In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: evidence showing that the defendants used the mark selectively or that they failed to use it pervasively in all their commercial dealings, even if these dealings were low in volume. Furthermore, though the Allard Court granted ownership rights to the defendants based only on oral testimony of various "solicitations" and insubstantial documentary evidence of prior use, the Court noted that there was also good evidence of widespread public recognition of the defendants' use of the service mark. Evidence of public recognition is only necessary in cases requiring proof of secondary meaning, but such evidence may be probative of a party's actual use of a mark in cases where secondary meaning is not required. See id.; see also Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F.Supp. 428, 431 (M.D.Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). Public recognition is probative of a party's
Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiff established a right to a slogan based on evidence of public recognition of its use by the plaintiff (D) holding that a plaintiff had established a primafacie failuretohire case notwithstanding evidence that the position sought by the plaintiff was ultimately filled with a person of the same race as the plaintiff (E) holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: of his criminal history and likelihood of reoffending. Currie notes that most of his prior convictions were remote and that he has demonstrated both a decrease in criminal behavior since 1990 and a decrease in violent conduct since 2006. However, the vast majority of Currie's adult life has been spent in prison, undermining his argument that his reduction in criminal convictions during this period is indicative of reduced criminality. Notably, Currie's dozens of institutional would impose the same sentence as a variance sentence, even if it erred in its Guidelines calculations or application of U.S.S.G. 4A1.3(a). And although Currie identified nonfrivolous mitigating factors in support of a lower sentence, see, e.g., United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 532-33 (4th Cir. 2014) (<HOLDING>), we cannot conclude, in view of the totality
Holding statements: (A) holding as a matter of law that a child of the tender age of 3 years and 8 months could not have realized the risk or danger of an artificial body of water (B) holding that adea plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case of age discrimination when he was replaced by someone only two years younger and within the protected age group and there was no other evidence of age discriminatory motive (C) recognizing reduced culpability in youthful offenders and inverse correlation between inmates age and risk of recidivism (D) holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference (E) holding age discrimination claim barred
[EX A]: (C)

[EX Q]: no evidence that Georgia's "general" K-12 local schools offer "a year round program with multi-age, student-centered classrooms featuring pedagogy that is based on constructivist and multiple intelligence learning" like CCAT. Why is that curriculum not sufficiently different to qualify as "special"? Again, the majority does not say. If a "special school" is to be compared to the ordinary local school and must only differ to some extent, then the Charter Schools Commission could create all sorts of commission charter schools that should satisfy constitutional scrutiny, even if the three charter schools at issue in this case are not "different" enough to satisfy the majority. If that is the case, the majority errs in striking down the 2008 Act on its face. See Blevins, 288 Ga. at 118 (<HOLDING>). In the normal course of constitutional
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a plaintiff may be able to establish that the statute is unconstitutional by showing that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep citation omitted (B) holding that facially valid indictment may not be challenged on the ground that it is based on inadequate evidence (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that person challenging statute as facially vague must show that the challenged law is unconstitutional in every possible application (E) holding that a statute may be facially challenged only by establishing that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid ie that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep
[EX A]:
(E)