In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
states that a lack of due diligence should not prevent a party from presenting the new evidence. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 29 cmt. j (1982); see also Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J.Super. 558, 788 A.2d 834, 840 (2002) ("[T]he judge may consider diligence, or lack of diligence, ... [but] a lack of diligence does not require invocation of collateral estoppel particularly where, as here, plaintiff attempted to obtain Dr. Matthew's evaluation prior to the arbitration proceeding."). But see Klein v. Comm'r, 880 F.2d 260, 263 (10th Cir.1989) ("A party may not assert a change in controlling facts when the facts allegedly showing a change in circumstances could have been discovered in the exercise of due diligence."); Calcutt v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 14, 25, 1988 WL 71262 (1988) (<HOLDING>). Having concluded that the fairness
Holding statements: (A) holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial (B) holding that evidence which by due diligence could have been produced in the first proceeding is considered to have been available at the first proceeding and therefore will not preclude the application of collateral estoppel (C) holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party to the prior action

Ex Output:
holding that posttrial discovery of asserted newly discovered evidence did not satisfy the requirement that the evidence must be such as with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered and produced at trial

Ex Input:
controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia's onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts "Where there is no material connection between the district and'the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action." Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 'When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made." Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether
Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action

Ex Output:
holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership

Ex Input:
The Court emphasized that reasonable strategic choices by counsel after an appropriate investigation of the facts and law are "virtually unchallengeable." Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Those "made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." .Id. The responsibility rests with petitioner to "overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' ", Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citation omitted). The decision to. rely on the plea colloquy for evidence , related to respondent's extreme stress, caused by his inability to support his family was found reasonable because it prevented the State from cross-e 2015) (<HOLDING>). With respect to ineffective assistance of
Holding statements: (A) holding state court unreasonably applied strickland test because counsels failure to investigate expert testimony which called into doubt the central forensic evidence linking the inmate to the crime was ineffective assistance and prejudicial to defendant (B) holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy (C) holding trial counsels failure to investigate and present substantial mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (D) holding that counsels failure to present expert testimony explaining a possible causal link between defendants childhood and his crime was prejudicial (E) holding that the state court unreasonably applied chapman but that the error was not prejudicial under brecht

Ex Output:
holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy