In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Respondents reversed their position at oral argument) that once subsection four applies, subsection one no longer governs. The parties do dispute the meaning of the word "claimant" in subsection four. Under the plurality's view, as Chief Justice Eismann points out in the Gillihan II dissent, the word "claimant" in subsection four must be synonymous with the idea of "prevailing party." This is because, in order for the word "claimant" in subsection four to refer to either the defendant or plaintiff, it must also signify that such a defendant or plaintiff has prevailed in the personal injury action, since losing parties do not recover attorney fees under Idaho law. See Gillihan II at 271, 92 P.3d at 521 (Eismann, J., concurring in disse 53 Idaho 200, 201, 23 P.2d 739, 740 (1933) (<HOLDING>); In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58 from
Holding statements: (A) holding elimination of provisions prior to passage of bill requiring a certificate of convenience and necessity indicates legislature intentionally omitted such provisions (B) holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence (C) holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa (D) holding predecessor statute unconstitutional specifically because of vicariousliability provisions elimination of intent requirement (E) holding that such provisions are valid
(A)

(3) the de fendant's culpability in the fraud perpetrated by the controlled person. See Securities & Exchange Com'n v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir.1996). First, as the Court has found, plaintiffs have failed properly to plead a violation of the 1934 Act. Second, as we also have noted, plaintiffs have failed properly to allege scienter and/or culpability on the part of "Merrill Lynch." Even had we found a properly pled violation of the 1934 Act, we would not automatically impute this violation to "Merrill Lynch" as a controlling entity. See Baesa, 969 F.Supp. at 242 ("[T]he law in this circuit is clear that a subsidiary's fraud cannot be automatically imputed to its corporate parent."). See also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Novak, 997 F.Supp. at 435. Finally the Court
Holding statements: (A) holding that a parent must exercise some control over the subsidiarys activities which does not require that the subsidiary be controlled to an ultimate degree by its parent although something more than mere passive investment by the parent is required the parent must have and exercise control and direction over the affairs of its subsidiary in order for venue to be proper (B) holding that district court has the power to decide what portion of subsidiarys income should be reallocated to its parent (C) holding that a parent company would at the very least have to have been deliberately blind to its subsidiarys fraud in order to have the requisite scienter (D) holding that even in separate trial other crimes evidence would not have been admissible and identification testimony would have been admissible (E) holding that a subsidiarys contacts can be imputed for purposes of service of process where a parent uses the subsidiary to do what it otherwise would have done itself
(C)

97, 292 S.W.2d 324, 328 (1956). The enabling legislation empowering the district court merely repeats the language of Article V, Section 8. Tex.Gov't Code ANN. 24.020 (Vernon 2004) ("The district court has appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over the commissioners court, with the exceptions and regulations prescribed by law."); Ector County, 843 S.W.2d at 479. However, the scope of the district court's jurisdiction has been defined by case law. Ector County, 843 S.W.2d at 479. A party can invoke the district court's constitutional supervisory control over a commissioners court judgment only when the commissioners court acts beyond its jurisdiction or clearly abuses the discre ct No. 18 of Limestone County, 172 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1948, writ refd) (<HOLDING>); Harris County v. Bassett, 139 S.W.2d 180, 182
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court must consider the extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third partys means of infringement (B) recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts (C) holding that the supervisory control of the district court may be exercised through its equitable jurisdiction (D) holding that the district court should have quashed an indictment without requiring the target to show prejudice because the district attorney improperly exercised control over the selection and excusal of grand jurors and the defendant brought this to the attention of the district court before trial (E) holding that a plenary suit is required to invoke the district courts supervisory control over the commissioners court
(C)