In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

In my judgment, it is extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power. See Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. Appx. 697, 702-703 (1864) (opinion of Taney, C. J.); United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48 (1852). It may well follow that the misguided opinion of today's majority has nothing more than an advisory character. Whether or not that be so, the better rea soning in Justice Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly opinion will surely be the law one day. For these reasons, as well as those set forth in Justice Souter's opinion, I respectfully dissent. 1 See, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1 (1989) (<HOLDING>); In re Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F. 3d 630
Holding statements: (A) holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a 106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution (B) holding that a federal court may order a state to pay cleanup costs pursuant to the comprehensive environmental response compensation and liability act of 1980 (C) holding that response costs can be necessary even though the agency that required cleanup never approved the response actions taken (D) holding that bankruptcy court may enjoin state environmental reclamation order (E) holding that debtor was liable to the commonwealth for past and future cleanup costs
holding that an action by plaintiffs who had a legal obligation to conduct cleanup pursuant to a 106 order and then sought costs for cleanup from other prps was the quintessential action for contribution

not contest Alaimalo's actual innocence. B. Prior Opportunities to Raise Actual Innocence Claim We turn to the question of whether Alaimalo's actual innocence claim was unavailable to him during his direct appeal and his first 2255 motion. In making this determination, we consider "(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner's claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petitioner's claim after that first 2255 motion." Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). An intervening court decision must "effect a material change in the applicable law" to establish unavailability. Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. See also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 607, 610 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the supreme courts decision in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 effected a material change in the law because the circuit previously held that accessability of a firearm was enough to support an inference that a firearm was used in a drug crime whereas bailey required active employment of the firearm (B) holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used (C) holding that the supreme courts interpretation of 18 usc 924c1 in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 has retroactive application to cases on collateral review (D) holding that the rule announced in bailey v united states 516 us 137 116 sct 501 133 led2d 472 1995 applies retroactively on collateral review (E) holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used

S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, which is a named defendant in this action. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to Mr. Sprouse in this opinion. 4 .Ms. Bagwell, who is not a lawyer, also testified that she thought that the original five-year lease was on "a year[-]to[-]year basis." 5 . Mr. Sprouse did not take issue with the $534 award for the damage to Mr. Ellis's corn crop. 6 . See also 2 Friedman on Leases 14.301, at 915 (noting that payment of increased rent under an option constitutes an acceptance of the option). 7 . Painter v. Town of Groveland, 79 So.2d 765, 767 (Fla.1955) (finding such a presumption contrary to statute); Branagen v. Winders & Alm, 194 Iowa 461, 187 N.W. 440, 440-41 (Iowa 1922); Schiltz v. Teledirect Int'l, Inc., 524 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Iowa Ct.App.1994) (<HOLDING>); Elec. Sales Eng'rs, Inc. v. Urban Renewal &
Holding statements: (A) holding there was no renewal but finding estoppel on the part of the landlord (B) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (C) holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record (D) recognizing the abuse of discretion standard and the requirement of evidentiary support for a finding of estoppel (E) holding that estoppel was a question of fact
holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record