In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: transcript has the same character as the act of denying a debtor the opportunity to register for class or to graduate, as it deprives a student of a service that would be available to her were she not a debtor ..." Id. at 534. Numerous courts have examined the issue whether an educational institution violates the automatic stay when it withholds a debtor's transcript due to an outstanding tuition balance or student loan debt. "The majority view is that the withholding of a debtor's transcript because of an outstanding tuition balance or unpaid student loans violates the automatic stay." In re Moore, 407 B.R. 855, 860 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2009) (citing In re Mu'min, 374 B.R. 149, 155 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2007)); Parker, 334 B.R. at 534-36; see also In re Carson, 150 B.R. 228, 231 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1993) (<HOLDING>). ANALYSIS Based on the foregoing, the Court
Holding statements: (A) holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order (B) holding judgment in violation of automatic stay void (C) holding that university violated the automatic stay by withholding chapter 7 debtors transcripts because the debts were not yet determined nondischargeable (D) holding that creditors failure to voluntarily turn over property lawfully seized prepetition constituted violation of automatic stay (E) holding that a college withholding delivery of transcripts due to an outstanding prepetition debt is an act to collect in violation of the automatic stay
[EX A]: holding that the denial of a motion to find a violation of the automatic stay was a final order

[EX Q]: (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. (1974), 416 U.S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080.) Although Calero-Toledo did not involve the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, the Court in that case emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding is brought against the instrumentality of a crime, rather than against the offender himself. The Calero-Toledo Court noted that the object of the forfeiture is " 'primarily considered as the offender ***. [T]he practice has been, and so this Court understand^] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.' " (Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684, 40 L. Ed. 2d at 468, 94 S. Ct. at 2092, quoting The Palmyra (1827), 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14-16, 6 L. Ed. 531, 535-36 (<HOLDING>).) The Calero-Toledo Court also noted,
Holding statements: (A) holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding (B) holding that a judgment set forth in a separate document is not a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction where the parties assumed that there was a final judgment (C) holding that a conviction for piracy was not a prerequisite to a proceeding to forfeit a ship allegedly engaged in piratical aggression (D) holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding (E) holding jeopardy had not attached because the district court was without power to enter a judgment of conviction in a pretrial proceeding
[EX A]: holding claim that prior conviction was not serious felony under californias sentencing law not cognizable in federal habeas proceeding

[EX Q]: as: "bodily injury which ... involves a substantial risk of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or burns of the second or third degree". Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-l-901(3)(p). Thus, Gonzalez contends the Colorado statute includes a different class of injuries (e.g., fractures) than the MPC. Although Gonzalez cites similar cases supporting his assertions, other case-law cuts against his position. Compare United States v. Calzada-Ortega, 551 Fed.Appx. 790, 792-93 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding a similar Wisconsin statute was broader than the enumerated aggravated-assault offense), with United States v. Aluya, 590 Fed.Appx. 433, 434 (5th Cir. 2015) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, pursuant to our limited
Holding statements: (A) holding on plainerror review an oklahoma statute for assault and battery was equivalent to the enumerated offense (B) holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two (C) holding that virginia domestic assault and battery statute did not qualify (D) holding that the oklahoma statute like the california statute did not qualify as an enumerated offense because it lacked the elements of substantial interference with the victims liberty and risk of bodily injury (E) holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery
[EX A]:
holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two