Detailed Instructions: In this task, you are given a part of an article. Your task is to generate headline (title) for this text. Preferred headlines are under fifteen words.
Problem:<lb>Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse correlated<lb>equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning dynamics, have near-optimal<lb>welfare. This work provides two main technical results that lift this conclusion to games of incomplete<lb>information, a.k.a., Bayesian games. First, near-optimal welfare in Bayesian games follows directly from<lb>the smoothness-based proof of near-optimal welfare in the same game when the private information<lb>is public. Second, no-regret learning dynamics converge to Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium in<lb>these incomplete information games. These results are enabled by interpretation of a Bayesian game<lb>as a stochastic game of complete information.
Solution:
No-Regret Learning in Repeated Bayesian Games