QUES: Even after Bin Laden's departure from the area, CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was still set up. The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity. On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and Bin Laden. Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA. When the former Bin Laden unit chief found out about Clarke's call, he questioned CIA officials, who denied having given such a clearance. Imagery confirmed that less than a week after Clarke's phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site was deserted. CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt, were irate." Mike" thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possible site for targeting Bin Laden. The United Arab Emirates was becoming both a valued counterterrorism ally of the United States and a persistent counterterrorism problem. From 1999 through early 2001, the United States, and President Clinton personally, pressed the UAE, one of the Taliban's only travel and financial outlets to the outside world, to break off its ties and enforce sanctions, especially those relating to flights to and from Afghanistan. These efforts achieved little before 9/11. In July 1999, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid threatened to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Laden. The Taliban did not take him seriously, however. Bin Zayid later told an American diplomat that the UAE valued its relations with the Taliban because the Afghan radicals offered a counterbalance to "Iranian dangers" in the region, but he also noted that the UAE did not want to upset the United States.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION: When and why did the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hamdan bin Zayid threaten to break relations with the Taliban over Bin Laden?

QUES: On a day it celebrated 50 years of giving free legal advice, Southern Arizona Legal Aid announced it has received two grants totaling more than $7 million. One of the grants includes the creation of a Web site with legal advice for the poor. A three-year grant worth $6.6 million and a separate technology grant were announced at a press conference and dinner held Thursday at Evo. A. DeConcini Federal Courthouse, 405 W. Congress St. Deconcini was one of the organization's early board members. Thursday's celebration was the first public even held at the courthouse. About 100 members of the legal community attended, including state Attorney General Janet Napolitano and Arizona Supreme Court Justice Thomas Zlaket. Both grants come from the Legal Services., a private, nonprofit corporation established by Congress in 1974 to offer poor people equal access to the justice system. It's funded through congressional appropriation. The $6.6 million grant will pay for staffing operations. The Web site, which will be created with a $50,000 grant, is intended to offer legal advice to poor people across Arizona, said Paul Julian, chief executive officer of Southern Arizona Legal Aid. He said he wants every poor person in Arizona to have legal help. "This is another step in trying to realize that. We feel like we do a pretty good job of helping people who find us," Julian said. Julian said that though most people do not own computers, they can still access them at libraries, schools, and courthouses. He said the Web site will help bridge the "digital divide" that keeps the poor from using the Internet as a resource. Southern Arizona Legal Aid was founded in 1951 as the Legal Aid Society of the Pima County Bar Association. It offered free legal advice on civil matters including disputes in small claims court, divorce proceedings and obtaining Social Security benefits. Charles Ares, a member of the board of directors in the 1950s, said the office was kind of a charity operation.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION: How are the grants administered?

QUES: In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama Bin Laden and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting Bin Laden expelled from Afghanistan or possibly capturing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of Bin Laden's organization remained intact. President Clinton was deeply concerned about Bin Laden. He and his national security advisor, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on Bin Laden's reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about Bin Laden and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate-intended to avoid enhancing Bin Laden's stature by giving him unnecessary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors and of chemical and biological weapons. As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns-the Y2K scare. Some government officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such breakdowns. On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Bin Laden, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, "The time for training is over." Suspecting that this was a signal for Abu Hoshar to commence a terrorist operation, Jordanian police arrested Abu Hoshar and 15 others and informed Washington. One of the 16, Raed Hijazi, had been born in California to Palestinian parents; after spending his childhood in the Middle East, he had returned to northern California, taken refuge in extremist Islamist beliefs, and then made his way to Abu Zubaydah's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, where he learned the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. He and his younger brother had been recruited by Abu Hoshar into a loosely knit plot to attack Jewish and American targets in Jordan. After late 1996, when Abu Hoshar was arrested and jailed, Hijazi moved back to the United States, worked as a cabdriver in Boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters. After Abu Hoshar's release, Hijazi shuttled between Boston and Jordan gathering money and supplies. With Abu Hoshar, he recruited inTurkey and Syria as well as Jordan; with Abu Zubaydah's assistance, Abu Hoshar sent these recruits to Afghanistan for training.
Do you have any questions?
MY QUESTION:
What was breaking down in 2000 and why was that a concern to government officials?