In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

and so require an interpretive step to determine the expressive elements of these processes. However, neither the Supreme Court nor our court has ever drawn a distinction between the process of creating a form of pure speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these processes (the essay or the artwork) in terms of the First Amendment protection afforded. Although writing and painting can be reduced to their constituent acts, and thus described as conduct, we have not attempted to disconnect the end product from the act of creation. Thus, we have not drawn a hard line between the essays John Peter Zenger published and the act of setting the type. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983) (<HOLDING>). The process of expression through a medium
Holding statements: (A) holding that dating is a type of association protected by the first amendment (B) holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment (C) holding first amendment claim requires actual protected conduct (D) holding that possession of marijuana is not protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment (E) holding that a tax on ink and paper burdens rights protected by the first amendment
(E)

its concern with Plaintiffs' lack of proof of causation and specific damages when the court entered summary judgment against them on their injurious falsehood/business disparagement and wrongful interference with business relations claims, and Plaintiffs' testimony at trial failed to further illuminate their assertion that Petta's statements caused them special damages. Plaintiffs' testimony about special damages was unsupported by any documentary evidence, including any business operations analysis, tax returns or similar exhibits, or expert testimony, and Plaintiffs' own con-clusory statements provided little quantifiable evidence of their claimed damages, leaving the jury to speculate regarding special damages. See Gilmore v. Cohen, 95 Ariz. 34, 36-37, 386 P.2d 81, 82-83 (1963) (<HOLDING>). 43 Furthermore, the evidence presented does
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fifth and fourteenth amendments do not entitle a person to a federal remedy for every breach of contract by a state thus unless every breach of every public contract is to be actionable as a violation of constitutional rights it is necessary to distinguish between mere contract rights and constitutional property rights internal citations and quotation marks omitted (B) holding that the governments position must have a reasonable basis in both law and fact citations omitted (C) recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract (D) recognizing in a breach of contract ease that the plaintiff in every case should supply some reasonable basis for computing the amount of damage and must do so with such precision as from the nature of his claim and the available evidence is possible citations omitted (E) holding that one method of computing damages for a breach of contract is the contract price less the reasonable cost of completion
(D)

the Government charged Acosta with criminal activity in both the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and because the "jurors by their verdict rejected that there was any criminal conduct within" the Southern District of New York, the Court "must accept the jurors findings" in concluding that venue does not properly lie within this District. (Id. at 9.) The Court disagrees. As a threshold matter, Acosta waived any challenge to venue by not raising a specific objection to venue until after the jury returned its verdict. This approach is implicit in Second Circuit case law, which requires that a defendant's objection to venue must be specifically articulated by the close of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Lester, No. 96-1519, 1997 WL 321809, at *2 (2d Cir. June 13, 1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Mancebo-Santiago, No.
Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver (C) holding that the failure of three defendants to object to venue did not waive a fourth defendants objection and therefore affirming the trial courts decision to transfer venue (D) holding that under the second circuits longstanding doctrine a defendants failure to specifically object to venue at the close of evidence constitutes a waiver of objection to venue (E) holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error
(D)