In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: up to $2,000, which would have set aside, in a literal sense, a discrete "amount . . . necessarily consumed for the support of' the taxpayer and his or her family. Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H. at 572. This description, made in reference to an income tax exemption, is not applicable to the question of whether an income tax assessed on gross rather than net income is unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate. Certainly nothing in that opinion suggested that such an exemption was necessary in order to render that tax constitutional. Where we have found that a tax was unfair, unreasonable, or disproportionate, the constitutional deficiency has been of a much different character than the one the petitioners allege here. See Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 470-71 (1997) (<HOLDING>); Opinion of the Justices, 132 N.H. 777, 783-84
Holding statements: (A) holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety (B) holding that property tax was a state tax and was thus disproportionate unreasonable and unfair because of discrepancies in tax rates of up to 400 between school districts (C) holding that the essential purpose of use tax is the recoupment of lost sales tax revenue (D) holding that the tax was indirect even though the recipient could not shift the tax to others (E) holding that taxpayers failure to follow state requirement that he report change in federal income tax did not except state tax liability from discharge

Output: holding that state legislature should determine whether to cure discriminatory tax by enforcing tax as to all or forgiving tax in its entirety

Input: Consider Input: defendant's activities fall outside the FDCPA's general provisions); Overton v. Foutty & Foutty, LLP, No. 1:07-cv0274-DFHTAB, 2007 WL 2413026, at *4 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 21, 2007) (recognizing majority position that party whose activities are limited to enforcement of security interests is not subject to all FDCPA requirements, and stating, "[i]f a person invokes judicial remedies only to enforce the security interest in property, then the effort is not subject to the FDCPA (other than 1692f(6) and 1692i(a))[,] [b]ut if the person is also seeking additional relief, such as a personal judgment against the borrower, then the FDCPA applies.") (collecting cases); Chomilo v. Shapiro, Nordmeyer & Zielke, LLP, Civ. No. 06-3103 (RHK/AJB), 2007 WL 2695795, at *6 (D.Minn. Sept. 12, 2007) (<HOLDING>); Acosta v. Campbell, No. 6:04CV761 ORL28DAB,
Holding statements: (A) holding that law firm executing nonjudicial foreclosure pro ceeding was enforcing a security interest rather than collecting a debt and hence fell outside the ambit of the fdcpa except for the provisions of section 1692f6 (B) recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of 1692a6 a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to 1692f6 (C) holding that a debt collectors filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears to be timebarred is an unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt (D) holding that the defendants actions in filing judicial foreclosure proceeding against mortgagor amounted to debt collection activity under the fdcpa and distinguishing decisions involving pursuit of nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings under a deed of trust from those in which a defendant has pursued judicial foreclosure proceedings which included seeking judgment on a note by filing a lawsuit in state court (E) holding that back rent is debt under the fdcpa

Output: recognizing distinction between general debt collection and enforcement of a security interest and observing that by the plain language of 1692a6 a person whose business has the principal purpose of enforcing security interests but who does not otherwise satisfy the definition of a debt collector is subject only to 1692f6

Input: Consider Input: as saying, "[m]y feeling is, if I'm going to sentence someone to state prison or county jail it should always be followed by probation." Martin v. State, 804 So.2d 360, 362 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). When the court indicated that such a motion must be in writing, defense counsel asked for time to file a written motion. The court denied the request and sentenced him to a five year prison term. Subsequently, Tyler filed the motion to recuse in -writing. The court denied the motion, finding that it was legally insufficient. The court also denied a motion to correct sentence, which was based on the motion to disqualify. Denial of a motion for continuance for the purpose of filing a written motion to recuse is an abuse of discretion. See Reynolds v. State, 568 So.2d 76, 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)(<HOLDING>). Clearly, an oral motion is insufficient.
Holding statements: (A) holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing (B) holding that appellant did not preserve error because he failed to obtain ruling on motion for continuance (C) holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for continuance when not in proper affidavit form (D) holding it was error for trial court not to grant a continuance when appellant moved in open court to disqualify judge or in the alternative for a continuance to file a proper motion (E) holding the record open for additional testimony amounts to a continuance
Output: holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for continuance two days before summary judgment hearing