In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: that is so related structurally to another substance as to be theoretically derivable from it even when not so obtainable in practice (the methoxy of naphthalene)." Webster's Int'l 608. Thus, while some of the general purpose dictionaries provide support for Defendant's suggested definition for derivative, others define the term as proposed by Plaintiffs. Technical dictionaries can also assist claim construction by showing how those skilled in the art define "derivatives." Moba v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2003) ("[A]s this court has repeatedly counseled, the best indicator of claim meaning is its usage in context as understood by one of skill in the art at the time of invention."); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed.Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Here, again, the cited sources provide
Holding statements: (A) recognizing we must give insurance policy language its ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words used are intended to impart a technical or different meaning (B) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (C) holding that the specifications reference to a selector sufficed as one skilled in the art would have understood the term (D) holding a technical term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the field of the invention unless it is apparent from the patent and the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a different meaning (E) holding that courts may consult scientific dictionaries and technical treatises to deter mine the ordinary meaning of a technical term to persons skilled in the art
[A]: (E)

[Q]: carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the 924(c) offense. Thus, because 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant's offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of 924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for 924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a 924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a 924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by 924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting when it applied an increase under 2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating 924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants 924c conviction
[A]: (D)

[Q]: Common sense tells us that lead paint that never leaves a wall or ceili 79, 615 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1st Dep't 1994); St. Leger v. American Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 870 F.Supp. 641 (E.D.Pa.1994) (same), aff'd without opinion, 61 F.3d 896 (3d Cir.1995); Kaytes v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co., No. Civ. A. 93-1573, 1994 WL 780901 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 6, 1994) (same). On that interpretation, it might be permissible for Chubb to refuse to A.2d 617, 622-23 (1995) (same); Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. McFadden, 413 Mass. 90, 595 N.E.2d 762, 764 (1992) (same). Because the poisoning occurred inside an apartment, the lead paint might not be regarded as an environmental pollutant and therefore coverage would not be excluded. See United States Liability Ins. Co. v. Bourbeau, 49 F.3d 786, 789 (1st Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). The clause at issue here bars coverage for
Holding statements: (A) holding that a discharge into the environment is necessary for the total pollution clause to be applicable (B) holding that removal of insulation that released asbestos a thermal irritant into an apartment was covered by the pollution exclusion (C) holding that the discharge of paint chips into soil was covered by the pollution exclusion because it polluted the environment but that the presence of lead paint in a household would not be so covered (D) holding lead paint poisoning covered by the pollution exclusion (E) holding that pollution exclusion did not apply to claim arising from ingestion of lead paint because exclusion reasonably may be limited to environmental claims
[A]:
(C)