In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged. Commonwealth v. Hooks, 375 Mass. 284, 288 (1978). A defendant's illiteracy or low intelligence is not dispositive of his capacity to waive Miranda rights and render a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary confession. See Commonwealth v. Ostrander, 441 Mass. 344, 346, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 867 (2004); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 86-87 (2000) (concluding that the defendant, who had a learning disability and an IQ in the eighties, validly waived his rights in light of his "considerable prior experience with the police and in receiving Miranda warnings," as well as his "cunning" attempts to exculpate himself "after being confronted with the [ ] evidence against him"); Commonwealth v. Hartford, 425 Mass. 378, 380-81 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Commonwealth v. Dingle, 73 Mass.App.Ct. 274,
Holding statements: (A) holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney (B) recognizing that plaintiffs had standing to allege infringements of their first amendment rights where the record established that they had been threatened with enforcement of the statute and that such enforcement would cause them injury (C) holding that language difficulties may impair the ability of a person in custody to waive his miranda rights in a free and aware manner (D) holding admissible suspects statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his miranda rights (E) holding that irrespective of the suspects limited reasoning ability and iq of 73 evidence that the suspect had held various parttime jobs had been living on his own possessed a drivers license and had prior experience with law enforcement was probative of competence to waive miranda rights
[A]: holding that a 15yearold was of suitable intelligence and maturity to validly waive miranda rights specifically focusing on the fact that the juvenile had been advised of his rights on three prior occasions and had once asked for an attorney

[Q]: to those sentences because no error in the sentencing appears on the face of the record. Ninety-nine years is a "term of years not less than five years." While Thomas' sentences, under court interpretations of 566.030.2, may not be authorized, we are not able to reach such issues where the sentencing defect is not so patent as to present a jurisdictional issue. This sentencing does not present a jurisdictional issue. Conclusion Thomas is ordered to be returned to the circuit court of the City of St. Louis for resentencing on the three first degree robbery counts within the limits authorized by the law. SO ORDERED. All concur. 1 . All sectional references are to Missouri Revised Statutes 1986, unless otherwise indicated. 2 . See, e.g., State v. Williams, 828 S.W.2d 894 (Mo.App.1992)(<HOLDING>); State v. Charron, 743 S.W.2d 436
Holding statements: (A) holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (B) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (C) holding sentence of thirtyfive years in prison with ten years probation for seconddegree murder is within the statutory maximum under 1997 statutes (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding sentence of 100 years for forcible rape was in excess of statutory maximum
[A]: holding that a defendants sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum

[Q]: L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). 3 . Because the search was without a warrant, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the search was lawful. See United States v. Johnson, 936 F.2d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam). Thus, if the government were relying on some notion of plain sight, it would be required to produce evidence that the gym bag was open. It did not do so. Nor could it satisfy its burden premised on Smith's consent, since, as we explain below, that consent could not extend to the bag. Moreover, even if the bag had been open, the fact that it was stored under the bed, thus requiring the police to move it, would have required probable cause, since such movement would constitute a search. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the condition of the bag was
Holding statements: (A) holding that an officers movement of stereo components to examine their serial numbers was a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment (B) holding canine sniff of an unattended vehicle parked outside the curtilage of defendants home was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment (C) holding a canine sniff on a legitimately detained automobile is not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment (D) holding an officers movement of stereo equipment to view a serial number constituted a search under the fourth amendment (E) holding that the warrantless search of knights supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation was reasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment
[A]:
holding canine sniff of an unattended vehicle parked outside the curtilage of defendants home was not a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment