In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: 593, 598 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 1, 135 L.Ed.2d 1098 (1996), and of mixed questions of law and fact, see Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). However, the state court's factual findings underlying those determinations are presumed to be correct and binding, as long as they were made after a full, fair, and adequate hearing on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d) (West 1994) (pre-AED-PA); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of es ing that the findings of the trial court on discriminatory intent in Batson challenge are reviewed for clear error); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2977, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421 (4th
Holding statements: (A) holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard (B) holding that the question of causation in a prima facie case of retaliation brought under general statutes 46a60 is factual in nature and thereby subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (C) holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review (D) holding that pretext is subject to the clearly erroneous standard (E) holding that a finding of accommodation is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review instead of under a de novo standard
Example Output: holding that the intent to discriminate under batson is a pure issue of fact subject to review under a deferential standard

Example Input: and began questioning the two men. The fact that the detectives in this ease requested that Peterkin answer questions apart from Durovic, and separated them by about ten feet, does not convert an otherwise voluntary encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The first moment at which Peterkin may have been seized was when Detective Lascik took Peterkin's identification back to the van to run a background cheek. By that time, however, Peterkin and Durovic had already given the detectives conflicting stories, including whether they knew each other. This inconsistency, together with the detectives' earlier observations of their unusual behavior, was enough to create reasonable suspicion to support a Terry stop. See United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 458-59 (3d Cir.2003) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 574, 578
Holding statements: (A) holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous (B) holding that after receiving conflicting stories from a driver and passenger the officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the terry stop and conduct background checks on them both (C) holding that receiving conflicting stories from the driver and passenger of a stopped car about their travel gave the officer reasonable suspicion to extend the terry stop (D) holding that it was impermissible for an officer to question a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after the officer had fulfilled the purpose of the stop by issuing a written warning to the driver (E) holding that a police officer may stop a driver where the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion regarding the commission of a civil traffic violation
Example Output: holding an officer may order a passenger to get out of a car during a traffic stop and may frisk a passenger for weapons if the officer reasonably suspects the passenger is armed and dangerous

Example Input: is one factor that is "the focus of a district court's analysis when determining whether to utilize a multiplier"); Longden v. Sunderman, 979 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir.1992) (post-Dague case noting that Fifth Circuit still uses multipliers, including for risk, to adjust the lodestar amount); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 150 F.R.D. 174, 185 & n. 6 (D.Colo.1993) (rejecting argument that Dague precludes use of risk multiplier in common fund cases); In re Avon Prods., Inc. Sec. Litig. [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) 97,061, at 94, 701, 1992 WL 349768 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1992) (post-Dague decision using percentage method, but stating that risk multiplier of 2 to 3 would be appropriate under lodestar method), with Nensel v. Peoples Heritage Fin. Group, Inc., 815 F.Supp. 26, 30 (D.Me.1993) (<HOLDING>); In re Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. Sec-Litig.,
Holding statements: (A) holding teague applies to capital cases (B) holding that eaja applies to court proceedings for review of social security cases (C) holding that strickland applies to cases involving successive representation (D) holding that dagues proscription of the use of risk multipliers applies to common fund cases (E) holding the medical improvement standard applies to closed period cases
Example Output:
holding teague applies to capital cases