TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). By assenting to settlement in this action, Defendants waived, for example, the right to contest the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction, which would have been an element of the EPA's substantive claim. See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 972 (7th Cir.2000) ("[T]he interstate connection, i.e. that the waters involved were 'waters of the United States,' is merely an element of the United States' Clean Water Act case under section 301."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 482, 148 L.Ed.2d 455 (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir.1997) (indicating proof of interstate nexus is an element of criminal liability under CWA); United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, a consent decree "is an agreement
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (B) recognizing the existence of the special relationship (C) recognizing existence of two tests (D) recognizing the existence of purely jurisdictional elements (E) holding that one of the essential elements of an abuse of process claim is the existence of an ulterior motive

SOLUTION: recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional

PROBLEM: defendant's activities fall outside the FDCPA's general provisions); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv0274-DFHTAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (recognizing majority position that party whose activities are limited to enforcement of security interests is not subject to all FDCPA requirements, and stating, "[i]f a person invokes judicial remedies only to enforce the security interest in property, then the effort is not subject to the FDCPA (other than 1692f(6) and 1692i(a))[,] [b]ut if the person is also seeking additional relief, such as a personal judgment against the borrower, then the FDCPA applies.") (collecting cases); Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, Civ. No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 2695795, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 12, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV761 ORL28DAB,
Holding statements: (A) holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure pro ceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 (B) recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of 1692a6 a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to 1692f6 (C) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (D) holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note by filing a lawsuit in state court (E) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa

SOLUTION: recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of 1692a6 a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to 1692f6

PROBLEM: 24 . It appears Plaintiffs themselves recognized this at some point. In their original Motion for Entry of Judgment, Plaintiffs sought as damages the entire principal amount of the underlying-judgment of $5,830,000. In their supplemental brief, Plaintiffs modified their request to seek the remaining principal of the underlying excess verdict of $5,730,000 ($5,830,000 - $100,000). 25 . Interest = Principal x Rate x Time in years: $5,830,000 x 6.25% x (493 days/365 days). 26 . Had Nationwide wanted to reduce the amount of interest accruing on the judgment, it could have paid its $100,000 policy limits immediately after the judgment was entered and before any substantial amount of interest had accrued. See JTH Tax, Inc. v. Flowers, 311 Ga.App. 495, 497, 716 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2011) (<HOLDING>); Threatt v. Forsyth Cnty., 250 Ga. App. 838,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court appointed by the court directed by the court and paid by the court but is in no sense an agent or employee or officer of the united states (B) holding that the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof which is the subject of litigation (C) holding that a judgment debtor may abate the accrual of interest by paying amount owed and may abate the accrual of interest during appeal by complying with ocga 91167 by depositing with the court all or any part of such sum to be held by the clerk of the court subject to withdrawal in whole or in part at any time thereafter upon order of the court upon posting of sufficient security (D) holding that jurisdiction of the subject matter in either a civil or criminal action may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even after a plea of guilty and for the first time in the appellate court (E) holding in the context of a case involving the availability for public inspection of criminal docket books that files in the possession of the clerk of the criminal court of the city of new york are public records which may be fully examined by any person unless the papers have been sealed from public scrutiny by the court or by the terms of a statute

SOLUTION:
holding that a bankruptcy trustee is an officer of the court appointed by the court directed by the court and paid by the court but is in no sense an agent or employee or officer of the united states