In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
of the documents. In his report, Gage stated only that the witnesses could not recall whether or not Peng raised his fist, but that they saw Peng grab the documents from Mei Hu. Peng has submitted a declaration by C. Peng that neither he nor Mr. Chi ever told anyone anything about what happened. As the district court noted, Peng has not cast doubt on the fact that, prior to Peng's arrest, Jonathan Hu, acting as interpreter, told Gage that the two witnesses saw Peng grab the documents from Mei Hu. Peng has cast doubt on the identity of the witnesses and the veracity of Jonathan Hu, but Gage could not have known this at the time of the arrest. We are satisfied that Gage made a reasonable investigation under the circumstances before he arrested Peng. See Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1442-44 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the presence of a factual
Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers have a duty to conduct an investigation into the basis of the witness report (B) holding that because the court could not consider police reports it could not rely on an attorneys argument based on the police report as the basis for determining the statutory basis for a conviction (C) holding that error in excluding a police officers report was harmless where the same evidence was presented by another witness (D) holding that an insurer has a duty to conduct an investigation reasonably appropriate under the circumstances (E) holding that witness statements in police report inadmissible

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
918 F.2d 154, 159 (11th Cir.1990). A district court should grant a preliminary injunction only if the movant clearly shows: 1. a substantial likelihood that the mov-ant will prevail on the merits; 2. that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if an injunction is, not issued; 3. that the potential injury to the mov-ant outweighs the possible harm to the nonmovant; and 4. that the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Id. This Court will address each element in turn. 1. SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS To begin, the instant ease is controlled by this Court's decision in Luckie v. Smith Barney, 766 F.Supp. 1116 (M.D.Fla.1991). In Luckie, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with AAA pursuant to the AMEX Window. Id. The defendants argued th 2nd Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>). Also, in Merrill Lynch v. Noonan, [Current]
Holding statements: (A) holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement (B) holding that the federal arbitration act requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement and mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration agreement emphasis added (C) holding that the arbitration provision naming particular arbitration fora superseded the amex constitution closed the amex window and precluded arbitration before aaa who was not named in the arbitration provision (D) holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the underlying agreement (E) holding that a specific customer agreement can supersede the amex constitution and requiring arbitration before one of the fora named in the agreement

Ex Output:
(E)

Ex Input:
for the proposition that "a plaintiff is not required to produce evidence of emotional distress beyond his own testimony." King, 452 F.Supp.2d at 1281. Two other courts faced with the same question since Moore was decided, however, have come out the other way and required more than an FCRA plaintiffs own testimony to support a claim for emotional distress damages. See Sampson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. CV204-187, 2005 WL 2095092, at *5 (S.D.Ga. Aug. 29, 2005) (collecting cases and concluding that an FCRA plaintiff "must produce some form of independent, corroborating evidence of her humiliation and embarrassment at trial to recover compensatory damages for emotional distress"); Jordan v. Trans Union LLC, No. 1:05 CV 305 GET, 2006 WL 1663324, at *7-8 (N.D.Ga. June 12, 2006) (<HOLDING>). In addition, Moore provides dubious support
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs proof that she became depressed and was prescribed depression medication by her family physician was insufficient to support claim and stating evidence that randolph is very depressed and very upset is insufficient to sustain damages for mental anguish (B) holding that adverse inference alone insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment (C) holding the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that the plaintiff could be awarded damages for anxiety mental anguish and loss of consortium for a violation of the kentucky act (D) holding that a complaints bare assertions alone were insufficient for certification (E) holding in a case arising under the fcra that the remainder of plaintiffs complaints such as feeling frustrated and degraded are insufficient standing alone to support damages for mental anguish

Ex Output:
(E)