In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

See Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 627, 651 A.2d 92, 95 (1995). However, apart from any persuasive weight afforded the Ninth Circuit's decision in C'Est Moi, NHIC proffers no case law specifically suggesting that common law doctrines such as uberrimae fidei and equitable fraud may not be modified or superseded by a contractual agreement between the insurer and the insured. On the contrary, as we have noted, a number of courts have embraced the ability of parties to contract around common law. See, e.g., King, 906 F.2d at 1540-41; Conn. Indem. Co., 390 F.Supp.2d at 166-67; Progressive N. Ins. Co., 314 F.Supp.2d at 829-30; see also, e.g., McBride v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2007 WL 5185293, at *18, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16917, at **64-65 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 29, 2007) (<HOLDING>). 19 . NHIC points out that during a telephone
Holding statements: (A) holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application (B) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (C) holding that insurance application clause modified federal common law governing misrepresentations because once an insurer has entered into a policy by using an application form more favorable to the insured than the law provides it may not rely on a rule of law which is more stringent than the application form quoting espinosa v guardian life ins 856 fsupp 711 717 dmass1994 (D) holding that the mccarranferguson act which bars application of a federal law in the face of a state law enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance did not preclude the concurrent assertion of the federal rico statute and nevada insurance law (E) recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous
holding an insurer has a right to rely on statements made in an insurance application

merits of a plaintiffs cause of action ... also implicate the class certification decision," Jackson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth, 260 F.R.D. 168, 184 (E.D.Pa.2009), such an inquiry is merely preliminary. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317. A plaintiff need not establish by a preponderance of the evidence the merits of its claims at the class certification stage, and any inquiry into the merits that is not necessary to a Rule 23 decision is precluded. Jackson, 260 F.R.D. at 184 (citing Newton, 259 F.3d at 166-67, and Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317-18). However, the movant must do more than "assur[e] ... the court that it intends or plans to meet the requirements" of Rule 23. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318; see also Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 186 (3d Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). As with other matters relating to Rule 23
Holding statements: (A) holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right (B) holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity (C) holding that clearly established means the contours of the right were so clear at the time the officials acted that a reasonable official would have understood that what he was doing violated that right (D) holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she is doing violates that right (E) holding that there must be full and clear articulation of the litigations contours at the time of class certification
holding that the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right

A. 598 (1935), this Court held that a graduated-rate income tax violated the Uniformity Clause. The statute in that case taxed income below $5,000 at a rate of 2%, income between $5,000 and $10,000 at a rate of 2.5%, and income between $10,000 and $25,000 at a rate of 3%. The Kelley Court explained that the tax was non-uniform because it "resulted] in taxing those whose incomes arise above a stated figure merely for the reason that in the discretion of the Legislature their incomes are sufficiently great to be taxed." Id. at 602. Relying upon Kelley, we subsequently struck down a city ordinance that taxed "every individual engaged in an occupation ... whose gross earnings would amount to $600 or more during the year." Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 413 Pa. 316, 196 A.2d 664 (1964) (<HOLDING>). More recently, in Amidon, supra, this Court
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the equal protection clause proscribes discrimination against whiteanglos (B) holding that a graduatedrate income tax violates the uniformity clause (C) holding that the statement of current monthly income was the presumptive amount of projected disposable income but presumption could be rebutted by the debt or upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances (D) holding that unlike the uniformity clause the united states constitution does not require equalization across all potential subclassifications of real property (E) holding that the uniformity clause proscribes the unequal treatment of certain individuals based upon their income
recognizing that the equal protection clause proscribes discrimination against whiteanglos