In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
pre-estimate may in fact operate as a penalty and become unenforceable is shown by the fact that even though the sum fixed as compensation for each day's delay ... is held to be a reasonable provision for liquidated damages and to be enforceable, no court will permit it to go on operating forever. 11 Corbin on Contracts, supra, 58:21 at 523. That treatise then observes that there is "some lack of uniformity in the method of determining this time limit." Id. In general, there are two rules that courts have applied to this predicament. Some courts have held that a liquidated damages clause is inapplicable when a contractor has completely abandoned a project. See, e.g., City of Elmira v. Larry Walter, Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 912, 563 N.Y.S.2d 45, 564 N.E.2d 655, 656 (1990) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Others have held that, when a contractor has
Holding statements: (A) holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict (B) holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages (C) holding that liquidated damages under the adea are intended to punish and deter while contrasting them to the legislative purpose of liquidated damages under the fsla (D) holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award (E) holding that in the absence of clear and unambiguous language indicating that liquidated damages clause was intended to apply to contractors outright abandonment of the project no such damages should be awarded

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
dominion and control over" the weapon. Id. at 126 (quoting Evans, 888 F.2d at 895). The case law in this circuit, then, clearly recognizes that under the statute an individual "carries" a firearm when it is within an accessible distance from that individual. Although this circuit has not addressed the definition of "carry" since the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, other circuits nave addressed the issue and continue to define "carry" broadly. Most circuits agree that a weapon must be accessible to the defendant in order to meet the definition of "carry." In United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2nd Cir.1996), a firearm located in a secret compa 4 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that firearm need not be accessible to be "carried"); United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity (B) holding that use of gun was attributable to defendant who aided and abetted armed robbery but never personally carried gun (C) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (D) holding that gun found in unreachable secret compartment in vehicle was carried (E) holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). What matters is that Renb-A-Center's interest in assuring that its employees focus on their work while on the job is a rational one, and the company's prohibition on non-emergency, personal phone calls is a reasonable manifestation of this policy. Certainly, Rent-A-Center has a legitimate interest in ensuring that Bradford's personal phone calls do not disrupt business meetings or interfere with his daily responsibilities. See, e.g., Koons v. Aventis Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 367 F.3d 768 (8th Cir.2004) (affirming district court's holding that the discharge of an employee for making excessive personal calls was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason); Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003, 1011 (7th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Because Renb-A-Center has successfully set
Holding statements: (A) holding that termination of individuals employment for making personal phone calls was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharge (B) recognizing that even a personal grudge can constitute a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment decision (C) holding that employer met its burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiffs termination by offering admissible evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that plaintiff was fired because of his failure to maintain accurate attendance records (D) holding that drugrelated misconduct is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination (E) holding that employees threats of violence against a coworker were legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination

Ex Output:
(A)