TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: ("Due process requires that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his 'day in court.' "). The 1992 statute, as applied in this case, provided State Farm no "fair opportunity" to be heard before it was called upon to divest itself of a significant property interest if it chose to preserve its long-recognized right of subrogation. Instead, the statute placed State Farm in the untenable position of being bound by law to the outcome of private settlement negotiations between the Hassens and UniSun that essentially determined its immediate liability for an award of damages, including noneconomic damages, even though it was not a party to the negotiations and had no available means to assert any legal defenses to the Hassens' claim. Cf. Freidus v. Freidus, 89 So.2d 604 (Fla.1956) (<HOLDING>). The fact that the statute entitled State Farm
Holding statements: (A) holding that it is not (B) holding that foreign states are not persons entitled to rights under the due process clause (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it (E) holding that a corporation is entitled to due process of law insofar as property rights are concerned so that a money judgment may not be entered against it where it was not a party to a cause and was not served with process even though the principal stockholder was a party to the cause

SOLUTION: holding that it is not

PROBLEM: by " '(1) the peculiar dignity and protection to which the law cloaks the human person, as contrasted with articles of commerce; (2) the inequality of the bargaining positions and relative intelligence of the contracting parties; (3) the amount of consideration received; (4) the likelihood of inadequate knowledge concerning future consequences of present injury to the human body and brain; and (5) the haste, or lack thereof, with which release was obtained.' " Finch, 84 Wn.2d at 146 (quoting Finch v. Carlton, 10 Wn. App. 32, 39, 516 P.2d 212 (1973) (McInturff, J., dissenting)). 2 A few cases have imposed an affirmative duty to explain contracts when the defendants know the signer is illiterate or speaks another language. See Scott v. Bodnar, 52 N.J. Super. 439, 145 A.2d 643 (1958) (<HOLDING>); S. Pac. Co. v. Gastelum, 36 Ariz. 106, 283 P.
Holding statements: (A) holding failure to explain consequence of signature to illiterate plaintiff could be grounds for avoiding release (B) holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal (C) holding that failure to explain the effect of a term of supervised release was harmless error where term of imprisonment combined with maximum imprisonment for violation of supervised release was still less than statutory maximum (D) holding that 24 hours is sufficient time for a plaintiff to review release (E) holding that fundamental error occurred and reversal was required when trial court failed to explain allegations or to explain adequately future use of adjudication record

SOLUTION: holding that failure to explain allegations and possible consequences mandated reversal

PROBLEM: Ins. Co. (Mo. Ct. App.), 724 S.W.2d 307; Britt v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co. (N.M. 1995), 907 P.2d 994; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts (N.C. 1964), 134 S.E.2d 654; Celina Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Saylor (Ohio Misc. 1973), 301 N.E.2d 721; Stucky v. Long (Okla. Ct. App. 1989), 783 P.2d 500; Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Or. 1973), 507 P.2d 9; Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Olivier (R.I. 1990), 574 A.2d 1240; Stepp v. Hill (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993), 1993 WL 181984; Whitehead v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), 952 S.W.2d 79. But see McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Minn. 1992), 488 N.W.2d 476, 479 (under UM coverage, "accident" is to be viewed from the perspective of the tortfeasor); Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co. (N. J. 1994), 649 A.2d 1272, 1276 (<HOLDING>); McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident
Holding statements: (A) holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy (B) holding that sciascia v american ins co nj super 1982 443 a2d 1118 which held that for purposes of um coverage accident must be viewed from the insured victims perspective was no longer respectable authority (C) holding that in order for insured to qualify for uim benefits there must have been a liability policy in effect um coverage does not satisfy this requirement (D) holding that waiver of um coverage was ineffective under south carolina law because insurer did not adequately advise insured party about um coverage (E) holding public policy of um statute not violated by exclusion of um coverage for passenger of vehicle driven by excluded driver

SOLUTION:
holding named driver exclusion eliminating liability coverage as well as um coverage did not contravene um statute because statute required um coverage only if the claimant otherwise qualifies for liability coverage under the policy