In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: reasons for his back problems, reasons that Anderson, given his attitude toward work and pain, apparently accepted without question. Considering the evidence as a whole, I conclude that substantial evidence does not support a conclusion that Anderson did know or should have known he had a compensable injury which needed to be reported to Frontier until Drs. Gallagher and Pinto provided reports to Anderson's attorney in April or May 2009. It was these reports that first established a relationship between Anderson's injury and his work for Frontier. Therefore, I would hold that the letter sent by Anderson's attorney on May 13, 2009, constituted timely notice to Frontier under the statute and our case law. 1 . Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 320-22, 101 N.W.2d 200, 205-06 (1960) (<HOLDING>). 2 . A worker may qualify for social security
Holding statements: (A) holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act (B) recognizing the natural consequences flowing from a compensable injury absent an independent intervening cause are compensable as well as the aggravation of a preexisting condition infirmity or disease by a workrelated injury (C) holding that when a preexisting infirmity is aggravated by repetitive minute trauma as a result of the ordinary and necessary duties of employment the disability resulting from such aggravation is compensable as a personal injury under the workers compensation statute (D) recognizing that a preexisting disease or infirmity of the employee does not disqualify a claim arising out of employment if the employment aggravated accelerated or combined with the disease or infirmity to produce disability for which compensation is sought (E) holding that psychological conditions resulting from workrelated trauma are compensable
[EX A]: holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act

[EX Q]: see State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, 9, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017. {34} Defendant argues that two provisions in the current Delinquency Act suggest the Legislature's intent to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the Section 32A-2-20 findings. These two provisions, Section 32A-2-24(B) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in probation revocation hearings), and Section 32A-2-16(E) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding), are readily distinguishable from the amenability determination under Section 32A-2-20(B). First, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a delinquency proceeding is constitutionally mandated. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. Second, a probation revocation hearing, l 7, 1140-41 (Ct.App.1978) (<HOLDING>); State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 651, 674 P.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (B) recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights (C) holding right to testify was federal constitutional right (D) holding that treatment as a child is not a constitutional right but a right granted by the legislature and statute met basic due process requirements (E) holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard
[EX A]: holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel

[EX Q]: three officers observed that the green sedan had side windows that appeared to be tinted beyond the legal limit, and both Garcia and Char-bonier admitted that the windows were tinted. (Tr. at 155; GX 2.) The fact that Officer Argila never tested the windows with a "tint meter" to determine if they were, in fact, in violation of the law is immaterial, as only an objectively reasonable belief or suspicion of a violation, supported by articulable facts, is required. See Harrell, 268 F.3d at 149 (probable cause to stop car existed because "an 'objectively reasonable' police officer would have suspected the windows were tinted in violation of 375(12 a)(b) of the Vehicle & Traffic Law"); accord Scopo, 19 F.3d at 781-82; see also United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Officer Argila formed such a
Holding statements: (A) holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant (B) holding that the purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it (C) holding that although jury found officer not to have had probable cause for arrest officer was entitled to immunity because law was not clearly established as to circumstances in which officer found himself (D) holding that in deciding whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity it is not only the evidence of clearly established law that is for the court but also whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his or her conduct was lawful in light of the information the officer had (E) holding that an officers misunderstanding of the tinting law was immaterial because the officer was not taking the bar exam the issue is not how well the officer understood californias window tinting laws but whether he had objective probable cause to believe that these windows were in fact a violation
[EX A]:
holding that the courts determination of whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest is an independent and objective determination and an officers own subjective reason for the arrest is irrelevant