In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: next argues that the standstill agreement initially executed on January 24, and repeatedly extended until March 26, tolled the running of the sixty-day cure period provided in the Distribution Agreement, and that because the parties entered into the initial standstill agreement four days before the end of the cure period, Innomed was entitled to four additional days to cure the breach beyond the expiration of the last standstill agreement on March 26, 2001. We agree with the district court, however, that the language of the standstill agreement unambiguously indicates that the parties agreed simply to postpone the date on which the termination would become effective, rather than to toll the running of the cure period. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 629 (2d Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations
Holding statements: (A) holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law (B) holding that where the language of the contract is unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning the court may decide the meaning of the contract as a matter of law (C) holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties (D) holding as a general rule of contract law if no other meaning is reasonable the court shall rule as a matter of law that the meaning is established (E) holding that where each side ascribes a different meaning to what the sides claim is the unambiguous language in a contract the contract is ambiguous and summary judgment is improper
[A]: holding that if the contract can be given a definite and certain meaning or interpretation the contract is not ambiguous and will be construed by the court as a matter of law

[Q]: Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word "claimant" in subsection four. Under the plurality's view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word "claimant" in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of "prevailing party." This is because, in order for the word "claimant" in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from
Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
[A]: holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence

[Q]: candidate for nomination shall file a petition for nomination.... The petition shall be sworn to before an officer authorized to administer an oath by the candidate and by not less than two (2) registered voters from the district or circuit from which he seeks nomination. Subsection (3) states in part: The petition for nomination shall be in the form prescribed by the State Board of Elections. The petition shall include a declaration sworn to by the equiring the voters to swear that they are registered voters in that circuit and interpret subsection (3) as requiring only the candidate to swear that he meets the requirements of the office. Additionally, we view subsection (2) as containing both mandatory and directory provisions. See Skaggs v. Fyffe, 266 Ky. 337, 98 S.W.2d 884 (1936) (<HOLDING>). We believe the legislature clearly intended
Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to follow mandatory provision of statute renders the act void whereas failure to follow directory provision does not (B) holding that a claimants failure to lose weight does not constitute a refusal to follow the treatment (C) holding that failure to follow gaap without more is insufficient to establish scienter (D) holding that the failure to follow rule 252b3a was jurisdictional (E) holding that a tortfeasor seeking contribution and indemnification is required to follow the 120day notice provision in the cda and not the 60day notice provision
[A]:
holding that a claimants failure to lose weight does not constitute a refusal to follow the treatment