In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: June 1993 was being denied. Katz asserts that he never received the letter and, therefore, until March 27, 1995, when he received the notice of the denial of coverage, Colonial had led him to believe that his policy covered registered nursing care provided at a general hospital. As the dispute as to whether Katz actually received the letter cannot be resolved at this juncture, I now consider whether, if he did not receive the letter, Colonial should be estopped from denying coverage for the October/November private nursing care. In order to prevail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Katz must show (1) a material representation, (2) reasonable reliance upon that representation, and (3) damage resulting from that representation. Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1009 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Katz asserts that Colonial's failure to
Holding statements: (A) recognizing difference between tolling and equitable estoppel (B) recognizing cause of action (C) holding that ejven if there were no express preemption under erisa 514a of the cause of action in that case it would be preempted because it conflicted directly with an erisa cause of action (D) recognizing the cause of action (E) recognizing cause of action for equitable estoppel under erisa
[A]: (E)

[Q]: 563 U.S. 421, 438, 131 S.Ct. 1866, 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011). Nonetheless, the District Court and the Plan have cited to the language in the Summary Plan Description ("SPD") as the language of the Plan. We, too, adopt this approach. See US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 133 S.Ct. 1537, 1543 n.1, 185 L.Ed.2d 654 (2013) ("Because everyone in this case has treated the language from the summary description as though it came from the plan, we do so as well."). Moreover, insofar as McLaughlin and J.J.M. now contend that the SPD was not "designated a plan document" and so cannot control here, McLaughlin Reply Br. 1, we deem this argument forfeited because it is raised solely in the reply brief. See Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>). 4 . We have considered McLaughlin's and
Holding statements: (A) holding an argument not raised in opening brief is waived (B) holding that a party waives an argument that it raises in the background section of its brief but not in the argument section (C) holding argument waived for failure to raise it in opening brief (D) holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived (E) holding that an argument is not preserved unless a party raises it in its opening brief
[A]: (E)

[Q]: opposing party access to the terms of the agreement between the paying party and the compensated witness. Many courts, including courts in this Circuit, have found that a compensated fact witness is competent to testify as long as the fact that payments were made to that witness is disclosed to the trier of fact. See Jamaica Time Petroleum, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 366 F.2d 156, 158 (10th Cir.1966) (finding that an agreement to pay a reward or "[t]he payment of the reward affects the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his testimony. These factors are not determinative of competence to testify."); Goldstein v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., No. 95 Civ. 2410, 1997 WL 580599, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1997); New York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 166 F.R.D. 284, 291 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>). In sum, the "newly discovered evidence" put
Holding statements: (A) holding that evidence that the defendant and a witness sold drugs together was relevant to prove how the witness knew the defendant (B) holding that the constitution does not require the government to disclose impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal defendant (C) holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness (D) recognizing that informing the jury that testifying witness has agreed to cooperate with the government is a doubleedged sword as the existence of such agreement may suggest either that the witness will testify in accordance with the governments wishes regardless of the truth or that the witness will not he under threat of revocation of the agreement should the witness commit perjury (E) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case
[A]:
(C)