In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.

Example input: SECTION 1. LIABILITY OF BUSINESS ENTITIES PROVIDING USE OF FACILITIES
TO NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Business entity.--The term ''business entity'' means a
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint
venture, or other form of enterprise.
(2) Facility.--The term ''facility'' means any real
property, including any building, improvement, or appurtenance.
(3) Gross negligence.--The term ''gross negligence'' means
voluntary and conscious conduct by a person with knowledge (at
the time of the conduct) that the conduct is likely to be
harmful to the health or well-being of another person.
(4) Intentional misconduct.--The term ''intentional
misconduct'' means conduct by a person with knowledge (at the
time of the conduct) that the conduct is harmful to the health
or well-being of another person.
(5) Nonprofit organization.--The term ''nonprofit
organization'' means--
(A) any organization described in section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from
tax under section 501(a) of such Code; or
(B) any not-for-profit organization organized and
conducted for public benefit and operated primarily for
charitable, civic, educational, religious, welfare, or
health purposes.
(6) State.--The term ''State'' means each of the several
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern
Mariana Islands, any other territory or possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision of any such State,
territory, or possession.
(b) Limitation on Liability.--
(1) In general.--Subject to subsection (c), a business
entity shall not be subject to civil liability relating to any
injury or death occurring at a facility of the business entity
in connection with a use of such facility by a nonprofit
organization if--
(A) the use occurs outside of the scope of business
of the business entity;
(B) such injury or death occurs during a period
that such facility is used by the nonprofit
organization; and
(C) the business entity authorized the use of such
facility by the nonprofit organization.
(2) Application.--This subsection shall apply--
(A) with respect to civil liability under Federal
and State law; and
(B) regardless of whether a nonprofit organization
pays for the use of a facility.
(c) Exception for Liability.--Subsection (b) shall not apply to an
injury or death that results from an act or omission of a business
entity that constitutes gross negligence or intentional misconduct,
including any misconduct that--
(1) constitutes a crime of violence (as that term is
defined in section 16 of title 18, United States Code) or act
of international terrorism (as that term is defined in section
2331 of title 18) for which the defendant has been convicted in
any court;
(2) constitutes a hate crime (as that term is used in the
Hate Crime Statistics Act (28 U.S.C. 534 note));
(3) involves a sexual offense, as defined by applicable
State law, for which the defendant has been convicted in any
court; or
(4) involves misconduct for which the defendant has been
found to have violated a Federal or State civil rights law.
(d) Superseding Provision.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2) and subsection
(e), this Act preempts the laws of any State to the extent that
such laws are inconsistent with this Act, except that this Act
shall not preempt any State law that provides additional
protection from liability for a business entity for an injury
or death with respect to which conditions under subparagraphs
(A) through (C) of subsection (b)(1) apply.
(2) Limitation.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to
supersede any Federal or State health or safety law.
(e) Election of State Regarding Nonapplicability.--This Act shall
not apply to any civil action in a State court against a business
entity in which all parties are citizens of the State if such State
enacts a statute--
(1) citing the authority of this subsection;
(2) declaring the election of such State that this Act
shall not apply to such civil action in the State; and
(3) containing no other provision.
Example output: Shields a business entity from civil liability relating to any injury or death occurring at a facility of that entity in connection with a use of such facility by a nonprofit organization if: (1) the use occurs outside the scope of business of the business entity; (2) such injury or death occurs during a period that such facility is used by such organization; and (3) the business entity authorized the use of such facility by the organization.
Makes this Act inapplicable to an injury or death that results from an act or omission of a business entity that constitutes gross negligence or intentional misconduct, including misconduct that: (1) constitutes a hate crime or a crime of violence or act of international terrorism for which the defendant has been convicted in any court; or (2) involves a sexual offense for which the defendant has been convicted in any court or misconduct for which the defendant has been found to have violated a Federal or State civil rights law.
Preempts State laws to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this Act, except State law that provides additional protection from liability. Specifies that this Act shall not be construed to supersede any Federal or State health or safety law.
Makes this Act inapplicable to any civil action in a State court against a business entity in which all parties are citizens of the State if such State, citing this Act's authority and containing no other provision, enacts a statute declaring the State's election that this Act shall not apply to such action in the State.
