TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] ... begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself."). Section 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) states in part that "attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee." (emphasis added). On its face, 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) generally references "the cost of living" not a local/regional cost-of-living. Id. (emphasis added). See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) ("[CJourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.") (citations omitted). Cf. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>) (citation omitted). This choice of language
Holding statements: (A) holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity (B) holding that where a conflict between state and federal law is alleged it must be reasonable to conclude that congress would have intended to preclude the state law in question since it would make little sense to preempt state law in order to serve the purposes underlying federal legislation if congress itself would not require or admit of preemption of state authority (C) holding that the more general cpiu for all items applied because if congress had meant to permit upward adjustments based on the increased cost of legal services it would have done so with greater specificity and clarity (D) holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001 (E) holding that based on the statutes purpose and its legislative history the legislature would have included specific language regarding drug rehabilitation if it had meant to include it

SOLUTION: holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity

PROBLEM: of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi appears to indicate that the assets must be blocked at the time judgment against the asset is finalized. See 556 U.S. 366, 369, 377-79, 129 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 1739-40, 173 L.Ed.2d 511 (2009) ("We ultimately hold that the Cubic Judgment was not a 'blocked asset' at the time the Court of Appeals handed down its decision.... "). The controlling determination in that case, though, was that the asset in question was never blocked because Iran's interest in it arose after the Treasury Department unblocked all Iranian assets. Id. at 376, 129 S.Ct. at 1739. In Holy Land Foundation, the assets were unreachable because they were unblocked during the pendency of the original civil suit, prior to the commencement of any execution proceeding. 722 F.3d at 687 (<HOLDING>). This rule is not just prescribed by law; it
Holding statements: (A) holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment (B) holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order (C) holding that the governments restraining order against a blocked asset obtained prior to the entry of a civil judgment unblocked it for tria purposes (D) recognizing that a stay contained in anex parte order did not serve to suspend the effectiveness of the restraining notice otherwise any judgment debtor could obtain such an order without notice to the court that a restraining notice had been served or to the judgment creditor and recover his property theretofore properly made the subject of the restraining notice (E) holding that the cubic judgment was not blocked

SOLUTION: holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment

PROBLEM: both prolonging this litigation and unnecessarily increasing the confusion and complexity already inherent to such actions. While the Court is not of the opinion that intervention as of right under Rule 24(a) is appropriate, permissive intervention shall be allowed under Rule 24(b). First to be considered will be the SEC's position that, setting aside any inquiry into the demands of Rule 24, Section 21(g) absolutely bars intervention in any SEC enforcement action without the SEC's prior consent. Section 21(g) states as follows: Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1407(a) of Title 28, or any other provision of law, no action for equitable relief instituted by the Commission pursuant to the securities laws shall be co iv.A. 95-1746-LFO, 1998 WL 29496, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1998) (<HOLDING>). As was noted in SEC v. Prudential Securities,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing intervention is generally impermissible after entry of final judgment and exception allowing postjudg ment intervention in the interests of justice is limited to permitting intervention by affected persons so that an appeal can be taken (B) holding that pursuit of a parallel state court lawsuit involving claims and parties common to the federal action does not justify the district courts intervention in state court proceedings (C) holding that article iii standing is not a prerequisite to intervention (D) holding that article iii standing is necessary for intervention (E) holding that as applied to case in which applicants for intervention are already plaintiffs in another ongoing lawsuit and that the matter on which they wish to expound is squarely before the other court section 21g bars intervention noting that allowing intervention would effectively allow coordination of enforcement action with lawsuit already pending in another jurisdiction

SOLUTION:
recognizing intervention is generally impermissible after entry of final judgment and exception allowing postjudg ment intervention in the interests of justice is limited to permitting intervention by affected persons so that an appeal can be taken