In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978);, 5 LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure 25.3(c) (West 1999). A finding of insufficient evidence is equivalent to an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325-26, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). 3 . An exception to this bar is when the conviction is overturned on appeal. Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). 4 . The Double Jeopardy Clause applies to both individuals and corporations. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). 5 . Compare Brown, 432 U.S. at 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221 (<HOLDING>) with Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 78
Holding statements: (A) holding that a bargainedfor plea waives the right to attack multiple convictions on double jeopardy grounds (B) holding that the prosecution cannot divide a single crime into multiple units to avoid double jeopardy (C) holding that multiple convictions under 924c cannot be based on offenses forming a single unit of prosecution (D) holding that a defendant and his attorney are a single entity with respect to double jeopardy waiver (E) holding the first question for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis is whether congress expressed its intent concerning multiple convictions at a single trial for different statutory violations arising from the same act or transaction

Ex Output:
(B)

Ex Input:
case. In light of our decision that the parties' dispute will not be resolved by an appraisal proceeding, we need not decide, as appellants assert, whether the district court erred by observing that the appraisal process would be subject to the statutes governing confirmation or vacation of an arbitration award. Nonetheless, pertinent to our holding in this case, we take the opportunity to acknowledge that although some arbitration standards apply in processing appraisal results, Minnesota recognizes a distinction between appraisal and arbitration. Compare QBE, 778 N.W.2d at 398 (stating that "[ajppraisal decisions are subject to Minn.Stat. [ ] 572.08-.30 (2008), the arbitration statute") and David A. Brooks Enters., Inc. v. First Sys. Agencies, 370 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn.App.1985) (<HOLDING>) with Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (holding that
Holding statements: (A) holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required (B) holding that because appraisal is analogous to arbitration the court would apply principles of arbitration law to this dispute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause (C) recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit (D) holding that minnesotas arbitration statutes govern appraiser decisions and appraisal awards are to be treated as arbitration awards (E) holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
have pleaded that the 2007 Agreement was terminated, and the Court is required to accept that fact as true at this stage of the litigation. Therefore the continued use of Plaintiffs' trademarks by Defendant as alleged would be without the benefit of a license. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss the trademark infringement claim is DENIED. C. Breach of Contract Plaintiffs claim that Big Time Toys breached the parties' contracts when it failed to cure its default on the royalty payments. Am. Compl. 88. As an initial matter, the continued use of a licensed trademark after termination of a license agreement can be actionable as both breach of contract and trademark infringement. See, e.g., Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., 576 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (<HOLDING>); Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co., 107 F.Supp.2d 369,
Holding statements: (A) holding that contributory trademark infringement requires some predicate act of infringement (B) holding that although the underlying action is one for trademark infringement the infringement occurred as a result of the underlying defendants use of the trademark in their advertising (C) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (D) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (E) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation

Ex Output:
(D)