In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: contract claims under general liability policies. See Keystone Filler & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. American Mining Ins. Co., 179 F.Supp.2d 432 (M.D.Pa.2002); Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria County v. Int'l Ins. Co., 454 Pa.Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581 (1996) (en banc); see also Augenblick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. 99-3419, 1999 WL 975118 (E.D.Pa. Oct.8, 1999). General liability policies provide the insured coverage for personal injury or property damage resulting from an "occurrence," and are intended "to protect the insured from liability fo e in Redevelopment Authority that there is no 'occurrence' if the underlying claim is one merely for breach-of-contract has been followed by numerous state and federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania.") (citing cases); Augenblick, 1999 WL 975118, at *2, 5 (<HOLDING>). In contrast to those cases, U.S. Specialty's
Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that insureds breach of contract suit against insurer raised a coverage issue which was not settled by insurers payment of only part of what insured was claiming in breach of contract action (D) holding immaterial breach did not constitute breach of contract (E) holding insurer did not have to cover insured for a breach of contract because it was not an accident

A: holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer
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Q: 718. Under Texas law, a person may engage in the practice of engineering, architecture, or landscape architecture if he is licensed in those professions. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 3271a, 1.2 (Vernon Supp.1999) (engineering); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art.249a, 1 (Vernon Supp.1999) (architecture); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 249c, 5(a) (Vernon Supp.1999) (landscape architecture). The State complains Henry was allowed to testified as to matters requiring expertise in surveying, engineering, architecture, and landscape architecture even though he is not licensed in any of those professions. Therefore, because Henry is not licensed, he was not qualified to testify as an expert. See Prellwitz v. Cromwell, Truemper, Levy, Parker & Woodsmale, 802 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); but see Southland Lloyd's Ins. Co. v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury (B) holding that a witness who will be giving opinion evidence about a propertys fair market value must be disclosed and designated as an expert pursuant to discovery and other applicable rules (C) recognizing that a licensed chiropractor is a health care provider competent to testify as a medical expert (D) holding that where a treating doctor is called to give an expert opinion on the standard of care that doctor is properly labeled an expert witness and must be disclosed to the other party along with other experts (E) holding that witness giving expert opinion regarding stan dard of care for particular licensed profession must hold license for same profession

A: holding that because the tendered expert witness was a licensed psychologist and not a medical doctor he was not qualified to state an expert medical opinion regarding the cause of johns injury
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Q: (order) (dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. Gamez's equal protection "class of one" claims were properly dismissed because prison administrators have a rational basis for segregating validated gang associates from the general prison population, and Gamez's assertion that he was the only prisoner required to debrief in order to be released from the SHU is facially implausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (claim must be "plausible on its face"); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (<HOLDING>); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22, 106
Holding statements: (A) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (B) holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection (C) recognizing class of one equal protection claim where ordinance targeted a single individual on basis that state action was irrational and arbitrary (D) holding that an equal protection claim was no more than a first amendment claim dressed in equal protection clothing and was thus subsumed by and coextensive with the first amendment claim (E) holding that montana constitutions equal protection clause protects against arbitrary and discriminate state action

A:
holding that the state law violated equal protection principles
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