In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: The defendants, contend that, assuming their conduct was unlawful and negligent as charged in the complaint, it was nevertheless not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered. But a tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which result in the ordinary course of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. The fact that there were also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability. Ordinarily these questions of proximate and intervening cause are left to the jury for its factual determination. [Ibid, (citations omitted).] See also, J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 352, 714 A.2d 924 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 465-66, 545
Holding statements: (A) holding that prolonged sexual abuse of neighboring adolescent girls by defendants husband with known proclivity for such behavior not a superseding cause of wifes negligent failure to warn victims or take other reasonable steps to prevent harm to them (B) holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims (C) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse

A: (A)
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Q: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS's liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase "liabilities covered" in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not "covered," and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from "liabilities covered." See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once
Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage

A: (E)
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Q: have travelled in interstate commerce to commit the murder, thereby making Mandaeina the cause of McGuire's interstate travel. Second, the evidence listed above also provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that McGuire travelled in interstate commerce with the intent to murder Strada. In view of the evidence, the jury could fairly conclude that McGuire's intent to commit the murder was formed in January 1990, continued up until the time that he committed the murder on May 16, 1990 and existed at the time that he travelled from Rockford, Illinois to Kansas City, Missouri, on some date betweeh May 12,1990, and May 16,1990. See United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937, 107 S.Ct. 415, 93 L.Ed.2d 366 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Earlywine's testimony that he was
Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must show only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them (B) recognizing that the government need only prove that crime occurred reasonably near the date stated in the indictment (C) holding after lopez that the interstate nexus element of the hobbs act still requires the government to show only a minimal connection to interstate commerce (D) holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus (E) holding that under a similar statute the government need only show that the defendant had the intent to carry on illegal activity and that the crime occurred in conjunction with interstate travel

A:
(E)
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