Input: Not until 1998 did al Qaeda undertake a major terrorist operation of its own, in large part because Bin Laden lost his base in Sudan. Ever since the Islamist regime came to power in Khartoum, the United States and other Western governments had pressed it to stop providing a haven for terrorist organizations. Other governments in the region, such as those of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and even Libya, which were targets of some of these groups, added their own pressure. At the same time, the Sudanese regime began to change. Though Turabi had been its inspirational leader, General Omar al Bashir, president since 1989, had never been entirely under his thumb. Thus as outside pressures mounted, Bashir's supporters began to displace those of Turabi. The attempted assassination in Ethiopia of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in June 1995 appears to have been a tipping point. The would-be killers, who came from the Egyptian Islamic Group, had been sheltered in Sudan and helped by Bin Laden. When the Sudanese refused to hand over three individuals identified as involved in the assassination plot, the UN Security Council passed a resolution criticizing their inaction and eventually sanctioned Khartoum in April 1996. A clear signal to Bin Laden that his days in Sudan were numbered came when the government advised him that it intended to yield to Libya's demands to stop giving sanctuary to its enemies. Bin Laden had to tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave the country. Outraged, several Libyan members of al Qaeda and the Islamic Army Shura renounced all connections with him. Bin Laden also began to have serious money problems. International pressure on Sudan, together with strains in the world economy, hurt Sudan's currency. Some of Bin Laden's companies ran short of funds. As Sudanese authorities became less obliging, normal costs of doing business increased. Saudi pressures on the Bin Laden family also probably took some toll. In any case, Bin Laden found it necessary both to cut back his spending and to control his outlays more closely.

Does the response "Because the Libyan government was not sheltering them anymore" correctly answer the question "Why did Bin Laden tell the Libyans who had been part of his Islamic army that he could no longer protect them and that they had to leave Sudan?"?
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Output: yes

Input: As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

Does the response "Late 1999" correctly answer the question "After what time would three of four Hamburg cell members soon arrive?"?
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Output: no

Input: The film starts with a brief pre-title clip from presenter Greg Palast s aborted interview with Florida Director of Elections Clayton Roberts , who walks out . Palast introduces George W. Bush with particular reference to his popular image as a war hero cemented in the public mind by his landing on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln for the 2003 Mission Accomplished Speech . However Palast alleges that Bush used his father s influence to gain a draft-dodging placement with the Texas Air National Guard Which he subsequently failed to serve . Palast picks up the story with Bush s 2000 US Presidential Election campaign where he claims Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris used their influence to purge and discount the ballots of predominantly Gore-supporting black voters through the fake felons list compiled by private company DBT/ChoicePoint for US$ 4 million . Palast goes on to examine the corporate donors to Bush s election campaign , such as Enron CEO Ken Lay , who as members of Bush s pioneer network contributed huge sums through family and friends , and who he claims subsequently profited from the Bush presidency with senior government appointments , no-bid contracts , executive orders and deregulation . Palast outlines what he refers to as the Bush-cycle , where Bush family members use money to gain political office and then use the office to gain even more money , dating back to Senator Prescott Bush who funded the family s entry into the oil business , citing the example of Bush s Harken Energy winning a contract to drill in the Persian Gulf thanks he alleges to Bush Snr s presidency .

Does the response "Walk out of interviews" correctly answer the question "What methods does Palast claim Bush used during his election campaign?"?
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Output:
no