In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: it was given voluntarily. If these questions are resolved in favor of the State, then, without being advised of the court's decision, the jury shall be instructed that they should decide whether in view of all the same circumstances the defendant's confession is true. If they find that it is not true, then they must treat it as inadmissible and disregard it for purposes of discharging them function as fact finders on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. [Id. at 272, 294 A.2d 23.] See also State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344, 366, 387 A.2d 1187 (1978) (reaffirming Hampton principle that trial court is sole arbiter of voluntariness of defendant's statements and rejecting defendant's invitation to overrule decision); State v. Bowman, 165 N.J.Super. 531, 537-39, 398 A.2d 908 (App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>). The New Jersey Rules of Evidence codified the
Holding statements: (A) holding prosecutors statement to jury on summation that trial court had previously found defendants two confessions voluntary constituted reversible error even though trial court gave hampton charge because it failed to instruct jury to disregard prosecutors statement (B) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (C) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (D) holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony (E) holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error
[EX A]: holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge

[EX Q]: with ever since his age of 13 and believes that this criminal record and his continued violation of the law does require a sentence at the top of the guideline range." Id. at 8. I. A. Commerce Clause Challenge to Section 922(g)(1) Williams first challenges the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute as it applies to his possession of the Smith and Wesson revolver. Williams posits that because he possessed the gun solely within the State of Wisconsin, and because the record reveals no substantial connection between his possession of the gun and interstate commerce, Congress had no authority under the Commerce Clause, see U.S. Const. Art. I, 8, cl. 3, to reach his possession of the gun. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Williams did not make this argument below, so
Holding statements: (A) holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce (B) holding that statute which prohibited gun possession near a school zone exceeded congresss authority under the commerce clause because the statute did not regulate activity that had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (C) holding that enactment of 13981 exceeded congressional authority under either the commerce clause or section 5 of the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that gunfree school zones act of 1990 which proscribed possession of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school exceeded congressional authority under commerce clause because it reached conduct that did not substantially affect or have a meaningful connection with interstate commerce (E) holding that the gunfree school zones act exceeds congress power under the commerce clause
[EX A]: holding that the gunfree school zone act exceeds congresss authority to regulate commerce

[EX Q]: 125 S.Ct. 1561, 161 L.Ed.2d 563 (2005). The homestead exemption is not, however, the exclusive remedy for a debtor facing the loss of his or her residence. An alternative remedy is for the debtor to seek abandonment by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. 554(b) if the property is "of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." If Jahn could extinguish the abandonment remedy by simply tendering the homestead exemption, then he could effectively nullify 11 U.S.C. 554(b). Such an argument overlooks relevant caselaw and the text of the abandonment statute. Jahn's second argument is that the Burkes lacked Article III standing to proceed on their motion to compel abandonment. To ha uest for the abandonment of another's property. See In re Miller, 302 B.R. 705, 711 (10th Cir. B.A.P. 2003) (<HOLDING>). In such a case, the debtor has suffered no
Holding statements: (A) holding that the debtor had no standing to compel the trustee to abandon production equipment and other property that concededly belonged to third parties (B) holding that in chapter 7 context the debtors had no power to transfer the property without the approval of the trustee (C) holding that a trustee lacked standing to sue a third party for damages incurred by debenture holders of the corporate debtor (D) holding that claims for alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against attorneys that represented the chapter 11 debtor in possession belonged to the bankruptcy estate and upon conversion of the case to chapter 7 such claims belonged to the chapter 7 trustee as successor to the debtor in possession (E) holding that for purpose of the means test debtor can deduct mortgage payment even though debtor will abandon property
[EX A]:
holding that in chapter 7 context the debtors had no power to transfer the property without the approval of the trustee