TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 386-87 (6th Cir.1992). The district court below also acknowledged this interest as a substantial one. TSSAA's other two justifications, however, are very much in dispute. Brentwood, for example, argues that there is no support in the record for the proposition that student athletes need protection from exploitation. The district court agreed. It concluded that TSSAA offered no proof that exerting undue influence on middle school athletes to recruit them for athletic purposes actually harms those students. Proof of actual harm, however, is not required in order to recognize a state actor's interest in preventing reasonably anticipated harm. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, Ohio, 240 F.3d 553, 565-66 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Finally, TSSAA's newly asserted interest in a
Holding statements: (A) holding that the village could regulate doortodoor solicitation based on a fear of an anticipated harm without proof of actual harm (B) holding that likelihood of irreparable harm must be based on evidence in the record not unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm the plaintiff might suffer (C) recognizing 1951 includes fear of economic harm (D) holding that because persecution cannot be based on a fear of psychological harm alone petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal based on the psychological harm she would suffer if her us citizen daughter were to undergo fgm (E) holding that an essential element of a claim of legal malpractice pursued under either a contract or trespass theory is proof of actual loss rather than breach of a professional duty causing only nominal damages speculative harm or the threat of future harm

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: federal courts intervene in the matter. The argument is unavailing, however, where the pending question is whether the Board's proceedings constitute an effort by the state to impose its regulatory authority in a field preempted by Congress. See Association of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 208 F.3d 1, 2000 WL 298563, at *3 (1st Cir. March 27, 2000)(finding that the court's initial invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine was unwise where "the ultimate legal determination of whether the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the [federal Clean Air Act] is a question of federal preemption law for the courts alone to decide"); Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd., 454 F.2d 38, 41 (1st Cir.1972)(<HOLDING>). The state defendants also move to dismiss
Holding statements: (A) holding that the plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies and it does not matter that the plaintiff was using state law as the vehicle to press her assertion (B) holding that plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies before the puerto rico labor relations board before invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether the boards assertion of jurisdiction was proper (C) recognizing the general rule that parties must exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from federal courts (D) holding that plaintiff could not present his erisa estoppel claim to the district court because he did not properly exhaust it before the administrative review board (E) holding that federal prisoners need not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: Here, Defendants challenge venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a) rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). Although many federal courts hold that waiver under Rule 12 applies equally to 1406(a), there appears to be some disagreement on the issue. Compare, e.g., Gardner v. Mylan Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01289, 2010 WL 2595114, at *2 (S.D.W.Va. June 24, 2010) (indicating that Rule 12 waiver guidelines apply to 1406(a)); Bosse v. Mertoff, No. 05-CV-02170, 2007 WL 484590, at *2 (D.Colo. Feb. 9, 2007) ("[T]here is significant authority for the proposition that, once a defense of improper venue is waived, a defendant is also foreclosed from seeking a transfer under 1406."); with, e.g., Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 12 C 5842, 2013 WL 323404, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 25, 2013) (<HOLDING>). Regardless, it is clear that a party can
Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer most appropriate under 28 usc 1406a (B) holding that a partys repeated representations that venue was proper in one forum waived its right to bring a subsequent motion under 28 usc 1406a challenging venue (C) holding that motion to transfer also must show either that county where action is pending is improper or that venue is mandatory in another county (D) recognizing conflicting case law regarding whether waiver under rule 12b3 extends to a request for a transfer under 1406a given that such a transfer is premised on venue being improper in this district (E) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court

SOLUTION:
(D)