In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: is knowing and voluntary, when there is a factual foundation to support it, when the state has agreed to it, then the discretion has ended and the plea must be accepted." Id. at 1041. We noted, however, that this rule applied only to "unconditional and unqualified" guilty pleas, not to negotiated pleas where the State has agreed to a particular sentence or to the disposition of particular charges, or where the State opposes the plea. Id. at 1041-42 (on motion for rehearing). Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) provides: "A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved." See State v. Ashby, 245 So.2d 225 (Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). A trial judge has wide discretion to refuse
Holding statements: (A) holding a contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review (B) holding that a defendant in a criminal case might plead no contest conditioned on the right to preserve for appellate review a question of law (C) holding that the defendant failed properly to preserve assignment of error for appellate review because the trial court had no opportunity to consider the defendants contention as presented on appeal (D) holding that there is no due process right to appellate review (E) holding that under state procedural law a timely objection is necessary to preserve a batson question for appellate review

A: (B)
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Q: Id. The district court excluded this portion of the expert's testimony. Id. at 1397. Relying on Downing, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 1401. We agree that expert testimony on eyewitness identification may properly be admitted under Daubert in certain circumstances, but Stevens simply does not persuade us that the district court abused its discretion in the instant case. We note that here there were five eyewitness identifica tions, not one. Likewise, as counsel for the government pointed out at argument, there was also testimony that Mr. Smith changed his alibi. In this admittedly close case, we hold only that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony under the circumstances. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.1987) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103,
Holding statements: (A) holding admissible expert testimony concerning factors that may impair eyewitness identification and rejecting that concerning a particular eyewitness credibility and the statistical probability of eyewitness misidentification (B) holding no abuse of discretion to exclude expert eyewitness identification testimony where governments case relied on more than eyewitness identification (C) holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury to consider certain additional factors in evaluating the validity of eyewitness identification testimony (D) holding that a specific instruction was unnecessary because eyewitness was crossexamined and the eyewitness testimony was discussed in defense counsels opening statement (E) holding exclusion of expert eyewitness identification testimony harmless error where governments case included three separate eyewitnesses and a palm print that discredited the defendants alibi

A: (B)
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Q: as late as February 1994, although the wife stated that she did not think that she lived with them for longer than one year. The wife testified that, during the time that she lived with the husband's parents, they helped her financially. It appears that the trial court may have considered the husband's obligation to support the wife suspended during the time that she lived with his parents, as the order reflects that it calculated arrearage beginning in February 1994. Alimony arrearage is a final judgment as of the date due and is not subject to modification. Harris v. Harris, 553 So.2d 129 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). In some instances alimony obligations can be satisfied by means other than direct payment from the husband to the wife. See, Swindle v. Swindle, 429 So.2d 601 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Frazier, 455 So.2d 883
Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (C) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils (D) holding that obligation to pay mortgage on home was satisfied by payment of fire insurance proceeds where husband maintained fire insurance policy (E) holding that when the house is destroyed by fire and there exists thereon a policy by insurance the money arising therefrom stands in the place instead of such house the proceeds of the policy therefore take the place of the property loss

A:
(D)
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