In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: 558, 563, 564 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2002). DISCUSSION Moody argues the circuit court erred in granting Dairy-land's motion for summary judgment, asserting Dairyland did not make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage because it failed to offer coverage in amounts less than the statutory minimum limits. We disagree. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature." Hawkins v. Bruno Yacht Sales, 353 S.C. 31, 40, 577 S.E.2d 202, 207 (2003).. Moreover, "[w]here the terms of the statute are clear, [this Court] must apply those terms according to their literal meaning." Brown v. South Carolina Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002); see also Rowe v. Hyatt, 321 S.C. 366, 369, 468 S.E.2d 649, 650 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In relevant part, section 38-73-470 provides
Holding statements: (A) holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning (B) holding that we must give the words in statutes their plain and ordinary meaning (C) holding when interpreting a statute words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statutes operation (D) holding that where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation (E) holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning

A: holding that the clear and unambiguous words of an insurance contract should be given their plain and ordinary meaning
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Q: conversion should have an opportunity to reassert objections to exemptions. Indeed, Rule 1019(2) specifically addresses time period for actions after conversion, and provides for the re-running of times allowed for filing a claim, objecting to discharge and objecting to dischargeability. There is no new time period, however, for the trustee to assert objections to exemptions. "If a new time period for objections to exemptions began to run upon conversion of a case, one would expect to see it mentioned in Rule 1019(2), [and][i]t is not there." In re Brown, 178 B.R. 722, 728 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1995). Where the statute is clear, it is not appropriate to look to policy arguments. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109-S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (<HOLDING>), and none of the policy arguments are
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear (B) holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint (C) holding that the relevant dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful (D) holding that pursuant to 28 usc 2254d1 if the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry (E) holding that where the statutory scheme is clear the inquiry should end

A: recognizing that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity where statutory language is clear
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Q: M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). The intended effect of the statutory language is at best uncertain because the reference to "any such grounds applied in [Suter ], but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions" is open to interpretation. However, "the fairest reading of Section 1320a-2 [and 1320a-10] is that Congress was concerned ... that a court should not eviscerate an otherwise enforceable right merely because it appears in a statute mandating that participating states include a particular provision in their state plans." Messier v. Southbury Training School, 916 F.Supp. 133, 144-45 (D.Conn.1996); see also Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1002-03 (11th Cir.1997). But see LaShawn A. v. Barry, 69 F.3d 556, 568-70 (D.C.Cir.1995), vacated by 87 F.3d 1389 (1996) (<HOLDING>). In light of sections 1320a-2 and 1320a-10,
Holding statements: (A) holding that because buter did not use an approach different from past cases 1320a2 1320a10 are without any effect (B) recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended (C) holding that an arbitrator was not bound by an earlier award involving a different contract and different union (D) holding that a district court cannot use the psrs factual statements when applying the modified categorical approach (E) holding that the categorical approach applies to 924c

A:
recognizing that the legislature would not generally use a different meaning for the same word in a legislative provision unless a different purpose was intended
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