instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
the terms of the agreement as to the status of the donor in writing. After the mother and her partner ended their relationship, the sperm donor filed suit to adjudicate his parental rights. The court looked to the plain language of the Texas statute and determined that the sperm donor lacked standing to pursue the paternity action. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. 160.702 (Vernon Supp.2006) ("A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction."). The "do-it-yourself" manner in which the artificial insemination was conducted does not alter the fact that B.O.C. was a sperm donor under section 742.14. The statute does not require that the artificial insemination be performed in a clinical setting to apply. Compare McIntyre v. Crouch, 98 Or.App. 462, 780 P.2d 239 (1989) (<HOLDING>), with C.O. v. W.S., 64 Ohio Misc.2d 9, 639
Holding statements: (A) holding that where the donor nonpaternity statute did not explicitly reference physician involvement the statute applied even though the sperm was not provided to a physician (B) holding that writ was explicitly abolished by statute (C) holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute (D) holding that where first amendment freedoms are not infringed by the statute a vagueness claim must be evaluated as the statute is applied to the facts of the case (E) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause
answer:
(A)

question:
CURIAM. Appellant, Roberto Trejo, was indicted for racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering. His predicate offenses included attempted first degree murder, shooting into a building, and three armed robberies with a firearm. He was also charged on substantive counts for the same five offenses. Trejo was acquitted on the racketeering, conspiracy, and shooting into a building charges, but convicted of attempted second degree murder with a firearm and the three armed robberies. We affirm on all issues raised in this appeal, including his fifty-year sentence. The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) does not apply to appellant's sentence. See Guzman v. State, 110 So.3d 480, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (<HOLDING>). As we did in Guzman, we certify conflict with
Holding statements: (A) holding that williams fiftyyear sentence is not a de facto life sentence in violation of graham (B) recognizing that njeither graham nor miller explicitly apply to the functional equivalent of life without parole ie de facto life sentences (C) holding that the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile does not violate the holding of roper (D) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (E) holding that double jeopardy clause does not prohibit imposition of death sentence in alabama despite life sentence in georgia in murdertrial arising from same homicide
answer:
(D)

question:
proceeding against him. 65 . 221 B.R. 49 (Bankr.D.Conn.1998). 66 . Id. at 51. 67 . Bassett, 221 B.R. at 55. 68 . Id. 69 . 11 U.S.C. 550(a). 70 . Id. at 1322. 71 . Id. 72 .The "mere conduit" exception is "an equitable exception to the literal statutory language of 'initial transferee,' ... for initial recipients who are 'mere conduits' with no control over the fraudulently-transferred funds." Harwell, 628 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir.2010). Because SunTrust was the end recipient of the Transfers, it certainly was not a mere conduit. 73 . 446 B.R. 564 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2011). 74 . ATM Financial, 446 B.R. at 566. 75 . Id. 76 . Id. 77 . Id. at 568-71. 78 . Id. at 570-71. 79 . 11 U.S.C. 101(54); Fla. Stat. 726.102(12). 80 . See In re Wayne, 237 B.R. 506, 508-09 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1999) (<HOLDING>). See also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393,
Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) recognizing potential for fraudulent transfer in foreclosure context if debtor enjoyed significant equity in property but received little or no value from the transfer (C) holding that even when the event that would cause the damage had not yet occurred the claims in the case were still ripe for review (D) holding that the debtor could retain exempt property because it was not property of the estate (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default
answer:
(A)