In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
that placed a forty-five day time limit on the administrator's decision to grant or deny a license. See Redner, 29 F.3d at 1500. In the event the administrator exceeded the forty-five day time limit, the ordinance stated that "the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought," unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application." See id. at 1500-01 (citation omitted). We held that the ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because its use of the word "may" rather than "shall" allowed the individuals responsible for enforcing the ordinance to suppress the protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on their part or any judicial determination. See id. at 1501 (<HOLDING>). In Lady J. Lingerie, we examined the
Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff (B) holding that a party may not invoke the capable of repetition yet evading review exception where its failure to obtain prompt relief has prevented judicial review (C) holding also that the ordinance failed to provide for prompt judicial review (D) holding that because here the statutes in issue provide for judicial review via citizen suit provisions yet do not set forth a standard for that review judicial review is limited to apa review on the administrative record (E) holding that the llupa does not provide for judicial review of a request to change a comprehensive zoning plan

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
the B-side breakers were cross-phased caused transformer B to fail, and the failure of transformer B necessitated its testing, removal, oil disposal, repair and reinstallation. No additional link in the causal chain was necessary to bring about the injury or damages. The parties can be "conclusively presumed to have foreseen" that Powell's substandard performance would result in the failure of the transformer and that failure of a transformer would require HP to incur costs associated with repairing it. Cf. Arthur Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 816. We are not persuaded otherwise by Powell's argument that direct damages in this case should be limited to the cost of uncrossing the wrongfully crossed cables or the difference between the value of Powell's actual services and the value of t *8-9 (<HOLDING>). Powell asserts that these provisions refer to
Holding statements: (A) holding that where electricity supplier had its employees on construction site from time to time in connection with supplying temporary electricity any knowledge suppliers employees had of building construction was incidental to supplying electricity thus construction worker who was injured when he contacted live highvoltage electrical transmission lines wholly failed to establish any reason why electricity supplier should have foreseen injury and no duty arises to act to prevent such unanticipated injury (B) holding costs of providing power during construction delay were direct damages because contract provision specified that owner would provide electricity to construction site (C) recognizing the rights of third parties who were not signatories to a construction contract (D) holding that construction safety manuals and codes were properly admitted as objective standards of safe construction (E) holding that whether clause in construction contract providing that no damages would be available for delay was enforceable was a factual question where there was evidence that damages resulted from unreasonable delay beyond the contemplation of the parties

Ex Output:
(B)

Ex Input:
judgment to select suitable goods, so as to support liability under the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. 2.315 (Vernon 1994). In addition, the implied warranty of merchantability does not apply in Texas to used goods which are purchased, as in this case, with knowledge that they are used. See Southerland v. Northeast Datsun, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1983, no writ); Thornton Homes, Inc. v. Greiner, 619 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1981, no writ); Cheney v. Parks, 605 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 5 pp.3d 464, 710 N.E.2d 770, 771-73 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Restatement (Second) of Toets 388
Holding statements: (A) holding supplier of compactor had no duty to warn worker or his employer of the availability andor need for a rops for the compactor because this was an open and obvious danger (B) holding that seller of frontend loader had no duty to warn injured worker concerning the dangers of operating the loader without a rops because the dangers were obvious under an objective standard (C) holding danger was so open and obvious to plaintiff that as a matter of law he knew or should have known of danger (D) holding under section 388 of the restatement seoond of torts defendants had no duty to warn injured tractor driver that tractor lacked a rops because this was an open and obvious danger (E) holding that a grocery store employer had no duty to warn an employee that placing his hand in the doorjamb of a customers car is an obvious danger

Ex Output:
(A)