instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
Leak should not have been admitted, because, they say, 1) its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and 2) it was inadmissible under the general exclusionary rule. However, Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County did not object before the trial court based on these grounds. Because Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County failed to state these grounds for their objection, the alleged error was not preserved for appeal. Rule 103, Ala. R. Evid. The trial record shows that Tinsley and Tuscaloosa County based their objection to the testimony on a relevancy argument. They do not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that the evidence was relevant. Therefore, they have not presented any basis for appellate review on this issue. See Landreth v. State, 600 So.2d 440 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (<HOLDING>). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Holding statements: (A) holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal (B) holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered (C) holding that the statement of specific grounds in a motion for a new trial waives all other grounds not specified (D) holding that where specific grounds for an objection are stated at trial all other grounds are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal (E) holding that a claim not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal
answer:
holding that summary judgment must be affirmed where multiple grounds are asserted and the appellant does not attack all grounds on appeal

question:
speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
answer:
holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241

question:
notice. Although in R.G. the record contained an order that notice be sent, we nonetheless find it controlling here. Appellant next argues that R.G. was wrongly decided because it did not require the State affirmatively to show he received notice. Appellant cites no authority holding section 54.11 places this burden on the State. Rather, he analogizes to Family Code section 53.06, which provides, "The juvenile court shall direct issuance of a summons to ... the child named in the petition.... " Tex. Fam.Code Ann. 53.06 (Vernon 1996). He also relies on the case law interpreting section 53.06, which requires the State affirmatively to show the juvenile received service of summons for jurisdiction to vest in the juvenile court. See In the Matter of D.W.M., 562 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Tex.1978) (<HOLDING>); see also Grayless v. State, 567 S.W.2d 216,
Holding statements: (A) holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles (B) holding that juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims (C) recognizing juveniles right to counsel in certain juvenile proceedings (D) holding the trial court had jurisdiction where summons was served on the attorney advocate for the juveniles guardian ad litem (E) holding 1 record must affirmatively show summons with which juvenile was served for jurisdiction to vest in juvenile court and 2 no jurisdiction existed despite juveniles attendance because no affirmative showing of service was made
answer:
holding juveniles statement inadmissible when after being placed in custody police took juvenile to police station and held juvenile in area where adult suspects were held instead of taking juvenile to a juvenile processing office or any of the places listed as an alternative in section 5202 and placing juvenile in specifically designated office for juveniles