In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: 616.8. Like our general venue statute, section 616.8, known as our common carrier statute, has also remained virtually unchanged for over a century. Compare Iowa Code 2582 (1873), with Iowa Code 616.8 (2001). It provides: An action may be brought against any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars, express, canal, steamboat and other river crafts, telegraph and telephone companies ... in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated. Iowa Code 616.8. Although not expressly mentioned, we have held that semi-trucks carrying freight on a fixed schedule over a regular route with fixed termini constitute a "line of ... cars" for purposes of the statute. Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston, 227 Iowa 50, 52-55, 287 N.W. 278, 278-81 (1939) (<HOLDING>). The Richards contend section 616.8, like
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language (B) holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes (C) holding the fact legislature could not have foreseen rise of semitrucks when it enacted common carrier statute in the nineteenth century did not foreclose an interpretation that would effectuate its intent (D) holding an administrative interpretation cannot change the meaning of a statute or control the courts interpretation of it (E) holding that shipper negligence does not absolve a carrier of liability if damage would not have occurred but for the concurrent fault of the carrier
[A]: holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language

[Q]: reasoning of these cases. Moreover, we believe that declaratory relief is also moot when the challenged acts have already "irretrievably occurred." Accordingly, we apply the teachings of N.J. Tpk. Auth., that the claim for injunctive relief had become "academic by reason of these changed circumstances .... " Id. at 27. Here, as in N.J. Tpk. Auth., the challenged action awarding the contracts has already occurred, and the work required by them has already been performed. There is no longer a " 'subject matter upon which the judgment of the court can operate' to make a substantive determination on the merits." Id. at 30 (quoting Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 20 S.Ct. 673, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)); see also Jersey Cent. Power and Light Co. v. State of N.J., 772 F.2d 35, 36 (3d Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). II. For Appellants to be prevailing parties
Holding statements: (A) holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot (B) holding that plaintiffs who sought injunctive relief under 42 usc 1983 could get same relief in a state court mandamus action (C) holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed (D) holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer (E) holding that injunctive claim was rendered meaningless since the state action sought to be enjoined has irretrievably occurred
[A]: holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot

[Q]: be employees to be "teachers" and thus covered by the retirement system's pension plan. But the STRS determined that Nese, Williams, and Miles were not "teachers," because they were independent contractors rather than employees when they worked as VLA instructors for Jefferson County ESC. We thus turn to the legal tests for distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. Common Law: Distinguishing Employees from Independent Contractors { 33} "The chief test in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is the right to control the manner or means of performing the work." Bobik v. Indus. Comm., 146 Ohio St. 187, 64 N.E.2d 829 (1946), paragraph one of the syllabus. See also Foran v. Fisher Foods, Inc., 17 Ohio St.3d 193, 194, 478 N.E.2d 998 (1985) (<HOLDING>). "If such right is in the employer, the
Holding statements: (A) holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work (B) holding that the tort of conversion accrues where a party exercises wrongful dominion and control over the property to the detriment of the rights of its actual owner (C) holding that one who exercises daytoday control over the employee will be considered as the employer (D) holding corporations president personally liable where he had ultimate control over businesss daytoday operations and was the corporate officer principally in charge of directing employment practices (E) holding that where daytoday operations were within sole control of the franchisee no agency relationship existed with franchisor
[A]:
holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work