Input: Plants also detect the daily cycle of light and darkness. Do you know how plants respond to these changes? Some plants open their leaves during the day. It is during these hours the plant can collect sunlight. At night, the plant closes its leaves to prevent water loss. Many plants respond to the change in the length of the day. As days grow shorter, some plants respond by going dormant. Dormant is when a plant suspends its growth. It does this in order to survive. Shorter days signal the coming of winter. Winter in most areas means extreme cold. It is also very dry in the winter months. As winter approaches, some plants respond by their leaves changing color. After the change in color, they fall off. This dormancy period helps trees. It allows them to survive the cold and dry winter. Plants only want to grow when conditions are right.

Does the response "So they can dry themselves" correctly answer the question "Why do plants open their leaves during the day?"?
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Output: no

Input: Earthquakes seemed to outline a special feature of earth's crust. Earthquakes let scientists know where the crust was moving. This led to the discovery that the Earths crust was broken up into regions, or plates. Earthquakes happen most often along these plate boundaries. This was evidence that continents can move. The movements of the plates are called plate tectonics. The Earths crust is divided into plates. There are about a dozen large plates and several small ones. Each plate is named for the continent or ocean basin it contains. Scientists know he plates are in motion. They now know the direction and speed of this motion . Plates dont move very fast. They move only a few centimeters a year. This is about the same rate fingernails grow. So you might wonder, what could cause this motion? What supplies the energy to cause this change?

Does the response "Earth's land masses" correctly answer the question "Earthquakes happen along plate boundaries, which scientists believe is evidence that what moves?"?
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Output: yes

Input: In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama Bin Laden and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting Bin Laden expelled from Afghanistan or possibly capturing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of Bin Laden's organization remained intact. President Clinton was deeply concerned about Bin Laden. He and his national security advisor, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on Bin Laden's reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about Bin Laden and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate-intended to avoid enhancing Bin Laden's stature by giving him unnecessary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors and of chemical and biological weapons. As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns-the Y2K scare. Some government officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such breakdowns. On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Bin Laden, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, "The time for training is over." Suspecting that this was a signal for Abu Hoshar to commence a terrorist operation, Jordanian police arrested Abu Hoshar and 15 others and informed Washington. One of the 16, Raed Hijazi, had been born in California to Palestinian parents; after spending his childhood in the Middle East, he had returned to northern California, taken refuge in extremist Islamist beliefs, and then made his way to Abu Zubaydah's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, where he learned the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. He and his younger brother had been recruited by Abu Hoshar into a loosely knit plot to attack Jewish and American targets in Jordan. After late 1996, when Abu Hoshar was arrested and jailed, Hijazi moved back to the United States, worked as a cabdriver in Boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters. After Abu Hoshar's release, Hijazi shuttled between Boston and Jordan gathering money and supplies. With Abu Hoshar, he recruited inTurkey and Syria as well as Jordan; with Abu Zubaydah's assistance, Abu Hoshar sent these recruits to Afghanistan for training.

Does the response "Samuel "Sandy" Berger" correctly answer the question "President Clinton along with which top aid explore options regarding Bin Laden, including expulsion from Afghanistan and execution?"?
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Output: yes

Input: As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

Does the response "knowledge of the funding" correctly answer the question "What remains murky about the knowledge we knew during this period and how much money did each Hamberg cell member receive?"?
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Output:
yes