In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee's sexual organ with the child's female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee's mouth with the child's sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child's sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91
Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity

Output: (A)

Input: Consider Input: a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, id., and "the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations." Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004). 1. Equal protection "Unless a classification ... is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage," statutory distinctions are presumed constitutional, and will survive a challenge if the classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Although not every non-suspect legislative classification passes muster under rational basis review, see, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985) (<HOLDING>), "the judiciary may not sit as a
Holding statements: (A) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (B) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (C) holding that a preferential state tax rate for domestic businesses violated the equal protection clause because the states justifications that the tax promoted domestic industry and encouraged investment in domestic assets were not legitimate government interests since if they were any discriminatory tax would be valid if the state could show it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business (D) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (E) holding that if federal income tax statutes are intended to benefit anyone it is the federal government to whom the withheld tax is to be remitted there is no indication anywhere in the language of the statutes that congress intended to confer rights on employees with respect to the withholding of tax

Output: (C)

Input: Consider Input: remedy is exclusive"). In other words, Parnar claims are usually raised only in "a 'narrow class of cases' where the wrongful discharge action is seen as necessary to effectuate the public policy at stake." Ross, 76 Hawai'i at 464, 879 P.2d at 1047 (quoting Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F.Supp. 991, 993 (D.Haw.1988) , abrogated on other grounds by Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir.1990)). This necessity usually arises only where a statutory or other policy does not itself provide for a remedy to enforce the policy. An exception to this general rule occurs where the legislative body specifically provides that a common law claim exists even though a statutory remedy is also in place. Ross, 76 Hawai'i at 465, 879 P.2d at 1047 (<HOLDING>). Under the HWPA, the Hawaii legislature
Holding statements: (A) holding that the narrowing of the use of parnar claims only applies absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary and citing to hrs 37869 as an example of such legislative intent (B) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only (C) holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law (D) holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent (E) holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent
Output: (A)