In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: how much more of a connection to interstate commerce, if any, must be shown under a substantial rather than a de minimis standard. See Russell, 471 U.S. at 859-60 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455 (suggesting in a pre-Lopez opinion that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress could only reach criminal activity " 'substantially affecting interstate commerce.' "). It is clear, however, that the direct interstate connection required by Instruction 10 is much more substantial than the indirect interstate connection articulated by the government and disapproved of by the Court in Lopez. In Lopez, the connections articulated by the government between the possession of a firearm in a local school zone and interstate commerce were, to say the least, attenuated. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (<HOLDING>); see also Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189 (describing
Holding statements: (A) holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference (B) holding that adverse inference rule is permissive (C) recognizing that a vital fact may not be established by piling inference upon inference (D) holding that the nonmovant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference (E) recognizing that to uphold the government contentions would require the court to pile inference upon inference
[A]: holding that a reasonable inference need not be the sole possible inference

[Q]: the Bond offering because they underwrote the transaction and sold the Bonds to investors, either directly or through their brokers. Indeed, given the role of underwriters generally, Baird, Jones, and Stern "had a duty to make an to speak, they knew investors might rely on the statements made. The law firms' duty, however, must also be considered in light of the services they were retained to perform. Because Kutak and Stinson were not hired to opine on the feasibility of the Event Center, they cannot have been held to a duty to investigate or determine whether the financial projections were realistic unless these firms otherwise became involved in the making, preparing, or drafting of those projections. See N.Y. City Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Berry, 616 F.Supp.2d 987, 994 (N.D.Cal.2009) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, to the extent the law firms
Holding statements: (A) holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the 3553a factors or to discuss each of the 3553a factors (B) holding that substantial participation requires particular facts relating to each djefendants specific role in the preparation of each of the allegedly misleading statements (C) recognizing that questions of changed conditions and the amount of child support must be resolved on the particular facts of each case (D) holding that district court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular facts of each case (E) holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case
[A]: holding that nothing in booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the 3553a factors or to discuss each of the 3553a factors

[Q]: district courts and state courts have found judges to be judicially immune from criminal charges relating to the performance of judicial duties. See Chaplin, 54 F.Supp. at 934-35 (sustaining a judge's plea at bar that he should be immune from indictment and prosecution for depriving a citizen of civil rights "under the color of any law" in judicial proceedings in his court); In re Petition of Dwyer, 486 Pa. 585, 406 A.2d 1355, 1360 (1979) (finding "that the petitioners are quasi-judicial and/or quasi-proseeutorial officers ... [and] in the absence of allegations of bad faith or corruption, the petitioners, in granting the extensions and variance, are insulated from criminal prosecution for the consequences of their actions"); Commonwealth v. Tartar, 239 S.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Ky.App.1951) (<HOLDING>); In re McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 502
Holding statements: (A) holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under 1983 (B) holding that the circuit court properly sustained a demurrer to the indictment of a judge for misfeasance in office because judges acting in their official capacities should be protected from harassment by either civil suits or criminal prosecutions (C) holding that states and state officials acting in their official capacities are not persons subject to liability under 1983 (D) holding that an action brought against the state officials in their official capacities was not properly removed to federal court because the district court lacked jurisdiction (E) holding that state employees acting in their official capacities are insulated from liability for money damages
[A]:
holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are persons under 1983