In this task, you are given a part of an article. Your task is to generate headline (title) for this text. Preferred headlines are under fifteen words.

We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information<lb>setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordi-<lb>nal preference information. Our model is motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents<lb>cannot express the numerical values of their utility for different outcomes, but are still able<lb>to rank the outcomes in their order of preference. Specifically, we study problems where the<lb>ground truth exists in the form of a weighted graph of agent utilities, but the algorithm can<lb>only elicit the agents' private information in the form of a preference ordering for each agent<lb>induced by the underlying weights. Against this backdrop, we design truthful algorithms to<lb>approximate the true optimum solution with respect to the hidden weights. Our techniques<lb>yield universally truthful algorithms for a number of graph problems: a 1.76-approximation<lb>algorithm for Max-Weight Matching, 2-approximation algorithm for Max k-matching, a 6-<lb>approximation algorithm for Densest k-subgraph, and a 2-approximation algorithm for Max<lb>Traveling Salesman as long as the hidden weights constitute a metric. We also provide im-<lb>proved approximation algorithms for such problems when the agents are not able to lie about<lb>their preferences. Our results are the first non-trivial truthful approximation algorithms for<lb>these problems, and indicate that in many situations, we can design robust algorithms even<lb>when the agents may lie and only provide ordinal information instead of precise utilities.
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World