In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: venue, the propriety of venue is fixed in the county chosen by the plaintiff. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. 15.063 (Vernon 1986); Tex.R.Civ.P. 86-1. If a defendant objects to the plaintiffs venue choice and properly challenges that choice through a motion to transfer venue, the question of proper venue is raised. Tex.R.Civ.P. 86. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. Id. 87-2(a). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the trial court must transfer the lawsuit to another specified county of proper venue. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. 15.063(1) ("The court ... shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if ... the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county...."); Tieuel, 654 S.W.2d at 775 (<HOLDING>). If the plaintiff meets the burden, the trial
Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county (C) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (D) holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed (E) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue

Output: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings

Input: Consider Input: that in December 1995, his wage was $8.67 per hour. Lewis stated that a Caucasian employee, who misrepresented his knowledge of desktop publishing, was hired at a rate of $9.00 per hour in his department. This employee ultimately was "[p]ushed out the door." Supp.App. at 354. Lewis also stated that another Caucasian employee received a pay increase from $7.50 to $8.25 per hour after he went from part-time to full-time status, and that a third Caucasian employee told him that he received a raise after his father called the store manager. The District Court held that Lewis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown that the employees he identified were similarly situated to him. See Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 857-58 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Finally, on his wrongful termination claim,
Holding statements: (A) holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated (B) holding that a plaintiff who did not show that he was paid at a lower rate than similarly situated employees could not survive summary judgment (C) holding that plaintiff was not similarly situated to another employee who also engaged in protected activity for purposes of plaintiffs retaliation claim (D) holding that employees of differing seniority levels were not similarly situated (E) holding that employee who violated a different policy of the store than plaintiff was not similarly situated

Output: holding that caucasian employees who engaged in the same act as the plaintiff but it did not result in injury to others were not similarly situated

Input: Consider Input: the universe of payees has expanded to include the child's parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative. BAPC-PA also now provides that a DSO may be "owed to or recoverable by" the payees named in the statute. 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5) (2006) (italics added). This new definition has spawned several lines of case law. Some courts infer that by identifying the universe of payees, Congress reinforced the restrictions on who could assert a DSO. See Tucker v. Oliver, 423 B.R. 378, 379-81 (W.D.Okla.2010); see also In re Aguirre, Bankr.No. 11-41126-JDP, 2012 WL 632400 (Bankr.D.Idaho Feb. 27, 2012). Other courts read the new language to include obligations to make payments to third parties that are recoverable by a former spouse. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 289, 295 (Bankr.M.D.N.C.2008) (<HOLDING>). Other courts continue to ignore the payee
Holding statements: (A) holding nondischargeable a debtors obligation to his former spouse under a divorce decree to assume liability for two joint debts to a third party and stating that 523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements (B) holding where a debtor does not exercise hisher right to designate which one of several debts to which a payment should be applied creditor may apply payment as he she chooses even if there is a surety or guarantor liable on one of the debts (C) holding that when one corporation transfers its assets to another the receiving corporation is not responsible for debts of transferor unless it agrees to assume these debts (D) holding that although a corporate officer is not presumed to be personally liable for corporate debts the officer may expressly bind himself or herself to be answerable for such debts (E) holding that the code excepts from discharge debts resulting from agreements by the debtor to hold the debtors spouse harmless on joint debts to the extent those debts are in the nature of alimony maintenance or support
Output: holding nondischargeable a debtors obligation to his former spouse under a divorce decree to assume liability for two joint debts to a third party and stating that 523a15 is intended to cover divorcerelated debts such as those in property settlement agreements