In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
method (under 3663) in favor of an incorrect method (under 1593), the district court erred. Moreover, we hold that the district court's error was "plain," because the statutes are clear and because the government openly admitted that its proposed methodology derived from the wrong restitution statute. See United States v. Tuyet Thi-Bach Nguyen, 565 F.3d 668, 677 (9th Cir.2009) ("An error is plain when it is 'clear' or 'obvious' under the law."). Finally, we hold that the error affected Defendants' substantial rights and affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. The government did not present evidence and the district court did not make findings of the victims' actual losses, as required by 3663. See Bussell, 504 F.3d at 964 (<HOLDING>); United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 81 (2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that restitution is proper under 2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc 3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction (D) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses (E) holding that restitution in the full amount of each victims losses does not exceed the statutory maximum

Ex Output:
holding that restitution is proper under 2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses

Ex Input:
this suit ... was a necessary incident to the attorney's effort to establish [the defendants' claim]." Id. Unlike Bosurgi, however, the plaintiffs allegations provide no "basis for an inference" that CARCO conferred authority on Steele to receive service. Cf. Santos v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 902 F.2d 1092,1094 (2d Cir.1990) (noting that service on defendant State Farm's attorneys was improper where the plaintiff offered "no basis for an inference that State Farm had authorized its attorneys to accept service of process"). Accordingly, the court determines that the plaintiff has not shown that Steel was an agent of CARCO for service and that the plaintiffs service on CARCO was therefore deficient. United States v. Ziegler Bolt and Parts Co., Ill F.3d 878, 881 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); J. and L. Parking Corp. Inc. v. United
Holding statements: (A) holding that even where an attorney exercises broad powers to represent a client in litigation these powers of representation alone do not create a specific authority to receive service (B) recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 (C) recognizing separation of powers doctrine (D) holding that states grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client

Ex Output:
recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1

Ex Input:
the restitution at the rate of [$50.00] per month." However, despite Yamamoto's full compliance with these conditions, the sentencing court in 1992 revoked his probation on the grounds that Yamamoto had inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial condition of his probation, ie., had failed to pay the entire $118,000.00 in restitution during his five-year term of probation. In revoking Yamamoto's probation, the sentencing court in the instant case erroneously assumed that the order to pay $118,-000.00 in restitution was a condition of his probation. In actuality, the restitution order was an authorized free-standing sanction imposed in combination with Yamamoto's sentence of probation. See HRS 706-605(1)(d) (1993); State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 154, 890 P.2d 1167, 1194 (1995) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks, internal brackets,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative (B) holding that the suspension or revocation of a drivers license is not a sanction which once imposed precludes the application of criminal sanctions (C) recognizing that an order of restitution is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions (D) holding that where no discovery order was violated sanctions could not imposed pursuant to rule 37 but nevertheless upholding the sanction order under the courts inherent power (E) holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not

Ex Output:
recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative