In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: trekker from Nepal who agreed to transport a suitcase from Thailand to the United States. Id. at 658, 663. Customs agents found the suitcase to contain three kilograms of 87% pure heroin, and the defendant was ultimately convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute and importation of heroin. Id. at 658. In affirming the reduction of the defendant's offense level under the safety valve, the Ninth Circuit observed that the defendant "provided the authorities with substantial information concerning the offense, including the names of those involved abroad," while maintaining that he was innocent of knowing the contents of the suitcase. Id. at 663. Vazquez has not so cooperated with the Government. Cf. United States v. Garcia-Sanchez, 189 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir.1999)
Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendant was not eligible for the safety valve provision because he never even met with the government to offer information and suggesting that given his undisputed association with members of the conspiracy he would have some perhaps useless relevant information to provide the gov ernment even if he were innocent of drug dealing himself (B) holding that once a defendant becomes associated with a conspiracy he is responsible for all of the acts of the conspiracy even those which occurred before or after his association with the conspiracy (C) holding that evidence was sufficient for jury to find that the defendant participated in the conspiracy even though he did not have a relationship with all of his fellow coconspirators (D) holding there was enough evidence to find the defendant abandoned his child when he claimed to have knowledge of cpss involvement he admitted that for periods of two years and six months he did not attempt any contact with his child and from the date he canceled a home study until the petition was filed he did not attempt to contact the child or cps or provide support even when he was out of jail (E) holding that the movants assertion that he failed to advise the plea court of counsels alleged deficiencies because he blamed himself for his lack of funds was undermined by the fact that the plea court advised the movant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford to pay for counsel

A: (A)
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Q: on behalf of' MBC. The record also discloses that the contract makes no reference to MBC and was signed by Mullis as "Contractor." The record further discloses that payments were made to Mullis, not MBC, and that the payments were deposited into Mullis's personal account, not into MBC's account in a separate bank. This evidence supports the trial court's findings and its ultimate conclusion that Mullis was individually liable for any damages suffered by the Brennans. If Mullis wanted to act as agent for MBC and bind the corporation to the contract, he should have signed the contract in his corporate capacity. This would have had the effect of insulating him from liability. See Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 619 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind.1994) (<HOLDING>). Mullis, without any citation to authority,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the general corporate laws are incorporated into the corporate charter (B) holding defendants personally liable for alleged conversion even when acting in corporate capacity (C) holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery to determine whether the defendant intended to be bound in his personal andor corporate capacity where the agreement contained certain personal guarantees by the defendant but where the defendant signed the agreement only in a corporate capacity with no signature blocks provided for signing in a personally capacity (D) holding that a corporate officer signing a contract in his corporate capacity is generally not liable for damages under the contract (E) holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents

A: (D)
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Q: by telling the accused he or she is only a witness, when, in fact, the person is a suspect. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S.Ct. 711; see also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); Cummings, 27 Md.App, at 379-80, 341 A.2d 294. Police may also exaggerate the evidence they have accumulated against the person being interviewed. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S.Ct. 711. A third factor, perhaps most important for this case, is that there is rarely custody when the person questioned leaves the interrogation unencumbered, only to be arrested at a later time. See Bartram v. State, 33 Md.App. 115, 148-49, 364 A.2d 1119 (1976); Cummings, 27 Md.App. at 378-79, 341 A.2d 294; see also United States v. Scully, 415 F.2d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir.1969) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Manglona, 414 F.2d 642, 644
Holding statements: (A) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to give his side of the story and then left the station unencumbered (B) holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station freely (C) holding the defendant was not under arrest when police asked him to go to the station and then offered him a ride because he did not have transportation (D) holding that police failure to inform the accused of his attorneys attempts to contact him and misstatements to the attorney as to whether the accused was at the police station did not violate the accuseds due process rights (E) holding that having the defendant follow an officer to a police station three to four miles away after the officer had asked for and retained the defendants drivers license reg istration and title was not permissible as part of a terry stop and stating that we understand the hayes decision as eliminating the option of forcing the suspect to go to the police station from the alternatives available to the officer during an investigative detention

A:
(B)
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