QUES: One day, Phoebe woke up and found that her house had been broken into. Her front door was wide open. She went into the living room and saw that her television set and stereo were missing. She checked the kitchen, but didn't find anything missing there except for a clock. Then she saw that her purse had been stolen too. She called the police to report what had happened. The police officer told her that there had been a lot of cases like this in her neighborhood lately, and they were looking for the criminals. Phoebe went into her bedroom and started to cry. She had no money to buy a new television set or stereo. She was scared that the robbers might try to break into her house again. She called her friend Mary and asked her what to do. Mary told Phoebe to change her front door lock right away. She said she knew a detective who could try to find the robber who had broken into her house. Phoebe thanked Mary, and said she felt safe knowing that there was someone who could help her catch the robber so he wouldn't do it again.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION: How did the thieves the break in?

QUES: In February 1998, the 40-year-old Saudi exile Usama Bin Laden and a fugitive Egyptian physician, Ayman al Zawahiri, arranged from their Afghan headquarters for an Arabic newspaper in London to publish what they termed a fatwa issued in the name of a "World Islamic Front." A fatwa is normally an interpretation of Islamic law by a respected Islamic authority, but neither Bin Laden, Zawahiri, nor the three others who signed this statement were scholars of Islamic law. Claiming that America had declared war against God and his messenger, they called for the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the "individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it." Three months later, when interviewed in Afghanistan by ABC-TV, Bin Laden enlarged on these themes. He claimed it was more important for Muslims to kill Americans than to kill other infidels." It is far better for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities," he said. Asked whether he approved of terrorism and of attacks on civilians, he replied:"We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets." Note: Islamic names often do not follow the Western practice of the consistent use of surnames. Given the variety of names we mention, we chose to refer to individuals by the last word in the names by which they are known: Nawaf al Hazmi as Hazmi, for instance, omitting the article "al" that would be part of their name in their own societies. We generally make an exception for the more familiar English usage of "Bin" as part of a last name, as in Bin Laden. Further, there is no universally accepted way to transliterate Arabic words and names into English. We have relied on a mix of common sense, the sound of the name in Arabic, and common usage in source materials, the press, or government documents. When we quote from a source document, we use its transliteration, e.g.,"al Qida" instead of al Qaeda. Though novel for its open endorsement of indiscriminate killing, Bin Laden's 1998 declaration was only the latest in the long series of his public and private calls since 1992 that singled out the United States for attack. In August 1996, Bin Laden had issued his own self-styled fatwa calling on Muslims to drive American soldiers out of Saudi Arabia.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION: Why does the author use the spelling "Al Quida" instead of "Al Qaeda"?

QUES: The after-action review had treated the CIA as the lead agency for any offensive against al Qaeda, and the principals, at their March 10 meeting, had endorsed strengthening the CIA's capability for that role. To the CTC, that meant proceeding with "The Plan," which it had put forward half a year earlier-hiring and training more case officers and building up the capabilities of foreign security services that provided intelligence via liaison. On occasion, as in Jordan in December 1999, these liaison services took direct action against al Qaeda cells. In the CTC and higher up, the CIA's managers believed that they desperately needed funds just to continue their current counterterrorism effort, for they reckoned that the millennium alert had already used up all of the Center's funds for the current fiscal year; the Bin Laden unit had spent 140 percent of its allocation. Tenet told us he met with Berger to discuss funding for counterterrorism just two days after the principals' meeting. While Clarke strongly favored giving the CIA more money for counterterrorism, he differed sharply with the CIA's managers about where it should come from. They insisted that the CIA had been shortchanged ever since the end of the Cold War. Their ability to perform any mission, counterterrorism included, they argued, depended on preserving what they had, restoring what they had lost since the beginning of the 1990s, and building from there-with across-the-board recruitment and training of new case officers, and the reopening of closed stations. To finance the counterterrorism effort, Tenet had gone to congressional leaders after the 1998 embassy bombings and persuaded them to give the CIA a special supplemental appropriation. Now, in the aftermath of the millennium alert, Tenet wanted a boost in overall funds for the CIA and another supplemental appropriation specifically for counterterrorism. To Clarke, this seemed evidence that the CIA's leadership did not give sufficient priority to the battle against Bin Laden and al Qaeda. He told us that James Pavitt, the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, "said if there's going to be money spent on going after Bin Laden, it should be given to him. My view was that he had had a lot of money to do it and a long time to do it, and I didn't want to put more good money after bad." The CIA had a very different attitude: Pavitt told us that while the CIA's Bin Laden unit did"extraordinary and commendable work," his chief of station in London "was just as much part of the al Qaeda struggle as an officer sitting in [the Bin Laden unit]." The dispute had large managerial implications, for Clarke had found Ailies in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION:
Who claimed that James Pavitt said "if there's going to be money spent on going after Bin Laden, it should be given to him."