Input: Boone, Ia. -Poor and elderly people may soon go without legal representation in Boone County. Boone County Legal Aid, which for 31 years has provided legal services to those who couldn't afford them, will close in February if a $10,000 grant from Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino is not awarded. The legal service is one of the few programs in Iowa that offers legal representation to those who qualify without turning to the state for its services. "It is a very sad situation, but that's the fact," said Alan Schroeder, city attorney and supervisor of Boone County Legal Aid. For the past two years using money mostly from the city and county, Schroeder has upheld the outfit alone, taking on about 60 clients a year, and settling cases that range from domestic abuse to bankruptcy. He also has a private practice. If the legal service closes, he's unsure where his clients will go. The city of Boone gave Schroeder $6,300 in July to resolve pending cases, said Kathy Berg, Boone's finance officer. Without that, the program might already be closed. "All governments are having problems with finances," Boone Mayor George Maybee said. "No one else stepped in. The county didn't. The state didn't." Donovan Olson, chairman of the county Board of Supervisors, said the board quit funding the legal service in July because it felt the county didn't need it. Drake University ended its funding after the 2000 spring semester "for a variety of reasons," Suzanne Levitt, the law professor who oversaw the program, said via e-mail. Olson said Schroeder must prove Prairie Meadows is the primary money source for the board to grant the program any more money. Schroeder ran the program without the help of law students or Drake, which had provided as much as two-thirds of the money in some years.
"Who has or will be cutting funding to Boone County Legal Aid?" is "Prairie Meadows"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output: no

Input: Bin Laden reportedly discussed the planes operation with KSM and Atef in a series of meetings in the spring of 1999 at the al Matar complex near Kandahar. KSM's original concept of using one of the hijacked planes to make a media statement was scrapped, but Bin Laden considered the basic idea feasible. Bin Laden, Atef, and KSM developed an initial list of targets. These included the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center. According to KSM, Bin Laden wanted to destroy the White House and the Pentagon, KSM wanted to strike the World Trade Center, and all of them wanted to hit the Capitol. No one else was involved in the initial selection of targets. Bin Laden also soon selected four individuals to serve as suicide operatives: Khalid al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Khallad, and Abu Bara al Yemeni. During the al Matar meetings, Bin Laden told KSM that Mihdhar and Hazmi were so eager to participate in an operation against the United States that they had already obtained U.S. visas. KSM states that they had done so on their own after the suicide of their friend Azzam (Nashiri's cousin) in carrying out the Nairobi bombing. KSM had not met them. His only guidance from Bin Laden was that the two should eventually go to the United States for pilot training. Hazmi and Mihdhar were Saudi nationals, born in Mecca. Like the others in this initial group of selectees, they were already experienced mujahideen. They had traveled together to fight in Bosnia in a group that journeyed to the Balkans in 1995. By the time Hazmi and Mihdhar were assigned to the planes operation in early 1999, they had visited Afghanistan on several occasions. Khallad was another veteran mujahid, like much of his family. His father had been expelled from Yemen because of his extremist views. Khallad had grown up in Saudi Arabia, where his father knew Bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and Omar Abdel Rahman (the "Blind Sheikh").

Does the response "Atef" correctly answer the question "Who else did Bin Laden and KSM discuss hijacking planes with to make a media statement?"?

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- no
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Output: yes

Problem: The second major point on which the principals had agreed on March 10 was the need to crack down on terrorist organizations and curtail their fund-raising. The embassy bombings of 1998 had focused attention on al Qaeda's finances. One result had been the creation of an NSC-led interagency committee on terrorist financing. On its recommendation, the President had designated Bin Laden and al Qaeda as subject to sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This gave theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) the ability to search for and freeze any Bin Laden or al Qaeda assets that reached the U.S. financial system. But since OFAC had little information to go on, few funds were frozen. In July 1999, the President applied the same designation to the Taliban for harboring Bin Laden. Here, OFAC had more success. It blocked more than $34 million in Taliban assets held in U.S. banks. Another $215 million in gold and $2 million in demand deposits, all belonging to the Afghan central bank and held by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, were also frozen. After October 1999, when the State Department formally designated al Qaeda a "foreign terrorist organization," it became the duty of U.S. banks to block its transactions and seize its funds. Neither this designation nor UN sanctions had much additional practical effect; the sanctions were easily circumvented, and there were no multilateral mechanisms to ensure that other countries' financial systems were not used as conduits for terrorist funding. Attacking the funds of an institution, even the Taliban, was easier than finding and seizing the funds of a clandestine worldwide organization like al Qaeda. Although the CIA's Bin Laden unit had originally been inspired by the idea of studying terrorist financial links, few personnel assigned to it had any experience in financial investigations. Any terrorist-financing intelligence appeared to have been collected collaterally, as a consequence of gathering other intelligence. This attitude may have stemmed in large part from the chief of this unit, who did not believe that simply following the money from point A to point B revealed much about the terrorists' plans and intentions. As a result, the CIA placed little emphasis on terrorist financing. Nevertheless, the CIA obtained a general understanding of how al Qaeda raised money.

Question: "What are the main United States offices and committees involved in the following of terrorist funds include Qaeda and Taliban in the late 1990's?"

Answer: "Drug"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer:
no