In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: interests inferior to the unsecured creditors [and, t]hus there should be little difficulty with the absolute priority rule____"). Sweetwater does not dispute that general proposition, but argues that the insider claims in this case should be subordinated to it, and not receive or retain any property since Sweetwater's claim is not being paid in full. The Court disagrees. Several courts have expressed the opinion that the claim of an insider or equity holder may not be treated unequally unless the insider or equity holder used superior knowledge concerning the debtor's affairs in an unfair manner or equitable subordination principles otherwise apply. See e.g., In re ARN LTD. Ltd. P'ship, 140 B.R. 5, 13 (Bankr.D.D.C.1992), citing In re Ho-lywell Corp., 913 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Heritage Org., 375 B.R. at 301 (agreeing that
Holding statements: (A) holding that the mere fact that relevant evidence is shocking to the sensibilities does not make the admission of that evidence a violation of due process (B) holding that the mere fact that a claim is held by an equity security holder does not justify its subordination and insider claims may be equitably subordinated only based on evidence of unfair conduct (C) holding that direct evidence of a fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient but may also be more certain satisfying and persuasive (D) holding that an employer in an employment discrimination case may not justify its conduct based on evidence that did not motivate it at the time of the employment decision (E) recognizing that mere passage of time does not make evidence irrelevant as it will also depend on the nature of the evidence and its relation to what is to be proven

A: (B)
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Q: was indeed barred (or limited) under the mandatory Guidelines regime, see Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-95, 116 S.Ct. 2035, the alternative sentencing methodology employed by his sentencing court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. Nor did the court exclude or limit its consideration of any category of sentencing factors. To the contrary, the court extended Simpson an open-ended invitation to make mitigating arguments, regardless of whether they would have been available under the Guidelines scheme. See Sentencing Hr'g Tr. 25-26. And Simpson responded to that invitation by citing a series of factors in support of a sente 440 (D.C.Cir.1995). In later cases, we settled on a plain error standard of review for such claims. See United States v. Draffin, 286 F.3d 606, 609 (D.C.Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); In re Sealed Case, 204 F.3d 1170, 1173
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable (B) holding that failure to identify ground of admissibility limited appellate review to plain error (C) holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure (D) holding that the failure to grant a sentencing departure on an unrequested ground is reviewable only for plain error (E) holding that an error is plain only if it is clear under current law when there is no binding precedent on point an instruction typically will not be plain error

A: (D)
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Q: 1989); Tweedle v. State, 153 Tex.Crim. 200, 218 S.W.2d 846 (1949). But Humphreys was not convicted in a Texas court, and we think it sufficient answer to point out the obvious: Texas criminal procedure does not govern federal criminal trials in Iowa. BODA was required, under Tex.R.Disci-plinaey P. 8.02 (1992), to treat the record of conviction as "conclusive evidence" of Hum-phreys's guilt. Moreover, U.S. Const, art. 4, 1, and 28 U.S.C. 1738, require Texas to extend "full faith and credit" to the judgments of federal trial courts in other states just as Texas must to the decisions of other state courts. Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640, 645, 20 S.Ct. 506, 508, 44 L.Ed. 619 (1900); see generally Bard v. Charles R. Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>). While Texas will not extend full faith and
Holding statements: (A) holding this rule does not deny full faith and credit (B) holding that texas is required to extend full faith and credit to valid judgments from other states (C) holding that puerto rican judgments are entitled to full faith and credit (D) holding that a judgment of another states court is entitled to full faith and credit j when the judgment is considered final under the laws of the rendering state (E) holding that the full faith and credit clause does not require a state to apply another states law in violation of its own legitimate public policy

A:
(B)
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