In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: a work-related injury, taking into account such factors as age, education, training, and mental capacity." Id. at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and social environment, ... [and] permanent impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quotation marks omitted)). 120 The fact that an employee returned to work for some period of time following his industrial injury does not automatically preclude him from claiming permanent total disability benefits at a later date if he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to the point that he is no longer able to maintain regular employment. See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28 (<HOLDING>). See generally Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n,
Holding statements: (A) holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits (B) holding that an employee who returned to work for six years following his workrelated injury could nevertheless obtain permanent total disability benefits and observing that it may be years before the effect of an injury is felt (C) holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury (D) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability (E) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence

Answer: holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits

Question: complaint nor any facts relating to VBCJ's General Order support an argument that Waters received less procedural due process than what is constitutionally required in the circumstances. Therefore, VBCJ's fee program does not violate Waters' right to procedural due process. C. Legitimate Penological Interest Finally, Waters' complaint, broadly construed, alleges that Virginia's one dollar per day room and board fee is not reasonably related to any legitimate penological interest. This claim also plainly fails, as there are several conceivable rationales to support the finding that VBCJ's fee program is " 'reasonably related' to promoting a legitimate penological interest." Sample v. Angelone, 173 F.3d 425 (Table), 1999 WL 52347, *1 (4th Cir. Feb.5 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Section 53.1-131.3 provides as follows:
Holding statements: (A) holding that in a prisoners eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay person (B) holding that the eighth amendment protects prisoners only from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs (C) holding that in order to state a violation of the eighth amendment an inmate must demonstrate that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (D) holding that deliberate indifference standard for imposing supervisory liability based on an eighth amendment violation is consistent with iqbal and collecting cases (E) holding that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need establishes an eighth amendment violation

Answer: holding that in a prisoners eighth amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need expert testimony is necessary when the seriousness of injury or illness would not be apparent to a lay person

Question: of the issue in question. Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 Ind. L.J. 219, 225 (2000). However, there is some disagreement as to the prohibition's precise legal operation. Id. A few courts conceptualize the general prohibition as a question of justiciability. See, e.g., Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir.1997) (stating "true belief is not readily justiciable"); Nayak v. MC 33 (4th Cir.1997) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under First Amendment); Klagsbrun v. Va'ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F.Supp.2d 732, 736 (dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Establishment Clause); Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 185-88 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . See Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii (B) holding first amendment precluded subjectmatter jurisdiction over title vii suit challenging church hiring procedures (C) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction (D) holding that standing is component of subjectmatter jurisdiction and subjectmatter jurisdiction is essential to courts authority to hear case (E) holding that plaintiffs failure to exhaust available grievance procedures does not bar her title vii claims

Answer:
holding that a title vii plaintiff could not hold coworkers liable in their individual capacities under title vii