In this task, you will be presented with a context passage, a question about that paragraph, and a possible answer to that question. The task is to check the validity of the answer. Answer with "Yes" or "No".

Ex Input:
Joey got a German Shepherd for his birthday present. He had never had any pets before, but was always excited to see the other dogs and cats in his neighborhood. Since his birthday was in June, he spent a lot of time playing outside with his new puppy, which he named Max. Max and Joey would often run through fields in a game of chase. They also liked to go through the small forest behind the house, making a game of hide and seek. They never went near the lake because Joey was afraid of water. One day, Max hid a little too well and Joey couldn't find him. Joey spent the afternoon looking for his German Shepherd where they often played, like the field and forest. Joey was a shy boy who often read by himself, and Max was his best friend. After dinner, he went to look for Max one last time before he had to take a bath and go to bed. He heard some barking on the next street, so he ran to see if it was his puppy. Sure enough, he saw Max playing with a poodle. The dogs were having so much fun. Joey brought Max home, happy that he had his puppy back. Max seemed to be happy to have his human by his side as well as a new doggy friend. All summer long, Joey took Max to the poodle's house so they could play without having to worry about losing his present. <sep>What were the times of day that Joey looked for Max?<sep>In the morning after breakfast

Ex Output:
No

Ex Input:
The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money. <sep>Why did the OFAC have little information about the financing of al Qaeda?<sep>Al Qaeda was a clandestine worldwide organization

Ex Output:
Yes

Ex Input:
While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued. <sep>Who met with Musharraf to discuss the issues of Pakistan cooperation with the U.S.?<sep>Karl Inderfurth and Michael Sheenan

Ex Output:
Yes