In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: irrelevant, a respondent's awareness that his conduct will violate an ethical proscription is not itself material."). Simply because an attorney's conduct is intentional or dishonest does not by itself establish a dishonest or selfish motive. See In re Alcorn, 202 Ariz. 62, 74, 42, 41 P.3d 600, 612 (2002) (respondent violated his ethical duty of candor toward the tribunal, but selfish motive was not an aggravating factor). 43 In the past, we have held that dishonest or selfish motive is an aggravating factor when an attorney received some financial gain or made misrepresentations to cover his or her negligence. These previous holdings of dishonest or selfish motive involved private attorneys, not public sector lawyers. See, e.g., Arrick, 180 Ariz. at 143, 882 P.2d at 950 (<HOLDING>); Shannon, 179 Ariz. at 69, 876 P.2d at 565
Holding statements: (A) holding that even where a client was more sophisticated in business matters than the lawyer himself the lawyer should have assumed the client was relying on the lawyer for the legal aspects of the loan from the client to the lawyer to the same extent that the client would rely on the lawyer for advice were the client making the loan to a third person (B) holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client (C) holding that lawyer who made deliberate misrepresentations to his client to conceal his negligence and improperly retained a fee from that client had a dishonest or selfish motive (D) holding that an attorneys filing a notice of appearance on behalf of his or her client constitute a waiver of service of process by the client (E) holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case

Output: (C)

Input: Consider Input: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court's conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that "typically involve[s] purposeful, 'violent,' and 'aggressive' conduct." United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that "[t]he phrase
Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: outline two methods for dealing with thirdparty liability: "cost avoidance" and "pay and recover later." 42 C.F.R. 433.139(a)(2) (2005). When the probable liability of a third party is established at the time a claim is filed, the state Medicaid agency is required to practice cost avoidance by rejecting the claim and returning it to the provider for a determination of the amount of third-party liability. See 42 C.F.R. 433.139(b) (2005). When, on the other hand, probable thirdparty liability is established or other benefits become available after the claim is filed, the state Medicaid agency is required to use the pay and recover later method, see 42 C.F.R. 433.139(c) (2005), also known as "pay and chase," Atlanticare Med. Center v. Com'r of Div., 785 N.E.2d 346, 353 (Mass. 2003) (<HOLDING>). When a state Medicaid agency is obligated to
Holding statements: (A) holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983 (B) holding that the court does not examine legislative history when the statutes text and context are not subject to more than one plausible reading (C) holding that 42 usc 1396aa13a which requires states to make reasonable reimbursement to providers was enforceable by the providers pursuant to section 1983 (D) holding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the fcpa indicates the congressional intent to create a private right of action (E) holding that natural reading of 42 usc 1396a25b and legislative history demonstrate congressional intent that state medicaid agencies seek reimbursement from liable third parties rather than providers
Output: (E)