In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: he called the dispatcher for assistance, the occupants had already been handcuffed. And the record provides no indication that the occupants threatened his safety. Moreover, if Reilly had not been concerned that the occupants would discard evidence, he and Horn could have driven the four, two to a car. Instead, he opted to wait for separate transportation, so the suspects could not leave contraband in the patrol car and possibly blame their fellow passengers. Reilly also had an objective reason to believe that Voichahoske was concealing evidence and that given the opportunity, he might destroy it. Reilly already had probable cause to believe Voichahoske was concealing drugs on his person, which, in turn, justified his arrest. See State v. Dussault, 193 Neb. 122, 225 N.W.2d 558 (1975) (<HOLDING>). Because a search of his person was
Holding statements: (A) holding fourth amendment protects right to be free from arrest without probable cause (B) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (C) holding that probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest (D) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: The defendants, contend that, assuming their conduct was unlawful and negligent as charged in the complaint, it was nevertheless not the proximate cause of the injuries suffered. But a tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries which result in the ordinary course of events from his negligence and it is generally sufficient if his negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries. The fact that there were also intervening causes which were foreseeable or were normal incidents of the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability. Ordinarily these questions of proximate and intervening cause are left to the jury for its factual determination. [Ibid, (citations omitted).] See also, J.S. v. R.T.H., 155 N.J. 330, 352, 714 A.2d 924 (1998) (<HOLDING>); Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 465-66, 545
Holding statements: (A) holding that prolonged sexual abuse of neighboring adolescent girls by defendants husband with known proclivity for such behavior not a superseding cause of wifes negligent failure to warn victims or take other reasonable steps to prevent harm to them (B) holding that defense may only be raised in context of negligent failure to warn claims (C) holding the wifes testimony that husbands release would cause psychological harm to other family members was insufficient to support commitment courts finding that husband would cause serious bodily harm to another person (D) holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn (E) holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse

Output: (A)

Input: Consider Input: between her ankle injury and her employment, neither the hearing officer nor the full Board ever reached the question of whether Milledge's infection and subsequent amputation were causally connected to her ankle injury. Therefore this cause is remanded to the Board for consideration of this issue. Conclusion We conclude that an injury resulting from an unexplained accident falls under the category of a neutral risk, one neither distinctly personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. We conclude also that in the case of a neutral risk, the positional risk doctrine applies. As applied in this case, Milledge would not have been at the place where she injured her ankle injury but for the duties of her employment. Consequently, a presumpt 83, 786 (1970) (<HOLDING>); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Maw, 510 N.W.2d
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment (B) holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment (C) holding that it is the claimants burden to show that the injury was the result of an accident that not only arose in the course of the employment but that it also grew out of or resulted from the employment (D) holding that where an employee is fatally injured in an unexplained assault there is a rebuttable presumption that the employees death arose out of the employment (E) holding that in determining whether an accident arose out of employment the issue is whether the employees employment brought him in contact with the risk that in fact caused his injuries
Output: (B)