In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict, we need not consider whether the District's failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith's case) further limits our review "to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice," Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury's verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy
Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under 1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc 1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc 1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior
[A]: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom

[Q]: susceptible to many meanings. Although there is no direct statement that Mooney failed to perform his duties with regard to assisting his clients with their investments, this is the clear import of the specific language used. "Only knew" clearly implies that Mooney knew nothing about anything else. What was implied in that statement is made express in the next "didn't know anything about investments." "Hated helping clients" also unambiguously indicates that Mooney was not interested in executing his duties to his clients. These statements embody a "pejorative implication" that a reasonable listener would perceive "as an assertion that the [plaintiff] failed to perform his duties as an advisor." Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 958 N.E.2d 598, 609 (Ohio Ct.App.2011); see Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707 (<HOLDING>). The statement "invested her in all of the
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (B) holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident (C) holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law (D) holding that though there was no express statement that the appellant had committed perjury the clear impact of the specific language in nine sentences was that the appellant lied while under oath which weighed in favor of an actionable statement (E) holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr 3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service
[A]: holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement

[Q]: method that is fairest given the prevailing circumstances. The interpretation championed by the second line of cases renders the second sentence of 506(a) virtually meaningless. Moreover, it would allow a reorganizing debtor to reap a windfall by stripping down the hen to liquidation value and quickly selling the collateral at fair market value, thus pocketing equity that would have been completely beyond reach save for the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) (bankruptcy law should "prevent a party from receiving a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy") (quotation omitted). It is true that the debt- or's intention to reorganize under Chapter 11 is w 4-86 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other
Holding statements: (A) holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debtor (B) holding that second sentence of 506a precludes deduction of hypothetical costs of sale in valuing chapter 13 debt ors real property to be retained by debtor (C) recognizing that a debt ors sequential filing of a chapter 7 petition and then a chapter 13 petition is the socalled chapter 20 (D) holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debt or (E) holding that 506a does not require or permit a reduction in the creditors secured claim to account for purely hypothetical costs of sale of chapter 13 debtors residence
[A]:
holding that for chapter 12 plan confirmation purposes hypothetical costs should not be deducted from fair market value in valuing collateral to be retained by debtor