In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") because Erickson failed to allege specific facts showing a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sanford v. Member-Works, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing elements of a.RICO claim and particularity requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)). The district court properly dismissed Erickson's claims under the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act ("RES-PA") and the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") as time-barred because Erickson filed his action more than three years after the alleged violations. See 12 U.S.C. 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year statute of limitations for violations of RES-PA); 15 U.S.C. 1640(e) (an action for damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); see also King, 784 F.2d at 915 (<HOLDING>). However, after the district court dismissed
Holding statements: (A) holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc 2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction (B) holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond (C) holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer (D) holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction (E) holding under section 1144s predecessor statute that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period

Output: holding fiveyear limitation period in 28 usc 2462 runs from date of predicate violation not from date of administrative assessment of sanction

Input: Consider Input: (emphasis added) (quoting Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720). 27 . Faust, 337 S.W.3d at 335 (emphasis added). 28 . Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tex.1995). 29 . See Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 218. 30 . Synar v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 1299 00428-CV, 2001 WL 1263573, at *6 (Tex.App.-Tyler Oct. 17, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). 31 . See id. 32 . See Tex.R. Evid. 803(18); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556. 33 . C 545 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g). 55 . See id. 56 . See Tex.R. Evid. 401; Nichols, 379 S.W.3d at 387-89. 57 . See Sw. Country Enters., Inc., 991 S.W.2d at 493-94; see also Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(B), 33.2; Tex.R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 58 . See Barraza v. Eureka Co., Inc., 25 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). 59 . See Charter Oak Fire Ins. v. Perez, 446
Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed (B) holding that threatening employee to mind her own business investigating her videotaping her without her permission and forcing her to take polygraph could not be considered adverse employment actions because they had no effect on conditions of employment (C) holding that a plaintiff who pled in her complaint that her law firm actively misled her in support of her request for application of the discovery rule had sufficiently pled the application of the doctrine (D) holding that testimony of plaintiff and her coworkers regarding cause of her injury was pure conjecture (E) holding that plaintiffs allegations that her supervisor was a lesbian and that she made improper remarks to her including telling the plaintiff to invite her to lunch and making comments about plaintiffs coworkers private lives and sexual preferences and on one occasion approaching the plaintiff from behind hugging her and whispering in her ear a request for a cookie from another table did not suffice to establish a hostile working environment

Output: holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed

Input: Consider Input: included offense instructions requested by a party constitutes error, as does the trial court's failure to give an appropriate included offense instruction that has not been requested. Such error, however, is harmless when the jury convicts the defendant of the charged offense or of an included offense greater than the included offense erroneously omitted from the instructions. The error is harmless because jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions, and, under the standard jury instructions, the jury, "in reaching a unanimous verdict as to the charged offense [or as to the greater included offense, would] not have reached, much less considered," [Holbron ], 80 Hawai'i [at] 47, 904 P.2d [at 932,] the absent lesser offense on which it should have been instructed. [Id.] (<HOLDING>). To the extent that [State v.]Kupau [, 76
Holding statements: (A) holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause (B) holding that the trial courts erroneous instruction on the nonexistent included offense of attempted reckless manslaughter was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the jury reached a unanimous guilty verdict as to the charged offense of attempted murder in the second degree (C) holding that defendants conviction must be vacated where defendant argued that trial court committed plain error in instructing jury on nonexistent crime of attempted second degree murder (D) holding that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue based on the first districts decision in montgomery that the standard attempted manslaughterbyact instruction was fundamentally erroneous where betts was charged with attempted firstdegree premeditated murder and convicted of the necessary lesserincluded offense of attempted seconddegree murder (E) holding that where jury had opportunity to convict defendant of manslaughter but convicted of greater offense of second degree murder refusing to give instruction on negligent homicide was if error harmless
Output: holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause