In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *3-5 (D.Or. Dec. 13, 2010) (collecting cases); see also Nelson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 446 Fed.Appx. 158, 158 (11th Cir.2011) (similar). 93 . See, e.g., Wright v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, No. CV 11-00095-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 4101513, at *2 (D.Ariz. Sept. 14, 2011) (citing Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F.Supp.2d 925, 930 (N.D.Ill.2011)). 94 . Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5. 95 . Lucia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F.Supp.2d 1059, 1069 (N.D.Cal.2011) (citations omitted). 96 . Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.2011). 97 . Id. at 1040 (citations omitted). 98 . Id. 99 . Id. at 1039. 100 . Id. 101 . Id. (citation omitted). 102 . Dkt. 30 at 5-6; Dkt. 47 at 17-27. 103 . See In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392, 397-405 (D.Idaho 2009) (<HOLDING>); Saxon Mortg. Servs. v. Hillery, No. C-08-4357
Holding statements: (A) holding that creditors could not seek relief from a bankruptcy stay because they were not the real parties in interest and lacked standing as they were not holders of the notes and failed to establish that mers was the holder or had authority to transfer the notes (B) holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid (C) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because they failed to demonstrate any likelihood that they would end up back in jail where alleged constitutional violations occurred (D) holding that despite evidence of voluntary transfer of promissory notes and the plaintiffs possession thereof the plaintiff was not the holder of the note under the ucc as the notes were not drawn issued or indorsed to her to bearer or in blank the plaintiff testified to some of the circumstances under which she obtained possession of the notes but the trial court made no findings of fact with respect thereto (E) holding that mers was not the beneficiary of a deed of trust under the oregon trust deed act absent conveyance to mers of the beneficial right to repayment and that mers could not hold or transfer legal title to the deed as the lenders nominee
[A]: holding that the creditors had standing because the plan eliminated their interests in the borrower notes and deeds of trust and disposed of the assets in the estate from which they seek to be paid

[Q]: advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant subsequently gave a statement. Id. 476. The court held that the detective's statements at the jail cell did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 479-480. The court further determined that the defendant, by stating that he wanted to tell his side of the story, " 'initiated' further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word." Id. at 480. Similarly, in Bunch v Thompson, 949 F2d 1354, 1361 (CA 4, 1991), the court held that a defendant's statement was not the product of "police-initiated interrogation" where it followed an inquiry that "amounted to nothing more than an effort to ascertain if Bunch had changed his mind about wanting an attorney." See also McCall v State, 501 So 2d 496, 500 (Ala Crim App, 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v Acquin, 187 Conn 647, 669-670; 448
Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (B) holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (C) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (D) holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity (E) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation
[A]: holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime

[Q]: 2252A and that a conviction for both offenses based on the same conduct violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1374-75 (citations omitted). That said, the Eleventh Circuit found in Bobb that the defendant's convictions for both receipt and possession of child pornography did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his convictions were "based on two distinct offenses, occurring on two different dates, and proscribed by two different statutes." Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375; see also United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 697-98 (9th Cir.2009) (finding that conviction for receipt and possession of child pornography did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the convictions were based on separate conduct); United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 158-59 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Wendehake, No. 06-14040-CR,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar charging the defendant with both receipt and possession of child pornography where the defendant was charged with possessing a set of files that did not form the basis for a separate receipt count (B) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court (C) holding that appellants specific factual denial of receipt was sufficient evidence to defeat the presumption of receipt raised by a docket entry showing mailing (D) holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated (E) holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy
[A]:
holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court