TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: marks and citations omitted). {12} We are unconvinced that application of Texas law to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate would violate any fundamental principle, or public policy of New Mexico, nor are we convinced that the outcome of this determination would differ, depending upon whether we applied the law of Texas or New Mexico. Under Texas law, any doubts about whether there is an agreement to arbitrate must be resolved in favor of arbitration. See Dell, Inc. v. Muniz, 163 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Tex.App.2005); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Tex.App.2003). It is not clear that New Mexico has applied the same presumption to this initial determination of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. See DeArmond, 2003-NMCA-148, 8, 134 N.M. 630, 81 P.3d 573 (<HOLDING>). {13} Even though the presumption in favor of
Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration (C) recognizing that a legally enforceable contract is still a prerequisite for arbitration and characterizing the holding in first options of chicago inc v kaplan 514 us 938 94445 115 sct 1920 131 led2d 985 1995 as stating that the presumption in favor of arbitration is reversed when there is a dispute as to the existence of an agreement (D) recognizing that in reviewing ruling on motion to compel arbitration we first determine whether party seeking arbitration established existence of arbitration agreement (E) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added

SOLUTION: holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement

PROBLEM: of not more than 15 years, and it similarly concluded as follows: If a sentence under this paragraph provides for imprisonment, the sentence shall include a special parole term of not less than three years in addition to such term of imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1). The language of 841(b)(1)(A) and 960(b)(1) thus squarely contradicts Walberg's contention, for each stated that the special parole term shall be a minimum of a certain number of "years in addition to [the] term of imprisonment." Accord United States v. Mack, 509 F.2d 615, 616 (9th Cir.1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct. 1578, 43 L.Ed.2d 783 (1975); Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir.1975). Cf. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 388, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (<HOLDING>). The legislative history of the Act and the
Holding statements: (A) holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc 848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc 848c (B) holding that no special parole term was authorized for a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 usc 846 which mentioned only fine and imprisonment and not special parole and emphazing the in addition to language of 21 usc 841b1b (C) holding that in order for a trial court to determine which of the three graduated penalty subsections of 21 usc 841b applies to defendants convicted of a 846 drug conspiracy the jury must be instructed to determine the threshold quantity of drugs attributable to each conspiracy defendant on trial (D) holding that the elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 usc 846 do include an overt act requirement (E) holding lopez was inapplicable to the language prior conviction for a felony drug offense in 21 usc 841b1a because felony drug offense was defined in 21 usc 80244 as an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the united states or of a state

SOLUTION: holding conviction for cce murder 21 usc 848e1 is a separate offense from a cce 21 usc 848c

PROBLEM: (9th Cir.1954) (concluding that expert opinions did not support jury verdict, in part because "[o]pinion evidence is only as good as the facts upon which it is based" and record did not support opinions). Here, for the reasons stated, the record demonstrates that the officers' percep tion of an immediate threat whether correct or not was clearly reasonable and therefore that their initial use of deadly force was justified. 9 . The situation Appellants faced here having to determine in a split-second whether a suspect is using his vehicle as a weapon is analogous to the scenario of an officer forced to make a split-second decision as to whether to use deadly force against a suspect who he believes has a firearm. See, e.g., McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215-17 (4th
Holding statements: (A) holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something (B) holding officer may search vehicle for weapons if officer has reasonable belief based on articulable facts that officer or another may be in danger (C) holding that an officer may use deadly force when a fleeing suspect threatens the officer with a weapon (D) holding that use of deadly force was justified against a suspect when officer forced to make a splitsecond decision relied on his reasonable belief that another officer had seen a gun in the suspects hands even though the suspects hands were handcuffed in front of him and the defendant officer never saw a weapon (E) holding that suspect was not in custody when officer handcuffed him for officer safety while transporting him to police station

SOLUTION:
holding that use of deadly force was justified when suspect in vehicle repeatedly refused orders to raise his hands and the officer perceived that he was holding something