Problem: As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

Question: "What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions?"

Answer: "They met the requirements in late May and you can find more details in chapter 7"
Answer: no

Problem: These experiments in political Islam faltered during the 1990s: the Iranian revolution lost momentum, prestige, and public support, and Pakistan's rulers found that most of its population had little enthusiasm for fundamentalist Islam. Islamist revival movements gained followers across the Muslim world, but failed to secure political power except in Iran and Sudan. In Algeria, where in 1991 Islamists seemed almost certain to win power through the ballot box, the military preempted their victory, triggering a brutal civil war that continues today. Opponents of today's rulers have few, if any, ways to participate in the existing political system. They are thus a ready audience for calls to Muslims to purify their society, reject unwelcome modernization, and adhere strictly to the Sharia. Social and Economic Malaise In the 1970s and early 1980s, an unprecedented flood of wealth led the then largely unmodernized oil states to attempt to shortcut decades of development. They funded huge infrastructure projects, vastly expanded education, and created subsidized social welfare programs. These programs established a widespread feeling of entitlement without a corresponding sense of social obligations. By the late 1980s, diminishing oil revenues, the economic drain from many unprofitable development projects, and population growth made these entitlement programs unsustainable. The resulting cutbacks created enormous resentment among recipients who had come to see government largesse as their right. This resentment was further stoked by public understanding of how much oil income had gone straight into the pockets of the rulers, their friends, and their helpers. Unlike the oil states (or Afghanistan, where real economic development has barely begun), the other Arab nations and Pakistan once had seemed headed toward balanced modernization. The established commercial, financial, and industrial sectors in these states, supported by an entrepreneurial spirit and widespread understanding of free enterprise, augured well. But unprofitable heavy industry, state monopolies, and opaque bureaucracies slowly stifled growth. More importantly, these state-centered regimes placed their highest priority on preserving the elite's grip on national wealth. Unwilling to foster dynamic economies that could create jobs attractive to educated young men, the countries became economically stagnant and reliant on the safety valve of worker emigration either to the Arab oil states or to the West. Furthermore, the repression and isolation of women in many Muslim countries have not only seriously limited individual opportunity but also crippled overall economic productivity. By the 1990s, high birthrates and declining rates of infant mortality had produced a common problem throughout the Muslim world: a large, steadily increasing population of young men without any reasonable expectation of suitable or steady employment-a sure prescription for social turbulence.

Question: "Which state barely had economic development unlike other states in its time?"

Answer: "Afghanistan; in the 1980's Arab nations and Pakistan were headed toward balanced modernization"
Answer: yes

Problem: Nine families displaced by a fire at Alamo Hills Apartments in March filed lawsuits Wednesday against the apartment complex. They allege that the complex could have done more to protect belongings they were forced to abandon in the aftermath of the blaze. Bernard Dempsey Jr., an attorney with Western Michigan Legal Services, the group that represents the tenants, said Alamo Hills gave the displaced families very limited opportunity to remove belongings. "They were given three days to get their stuff out, and if they couldn't get moved out in three days, their stuff was discarded," Dempsey said. "Alamo Hills just threw it out." Others, he said, lost possessions to looters after the March 23 blaze, which left 78 people temporarily homeless. According to the lawsuit, the tenants were prohibited from entering their apartments to retrieve possessions and were promised that the complex would provide security. A spokesperson for PM One, the company that manages Alamo Hills, could not be reached for comment. Nine separate suits were filed in 8th District Court, which handles civil claims of less than $25,000. "We're asking for the reimbursement of the value of their property and a small amount for stress -- $3,000 on top of their out-of-pocket expenses for their lost stuff," Dempsey said. "They're not looking to get rich off this. A lot of this is simply because they were treated so badly." Dempsey said most of the tenants who filed suits still live at the apartment complex, although many are trying to find homes elsewhere. "The new apartments (they were provided) were not in very good shape. That's actually one of the claims," he said.

Question: "What is the name of the management company which manages the apartment complex where nine families were displaced in March?"

Answer: "Alamo Hills"
Answer:
no