In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: and therefore, need only show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause. "[A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied." State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (<HOLDING>); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
Holding statements: (A) holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence (B) holding that an effective life sentence of fortyfive years for seconddegree forgery was excessive and that a life sentence was cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amendment (C) holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded (D) holding life sentence mandatory under 21 usc 841b and district court could not depart from the mandatory life sentence unless government made a motion (E) holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under 3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under 3161h7
[EX A]: holding that graham which prohibited the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide does not apply to a lengthy termofyears sentence that might constitute a de facto life sentence

[EX Q]: CURIAM: Michael Disch appeals his convictions for mailing threatening communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 876(c), and making false statements to an FBI agent, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Disch argues that the district court judge was required to recuse himself sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. 455(a) and 455(b). Ordinarily, we review a judge's decision not to recuse himself under 455(a) and 455(b) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bailey, 175 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir.1999); see also Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (11th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). However, when a defendant fails to seek
Holding statements: (A) holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error (B) holding that a 455b violation is subject to harmless error review (C) holding that violation of rule 16 in that case was not harmless error (D) holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless error review (E) holding that the omission of an element is subject to harmless error analysis
[EX A]: holding that a confrontation clause violation constituted harmless error

[EX Q]: court's description of the panel's rationale as "one over which reasonable jurists may differ" can hardly be construed as a ringing endorsement of Bush v. Gore's precedential value or its application to the issue of variations in voting technology. Shelley II, 344 F.3d at 918. At the very least, the Ninth Circuit's unanimous decision in Shelley II divested the panel decision of whatever precedential value it otherwise would have had. Undeterred, the majority struggles to accord such value to Shelley I because the rationale adopted by the majority is virtually identical to the one provided by the Shelley I panel namely, that the plaintiffs' novel equal protection claims are controlled by Supreme Court precedents that mandate the equal weighting of votes. Compare Maj. Op. at 870-71 (<HOLDING>), with Shelley I, 344 F.3d at 894-95
Holding statements: (A) holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error (B) holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional (C) holding that the counties use of outdated technology results in the weighting of votes differently (D) holding that a plaintiff need only show that the results of a polygraph examination were a factor in the termination of employment and rejecting requirement that results be the sole factor for employees discharge (E) holding that in a statutory fee case the results obtained factor was already subsumed in the lodestar and that results multipliers should be awarded only in some cases of exceptional success
[EX A]:
holding that the erroneous use of an outdated jury instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force requiring the defendant to retreat if possible negated defendants claim of selfdefense and rose to the level of fundamental error