Defeated last month for re-election, Gov. Roy Barnes announced Tuesday that he will spend his first six months out of office as an unpaid attorney for the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, where he will represent poor people. "One day I'll probably do some legal work that I will charge a handsome fee for - at least I hope there are those that are still willing to pay," he told reporters. "But for now, I think it is important to fulfill my duty as a lawyer to help those who need it the most, to speak for those who cannot speak for themselves and to defend those whose life and livelihoods depend on it," he said. Previous governors have gone to prestigious law firms, joined corporate boards or returned to thriving businesses. "I don't think I've ever heard of anybody doing this before," Emory University political science professor Merle Black said. "If he's actually going to represent individuals for that organization, they're going to get great representation. You're going to get some powerful legal muscle there," Mr. Black said. Mr. Barnes said he already has his first case, but he wouldn't say what it is. Atlanta Legal Aid provides civil services to poor people in five metro Atlanta counties. Mr. Barnes said he was hoping to send a message to other lawyers. "This privilege to practice law is just that - it's a privilege. And it comes with a cost and it comes with a bill . We as lawyers have a responsibility to make sure that everyone, regardless of whether they can afford it or not, has quality representation. And if we don't do that, then we're not much of a profession," he said. Steven Gottlieb, the society's executive director, said, "I can't imagine anything that could be better than to have the governor of the state, in his first act as a private citizen, donate six months of his time to represent poor people .

Question: "Where did Roy Barnes decide to work for his first 6 months out and what do they do?"

Response: "Atlanta Legal Aid Society, they provide civil services to poor people in five Atlanta counties"
OPTIONS:
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- yes

A: yes

Problem: Bin Laden and his aides did not need a very large sum to finance their planned attack on America. The 9/11 plotters eventually spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack. Consistent with the importance of the project, al Qaeda funded the plotters. KSM provided his operatives with nearly all the money they needed to travel to the United States, train, and live. The plotters' tradecraft was not especially sophisticated, but it was good enough. They moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time. The origin of the funds remains unknown, although we have a general idea of how al Qaeda financed itself during the period leading up to 9/11. General Financing As we explained in chapter 2, Bin Laden did not fund al Qaeda through a personal fortune and a network of businesses in Sudan. Instead, al Qaeda relied primarily on a fund-raising network developed over time. The CIA now estimates that it cost al Qaeda about $30 million per year to sustain its activities before 9/11 and that this money was raised almost entirely through donations. For many years, the United States thought Bin Laden financed al Qaeda's expenses through a vast personal inheritance. Bin Laden purportedly inherited approximately $300 million when his father died, and was rumored to have had access to these funds to wage jihad while in Sudan and Afghanistan and to secure his leadership position in al Qaeda. In early 2000, the U.S. government discovered a different reality: roughly from 1970 through 1994, Bin Laden received about $1 million per year-a significant sum, to be sure, but not a $300 million fortune that could be used to fund jihad. Then, as part of a Saudi government crackdown early in the 1990s, the Bin Laden family was forced to find a buyer for Usama's share of the family company in 1994. The Saudi government subsequently froze the proceeds of the sale. This action had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of what otherwise might indeed have been a large fortune. Nor were Bin Laden's assets in Sudan a source of money for al Qaeda. When Bin Laden lived in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, he owned a number of businesses and other assets.

Question: "What kind of a network provided the $30 million al Qaeda used for its activities before 9/11?"

Answer: "Terrorism"

OPTIONS:
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- yes
Answer: no

Input: In March 2001, Rice asked the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan. Rice's recollection was that the idea had come from Clarke and the NSC senior director for intelligence, Mary McCarthy, and had been linked to the proposal for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks. Rice described the draft document as providing for "consolidation plus," superseding the various Clinton administration documents. In fact, the CIA drafted two documents. One was a finding that did concern aid to opponents of the Taliban regime; the other was a draft Memorandum of Notification, which included more open-ended language authorizing possible lethal action in a variety of situations. Tenet delivered both to Hadley on March 28. The CIA's notes for Tenet advised him that "in response to the NSC request for drafts that will help the policymakers review their options, each of the documents has been crafted to provide the Agency with the broadest possible discretion permissible under the law." At the meeting, Tenet argued for deciding on a policy before deciding on the legal authorities to implement it. Hadley accepted this argument, and the draft MON was put on hold. As the policy review moved forward, the planned covert action program for Afghanistan was included in the draft presidential directive, as part of an "Annex A" on intelligence activities to "eliminate the al Qaeda threat." The main debate during the summer of 2001 concentrated on the one new mechanism for a lethal attack on Bin Laden-an armed version of the Predator drone. In the first months of the new administration, questions concerning the Predator became more and more a central focus of dispute. Clarke favored resuming Predator flights over Afghanistan as soon as weather permitted, hoping that they still might provide the elusive "actionable intelligence" to target Bin Laden with cruise missiles. Learning that the Air Force was thinking of equipping Predators with warheads, Clarke became even more enthusiastic about redeployment. The CTC chief, Cofer Black, argued against deploying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes. He recalled that theTaliban had spotted a Predator in the fall of 2000 and scrambled their MiG fighters. Black wanted to wait until the armed version was ready. "I do not believe the possible recon value outweighs the risk of possible program termination when the stakes are raised by the Taliban parading a charred Predator in front of CNN," he wrote.

Does the response "Clarke became even more enthusiastic about redeployment" correctly answer the question "In the debate over the use of armed Predator drones what position did Clarke favor?"?

OPTIONS:
- no
- yes
***
Output:
yes