In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: factors to the State's requested accommodation. The use of two-way video conferencing can satisfy a defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation in certain limited circumstances like those present here. 20 Applying Craig, we conclude that the strong preference for face-to-face confrontation must give way in the special circumstances of this ease to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. The State's requested accommodation is necessary to further two important public policies: protecting the rights of a vulnerable alleged sexual assault victim who has been ruled to be outside Arizona's subpoena power and preserving society's interest in prosecuting accused sexual offenders. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149-50, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court properly refused to permit the defendant to question the nineyearold victim as to whether he had been sexually abused in the past because indianas rape shield statute shields the victim of a sex crime from a general inquiry into the history of past sexual conduct (B) recognizing michigans rape shield law furthers the legitimate state interests of protecting a sexual assault victim from surprise harassment and unnecessary invasions of privacy (C) holding that a prosecutors questions eliciting testimony from a victim as to issue of virginity prior to the assault did not violate colorados rape shield statute because that statute does not specifically prohibit a victim from testifying as to a lack of prior sexual activity id at 1020 (D) holding that application of the rape shield law to a case in which the underlying events occurred prior to the enactment of the rape shield law was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws (E) holding that a public indecency statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality

A: holding that the trial court properly refused to permit the defendant to question the nineyearold victim as to whether he had been sexually abused in the past because indianas rape shield statute shields the victim of a sex crime from a general inquiry into the history of past sexual conduct
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Q: motions). The Second Circuit has not yet announced a specific standard for exercising the district court's discretion in ruling on such a motion. The Second Circuit has, however, stated that: "[o]nly 'reasonably genuine surprise' on the part of the appellant, Moylan v. Siciliano, 292 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir.1961), combined with an assertion of the nature of the additional evidence, Berns v. Pan Am. World Airways, 667 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir.1982), would give us sufficient reason to remand for the taking of additional evidence." Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.1985); see also Matthew Bender & Co., 158 F.3d at 679 (upholding district court's decision to permit party to re-open a hearing where (1) additional evidence was material, (2) opposing part (S.D.N.Y.1994) (<HOLDING>). I shall consider the issue of Plaintiff's
Holding statements: (A) holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them (B) holding that an appellate court is not required to search the appellate record with no guidance from the briefing party to determine if the record supports the partys argument (C) holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court (D) holding that when appraising a partys motion to reopen the record posttrial the court must consider 1 whether or not the moving partys failure to submit evidence was the result of its own lack of diligence 2 the extent to which reopening the record might prejudice the nonmovant and 3 where the interests of justice lie (E) holding the moving party must meet its burden by showing that is pointing out to the trial court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case

A: holding that the rules of procedure are structured to provide the nonmovant with substantially more time for filing affidavits than the moving party because the nonmoving party should have an opportunity to examine and reply to the moving partys papers before the court considers them
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Q: contractual, measures of recovery. Id. 14 . In the Roberdeau case, the insurer paid for $575 of repairs to the insured's station wagon after it was damaged in a collision. See 231 S.W.2d at 949. The insurer then offered to pay $475 (the amount of repairs minus the $100 deductible). See id. The policy stated that the insurer's limit of liability would not exceed the vehicle's actual cash value nor the cost to repair or replace the vehicle with another of like kind and quality. As here, the policy also gave the insurer the option of paying for the loss in money or paying for repair or replacement. See id. at 950. The insured refused the offer and sued the insurer for the difference between the vehicle's actual cash value before and afte d Cas. Co. v. Watson, 298 P.2d 762, 767 (Okla.1956) (<HOLDING>); Barton v. Fanners Ins. Exch., 255 S.W.2d 451,
Holding statements: (A) holding that to find the measure of damages as the difference in market value immediately before and after the collision would be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the right of defendant to make repairs or replace the damaged part with materials of like kind and quality (B) holding that if repairs to a firedamaged vehicle with parts of like kind and quality would not restore the vehicle to its former market value the proper measure of damages was the difference in market value before and after the loss (C) holding that unless the collision resulted in a total loss the measure of recovery is the difference between the fair market value of the vehicle in the condition in which it was immediately prior to the collision and its value thereafter (D) holding there cannot be a complete restoration of the property unless it can be said that there has been no diminution of value after repair of the car and adding that the appropriate and fair measure of damages could be achieved by awarding either the difference between the fair cash value of the car before and after the collision or similarly the cost of repairs plus any diminution in value (E) holding the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the automobile prior to the upset and its value when prepared and presented to the plaintiff for acceptance

A:
holding that to find the measure of damages as the difference in market value immediately before and after the collision would be arbitrarily reading out of the policy the right of defendant to make repairs or replace the damaged part with materials of like kind and quality
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