In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: But he claims that release at age 60 is a geriatric release and the functional equivalent of life without parole in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also argues that such release violates the principles in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery because release at age 60 provides only grim prospects for any meaningful future outside prison. [12.] Even if Charles's 92-year sentence is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole, that alone does not mean his sentence is unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment precedent. The United States Supreme Court bars mandatory life sentences without parole against juvenile homicide offenders, not discretionary sentences of life without parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469; State v. Springer, 2014 S.D. 80, 15, 856 N.W.2d 460, 466 (<HOLDING>). [13.] In response, Charles asks this Court
Holding statements: (A) holding sentences of life without parole unique in their severity (B) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (C) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (D) holding that consecutive fixedterm sentences for juveniles who committed multiple nonhomicide offenses are not clearly unconstitutional under graham even when they amount to the practical equivalent of life without parole (E) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham

Output: (C)

Input: Consider Input: on CRiminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). In 1997, the legislature amended the child pornography statute to eliminate a loophole in the existing statute that impeded prosecution of individuals for possession or promotion of child pornography depicted or distributed by computer. Id.; House Comm, on CRiminal JURISPRUDENCE, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 674, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). There is nothing in these materials to suggest that the legislature intended to prohibit anything other than pornography depicting actual children. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas child pornography statute prohibits only the possession of visual materials depicting real children. Because the Texas statute only prohibits pornography depicting actual children, the sta App.1991) (<HOLDING>). Appellant also contends that the statute is
Holding statements: (A) holding twentyeight charges against defendant for possession of child pornography were not multiplicious (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (D) holding that an overbreadth challenge to a child pornography law was rendered moot by amendment to the statute (E) recognizing continuing harm from defendants knowing possession of child pornography

Output: (B)

Input: Consider Input: changes to M.R.E.s 103(a)(2), 404(a), 701-702, and 803(6) that have already taken effect through operation of M.R.E. 1102. 3 . The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits follow rules similar to the Ninth Circuit's formulation in Cox. See, e.g., United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. White, 569 F.2d 263, 267 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 268 (7th Cir.1976); DeLoach v. United States, 307 F.2d 653, 655 (D.C.Cir.1962) (pre-Federal Rules of Evidence case); see also United States v. Coleman, 284 F.3d 892, 894 (8th Cir.2002) (upholding police officer's testimony interpreting defendant's "drug jargon"); United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 640-42 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Sixth Circuit, however, maintains that a
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that although early interpretations of the act were narrow subsequent interpretations demonstrate that the act reaches a wide variety of deceptive commercial practices (B) holding that fbi agents testimony regarding witnesss pri or identification was admissible where nothing in the record suggested that the declarant was unavailable for reexamination after the agents testimony (C) holding that an fbi agents investigation of the written contents of a notebook that was lawfully in the possession of the fbi constituted a search that violated the defendants fourth amendment rights (D) holding that the plaintiffs ftca claims failed because the fbi agents were privileged to use reasonable force under texas law (E) holding that fbi agents interpretations of codefendants conversations were inadmissible under fedrevid 701
Output: (E)