In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: an interpretation of section 85.321 that would make any party who holds a mineral interest indefinitely liable to all subsequent interest holders for prior alleged damage to the land. The consequences of such an interpretation run contrary to the legislative intent to protect and encourage the development of Texas natural resources. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, 59. We are mindful of the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov't Code 311.023(5); McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Absent a legislative enactment clearly abrogating the common law, we conclude that Emerald does not have standing as a subsequent lessee to pursue a claim under section 85.321 for Exxon's alleged wrongful actions as a prior lessee. See, e.g., Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 342-43 (Tex.2006) (<HOLDING>). C. Negligence Per Se Because our holding that
Holding statements: (A) holding that citys enforcement of the entire state penal code would not constitute a city policy because the city was required to follow state law (B) holding that tex loc govt code 51075 abrogated city of texarkana v city of new boston 141 sw3d 778 texapptexarkana 2004 (C) holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract (D) holding that the city of boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction (E) holding that distribution of catalogs to city addresses constituted use within city subject to taxation under municipal code provision
[A]: (B)

[Q]: Def.'s Mot., Ex. E, Gaskins' Decl. 5. Although plaintiff said that he "heard the rumor about [the cubicle] being unsafe[,]" he contends that the cubicle was not in disrepair and was removed solely in retaliation for his EEO complaint. Def.'s Mot., Ex. A, Jones Dep. at 113, 115. However, plaintiff did not testify that he was unable to complete his work assignments; rather, he testified that the result of the cubicle being dismantled was that he "had no place to put none of [his] stuff[,]" which included "records and stuff[,]" although he testified that the cubicle was replaced with a desk, albeit a small one. Id. at 114-15. These facts do not support a finding of an adverse action sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See, e.g., Brodetski, 141 F.Supp.2d at 45 (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). III. Conclusion For the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the administrative transfer of a teacher which denied him the opportunity to teach his preferred subject could constitute an adverse employment action (B) holding that plaintiff s allegations that defendants denied him his right to choose a new workstation on two occasions do not constitute adverse employment actions even if they made plaintiff feel slighted or wrong (C) recognizing that employment actions can be adverse even if such actions are subsequently withdrawn (D) holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false (E) recognizing that a set of actions may constitute an adverse employment action when considered collectively even though some actions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action individually
[A]: (B)

[Q]: to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any individual or other party in removal proceedings, in litigation with the United States, or in any other form or manner."); United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 71 (2d Cir.1983) (concluding that a "policy [that] is merely an internal guideline for exercise of prosecutorial discretion [is] not subject to judicial review," and emphasizing that the policy "is not a statute or regulation; nor is it constitutionally mandated"); see also United States v. Craveiro, 907 F.2d 260, 264 (1st Cir.1990) ("[T]he internal guidelines of a federal agency, that are not mandated by statute or the constitution, do not confer substantive rights on any party."); cf. Firstland Int'l, Inc. v. INS, 377 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.2004) (<HOLDING>); Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 166 (2d
Holding statements: (A) holding moot appeal from revocation of visa petition where immigrant subsequently obtained lpr status (B) holding that the beneficiary of a form 1130 visa petition did not have standing to challenge a denied petition (C) holding no abuse of discretion where ij denied aliens request for continuance because alien had no immigrant visa available and it was unlikely attorney general would exercise discretion to permit excludable alien to stay (D) holding that it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available (E) holding that the ins was deprived of any discretion to revoke approval of an immigrant visa petition when it failed to follow statutorilymandated notice requirement
[A]:
(E)