In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
this suit ... was a necessary incident to the attorney's effort to establish [the defendants' claim]." Id. Unlike Bosurgi, however, the plaintiffs allegations provide no "basis for an inference" that CARCO conferred authority on Steele to receive service. Cf. Santos v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 902 F.2d 1092,1094 (2d Cir.1990) (noting that service on defendant State Farm's attorneys was improper where the plaintiff offered "no basis for an inference that State Farm had authorized its attorneys to accept service of process"). Accordingly, the court determines that the plaintiff has not shown that Steel was an agent of CARCO for service and that the plaintiffs service on CARCO was therefore deficient. United States v. Ziegler Bolt and Parts Co., Ill F.3d 878, 881 (Fed.Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); J. and L. Parking Corp. Inc. v. United
Holding statements: (A) holding that even where an attorney exercises broad powers to represent a client in litigation these powers of representation alone do not create a specific authority to receive service (B) recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1 (C) recognizing separation of powers doctrine (D) holding that states grant of general corporate powers to hospital authorities does not include permission to use those powers anticompetitively (E) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client

Ex Output:
recognizing a state agencys powers are limited to 1

Ex Input:
statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years, see 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 5524, and thus a two-year statute of limitations applies to this case. See Sameric Corp. of Del, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). The date when a Section 1983 action accrues, however, is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Koto. 549 U.S. 384, 388, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007). A Section 1983 claim accrues "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Sameric, 142 F.3d at 599; see also Sanduteh v. Muroski, 684 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir.1982) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Here, Giles asserts that the City violated
Holding statements: (A) holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (B) holding that in an environmental contamination ease a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of his or her cause of action and of the identity of a party or parties who may be responsible for the injury (C) holding that a federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff is aware or should be aware of the existence of and source of the injury not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong (D) holding that 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury (E) holding that a 1983 claim generally accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action

Ex Output:
holding that a 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury

Ex Input:
date of the Act, N.J. Property Liab. Guar. Ass'n v. Brown, 174 N.J.Super. 629, 633-634, 417 A.2d 117 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 462, 427 A.2d 561 (1980), is instructive. There, a bail bondsman in his office accidentally shot a friend who had paid him a social visit with a gun possessed for business reasons. We held that the exception to the insured's homeowners' policy exclusion for non-business pursuits provided coverage because "[sjhowing a gun to a friend in such circumstances would not be an activity ordinarily incident" to the duties of a bail bondsman. Id. at 634, 417 A.2d 117. Cases decided after the effective date of the Act have also given effect to exception to exclusion clauses. See Burdge v. Excelsior Ins. Co., 194 N.J.Super. 320, 476 A.2d 880 (App.Div.1984) (<HOLDING>). Because an exception to an exclusion clause
Holding statements: (A) holding that the underlying action arose out of insureds exercise of his personal and political rights and not out of business pursuits and thus the policy exclusion for claims arising out of business pursuits did not apply because the exception to the exclusion for nonbusiness pursuits was applicable (B) holding that nature of alleged bias must be personal and not arising out of litigation (C) holding that an arising out of exclusion applies to claims flowing from or growing out of the excluded activity (D) holding as unambiguous under iowa law the insurance policys exclusion of coverage to any obligation of the insured to indemnify another because of damages arising out of a bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured (E) holding that employees claims against firm were not subject to mandatory arbitration because they did not arise out of business activities of either employee or firm but instead arose out of divorce agreement

Ex Output:
holding that nature of alleged bias must be personal and not arising out of litigation