In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of purely legal questions, such as whether a given set of facts alleged by the plaintiffs would demonstrate a constitutional violation. 4 . We note that the record contains no indication that the OSHP employs explicit racial criteria or admits to racially-motivated decision making. If such a showing could be made, the plaintiffs would not need to establish the existence of a similarly situated class that was not investigated. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir.2000) ("[I]t is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly situated non-minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an express, racial classification."), cert. denied, U.S. -, 122 S.Ct. 44, 151 L.Ed.2d 16 (2001); cf. United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1104-05 (6th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). "In its more recent pronouncements on laws
Holding statements: (A) holding that it is unnecessary for criminal defendant to establish threeprong test for discrimination in grand jury selection where there is direct evidence of exclusion based upon race (B) holding that a defendants guilty plea forecloses independent inquiry into the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury (C) holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment (D) holding that although there was evidence of discrimination based on race there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of constructive discharge (E) holding that it is error to conduct most of the jury selection process in the absence of the defendant

A: (A)
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Q: although incorporated or approved in the decree, is not merged therein, the parties may enforce it by s clear that "jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events." Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957) (citation omitted). 18 . Courts in this district have long recognized that "a coiporation is an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action suit." See Gibson v. BoPar Dock Co. Corp., 780 F.Supp. 371, 373 (W.D.Va.1991) (citing Tower Hill Connellsville Coke Co. v. Piedmont Coal Co., 33 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir.1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 607, 50 S.Ct. 157, 74 L.Ed. 650 (1930)); Bates v. Cekada, 130 F.R.D. 52, 59 (E.D.Va.1990) (<HOLDING>) (citations omitted); Taylor v. Swirnow, 80
Holding statements: (A) holding that in order to maintain a derivative cause of action a shareholder must maintain a continuous ownership interest in the corporation (B) recognizing that a corporation is properly aligned as a defendant in a shareholder derivative suit when the corporation is in antagonistic hands (C) recognizing that in a derivative action the corporation for whose benefit suit is brought is a necessary party to the action (D) holding that a shareholder who disposes of his shares loses standing to bring a derivative action no longer a shareholder in the corporation the defendant cannot maintain a derivative action on its behalf (E) recognizing that the corporation is always deemed to be an indispensable party in a shareholder derivative action

A: (E)
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Q: "escape" offense for purposes of sentencing. See Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d at 668 ("Even though the word 'escape' does not appear in subsection three, the crime is plainly an escape offense within the meaning of [the consecutive sentence statute]."). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no basis upon which to distinguish escape and failure-to-appear offenses in the context of a continuing-offense analysis: [A] defendant who fails to appear for sentencing presents a threat to society analogous to that posed by an escaped prisoner. Both are convicted criminals obligated to serve sentences or facing sentencing. In addition, the failure of a defendant to appear for sentencing poses a threat to the integrity and authority of the court. United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2168,
Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to appear for sentencing is a continuing offense because a convicted criminal has a continuing obligation to face sentencing and presents an ongoing threat to the integrity and authority of the court so long as he has not appeared (B) holding that the defendants oral promise to appear was insufficient to amount to a required appearance within the meaning of the failure to appear statute (C) holding that dismissal for failure to appear at a deposition is on the merits (D) holding that failure to appear when released on bond was a continuing offense (E) holding that failure to appear is also a continuing offense

A:
(E)
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