In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the report and recommendation did not notify the parties that they must file timely objections to preserve their right to appellate review. He argues that the firm waiver rule should not be enforced in the absence of such an explicit notification. While we have held that the firm waiver rule is inapplicable when pro se litigants are not given explicit notice of the rule, see id. at 659, we have never extended that practice to counseled cases. We decline to do so today, because we expect counsel to know the rules. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 n. 5 (10th Cir.2007) ("[W]e expect counsel to know the pleading rules of the road without being given personal notice of them by the district court."); United States v. Windrix, 405 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). While 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) provides that a
Holding statements: (A) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules (B) holding that a criminal defendants counsel is charged with knowledge of the local criminal rules in their entirety including those parts of the local civil rules incorporated by reference (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying its own local rules even though those rules prevented it from considering some facts improperly alleged by plaintiffs that might have been relevant to the summary judgment motion (D) holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery (E) holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings

Ex Output:
holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in striking fact statements that did not comply with the local rules

Ex Input:
to her or to the government, and some of which may be quite different than either thought possible. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21; see also Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27, 38 (1st Cir. 2010). At the time of sentencing there was no "sentencing error". Petitioner made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights, choosing the certainty of a binding plea agreement over the uncertainty of a jury trial. He cannot accept the benefit of that agreement and then repudiate it when a change in circumstances later arises. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21. A retroactive determination that an advisory guideline range may have been miscalculated does not overcome petitioner's appellate waiver; See Sotirion, 617 F.3d at 38; see also United States v. Calderon-Pacheco, 564 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (<HOLDING>). In view of the circumstances, the Court
Holding statements: (A) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver (B) holding a showing of egregious facts required to vault the hurdle erected by the waiver (C) holding that the failure to provide a person with all of the information required by ors 4261001 constitutes an egregious error that justifies plain error review (D) recognizing waiver by acquiescence as a possible defense to an action for past due alimony but finding no waiver under the facts presented (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case

Ex Output:
holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver

Ex Input:
that may be imputed to a governmental entity as the act of the entity's servant comes within 893.80). 38. The principles of immunity for particular types of agents under Wis. Stat. 893.80, as discussed in Kettner, should be read in harmony with the Lyons test and with the principles of governmental immunity enunciated in 893.80(4). For example, the allegation in Lyons that the bridge was improperly designed by the governmental contractor, who undertook the design at the direction of the governmental entity, was the act of a 893.80(4)-type agent because the governmental entity controlled the design choice and design choices are legislative or quasi-legislative functions. See Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d at 452-58; see also Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 100-01, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973) (<HOLDING>). 39. However, if the allegation in Lyons
Holding statements: (A) holding that a construction lender may voluntarily assume a duty to inspect the construction project for the borrowers benefit in addition to the lenders independent contractual right to inspect the project for its own exclusive benefit (B) recognizing legislative or quasilegislative nature of design decision (C) recognizing that the existence of a copy of a decision in a bill file along with numerous references to a decision of the court of appeals in the legislative history indicated that an amendment was made in response to that decision (D) recognizing that the decision to undertake a project or how to design the project may be immunized as the exercise of a legislative or quasilegislative function (E) holding that design professionals marking on pipe to indicate how it should be cut was a construction project within the meaning of a kansas statute similar to rcw 51240351

Ex Output:
holding that a construction lender may voluntarily assume a duty to inspect the construction project for the borrowers benefit in addition to the lenders independent contractual right to inspect the project for its own exclusive benefit