instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
are reversed with instructions that he be re-sentenced under a correctly calculated score sheet. Cooper also asserts the same argument for his 41.712-month sentence on the delivery of cocaine charge. The question, however, is whether this error is harmless because Cooper was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. While the 41.712-month sentence happened to be equal to the minimum guidelines sentence under the incorrectly calculated score sheet, the guidelines scoresheet is legally irrelevant because Cooper was habitualized. See 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2002)("A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002 [The Criminal Punishment Code]."); Tannihill v. State, 848 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); LaFleur v. State, 812 So.2d 545, 546 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(<HOLDING>); Kenon v. State, 780 So.2d 258, 261 (Fla. 5th
Holding statements: (A) holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant (B) holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal (C) holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal (D) holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines (E) holding that defendant should be resentenced where district court imposed a sentence under an erroneously calculated guidelines range even where the sentence imposed fell within the correct range
answer:
holding habitual sentence rendered guidelines scoresheet irrelevant

question:
clause could be vitiated based on evidence of fraud "relating to the merger clause or fraud that invalidates the entire contract including the merger clause." 228 Mich.App. 486, 498, 579 N.W.2d 411, 417 (1998). The plaintiffs have not alleged fraud in the merger clause itself. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants fraudulently induced them to buy investment properties in Detroit. The plaintiffs' allegations of fraud in the inducement do not save their breach of contract claim because the remedy for fraud in the inducement is to void the contract, not reform it. See UAW-GM, 228 Mich.App. at 508, 579 N.W.2d at 418 ("Fraud ... makes a contract voidable at the instance of the innocent party.") (quoting 3 Corbin, Contracts, 580, p. 431); Star Ins. Co., 392 F.Supp.2d at 929 (<HOLDING>). The plaintiffs' argument conflates their tort
Holding statements: (A) holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable (B) holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law (C) holding that the filed rate doctrine precludes insureds fraudulent inducement claim (D) holding that making of agreement to arbitrate was not called into question by general allegation that entire contract was void because of fraudulent inducement (E) holding that fraudulent inducement renders a contract void or voidable
answer:
holding that a contract made in violation of section 432070 is void rather than voidable

question:
keep that information confidential, (b) not compete with their employer by using that information, and (c) return the information upon termination. InnoSys then alleges that it disclosed confidential information to Ms. Mercer under the protection of a signed NDA (thereby giving rise to the fiduciary duty) and that Ms. Mercer subsequently breached that duty by disclosing the confidential information during the DWS hearing. But as shown above, InnoSys must utilize these same facts to substantiate its claim for misappropriation of trade secrets. Therefore, InnoSys's claim for breach of fiduciary duty is preempted by the UTSA, and its dismissal was proper for this additional reason. 1 . See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Ssangyong Cement Indus. Co., 107 F.3d 30, 1997 WL 59360, at "7-8 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); Firetrace USA, LLC v. Jesclard, 800 F.Supp.2d
Holding statements: (A) holding that where the amount of damages was the primary issue in dispute the plaintiffs claim for damages was not liquidated until the date the jury returned its verdict and the plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest under ksa 16 201 (B) holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim (C) holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages (D) holding that the more than three month gap between the plaintiffs eeoc complaint and the allegedly adverse action was insufficient to show causation (E) holding that californias codification of the utsa requires plaintiffs to show damages in one of the three listed categories
answer:
holding that where the amount of damages was the primary issue in dispute the plaintiffs claim for damages was not liquidated until the date the jury returned its verdict and the plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest under ksa 16 201