In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

)4 mile away. Fifth, also at this time, a vehicle registered to Nelson pulled in and parked next to Miller's car. Sixth, the note at the boat ramp informed Kaplan that he was being watched. Seventh, Miller and Nelson both left the lake at the same time Kaplan left. Eighth, Nelson arrived at the same McDonald's immediately after Kaplan arrived. Ninth, a passenger from Nelson's car approached Kaplan's vehicle and peered into Kaplan's vehicle from a distance of 10 feet away. Tenth, Nelson drove home from the McDonald's using what would normally be described as counter-surveillance techniques. Finally, Miller changed his story as to why he was at the lake that day at that time. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1289-90, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348
Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence (B) holding that the conspiratorial agreement may be proved by circumstantial evidence including the acts and conduct of the coconspirators and the inferences that may be drawn from their acts (C) holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence (D) recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence (E) holding that there was no evidence or inferences to be drawn from the evidence to support the damage award
(B)

speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
(E)

that, although the trial court was initially prepared to suppress based solely on the deputies' conduct in providing Gomez's name, the court ultimately applied the Neil factors and, finding that the identification was unreliable, ruled the state failed to establish that the witness' recollection was independent of the suggestive identification. On these facts, the trial court could properly conclude that it was unnecessarily suggestive for the victims to be provided the defendant's name and resulting access to his photo on the website before having any opportunity to identify him, thus giving rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See generally Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 518 (Fla.2005)(quoting Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 365 (Fla.1994)) (<HOLDING>); Johnson v. State, 566 So.2d 888, 890 (Fla.
Holding statements: (A) holding that showup identification proce dure was not unduly suggestive where officer said to eyewitness we got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about (B) holding that unprovoked flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing but it is certainly suggestive of such (C) holding showing of a single photo is unduly suggestive (D) holding that showup identification procedure was not unduly suggestive where defendant was handcuffed and placed under police spotlight (E) holding due process requires suppression of testimony regarding pretrial identification when procedure employed is impermissibly suggestive
(C)