TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 602 F.Supp. 859, 864 (D.N.J.1985); Tedesco v. U.S. Po esentation against the Government. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). Further, the FTCA requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to adjudication in a federal court, all claims to first be brought before the appropriate agency-here, the USPS's Tort Claims Examiner. See 28 U.S.C. 2675(a). It is undisputed that Mr. Foster did not bring his claims to the USPS before initiating this suit. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. II Mr. Foster also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for reconsideration and its denial of sanctions against USPS. We review these determinations for abuse of discretion. Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed.Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Gary v. The Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive (B) holding that state law provides the standard of review for a denial of a rule 50 motion in a diversity case (C) holding under third circuit law that denial of rule 11 sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (D) holding that courts of appeals should review all aspects of the district courts rule 11 determination for abuse of discretion and noting that the district court has broad discretion to impose rule 11 sanctions (E) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit

SOLUTION: holding that a motion for rule 11 sanctions is dispositive

PROBLEM: v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1967), stated that section 2(d) shows that the legislature contemplated multiplicity of actions and provides a court with two options: stay the entire proceeding pending arbitration, or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be granted with respect to that issue only. 710 ILCS 5/2(d) (West 1994). The Galt court explained: "In enacting the Uniform Arbitration Act, the [Illinois] Legislature has not eradicated a chancellor's inherent powers, but the legislature has determined in Section 2 that it is no longer equitable to enjoin arbitration to prevent multiplicity of actions." Galt, 376 F.2d at 716. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 782, 103 S. Ct. 927, 939 (1983) (<HOLDING>). Accord Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
Holding statements: (A) holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement as providing that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that the faa mandates courts to direct parties to arbitration on issues to which a valid arbitration agreement has been signed

SOLUTION: holding that where an arbitration agreement between an employer and employee does not specifically provide for the handling of arbitration costs california courts should interpret the arbitration agreement as providing that the employer must bear the arbitration forum costs

PROBLEM: or serious bodily injury." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 1.07(a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). A car can be a deadly weapon. Butler v. State, 928 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd). Randy and Gary collectively testified that Appellant rammed them with his vehicle two or three times, and Randy testified that Appellant caught them even after he drove sixty or seventy miles-per-hour while fleeing from Appellant. Although neither Randy nor Gary testified that they were physically injured by Appellant's conduct, there is no requirement that the deadly weapon actually cause death or serious bodily injury before the jury can affirmatively answer the deadly weapon question. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 1.07(a)(17)(B); see also McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (<HOLDING>). The evidence is legally sufficient to support
Holding statements: (A) holding that reckless conduct was lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault by threatening another with imminent bodily injury by use of deadly weapon because the danger of serious bodily injury in the lesser offense is necessarily established when a deadly weapon is used in the commission of an offense as required for the greater offense (B) holding that although defendants vehicle was not used with deadly effect it was a deadly weapon because it was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury if not for an oncoming drivers evasive maneuver (C) holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim (D) holding that the evidence was insufficient to support a deadlyweapon finding because a motor vehicle is not a deadly weapon per se and there was no testimony in the record that defendant operated his vehicle in a manner that was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury (E) holding section 107a17bs plain language does not require that the actor actually intend death or serious bodily injury an object is a deadly weapon if the actor intends a use of the object in which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury

SOLUTION:
holding that reckless conduct was lesserincluded offense of aggravated assault by threatening another with imminent bodily injury by use of deadly weapon because the danger of serious bodily injury in the lesser offense is necessarily established when a deadly weapon is used in the commission of an offense as required for the greater offense