In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: in that the timely filing of such claims is both mandatory and jurisdictional. That limitation derives from the proposition of sovereign immunity. It is well established that a claim against the United States is barred absent waiver of sovereign immunity, " 'and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' " United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941)). A waiver of immunity cannot be implied; it must be "unequivocally expressed in the statutory text." Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (<HOLDING>). The United States has expressly consented to
Holding statements: (A) holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal (B) holding that the united states is liable for interest only in the event of a clear statutory waiver of sovereign immunity (C) recognizing federal constitutional claim against the united states (D) holding that federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to hear a claim against the united states or one of its agencies absent a clear waiver of sovereign immunity (E) holding that a lack of a waiver of sovereign immunity deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction
[A]: (D)

[Q]: Under section 22.011(c), a "child" is a person "younger than 17 years of age who is not the spouse of the actor." Id. 22.011(c)(1). A "spouse" means a person who is legally married to another. Id. 22.011(c)(2). Legal marriage in Texas requires a marriage license or proof of an informal marriage. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. 2.001(b), 2.401 (Vernon 2006). A marriage license may not be issued for the marriage of persons of the same sex. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. 2.001(b). An informal marriage is solely recognized between a man and a woman. Id. 2.401. Here, because the State clearly showed that J.B. is a male and that appellant is male, the evidence is legally sufficient to prove that appellant was not married to J.B. See Jacques v. State, 579 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (<HOLDING>); Henson v. State, 638 S.W.2d 504, 505
Holding statements: (A) holding that money invested in voluntary investment plan during marriage was marital property because it was property acquired during marriage (B) holding that the law to be applied in determining the validity of an outofstate marriage is the law of the state in which the marriage occurred (C) recognizing that basis for deportation was aliens misrepresentation about his marriage not the validity of his marriage (D) holding husband could not have marriage annulled because wife was pregnant by him at time of marriage (E) holding that appellants substantive rights were not prejudiced by omission in indictment that complainant was not the spouse of the defendant because it had been clearly shown that both appellant and complainant were male and that they could not have obtained marriage license nor entered into commonlaw marriage
[A]: (E)

[Q]: 68 L.Ed.2d 238 (1981); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 2654, 41 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125, 93 S.Ct. 939, 35 L.Ed.2d 257 (1973); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910, 79 S.Ct. 237, 3 L.Ed.2d 231 (1958). The California Supreme Court has held that the state constitution enshrines a correlative protection. Mitchell, 37 Cal.3d at 274, 208 Cal.Rptr. at 155, 690 P.2d at 628. The Ninth Circuit has addressed the issue of compelled disclosure of media sources in the context of non-grand jury-criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Farr v. Pritchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 3200, 49 L.Ed.2d 1203 (1976) (<HOLDING>). In so doing, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
Holding statements: (A) recognizing a qualified privilege for confidential sources in a libel suit (B) holding that pennsylvanias interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed new yorks interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant (C) holding accuseds right to fair trial outweighed newsmans interest in protecting sources and privilege must yield (D) recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental (E) recognizing academic privilege but holding plaintiffs need for information outweighed colleges interest in confidentiality
[A]:
(C)