In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: a "public official," places a great emphasis on two of the elements: (1) the statutory powers and duties of a position, and (2) whether that position exercised sovereign power. See, e.g., Spaulding, 102 Iowa at 649, 72 N.W. at 291 (concluding that the treasurer of the commissioners of pharmacy was not a public officer because the position of treasurer "was a creation of the commission ... and at all times subject absolutely to their control"); McKinley, 228 Iowa at 1189-91, 293 N.W. at 451 (concluding that county engineer was an "official" because he furnished a bond and took an oath of office; but more importantly because several statutes defining the powers and duties of the county engineer delegated certain sovereign powers to that position); Whitney, 232 Iowa at 71, 4 N.W.2d at 398 (<HOLDING>); Hutton, 235 Iowa at 56, 16 N.W.2d at 20
Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that a teachers complaint to school authorities that her principal had instructed her to make improper changes in her own students grades was unprotected because it was made pursuant to her official duties (C) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was an employee not an official and therefore entitled to benefits under the workers compensation act (D) holding that a schoolteacher elected by the school board was not an official because she was not required to give bond or take an oath none of the statutes impose upon her the exercise of discretion in any way they delegate no sovereign power to her (E) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment
[A]: holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment

[Q]: of other courts have concluded, outside the RICO and Clayton Act context, that "by reason of" should be read to require only "but for" rather than proximate causation. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009) ("The words 'because of' mean 'by reason of: on account of.' Thus, the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action 'because of age is that age was the 'reason' that the employer decided to act. To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); Robinson Knife Mfg. Co. v. C.I.R., 600 F.3d 121, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>); Spirtas Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 555 F.3d 647,
Holding statements: (A) holding that in 26 cfr 1263ale3i the language directly benefit or are incurred by reason of boils down to a butfor causation test (B) holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support (C) holding in an appeal from a postanswer default judgment that third prong of craddock test required appellant to offer to reimburse appellee for legal expenses he incurred in obtaining default judgment even though most of the fees incurred had not been paid (D) holding that pursuant to the eaja courts may not award expenses of an attorney that are not incurred or expended solely or exclusively in connection with the case before the court (E) holding a tribe subject to 1 a tax on the use of certain highway motor vehicles 26 usc 4481a 2 a tax on diesel fuel used in highway vehicles 26 usc 4041a 3 a tax on special fuels used in motor vehicles 26 usc 4041b and 4 a tax on manufacturing in this case a truck chassis assembled by the tribe 26 usc 4061a 4218a
[A]: holding that fees incurred by debtor were not in the nature of support

[Q]: criminal statutes. In addition, the disclosures do not subject the defendant to a real danger of self-incrimination since the source of the funds is not disclosed----Thus, the defendant has failed to show that the Bank Secrecy Act violated any individual right [that] ... Grosso seek to protect."). Likewise, the provision at issue here, 31 C.F.R. 1010.420, applies to hundreds of thousands of foreign bank accounts. "There is nothing inherently illegal about having or being a beneficiary of an offshore foreign banking account." In re Grand Jury Investigation M.H., 648 F.3d at 1074. Because the record-keeping requirements of 31 C.F.R. 1010.420 do not target inherently illegal activity, the provision is essentially regulatory in nature. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 435 (<HOLDING>); In re Special February 2011-1 Grand Jury
Holding statements: (A) holding civil factual sufficiency preservation requirements do not apply in criminal context (B) holding that the federal register notice requirements do not apply to federal criminal statutes (C) holding that sornas registration requirements and criminal enforcement provision are proper under the commerce clause (D) holding that regulatory requirements are not jurisdictional in nature (E) holding that because the bsas recordkeeping requirements serve purposes unrelated to criminal law enforcement and because the provisions do not exclusively target people engaged in criminal activity we conclude that the requirements are essentially regulatory satisfying the required records exceptions first prong
[A]:
holding civil factual sufficiency preservation requirements do not apply in criminal context