In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: plenary determination of jurisdiction over five landlocked canals); Weiszmann v. District Engineers, U.S. Army Corp, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.1976) (same outcome as in Sexton Cove in action brought by landowner); U.S. v. St. Bernard Parish, 589 F.Supp. 617 (E.D.La.1984) (plenary trial determining jurisdictional issue); U.S. v. Lambert 589 F.Supp. 366 (M.D.Fla.1984) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland; proof by preponderance of evidence was measure of government's burden of persuasion); U.S. v. Ciampitti, 583 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.J.1984) (in action for preliminary injunction, court made own determination that property was a wetland); U.S. v. City of Fort Pierre, 580 F.Supp. 1036 (D.S.D.1983) (plenary trial determining property was a wetland) rev'd, 747 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); Parkview Corp. v. Department of Army Corp of
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property (B) holding property not a wetland (C) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (D) recognizing that exempt property ceases to be property of the estate (E) holding that because property was no longer property of the estate the court could not order turnover
Example Output: holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property

Example Input: facts underlying the charges for which the defendant had been acquitted were an "integral and natural part of an account of the [defendant's] crimef.]" The same cannot be said for the facts at issue here, which relate to a seizure that occurred on an entirely different occasion. For that reason, we do not find either Agee or Solomon directly relevant to the present controversy. As a result, we will first examine the challenged evidence in light of the principles traditionally employed in evaluating challenges to evidence admitted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 8C-1, Rule 404(b), which focus on the similarity between the prior incident and the incident that underlies the current charges against the defendant. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348, 107 L. Ed. 2d 708, 717 (1990) (<HOLDING>). To be sure, the events of 10 February 2005
Holding statements: (A) holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case (B) holding that the estoppel doctrine did not apply because unlike the situation in ashe v swenson the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (C) holding that a prior acquittal does not preclude the admission of evidence of a defendants other alleged crimes in a prosecution for the bank robbery on the basis of collateral estoppel principles because the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case (D) holding that a criminal acquittal does not have collateral estoppel effect on a later civil forfeiture proceeding based on the same conduct (E) holding that there is no need for a formal motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial because the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal
Example Output: holding that collateral estoppel component of tire double jeopardy clause did not preclude government from introducing defendants prior acquittal at trial because government was presented with lower standard of proof in the later case

Example Input: property owners and others to open their lands to recreational users. The Ward court found, under the agreement, the landowner did not delegate to the defendant the power to control entry to the land. Holding that "[a] grant of immunity to the [defendant] would not serve the underlying purpose of the recreational use statute," the court concluded the defendant was not an occupant under the act. Id., 890 P.2d at 1147. While discussing other jurisdictions' decisions, the Ward court emphasized that "[t]he relationship of an entity to the premises, not the length and stability of its presence, should primarily determine whether the entity 'occupies' the premises" under the statute. Id., 890 P.2d at 1148. See also Tennyson v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 73 Wash.App. 550, 872 P.2d 524 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Adams v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 191
Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that where a coworker commits an intentional tort not related to the interests of the employer the policies behind the act would not be served by immunizing the coemployee (C) holding prior act testimony admissible to establish the identity behind an alias (D) holding that extending immunity to contractors under the act would not further the purpose behind the act (E) holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective
Example Output:
holding that the act is not retroactive