In India to purchase some horses , British aristocrat , Lord Esketh and his wife , Edwina , come to the town of Ranchipur at the invitation of the elderly Maharani . Their marriage is an unhappy one and Lord Esketh announces his intention to return to England and begin divorce proceedings . The spoiled , insensitive Edwina scoffs at this . She renews in Ranchipur an acquaintance with a former lover , Tom Ransome , now a dissolute alcoholic . She also meets and attempts to seduce a distinguished Hindu physician , Dr. Rama Safti , a decent man who is the elderly Maharani's personal choice to succeed her someday . Safti at first resists , but ultimately succumbs to Edwina's charms and falls hopelessly in love with her . Lord Esketh becomes aware of this , but Safti saves him from a man-eating tiger during a safari . Safti admits his love for Edwina to Lord Esketh , who is now sympathetic toward this good man's plight . Ransome feels the same way , warning Edwina to stay away from Safti , a friend he admires . Edwina similarly falls into disfavor with the Maharani , who explains that Safti has been raised to lead a pure life and that Edwina is unworthy of him . Ranchipur suddenly is ravaged by a natural disaster , an earthquake and flood . Dr. Safti is so busy saving lives that he can not personally care for Edwina , who has fallen ill . Ransome looks after her as well as for young Fern Simon , who has declared her love for him . When a dam is exploded by dynamite and as a result the flood waters recede , it is Dr. Safti who reveals that Ransome is the one who risked his personal safety to save the people of Ranchipur .

Who tries to seduce the man who saves Lord Esketh from a man-eating tiger during a safari?

As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

How much did the 9/11 plotters spend and how much was given to Hamburg operators in regards to their role in the plot?

Bin Laden reportedly discussed the planes operation with KSM and Atef in a series of meetings in the spring of 1999 at the al Matar complex near Kandahar. KSM's original concept of using one of the hijacked planes to make a media statement was scrapped, but Bin Laden considered the basic idea feasible. Bin Laden, Atef, and KSM developed an initial list of targets. These included the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center. According to KSM, Bin Laden wanted to destroy the White House and the Pentagon, KSM wanted to strike the World Trade Center, and all of them wanted to hit the Capitol. No one else was involved in the initial selection of targets. Bin Laden also soon selected four individuals to serve as suicide operatives: Khalid al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Khallad, and Abu Bara al Yemeni. During the al Matar meetings, Bin Laden told KSM that Mihdhar and Hazmi were so eager to participate in an operation against the United States that they had already obtained U.S. visas. KSM states that they had done so on their own after the suicide of their friend Azzam (Nashiri's cousin) in carrying out the Nairobi bombing. KSM had not met them. His only guidance from Bin Laden was that the two should eventually go to the United States for pilot training. Hazmi and Mihdhar were Saudi nationals, born in Mecca. Like the others in this initial group of selectees, they were already experienced mujahideen. They had traveled together to fight in Bosnia in a group that journeyed to the Balkans in 1995. By the time Hazmi and Mihdhar were assigned to the planes operation in early 1999, they had visited Afghanistan on several occasions. Khallad was another veteran mujahid, like much of his family. His father had been expelled from Yemen because of his extremist views. Khallad had grown up in Saudi Arabia, where his father knew Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and Omar Abdel Rahman (the "Blind Sheikh").
Who was involved in the initial selection of targets?