In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: relevant facts. See Mot. at 13-14. Defendant, too, claimed in its subsequent statement of the issues that this talk happened between April 1 and April 4 and cited the same supportive evidence to this effect. See SOF, 73 (citing Howe Dep. at 32:7-12, 34:12-19 and May 13, 2014, Howe Email). Because Marks never refuted this fact by offering his own statement of the issues, as required under Local Rule 7(h), the Court could thus consider WWL's account admitted on this ground alone. See LCvR 7(h) ("[I]n determining a motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to- the motion."); Jackson, 101 F.3d at 153 (<HOLDING>). The Court, however, need not rest on this
Holding statements: (A) holding that the relevant inquiry is not whether the court has discretion to facilitate notice but whether this is an appropriate case in which to exercise discretion (B) holding district court has complete discretion whether to treat facts as conceded where local rule is violated (C) holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying local rules that excluded some of the material facts offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment (D) holding that the predecessor to local rule 561b3 provides the only acceptable means of presenting additional facts to the district court (E) holding a district court has discretion under rule 55b2 once a default is determined to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: industry is constitutional." Reply [# 29] at 3. Defendants maintain that "the Court may not rely on a federal regulation (9 C.F.R. 2.126) or on the Guide to conclude that the Fourth Amendment right at issue is clearly established." Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Defendants further argue that even if the Court considered the regulation and the Guide, they do not limit the APHIS' powers of inspection or set policy. Id. at 5. As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they are not challenging the statutory scheme governing the USDA's warrantless searches, but rather are challenging the application of that statutory scheme by the Inspector Defendants on May 7, 2013 at Big Cats. See, e.g., LeSueur-Richmond Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 268-69 (4th Cir.2012) (<HOLDING>). In LeSueur, the Fourth Circuit closely
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fourth amendment protects property as well as privacy (B) holding that under the fourth amendment a party may challenge both the constitutionality of the act permitting warrantless searches as well as the conduct of the government officials in a particular case (C) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause (D) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (E) holding there is no requirement that the government obtains a warrant at the first moment probable cause exists the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of warrantless searches is one of reasonableness under the circumstances
[EX A]: (B)

[EX Q]: property to a third party for $8,500. The original owner then attempted to redeem the property and argued that the redemption amount was based on $8,500 paid at the subsequent sale, not the $380,000 paid at the foreclosure sale. This Court, while noting that the sale price should be reduced by the amount of the insurance proceeds the bank received when the house on the property was destroyed, concluded that 6-5-253(a) referred to the sale price at the foreclosure sale, not at the subsequent sale. We stated that "both the plain meaning and the existing precedent governing this statute lead us to conclude that Pitts must pay Gangi the purchase price paid by Bank One at the foreclosure sale." Pitts, 896 So.2d at 436. See also Dicie v. Morris, 285 Ala. 650, 653, 235 So.2d 796, 798 (1970) (<HOLDING>). Additionally, the LLC argues that the word
Holding statements: (A) holding that the mortgagee had no right to rents under its assignment of rents during the redemption period because it purchased the property for the full amount of the mortgage debt at its foreclosure sale (B) holding that debtor not bank paid the propertytax redemption amount even though debtor paid this amount using proceeds of loan from the bank (C) holding that the debtors right to cure ended when the sheriff accepted the bid at the foreclosure auction even though the order confirming the sale had not been entered at the time of the bankruptcy filing (D) holding that a foreclosure action becomes final only when the order confirming sale establishes who gets the property at what price and what deficiency judgment if any will be entered against the mortgagor (E) holding that the redemption price was based on the amount bid at foreclosure and not what the subsequent purchaser paid for the property
[EX A]:
(E)