instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In Landgraf, the Court noted that a statute only truly operates retroactively if applying it would "impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Id. 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see also RTC v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1994)(analyzing retroactivity of lease repudiation damage limitation provision of FIRREA). Thus, like other courts that have analyzed similar FIRREA provisions, we must address prior banking law to determine whether application of the damage limitation provisions of 1821(e)(3) would have the retroactive effect defined in Landgraf. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit, 30 F.3d at 1388 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, in the Crafts' case, it
Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that firreas damage limitations for repudiation of leases worked no substantive change in the law and thus their application was not retroactive (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary
answer:
holding that the act is not retroactive

question:
arm's-length transaction or from making as prompt or searching investigation as might otherwise be expected. In some situations there is no legal duty to use means available for discovering the fraud.... We are not prepared to say, however, that one in a relationship of trust and confidence is always justified as a matter of law in neglecting every precaution until something occurs to arouse his suspicions. Courseview, 312 S.W.2d at 205; Duthu v. Pena, 228 F.3d 409, 2000 WL 1056126, at *7-9 (5th Cir.2000) (unpublished) (collecting cases). This case presents precisely the sort of intentional concealment of ill-gotten profits (in the face of a duty to disclose such profits) that allows a plaintiff to benefit from equitable estoppel. See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>);. Gibson v. Burkhart, 650 S.W.2d 185, 188-89
Holding statements: (A) holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself (B) holding that because a physician lias a duty to disclose a negligent act or fact that an injury has occurred and physician failed to do so cause of action was deferred until victim learned of the right of action (C) recognizing negligent procurement to be a negligence cause of action (D) recognizing cause of action (E) recognizing the cause of action
answer:
holding a cause of action accrues once an injury has occurred and manifested itself

question:
such as the privilege against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege. Jane, quoting People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 235 N.E.2d 439, 443 (1968), notes that " '[f]aced with a confusing variety of rules concerning the existence and scope of his privileges, a witness should not be required to make these choices unaided by his lawyer.' " See also People v. Smays, 156 Mise.2d 621, 594 N.Y.S.2d 101, 105 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1993) (discussing Ianniello). Jane argues confidentiality concerns regarding the presence of her counsel during her testimony are misplaced. Jane asserts her counsel will be bound by the same confidentiality requirements as others who attend the hearing. See Op. of the Justices to the Governor, 373 Mass. 915, 371 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (1977) (<HOLDING>). Jane also notes her counsel would be bound by
Holding statements: (A) holding that usual rule 6e secrecy protecting identity of witnesses did not apply to the president because it was already widely known that he had testified in front of the grand jury (B) holding that governments weak interest in preserving grand jury secrecy did not warrant in camera submission where party seeking access to submission would learn of submission contents as soon as he was called as a grand jury witness (C) holding the presence of counsel for a witness did not violate grand jury secrecy (D) recognizing the importance of grand jury secrecy (E) holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury
answer:
holding that usual rule 6e secrecy protecting identity of witnesses did not apply to the president because it was already widely known that he had testified in front of the grand jury