TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: involvement with five or more kilograms of cocaine, arguing that he had withdrawn before El Don organized the delivery of the intercepted 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011. Ortega argues that the sole evidence of a conspiracy existing at the time of the seizure of 7.2 kilograms of cocaine on March 25, 2011 was the April 17, 2011 phone calls between Ortega and El Don. In that call Ortega had arranged for El Don to buy five kilograms of cocaine. Ortega's argument is unavailing. A conspiracy between Ortega and El Don having been established by the government, the burden rested with Ortega to prove that he affirmatively withdrew from it, not with the government to prove the nonexistence of withdrawal. See Smith v. United States, U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 714, 720, 184 L.Ed.2d 570 (2013) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that Ortega has not met his
Holding statements: (A) holding that in passing 21 usc 846 congress left the common law burden of proving the affirmative defense of withdrawal on the defendant rather than requiring the government to prove nonexistence of withdrawal (B) holding that the government was not responsible for delay from withdrawal of guilty plea (C) holding that the defendant has the burden of proving a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea (D) holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea (E) holding that when congress is silent on the issue of the burden of proof applicable to a common law affirmative defense that does not negate an element of the offense we presume congress intended the defendant to bear the burden of proof of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: then the trial court erred in allowing prejudgment interest to accrue on that sum at 10% per annum "[bjecause no prejudgment interest statute applies to this case." Assuming arguendo that their argument was true, then the answer to the problem is found in their own brief. They acknowledge that the prejudgment interest scheme established under 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code applied if no other statute did. See Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 530-31 (Tex.1998) (dealing with Texas Revised Civil Statute art. 5069-1.05, 6(a), the predecessor to 304.101 et seq. of the Texas Finance Code). And, at the time of judgment, see Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy, Co., 113 S.W.3d 400, 414 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2003, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>), prejudgment interest accrued at the rate of
Holding statements: (A) holding that once a rate is filed with the appropriate agency except for review of the agencys orders the courts can assume no right to a different rate on that ground that in its opinion it is the only or the more reasonable rate (B) holding that the applicable rate is that in existence at the time of judgment (C) holding that in order to qualify as newly discovered evidence the evidence must have been in existence and hidden at the time of judgment (D) holding that the penalty is applicable (E) holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: an arbitration clause, ther s Workers of Am., 422 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1970) (relying on "positive assurance" rule to conclude that employer claims were subject to arbitration). Notably, less than a month before this court heard oral arguments in this case, the Second Circuit again emphasized that although traditional rules of contract interpretation generally apply to these types of cases, they are not always "readily [ ] transposed into the context of national labor lawas though the notion 'one size fits all' applies in the law. On the contrary, in labor law there are other policies to con sider, in particular the strong presumption in favor of arbitrability...." Mulvaney Mechanical, Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 288 F.3d 491, 2000 WL 33730559, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr.24, 2002) (<HOLDING>). C. Interpretation of "Article XXIII:
Holding statements: (A) holding that in the grievance representation context an employee must prove that the unions acts tainted the grievance procedure such that the outcome was more than likely affected by the unions breach internal citation and quotation omitted (B) holding that presumption of arbitrability precluded employer from unilaterally repudiating its cba despite unions breach of nostrike clause (C) holding that a cause of action for breach of a purported implied contract would require interpretation of a cba and the totality of the parties contractual relationship (D) holding that proof of unions breach of duty to fairly represent is an essential element of employees hybrid suit (E) holding that no modification of the original employment contract occurred when the employer unilaterally issued a new handbook

SOLUTION:
(B)