Problem: Is this an insect or an animal? A snail is an animal just like you and me. Thats right, you too are an animal. No, you don't look like a snail. You do have some things in common. Animals can be divided into many groups. These groups are decided based on their characteristics. All animals have some basic features in common. That does not mean they are the same. They also have many differences. For example, snails are mollusks and not insects. Mollusks have a unique set of features. Notice the large foot that allows it to move. Yes, it only has one foot. Did you notice the long antennas on its head? This is where the snail's eyes are. They are on the end of the antenna. They are not on its head like most animals. The foot and eyes are unique features. Scientists use these features to place animals into groups.

Question: "Where are a snail's eyes located?"

Answer: "On the end of its antenna on their heads"

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Answer: yes

Question:
In Hamburg, Jarrah had a succession of living accommodations, but he apparently never resided with his future co-conspirators. It is not clear how and when he became part of Atta's circle. He became particularly friendly with Binalshibh after meeting him at the Quds mosque in Hamburg, which Jarrah began attending regularly in late 1997. The worshippers at this mosque featured an outspoken, flamboyant Islamist named Mohammed Haydar Zammar. A well-known figure in the Muslim community (and to German and U.S. intelligence agencies by the late 1990s), Zammar had fought in Afghanistan and relished any opportunity to extol the virtues of violent jihad. Indeed, a witness has reported hearing Zammar press Binalshibh to fulfill his duty to wage jihad. Moreover, after 9/11, Zammar reportedly took credit for influencing not just Binalshibh but the rest of the Hamburg group. In 1998, Zammar encouraged them to participate in jihad and even convinced them to go to Afghanistan. Owing to Zammar's persuasion or some other source of inspiration, Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah eventually prepared themselves to translate their extremist beliefs into action. By late 1999, they were ready to abandon their student lives in Germany in favor of violent jihad. This final stage in their evolution toward embracing Islamist extremism did not entirely escape the notice of the people around them. The foursome became core members of a group of radical Muslims, often hosting sessions at their Marienstrasse apartment that involved extremely anti-American discussions. Meeting three to four times a week, the group became something of a "sect" whose members, according to one participant in the meetings, tended to deal only with each other. Atta's rent checks for the apartment provide evidence of the importance that the apartment assumed as a center for the group, as he would write on them the notation "Dar el Ansar," or "house of the followers." In addition to Atta, Binalshibh, Shehhi, and Jarrah, the group included other extremists, some of whom also would attend al Qaeda training camps and, in some instances, would help the 9/11 hijackers as they executed the plot: Said Bahaji, son of a Moroccan immigrant, was the only German citizen in the group. Educated in Morocco, Bahaji returned to Germany to study electrical engineering at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg. He spent five months in the German army before obtaining a medical discharge, and lived with Atta and Binalshibh at 54 Marienstrasse for eight months between November 1998 and July 1999. Described as an insecure follower with no personality and with limited knowledge of Islam, Bahaji nonetheless professed his readiness to engage in violence. After reading the above, is "Evidence of the importance that the apartment was a center for the group" the correct answer to the question "The four became somewhat of a sect meeting 3 to 4 times a week and what was it that Atta would write on the rent checks?"? OPTIONS:
- no
- yes

Answer:
no

Input: As noted above, the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. The available evidence indicates that the 19 operatives were funded by al Qaeda, either through wire transfers or cash provided by KSM, which they carried into the United States or deposited in foreign accounts and accessed from this country. Our investigation has uncovered no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government-or foreign government official-supplied any funding. We have found no evidence that the Hamburg cell members (Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, and Binalshibh) received funds from al Qaeda before late 1999. It appears they supported themselves. KSM, Binalshibh, and another plot facilitator, Mustafa al Hawsawi, each received money, in some cases perhaps as much as $10,000, to perform their roles in the plot. After the Hamburg recruits joined the 9/11 conspiracy, al Qaeda began giving them money. Our knowledge of the funding during this period, before the operatives entered the United States, remains murky. According to KSM, the Hamburg cell members each received $5,000 to pay for their return to Germany from Afghanistan after they had been selected to join the plot, and they received additional funds for travel from Germany to the United States. Financial transactions of the plotters are discussed in more detail in chapter 7. Requirements for a Successful Attack As some of the core operatives prepared to leave for the United States, al Qaeda's leaders could have reflected on what they needed to be able to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm. We believe such a list of requirements would have included leaders able to evaluate, approve, and supervise the planning and direction of the operation; communications sufficient to enable planning and direction of the operatives and those who would be helping them; a personnel system that could recruit candidates, vet them, indoctrinate them, and give them necessary training; an intelligence effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and weaknesses; the ability to move people; and the ability to raise and move the necessary money. The information we have presented about the development of the planes operation shows how, by the spring and summer of 2000, al Qaeda was able to meet these requirements. By late May 2000, two operatives assigned to the planes operation were already in the United States. Three of the four Hamburg cell members would soon arrive.
"What time in 2000 does al Queada meet the requirements and what chapter can you find more details about financial transactions?" is "Spring and summer, chapter 7"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output: yes

Input: The grant also will help victims go through court proceedings after losing a job or being evicted because of an abuser's actions, Xanthopoulos said. "It's going to help the victims, but it's also going to help their children," he said. More than 270 domestic violence assaults in Madison County were reported last year, according to Tennessee Bureau of Investigation statistics. In Jackson, more than 730 domestic violence assaults were reported last year, according to records. "Domestic violence is certainly on the increase and we need to do something to curve that. I see this as helping that," Madison County Sheriff David Woolfork said of the grant. Domestic violence accounted for five of 12 murders in 2001 in Jackson, police have said. And the increase in calls prompted Jackson Police Chief Rick Staples in March to form a focus group to determine if police officers need to make changes in their response to domestic calls.
"How many more domestic violence assault cases were in Madison county and Jackson county?" is "Just under 1,500"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
Output:
no