existing mandatory cybersecurity standards,
a report from the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (''NERC'') suggests that many utilities are
underreporting their assets, potentially to avoid compliance
requirements. In April 2009, NERC reported that only 23 percent
of responding utilities identified a ''Critical Cyber Asset''
as required by NERC Reliability Standard 002-1. According to
NERC, the results of this survey suggest that utilities may not
have identified certain qualifying assets as ''Critical''. NERC
requested that entities take a fresh, comprehensive look at
their methodology in order to identify and secure more Critical
Cyber Assets.
(10) On May 21, 2008, in testimony before the House
Committee on Homeland Security, Joseph Kelliher, then-Chairman
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (''the
Commission''), stated that his agency is in need of additional
legal authorities to adequately protect the electric power
system against cyber attack.
(b) Research on Cyber Compromise of Critical Electric
Infrastructure.--(1) Pursuant to section 201 of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) and in furtherance of domestic preparedness
for and collective response to a cyber attack by a terrorist or other
person, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with other national
security and intelligence agencies, shall conduct research and
determine if the security of federally owned programmable electronic
devices and communication networks (including hardware, software, and
data) essential to the reliable operation of critical electric
infrastructure have been compromised.
(2) The scope of the research referred to in paragraph (1) shall
include: the extent of compromise, identification of attackers, the
method of penetration, ramifications of the compromise on future
operations of critical electric infrastructure, secondary ramifications
of the compromise on other critical infrastructure sectors and the
functioning of civil society, ramifications of compromise on national
security, including war fighting capability, and recommended mitigation
activities.
(3) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall report the findings to
the appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the Senate. The report
may contain a classified annex.
(c) Federal Power Act Amendment.--Part II of the Federal Power Act
(16 U.S.C. 791a and following) is amended by adding the following new
sections at the end thereof:

''SEC. 224 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

''(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
''(1) Critical electric infrastructure.--The term 'critical
electric infrastructure' means systems and assets, whether
physical or cyber used for the generation, transmission,
distribution, or metering of electric energy that, in the
determination of the Commission, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security and other national security
agencies, are so vital to the United States that the incapacity
or destruction of such systems and assets, either alone or in
combination with the failure of other assets, would cause
significant harm to the security, national or regional economic
security, or national or regional public health or safety.
''(2) Critical electric infrastructure information.--The
term 'critical electric infrastructure information' means
critical infrastructure information related to critical
electric infrastructure.
''(3) Critical infrastructure information.--The term
'critical infrastructure information' has the same meaning as
is given that term in section 212(3) of the Critical
Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 131(3)).
''(4) Cyber threat.--The term 'cyber threat' means any act
by a terrorist or other person that disrupts, attempts to
disrupt, or poses a significant risk of disruption to the
operation of programmable electronic devices and communication
networks (including hardware, software, and data) essential to
the reliable operation of critical electric infrastructure.
''(5) Cyber vulnerability.--The term 'cyber vulnerability'
means any weakness that, if exploited by a terrorist or other
person, poses a significant risk of disruption to the operation
of programmable electronic devices and communication networks
(including hardware, software, and data) essential to the
reliable operation of critical electric infrastructure.
''(b) Assessment, Report, and Determination.--
''(1) In general.--Pursuant to section 201 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121), the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall assess cyber vulnerabilities or threats to
critical infrastructure, including critical electric
infrastructure and advanced metering infrastructure, on an
ongoing basis and produce reports, including recommendations,
on a periodic basis for the purposes of homeland security,
including the enhancement of domestic preparedness for and
collective response to a cyber attack by a terrorist, nation-
state, or other person, and for other purposes.
''(2) Elements of the report.--The Secretary shall--
''(A) include in the reports under this section
findings regarding a cyber vulnerability or terrorist
threat or potential terrorist threat, and a nation-
state threat or potential threat to critical electric
infrastructure; and
''(B) provide recommendations regarding actions
that may be performed to enhance individualized and
collective domestic preparedness and response to the
cyber vulnerability or terrorist or nation-state.
''(3) Transmittal of report.--The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall transmit reports prepared in response to the
cyber vulnerability or threat to the Commission and the
appropriate committees of Congress, including the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee of the
Senate, of the Secretary's determinations under this section.
Each such report may contain a classified annex.
''(4) Timely determination.--If, in carrying out the
assessment required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of
Homeland Security determines that a significant cyber
vulnerability or threat to critical electric infrastructure has
been identified, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
communicate such a determination to the Commission in a timely
manner. The Secretary of Homeland Security may incorporate
intelligence or information received from other national
security or intelligence agencies in making such determination.
''(c) Commission Authority.--
''(1) Issuance of rules or orders.--Following receipt of a
finding under subsection (b), the Commission shall issue (and
from time to time thereafter amend) such rules or orders as are
necessary to protect critical electric infrastructure against
vulnerabilities or threats.
''(2) Emergency procedures.--The Commission may issue, in
consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, a rule or
order under this section without prior notice or hearing if it
determines the rule or order must be issued immediately to
protect critical electric infrastructure from an imminent
threat or vulnerability.
''(d) Duration of Emergency Rules or Orders.--Any rule or order
issued by the Commission without prior notice or hearing under
subsection (c)(2) shall remain effective for not more than 90 days
unless, during such 90 days, the Commission gives interested persons an
opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments (with or
without opportunity for oral presentation) and affirms, amends, or
repeals the rule or order.
''(e) Jurisdiction.--Notwithstanding section 201, the provisions of
this section shall apply to any entity that owns, controls, or operates
critical electric infrastructure, and such entities shall be subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission for purposes of carrying out this
section and for purposes of applying the enforcement authorities of
this Act with respect to such provisions, but shall not make an
electric utility or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission for any other purposes.
''(f) Protection of Critical Electric Infrastructure Information.--
The provisions of section 214 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 133) shall apply to critical electric infrastructure information
submitted to the Commission under this section to the same extent that
they apply to critical infrastructure information voluntarily submitted
to the Department of Homeland Security under that Act (6 U.S.C. 101 and
following).

