In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
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Question: guidelines; and (4) that the special conditions of Neffs supervised release were beyond the limits described in 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied in all respects. I. BACKGROUND On April 29, 1992, Anthony Neff was arrested on charges of driving while intoxicated by Nassau County Police who found in his possession a receipt from a licensed firearms dealership. The receipt indicated that on April 23, 1992, he had purchased a 12 gauge shotgun. Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") interviewed the owner of the firearms dealership and discovered that Neff, who was then on parole for a 1989 attempted burglary conviction, had not revealed that he was a convicted felon when he executed ATF form 4473, a necessar 3 (3d Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Although this language appears broad in
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a claim that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum (B) holding that for purposes of apprendi the statutory maximum is the maximum sentence that may be imposed based solely on the jurys findings (C) holding that where the guideline range is higher than the statutory maximum sentence the court should depart from the lowest range that could support the statutory maximum (D) holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum (E) holding statutory maximum for prior conviction is the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant according to the states sentencing guidelines

Answer: (A)

Question: which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(2)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)®️. Furthermore, 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes judicial review of: (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) ] or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security®️ 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2). However, despite the jurisdictional limitations in 1252(a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(B), we are not precluded from reviewing constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a properly filed petition for review. 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D); Balogun, 425 F.3d at 1359 (<HOLDING>); see also Frech v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 491 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law (B) holding no jurisdiction to review order raising amount of bail and questioning jurisdiction to review denial of motion to reduce bond (C) holding that the real id act leaves this court deprived of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations (D) holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review (E) holding that a habeas petition filed more than 30 days after the effective date of the real id act cannot be transferred to the court of appeals as a petition for review for lack of jurisdiction

Answer: (A)

Question: employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation," Ckandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 357, 115 5. Ct. 2172, 2184, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995) (quotations omitted). The Stewart Court held that, although it was idle, with one scow at sea and the other without a working engine, the Super Scoop was a vessel in navigation because it "had not been taken out of service, permanently anch "repairs," the "necessaries" for which maritime liens are authorized under the Federal Maritime Lien Act specifically include towage. See 46 U.S.C. 31301(4). Although she could not self-propel, the BETTY LYN II could be towed upon 24 hours notice. Nor does the fact that the BETTY LYN II was drydocked for the repairs divest her of vessel status. See N. Pac. S.S. Co., 249 U.S. at 128, 39 S.Ct. at 224 (<HOLDING>); Jones v. One Fifty Foot Gulfstar Motor
Holding statements: (A) holding that rule 4 displaced service provision in the admiralty act (B) holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction (C) holding that admiralty jurisdiction extends to maritime insurance contracts (D) holding that admiralty jurisdiction extended to an action for ship repairs performed in drydock because there is no difference in character as to repairs made upon the hull of a vessel dependent upon whether they are made while she is afloat while in dry dock or while hauled up by ways upon land the nature of the service is identical in the several cases and the admiralty jurisdiction extends to all (E) holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures

Answer:
(D)