In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
1999) (same); Hill v. Fidelity Fin. Servs. (In re Hill), 152 B.R. 204, 206 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1993) (same); In re Reese, 194 B.R. 782, 787 (Bankr.D.Md.1996) (same); Barclays Am./Mortgage Corp. v. Wilkinson (In re Wilkinson), 186 B.R. 186, 191 (Bankr.D.Md.1995) (same); In re Redditt, 146 B.R. 693, 697 (Bankr.S.D.Miss.1992) (stat ing that "[b]y the statute's own terms, only the trustee has standing to exercise the strong-arm avoidance powers"); Mast v. Borgess Medical Center (In re Mast), 79 B.R. 981, 982 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1987) (same); In re Driver, 133 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ind.1991) (stating that "a Chapter 13 debtor is not explicitly bestowed with the trustee's strong arm transfer avoidance powers."); Hollar v. United States (In re Hollar), 174 B.R. 198, 203 (M.D.N.C.1994) (<HOLDING>). As In re Higgins, most of the majority
Holding statements: (A) holding that chapter 13 debtors have standing to bring avoidance actions by reasoning that chapter 13 trustee has standing but little incentive to bring avoidance actions that will result in benefit to debtors of recovering exempt assets (B) holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case (C) holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees avoidance power (D) holding that an order striking a standing trustees motion to convert a chapter 13 petition to a chapter 7 is interlocutory not final (E) holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
determination under the reasonableness test as clearly erroneous, we perceive no error. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 1 . Appellees' original complaint was filed before the bylaw amendment was passed. 2 . The lobby, which per Paragraph 7(c) of the Ridgely Declaration is explicitly characterized as a common element, was refurbished in 1990 out of common funds consisting of contributions from each unit owner. To deny the use of the lobby to clients of the commercial owners constitutes an ultra vires taking of a portion of their percentage interest in the common areas in derogation of the Ridgely Condominium declaration as well as certain provisions of the Maryland Condominium Act. Paragraph 8 of the Ridgely Declaration, in pertinent part, provid 495, 500 (1991) (<HOLDING>). See also Jarvis v. Stage Neck Owners Ass'n,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the defendants presence in a dark alleyway at six oclock in the morning behind a closed business in an exclusively commercial area supported the investigative stop and explaining that knowledge of recent burglaries in an area is a relevant circumstance to be considered in determining the reasonableness of an officers suspicion because knowledge of the character of the area is part of an officers expertise (B) recognizing that unit owners own the common elements in fee as tenants in common (C) holding that the requirement of explicitly and prominently was intended by the legislature to ensure that the declaration give unequivocal notice to the project unit owners of the authorization for such use (D) holding that the grant of exclusive use to one unit owner of a common area is sufficient to change the relative interest of the unit owners in that common area (E) holding that the statute in question served to modify prior common law and that the legislature was empowered to make such changes in the common law based on the public interest

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
770) (2006) (declaratory judgment could not be used to compel ex-husband to provide additional funds to ex-wife). The trial court erred by dismissing Appellants' request for declaratory judgment on the basis that it impermissibly asked the trial court to interpret a criminal statute and that it imprope injunctive relief enjoining the arrest or prosecution of Appellants squarely implicates the administration of criminal law and, thus, is improper. See Mohwish v. Franklin, 291 Ga. 179, 179-180 (728 SE2d 240) (2012) (injunction not available where sought to interfere with an ongoing prosecution); Holmes v. Bd. of Commrs., 271 Ga. 206 (517 SE2d 788) (1999) (injunction not available to restrain trespass prosecution); City of East Point v. Minton, 207 Ga. 495, 499 (62 SE2d 911) (1951) (<HOLDING>). Decided May 9, 2016. John R. Monroe, for
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a criminal prosecution is not complete until a sentence has been imposed (B) holding that malicious prosecution claim accrues when underlying prosecution is terminated (C) holding that a 1983 due process claim that essentially contests the fairness of the plaintiffs prosecution is similar to his malicious prosecution claim and claims resembling malicious prosecution do not accrue until the prosecution has terminated in the plaintiffs favor (D) recognizing that ejquity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution solely to prevent such a prosecution (E) holding that foreign states prosecution did not bar subsequent florida prosecution for same conduct

Ex Output:
(D)