Example explanation: This Bill focuses on shielding business entities from civil liability relating to an injury or death depending on the conditions of injury, hence the generated summary is correct.
Q: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ''American Missile Protection Act of
1998''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The threat of weapons of mass destruction delivered by
long-range ballistic missiles is among the most serious
security issues facing the United States.
(A) In a 1994 Executive Order, President Clinton
certified, that ''I ... find that the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ('weapons of
mass destruction') and the means of delivering such
weapons, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat
to the national security, foreign policy, and economy
of the United States, and hereby declare a national
emergency to deal with that threat.'' This state of
emergency was reaffirmed in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
(B) In 1994 the President stated, that ''there is
nothing more important to our security and the world's
stability than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles''.
(C) Several countries hostile to the United States
have been particularly determined to acquire missiles
and weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton
observed in January of 1998, for example, that ''Saddam
Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and
much of his nation's wealth, not on providing for the
Iraqi people, but on developing nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them''.
(D) In 1996, the Senate affirmed that, ''it is in
the supreme interest of the United States to defend
itself from the threat of limited ballistic missile
attack, whatever the source.''
(2) The long-range ballistic missile threat to the United
States is increasing.
(A) Several adversaries of the United States have
stated their intention to acquire intercontinental
ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United
States.
(i) Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has
stated, ''If they know that you have a
deterrent force capable of hitting the United
States, they would not be able to hit you. If
we had possessed a deterrent--missiles that
could reach New York--we would have hit it at
the same moment. Consequently, we should build
this force so that they and others will no
longer think about an attack.''
(ii) Abu Abbas, the head of the Palestine
Liberation Front, has stated, ''I would love to
be able to reach the American shore, but this
is very difficult. Someday an Arab country will
have ballistic missiles. Someday an Arab
country will have a nuclear bomb. It is better
for the United States and for Israel to reach
peace with the Palestinians before that day.''
(iii) Saddam Hussein has stated, ''Our
missiles cannot reach Washington. If we could
reach Washington, we would strike if the need
arose.''
(iv) Iranian actions speak for themselves.
Iran's aggressive pursuit of medium-range
ballistic missiles capable of striking Central
Europe--aided by the continuing collaboration
of outside agents--demonstrates Tehran's intent
to acquire ballistic missiles of ever-
increasing range.
(B) Over 30 non-NATO countries possess ballistic
missiles, with at least 10 of those countries
developing over 20 new types of ballistic missiles.
(C) From the end of World War II until 1980,
ballistic missiles were used in one conflict. Since
1980, thousands of ballistic missiles have been fired
in at least six different conflicts.
(D) The clear trend among countries hostile to the
United States is toward having ballistic missiles of
greater range.
(i) North Korea first acquired 300-
kilometer range Scud Bs, then developed and
deployed 500-kilometer range Scud Cs, is
currently deploying the 1000-kilometer range
No-Dong, and is developing the 2000-kilometer
range Taepo-Dong 1 and 6000-kilometer range
Taepo-Dong 2, which would be capable of
striking Alaska and Hawaii.
(ii) Iran acquired 150-kilometer range CSS-
8s, progressed through the Scud B and Scud C,
and is developing the 1300-kilometer range
Shahab-3 and 2000-kilometer range Shahab-4,
which would allow Iran to strike Central
Europe.
(iii) Iraq, in a two-year crash program,
produced a new missile, the Al-Hussein, with
twice the range of its Scud Bs.
(iv) Experience gained from extending the
range of short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles facilitates the development of
intercontinental ballistic missiles.
(E) The technical information, hardware, and other
resources necessary to build ballistic missiles are
increasingly available and accessible worldwide.
(i) Due to advances in information
technology, a vast amount of technical
information relating to ballistic missile
design, much of it formerly classified, has
become widely available and is increasingly
accessible through the Internet and other
distribution avenues.
(ii) Components, tools, and materials to
support ballistic missile development are
increasingly available in the commercial
aerospace industry.
(iii) Increasing demand for satellite-based
telecommunications is adding to the demand for
commercial Space Launch Vehicles, which employ
technology that is essentially identical to
that of intercontinental ballistic missiles. As
this increasing demand is met, the technology
and expertise associated with space launch
vehicles also proliferate.
