In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: or "plain error" exists. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987); State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). In the present case, or in any similar case, the only way that a defendant could challenge the constitutionality of section 78 331(6)(a) would be first to consent to a hearing by a commissioner and then to challenge the validity of that very consent. Such a procedure would likely be futile inasmuch as it would invariably result in the withdrawal of the consent, either by the defendant or by court order. Indeed, absent the approach taken by Ohms, it is unlikely that section 78-3-31(6)(a) would ever be subject to constitutional scrutiny. This is precisely the sort of exceptional circu Ct.App.1990) (<HOLDING>). For example, a legislator cannot appoint
Holding statements: (A) holding that utah const art vi 1 limits legislatures ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others (B) holding that the governor of new york has only those powers delegated to him by the state constitution and the statutes (C) holding that the contact clause reaches every form in which the legislative power of a state is exerted whether it be a constitution a constitutional amendment an enactment of the legislature a bylaw or ordinance of a municipal corporation or a regulation or order of some other instrumentality of the state exercising delegated legislative authority (D) holding that crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the utah legislature to any other person or body (E) holding that legislative functions such as powers of zoning and rezoning cannot be delegated

A: (D)
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Q: on the basis of an otherwise constitutional statutory aggravator. 32 Even if we assume Graham supplies the proper analysis for challenging an aggravator, such a challenge fails here. Under Graham, a court "considers 'objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice' to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue." 130 S.Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)). In the past decade, the Supreme Court has used this approach in three death penalty eases. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 171 L.Ed.2d 525 (2008) (concluding the death penalty cannot be imposed for rape); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (<HOLDING>); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122
Holding statements: (A) holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime (B) holding that the execution of individuals who were under 18 years of age at the time they committed capital crimes violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution (C) recognizing that within the world community the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved (D) holding that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates eighth amendment (E) holding the eighth and fourteenth amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed

A: (E)
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Q: Howard's due process claims lack merit. In the first instance, Howard admitted the prohibited conduct. Secondly, an "inmate does not have a constitutional right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testify against him, although prison officials have the discretion to grant that right in appropriate cases." Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). We note that any defenses Appellant may have had to his conviction, including a sustainable Johnson claim, could have been raised and reviewed pursuant to the internal prison grievance process. Accordingly, we reject Appellant's contention that he was convicted without due process of law. See Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 373, 527 S.E.2d at 752 (<HOLDING>). IV. Conclusion Because the plain language of
Holding statements: (A) holding that in reciprocal discipline cases disciplinary procedures in the other state must meet minnesotas due process requirements (B) holding that the fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process (C) holding that the conditions delineated in canon 3c1a alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the due process clause (D) holding that scdcs disciplinary and grievance procedures are consistent with constitutional standards delineated in wolff v mcdonnell 418 us 539 94 sct 2963 41 led2d 935 1974 which established the minimum constitutional requirements for procedural due process when an inmate is disciplined for serious misconduct (E) holding that an inmate stated a claim under the due process clause when guards had placed her in a cell with a dangerous inmate

A:
(D)
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