In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: speech." The categorical distinction is particularly difficult to apply to statutes that proscribe threats. Generally, threats involve words, or "speech." Moreover, in the R.A.V. case itself, the Court implicitly suggested that threats did not fall within its exception for statutes "directed at conduct." See R.A.V., U.S. at --, 112 S.Ct. at 2546 (describing 18 U.S.C. 871, which proscribes threats against the President, as fully subject to its general rule). Nonetheless, as I discuss below, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute selectively proscribing threats of force is "directed at conduct" and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. 3631, as applied to a cross-burning incident); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,
Holding statements: (A) holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241 (B) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (C) holding that 18 usc 245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc 3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights (D) holding that 18 usc 1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc 1001 (E) holding that 18 usc 241 and 42 usc 3631 fall within a separate exception to rav
[EX A]: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc 241

[EX Q]: re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr.D.Mass.1987); Williams v. Clark (In re Clark), 91 B.R. 324, 332-34 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988). And, although 105 "does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law," Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, n. 1; "[b]ankruptcy courts ... enjoy inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct." Mapother & Mapother v. Cooper (In re Downs), 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir.1996). This inherent power authorizes federal courts "to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities." Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823, 116 S.Ct. 1777, 135 L.Ed.2d 102 (1996). See also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991)(<HOLDING>); Jones v. Bank of Santa Fe (In re Courtesy
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it (B) recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals (C) recognizing district courts inherent authority to dismiss with prejudice for abuse of judicial process (D) recognizing inherent power of federal district court to sanction conduct abusive of judicial process (E) recognizing courts inherent power to impose sanctions including attorneys fees for conduct that abuses the judicial process
[EX A]: recognizing that court has inherent power to control the judicial business before it

[EX Q]: employees to determine who has authority to accept service, service is proper when, objectively viewed, it is calculated to give notice to the corporation. See id. at 273, 428 N.Y.S.2d 890, 406 N.E.2d 747 ("[W]hen the corporation is regularly doing business in the State, it generally cannot be heard to complain that the summons was delivered to the wrong person when the process server has gone to its offices, made proper inquiry of the defendant's own employees, and delivered the summons according to their directions."). Thus, service may be sustained where the employee accepting service has apparent authority to do so. Courts within the Second Circuit have adopted this broadening approach. See, e.g., Melkaz Int'l Inc. v. Flavor Innovation Inc., 167 F.R.D. 634, 642-43 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (<HOLDING>); Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 111 F.R.D. 407, 414
Holding statements: (A) holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits (B) holding service on corporation proper where process server went to corporate defendants headquarters identified himself to an employee of corporate defendant and stated that he was there to serve legal papers and the employee then directed him to another employee who accepted service even though neither employee was authorized to accept service and neither represented that she was in fact so authorized because both were obviously corporate defendant employees and the employee redelivered the summons and complaint to an employee authorized to accept service on the same date (C) holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service (D) holding that res judicata properly barred claims based on an employers decision to terminate an employee because the termination was not a fresh act of discrimination rather it was the same decision not to allow the employee to return to work that the employee had challenged previously (E) holding that a clerical employee was not an agent authorized to accept service of process for the corporation
[EX A]:
holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits