instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
this is irrelevant to the question of whether a loan was made to Busson-Sokolik in the first place. Finding no clear error on the question of whether the funds were in fact transferred to Busson-Sokolik and no defects in the formation of a valid contract between the parties, we affirm the finding that the sum MSOE transferred to Busson-Sokolik was a loan. 2 . "Abuse of discretion" is the clear standard for evaluating a judge's decision to impose sanctions in a bankruptcy case. See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 212 F.3d 1039, 1046 (7th Cir.2000). While the standard for evaluating a judge's decision not to impose sanctions in a bankruptcy case is somewhat less clear, we adopt the Sixth Circuit's approach of using the "abuse of discretion" standard. See In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472, 480 (6th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). 3 . An appeal is frivolous "when the result
Holding statements: (A) holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion (B) holding that the applicable standard of review for evaluating a bankruptcy courts denial of fed r bankrp 9011 sanctions is abuse of discretion and noting similar approaches taken by the ninth and tenth circuits (C) holding that the standard of review for the denial of rule 11 sanctions is governed by the law of the regional circuit (D) holding that the conclusion that the wiretap was necessary in each situation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and bringing the tenth circuit into accordance with the authority of a majority of other circuits (E) holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and an appeal from denial of rule 60b relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review
answer:
holding that the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion

question:
controversy turns, in part, on a categorization of the loss at issue; an inherently factual determination requiring the testimony of Penn and NBC staff juxtaposed against Gioia's onsite analysis. Thus, Gioia is a material witness and his convenience weighs in favor of transfer. B. Locus of the Operative Facts "Where there is no material connection between the district and'the operative facts, ... the interests of justice require the transfer of [the] action." Manao Invests., 1997 WL 53200, at *2 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 'When determining the locus of operative facts in a declaratory judgment action concerning the interpretation of an insurance policy contract, this Court has considered where the insurance contract was made." Royal Ins., 2002 WL 31385815, at *3-4 (<HOLDING>). Here, while it is unclear whether
Holding statements: (A) holding that neither the new york location of the terrorist attack giving rise to the policyholders claim nor the new yorkbased claims adjustor rendered new york the locus of operative facts because new york was not the site of the contracts execution (B) holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership (C) holding that contract signed in new york by promisor from florida and partially performed in florida was governed by new york law because it was executed in new york (D) holding that for purposes of longarm jurisdiction because plaintiff was employed in new york the original event causing his injury occurred in new york (E) holding that outofstate defendants transmittal into new york of ceaseanddesist letter to new york plaintiff for purported trademark infringement was insufficient to create jurisdiction over defendant in a new york declaratory judgment action
answer:
holding jurisdiction over nonresident defendant existed where note was payable in new york contained new york choice of law clause and proceeds were used to finance new york limited partnership

question:
the OA says FedEx directs the results, but not the manner and means, of the Plaintiffs' work. (OA, 1.15) More specifically, the OA provides that FedEx cannot "prescribe hours of work, whether or when the Contractor is to take breaks, what route the Contractor is to follow, or other details of performance." (Id.) The contractual designation of the work status of a person is not conclusive for purposes of determining whether he is an employee or an independent contractor, when there is evidence to overcome such designation. Nunn, 151 S.W.3d at 401. See also, Williams, 2009 WL 2592312, at *3-4 (the mere characterization in a con tract of a party as an independent contractor is not controlling, especially when other contractual provisions evidence control); Burgess, 923 S.W.2d at 454 (<HOLDING>). Simply characterizing a party as an
Holding statements: (A) holding that the agreement was not illusory because it was supported by consideration insofar as the employee and employer were equally bound by a promise to arbitrate disputes (B) holding that even though certain corporate formalities had not been complied with in the execution of the subject contract the corporation had knowledge of the existence of the contract and treated it as a valid and binding contract and thus ratified the contract by accepting the benefits thereunder (C) holding that the fact that the defendant maintained employment records was insufficient to establish that she was a joint employer under the economic reality test (D) holding that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and declining to permit the reality of that status to be obscured by illusory formalities in the employment contract (E) holding that an agreement to arbitrate is illusory if as here the employer can unilaterally modify the contract
answer:
holding that the agreement was not illusory because it was supported by consideration insofar as the employee and employer were equally bound by a promise to arbitrate disputes