TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: to that extent. Reed, supra, at 17, 104 S.Ct. 2901. The holding in Cage represents a degree of novelty sufficient to constitute cause. As such, Mercer has established cause to avoid otherwise procedurally defaulting on his claim challenging the reasonable doubt instruction. Sufficient prejudice to establish federal habeas jurisdiction also exists. In particular, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases is so intertwined with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury verdict that a constitutionally deficient jury instruction cannot produce a guilty verdict comporting with due process but, rather, requires reversal of a conviction. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-80, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (<HOLDING>). It follows that a claimed Cage violation
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where the error involved defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to conduct a meaningful harmless error analysis then the error will not be proven harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (B) holding exclusion was harmless error (C) holding that when defendant properly objects to charge error reversal required unless error was harmless (D) holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error (E) holding a cage violation could never be held harmless error and thus not amenable to harmless error review but rather required outright reversal

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: those same arguments. Like the majority of the appellate panel that first reviewed this appeal, we are not persuaded to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this evidential ruling. It was for the trial court to assess defendant's prior conviction's probative value in light of its remoteness, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in that judgment. The question is not whether we would have made a different determination in the first instance. Rather, we apply the normal, deferential standard and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the use of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. The conviction was not stale by the standard in use for assessing remoteness. See Harris, supra, 209 N.J. at 436, 444-45, 38 A.3d 559 (<HOLDING>). And, we cannot say that the trial court's
Holding statements: (A) holding that prior drug convictions that were four ten and eleven years old were not so remote from the charged drug offenses as to render them inadmissible (B) holding two prior convictions more than ten years old admissible where disorderlypersons offenses bridged the gap (C) holding that state may charge separately for the same offense but the convictions for more than one of the offenses cannot stand (D) holding that evidence of two intervening felony convictions removed taint of remoteness from convictions more than 10 years prior permitting analysis under rule 609a (E) holding that prior distribution and possession convictions that were eight and ten years before the charged conduct occurred were not too remote

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: the information to the "best of its ability." Def. Br. 25. Alternatively, Commerce claims that this argument is beyond the scope of this proceeding since it is not an issue raised by the Plaintiff. "[IJntervenor is limited to the field of litigation open to the original parties, and cannot enlarge the issues tendered by or arising out of plaintiffs bill." Torrington Co. v. United States, 14 CIT 56, 57, 731 F.Supp. 1073, 1075 (1990) (citing Chandler & Price Co. v. Brandtjen & Kluge, 296 U.S. 53, 56, 56 S.Ct. 6, 80 L.Ed. 39 (1935)) (granting plaintiffs motion to strike defendant-intervenor's affirmative defenses because they raised issue of standing not contested by plaintiff and defendant); see also Grupo Indus. Camesa v. United States, 18 CIT 107, 108 (1994) (not reported in F.Supp.) (<HOLDING>). Russel's claim that Commerce failed to
Holding statements: (A) holding that even though plaintiffs claim was barred by the cgia because it sounded in tort attorney fees were not appropriate where it was a contract claim that was pleaded and thus a contract claim that was dismissed (B) holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity (C) holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint (D) holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing (E) holding that plaintiffintervenors argument was separate from plaintiffs claim because plaintiff did not challenge pertinent statute as unconstitutional even though complaint alleged that itcs determination was not in accordance with law in a number of respects including the following

SOLUTION:
(E)