In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. 101(5)(B). Thus, it is clear that, under some circumstances, injunctions can constitute claims which are dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court must determine whether this case presents such a circumstance. A number of courts have considered whether an injunction prohibiting future breaches of a noncompete agreement can constitute a claim under Section 101(5)(B), reaching conflicting results based on a variety of reasonings. See e.g., In re Oseen, 133 B.R. 527 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1991) (finding that the injunction did not constitute a claim); In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>); In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703 (Bankr.D.Mass.1996)
Holding statements: (A) holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim (B) holding an appeal of injunction moot where the injunction expired three months before the appellate court heard arguments in the case (C) holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction (D) holding federal injunction countermanding a state court injunction did not violate antiinjunction act (E) holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified

Output: (A)

Input: Consider Input: improperly determined that the "neither expected nor intended" language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an "occurrence." 21 The CGL policy's core provision defines "occurrence" by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was "neither expected nor intended." This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured's expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an "occurrence" and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). 22 Here the District Court found that Ribi
Holding statements: (A) holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended (B) holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence (C) holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution (D) holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view (E) holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended

Output: (A)

Input: Consider Input: need not be witnessed. See Dove v. Dove, 285 Ga. 647 (680 SE2d 839) (2009). However, such contracts were long deemed invalid as contrary to our State's public policy favoring marriage, and while they are now enforceable under some circumstances, they must meet other requirements. See id. at 650-651; Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641 (2 al agreements settling property rights of the parties at death are made in contemplation of marriage"). On the other hand, contracts that provide for alimony payments in the event of divorce, or that direct how property should be distributed if the parties divorce, are considered to be made in contemplation of divorce rather than marriage alone and thus are not subject to OCGA 19-3-63's attestation requirement. See Lawrence, 286 Ga. at 311-312 (<HOLDING>); Dove, 285 Ga. at 37 ("This Court has
Holding statements: (A) holding that an agreement that defined the parties respective rights in the property of the other and waived each spouses right in the others property either before or after death was a marriage contract (B) holding that an agreement which both addressed alimony and divided the parties property in the event of divorce was not a marriage contract subject to ocga 19363 (C) holding that parties can stipulate that they were both parties to a contract and thus the real parties in interest even when one party did not sign the contract (D) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (E) holding that the information must establish that the court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties
Output: (B)