In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: rejected'this argument, holding that the allegations, even if true, did not amount to an -IDEA procedural violation. See 20 U.S.C. 1415 et seq. (setting forth the procedural safeguards afforded to parents when their child is in special education). 13 . It is worth noting that at least one state Massachusetts, as the IDEA permits, has enacted a more stringent standard. Specifically, children in Massachusetts who are eligible for special education services are entitled to IEPs that provide for their "maximum possible development.'' See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B 2 (emphasis added); Frank S. v. School Committee of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District, 26 F.Supp.2d 219, 226 (D.Mass.1998). 14 . See Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County, 118 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task (B) holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors (C) holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied (D) holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity (E) holding that it was pure speculation that if the preference payment had not been made the vendor would have been included as a critical vendor and the court would have approved it
[A]: holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors

[Q]: partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court's order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants' arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
[A]: holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied

[Q]: Order, he also refused to withdraw them after being notified by defendant that they were protected. PG & E Violation Opinion, 79 Fed.Cl. at 746. It therefore appears that counsel for PG & E intentionally and voluntarily performed an act which he should have known to be contrary to the court's Order Amending Protective Order. As in Aloe Vera, Eagle Comtronics, and Lion Raisins, regardless of plaintiffs counsel's subjective intentions or beliefs, he violated a clear and unambiguous court order. See Aloe Vera, 376 F.3d at 966; Eagle Comtron-ics, 305 F.3d at 1313-14; Lion Raisins, 64 Fed.Cl. at 544. Because plaintiffs counsel undisputably acted in violation of a clear and unambiguous court order when he used thirty-five doc man v. American Red Cross, 979 F.2d 1135, 1141 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). See Def.'s Br. 3. However, as plaintiffs
Holding statements: (A) recognizing relevance of information and that need for this information outweighs the burden to appellants (B) holding that the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a violation of the fcra based on extraneous information where it was alleged that the document included broad language regarding disclosure of the information the accuracy of the information the consequences of providing a false statement and the effect of a photocopy (C) holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause (D) holding that certain information on police blotter show up and arrest sheets and front page of offense report are public information (E) holding that coleman could use certain information to bring a new and separate suit even though that information was discovered subsequent to a violation of the courts protective order
[A]:
recognizing relevance of information and that need for this information outweighs the burden to appellants