In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: of whether the images on the site constituted child pornography, the receipt shows Shiver's familiarity with making commercial transactions for pornographic images on the Internet. The government also presented evidence specifically showing that the image of one child in particular had been produced in North Carolina. That the latter image ended up on Shiver's computer in Florida strongly suggests that it traveled in interstate commerce. We likewise reject Shiver's contention that the government's evidence was insufficient to support the jury's conclusion that he "knowingly possessed" the images of child pornography on his computer. Although we have interpreted the meaning of "knowing possession" in other contexts, see, e.g., United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 748 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>) (quotation omitted), we have not yet had
Holding statements: (A) holding that the phrase possession or custody in 5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession (B) holding in a similar factual situation that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because it had no actual or constructive possession of the letters of credit involved (C) recognizing theory of constructive possession (D) holding that constructive possession need not be exclusive but may be shared by others (E) holding that k no wing possession can be demonstrated by proof of either actual or constructive possession
[EX A]: holding that the phrase possession or custody in 5225b requires actual and not merely constructive possession

[EX Q]: Brown's argument that she was speaking as a citizen is supported by the fact that ordinary citizens may similarly report public misconduct to the Auditors. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-61dd (conferring right to file reports with Auditors on "any person"). The existence of a civilian analogue to Brown's conduct strengthens her allegations that her speech was as a citizen and thus protected by the First Amendment. See Matthews I, 779 F.3d at 176. The instant case is not similar to other cases of its type that were dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage. In many of those cases, the plaintiff-employee had made an admission that the alleged speech was made, at least in part, pursuant to his or her official duties. See Matthews v. Lynch, 483 Fed.Appx. 624, 626 (2d Cir. 2012) (Matthews III) (<HOLDING>); Anemone, 629 F.3d at 116. Here, there is no
Holding statements: (A) holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel (B) holding that a plaintiff did not complain to the eeoc pursuant to official duties but rather as a citizen (C) holding that pursuant to garcetti plaintiffs speech made in the course of his official duties was unprotected as a matter of law (D) holding that speech was pursuant to official duties because plaintiff conceded at oral argument that as an internal affairs officer he had a broad responsibility to investigate and report police misconduct (E) holding police officer is a public official
[EX A]: holding that rule was not violated where officer stated he made a report but was unable to find it because there was no report to tender to counsel

[EX Q]: acknowledge that Garcetti addresses mostly free speech claims, as opposed to political affiliation or freedom of association claims: But Garcetti's concerns about the "delicate balancing" of public-employee rights and government flexibility, as well as its anxiety about "judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental operations," are not applicable only in the free speech context. 547 U.S. at 423, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Those concerns, for example, also underlie the so-called policymaker exception: the principle that political affiliation, for certain public employees, is an "appropriate requirement for continued tenure." O'Connell, 724 F.3d at 126 (quoting Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir, 2003)); see also Maymi v. P.R, Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). 6 . Speaker Eves cites several other
Holding statements: (A) holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment (B) recognizing that both an officials political affiliation and her substantive views on agency matters are permissible justifications for firing or demotion when she occupies a policymaking role citing flynn v city of boston 140 f3d 42 47 1st cir 1998 (C) holding that first amendment prohibits government officials from discharging or threatening to discharge lowerlevel public employees based on their political affiliation (D) holding that independent contractor claiming termination of contract because of political affiliation not protected by first amendment (E) recognizing a life tenants power to lease not only her present interest in the land she occupies but also a future interest she owns in the same land
[EX A]:
holding that independent contractor claiming removal from city towing rotation list because of political affiliation was not protected by first amendment