In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: that any negligent infliction claim remains before us on this appeal (as none has been separately argued) that claim is preempted for the same reasons. III. Conclusion We hold that Humble's intentional infliction/tort of outrage claim is preempted on the facts of this case, and her race and nationality discrimination claims have been abandoned. Humble's reasonable accommodation claim under the WLAD is not preempted, and we remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Humble requests that a remand to state court for the latter claim be ordered, but we leave it to the district court to make that discretionary determination. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1 . 29 U.S.C. 185(a). 2 . Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 216, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (<HOLDING>). 3 . Id. at 213, 105 S.Ct. 1904. Without
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by 301 (B) holding that broad language releasing all claims whether in contract tort or otherwise necessarily included a bad faith claim (C) holding that a bad faith claim is a tort (D) holding that future benefits are available upon a finding of bad faith because repudiation is a legal conclusion which the trial court reaches after the fact finder makes its determinations about whether there was a breach and whether the breach was in bad faith (E) holding that a state law tort of bad faith was necessarily based on breach of duties contained in the cba and was therefore preempted

Output: holding that plaintiffs state law claim against a nonsignatory to the cba was preempted by 301

Input: Consider Input: it was given voluntarily. If these questions are resolved in favor of the State, then, without being advised of the court's decision, the jury shall be instructed that they should decide whether in view of all the same circumstances the defendant's confession is true. If they find that it is not true, then they must treat it as inadmissible and disregard it for purposes of discharging them function as fact finders on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. [Id. at 272, 294 A.2d 23.] See also State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344, 366, 387 A.2d 1187 (1978) (reaffirming Hampton principle that trial court is sole arbiter of voluntariness of defendant's statements and rejecting defendant's invitation to overrule decision); State v. Bowman, 165 N.J.Super. 531, 537-39, 398 A.2d 908 (App.Div.1979) (<HOLDING>). The New Jersey Rules of Evidence codified the
Holding statements: (A) holding prosecutors statement to jury on summation that trial court had previously found defendants two confessions voluntary constituted reversible error even though trial court gave hampton charge because it failed to instruct jury to disregard prosecutors statement (B) holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge (C) holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court sustained the defendants objection and admonished the jury to disregard the statement (D) holding no injury to ashley shown by statement to widow of murder victim that was not in evidence because trial court gave sua sponte instruction to jury to disregard statement and statement did not contradict ashleys testimony (E) holding that trial judges admonition of the jury to disregard prosecutors comments on the defendants failure to testify did not cure the error

Output: holding that trial courts jury charge did not amount to reversible error given that plaintiff failed to show she was prejudiced by inapplicable portion of trial courts charge

Input: Consider Input: Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. 507. OFAC has directed us to a few cases, however, in which the Supreme Court has analyzed whether a warrantless search was reasonable in the totality of the circumstances without reference to any specific exception. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 124 S.Ct. 1582, 158 L.Ed.2d 311 (2004); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). We will assume for the purpose of our discussion (but do not decide) that the " 'general Fourth Amendment approach,' " Samson, 547 U.S. at 848, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587), applies equally to warrantless seizures. But see KindHearts I, 647 F.Supp.2d at 878-79 (<HOLDING>). Under this approach, "we examine the totality
Holding statements: (A) holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify (B) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances (C) recognizing a presumption of reasonableness (D) holding that there is no general reasonableness approach to warrantless seizures (E) holding that reasonableness analysis applies in general jurisdiction case under federal circuit law
Output: holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify