In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court's factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th
Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes 46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
[EX A]: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard

[EX Q]: P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997) (providing that a party seeking to change custody must establish that circumstances have substantially changed since the most recent custodial order, and that any events that took place before the prior proceedings cannot be used to show changed circumstances). Although we will not substantively review the decree's child custody arrangement because of mootness, we note, in passing, that a district court, faced with evidence that one parent is attempting to disrupt the other parent's 8 (1993); see also NRS 125.480(1) (providing that the sole consideration in awarding custody of a child is the best interest of the child). 11 84 Nev. 710, 447 P.2d 664 (1968). 12 Id. at 711, 447 P.2d at 665. 13 Cf. Hopper v. Hopper, 113 Nev. 1138, 1143, 946 P.2d 171, 174-75 (1997) (<HOLDING>). 14 Most v. Most, 477 A.2d 250, 263 (Me. 1984)
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that conduct that preceded the prior custody determination cannot be admitted to show a change in circumstances (B) holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances (C) holding that a showing of a change in circumstances that is or is likely to be beneficial to the child may also warrant a change in custody (D) holding that a subsequent petition may be filed upon a showing of a change in circumstances (E) holding court cannot change custody without showing that change is in best interests of child
[EX A]: holding the teenage childrens preference to live in fathers home was sufficient evidence to support a change in physical custody in a modification of a split physical custody arrangement even though the party seeking the change failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances

[EX Q]: objection made by his counsel at a later point during Dr. Barron's testimony, in which he repeated the previously asserted objection to exhibits 1 and 2 and then added an objection on the basis of hearsay. What is fatal to respondent's argument, however, is the fact that, at the earlier point in time when counsel for DCYF had moved for the admission of exhibits 1 and 2, the only objection articulated by respondent's counsel was that Dr. Barron was "here to testify." That objection was certainly not sufficiently focused to direct the trial justice's attention to the hearsay evidence rule, see Diefenderfer, 970 A.2d at 30; and the context did not make it apparent that such was the "specific ground" of objection. See Rule 103(a)(1); cf. State v. Baptista, 894 A.2d 911, 914 n. 2 (R.I.2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, since exhibits 1 and 2 had
Holding statements: (A) holding that an objection raised in a motion to suppress evidence preserves the issue for appeal despite the lack of further objection at trial (B) holding that for error to be preserved on appeal with regard to admission of evidence in violation of a ruling on a motion in limine that the evidence is inadmissible an objection should be made at the time the evidence is offered (C) holding that the defendants motion in limine which sought to exclude the evidence to which the defendant later made a general objection at trial adequately provided the context for determining the specific ground of objection (D) holding that to preserve an alleged error in the admission of evidence a timely objection must be made to the introduction of the evidence specific grounds for the objection should be stated and a ruling on the objection must be made by the trial court (E) holding that where defense counsel made a timely objection and it was overruled by the trial court a further request for a mistrial was unnecessary and futile since the reasons for the objection were apparent and the trial courts denial of the objection indicated its belief the jury could properly hear the matter which was the subject of the objection
[EX A]:
holding that an objection raised in a motion to suppress evidence preserves the issue for appeal despite the lack of further objection at trial