TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: the ammunition charge from the gun charges. II. DISCUSSION A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Unregistered Firearm Count Under 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), it is unlawful for any person to "possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record." For purposes of this provision, the definition of "firearm" includes a shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length or with an overall length less than twenty-six inches. 26 U.S.C. 5845(a). In order to obtain a conviction under 5861(d), the government must demonstrate that the defendant knew the barrel's length was less than eighteen inches or the overall length was less than twenty-six inches. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (<HOLDING>); see also United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that the government must prove the defendant knew of the features of the firearm that brought it within the scope of the act (B) holding the government must demonstrate the defendant knew of the characteristics of the firearm that required it to be registered (C) holding that while the government was required to prove that the defendants phone call crossed a state line the government did not need to prove that the defendant knew of the interstate nexus (D) holding that the government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that his acts violated the clean water act but merely that he was aware of the conduct that resulted in the permits violation (E) holding that the government was required to prove that the defendant lacked a license to possess a firearm but not that the defendant possessed the firearm for any duration of time

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a "line of ... cars" for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: was a member of an identifiable group which is distinguishable from "white persons". Other courts have attempted to ascertain, regardless of any "objective" definition of race and without questioning the existence thereof, whether the discrimination alleged was based upon "racial animus." In any event, the cases applying this third approach abandon a rigid distinction between race and national origin and attempt to determine the "racial character" of the allegations in a more practical manner. Thus many of the courts in this third category conclude that plaintiffs state a valid claim under section 1981 regardless of whether their claim is characterized as one of national origin, race, alienage or ethnicity. See Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 970-72 (10th Cir. 1979) (<HOLDING>); Madrigal v. Certainted Corp., 508 F.Supp.
Holding statements: (A) holding that a plaintiff could not assert a 1981 claim based on gender discrimination (B) holding that plaintiff who alleged discrimination on the basis of his mexicanamerican descent had stated a valid claim under section 1981 (C) holding that title vii precludes a claim under section 1981 for racial discrimination against a federal employee (D) holding by implication that plaintiff a brownskinned person of east indian descent had stated a proper claim under section 1981 (E) holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin

SOLUTION:
(B)