In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: a threat to water quality because they do not introduce any invasive species from outside the Great Lakes. EPA has properly rejected this argument, noting that Lakers can spread or more rapidly distribute invasive species already present, in the Great Lakes. Id. at 501. 16 . Federal regulation permits such limits to be expressed narratively if the calculation of numeric limits is "infeasible." 40 C.F.R. 122.44(k)(3). 17 . EPA also claims general prohibitions can be BMPs, citing 40 C.F.R. 122.2, but does not offer an example of something as general as the WQBEL standard being found to be a BMP. As discussed herein, the EPA's charac-terizationis inconsistent with regulations that require WQBELs to "ensure compliance." 40 C.F.R. 122.4(d); see Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, 117 S.Ct. 905 (<HOLDING>). 18 . EPA's response is that petitioners'
Holding statements: (A) holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation (B) holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation (C) holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (D) holding that a secretarys interpretation of a departments regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation (E) holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
[A]: holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation

[Q]: 7, and 10), plaintiffs response thereto, and the reply brief of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center, Nora Marden, and Joan K. Richards, and for the reasons stated in the accompa nying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED; 2. Count I is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 3. The Court having declined to exercise its jurisdiction as to the remaining Counts of the complaint, they are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their reassertion in state court; 4. The petition of defendant James E. Clark to join in the motion of defendants Crozer-Chester Medical Center and Joan K. Richards to dismiss the complaint (docket entry #9) is GRANTED AS UNOPPOSED; 5. The petition of defendant Nora 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (<HOLDING>). 5 . Even absent Dr. Klavan's concession on
Holding statements: (A) holding that amtrak was a state actor (B) holding that a privately owned nursing home that received ninety percent of its funding from the state and was subject to significant state regulation was nevertheless not a state actor (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that such a physician was a state actor under 1983 (E) holding that a school was not a state actor even though it had to comply with many state regulations to be eligible for state funding and almost all of its students had been referred to it by the state
[A]: holding that amtrak was a state actor

[Q]: 110, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061. The Supreme Court contrasted discrete acts of discrimination with hostile work environment claims, for which the continuing violation doctrine remained available, because hostile work environment claims by "[t]heir very nature involve[] repeated conduct," and further explained that "a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own." Id. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Although Morgan discussed the continuing violation doctrine in the context of Title VII, many courts have held that an alleged failure to provide a requested accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA is also a "discrete act" under Morgan and thus cannot rest on a continuing violation theory to make it timely. See, e.g., Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1246-47 (9th Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); Szedlock v. Tenet, 61 Fed.Appx. 88, 93 (4th
Holding statements: (A) holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act (B) holding that denials of hearingimpaired employees multiple requests for accommodations under the rehabilitation act were each discrete acts of discrimination under morgan (C) holding rehabilitation act applicable (D) holding that denial of request for accommodation of religion is a discrete act under morgan (E) holding that denial of employees request for respirators under the rehabilitation act was a discrete act of discrimination under morgan
[A]:
holding that the same standards apply to claims under the ada and under the rehabilitation act