Even after Bin Laden's departure from the area, CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was still set up. The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity. On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and Bin Laden. Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA. When the former Bin Laden unit chief found out about Clarke's call, he questioned CIA officials, who denied having given such a clearance. Imagery confirmed that less than a week after Clarke's phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site was deserted. CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt, were irate." Mike" thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possible site for targeting Bin Laden. The United Arab Emirates was becoming both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem. From 1999 through early 2001, the United States, and President Clinton personally, pressed the UAE, one of the Taliban's only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and enforce sanctions, especially those relating to flights to and from Afghanistan. These efforts achieved little before 9/11. In July 1999, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid threatened to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Laden. The Taliban did not take him seriously, however. Bin Zayid later told an American diplomat that the UAE valued its relations with the Taliban because the Afghan radicals offered a counterbalance to "Iranian dangers" in the region, but he also noted that the UAE did not want to upset the United States.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer: Why were CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt angry?

Powell contended that it was not inconsistent to want to foster cooperation even with an organization like the Indonesian military, which has a history of human rights abuses. "If you get young officers, expose them to a military organization that is within a democratic political institution, such as the United States, then that rubs off on them," he said. In Malaysia, Powell met with Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who has led the country since 1981. The Malaysian foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, later told local reporters that Powell had proposed that American and Malaysian officials review the idea of forming a regional training center in Malaysia to coordinate antiterrorism activities. His brief stop in Malaysia also highlighted the moral ambiguities of the effort to prevent terrorism and its emphasis on cooperation with governments that the United States has often criticized. The United States once distanced itself from Mahathir for strong-arm tactics with political rivals, and human rights groups criticize him for arresting and jailing scores of suspected militants, including some who may be linked to al-Qaida, without trial. Powell said his discussions with Mahathir "touched on the case" of his former deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, who is serving a 15-year sentence on charges of sodomy and abuse of power after trials that Powell said the United States had "always felt" were flawed. The assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, James Kelly, met on Tuesday morning with Anwar's wife, Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, for what she later told Malaysian reporters was a discussion about both the detention of her husband and six supporters, and the campaign against terrorism.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer: How is Colin Powell's approach to relations with the Indonesian military different than the US previous approach?

Befitting a lush, tropical island stranded in the middle of the ocean, Madeira's origins are shrouded in mystery and fanciful legend. Some claim that the archipelago is what remains of Plato's lost Atlantis, or part of a landmass that once fused the continents of Europe and America. The Portuguese Step Ashore: Recorded history of the volcanic archipelago begins in relatively recent times: 1418, just as the golden age of Portuguese discovery was erupting. Under the leadership of Henry the Navigator, caravels set out from the westernmost point of the Algarve, in southern Portugal, in search of foreign lands, fame, and wealth. Joao Goncalves Zarco, sailing in the service of Prince Henry, made the first of many famous Portuguese discoveries, which would culminate a century later in Magellan's historic circumnavigation of the globe. Zarco happened upon a small volcanic archipelago 1,000 km from Lisbon. Perhaps Zarco knew precisely where he was heading, having learned of the existence of Madeira from a Castilian source. After all, the waters of the Canary Islands, only 445 km (275 miles) to the south, had occupied busy shipping lanes for very nearly a century, and Genovese maps from the mid-14th century depict both Madeira and Porto Santo. More likely, Zarco was heading for Guinea and storms forced him onto the beach of Porto Santo. If so, then he was extremely fortunate, for he managed to land on the only large, sandy beach for hundreds of miles around. Little wonder he subsequently named it Porto Santo (Holy Port). The following year Zarco returned to claim the larger island he had seen from Porto Santo, and with him went Tristao Vaz Teixeira and Bartolomeu Perestrelo. They officially became the first men to set foot on the heavily forested island, naming it Ilha da Madeira, "Island of Timber. " The Portuguese Crown, delighted with its first important discovery, immediately embarked on a program of colonization. Zarco and Teixeira were appointed co-governors of Madeira, while Perestrelo was awarded Porto Santo.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer: What was the name of the small volcanic archipelago that Zarco happened upon?

While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued.
What question would one ask from this paragraph?
Answer:
What were two reasons the Secret Service, the CIA and counterterrorism officials advised President Clinton not to visit Pakistan?