In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: right to additional BLM permits or approvals. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 673, 676-77 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992, 91 S.Ct. 456, 27 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1971); Angelina Holly Corp. v. Clark, 587 F.Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.D.C.1984). They hold no more than an expectancy, the loss of which does not constitute a deprivation of property within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S.Ct. 446, 451, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 (1980); National Consumer Information Center v. Gallegos, 549 F.2d 822, 828 (D.C.Cir.1977). Their absence from the lawsuit does not preclude the district court from issuing the preliminary injunction. Compare Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.1974) (<HOLDING>). C. Exhaustion Mountain States asserts that
Holding statements: (A) holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction (B) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) recognizing the inappropriateness of a preliminary injunction where credibility determinations must be made but granting a preliminary injunction because the legal and factual issues have been sufficiently illuminated (E) holding that contract with construction company rendered inequitable a preliminary injunction restraining the contractors from performing the contractual obligations
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: evidence suggesting that each of the hotel stays involved the same individual, (e.g., the perpetrator gave the same fictitious address and/or fictitious telephone number; tips on credit card vouchers were in such amounts that the totals rounded off to even dollar amounts, the perpetrator departed prior to the scheduled end of his stay without checking out). "Evidence of this kind may be sufficient alone to establish a perpetrator's identity. See United States v. Milhollan, 599 F.2d 518, 524-25 (3d Cir.1979) (finding similar modus operandi evidence probative of identity); 2 Jack B. Wein-stein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404[16] (1992) (discussing "signature" evidence in context of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b))." See also Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497 (9th Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). Evidence of individual modus operandi may be
Holding statements: (A) holding that admission of testimony which denominated appellants modus operandi in previously uncharged and charged crimes was not clearly erroneous (B) holding that rule 404b evidence is probative of intent only when the prior acts were part of the same scheme or involved a similar modus operandi as the present offense (C) holding that prior con victions are not related simply because the crimes used the same modus operandi were part of a crime spree or shared the same motive (D) holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive (E) holding other crimes evidence was properly admitted to establish modus operandi when the defendant attacked older women as they exited their garages in the same area of chicago
Example Output: (A)

Example Input: Roscitis cannot recover anything above that amount from ICSOP. This frustrates the Legislature's purpose in passing 27-2-2.4, which was to "give an aggrieved and injured party the right to proceed directly against an insurer in those circumstances in which the tortfeasor has sought protection under the applicable provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code." D'Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222, 1229 (R.I.2005). ICSOP counters, however, by noting that the Rhode Island Legislature limited recovery under 27-7-2.4 to "insurance coverage available for the tort complained of' (emphasis added). Thus, ICSOP argues, it was clearly not the Legislature's intent to expand the scope of coverage available under an insurance policy. Cf. Barber v. Canela, 570 A.2d 670, 671 (R.I. 1990) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Yet IC-SOP contends that
Holding statements: (A) holding that a related direct action statute ri gen laws 2772 is designed only to provide a remedy to the injured party and not to enlarge the liability of the insurer beyond the limits stated in the policy (B) holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer (C) holding that when an insurer files suit to cancel a policy the entire liability of the insurer both on the policy and under the statute is put in issue (D) holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer (E) holding assignable to injured party insureds claim against insurer for judgment in excess of policy limits
Example Output:
(A)