In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Anderson claims that the trial court findings do not justify the decision to "increase" his child support on August 1, 1987. In other words, appellant construes the trial court's 1987 decision as a modification downward to $250 followed by a modification upward to $400. This is a misconstruction of the trial court's order. As the majority opinion indicates, the court did not make an upward modification. It does not follow, however, that the trial court could act without making findings on appellant's ability to pay child support. Without findings on appellant's ability to pay, or another indication that the trial court considered the facts as to appellant's ability to pay, the law commands us to remand the case rather than to affirm. Moylan v. Moylan, 384 N.W.2d 859, 864-65 (Minn.1986) (<HOLDING>). The dictates of Moylan should be applied. The
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court has jurisdiction to reconsider new trial order as long as case is pending (B) holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous (C) holding that a defendants attorney can waive the defendants sixth amendment confrontation right so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorneys decision and so long as it can be said that the attorneys decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy (D) holding that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that it could not consider the states failure to videotape the defendant (E) holding it improper to independently review the record to find support for a trial courts decision so long as it is unclear whether the trial court considered statutory factors
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert's testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103,
Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: to him, Martinez has not adduced competent evidence that Hubbard intentionally discriminated against him because of his race. Though Martinez claims that Hubbard lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the Acura, as I -noted .above* there is no genuine dispute that Hubbard discovered that, the Acura's license plates were stolen before pulling the vehicle over. Thus, it is undisputed that Hubbard had a non-discriminatory reason to initiate the stop. Courts have held that a plaintiffs equal protection claim may stand even if his arrest was valid and supported by probable cause when the plaintiff sufficiently alleged and provided evidence of intentional discrimination on the basis of race or another protected, class. See, e.g., Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>), overruled on other grounds, Harper v. Harris
Holding statements: (A) holding that the equal protection clause forbids the prosecution from challenging potential jurors solely on the basis of race or assumptions drawn from their race (B) holding that the equal protection clause forbids prosecutors from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race (C) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause (D) holding that the equal protection clause also prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender (E) holding that plaintiff stated viable equal protection clause claim where officer humiliated and harassed the plaintiff on basis of race prior to and during a lawful arrest
[EX A]:
(E)