Taliban and American aid. After the September 11 attacks, it was necessary for conservatives to somehow explain away the fact that the US government gave 245 million dollars to the new evildoers du jour. Never mind the fact that authors such as Robert Scheer warned of aiding the Taliban as early as in May 2001. Never mind that they did so not out of some humanitarian motivation, but because of the Taliban's violent enforcement of the ban on opium poppies. Never mind that in a regime that is controlled by warlords, it does not matter who is authorized to distribute the aid -- the ruling regional warlords will seize control of it and use it to their own advantage. Never mind that this very argument has been used by hawks in opposition to sending humanitarian aid to Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Never mind that the Taliban continued selling opium in spite of the deal. Never mind that this is all documented on Michael Moore's website about the film. Gun homicides. Statistics are Moore's weakest point, and it is surprising that his critics don't dwell on them longer. That's because they know all too well that Moore is correct: The United States have a far greater homicide rate (both gun- and non-gun) than most other first world countries. His main mistake is that he does not use population corrected data, his second mistake is that he does not cite his sources (and, as you correctly point out, he probably uses different reporting methods for the different countries). A good comparison of international homicide rates can be found on the relatively neutral guncite.com website.

Question: "Who continued selling opium in spite of the deal?"

Response: "Taliban"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A: yes

As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.

Question: "By what period was al-Qaeda able to meet the requirements for a successful attack?"

Response: "By the spring and summer of 2000"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A: yes

Once upon a time I had a dog named Toodles. He was black and white and had long floppy ears. He also had very short legs, but really big paws. Every Saturday we would go to the park and play Toodles' favorite game. Toodles loved playing fetch. One Saturday, Toodles ran over to the pond because he saw ducks swimming there. He ran all around the pond, barking at the ducks. The ducks ignored him, and kept swimming. Toodles wasn't having it! He jumped into the pond and started swimming toward the ducks, chasing around his new playmates. One of the ducks, braver than the others, poked Toodles with his beak - and then bit him right on one of his floppy ears! Toodles barked and ran out of the pond because the duck hurt his ear. Soaking wet, he ran toward where I was eating a sandwich on the grass and curled right up in my lap so I could make him feel better. After that, whenever he would see a duck, Toodles would run the other way.

Question: "How did toodles react to the duck biting his ear?"

Response: "He laughed"
OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

A:
no