In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence." Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 417, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964) ("established rule" is that "recognition operates retroactively to validate past acts"); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942) (recognition is retroactive in effect); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328-330, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937) (recognition is retroactive). Further, the FSIA itself is retroactive in application and applies to actions of foreign sovereigns prior to the passage of the FSIA. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1, (2004) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the FSIA would apply to all
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fsia applied retroactively to actions of the austrian government in 1948 (B) holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively (C) holding the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the actions of the federal government (D) holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review (E) recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively
[A]: (A)

[Q]: diligent effort' requires such pointed measures as an examination of telephone company records, utility company records, and records maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder, or similar ree-ord keepers."). {47 Here, the motion for publication Brown filed in 1978 states that "search has been made of the public records of the County of Weld and County of Morgan, State of Colorado." Such a search, if undertaken with reasonable diligence, should have resulted in the discovery of the 1950 Deeds, as they were readily available matters of public record and part of the relevant chain of title. Each document identified Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the city of the Gadbois' residence. Brown could-and should-have discovered this information. See In re Colon, 563 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>) 4 48 Sunflarly, Brown could-and should-have
Holding statements: (A) holding that implied easement arose because each deed in chain of title referenced community plan (B) holding that a typographical error in a security deed does not necessarily invalidate the legal description when the deed also referred to the propertys physical address (C) holding that trustees have a duty to exercise the same judgment and prudence that a careful owner would exercise in the sale of his own property (D) recognizing that a per son exercising reasonable prudence and diligence in examining propertys chain of title would have located a deed containing a misstatement in its descmptlon of the property (E) recognizing that the right to seek reformation of a deed is limited to the original parties to the deed and their successors in title
[A]: (D)

[Q]: (9th Cir. 2000)). This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp. Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) ("There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.") (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) ("Express covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties."); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (<HOLDING>). "The reason for the rule is simply that where
Holding statements: (A) holding that employment manuals express disclaimer superseded alleged implied contractual term (B) holding that under georgia law the duty of good faith cannot be breached apart from an express contractual term (C) holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract (D) holding that plaintiffs express contract with the surety company precludes an implied contract with defendant (E) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance
[A]:
(C)