TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: constructive, or judicially imposed lien, or (4) asserted against real or personal property. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. 51.903; Cardenas v. Wilson, 428 S.W.3d 130, 132 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that 51.903 inquiry into mechanic's lien determines only that mechanic's lien is provided by Texas law, not whether the underlying mechanic's lien was valid). If the motion requires greater inquiry, then it is a motion for declaratory judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 37.004(a) (West 2015); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. 1980) ("We look to the substance of a plea for relief to determine the nature of the pleading, not merely at the form of title given to it."); Nguyen, 2016 WL 2343893, at *2 (citing Becker, 2010 WL 877569, at *2-3 (<HOLDING>)). A motion for declaratory judgment must be
Holding statements: (A) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion (B) holding motion requesting more relief than section 51903 provides was motion for declaratory judgment (C) holding that motion accepting judgment but requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law was not directed against the judgment (D) holding that substance of motion to extend time was a section 1301f motion rather than a section 1301g motion and that trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the section 1301f motion (E) holding that the courts denial of either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment is not a final judgment and is not reviewable

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: v. Jones, 993 P.2d 424, 427-28 (Alaska 1999) (construing a statute to give rise to an equitable lien because it established "an interest in and a right to seek reimbursement from" a particular source). 13 . Cf. AS 09.35.160 (giving a judgment creditor and the process server who levies on property under a writ of execution full control over the timing of a sale in satisfaction of the judgment). 14 . See Alaska R. Civ. P. 89(a). 15 . AS 13.16.505. 16 . AS 13.06.050(39). This definition comports with the definition set out in Uniform Probate Code section 1-201(33), which states: " 'Property' includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means anything that 'may be the subject of ownership." 17 . Cf. Goldstein v. Prien, 143 Cal.App.2d 123, 299 P.2d 344, 346 (1956) (<HOLDING>). 18 . Since AS 13.16.505 prohibits liens from
Holding statements: (A) holding that it is improper for a trustee to liquidate claims that benefit only select creditors with the only benefit to the estate being the recoupment of administrative costs (B) holding that there is a difference between a debtor attempting to pursue an action for his own benefit and a trustee pursuing an action for the benefit of the creditors (C) recognizing under analogous section of california code that the right to recover property conveyed by a decedent in fraud of creditors is an asset of his insolvent estate and that the executor or administrator is a trustee thereof for the benefit of creditors (D) holding that directors of an insolvent corporation are trustees for the creditors (E) recognizing that the bangor punta doctrine was not applicable to suit brought by receiver of insolvent insurance company for the benefit of creditors

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: pro se motion to withdraw plea, he argued that "the plea offered ... was not the plea [a]greed upon [b]y the State and the Defendant" and that he "signed a plea under false pretenses and [was] led to [b]elieve it [was] the State[']s offer." These allegations if taken alone were sufficiently refuted by the written plea agreement and the plea colloquy. However, Davis's counsel also filed a motion to withdraw plea, asserting that Davis told counsel that "he was not properly served by undersigned counsel"; counsel also asserted that "[presumably this ... resulted in an involuntary plea being entered by Defendant." We are not entirely convinced that such a general allegation was sufficient to warrant a Sheppard hearing. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 52 So.3d 697, 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (<HOLDING>); Carter v. State, 22 So.3d 793, 795 (Fla. 1st
Holding statements: (A) holding that juveniles may waive right to counsel only upon advice of counsel (B) holding that counsels motion was not sufficient where counsel alleged only that counsel and appellants positions had become adverse (C) holding that even if counsel had performed as petitioner alleged counsel should have governments case was still as strong and guilty plea was prudent course (D) holding that counsel was not deficient in failing to call a witness where the defendant never provided the witnesss name to counsel and no evidence existed that counsel had any notice of the witnesss identity (E) holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel

SOLUTION:
(B)