In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: and began questioning the two men. The fact that the detectives in this ease requested that Peterkin answer questions apart from Durovic, and separated them by about ten feet, does not convert an otherwise voluntary encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The first moment at which Peterkin may have been seized was when Detective Lascik took Peterkin's identification back to the van to run a background cheek. By that time, however, Peterkin and Durovic had already given the detectives conflicting stories, including whether they knew each other. This inconsistency, together with the detectives' earlier observations of their unusual behavior, was enough to create reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458-59 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578
Holding statements: (A) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (B) holding that after receiving conflicting stories from a driver and passenger the officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the terry stop and conduct background checks on them both (C) holding that receiving conflicting stories from the driver and passenger of a stopped car about their travel gave the officer reasonable suspicion to extend the terry stop (D) holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver (E) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation

Output: holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous

Input: Consider Input: on the circuit court orders and the statements of defense counsel at the hearing. We hold that neither the doctors nor the trial court could rely on facts and legal conclusions within the circuit court orders. Thus, the doctors' assertions at the hearing, which were based on facts within the orders, constituted factual statements of counsel. Moreover, the orders were, in effect, memoranda submitted by counsel. In any event, the trial court could not properly consider factual statements from either when deciding the motions, however they are characterized. Cf. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 457 S.E.2d 601 (1995) (noting that the ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint); Gilmore, 290 S.C. 53, 348 S.E.2d 180 (<HOLDING>). This is not to say that circuit court orders
Holding statements: (A) holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment (B) holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment (C) holding that a trial court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that motion to dismiss cannot be treated as summary judgment (E) holding that conclusory statements without factual support are of no value to the court when deciding a summary judgment motion

Output: holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment

Input: Consider Input: for April Kurzke and her two sons, Brendan and Kyle Kurzke, until December 31, 1998. 2 The order entered included the following language: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall waive any potential statute of limitations defense under the laws of Germany with respect to plaintiffs' claims asserted in this action; and IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants shall consent to personal jurisdiction of the Courts of Germany with respect to plaintiffs' claims asserted in this action and shall not use the fact that they are entities incorporated and located in the United States as a legal objection to defendants being deposed in the German action. 3 E.g., Mercier v. Sheraton Int'l, 981 F.2d 1345, 1356 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 255 (1993) (<HOLDING>); Contact Lumber Co. v. P.T. Moges Shipping
Holding statements: (A) holding that a district court has discretion to grant a defendants forum non conveniens motion to transfer before disposing of any other threshold challenges (B) holding that the jones act does not preempt state law in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens and thus state law governs (C) holding that issue concerning forum non conveniens decision was not suitable for interlocutory appeal in part because a forum non conveniens decision is inherently factsensitive (D) holding that a district court may dismiss based on forum non conveniens without first addressing personal jurisdiction (E) holding that the unavailability absent compulsory process of a witness would result in serious injustice thus was a sufficient factor in granting the forum non conveniens motion
Output: holding that a district court has discretion to grant a defendants forum non conveniens motion to transfer before disposing of any other threshold challenges