In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017. {34} Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature's intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Second, a probation revocation hearing, l 7, 1140-41 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements (E) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard
holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel

hard at Whirlpool, that is not a mitigating factor. Those are things that we are expected to do, all of us. We are expected to work hard at our jobs. We are expected to be involved in our children's lives. We are expected to be civil to the people that we work and live around. Those aren't mitigating factor[s]. Those are what every single human being should do. The Defendant is asking for extra credit because he did it sometimes. Appellant argues that these statements misled the jury because Arkansas neither defines nor limits mitigation by statute. And, in fact, he points to decisions by this court wherein the court has held that there is no requirement that the mitigating circumstances reduce culpability for the offense. See Pickens v. State, 292 Ark. 362, 730 S.W.2d 230 (1987) (<HOLDING>). He asserts that the prosecutor's remarks
Holding statements: (A) holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence (B) holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (C) holding that any relevant mitigating evidence concerning a defendants character should not be excluded (D) holding that relevant evidence supporting a defendants theory of defense should not be excluded unless no other remedy suffices (E) holding that a trial court must not preclude the jury from considering any aspect of the defendants character or circumstances as a mitigating factor
holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence

De La Garza, 690 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, Burke testified to the financial hardship caused by his injury, but his testimony was limited to the hardship caused by his reduced earning capacity. The following exchange occurred at trial: [Plaintiffs Counsel:] Now, Ronnie, after all of this, how much do you make now working with Bennett? [Burke:] About twenty, about 20,000 and glad to have it. [Plaintiffs Counsel:] Ronnie, you haven't filed your taxes, have you? [Burke:] No, we haven't. [Plaintiffs Counsel:] We don't have your taxes for last year yet. But my point ny that plaintiff did not receive paychecks was not inconsistent with receipt of insurance benefits and did not open the door to collateral source evidence); Mundy, 783 S.W.2d at 745 (<HOLDING>). The trial court therefore did not abuse its
Holding statements: (A) holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony (B) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing collateral source testimony when plaintiff testified generally about financial hardship caused by injury (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the state to introduce direct evidence of the controlling nature of defendants relationship with the victim (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form (E) holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling based only on affidavits
holding juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony