TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: removal purposes. Instead, for complete preemption to apply, the cause of action not only must be preempted by ERISA but also must fall within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA 502(a), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a). See Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209, 124 S.Ct. 2488 ("[A]ny state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore preempted. The preemptive force of ERISA 502(a) is still stronger.... Hence, causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of 502(a) [are] removable to federal court." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 62-63, 67, 107 S.Ct. 1542 (<HOLDING>); Da-Ponte v. Manfredi Motors Inc., 157 Fed.
Holding statements: (A) holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under 1132a1b (B) holding that erisa permits suits to recover benefits only against the plan as an entity and thus the beneficiary had erred by suing her exhusbands employer and plan administrator when proper party would have been the benefits plan itself (C) holding that because an erisa plan is not a participant beneficiary or fiduciary subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under 502e of erisa over a suit brought by such a plan (D) holding that just because a claim implicates a federal issue or involves construction of federal law does not necessarily give rise to a federal question and confer removal jurisdiction on a federal court (E) holding that suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan falls directly under 502a1b of erisa and therefore was necessarily federal in character and subject to removal to federal court

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: between 1983 and 1986. Stanley's engineer, Hreha, was present throughout Powers' deposition. The Court revisits its ruling upon further contemplation of the purpose of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. In a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, there is no distinction between the corporate representative and the corporation. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C.1996) (noting that in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition "[t]he corporation appears vicariously through its designee"). "The Rule 30(b)(6) designee does not give his personal opinion. Rather, he presents the corpo ration's 'position' on the topic." Id. (citing cases). The designee testifies on behalf of the corporation and holds it accountable accordingly. See Starlight Int'l, Inc., v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 688 (D.Kan.1999) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Audiotext Communications Network,
Holding statements: (A) holding individual who signed contract on behalf of a corporation is individually liable where he knew corporation was not incorporated at the time the contract was executed (B) holding that a corporation has a duty under rule 80b6 to provide someone who is knowledgeable in order to provide binding answers on behalf of the corporation (C) holding that an officer or director generally owes a fiduciary duty only to the corporation over which he exercises management authority and any breach of fiduciary duty claims arising out of injuries to the corporation in most cases may only be brought by the corporation itself or derivatively on its behalf (D) holding that individuals assumption of the role of president of the corporation and her authority to sign documents on behalf of the corporation demonstrate that she had the requisite control over the corporation for purposes of finding individual liability under section 5a (E) holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: motion for attorneys' fees based on the proposal for settlement filed by Rebeca Ipox in her individual capacity. In a wrongful death case where there are joint personal representatives, the joint personal representatives are the party plaintiffs. As the party plaintiffs, only the joint personal representatives acting in that capacity are entitled to make a valid demand for judgment. The demand for judgment at issue here therefore was invalid. See 768.20, 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2001); Reid, 888 So.2d at 103. Appellees claim that Rebeca Ipox's act in serving her proposal for settlement should be deemed to be the act of both joint personal representatives. This argument is totally unwarranted. The proposal for settlement expressly stated that it was made by Rebeca Ipox in her 984) (<HOLDING>). In addition, there was no evidence that
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that where representative plaintiff and other members of class share an interest in prevailing on similar legal claims particular differences in amount of damages claimed or of availability of certain defenses against class representative may not render his or her claims atypical (B) holding that the cause of action under fela vests in the personal representative of the estate not in the beneficiaries (C) holding that a copersonal representative could not unilaterally file a notice of appeal without concurrence of the other copersonal representative (D) recognizing that authorized representative may be general or only for a certain claim (E) holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class

SOLUTION:
(C)