In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: of action to be known as "civil action"[,]' the statute authorizing foreclosures by action compelled such suits to be brought in equity") (some brackets added and some in original); Bank of Hawaii v. Davis Radio Sales and Service, Inc., 6 Haw.App. 469, 480-81, 727 P.2d 419, 427 (1986). A complaint in equity is an appeal to the exercise of the equity court's sound discretion, Fleming v. Napili Kai, Ltd., 50 Haw. 66, 430 P.2d 316 (1967). Equity jurisprudence is not bound by strict rules of law, but can mold its decree "to do justice," id.,' and a court of equity, once having assumed jurisdiction, may retain the case to afford complete relief. Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Haw. 455 (1958). Id. at 481, 727 P.2d at 427. See also Forte v. Nolfi, 25 Cal.App.3d 656, 692, 102 Cal.Rptr. 455, 479 (1972) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, the circuit court had the power
Holding statements: (A) holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan (B) holding that a promissory note is not enforceable against a party who signed the deed of trust but did not sign the promissory note inasmuch as promissory notes and deeds of trust are separate legal documents with unique purposes (C) holding that while nondebtor purchase money deed of trust can be described as part of the same transaction by which the buyer acquired debtors real property that does not elevate the deed of trust to status of something under a plan confirmed (D) holding that when note and deed of trust were null and void and of no legal effect because of forgery assignee of note and deed of trust nevertheless had equitable lien upon property for value of construction work for which note and deed of trust were given (E) holding that a beneficiary under a deed of trust was entitled to reformation of the grantors deed
[A]: holding that mers is capable of being a valid beneficiary of a deed of trust and that while entitlement to enforce both the deed of trust and the promissory note is required to foreclose nothing requires those documents to be unified from the point of inception of the loan

[Q]: that it can be restored, as when a house suffers smoke and water damage in a fire, the tort-feasor is liable for the costs of restoring the property to its former condition, up to the total value of the property. Applying these rules to fire-damaged trees is problematic. Is it the loss of the tree that is permanent, or the loss to the real estate? A tree that has burned and is dead is permanently destroyed, but the land on which the tree was located can be restored, either immediately by bringing in a fully grown tree or by planting a sapling. The question of "permanent" versus "temporary" damage is ultimately less helpful than the question of how the trees were used and their intrinsic value to the property. See, e.g., Mosteller v. Naiman, 416 N.J. Super. 632, 638, 7 A.3d 803 (2010) (<HOLDING>). One legal encyclopedia explains the use-value
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that quantifying damages for trees is a complex subject that depends upon the evidence in the particular case (B) holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality (C) recognizing that moving to the second stage of the saucier analysis is appropriate when the existence of a constitutional violation depends upon the resolution of uncertain state law (D) holding that the question whether section 3553b permits departure in some particular case is subject to plenary review (E) holding that the denial of due process in a particular case is subject to harmless error analysis
[A]: holding that suppression of secondary evidence depends on whether the police obtained the evidence through an exploitation of the prior illegality

[Q]: law also can serve as a basis for revoking an arbitration contract, so long as it does not single out arbitration agreements for special treatment. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-88, 116 S.Ct. 1652. Here, the only possible state statutory ground that Aspen cites for revoking the forum selection clause is N.C. Gen.Stat. 22B-3, which provides in relevant part: "[A]ny provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina that requires the prosecution of any action or the arbitration of any dispute that arises from the contract to be instituted or heard in another state is against public policy and is void and unenforceable." Aspen correctly concedes that the FAA preempts section 22B-3. See Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 4; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683, 687, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (<HOLDING>); Newman ex rel. Wallace v. First Atl. Res.
Holding statements: (A) holding that montana law cannot require special notice provisions in arbitration contracts (B) holding membership in new york stock exchange with concomitant obligation to be bound by arbitration provisions of its constitution and rules sufficient to constitute consent to arbitration of covered disputes whether or not arbitration provisions are specifically incorporated in contract (C) holding that proposed invalidation of the entire arbitration agreement even if the court were convinced that the plaintiff could not afford to pay for the arbitration proceedings was unnecessarily radical because the court could instead simply nullify the fee provisions of the arbitration agreement and force the defendant employer to bear the expense of arbitration (D) holding that montana law requiring all arbitration provisions to be typed in underlined capital letters was preempted because congress precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status (E) holding that arbitration provisions that preclude class actions are not unconscionable
[A]:
holding that montana law cannot require special notice provisions in arbitration contracts