In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 207-08 (2d Cir.2007); see also United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d Cir.2008). In fact we identify no error in this case, plain or otherwise, because the district court's statement that it had "look[ed] at the relevant conduct, what happened with the fellow you got $250,000 from," and its statement that it had reviewed the Pre-sentence Report ("PSR") and "adopt[ed] the factual information that's contained" therein, are reasonably construed as an explicit adoption of the PSR's detailed explanation for why Patterson's conduct causing a $250,000 loss to a California victim was fraudulent and qualified as relevant to the crime of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G. IB 1.3(a)(2). See generally United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 539 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). We further conclude that the adopted PSR
Holding statements: (A) holding district courts adoption of the presentence report constitutes sufficient findings (B) holding that factual findings set forth in the psi not objected to by a defendant are deemed admitted (C) holding that a district court satisfies its obligation to make factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report (D) holding that express adoption of factual findings in presentence report is sufficient (E) holding that this court will only set aside district courts factual findings when they are clearly erroneous

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that Ms. Toomer offers, no evidence of Ms. Stiger's threat other than her own self-serving assertions and that such unsupported, self-serving assertions do not give rise to a triable issue of fact. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (when scrutinizing motions for summary judgment courts "examine the facts in the record and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but do not accept bare conclusory allegations, as fact") (internal citations omitted); Ward v. District of Columbia, 950 F.Supp.2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) ("[S]elf-serving assertions are not sufficient to create an issue of material fact."); Musgrove v. Gov't of the District of Columbia, 775 F.Supp.2d 158, 170 (D.D.C. 2011) (<HOLDING>). Even if unsupported, self-serving assertions
Holding statements: (A) holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment (B) holding that evidence of alleged limitations obtained soon after accident was without more insufficient to survive summary judgment (C) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that a plaintiffs selfserving deposition testimony was not enough for her fdcpa claim to survive summary judgment but that a consumer survey may have been sufficient (E) holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
of the federal Equal Protection Clause. With respect, we do not think that the Indiana court correctly applied federal law." (citations omitted)); Berschback v. Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Dist., 154 Mich.App. 102, 397 N.W.2d 234, 240 (1986) ("The deeision[ ] in ... Sturrup appear[s] to be [an] anomalfy] in this area of the law. [T]he focus on the 'overbroad' and 'overinclusive' nature of the rules ... to find a denial of equal protection departs significantly from traditional equal protection analysis."), appeal denied, 427 Mich. 851, 398 N.W.2d 1 (1986). In addition, a number of courts have expressly held that various versions of high school association transfer rules do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g., Griffin High Sch., 822 F.2d 671 (<HOLDING>); In re United States ex rel. Mo. State High
Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer rule denying eligibility to students transferring from public to private schools did not violate the students rights to due process or equal protection of the laws as provided by the fourteenth amendment (B) holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection (C) holding transfer eligibility rule did not deny the student equal protection of the laws or procedural or substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment (D) holding that schools have no duty under the due process clause to protect students from assaults by other students even where the school knew or should have known of the danger presented (E) holding missouri transfer rule did not violate equal protection

Ex Output:
(A)