In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
District Attorney's Office to discriminate in the jury selection process. On April 26, 2007, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant relief and the instant appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claim: The lower court erred by limiting Appellant's hearing solely to proof of a policy or culture of discrimination by the Philadelphia District Attorney and further erred by denying Appellant the opportunity to develop and prove discrimination in his case. Before we proceed with a review of the merits of this issue, we must ascertain whether the PCRA court was correct in its conclusion that Appellant timely filed his fifth PCRA petition for, if he did not, we are without jurisdiction to address his claim. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 941 A.2d 1263 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(1), any PCRA
Holding statements: (A) holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed (B) holding that the time requirements of the statute are as much a part of the jurisdictional threshold as the mandate to file for a rehearing and that the time limits must be strictly construed and may not be waived by ferc or evaded by the courts (C) holding pcra time limits are jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed (D) holding that a governments consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign (E) holding 2513 to be jurisdictional and therefore must be strictly construed

Ex Output:
holding that railroad immunity act should be strictly construed

Ex Input:
Dr. Proctor testified about the 2014 Report's conclusion that filtered cigarettes increased the risk of adenocarci-noma (a type of lung cancer) by causing smokers to inhale more deeply, and by ventilating in a way'that "increases certain poisonous compounds." On appeal, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not have been permitted to use the 2014 Report to bolster the testimony of her expert witness. On this point, we also agree with Defendants. It is well established that "experts cannot bolster or corroborate their opinions with the opinions of other experts who do not testify," as -"[s]ueh testimony improperly permits one expert to become a conduit for the opinion of another expert who is not subject to cross-examination." Schwarz v. State, 695 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>); accord Tolbert v. State, 114 So.3d 291, 294
Holding statements: (A) holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion (B) holding that any probative value of bolstered testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice confusion of issues or misleading the jury quoting 90403 fla stat (C) holding that the probative value of contested evidence far outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice where any potential unfair prejudice was cured by a limiting jury instruction (D) holding in a criminal context that the probative value of evidence of other crimes is not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice where the court will give a limiting jury charge (E) holding that witness testimony about prior drug purchases from defendant was highly probative of brookins guilt and was not outweighed by any danger of undue prejudice

Ex Output:
holding that survey evidence offered to show actual confusion was properly excludable under rule 403 when it was so flawed that its probative value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice or confusion

Ex Input:
single question strongly implied that Leja had "said nothing" to police upon her arrest in Mississippi. But Leja never answered the question, and the jury was instructed to disregard it. The general rule is that the jury must be presumed to have followed the trial court's instructions. See State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 94 (Minn.2002). This is not a case of repeated questioning aimed at planting an improper inference. See State v. Harris, 521 N.W.2d 348, 352-53 n. 5 (Minn.1994) (questioning whether curative instruction would have prevented prejudice from repeated improper questioning). Rather, the prosecutor's question was brief, although, as the last question on cross-examination and one followed by a lengthy bench conference, it was not "undramatic." Cf. Dunkel, 466 N.W.2d at 429 (<HOLDING>). But the jury had already heard abundant
Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding that brief undramatic reference to defendants prearrest silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (C) holding that harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis not applicable in habeas cases (D) holding that appellate court should review error in trial procedure to determine if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that trial court must determine whether fifth amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

Ex Output:
holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt