In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors' assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders
Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion

Answer: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment

Question: states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) ("[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew's evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding."). But see Klein v. Comm'r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) ("A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence."); Calcutt v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness
Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action

Answer: holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial

Question: regarding the administrative appeal available in 1990 do not amount to a "clear and positive showing of futility," nor has Plaintiff established to a certainty that her claim would have been denied on appeal. Under the benefit Plan at issue in this case, it is clear that Plaintiff would not be entitled to additional benefits for mental illness. It is not certain, however, that an appeal would have been denied had Plaintiff presented the evidence that she in fact had previously been diagnosed as having MS and continued to seek medical evaluation for a possible physical disability, which she apparently did, and which ultimately led to the rediagnosis of MS. The record establishes that Plaintiff was diagnosed prior to April 12, 1989, as having MS and that she d 869, 874-75 (7th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Bomis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 970
Holding statements: (A) holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract (B) holding that duress toll to statute of limitations under state law had no application to federal rico statute of limitations (C) holding that insurance plans thirtynine 39 month contractual limitations period shorter than statute of limitations was reasonable and thus enforceable (D) holding that a reasonable contractedfor limitations period that is not contrary to public policy is generally enforceable (E) holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable

Answer:
holding that one year limitations period in insurance policy was reasonable and therefore enforceable to shorten the fifteen year statute of limitations for breach of contract