While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer: Why did Musharraf want the President to visit Pakistan?

While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer: Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan?

Porky is looking all over the big city for a hotel room , but due to a convention there are no vacancies . Porky takes the only available vacancy at one hotel , but will have to share with Daffy Duck , who is a very loud , obnoxious and annoying sort . Daffy introduces his invisible kangaroo friend '' Hymie '' , but Porky wo n't believe that . Daffy spends the rest of the night annoying Porky : pestering him with questions , shaking the bed , spilling water from a glass , hogging the blanket and finally literally sending the both of them flying off the bed when Daffy kicks , and startles , Porky with his literally frozen feet . Fed up with his antics , Porky stuffs Daffy in a pillow case and drops him out of the window . As Porky goes back to bed , Daffy returns bandaged , but shakes them off and prepares to get revenge . Daffy tricks the half-asleep pig into stepping out of a window thinking he 's boarding a train . Daffy hides the window saying it 's '' too gruesome '' to watch . Suddenly he hears train noises , and behind the shade , sees the still-drowsy Porky pulling away on an actual train and waving at Daffy . Daffy finds this silly . Then he bounces all around the room , '' Hoo-Hoo ! '' - ing wildly .
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer: What made Daffy Duck so happy that he was saying "Hoo Hoo"?

One of the most dramatic changes in priorities proposed by the City Council would shift $25.6 million from funding for court-appointed lawyers to the Legal Aid Society. In a document released yesterday to justify its reordered priorities, the Council contended that Legal Aid can achieve greater economies of scale than lawyers appointed pursuant to Article 18-B of the County Law. The Council document also noted that "inexplicably" 18-B lawyers are handling 50 percent of the indigent criminal cases in New York City, even though their mandate is to handle only multi-defendant cases where the Legal Aid Society had a conflict. In past years, the City Council had consistently added $5.6 million to the $54.7 million proposed for the Legal Aid Society by former Mayor Giuliani, bringing the total to just a shade over $60 million. But this year for the first time, the Council is proposing shifting more than $20 million in funds earmarked by the Mayor for 18-B lawyers to the Legal Aid Society, which would increase its total funding to $80.4 million. That would reflect a jump in its current finding of about one-third. Meantime, the City Council proposed slashing the Mayor's allocation of $62.8 million for 18-B lawyers by 66 percent, to $21.4 million.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer:
Which former mayor had an allocation of $62.8 million for lawyers appointed pursuant to Article 18-B?