In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In Landgraf, the Court noted that a statute only truly operates retroactively if applying it would "impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Id. 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see also RTC v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1994)(analyzing retroactivity of lease repudiation damage limitation provision of FIRREA). Thus, like other courts that have analyzed similar FIRREA provisions, we must address prior banking law to determine whether application of the damage limitation provisions of 1821(e)(3) would have the retroactive effect defined in Landgraf. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit, 30 F.3d at 1388 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, in the Crafts' case, it
Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that firreas damage limitations for repudiation of leases worked no substantive change in the law and thus their application was not retroactive (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary
Example Output: holding that the act is not retroactive

Example Input: of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Petitioner claims that Apprendi falls within the narrow scope of the second category of exceptions and is therefore applicable to his case retroactively. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether Apprendi should be considered a "watershed rule," falling within the Teague exceptions. However, every Circuit Court which has considered this question has held that Apprendi should not be applied retroactively on collateral review. United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 146 (4th Cir.2001); Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir.2001); see, e.g., Abdullah v. United States, 240 F.3d 683, 687 (8th Cir.2001)(<HOLDING>); Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262,
Holding statements: (A) holding that petitioner was barred from bringing apprendi claim on second or successive motion to vacate because supreme court had not made apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review (B) holding apprendi is not retroactive (C) holding that apprendi does not apply on collateral review (D) holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review that was previously unavailable (E) holding that the apprendi decision is not applicable on collateral review
Example Output: holding apprendi is not retroactive

Example Input: requires that the "parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration." See Section 9. What language is required in an agreement to indicate that a judgment of the court is authorized is not set forth in Section 9. While several courts have held that "an explicit agreement between the parties providing for judicial confirmation of an award is not an absolute prerequisite to [S]ection 9 authority to enter judgment on the award," see Booth v. Hume Pub. Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir.1990) (where parties agree that arbitration would be binding and final, district court has authority to enter judgment on award); see also Milwaukee Typographical Union No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 639 F.2d 386, 390 (7th Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838, 102 S.Ct. 144, 70
Holding statements: (A) holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law (B) holding that the term final and conclusive precludes judicial review of army claims decisions (C) holding an appeal may be taken from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration (D) recognizing intervention is generally impermissible after entry of final judgment and exception allowing postjudg ment intervention in the interests of justice is limited to permitting intervention by affected persons so that an appeal can be taken (E) holding that an award deemed to final conclusive and binding implicitly agrees that federal court intervention may be sought to compel compliance
Example Output:
holding that there is nothing for a court to review when an agency has never issued a final and binding judgment that has the force of law