In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 2009 SD 99, 33, 775 N.W.2d 221, 235 (2009) ("The community caretaker exception has been recognized only in the context of automobiles by the United States Supreme Court." (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973))); Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151-52 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (describing Cady as recognizing "a community caretaking function of law enforcement as a reasonable exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement" and acknowledging "the existence of the community caretaking function in Texas"); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 363-65 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (upholding a "seizure" as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on the community caretaking doctrine); State v. Ford, 2010 VT 39, 11, 188 Vt. 17, 998 A.2d 684, 689 (2010) (<HOLDING>); Knight v. Commonwealth, 61 Va.App. 297, 734
Holding statements: (A) recognizing emergency exception (B) recognizing exception (C) recognizing the community caretaking exception but holding it inapplicable to justify the police action at issue (D) recognizing that the community caretaking exception is distinct from the emergency aid or emergency assistance exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement (E) holding that community caretaker exception applied but citing and relying on cases discussing the emergency aid exception

A: recognizing emergency exception
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Q: clause could be vitiated based on evidence of fraud "relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause." 228 Mich.App. 486, 498, 579 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1998). The plaintiffs have not alleged fraud in the merger clause itself. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants fraudulently induced them to buy investment properties in Detroit. The plaintiffs' allegations of fraud in the inducement do not save their breach of contract claim because the remedy for fraud in the inducement is to void the contract, not reform it. See UAW-GM, 228 Mich.App. at 508, 579 N.W.2d at 418 ("Fraud ... makes a contract voidable at the instance of the innocent party.") (quoting 3 Corbin, Contracts, 580, p. 431); Star Ins. Co., 392 F.Supp.2d at 929 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs' argument conflates their tort
Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable (B) holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law (C) holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insureds fraudulent inducement claim (D) holding that making of agreement to arbitrate was not called into question by general allegation that entire contract was void because of fraudulent inducement (E) holding that fraudulent inducement renders a contract void or voidable

A: holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable
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Q: recognizes that the rights of unborn children are protected from third-party actors, criminalizing murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and assault against an unborn child. Geiser, at 17; see also N.D.C.C. 12.1-17.1-02 to 12.1-17.1-06. Under N.D.C.C. ch. 12.1-17.1, the legislature defined unborn child as, " 'the conceived but not yet born offspring of a human being, which, but for the action of the actor would beyond a reasonable doubt have subsequently been born alive.' " Geiser, at 17 (quoting N.D.C.C. 12.1-17.1-01(3)). Therefore, as stated in Geiser, "[t]his makes it clear that when the Legislature wants to cover unborn children, it does so expressly" and, if the legislature "intended N.D.C.C. 19-03.1-22.2(l)(b) to include unborn (2005) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280
Holding statements: (A) holding that the definition of person in the hawaii manslaughter statute did not include a fetus and thus did not apply when a woman caused the death of her fetus by smoking crystal methamphetamine (B) holding that fetus was not a human being for purposes of attempted firstdegree intentional homicide and firstdegree reckless injury statutes (C) holding for purposes of establishing the offense of reckless manslaughter against a pregnant woman a fetus is not a person (D) holding a fetus is not a child person or individual for purposes of criminal prosecution under the reckless injury to a child statute (E) holding that a woman possessed immunity from criminal prosecution for causing injury or death to her fetus

A:
holding that the definition of person in the hawaii manslaughter statute did not include a fetus and thus did not apply when a woman caused the death of her fetus by smoking crystal methamphetamine
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