TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 718. Under Texas law, a person may engage in the practice of engineering, architecture, or landscape architecture if he is licensed in those professions. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 3271a, 1.2 (Vernon Supp.1999) (engineering); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art.249a, 1 (Vernon Supp.1999) (architecture); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 249c, 5(a) (Vernon Supp.1999) (landscape architecture). The State complains Henry was allowed to testified as to matters requiring expertise in surveying, engineering, architecture, and landscape architecture even though he is not licensed in any of those professions. Therefore, because Henry is not licensed, he was not qualified to testify as an expert. See Prellwitz v. Cromwell, Truemper, Levy, Parker & Woodsmale, 802 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); but see Southland Lloyd's Ins. Co. v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury (B) holding that a witness who will be giving opinion evidence about a propertys fair market value must be disclosed and designated as an expert pursuant to discovery and other applicable rules (C) recognizing that a licensed chiropractor is a health care provider competent to testify as a medical expert (D) holding that where a treating doctor is called to give an expert opinion on the standard of care that doctor is properly labeled an expert witness and must be disclosed to the other party along with other experts (E) holding that witness giving expert opinion regarding stan dard of care for particular licensed profession must hold license for same profession

SOLUTION: holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury

PROBLEM: first time a party must specify the statute authorizing attorney's fees is in the Rule 54 motion (unless otherwise provided by statute or court order). In Missouri, attorney's fees are not recoverable from another party, except when a contract or statute allows it. Essex Contracting, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. banc 2009). The second sentence of the Missouri commissions statute is such an exception to the general Missouri rule. Kraft v. Edwards, 946 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Mo.App.1997). The district judge's ruling that there was no statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees is erroneous as a matter of law. On remand, the district court should consider whether to award attorney's fees. See Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 631 (8th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>). Because this case as tried addressed only
Holding statements: (A) recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award (B) holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained (C) recognizing district courts discretion to consider pending state charge in determining sentence (D) recognizing court discretion in determining reasonable fee under rule 11 (E) holding that attorneys fee award in a common fund case must be reasonable under the circumstances

SOLUTION: holding that the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained

PROBLEM: as corroboration of the testimony of a covert witness; each case must be judged on its own facts. Id. The tends-to-connect standard does not present a high threshold. See id. (citing In re C.M.G., 905 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, no writ)). The corroborating evidence does not, by itself, have to establish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, but it does have to tend to connect the defendant with the offense. McDuff, 939 S.W.2d at 613; Brown, 159 S.W.3d at 711; Torres, 137 S.W.3d at 196. Evidence that merely provides corroboration of "details" of the accomplice's testimony is not sufficient if it does not corroborate a fact that tends to connect the defendant to the offe , at *2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth May 27, 2004, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>); Leal v. State, No. 05-03-00281-CR, 2004 WL
Holding statements: (A) holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance (B) holding that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the controlled substance he was convicted of delivering when evidence established that he knew it was a controlled substance (C) holding officers identification of defendants voice on tape recording of phone call setting up controlled buy sufficient to corroborate informants testimony regarding subsequent buy (D) holding that possession of listed chemical with intent to manufacture controlled substance is controlled substance offense (E) holding informants testimony of actual transfer of a controlled substance sufficiently corroborated by testimony of dea agents that informant was given 150 to make controlled buy and by video recording made by informant that showed him buying two 50 rocks from defendant

SOLUTION:
holding that mens rea required for possession of a controlled substance is knowledge that defendant possessed a controlled substance