In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: reimbursement decisions to be made on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 549. Of note here, we explained that "even if the Commission had promulgated fee guidelines, the provider would not have a statutory right or privilege to be paid the amount set out in the guideline." Id. According to East Side, Vista is, likewise, neither entitled to a fee guideline nor entitled to any set amount of reimbursement. See id. Given that no specific reimbursement amount is required, even where the Division has established fee guidelines, and that the Division can reason ng statute and rule as whole to find broad definition of "prohibited activities" and absence of definition for "market power" as providing constitutionally permissible notice of type of prohibited conduct contemplated); Tinning, 875 S.W.2d at 409 (<HOLDING>). The language in these cases, similar to
Holding statements: (A) holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance (B) holding term share legal fees although not expressly defined provides adequate notices of type of conduct it would include (C) holding that when a term is defined in the statute it need not be further alleged in the indictment (D) holding that although term was not limited by the specification it was expressly defined in a narrow manner in the prosecution history (E) holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution

Output: holding that when a term is not defined in a contract the presumption is that the term is to be given its ordinary meaning and significance

Input: Consider Input: a favorable decision, by which we mean that the "prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too speculative." In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1101 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The NMCGA contends that the provision for attorneys' fees is an "egregious and illegal use of tax dollars." NMCGA's Response at 7. It is well established that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge state and federal spending decisions. Colo. Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1399 (10th Cir.1992) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, Cl. 183, 184-85 (2006) (<HOLDING>). While NMCGA does not have standing to
Holding statements: (A) holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties (B) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party (C) holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment (D) holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement (E) holding that an intervenor lacked standing to challenge a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the united states on the grounds that one of the plaintiffs claims was fraudulent because the intervenors were not parties to the settlement and suffered no personal harm from it notwithstanding the potential that its tax dollars went to pay the allegedly fraudulent claim

Output: holding that an intervenor has no power to veto a settlement by other parties

Input: Consider Input: therefore is not owed Chevron deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."); see also Wilderness Soc'y v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) ("If, under these canons, or other traditional means of determining Congress's intentions, we are able to determine that Congress spoke clearly ..., then we may not defer to the[agency's] contrary interpretation."). Moreover, the Secretary's regulation conflicts with NAGPRA's plain language and so is invalid for that reason. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001) (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
Holding statements: (A) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law (B) holding that chevron deference is due only to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency (C) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (D) holding that under a due weight deference standard a more reasonable interpretation overcomes an agency interpretation (E) holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority
Output: holding that chevron deference is due only when the agency acts pursuant to delegated authority and the agency action has the force of law