''SEC. 224B. PROTECTION AGAINST KNOWN CYBER VULNERABILITIES OR THREATS
TO THE CRITICAL ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE.

''(a) Interim Measures.--After notice and opportunity for comment,
the Commission shall establish, in consultation with the Secretary of
Homeland Security, by rule or order, within 120 days of enactment of
this section, such mandatory interim measures as are necessary to
protect against known cyber vulnerabilities or threats to the reliable
operation of the critical electric infrastructure in the United States.
Such interim reliability measures:
''(1) shall serve to supplement, replace, or modify
cybersecurity reliability standards that, as of the date of
enactment of this section, were in effect pursuant to section
215, but that are determined by the Commission, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and other national
security agencies, to be inadequate to address known cyber
vulnerabilities or threats; and
''(2) may be replaced by new cybersecurity reliability
standards that are developed and approved pursuant to section
215 following the date of enactment of this section.
''(b) Plans.--The rule or order issued under this subsection may
require any owner, user or operator of critical electric infrastructure
in the United States to develop a plan to address cyber vulnerabilities
or threats identified by the Commission and to submit such plan to the
Commission for approval.''.

SEC. 2. EVALUATION OF EXISTING AUTHORITIES.

Section 214 of title II, subtitle B of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (6 U.S.C. 133(i)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
''(i) Review of Authorities To Protect Critical Infrastructure.--
The Secretary of Homeland Security shall evaluate the capacity and
authority of the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal
agencies to ensure the security and resilience of electronic devices
and communication networks essential to each of the critical
infrastructure sectors identified pursuant to Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 7 against a cyber attack by a terrorist, nation-
state, or other person, for the purpose of enhancing domestic
preparedness for, and collective response to, a cyber attack by a
terrorist, nation-state, or other person and to enhance the Nation's
homeland security posture.''.
Output:
Directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with other national security and intelligence agencies, to conduct research and determine if the security of federally owned programmable electronic devices and communication networks (including hardware, software, and data) essential to the operation of critical electric infrastructure has been compromised.

Amends the Federal Power Act to direct the Secretary to make ongoing assessments and provide periodic reports with respect to: (1) cyber vulnerabilities or threats to critical infrastructure, including critical electric infrastructure and advanced metering infrastructure; and (2) the enhancement of domestic preparedness for a cyber attack.

Directs the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to establish mandatory interim measures to protect against known cyber vulnerabilities or threats to the operation of the critical electric infrastructure in the United States.

Amends the the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to direct the Secretary to evaluate the capacity and authority of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies to ensure the security against a cyber attack and resilience of electronic devices and communication networks essential to the critical infrastructure sectors.