In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: 20 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 24(b) ("Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.... In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties."). [ 21] 21. State v. Weidner, 684 P.2d 103, 113 (Alaska 1984) (adopting four-part test from Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324-25 (D.C.Cir.1981)). 22 . Harvey v. Cook, 172 P.3d 794, 799 (Alaska 2007). [23] 23. Scammon Bay Ass'n v. Ulak, 126 P.3d 138, 143 (Alaska 2005) (citing Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1231 (Ist Cir.1992)); see also Kirk v. Demientieff, 145 P.3d 512, 520 (Alaska 2006) (<HOLDING>). 24 . Ulak, 126 P.3d at 143. 25 . AOIC's May
Holding statements: (A) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (B) holding that a law firm could intervene in a former clients action to protect its interest in its contingency fee (C) holding attorneys motion to intervene in former clients tort suit untimely because attorney had clear and early notice that former client would not adequately represent his interests (D) holding that ambiguous agreement between attorney and client must be construed in the clients favor (E) holding that presumption of access to and knowledge of confidential information between attorney and former client notwithstanding attorneys declarations to the contrary may not be rebutted

Output: (C)

Input: Consider Input: despite the underlying circumstances. See United States v. Moudy, 132 F.3d 618, 620 (10th Cir.1998) (stating that "[ejvery escape scenario is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which always has the serious potential to do so" and that this characterization applies "to all escapes, whether or not violence was actually involved") (citing United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir.1994)). C. Sixth Amendment Claim Finally, Mr. Flowers argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to submit the fact of his prior convictions to a jury. This argument is also foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1223, 1226 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). III. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact of prior convictions under 924e need not be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury and also that the government need not charge in an indictment and prove to a jury that a defendants prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under 924e (B) holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under 924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury (C) holding that facts regarding prior convictions need not be charged in an indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (D) holding that prior convictions relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime do not need to be charged in an indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (E) holding that elements of statute which became 924e need not be reflected in indictment for crime charged

Output: (A)

Input: Consider Input: State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 146-47 (Me.1985); Miller v. State, 373 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Miss.1979); State v. Shankle, 58 Or.App. 134, 137-38, 647 P.2d 959, 961-62 (1982). Furthermore, the arrest rates for the Taylor roadblock indicate that it was sufficiently productive of the licensing and registration interest. Sergeant Canty testified that forty-two cars were stopped at the Taylor roadblock over the ninety minute period, and two arrests were made for unauthorized use of an automobile (namely, appellant Taylor and his passenger), meaning that arrests occurred involving approximately 2.4 percent of the stopped vehicles. This would appear to satisfy the requirement that there be something more than "a complete absence of data" indicating effectiveness. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2487 (<HOLDING>); Delaware v. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659,
Holding statements: (A) holding that sobriety checkpoints at which approximately 15 percent of the drivers passing through the checkpoint were arrested were sufficiently productive (B) holding that a drivers knowledge that there are concealable weapons in the car available for the drivers use is evidence of possession (C) holding that the seizure of motorists who were stopped at a sobriety checkpoint at which all vehicles were stopped was reasonable without individualized suspicion in light of the magnitude of the drunkdriving problem and the determination of law enforcement officials that such checkpoints were necessary to apprehend such individuals before tragedy strikes (D) holding that issue is preserved if the objections at the trial were sufficiently specific to notify the trial court at the time of the nature and character of the objections and the reasons for them (E) holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers
Output: (A)