In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978). Two of Gunther's theories are easily eliminated. First, a plaintiff is a member of a protected class if she asserts "a claim based on sex discrimination as a pregnant woman." White v. University of Mass., 410 Mass. 553, 557, 574 N.E.2d 356 (1991). There is no allegation that Gunther's termination was motivated by animus toward her pregnancy because at the time of her discharge she was not pregnant and had been working for over eight months in a managerial position with equivalent salary. Second, to the extent that Gunther is claiming she was discriminated against as a single mother, she can not prevail. Parenthood is not listed as a protected class in the statute. See G.L. c. 151B, 4; cf. Upton v. JWP Businessland, 425 Mass. 756, 758-59, 682 N.E.2d 1357 (1997) (<HOLDING>). With respect to the claim of pure gender
Holding statements: (A) recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (B) recognizing public policy exception to atwill doctrine (C) holding that it was not a violation of public policy for the defendant to discharge the plaintiff an atwill employee because she was a single mother unwilling to work newly imposed long hours (D) holding that an employee could maintain a claim for constructive discharge in violation of virginias public policy exception to the employment atwill doctrine (E) holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law
Example Output: recognizing tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

Example Input: 2d 266, 35 (discussing the reasoning in Brunst as being that "unless these 'time immemorial' duties were constitutionally protected from interference by others, the constitutional provision securing the people the right to choose sheriffs would become meaningless"). It seems incongruous to us that the policy of keeping duties within the office of sheriff because he is elected and answerable to the electors is consistent with the holdings in WPPA II (and, more recently Brown County), where the court held that because the duty was characteristically the sheriffs, he can, as a result, contract with third parties for the carrying out of the duty. Yet, we are bound by WPPA II (and its interpretation of Brunst) and Brown County. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 190, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 29. For the reasons stated, we reverse the
Holding statements: (A) holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision (B) holding that court of appeals may adopt such waiver rule (C) holding court of appeals erred in refusing to take judicial notice of published puc order (D) holding that the court need not follow a decision of the district of columbia court of appeals where it appears that the court of appeals itself would not follow that decision (E) holding that the court of appeals may not overrule modify or withdraw language from a previously published decision of the court of appeals
Example Output: holding that one panel cannot overrule a prior panels published decision

Example Input: 307 (2d Cir.2003). As a preliminary matter, we reject the government's contention that Hu failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1). Hu's brief to the BIA argued that Hu's testimony was consistent with the State Department country reports in the record because Hu's testimony was generally consistent. Hu's argument that her testimony was generally consistent was sufficient to indicate that Hu was challenging the IJ's adverse credibility determination as a whole. Further, in Gill v. INS, we noted that " 1252(d)(1) does not limit our review to those arguments specifically raised below." 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir.2005). Although Hu's brief may not have been clear about which factual findings Hu challenged, the legal nature of her argument was clear. See id. (<HOLDING>). Reviewing the IJ's adverse credibility
Holding statements: (A) holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below (B) holding that 1252d1 bars the consideration of bases for relief that were not raised below and of general issues that were not raised below but not of specific subsidiary legal arguments or arguments by extension that were not made below (C) holding that petitioners had abandoned arguments not raised below (D) recognizing general rule that an appellate court cannot address claims that were not raised below (E) holding that arguments not raised below are waived for appeal
Example Output:
holding that argument offered in defense of decision below had been waived when not raised below