In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

health, education, and family comfort are also acceptable. See Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So.2d 443 (1942); Read v. Leitner, 80 Fla. 574, 86 So. 425 (1920). However, a debtor's homestead was held to be abandoned when a debtor moved to New Hampshire and attempted to sell his property in Fort Myers, Florida. In re Goode, 146 B.R. 860 (Bankr.M.D.Fla. 1992). In Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), 183 B.R. 968 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1995), the Bankruptcy Court held that Chapter 7 debtor's property did not qualify for homestead exemption since, in placing property on the market for sale or lease, debtor abandoned his intent to use and occupy property as permanent place of residence. Teasdale v. Frederick (In re Frederick), supra. But cf., In re Herr, 197 B.R. 939 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1996) (<HOLDING>); In re Crump, 2 B.R. 222 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1980)
Holding statements: (A) holding that no abandonment of property as homestead was shown merely because after house located on property was destroyed in hurricane debtor had quit premises allowed property to become overgrown with weeds and posted a for sale sign (B) holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead (C) holding chapter 13 plan funded by sale of property was not feasible where the debtor had not stated the time period or terms of the sale and no provision was made for failure to sell the property (D) holding that the property held by the revocable trust in which the trustee was the beneficiary and the property was his permanent residence was a constitutionally protected homestead property (E) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate
holding that regardless of whether the property was held as tenants in common or by the entirety the husband was entitled to hold property as a homestead

the future because she continues to own and operate Helping Hands and intends to remain in the childcare services profession. Docket No. 17 at 112. She posits no other basis for establishing her standing to seek prospective relief against the Secretary. Docket No. 26 at 6-9. Her status as the owner and operator of a child-care facility does not provide her with standing to seek the declaratory and injunctive relief that she seeks. Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 933-934 (8th Cir.2005) (recognizing that an attorney's status as a member of the bar does not afford him or her standing to prospectively attack the implementation of the professional disciplinary procedures applicable to attorneys practicing in a particular jurisdiction); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 400, n. 5 (3d Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>). Burns does not allege that she has been
Holding statements: (A) holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness (B) holding that plaintiff must on his or her own initiative prove that the product reached him or her without substantial change (C) holding that for a legal malpractice claim to accrue a plaintiff need not know the precise extent of his or her damages or even have suffered all of the damages attributable to his or her attorneys negligence (D) holding that a prisoner cannot establish his or her standing to prospectively challenge the validity of a facilitys disciplinary procedures simply by referring to his or her status as an individual incarcerated in that facility (E) holding that an expert can comply with the timing requirement if an experts research even after his or her deposition revealed that the standard of care in his or her community was the same or similar to the standard of care in the community in which he or she is testifying when the injury occurred
holding that counsel cannot raise his or her own ineffectiveness

to the Knoedlers' claims. In fact, despite a review of the record, this Court is unable to find any further reference to the Blinco counterclaim subsequent to the Knoedlers' answer. The trial court's summary-judgment orders left pending the Blincos' counterclaim, and there is no Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., certification that the judgments are final. Consequently, the summary-judgment orders are nonfinal judgments, which will not support an appeal. See Bon Harbor, LLC v. United Bank, supra (dismissing appeal on grounds that trial court's summary-judgment order, which left pending defendants' counterclaims, was, at best, an order entering a partial summary judgment and not a "final, ap-pealable judgment"); Hill v. Huntsville West Ltd. Partnership, 847 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). APPEAL DISMISSED. COBB, C.J., and WOODALL,
Holding statements: (A) holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal (D) holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment (E) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment
holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees