In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
by [the motorist]." Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that "it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow." 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas's argument, this court observed that "procedural due process requires that a person have an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas
Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action

Ex Output:
holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

Ex Input:
than the Confrontation Clause, we review for plain error. See United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir.2007); United States v. Green, 324 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir.2003). Our consideration of the district court's decision begins and ends with the first element of plain error review because we conclude that the district court did not err in limiting the scope of Rios's cross-examination. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009) (explaining that the first element of plain error review requires that "there must be an error or defect"). A defendant's right to cross-examination is not unlimited. United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir.2011). The Sixth Amendment confrontation right is satisfied in this regard so Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). In sum, establishing a Confrontation Clause
Holding statements: (A) holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement (B) holding that the district court satisfied the confrontation clause by permitting the defendant to present facts concerning the adverse witnesss plea agreement and incentives to cooperate (C) holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment (D) holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing (E) holding that if a plea agreement is breached the district court may either grant specific performance or allow the defendant to withdraw the plea

Ex Output:
holding that the prosecutors statement about a witnesss truthfulness was proper because the evidence showed that the witness complied with the plea agreement not that he told the truth simply because he entered into the plea agreement

Ex Input:
either argument as a reason for reversal. 26 . There was no hearsay exception that would have permitted admission of Brisbon's out-of-court statements as substantive evidence against Wonson. Brisbon's statements implicating Wonson could not be introduced against Wonson as an admission because they were not made by or attributable to him, see Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 (D.C. 1988), nor were they admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest because they did not directly implicate the declarant, Brisbon. See Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 199-200 (D.C. 1979) (en banc) (adopting the principles set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)); Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (<HOLDING>). 27 . Only "in a certain, limited class of
Holding statements: (A) holding that nonself inculpatory statements are not statements against penal interest under fedrevid 804b3 (B) holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care (C) holding that statements in proof of loss are not conclusive claimant could explain statements (D) holding that only selfinculpatory aspects of hearsay statement but not other parts of statement are admissible under exception for statements against penal interest (E) holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay

Ex Output:
holding that statements made by a doctor to a patient are not admissible under fedrevid 8034 because the rule does not except statements by the person providing medical care