In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: induced his employer to terminate his at-will employment?" See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 491. The Supreme Court ruled only on that issue. See Haddle, 119 S.Ct. at 492. The Eleventh circuit had already previously rejected the intracorpo-rate conspiracy doctrine. Because the in-tracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not before the Supreme Court, it would be a mistake to draw any inference from the Court's silence on the issue. See United States v. Stewart, 650 F.2d 178, 180 (9th Cir.1981); Sacramento Valley Chapter of National Electrical Contractors Association v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 632 F.Supp. 1403, 1414 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd, 888 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989). The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first developed in the anti-trust context. See Nelson, 200 F.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). The Seventh Circuit extended the doctrine to
Holding statements: (A) holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice (B) holding a corporation cannot conspire with its officers and agents to restrain trade in its own products (C) holding that a hospital can conspire with members of its medical staff (D) recognizing that agents of a corporation may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed in the name of the corporation (E) recognizing that representation of a corporation by its officers in administrative proceedings is allowed

A: holding that as a general rule the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice
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Q: in favor of William Spencer, et al., (Spencer) and setting the penalties for violation of the California False Claims Act (CFCA). Spencer cross-appeals the denial of post-trial motions and refusal to award attorney's fees. We affirm on all grounds. I BART's unjust enrichment claim fads for want of a loss. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 881 (2000) (noting that the elements of unjust enrichment are "receipt of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another."). Even assuming that County of San Bernardino v. Walsh, 158 Cal.App.4th 533, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 848 (2008), recognized an exception to this rule, BART's claim does not fall into that exception. See Peterson v. Cellico P'ship, 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1594, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 (2008) (<HOLDING>). Concrete financial loss is required for
Holding statements: (A) holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement (B) holding that walsh does not support plaintiffs assertion that they need not allege any actual injury to bring an unjust enrichment claim (C) holding that where plaintiffs filed a complaint for conversion unjust enrichment and injunctive relief they had an adequate remedy at law (D) holding that there is no cause of action in california for unjust enrichment (E) holding that erisa does not permit a plaintiff to assert an independent federal common law cause of action such as unjust enrichment to enforce the terms of an erisa plan thus to the extent plaintiffs third cause of action for unjust enrichment is brought pursuant to a federal common law right it must be dismissed

A: holding preemption is appropriate where unjust enrichment claim does not allege that the defendants were enriched by anything other than copyright infringement
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Q: Byrd was sentenced in September 1992 for an offense committed in March 1992, this amended language governs his sentencing. See U.S.S.G. 4A1.2, comment, (n.6), (backg'd.) (Nov.1991). Thus, because' the pertinent language relied on by Jones I has been deleted and new language added, Byrd is incorrect that our decision in Jones I controls this appeal. Byrd next contends that the amended language should be interpreted to provide district courts with discretion to entertain constitutional challenges to prior convictions that will be relied upon to enhance a defendant's sentence. The courts of appeals that have addressed the meaning of the amended Application Note and Background Commentary have taken differing approaches. Compare United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 805 (2d Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121
Holding statements: (A) holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under 924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury (B) holding that due to statute defendant cannot collaterally attack prior convictions used to enhance sentence unless in violation of the right to counsel (C) holding that prior felony drug convictions that fall within the conspiracy period may be used to enhance the defendants sentence if the conspiracy continued after his earlier convictions were final (D) holding amended language gives district courts discretion to permit collateral attack on prior convictions used to enhance sentence (E) holding that commission did not intend amended language to provide discretion to district courts to entertain challenges to prior convictions at sentencing

A:
holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under 924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury
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