In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example input: Drapeau's cohorts, the cohort would be a "victim" of making the bomb. Further, firebombs are inherently dangerous. There is no peaceful purpose for making a bomb. Felony offenses that involve explosives qualify as "violent crimes" for purposes of enhancing the sentences of career offenders. See 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining a "violent felony" as: "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that ... involves use of explosives"). Courts have found possession of a'bomb to be a crime of violence based on the lack of a nonviolent purpose for a bomb and the fact that, by its very nature, there is a substantial risk that the bomb would be used against the person or property of another. See United States v. Newman, 125 F.3d 863 (10th Cir.1997) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Dodge, 846 F.Supp. 181,, Holding statements: (A) holding that possession of a pipe bomb is a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 3142f1 (B) holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc 2113a is a crime of violence (C) holding that sexual assault of a child qualified as crime of violence under 18 usc 16 (D) holding for the purposes of 18 usc 924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc 924e2b (E) holding that a court must only look to the statutory definition not the underlying circumstances of the crime to determine whether a given offense is by its nature a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 16
Example output: holding that bank robbery by force and violence or intimidation under 18 usc 2113a is a crime of violence
Example explanation: It's a good example. Based on the given prompt, holding that possession of a pipe bomb is a crime of violence for purposes of 18 usc 3142f1 is correct.
Q: to the defense of Poole. 6 . Moreover, not only did Poole's unilateral decision to have the school's interior remedi-ated violate the terms of the policy, (see ECF No. 1-2 at 19), and impair Nautilus's ability to protect its interests, which included mounting a litigation strategy to determine fault, see W. Bend Co. v. Chiaphua Indus., Inc., 112 F.Supp.2d 816, 824 (E.D.Wis.2000) (explaining that prohibitions against voluntarily assuming obligations "exist to give the insurer which is being asked to foot the bill an opportunity to protect its interests"), but the late tender to Nautilus appears to have- deprived it of the opportunity to control the defense of Poole in the state action. See Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F.Supp.2d 569, 596 (E.D.N.C.1999) (<HOLDING>). To hold, as Westfield urges, that Nautilus
Holding statements: (A) holding that the insurers failure to pay even what it had considered to be a reasonable sum for defense costs despite having nominally accepted the tender of defense constitutes a breach of the duty to defend (B) holding despite a reservation of rights that when the insurer provides a defense to its insured the insured has no right to interfere with the insurers control of the defense and a stipulated judgment between the insured and the injured claimant without the consent of the insurer is ineffective to impose liability upon the insurer (C) holding that insurer must pay for defense after it declined to provide a defense and coverage was found to exist (D) holding that delayed notice relieves insurer of obligation to pay defense costs if it was actually prejudiced by delay (E) recognizing that an insurers obligation to pay for prenotification legal expenses is concomitant with its right to control the defense and that a contrary result would require the insurer to pay for those defense costs which it had no opportunity to control
A:
holding that the insurers failure to pay even what it had considered to be a reasonable sum for defense costs despite having nominally accepted the tender of defense constitutes a breach of the duty to defend