In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: to warrant such a delay. See id. Moreover, despite his argument to the contrary, Staler did not demonstrate that his criminal trial was invalid due to a fundamental error. See Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106. Stuler was indicted and convicted for violating 26 U.S.C. 7208. See United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir.2007) (noting the elements of 26 U.S.C. 7203 include that the defendant: (1) was required to file the tax returns; (2) failed to file them; and (3) acted willfully). Stuler's invocation of a host of unrelated statutes and regulations does not alter the fact that "importing" is not an element of a 7203 charge. He has therefore failed to satisfy his burden of establishing a funda-' mental error. See United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir.1963) (<HOLDING>). Because Stuler showed neither that any
Holding statements: (A) holding that any proceeding which is challenged by the writ is presumed to be correct and the burden rests on its assailant to show otherwise (B) recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct (C) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (D) holding that an exercise by the state of its police power is presumed to be valid when it is challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (E) holding that the burden is on the defendant when the validity of the warrant is challenged
[A]: recognizing that an agencys decision to terminate an employee is presumed correct

[Q]: of any act which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer, ... or who knowingly resists or obstructs the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or order of any court, commits a simple misdemeanor---However, if a person commits an interference with official acts, as defined in this subsection, and in so doing inflicts bodily injury other than serious injury, that person commits an aggravated misdemeanor. Iowa Code 719.1(1). Because an aggravated misdemeanor under Iowa law carries the possibility of a two-year prison sentence, see Iowa Code 903.1(2), it qualifies as a "prior felony conviction" for purposes of 4B1.1, see USSG 4B1.2, comment, (n.1). See United States v. Postley, 449 F.3d 831, 832 (8th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>). To convict Malloy under section 719.1(1), a
Holding statements: (A) holding that an aggravated misdemeanor conviction under section 7191 is a felony for purposes of assessing criminal history points under ussg 4a12c (B) holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony (C) holding that drug felony under state law can constitute an aggravated felony for federal sentencing guidelines purposes even if the same conduct would not constitute a felony under federal law (D) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (E) holding that conviction under 2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under 101a43f
[A]: holding that conduct designated as a felony under state law but as only a misdemeanor under the controlled substances act does not qualify as an aggravated felony

[Q]: Homes, Inc., 518 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (excessive rain); Camacho Enters., Inc. v. Better Constr., Inc., 343 So.2d 1296, 1297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (heart attack). The court then concluded that the force majeure clause rendered Paradigm's obligation illusory under the Disclosure Act because the clause excuses delays that would "not qualify under Florida's impossibility of performance principles." Neither the district court nor the Steins have explained why the standard of legal impossibility should be the measure of obligation under the 1702(a)(2) exemption why any force majeure clause that extends beyond legal impossibility renders a contract non-exempt. This force majeure clause covers events that may or may not happen, but whether they do , 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (<HOLDING>). Nor does the clause make the two-year duty
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the fundamental principle of contract law and florida law that an obligation is illusory when it appears on its face to be so insubstantial as to impose no obligation at all (B) holding party in breach could not maintain suit for breach of contract (C) holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship (D) holding government could be liable for breach of a contractual obligation to purchase insurance for plaintiff (E) recognizing that a contractual provision renders an obligation illusory when it allows a party to breach with impunity
[A]:
recognizing the fundamental principle of contract law and florida law that an obligation is illusory when it appears on its face to be so insubstantial as to impose no obligation at all