In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: The State, by contrast, argues that because the court's summary denial of Pinholster's claim was an adjudication on the merits, we apply the usual deference required by AEDPA. Under our precedent, the California Supreme Court's denial of Pinholster's petition for writ of habeas corpus "on the substantive ground that it is without merit," Pinholster II, 525 F.3d at 754, constitutes a decision on the merits of his federal claim. See Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that "the California Supreme Court's denial of a habeas petition without comment or citation constituted a decision on the merits of the federal claims" (citing Harris v. Superior Court, 500 F.2d 1124, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc))); Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has not addressed the
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that we ordinarily do not accord precedential value to our unpublished decisions and that such decisions are entitled only to the weight they generate by the persuasiveness of their reasoning citation omitted (B) holding that we must first determine our jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the appeal (C) holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred (D) recognizing that we construe postcard denials such as these to be decisions on the merits citing hunter 982 f2d at 348 (E) recognizing that sanctions are collateral to the merits of the case and may be considered even after the merits are no longer before the district court

A: (D)
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Q: to use the latter route to circumvent Congress's apparent intent in enacting the AEDPA to bar all review of such decisions. Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1046 (D.C.Cir.1998). In 1997, the Ninth Circuit held that the new restrictions on successive petitions do not prevent a petitioner from bringing a 2241 claim after he has already brought a 2255 claim. See United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278 (9th Cir.1997). Furthermore, in 1998, the Second Circuit held that a 2255 petition that followed a 2241 petition was not barred. See Corrao v. United States, 152 F.3d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1998), citing Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir.1 the execution of a sentence are properly raised in a 2241 petition"); United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489 (4th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Corrao, 152 F.3d at 191 ("a motion under
Holding statements: (A) holding that subject matter jurisdiction under 2241 is present in the custodial court when the petition challenges the manner location or condition of a sentences execution (B) holding that a petition under 2241 attacks the execution of a sen tence while a 2255 petition attacks the validity of a judgment and sentence (C) holding that an attack on the computation and execution of a sentence must come in the form of a 2241 petition (D) holding that 2255 is unavailable to attack execution of sentence (E) holding that it is well settled in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that 2255 will lie only to attack the imposition of a sentence and that an attack on the execution thereof may be accomplished only by way of habeas corpus in the district of confinement

A: (C)
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Q: explained that' [t]he distractions of the litigation pose a serious threat to the continued successful operations of [SGL Carbon]. Further, the potential liability faced by [SGL Carbon] could very well force it out of business. Consistent with the policies and purposes of Chapter 11 which encourage early filing so as to increase the possibility of successful reorganization, the Court will not allow [SGL Carbon] to wait idly by for impending financial and operational ruin, when [SGL Carbon] can take action now to avoid such a consequence. SGL Carbon Corp., 233 B.R. at 291. The Committee has appealed. II. The District Court had jurisdiction over this bankruptcy case under 28 U.S.C. 1334(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. See In re Brown, 916 F.2d 120, 124 (3d Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). We have not yet had occasion to decide what
Holding statements: (A) holding that the rule 21 severance rendered the district court verdict a final and appealable judgment under 28 usc 1291 (B) holding that order denying motion to dismiss a bankruptcy petition is final under 28 usc 1291 (C) holding that summary judgment order that does not dispose of all claims between parties does not confer appellate jurisdiction because it is not a final decision under 28 usc 1291 (D) holding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine and 28 usc 1291 a state may appeal from a district court order denying it eleventh amendment immunity (E) holding that a nonparty may appeal an order of criminal contempt arising out of a pending action under 28 usc 1291

A:
(B)
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