In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

conversion should have an opportunity to reassert objections to exemptions. Indeed, Rule 1019(2) specifically addresses time period for actions after conversion, and provides for the re-running of times allowed for filing a claim, objecting to discharge and objecting to dischargeability. There is no new time period, however, for the trustee to assert objections to exemptions. "If a new time period for objections to exemptions began to run upon conversion of a case, one would expect to see it mentioned in Rule 1019(2), [and][i]t is not there." In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995). Where the statute is clear, it is not appropriate to look to policy arguments. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109-S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>), and none of the policy arguments are
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that pursuant to 28 usc 2254d1 if the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry (E) holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end
recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear

by assenting to forfeiture provisions included in plea agreements. In United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir.1999), a criminal defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he "agree[d] to forfeit and otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in all items seized during the investigation of any of the acts alleged." The defendant then filed a motion for the return of his property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e), and the district court denied the motion. Id. We affirmed the district court's decision, observing that "[t]he district court was entirely correct in denying Le's motion because Le ... relinquished any ownership rights he may have had in the property." Id. at 1278. See also United States v. Grover, 119 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). On appeal Mr. Montoya suggests that he should
Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea (B) holding that a rule 41e claimant relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property when he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain (C) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (D) holding that the district court did not err in continuing the trial without defendant when the trial had commenced in defendants presence he vigorously expressed his desire to be absent he was given ample opportunity to change his mind despite the disturbance he had created he had competent counsel and he knew of his right to be present (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel
holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea

Hook's unsafe workplace claim was "totally independent from the existence and administration of' the ERISA plan. 38 F.3d at 784. The claim for negligent misrepresentation was not preempted "because it neither sought benefits under the plan nor alleged improper processing of benefits." Id. A few months after the decision in Hook, the court again held that an employee's common law occupational injury claim did not relate to an employer's ERISA plan. Tex. Health Enters., Inc. v. Reece, 44 F.3d 243, 245 (5th Cir.1994). In Smith v. Texas Children's Hospital, the court held that preemption did not apply to a plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim because the claim was not necessarily dependent upon the plaintiffs rights under the ERISA plan. 84 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir.1996). The h Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Nunez v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc., 771 F.Supp.
Holding statements: (A) holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed (B) holding that a legal malpractice insurance policy that limited coverage to suits seeking damages and defined damages as excluding sanctions did not provide coverage for a sanctions motion against the insured (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding claim that insurance agent fraudulently induced insured to surrender coverage under existing policy to participate in erisa plan which did not provide promised coverage related to that plan only indirectly (E) holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant
holding that insurers failure to deny existence of insurance coverage under policy at issue was to admit that coverage existed