(F) Russia and China have provided significant
technical assistance to rogue nation ballistic missile
programs, accelerating the pace of those efforts. In
June of 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence,
reporting to Congress on weapons of mass destruction-
related equipment, materials, and technology, stated
that ''China and Russia continued to be the primary
suppliers, and are key to any future efforts to stem
the flow of dual-use goods and modern weapons to
countries of concern.''
(G) Russia and China continue to engage in missile
proliferation.
(i) Despite numerous Russian assurances not
to assist Iran with its ballistic missile
program, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Nonproliferation testified to the
Senate, that ''the problem is this: there is a
disconnect between those reassurances, which we
welcome, and what we believe is actually
occurring.''
(ii) Regarding China's actions to
demonstrate the sincerity of its commitment to
nonproliferation, the Director of Central
Intelligence testified to the Senate on January
28, 1998, that, ''the jury is still out on
whether the recent changes are broad enough in
scope and whether they will hold over the
longer term. As such, Chinese activities in
this area will require continued close
watching.''
(H) The inability of the United States to defend
itself against weapons of mass destruction delivered by
long-range ballistic missile provides additional
incentive for hostile nations to develop long-range
ballistic missiles with which to threaten the United
States. Missiles are widely viewed as valuable tools
for deterring and coercing a vulnerable United States.
(3) The ability of the United States to anticipate future
ballistic missile threats is questionable.
(A) The Intelligence Community has failed to
anticipate many past technical innovations (for
example, Iraq's extended-range Al-Hussein missiles and
its development of a space launch vehicle) and outside
assistance enables rogue states to surmount traditional
technological obstacles to obtaining or developing
ballistic missiles of increasing range.
(B) In June of 1997, the Director of Central
Intelligence reported to Congress that ''many Third
World countries--with Iran being the most prominent
example--are responding to Western counter-
proliferation efforts by relying more on legitimate
commercial firms as procurement fronts and by
developing more convoluted procurement networks.''
(C) In June of 1997, the Director of Central
Intelligence stated to Congress that ''gaps and
uncertainties preclude a good projection of exactly
when 'rest of the world' countries will deploy ICBMs.''
(D) In 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence
testified that Iran would have a medium-range missile
by 2007. One year later the Director stated, ''since I
testified, Iran's success in getting technology and
materials from Russian companies, combined with recent
indigenous Iranian advances, means that it could have a
medium-range missile much sooner than I assessed last
year.'' Department of State officials have testified
that Iran could be prepared to deploy such a missile as
early as late 1998, nine years earlier than had been
predicted one year before by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
(4) The failure to prepare adequately for long-range
ballistic missile threats could have severe national security
and foreign policy consequences for the United States.
(A) An attack on the United States by a ballistic
missile equipped with a weapon of mass destruction
could inflict catastrophic death or injury to citizens
of the United States and severe damage to their
property.
(B) A rogue state's ability to threaten the United
States with an intercontinental ballistic missile may
constrain the United States' options in dealing with
regional threats to its interests, deter the United
States from taking appropriate action, or prompt allies
to question United States security guarantees, thereby
weakening alliances of the United States and the United
States' world leadership position.
(5) The United States must be prepared for rogue nations
acquiring long-range ballistic missiles armed with weapons of
mass destruction.
(A) In its resolution of ratification for the START
II Treaty, the United States Senate declared that
''because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the
United States against long-range ballistic missile
threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new
deterrent strategies.''
(B) In September of 1994, Secretary of Defense
Perry stated that in the post-Cold War era, ''we now
have opportunity to create a new relationship based not
on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather
on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''
(C) On February 12, 1997, the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy testified to the Senate that ''I and
the administration are quite willing to acknowledge
that if we saw a rogue state, a potential proliferant,
beginning to develop a long-range ICBM capable of
reaching the United States, we would have to give very,
very serious attention to deploying a limited national
missile defense.''
(6) The United States has no defense deployed against
weapons of mass destruction delivered by long-range ballistic
missiles and no policy to deploy such a national missile
defense system.

SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is
technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system
capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited
ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or
deliberate).
A:
American Missile Protection Act of 1998 - States as U.S. policy to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).