TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: found it "difficult to maintain on a priori grounds that sex is physically dangerous" to every potential victim under the statute. Id. at 299. The First Circuit examined a similar statute-punishing a person over the age of 18 who engages in sexual intercourse with a person between 14 and 16-in United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1999). The court determined that statutory rape crimes fall within the exception to the categorical approach because they "cover[ ] conduct both inside and outside the 'violent felony' sphere." Id. at 4-5. We agree with the First and the Seventh Circuits that statutory rape statutes that include more mature victims and do not contain aggravating factors are not subject to the strict categorical approach articulated in Taylor. See Seaton, 45 F.3d at 111 (<HOLDING>). Thus, this case should be remanded for the
Holding statements: (A) holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins (B) holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 16 (C) holding that if a crime is broadly defined the court can look beyond the elements of the crime (D) holding that once the statute is found to be divisible the court must look to the charging papers and judgment of conviction to determine if the actual crime of which defendant was convicted was a crime of violence but emphasizing that the court is not to examine the particular facts underlying the conviction (E) holding that conviction of a crime requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime

SOLUTION: holding the crime of conspiracy is committed or not before the substantive crime begins

PROBLEM: by [the motorist]." Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). In Desmond, the ICA noted that "it is advisable that, at the commencement of the administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow." 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d at 353 (emphasis added). In rejecting Freitas's argument, this court observed that "procedural due process requires that a person have an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer v. Admin. Dir. of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463 (2000)); cf. Padilla-Agustin v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 21 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Since the hearing officer had advised Freitas
Holding statements: (A) holding that due process requires not only notice but sufficient information to allow petitioner to prepare and present objection to the agencys preliminary action or decision (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel (D) holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (E) holding that due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated under all circumstances to provide parties with notice of the pending action

SOLUTION: holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner

PROBLEM: reopen as untimely. See id. The BIA properly noted that it previously issued the final removal order in February 2004, and Chen did not file her motion to reopen until March 2007, well beyond the 90-day filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R 1003.2(c)(2). To the extent Chen argues that the family planning policy will now apply to her in a manner in which it did not apply before she gave birth to two children in the United States, and that such a difference amounts to a change in country conditions, her argument is without merit. Merely reframing her change in personal circumstances as a change in country conditions in China does not bring Chen's motion within the exceptions to the time limitation on motions to reopen. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 129,130-31 (2d Cir.2005)(<HOLDING>). Even if Chen's motion to reopen were subject
Holding statements: (A) holding that a change in personal circumstances is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances for the purpose of 8 cfr 10032c3h (B) holding that the state department country report constituted substantial evidence to support the agencys finding of changed country conditions in guatemala (C) holding that 8 cfr 10032c3ii applies to changed country conditions in the country of origin or deportation and not changed personal circumstances in the united states (D) holding that a change in personal circumstances namely the birth of a child in the united states does not fit under the changed circumstances exception provided by 8 cfr 10032c3ii (E) holding that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions the bia compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below

SOLUTION:
holding that a change in personal circumstances is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances for the purpose of 8 cfr 10032c3h