In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

removal purposes. Instead, for complete preemption to apply, the cause of action not only must be preempted by ERISA but also must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA 502(a), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 ("[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted. The preemptive force of ERISA 502(a) is still stronger.... Hence, causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of 502(a) [are] removable to federal court." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62-63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Da-Ponte v. Manfredi Motors Inc., 157 Fed.
Holding statements: (A) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under 1132a1b (B) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under 502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan falls directly under 502a1b of erisa and therefore was necessarily federal in character and subject to removal to federal court
(E)

should be drawn from the defendant's failure to call his accomplices to testify. The prosecutor remarked only that Mitchell had the power to subpoena witnesses, and that the defense could do so "if they thought it would contradict something [the State! presented." In light of defense counsel's earlier statements that "clearly you have a situation where a misidentification could take place," and that the jury should be able to see Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson in the courtroom, the prosecutor's remarks did not relate to the substance of those witnesses' potential testimonies. Had the prosecutor inferred that Corprew, Cochran, and Henderson would have testified unfavorably to the defense, that inference might well have conflicted with Christensen, 274 Md. at 140-41, 333 A.2d at 49 (<HOLDING>). Nevertheless, we conclude that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime (B) holding that sixth amendment only requires that witness be brought to court not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that it is irrelevant whether the witnesss refusal is grounded in a valid fifth amendment privilege an invalid privilege or something else entirely (C) holding that an adverse inference cannot be drawn from a defendants failure to call a witness if the states evidence establishes that the witness is an accomplice who would be entitled to assert a fifth amendment privilege (D) holding that witness was not an accomplice in distributing marijuana to himself (E) holding that the prosecutors comment regarding the defendants failure to call a potential witness did not shift the burden of proof because it did not implicate the defendants fifth amendment right not to testify
(C)

620, 622 (La.App.1967) (same). Takings of temporary easements are measured differently. A landowner must be compensated for the loss of use of property taken by a temporary easement and any impairment of access to the property during the period of construction. Miczek v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass.App. Ct. 105, 108, 586 N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (1992) (involving temporary slope easement). Some courts have held that the damages are equal to the rental value of the property for the period of occupation. 4 Nichols at 12E.01. This is commonly measured by the rental value of the property as a whole. See Paddock v. Town of Durham, 110 N.H. 106, 108, 261 A.2d 438, 441 (1970); 4A Nichols at 14.2462. Cf. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 8, 69 S.Ct. 1434, 1439, 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1949) (<HOLDING>). E. Miscellaneous Damages are to be measured
Holding statements: (A) holding that the proper measure of compensation in a temporary taking is the rental value that probably could have been obtained (B) holding that fair market value was proper measure of damages for stock brokers breach of margin agreement caused by sale of plaintiffs shares without authorization noting that generally speaking fair market value is proper measure of damages for breach of contract relating to sale of goods which have an ascertamable value on the market (C) holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure (D) holding that the proper measure of damages to repair defects for a building contract that has not been substantially performed is the contractually agreed upon measure of damages (E) holding that the proper measure of damages was the present value of all unaccrued payments that the plaintiff would have received if the contract had been performed
(A)