In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
claim because "she was not diligent in preserving her legal rights"); Felty, 818 F.2d at 1129 ("One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.") (quoting Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984)); United States ex rel. Cogifer, S.A. v. Ins. Co. of North Am., Civ. A. No. 86-183-NN, 1987 WL 19932, at *4 (E.D.Va. Oct. 15, 1987) (unpublished). 11 . See, e.g., Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990). 12 . See, e.g., Humble Oil, 402 F.2d at 896 (finding equitable estoppel where surety reneged on promise to pay after statute of limitations had run). 13 . See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nelson v. Reliance Ins. Co., 436 F.2d 1366, 1371 (10th Cir.1971) (<HOLDING>); United States ex rel. Atlas Erection Co. v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation (B) holding that an agreement which required the submission of an affidavit of payment to subcontractors or lien waivers before payment was made by the general contractor was for the direct benefit of the subcontractors (C) holding that a surety has standing to sue for a progress payment released by the government after notification by the surety of unpaid subcontractors (D) holding that estoppel applied where surety repeatedly responded to subcontractors threats to sue with answers which assured them that amicable settlement was just around the corner (E) holding that there is no privity of contract between the government and a surety since the government is not a party to the agreement between the surety and the contractor the government never undertakes an obligation to the surety

Ex Output:
holding that a performance bond surety was allowed to sue the government based on the doctrine of equitable subrogation

Ex Input:
money judgment can be satisfied out of any of the defendant's assets." Billman, 915 F.2d at 920 (citing United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 800-03 (7th Cir.1985)). Consequently, after a conviction on a forfeiture count, the district court may order forfeiture of the defendant's substitute assets. The Billman Court then examined the question of whether substitute assets could be restrained pending trial and ruled in the affirmative. 915 F.2d at 920-21. With an eye to the remedial purposes of the forfeiture statute, the court read the provision allowing for a restraining order in connection with the substitute assets provision as calling for the preservation and restraint of substitute assets pending trial. Id. at 921; see also United States v. Skiles, 715 F.Supp. 1567 (N.D.Ga.1989) (<HOLDING>). The Fourth Circuit in Billman relied on
Holding statements: (A) holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use (B) holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute (C) holding that a state conviction is a drug trafficking offense because the trafficked drug is listed in a csa schedule (D) holding in the drug trafficking context that the government is allowed to restrain additional assets pretrial to ensure sufficient assets for forfeiture (E) recognizing the connection between guns and drug trafficking

Ex Output:
holding that additional witnesses were not needed to corroborate the defendants drug abuse problems because counsel had already introduced sufficient evidence of drug use

Ex Input:
February 8, 2011 probation extension order failed to extend his probation period because the October 26, 2005 restitution order was improperly delegated to the probation officer, rather than determined by the circuit court as required by Code 19.2-305.1(D), thus any subsequent order is invalid. In relevant part, Code 19.2-305.1(D) states that "[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall determine the amount to be repaid by the defendant and the terms and conditions thereof." The amount of restitution to be paid by the defendant is within the sole province of the circuit court to determine and that determination may not be delegated to another department of government. See Code 19.2-305.2; see also McCullough v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 811, 815, 568 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2002) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the circuit court's October 26,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing (B) holding part of the sentencing phase of trial the restitution amount is determined following conviction and is a matter resting within the sole province of the sentencing judge (C) holding that the hearsay rule is not suspended in the sentencing phase (D) holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount (E) holding that the postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses

Ex Output:
holding that the sentencing judge could consider the defendants subsequent arrest even though the charges were dismissed during sentencing