Clarifying the Record The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly. More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.

Question: "Who coordinated the defense of US airspace on September 11?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "Defenders"

Response: no

Relying on an animal to come by is risky. A flower may have to wait a long time for the right animals to come by. What if one never passes close enough to the flower? Hoping the wind will blow is also risky for a plant. What if the wind does not blow? What if the blowing pollen does not land on another flower? The wind could even blow the pollen over the ocean where it is wasted. Giving free nectar is costly. It is not a good use of the plants energy. A plant uses a lot of energy to produce nectar. Some animals may just drink the nectar. They may not carry off any pollen in return. To improve their chances, plants evolved special traits. For example, they developed ways to hide their nectar. Only certain animals were able to get at the plants hidden nectar. These specific animals might be more likely to visit only flowers of the same species. This was also a benefit for some animals. Animals also evolved special traits to get to the nectar.

Question: "Why is it risky for a flower to wait on an animal to come by?"

Response: "Animals visit too many flowers"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A: no

Problem: Relying on an animal to come by is risky. A flower may have to wait a long time for the right animals to come by. What if one never passes close enough to the flower? Hoping the wind will blow is also risky for a plant. What if the wind does not blow? What if the blowing pollen does not land on another flower? The wind could even blow the pollen over the ocean where it is wasted. Giving free nectar is costly. It is not a good use of the plants energy. A plant uses a lot of energy to produce nectar. Some animals may just drink the nectar. They may not carry off any pollen in return. To improve their chances, plants evolved special traits. For example, they developed ways to hide their nectar. Only certain animals were able to get at the plants hidden nectar. These specific animals might be more likely to visit only flowers of the same species. This was also a benefit for some animals. Animals also evolved special traits to get to the nectar.

Question: "What might some animals do with a plant?"

Answer: "Hide the nectar"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer: no

The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. The captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get out of here-get out of here-get out of here." On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. This was below the norm for Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But there is no evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation. The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however, the takeover took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out the team for this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando International Airport in August. Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA personnel. We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have used them. We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside, he would not have been visible to the passengers.

Question: "How much longer was the United 93 takeover than their previous attemps?"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer: "15 minutes"

Response:
no