In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: to those sentences because no error in the sentencing appears on the face of the record. Ninety-nine years is a "term of years not less than five years." While Thomas' sentences, under court interpretations of 566.030.2, may not be authorized, we are not able to reach such issues where the sentencing defect is not so patent as to present a jurisdictional issue. This sentencing does not present a jurisdictional issue. Conclusion Thomas is ordered to be returned to the circuit court of the City of St. Louis for resentencing on the three first degree robbery counts within the limits authorized by the law. SO ORDERED. All concur. 1 . All sectional references are to Missouri Revised Statutes 1986, unless otherwise indicated. 2 . See, e.g., State v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.App.1992)(<HOLDING>); State v. Charron, 743 S.W.2d 436
Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (C) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding sentence of 100 years for forcible rape was in excess of statutory maximum

Answer: holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum

Question: acts of sexual harassment by the plaintiffs co-workers, about which defendants' supervisors neither knew nor should have known, does not give rise to a cognizable sexual harassment claim and will not revive an otherwise stale sexual harassment claim. See Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) ("[Because no harassment event occurring during the violation period was ever brought to the attention of [the employer] while [the plaintiff] was still employed, there is no violation during the limitation period that can serve as the anchor for the earlier conduct."). Additionally, the plaintiff cannot rely on the continuing violations doctrine, because there is no nexus between the conduct of the coworkers in 1994 and the earlier incidents going back to 1992. See Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, there being no dispute as to
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur (B) holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated to coworker to whom she compared herself (C) holding that the plaintiff could not rely on the continuing violations doctrine because she had failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between alleged touching incidents by a supervisor and the later conduct of fellow employees (D) holding that a constitutional claim against nongovernment entities only lies where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself (E) holding that plaintiff cook at a nursing home had sufficiently pled requisite public policy and a close fit where she alleged she was fired for expressing concerns that a fellow employee was contaminating the area where she was preparing food

Answer: holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur

Question: self-incrimination because the prosecutor might have moved to set aside Harley's plea on the basis of false testimony and to file charges against him fo crime apart from perjury Harley might reasonably be charged with in a future prosecution. The State refers only to capital murder, which in this case would be precluded by the prior conviction for the lesser included offense of first degree murder. As to the risk of prosecution for perjury, we are likewise skeptical. A witness may not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to prevent himself from imminent commission of peijury. Although the reverse is possible, i.e., a witness may claim the privilege to prevent himself from revealing a previous peijury, see, e.g., United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 632 (5th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>), the State fails to detail such circumstances
Holding statements: (A) recognizing privilege (B) holding that where a witness who testifies under oath and is subject to crossexamination in a prior state court proceeding explicitly refuses to answer the same questions at trial the refusal to answer is inconsistent with his prior testimony (C) recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury (D) recognizing that a witness may claim the privilege if his new testimony might suggest that he had perjured himself in testifying on the same subject at a prior proceeding (E) holding that a witness may invoke the privilege against selfincrimination at trial despite testifying previously before a grand jury in the same case

Answer:
recognizing privilege