In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: court's description of the panel's rationale as "one over which reasonable jurists may differ" can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore's precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit's unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel namely, that the plaintiffs' novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95
Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success
[A]: holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error

[Q]: language, by its express terms, releases only the Club and the Designer. It does not release the Manufacturer either by name or subject matter. 3. Pre-versus-Post-injury Releases In a different line of argument, appellees argue a release mentioning general subject matter is enough to release any and all claims even marginally related to that subject matter. Appellees contend that because the clause releases liability "from injuries or damages arriving [sic] out of or connected with [Sydlik's] attendance" it necessarily includes any and all claims resulting from an injury connected with Sydlik's attendance at the gym in essence all of Sydlik's claims in this case. As support, appellees cite Memorial Medical Center of East Texas v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Appellees fail to address two problems with
Holding statements: (A) holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release (B) holding that a general release of all claims did not operate by its terms to bar prospective antitrust claims nor could it in view of public policy (C) holding that a release covering all claims relating to keszlers relationship with the hospital was enough to release claims arising out of exposure to hazardous materi als (D) holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release (E) holding that a release of unknown claims has no effect in the absence of evidence apart from the words of the release
[A]: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release

[Q]: their motion for summary judgment. We review a district court's decision to deny a motion for summary judgment for an abuse of discretion. Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir.1995). Ortiz v. Jordan, U.S. , 131 S.Ct. 884, 889, 178 L.Ed.2d 703 (2011), precludes our consideration of most of the issues defendants raise with respect to their motions for summary judgment and to dismiss. But because Ortiz leaves open the possibility that cases "involving] ... [only] disputes about the substance and clarity of pre-existing law" may still be considered, Id. at 892, we briefly consider two legal arguments for summary judgment on the state law claims. See also Owatonna Clinic-Mayo Health Sys. v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 639 F.3d 806, 809-10 (8th Cir.2011) (<HOLDING>); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. North Pacific Ins.
Holding statements: (A) holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits (B) recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue (C) holding the denial of a motion for summary judgment on an issue which is later submitted to the jury is not reviewable (D) holding that we will not review under any standard the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits (E) holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity
[A]:
holding that we will not review the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment on the merits