In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
income. As the majority notes, the Internal Revenue Code is not the standard for determining weekly gross income for child support purposes, see op. at 13 (quoting Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b) that the weekly gross income figure may not be the same as gross income for tax purposes). It may be unfair to exclude all of the settlement proceeds where they have inured to the family's benefit in the past but it may also be unfair to include all of the proceeds where Scott has need of them for his own care. Commentary to Guideline 3(A) urges judges to "be innovative in finding ways to include income that would have benefited the family had it remained intact, but be receptive to deviations where reasons justify them." Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt. 2(b); see also Harris, 800 N.E.2d at 940-41 (<HOLDING>). [5] Because the trial court's decision was
Holding statements: (A) holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in including only the net amount of settlement proceeds from a wrongful termination lawsuit because that is the amount that would have ultimately benefited the children if the family had remained intact (B) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served (C) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding prejudgment interest is to be determined on the entire amount of compensatory damages and then reduced by the amount of interest which would have accrued at present value on the settlement amount determined before trial

Ex Output:
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a separate trial for the counterclaims where the convenience of the parties would be served

Ex Input:
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the "unified judicial system," is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) ("All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of 'Commonwealth government' and thus are state rather than local agencies."). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in
Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state

Ex Output:
holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action

Ex Input:
not dispute the fact that the BVA decided that issue correctly. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the Board. A remand should be based on some type of error committed by the Board. The majority's opinion basically says "try again," without pointing to any error committed by the Board. The reason for the majority's action is that their decision is based on an issue raised sua sponte. The appellant has not addressed a possible claim for total disability based on individual unemployability that may be still pending before VA. If there is one, she is free to pursue it without a remand from this Court. See Hanson v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 29 (1996) (stating that an unadjudi-eated claim generally remains pending before VA until withdrawn); Meeks v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 284 (1993) (<HOLDING>). This Court has consistently held that it will
Holding statements: (A) holding that a board affirmance of an ro decision subsumes that decision (B) holding that prior ro decision that had not become final was not subject to cue collateral attack (C) holding that a claim before an ro remains pending until a final decision is rendered (D) holding that the ros failure to issue an soc prevented the disputed ro decision from becoming final and appealable to the board and the claim therefore remained pending (E) holding vcaa inapplicable to claim that ro decision contained cue

Ex Output:
holding that a board affirmance of an ro decision subsumes that decision