In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: or inferences ... based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." Fed.R.Evid. 701(c). In other words, lay testimony must "result[] from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life" and not "from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field." Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note (internal quotation marks omitted). "Testimony based solely on a person's special training or experience is properly classified as expert testimony, and therefore it is not admissible under Rule 701." Compania Administradora v. Titan Intern'l, Inc., 533 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir.2008). This includes testimony about an opinion reached during a parole officer's investigation. See U.S. v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 216 (2d Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Cue's testimony here does not "result[] from
Holding statements: (A) holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine (B) holding that a witness may testify about his subjective interpretation of a conversation in which he is participating as long as his opinion is rationally based on his perception and is helpful either to an understanding of his testimony or to the determination of a fact in issue (C) holding that a law enforcement agent may not testify about an opinion reached during his investigation if the agents reasoning process depended in whole or in part on his specialized training and experience (D) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying an expert witness in the area of gang identity and investigation based on his training and experience (E) holding an agent from the drug enforcement agency could testify regarding the street value of cocaine where the agent was testifying regarding matters within his personal knowledge and experience as a narcotics officer
[A]: holding officer could testify based on his training and experience that a defendants actions were consistent with selling cocaine

[Q]: rejected'this argument, holding that the allegations, even if true, did not amount to an -IDEA procedural violation. See 20 U.S.C. 1415 et seq. (setting forth the procedural safeguards afforded to parents when their child is in special education). 13 . It is worth noting that at least one state Massachusetts, as the IDEA permits, has enacted a more stringent standard. Specifically, children in Massachusetts who are eligible for special education services are entitled to IEPs that provide for their "maximum possible development.'' See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B 2 (emphasis added); Frank S. v. School Committee of the Dennis-Yarmouth Regional School District, 26 F.Supp.2d 219, 226 (D.Mass.1998). 14 . See Springer v. Fairfax County School Board, 134 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) (citing Hartmann v. Loudoun County, 118 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that absent some statutory infraction the task of education belongs to the educators who have been charged by society with that critical task (B) holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors (C) holding that since the performer of a task which could be performed by a layperson represented that he was in fact a professional engineer krs 413245 applied (D) holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity (E) holding that it was pure speculation that if the preference payment had not been made the vendor would have been included as a critical vendor and the court would have approved it
[A]: holding that the critical vendor order was not a defense because it permitted rather than mandated payment of prepetition claims of critical vendors

[Q]: the legislature's authority to determine the sanctions to be imposed for contempt and a circuit court's inherent constitutional power to determine the species of contempt it chooses to use to enforce its orders and vindicate its authority. We conclude, therefore, that the legislature's authority to restrict the sanctions which courts may impose after a finding of contempt does not give it the concomitant authority to completely eliminate the power itself. See State ex rel. Franks v. Clark, 46 So.2d 488. We note that Florida is not alone in espousing this fundamental doctrine. Other states with constitutionally created courts also recognize this concept. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oregon State Bar v. Lenske, 243 Or. 477, 495, 407 P.2d 250, 256 (Or.1965) (and cases and authorities cited) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 1460, 16
Holding statements: (A) recognizing inherent power of supreme court independent of statutory authority to punish for contempt of court (B) holding that it is a well established rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another court (C) holding that the inherent power of the district court includes the power to santion attorneys for violations of court orders or other conduct which interferes with the courts power to manage its calendar and the courtroom (D) recognizing inherent power in the courts to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of justice and protect it from being impaired or destroyed (E) holding that the power of a constitutionally established court to punish for contempt may be regulated within reasonable bounds by the legislature but not to the extent that the courts power is substantially impaired or destroyed
[A]:
recognizing inherent power of supreme court independent of statutory authority to punish for contempt of court