TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: is adverse to its interests. Lamar cites no authority establishing that either "fact" was material to determining whether City exceeded the scope of its powers by surrendering and contracting away zoning authority that would otherwise have applied to Lamar's efforts to rebuild or relocate eight of the forty-two signs identified in the Agreement. For reasons we explain, neither factual contention prevented the entry of summary judgment in favor of City as a matter of law. We have already explained that the Agreement hindered City's zoning authority, and that zoning authority is an exercise of police powers. City thus established all that was necessary to demonstrate that the Agreement exceeded the scope of City's powers in violation of section 432.070. Stewart, 165 S.W.2d at 629 (<HOLDING>). It is true that "[t]he due process clauses of
Holding statements: (A) recognizing governmental interest in rehabilitation (B) holding that a local governmental body exceeds its jurisdiction under crcp 106a4 when it exercises discretion it does not have (C) holding that if a contract surrenders or contracts away governmental functions then it exceeds the scope of a governmental entitys powers and is void (D) holding governmental immunity is no defense to contractual liability (E) holding section 1010215 does not waive governmental immunity merely because a governmental action falls within the listed governmental functions thus further inquiry under the act is necessary

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: time to the end of the videotape. III. Defendant moved, and the State cross-moved, for leave to appeal the Appellate Division's judgment. We granted both motions, 205 N.J. 11, 11 A.3d 371 (2010), and we thereafter granted leave to the Attorney General to participate as an amicus curiae. Before this Court, defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred in rejecting the findings ajnd conclusions of the trial court that his initial request to speak with his mother was an invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent. First, he asserts that the panel was obligated to defer to the factual findings of the trial court and that its failure to do so yiolated the clear directives from this Court, requiring reversal. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 17, 974 A.2d 1057 (2009) (<HOLDING>); State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244, 927 A.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a factual question and should be accorded great deference and should not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (B) holding that trial courts determination of whether defendant accepted responsibility should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation (C) holding that a trial courts findings should be disturbed only if they are so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction (D) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous (E) holding that the case should be reopened where the cause has not proceeded so far that the ends of justice would be defeated or the orderly process of the court disturbed

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: only to effect the property and income of the Corporation. {11} Here, Plaintiff has offered no proof that a resolution was adopted by Defendant's board of directors, and since Article VIII's sue or be sued clause can only be made effective pursuant to the requirements set out in Section D of Article XVI, we conclude that no waiver was created. See Ninigret Dev. Corp., 207 F.3d at 30. {12} Plaintiff contends that federal law is clear that the simple appearance of a sue or be sued clause in the charters of Section 17 corporations serve as a general waiver of sovereign immunity. We disagree. Our review of the law indicates that a sue or be sued clause will only accomplish a waiver when the clause clearly expresses an intent to waive immunity. Parker Drilling Co., 451 F.Supp. at 1136-37 (<HOLDING>); S. Unique, Ltd. v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Holding statements: (A) holding that the sue or be sued clause in corporate charter served as a waiver because the clause had no restrictions or limitations and was a clear explicit and unambiguous waiver (B) holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous (C) holding that the waiver in two previous contracts was insufficient to support waiver of the contract at issue in that appeal (D) holding that the word waiver is not required to waive a right even when a statute requires clear and unmistakable evidence of waiver (E) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal

SOLUTION:
(A)