TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: is minimized if officers exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Id., 129 S.Ct. at 786-87. Here, evidence supports the district court's finding that Hollins's behavior gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe that Hollins was armed and dangerous when they searched him. First, Hollins repeatedly refused to follow instructions to keep his hands in plain view, and he would slide his hands toward his waist while he was seated in the vehicle. Nervous, evasive behavior, which Hollins exhibited, is one of several factors which may be pertinent in determining reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 756 (11th Cir.2000). Second, Hollins repeatedly refused to obey an officer's instruction to exit the vehicle. See Maryland, 519 U.S. at 410, 117 S.Ct. at 884 (<HOLDING>). Third, Hollins repeatedly disregarded an
Holding statements: (A) holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop (B) holding that it is permissible for an officer to order the occupants out of a vehicle during a lawful stop (C) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (D) holding that an officer may order a passenger out of a vehicle during a stop for a traffic infraction (E) holding that a traffic stop is reasonable under the fourth amendment when police have probable cause to believe a traffic infraction has occurred

SOLUTION: holding that police officer may order passengers to remain in vehicle with hands up during traffic stop

PROBLEM: In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702-703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today's majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea soning in Justice Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter's opinion, I respectfully dissent. 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630
Holding statements: (A) holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a 106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution (B) holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin state environmental reclamation order (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs

SOLUTION: holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a 106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution

PROBLEM: of the Zohar Funds and Patriarch, IMG Brands and DCF continued to sell Products beyond the December 31, 2008 termination date of the License Agreement. (Countercl. 196.) Although such conduct would normally constitute trademark infringement, the License Agreement provided that, following termination of the agreement, IMG Brands could continue to sell Products for an additional 135 days. See Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. v. D & L Ice Cream Co., Inc., 576 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (E.D.N.Y.1983) ("[T]he continued use by the defendants of a licensed trademark after the Franchise Agreement had been terminated constitutes ... trademark infringement as well as a breach of contract."); see also Romacorp, Inc. v. TR Acquisition Corp., No. 93 Civ. 5394, 1993 WL 497969 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1993) (<HOLDING>). Lastly, to the extent Houbigant alleges
Holding statements: (A) holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong (B) holding that continued use of trademark after termination of franchise for nonpayment of royalties constitutes lanham act violation (C) holding that a plaintiff in a lanham act trademark violation action must demonstrate that the defendants violation tended to deceive consumers (D) holding that the continued use of licensed trademark after termination of franchise agreement constituted trademark infringement and breach of contract (E) holding that defendants statement that it owned the rights to a trademark did not give rise to a false advertising claim under the lanham act

SOLUTION:
holding that proof of unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark had been terminated is sufficient to establish the likelihood of confusion prong