In this task, you are given text for US Congressional and California state bills, your task is to generate a summary for this bill.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ''ILSA Enhancement
and Compliance Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
TITLE I--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996

Sec. 101. Multilateral regime.
Sec. 102. Imposition of sanctions.
Sec. 103. Description of sanctions.
Sec. 104. Termination of sanctions.
Sec. 105. Sunset.
Sec. 106. Definitions.
Sec. 107. Effective date.
TITLE II--OFFICE OF GLOBAL SECURITY RISK IN THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION

Sec. 201. Establishment of office.
Sec. 202. Reports.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On September 16, 2003, the Under Secretary for Arms
Control and International Security, John R. Bolton, stated
before the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives that: ''Without question, among rogue states,
those most aggressively seeking to acquire or develop weapons
of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and which are
therefore threats to our national security, are Iran and North
Korea, followed by Libya and Syria. It is also the case that
these states are among those we identify as state sponsors of
terrorism.''.
(2) In his statement before the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) of the United Nations on September 8, 2003,
United States Ambassador Kenneth Brill denounced Iran's
patterns of deception regarding its nuclear program by
declaring Iran to be ''working in secret, going back into the
1980s, to develop sophisticated nuclear facilities; stalling,
stonewalling, and on a number of occasions first providing the
IAEA false information, and then changing its story when the
original version was revealed to be inaccurate; and attempting
to cover up traces of its activities to avoid detection by the
Agency''.
(3) The Final Resolution of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency on September 11, 2003, noted
with concern, ''that the agency environmental sampling at
Natanz has revealed the presence of two types of highly
enriched uranium, which requires additional work to enable the
Agency to arrive at a conclusion; that IAEA inspectors found
considerable modifications had been made to the premises at the
Kalaye Electric Company prior to inspections that may impact on
the accuracy of the environmental sampling; that some of Iran's
statements to the IAEA have undergone significant and material
changes, and that the number of outstanding issues has
increased since the report; and that despite the Board's
statement in June 2003 encouraging Iran as a confidence-
building measure, not to introduce nuclear material into its
pilot centrifuge enrichment cascade at Natanz, Iran has
introduced such material''.
(4) The Government of Iran, in a letter to the
International Atomic Energy Agency of August 19, 2003,
acknowledged that, in the early 1990s, there had been ''bench
scale'' uranium conversion experiments. Iran has indicated that
more time will be needed to find the people involved in these
experiments and to trace any other closed down facilities.
(5) Iranian authorities have stated that none of the
imported uranium had been processed and specifically, that it
had not been used in any centrifuge tests. It was observed,
however, during IAEA verification in March 2003, that some of
the UF<INF>6</INF> was in fact missing from the two small
cylinders.
(6)(A) Iranian authorities told the International Atomic
Energy Agency that the decision to launch a centrifuge
enrichment program had actually been taken in 1985 and that
Iran had received drawings of the centrifuge through a foreign
intermediary around 1987.
(B) The Iranian authorities described the program as having
consisted of three phases: activities during the first phase,
from 1985 until 1997, had been located mainly at the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) premises in Tehran; during
the second phase, between 1997 and 2002, the activities had
been concentrated at the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran;
during the third phase, 2002 to the present, the research and
development and assembly activities were moved to the Natanz
facility.
(7) In the August 19, 2003, letter from Iran, the
International Atomic Energy Agency was informed that, in the
past, apart from planned co-operation in laser fusion and laser
spectroscopy which never materialized, there had been a
research thesis on laser spectroscopy prepared by a university
student in co-operation with the laser division of the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran. Such a study by the AEOI could
later prove to be relevant to the implementation of laser
enrichment programs in Iran.
(8) In September 2003, Britain, France, and Germany
nevertheless offered western technology to Iran if it stopped
its nuclear fuel enrichment program and accepted more intrusive United
Nations inspections of its nuclear facilities, all in defiance of the
United States efforts to achieve a united front to counter the
burgeoning Iranian nuclear program.
(9) European oil investment and credit provisions have
unquestionably helped the Iranian economy by enabling it to
build its nuclear program. The Iranians are boasting that as
much as $20,000,000,000 in oil agreements have been signed
between Iran and European Union countries since 1995.
(10) France's Totalfina formed a multi-billion dollar
consortium to develop Iranian oil fields of South Pars in 1995
and has been adding to its development ever since. Britain has
issued credit guarantees to back up its oil investments in Iran
as well.
(11) Germany is actively seeking to increase its exports to
Iran and in 2001 it quadrupled its export insurance to that
country. The French bank BNP Paribas has arranged
$2,230,000,000 in loans for Iran since 1990.
(12) Europe has also been actively seeking a European
Union-Iran trade pact, formally giving the go-ahead to pursue
investments in Iran.
(13) The Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation,
John S. Wolf, in testimony before the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate on March 19, 2003, stated that: ''Libya
has crossed the nuclear threshold and is among the list of
nuclear wannabees. These wannabees seek nuclear weapons
capabilities even though they are all parties to the [Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons].''.
(14) In testimony before the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate on February 10, 2003, the Director
of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, remarked: ''Libya
clearly intends to reestablish its offensive chemical weapons
capability and has produced at least 100 tons of chemical
agents at its Rabta facility.''.
(15) In addition to manufacturing and possessing chemical
weapons, Libya has a history of employing them. According to
the Department of Defense, in 1987 Libya employed chemical
agents against troops from its neighboring country of Chad.
Libya has used missiles and aircraft in combat. Libya also
''fired SCUD missiles at an Italian island in 1987'', according
to the 2001 Department of Defense ''Proliferation: Threat and
Response'' Report.
(16) According to the same report, Libya may be capable of
producing small quantities of biological agents. And, ''with
the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya's ability to acquire
biological-related equipment and expertise will increase''.
(17) The Government of Libya continues to seek ballistic
missile delivery systems that could be used for chemical or
nuclear warfare. On October 31, 2002, the director of the
United States Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Ronald
Kadish, stated: ''The Libyans have been pretty active in trying
to get missile capability, and not just short-range. They have
enough money to buy it . . . We worry a lot about Libya in the
Missile Defense Agency.''.

TITLE I--AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996

SEC. 101. MULTILATERAL REGIME.

(a) Multilateral Negotiations.--Section 4(a) of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by inserting ''and Libya'' after ''Iran''; and
(2) by striking ''Iran's efforts'' and inserting ''the
efforts of both Iran and Libya''.
(b) Reports to Congress.--Section 4(b) of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as
follows:
''(b) Reports to Congress.--The President shall prepare and
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 6
months after the date of enactment of the ILSA Enhancement and
Compliance Act, and once every 6 months thereafter, a report on the
specific diplomatic efforts undertaken pursuant to subsection (a), the
results of these efforts, and a description of proposed diplomatic
efforts pursuant to such subsection. Each report shall include--
''(1) the countries that have agreed to undertake measures
to further the objectives of section 3 with respect to either
Iran or Libya;
''(2) a description of those measures, including--
''(A) government actions with respect to public or
private entities (or their subsidiaries) located in
their territories, that are engaged in Iran or Libya;
''(B) any decisions by the governments of these
countries to rescind or continue the provision of
credits, guarantees, or other governmental assistance
to these entities; and
''(C) actions taken in international fora to
further the objectives of section 3; and
''(3) the countries that have not agreed to undertake
measures to further the objectives of section 3 with respect to
Iran or Libya, and the reasons therefor.''.
(c) Suspension.--Section 4(c) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to read as follows:
''(c) Suspension.--The President may suspend the application of
section 5(a) with respect to nationals of a country on a case by case
basis for a period of not more than 6 months, if the President
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees at least 30 days
before the suspension is to take effect that--
''(1) the suspension is vital to the national security of
the United States; and
''(2) the country has undertaken substantial measures,
including economic sanctions, to prevent the acquisition and
development of weapons of mass destruction by the Government of
Iran or Libya, as the case may be, and to carry out activities
described in section 2 of this Act.''.
(d) Investigations.--Section 4 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
''(f) Investigations.--
''(1) In general.--Upon public or private disclosure of
activity related to investment in Iran or Libya as described in
this Act, the President shall direct the Secretary of the
Treasury to initiate an investigation into the possible
imposition of sanctions with respect to such activity and to
provide a recommendation to the President for such purposes.
''(2) Determination and notification.--Not later than 90
days after the date of the disclosure of activity described in
paragraph (1), the President shall make a determination whether
or not to impose sanctions with respect to the activity and
shall notify the appropriate congressional committees of the
basis for this determination.''.

SEC. 102. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.

(a) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Petroleum Resources.--
Section 5(a) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ''to Iran'' and inserting
''to Development of Petroleum Resources'';
(2) by striking '', with actual knowledge,''; and
(3) by striking ''Iran's ability to develop petroleum
resources in Iran'' and inserting ''the ability of Iran or
Libya to develop petroleum resources, as the case may be''.
(b) Sanctions With Respect to Development of Weapons of Mass
Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--Section 5(b) of the Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended to
read as follows:
''(b) Mandatory Sanctions With Respect to Development of Weapons of
Mass Destruction or Other Military Capabilities.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the President shall impose 2 or more of the
sanctions described in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the
President determines that a person has, on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act, exported, transferred, or otherwise provided to
Iran or Libya any goods, services, technology, or other items the
provision of which significantly and materially--
''(1) contributed to the ability of Iran or Libya to
acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or
destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional
weapons or enhanced the military or paramilitary capabilities
of Iran or Libya; or
''(2) contributed to the ability of Iran or Libya to
maintain its aviation capabilities.''.
(c) Persons Against Which the Sanctions Are To Be Imposed.--Section
5(c)(2) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note) is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ''or'' at the
end;
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and
inserting ''; or''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
''(D) is a private or government lender, insurer,
underwriter, re-insurer, or guarantor of the person
referred to in paragraph (1).''.

SEC. 103. DESCRIPTION OF SANCTIONS.

Paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 6 of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking ''may''
each place it occurs and inserting ''shall''.

SEC. 104. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.

Section 8 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701
note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking the heading;
(B) in the introductory matter preceding paragraph
(1)--
(i) by inserting ''or Libya'' after
''Iran'' the first place it appears; and
(ii) by inserting ''or Libya, as the case
may be'' after ''Iran'' the second place it
appears;
(C) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ''and'' at the
end;
(D) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ''; and''; and
(E) by adding at the end the following:
''(3) poses no threat to the national security of the
United States, its interests, or allies.''; and
(2) by striking subsection (b).

SEC. 105. SUNSET.

Section 13 of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is hereby repealed.

SEC. 106. DEFINITIONS.

(a) Investment.--Section 14(9) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended in the last sentence by
striking ''does not include'' and inserting ''includes''.
(b) Person.--Section 14(14)(B) of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by inserting after ''trust'' the following: '',
financial institution, insurer, underwriter, re-insurer,
guarantors''; and
(2) by striking ''operating as a business enterprise''.
(c) Petroleum Resources.--Section 14(15) of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ''and'' and inserting a comma; and
(2) by inserting '', and petroleum by-products'' after
''resources''.

SEC. 107. EFFECTIVE DATE.

The amendments made by sections 102 and 103 shall apply to
investments made on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

TITLE II--OFFICE OF GLOBAL SECURITY RISK IN THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION

SEC. 201. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE.

The Securities and Exchange Commission shall establish an Office of
Global Security Risk within the Division of Corporation Finance. The
duties of this office shall include, but will not be limited to:
(1) Establishing a process by which the Commission
identifies all issuers (as defined in section 2(a)(7) of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201(a)(7))) that are
operating in countries, particularly Iran and Libya, the
governments of which the Secretary of State has determined, for
purposes of section 6(j)(1) of the Export Administration Act of
1979 (50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(1)), have repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.
(2) Ensuring that all issuers operating in countries
described in paragraph (1) are disclosing to investors the
nature of their operations in such countries.
(3) Implementing enhanced disclosure requirements based on
the asymmetric nature of the risk to corporate share value and
reputation stemming from business interests in these higher
risk countries.
(4) Coordinating with other government agencies to ensure
the sharing of relevant information across the Federal
Government.
(5) Initiating a global dialogue to ensure that foreign
corporations whose shares are traded in the United States are
properly disclosing their activities in countries described in
paragraph (1) to United States investors.

SEC. 202. REPORTS.

The Commission shall provide the appropriate Congressional
committees with quarterly reports on the activities of Office of Global
Security Risk established pursuant to section 201.
ILSA Enhancement and Compliance Act - Amends the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to urge the President to immediately commence diplomatic efforts to establish a multilateral sanctions regime against Libya (currently limited to Iran). Expands reporting requirements by the President to Congress to cover Libya and specified governmental actions and assistance with respect to Iran or Libya.

Authorizes the President to suspend the application of sanctions upon certification that: (1) the suspension is vital to national security; and (2) the country has undertaken substantial measures to prevent the acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction by the Government of Iran or Libya.

Directs the President: (1) upon disclosure of specified activity related to investment in Iran or Libya, to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate an investigation; and (2) to impose two or more of specified mandatory sanctions upon determining that a person has provided to Iran or Libya any goods, services, technology, or other items which significantly and materially contributed to their ability to acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or specified other capabilities.

Makes specified sanctions under the Act mandatory. Repeals the Act's sunset provision.

Directs the Securities and Exchange Commission to establish an Office of Global Security Risk to: (1) establish a process for identifying all issuers that are operating in countries (particularly Iran and Libya) whose governments have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; and (2) ensure and enhance issuer disclosures regarding operations, risks of operating, and activities in such countries.