In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: until after the interview ended. Defendants therefore contend that we should ignore contrary testimony by Whalen and Connelly. On summary judgment, however, we do not merely accept the plaintiff's contentions as true. Instead, we must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmovanfs favor. There is no requirement that inferences favorable to the plaintiff may only be based on evidence that she has submitted to us. Here, the justifiable inference favorable to plaintiff is that a question of fact exists regarding this issue. 6 . The Supreme Court's plurality decision in Al-bright casts some doubt on whether a plaintiff may state a claim for coercion of a confession under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. See Albright,-U.S. at-,-,-, -, 114 S.Ct. at 813, 814, 817, 820-21 (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit has stated that Albright
Holding statements: (A) holding that false arrest supports a claim against state police under 1983 because it violates the fourth amendment (B) recognizing 1983 substantive due process claim (C) holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed (D) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment (E) holding in five separate opinions that 1983 claim based on persons arrest cannot be brought under substantive due process where more specific constitutional provision fourth amendment applies

A: (E)
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Q: the genus of goods or services for which it seeks protection. See 15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(2), (b)(2); 37 C.F.R. 2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP 1402.01; see also Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed.Cir.2014) ("Parties that choose to recite services in their trademark application that exceed their actual services will be held to the broader scope of the application."); Octocom Sys., 918 F.2d at 942 ("[R]egistrability of an applicant's mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the application.... "). The PTO will generally accept any identification of goods or services so long as it is "specific, definite, clear, accurate, and concise." TMEP 1402.01; see also In re Omega SA 494 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>) (quoting In re Water Gremlin Co., 635 F.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that relators failure to meet the particularity requirements of rule 9b did not bar his claim where the relator was a former employee of the defendants and lacked access to records and documents in the possession of the defendants that contained information necessary to plead with particularity (B) holding that the concerns that require fraud to be pleaded with particularity are even more urgent in a civil rico action (C) holding that plaintiff failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity but stating that party may be entitled to lenient application of rule 9b where information is in possession of corporate defendant (D) holding that it is within the discretion of the pto to require that ones goods be identified with particularity in a trademark application (E) holding that a rule 10b5 claim must be stated with particularity

A: (D)
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Q: a work-related injury, taking into account such factors as age, education, training, and mental capacity." Id. at 574; see also Norton v. Industrial Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (listing "age, sex, education, economic and social environment, ... [and] permanent impairment" as factors to be weighed (internal quotation marks omitted)). 120 The fact that an employee returned to work for some period of time following his industrial injury does not automatically preclude him from claiming permanent total disability benefits at a later date if he continues to suffer substantial pain throughout the period of his continued employment or if his industrial injury worsens to the point that he is no longer able to maintain regular employment. See Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027-28 (<HOLDING>). See generally Hoskings v. Industrial Comm'n,
Holding statements: (A) holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits (B) holding that an employee who returned to work for six years following his workrelated injury could nevertheless obtain permanent total disability benefits and observing that it may be years before the effect of an injury is felt (C) holding that workers compensation statutes do not prohibit claimant from receiving permanent partial disability benefits from prior accident concurrently with temporary total disability benefits from subsequent injury (D) holding that a totally disabled claimant whose preexisting osteoarthritis was temporarily aggravated by her employment was entitled to temporary total disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits because there was no causal connection between the temporary aggravation and the permanent disability (E) holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence

A:
(B)
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