New Legitimacy: Organized crime was soon to have a formidable adversary in its bid to control Las Vegascorporate cash. Though Las Vegas had developed a powerful local economy, few major outside investments were made in the city, due primarily to mob infiltration and its inherent ties to illegal activities. That would change dramatically with the 1966 arrival of billionaire Howard Hughes. A legitimate businessman, Hughes was nonetheless eccentric and dramatic, a style suited to the Las Vegas ethos. True to the myth, the reclusive Hughes immediately cloistered himself in the Desert Inn's penthouse. Several weeks later he was askedthen orderedto vacate the room to make room for high rollers, whereupon he promptly bought the property and fired the management. Thus began Hughes' legendary three-year, $300-million Las Vegas buying spree. When it was over, Hughes owned six casinos, an airport, and an airline, along with numerous plots of land stretching from the Strip to the mountains. Hughes' actions would have beneficial repercussions, both immediate and lasting. Because of the new legitimacy Las Vegas acquired from Hughes' investments, established companies such as Hilton Hotels bought into the gaming business, and their influence helped draw a line in the desert sand between legitimate operations and mob casinos, where illegal skimming of profits was rampant. That, combined with the formation of the Nevada Gaming Control Board, would signal the beginning of the end for heavy mob influence in the city. Las Vegas with a Vision As corporations moved in and the mob was slowly pushed out, a new Las Vegas emerged. The legitimization of gambling led to its increased legalization across the US. What was once a sure thing became much more competitive. Casino operators had to reassess the nature of their business. The first to really do so was Steve Wynn, a Las Vegas resident and owner of the Golden Nugget. In the mid-1980s, Wynn began plans to reinvigorate Las Vegas with a new resort. He bought several Strip propertiesthe Silver Slipper and Castaways among themand demolished them to make way for a new kind of resortMirage which became an instant success.

Who bought the Silver Slipper and Castaways?

Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont in America: Their Friendship and Their Travels edited by Oliver Zunz, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (University of Virginia Press; 2011) 698 pages; Includes previously unpublished letters, essays, and other writings Du systeme penitentaire aux Etats-Unis et de son application en France (1833) - On the Penitentiary System in the United States and Its Application to France, with Gustave de Beaumont. De la democratie en Amerique (1835/1840) - Democracy in America. It was published in two volumes, the first in 1835, the second in 1840. English language versions: Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. and eds., Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop, University of Chicago Press, 2000; Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Arthur Goldhammer, trans.; Olivier Zunz, ed.) (The Library of America, 2004) ISBN 978-1-931082-54-9. L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution (1856) - The Old Regime and the Revolution. It is Tocqueville's second most famous work. Recollections (1893) - This work was a private journal of the Revolution of 1848. He never intended to publish this during his lifetime; it was published by his wife and his friend Gustave de Beaumont after his death. Journey to America (1831-1832) - Alexis de Tocqueville's travel diary of his visit to America; translated into English by George Lawrence, edited by J-P Mayer, Yale University Press, 1960; based on vol. V, 1 of the OEuvres Completes of Tocqueville. L'Etat social et politique de la France avant et depuis 1789 - Alexis de Tocqueville Memoir On Pauperism: Does public charity produce an idle and dependant class of society? (1835) originally published by Ivan R. Dee. Inspired by a trip to England. One of Tocqueville's more obscure works. Journeys to England and Ireland 1835

Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont's friendship and travels we edited and translated by these two men?

Zinni feared that Bin Laden would in the future locate himself in cities, where U.S. missiles could kill thousands of Afghans. He worried also lest Pakistani authorities not get adequate warning, think the missiles came from India, RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA'S INITIAL ASSAULTS 135 and do something that everyone would later regret. Discussing potential repercussions in the region of his military responsibility, Zinni said, "It was easy to take the shot from Washington and walk away from it. We had to live there." Zinni's distinct preference would have been to build up counterterrorism capabilities in neighboring countries such as Uzbekistan. But he told us that he could not drum up much interest in or money for such a purpose from Washington, partly, he thought, because these countries had dictatorial governments. After the decision-in which fear of collateral damage was an important factor- not to use cruise missiles against Kandahar in December 1998, Shelton and officers in the Pentagon developed plans for using an AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missile strikes. Designed specifically for the special forces, the version of the AC-130 known as "Spooky"can fly in fast or from high altitude, undetected by radar; guided to its zone by extraordinarily complex electronics, it is capable of rapidly firing precision-guided 25, 40, and 105 mm projectiles. Because this system could target more precisely than a salvo of cruise missiles, it had a much lower risk of causing collateral damage. After giving Clarke a briefing and being encouraged to proceed, Shelton formally directed Zinni and General Peter Schoomaker, who headed the Special Operations Command, to develop plans for an AC-130 mission against Bin Laden's headquarters and infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Joint Staff prepared a decision paper for deployment of the Special Operations aircraft. Though Berger and Clarke continued to indicate interest in this option, the AC-130s were never deployed. Clarke wrote at the time that Zinni opposed their use, and John Maher, the Joint Staff 's deputy director of operations, agreed that this was Zinni's position. Zinni himself does not recall blocking the option. He told us that he understood the Special Operations Command had never thought the intelligence good enough to justify actually moving AC-130s into position. Schoomaker says, on the contrary, that he thought the AC-130 option feasible. The most likely explanation for the two generals' differing recollections is that both of them thought serious preparation for any such operations would require a long-term redeployment of Special Operations forces to the Middle East or South Asia. The AC-130s would need bases because the aircraft's unrefueled range was only a little over 2,000 miles.
What was done in order to minimize collateral damage in Kandahar in December of 1998?