In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

(1993). This privilege has been given an "expansive reach" by California courts, as recognized by the California Supreme Court. See Rubin, 4 Cal.4th at 1194, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. This privilege affords absolute immunity against tort liability arising out of such a communication, regardless of attempts by the "plaintiff' to "plead around" this "absolute barrier." See id. at 1201-02, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 828, 847 P.2d 1044. Thus, the immunity applies regardless of the particular label given to the cause of action (e.g., unfair competition). Section 47(b) protects participants in judicial proceedings from derivative tort actions based on communications in or regarding the judicial proceeding. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 781-83, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 830 (1996) (<HOLDING>). A "communication[ ] preparatory to or in
Holding statements: (A) holding that letter to possible coclaimants seeking support for filing of suit was covered by the privilege (B) recognizing privilege (C) holding that voluntary testimony by spouse is not covered by husbandwife privilege (D) holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated (E) holding that the initial disclosure of a crime to one spouses without more is covered by the marital communications privilege
(A)

to use the latter route to circumvent Congress's apparent intent in enacting the AEDPA to bar all review of such decisions. Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1046 (D.C.Cir.1998). In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the new restrictions on successive petitions do not prevent a petitioner from bringing a 2241 claim after he has already brought a 2255 claim. See United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir.1997). Furthermore, in 1998, the Second Circuit held that a 2255 petition that followed a 2241 petition was not barred. See Corrao v. United States, 152 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1998), citing Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir.1 the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a 2241 petition"); United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Corrao, 152 F.3d at 191 ("a motion under
Holding statements: (A) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under 2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (B) holding that a petition under 2241 attacks the execution of a sen tence while a 2255 petition attacks the validity of a judgment and sentence (C) holding that an attack on the computation and execution of a sentence must come in the form of a 2241 petition (D) holding that 2255 is unavailable to attack execution of sentence (E) holding that it is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that 2255 will lie only to attack the imposition of a sentence and that an attack on the execution thereof may be accomplished only by way of habeas corpus in the district of confinement
(C)

Fam.Code Ann. 107.013. 58 . See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-64, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); 519 U.S. at 128, 117 S.Ct. at 570. This statutory right may not be taken away without due process of law. Cf. Steny v. State, 959 S.W.2d 249, 257 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (recognizing that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have jury assess punishment, but does, however, have a statutory right to have the jury assess punishment and that this valuable statutory right may not be taken away without due process of law). 59 . See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 764, 102 S.Ct. at 1400. 60 . Compare Rylander v. State, 75 S.W.3d 119, 125 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. granted) with Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 4 an Antonio 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>); Turner v. Lutz, 654 S.W.2d 57, 59-60
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial courts failure to appoint parent an attorney ad litem in termination proceeding was reversible error (B) holding that a statute that provided that the court may appoint a guardian ad litem left the court with discretion to make an appointment (C) holding the trial court had jurisdiction where summons was served on the attorney advocate for the juveniles guardian ad litem (D) holding denial of a petition to vacate a termination order was reversible error (E) holding that guardian ad litem and psychologist fees incurred in child custody proceedings and ordered to be paid directly to the guardian ad litem and psychologist were nondischargeable under 523a5
(A)