In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: and sold it to nonre-latives. We conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the property is marital. The form of the transaction, while not dispositive, is compelling in the instant case because of Klem's knowledge of, and experience with, joint tenancies. Klem was fully aware of how joint tenancies operated. As the husband of Hazel, he became the sole owner of Hazel's family property as a surviving joint tenant, a fact he acknowledged during his deposition. Subsequent to his sole ownership of the property, he knowingly deeded the property to Larry and Colleen as joint tenants. In so doing, he gave both parties an interest in the property. See Melina v. Melina, 411 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn.App.1987); Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 567 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, also indicative of the donor's
Holding statements: (A) holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate (B) holding that devise of real estate to one spouse was nonmarital and noting that had testator intended such property to be devised as marital property he could have designated appellant as a joint tenant (C) holding money received from inheritance as nonmarital property presumptively became marital property when placed in joint account under arkansas law (D) holding that transferring joint property into one partys name for estate planning purposes does not convert marital property into nonmarital property (E) holding that circuit court erred in failing to consider that marital property in the form of marital earnings was used to pay debt against nonmarital property

Answer: holding that spouse could not claim exemption in property that was only property of other spouses estate

Question: the I.C. court perhaps Plaintiffs' strongest case determined that "the juvenile court can act to protect children within its jurisdiction." I.C., 742 So.2d at 404. The I.C. court looked to 39.453(8)(g), which holds: The court may issue a protective order in assistance, or as a condition, of any other order made under this part. In addition to the requirements included in the case plan, the protective order may set forth requirements relating to reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specified period of time by a person or agency who is before the court; and such order may require any such person or agency to make periodic reports to the court containing such information as the court in its discretion may prescribe. See also Henry & Rilla, 720 So.2d at 573 (<HOLDING>). Although Plaintiffs and their counsel, if
Holding statements: (A) holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts (B) holding that jeopardy attaches in juvenile adjudication that determines whether juvenile violated criminal law (C) holding that chapter 39 provides the juvenile judge the flexibility to factor a childs safety into a custody decision at all stages of a juvenile proceeding (D) holding that the defendant is entitled to be present at all stages of his trial and a judges response to a note from the jury is one of those stages (E) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles

Answer: holding that although the juvenile restitution statute does not expressly require the juvenile court to determine whether the juvenile has the ability to pay the restitution ordered as a condition of probation the policies underlying the adult restitutions command that a trial court make such an inquiry applies with equal force to juvenile courts

Question: found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the conspiracy began in 1992. Accordingly, the district court included 1992 and 1993 in its calculation of McGuire's sentence, adopted the reasoning of the PSR, and set McGuire's offense level at 28, which put McGuire in a sentencing range of 78 to 97 months. The district court sentenced McGuire to 78 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On October 13, 1999, the court entered final judgment. McGuire argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction to change his sentence, asserting that the sentence was "imposed" under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c) when the district co (2d Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Townsend, 33 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Clay, 37 F.3d 338, 340 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 869
Holding statements: (A) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (B) holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment (C) holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact (D) recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry (E) holding that imposition occurs at time of oral pronouncement

Answer:
holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment