In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity " 'substantially affecting interstate commerce.' "). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing
Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference

Ex Output:
holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference

Ex Input:
as well as recent country reports and his own affidavit, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his allegation that conditions in China have materially changed. We have previously reviewed the BIA's consideration of similar evidence in the context of an untimely motion to reopen and have found no abuse of discretion in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish changed conditions in China. Id. at 275 (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as "the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] ... it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion"); Jian Huan Guan, v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47 (2d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>). In addition, we find that the BIA did not
Holding statements: (A) holding that the bia did not abuse its discretion in denying a petitioners untimely motion to reopen where she submitted proof of the birth of her two sons a letter from her parents warning of the danger of forced sterilization and a purported sterilization certificate for her cousin who also had two children (B) holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that the bia correctly imputed a parents knowledge that she and her children were not eligible for entry to the united states to her children (E) holding that the bia abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it failed to consider the argument before it

Ex Output:
holding that bia abused its discretion in denying motion to reopen

Ex Input:
asserts that the real reason for his termination was UPS's failure to reasonably accommodate his disability. "Whether summary judgment is appropriate ... depends on numerous factors, including the strength of the employee's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered." Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir.2002). We conclude that Cooper has not produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that Cooper was discharged as retaliation for filing claims of discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of UPS on Cooper's retaliatory discharge claims is appropriate. Cf. McCoy, 492 F.3d at 562 (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection her complaints and the adverse action (B) holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext was insufficient because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that the employer did not honestly believe its proffered reasons for its action (C) holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiff attempted to prove pretext simply by showing that the defendant knew of her complaints and took an adverse employment action shortly thereafter and did not offer reasons as to why the legitimate reasons proffered for her discharge were pretextual (D) holding that posthoc reasons for an adverse employment decision constitute evidence of pretext (E) holding that the conflicting explanations given by defendants agents for the plaintiffs termination were also sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that defendants proffered reasons for the termination were pretextual the inconsistent testimony regarding the motivating reasons for plaintiffs termination cast doubts on the asserted nondiscriminatory legitimate reasons and may alone be sufficient to preclude summary judgment on plaintiffs claim

Ex Output:
holding that plaintiff cannot establish pretext because she is unable to show any causal connection her complaints and the adverse action