In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: complaint's allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues." Id. Here, a reasonable person would be put on notice that Weatherford's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not solely based on the false arrest or false imprisonment claims. Weatherford's claim is premised on the officers' alleged intentional retaliation and abuse of power and process when they violated standard police procedure, disregarded Chief Leonard's instructions and conspired to intentionally and publicly humiliate Weatherford. Furthermore, we note that Indiana now recognizes a separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, without the need for an accompanying tort. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30-31 (Ind.1991) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we find that Weatherford
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotion distress for the first time in indiana (B) recognizing that the indiana tort claims act grants broad immunity to governmental employees from suit for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (C) holding that claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotion distress fail as matter of law where challenged arrest is supported by probable cause (D) recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (E) holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress is a personal injury tort

A: (A)
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Q: before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82
Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status

A: (D)
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Q: by well-reasoned medical opinion notwithstanding the presence of negative x-ray evidence under 718.202(a)(4). See Newell v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 933 F.2d 510, 511 n. 2 (7th Cir.1991). Specifically, he cited the opinions of Dr. Robert Avena, Mr. Hubbell's treating physician for his final three years who diagnosed pneumoconiosis; Dr. Frederick Ridge, who listed the disease as one of the causes of death; and Dr. Anand Bhuptani, who suspected that Mr. Hubbell had COPD, and hinted that it was related to his exposure to coal dust. Peabody does not contest that Mr. Hub-bell had pneumoconiosis; instead, it takes issue with the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Hubbell's pneumoconiosis hastened his death under 20 C.F.R. 718.205(c)(2). See Peabody Coal Co., 972 F.2d at 183-84 (<HOLDING>); see also Livermore, 297 F.3d at 671. In doing
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute (B) holding a wrongful death action may not be maintained for the death of an unborn child (C) recognizing that any condition that hastens death qualifies as a substantially contributing cause or factor leading to death under 718205c2 (D) recognizing cause of action for wrongful death (E) holding applicable the directors interpretation of 20 cfr 718205c2 to mean anything that has an actual or real share in producing an effect and that any condition which hastens death fits this description

A:
(C)
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