In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed.Cir.2004). Since, as we explain below, sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict, we need not consider whether the District's failure to move for judgment as a matter of law at the close of its own case (as opposed to at the close of Smith's case) further limits our review "to considering whether the verdict is so unsupported by the evidence that allowing it to stand would constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice," Fredrick, 254 F.3d at 162. The District presents two fact-based challenges to the jury's verdict. First, it argues that the jury could not have reasonably concluded that the District had a deliberately indifferent policy or custom under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (<HOLDING>). Second, it claims that even had such a policy
Holding statements: (A) holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom (B) holding that county liability under 1983 cannot rest on a theory of respondeat superior (C) holding that conditionsofconfinement claims must be brought in 42 usc 1983 civil rights complaint rather than in habeas petition (D) recognizing respondeat superior liability (E) holding that municipal liability for purposes of claims brought under 42 usc 1983 must stem from an unconstitutional policy or custom rather than simply from respondeat superior

A: holding that discrimination against a municipal employee could trigger municipal liability under 1983 through official policy or custom
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Q: (Tex.2010) (orig. proceeding). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies creates a jurisdictional bar to proceeding with the claim. See City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex.2008) ("[Njoncompliance [with Chapter 21's administrative procedures] deprives courts of subject-matter, jurisdiction."); Smith v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). A would-be Chapter 21 claimant must first file an administrative complaint with the civil rights division of the Texas Workforce Commission. See Tex. Lab.Code Ann. 21.201(a) .(stating that an aggrieved person "may file a complaint with the commission"); id. 21.0015 (defining "commission" as "the Texas Workforce Commission civil rights division"); Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 486-88 (<HOLDING>). The complaint must be filed "not later than
Holding statements: (A) holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent (B) holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language (C) holding that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional (D) holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may (E) recognizing that exhaustion is mandatory and jurisdictional

A: holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent
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Q: these claims in a successive petition for post-conviction relief because the time for filing a notice of post-conviction relief has long expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1 and 32.4 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed "within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is later.") Although Rule 32.4 does not bar dilatory claims if they fall within the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P 32.1(d) through (h), Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions apply to him. Moreover, a state post-conviction action is futile where it is time-barred. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.2002); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, under Rule 32.2(a) of the
Holding statements: (A) holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule (B) recognizing a defendant may seek postconviction relief pursuant to rule 32 ariz rcrim p on ground that trial counsel had been ineffective by inducing defendant to enter guilty plea (C) holding that circuit court should have treated the habeas petition as a motion for postconviction relief (D) holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act (E) recognizing untimeliness under ariz rcrim p 324a as a basis for dismissal of an arizona petition for postconviction relief distinct from preclusion under rule 322a

A:
holding that a petition to correct sentence was properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 371 because it challenged a judgment entered on a plea of guilty on grounds cognizable under the rule
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