In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

with "complete and final discretionary authority to interpret the plans and maintain control over the operation and administration of the plans." Accordingly, the Chevron Plan, via the Services Agreement and the SPD, delegates authority to Aetna regarding benefit eligibility for the Medical Plan. Moreover, in this situation, Aetna made a factual determination that certain diagnostic testing and IVIG treatments were not medically necessary. "[F]actual determinations made by [an] administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion." Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir.1999); see also Chandler v. Hartford Life, No. 05-50688, 2006 WL 1209363, at *3 (5th Cir. Apr.28, 2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp., 168 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the admission or exclusion of evidence is within discretion of the trial court and that such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion (B) holding that a denial of benefits will not be reviewed de novo where the language of an erisa plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (C) holding that arbitrary and capricious standard applies to section 1132a1b denial ofbenefits claims if the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan (D) holding that rulings on admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion (E) holding that rjegardless of the administrators ultimate authority to determine benefit eligibility factual determinations made by the administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion
(E)

those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant's prior conviction's probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court's
Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap (C) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand (D) holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a (E) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote
(B)

be filed within three years of the time the petitioner's direct appeal is ruled upon. Miss.Code Ann. 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015). Here, Lyles's direct appeal of this conviction was affirmed by this Court on May 19, 2009. See Lyles v. State, 12 So.3d 552, 555 ( 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2009). He filed his PCR motion in February 2013, over three years later. Thus, his PCR motion is time-barred. 12. Certain statutory exceptions could waive the procedural bar, such as an intervening Mississippi Supreme Court decision like Gowdy, if it applied. See Miss.Code Ann. 99-39-5(2)(a)(i). However, Gowdy does not apply, because, as the State points out, it cannot be applied retroactively to cases that were final before April 7, 2011, the date Gowdy's mandate was issued. See Carr, 178 So.3d at 321 ( 6) (<HOLDING>). This Court affirmed Lyles's conviction on May
Holding statements: (A) holding miranda decision does not apply retroactively (B) holding that because apprendi does not apply retroactively neither does blakely (C) holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively (D) holding gowdy does not apply retroactively to habitualoffender convictions that were final when gowdy was issued (E) holding that 523a13 does not apply retroactively
(D)