In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

a threat to water quality because they do not introduce any invasive species from outside the Great Lakes. EPA has properly rejected this argument, noting that Lakers can spread or more rapidly distribute invasive species already present, in the Great Lakes. Id. at 501. 16 . Federal regulation permits such limits to be expressed narratively if the calculation of numeric limits is "infeasible." 40 C.F.R. 122.44(k)(3). 17 . EPA also claims general prohibitions can be BMPs, citing 40 C.F.R. 122.2, but does not offer an example of something as general as the WQBEL standard being found to be a BMP. As discussed herein, the EPA's charac-terizationis inconsistent with regulations that require WQBELs to "ensure compliance." 40 C.F.R. 122.4(d); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). 18 . EPA's response is that petitioners'
Holding statements: (A) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (B) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (C) holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (E) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation

intermediate Court of Appeals opinions. Over 30 years ago, in Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964), our intermediate Court of Appeals considered the question and determined that such provisions promote divorce and are violative of public policy. The Court of Appeals predicted that such provisions "could induce a mercenary husband to inflict on his wife any wrong he might desire with the knowledge his pecuniary liability would be limited." Id. 385 S.W.2d at 293. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 652 S.W.2d 913 (Tenn.App.1983) ("We are of the opinion ... that a provision in an antenuptial agreement which purports to limit a spouse's liability for alimony is conducive to divorce and therefore, void."). But see Gross v. Gross, No. 0257, 1989 WL 51535 (Tenn.App. May 17, 1989) (<HOLDING>). At the time of its adoption in Crouch, the
Holding statements: (A) holding that such provisions are valid (B) holding such a provision waiving alimony valid (C) holding that provision in 1983 constitution waiving sovereign immunity to the extent of insurance applies to municipalities (D) holding that because miranda warnings make defendant aware of right to counsel and of consequences of waiving sixth amendment rights defendants waiver of right to counsel after receiving such warnings is valid (E) holding invalid a premarital agreement waiving temporary alimony if marriage did not last seven years
holding that such provisions are valid

FAA whether an appeal was immediately permitted or only allowed after arbitration. Id. at 440. Numerous other state courts have reached the same conclusion when confronted with an argument that the FAA preempts state procedures of various types. In Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Sec. Corp., 14 Cal.4th 394, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 875, 926 P.2d 1061, 1069 (1996), the court held that the recognition of a right to a jury trial in FAA 4 did not preempt California's use of a summary procedure to decide a motion to compel arbitration. Quoting Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306, 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 137 (1988), the court said, "It is a 'general and unassailable proposition ... that States may establish the rules of procedure governing litigation 72, 703 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (1998) (<HOLDING>), rev. denied, 429 Mass. 1107, 710 N.E.2d 604
Holding statements: (A) holding that on appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration a court may only determine whether a dispute is subject to arbitration other contractual challenges must be determined by the arbitrator (B) holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration (C) holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court (D) holding that faa 16a3 did not preempt a state statute prohibiting appeal of an order to compel arbitration and reasoning that there is no reason to suppose that the timing of the exercise of the right of appeal from an order compelling arbitration is other than a procedural matter which does not alter the substantive rights of either party (E) holding denial of mandamus challenging arbitration order did not bar appeal of that order after arbitration was completed
holding that on appeal from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration a court may only determine whether a dispute is subject to arbitration other contractual challenges must be determined by the arbitrator