In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
exception, which provides that "[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen" if the motion "is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding." 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). After review of the administrative record and consideration of the parties' briefs, we dismiss the petition in part and deny the petition in part. I Ms. Lian acknowledges that binding circuit precedent prohibits us from reaching her challenge to the BIA's refusal to reopen her proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(a). See Lenis v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.2008) (<HOLDING>). Nonetheless, Ms. Lian urges us to overrule
Holding statements: (A) holding that we lack jurisdiction to review a claim not brought before the bia even when the bia addresses it sua sponte (B) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review claims that have not been raised before the bia (C) holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of the bia refusing to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte (D) holding that a decision of the bia whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 cfr 10032a is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond the courts review ie the court lacks jurisdiction to review the bias decision not to reopen (E) holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to review legal arguments not raised before the bia

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
dominion and control over" the weapon. Id. at 126 (quoting Evans, 888 F.2d at 895). The case law in this circuit, then, clearly recognizes that under the statute an individual "carries" a firearm when it is within an accessible distance from that individual. Although this circuit has not addressed the definition of "carry" since the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey, other circuits nave addressed the issue and continue to define "carry" broadly. Most circuits agree that a weapon must be accessible to the defendant in order to meet the definition of "carry." In United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667 (2nd Cir.1996), a firearm located in a secret compa 4 (4th Cir.1997) (finding that firearm need not be accessible to be "carried"); United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the twolevel enhancement was appropriate where drugs cash and drug scales were found in defendants parlor and a gun was found in a secret compartment in defendants bathroom vanity (B) holding that use of gun was attributable to defendant who aided and abetted armed robbery but never personally carried gun (C) holding that after making an arrest of the driver of a vehicle the police may search the passenger compartment of the vehicle (D) holding that gun found in unreachable secret compartment in vehicle was carried (E) holding that a defendant may not be charged with two separate offenses premised on two amounts of cocaine one found in a box and one found in a bag located in the passenger compartment of the defendants vehicle

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
must be compelling proof that the refusal to deal was motivated by anticompetitive purposes, or will produce an anticompetitive effect. See, e.q., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed. 2d 338 (1978) ("[Something more than an agreement between [a manufacturer and a distributor] must be shown. The agreement becomes violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act only if it is anticompetitive in purpose and effect in sum, it must be tested by the rule of reason.") (emphasis in original); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1728, 100 L.Ed.2d 192 (1988); cf. Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, regardless whether a combination
Holding statements: (A) holding that to be preempted as a per se illegal hybrid restraint a regulation must involve a delegation of market power to private parties that is per se illegal because otherwise the hybrid restraint could not be attacked as facially invalid (B) holding that the per se rule does not apply to a vertical agreement between a buyer and supplier and noting that precedent limits the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving horizontal agreements among direct competitors (C) holding that otherwise lawful nonprice mechanism agreements between a manufacturer and a distributor may be rendered per se unlaw ful if imposed as part of an illegal scheme to fix prices (D) holding that a maximum vertical price maintenance scheme is not per se illegal (E) holding such agreements to be per se illegal

Ex Output:
(C)