instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
The State, by contrast, argues that because the court's summary denial of Pinholster's claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court's denial of Pinholster's petition for writ of habeas corpus "on the substantive ground that it is without merit," Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that "the California Supreme Court's denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims" (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court
answer:
(D)

question:
as late as February 1994, although the wife stated that she did not think that she lived with them for longer than one year. The wife testified that, during the time that she lived with the husband's parents, they helped her financially. It appears that the trial court may have considered the husband's obligation to support the wife suspended during the time that she lived with his parents, as the order reflects that it calculated arrearage beginning in February 1994. Alimony arrearage is a final judgment as of the date due and is not subject to modification. Harris v. Harris, 553 So.2d 129 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). In some instances alimony obligations can be satisfied by means other than direct payment from the husband to the wife. See, Swindle v. Swindle, 429 So.2d 601 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Frazier, 455 So.2d 883
Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (C) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils (D) holding that obligation to pay mortgage on home was satisfied by payment of fire insurance proceeds where husband maintained fire insurance policy (E) holding that when the house is destroyed by fire and there exists thereon a policy by insurance the money arising therefrom stands in the place instead of such house the proceeds of the policy therefore take the place of the property loss
answer:
(D)

question:
tool and the ability to detain a person for a brief Terry-type investigation when that person runs at the sight of the police. If the police gain no additional information which would lead to probable cause, then the person should be free to go. Second, the Third District opined that the police had no reasonable suspicion that D.T.B. was engaged in any criminal activity. In fact, the police said just the opposite. Thus, the district court found that the officers were not executing any legal duty at the time the juvenile D.T.B. fled. Additionally, the Third District cited a number of other district court cases, decided prior to Wardlow, which held that flight alone was insufficient to demonstrate resisting/obstruction. See, e.g., DM. v. State, 681 So.2d 797 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (<HOLDING>); S.G.K. v. State, 657 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA
Holding statements: (A) holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car (B) holding that passenger of stopped car who fled from police was not guilty of obstruction without violence (C) holding that a passenger has standing to challenge a stops constitutionality because the passenger is seized from the moment a car is stopped (D) holding police officers making a traffic stop could order passengers out of the stopped car (E) holding that police officer was not justified in detaining a passenger who exited and began to walk away from a lawfully stopped vehicle absent an articulated reason as to why it was necessary to detain the passenger for the officers safety
answer:
(B)