In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
393 N.W.2d 286, 290-91 (S.D.1986). GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, (dissenting).. [ 26.] I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the lower court on Issue 2. I would hold the trial court erred when it granted partial summary judgment to 01-esens, holding City's operation of food service at the municipal bar was an ultra vires act. [27.] An express grant of authority from the legislature "includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized." City of Rapid City v. Rensch, 77 S.D. 242, 246, 90 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1958) (citation omitted). A municipality is vested with discretion as to how it exercises specific powers conferred upon it by the legislature, as long as the methods employed are n , 59 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1953) (<HOLDING>). Actions taken under a municipality's implied
Holding statements: (A) holding municipality had implied authority to enter into a long term contract to establish a golf course although state statute did not specifically grant authority to establish golf courses as public parks (B) holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute (C) holding that the governments attorney had the implicit authority to bind the government although the contracting officer had the express authority (D) holding that plaintiff had no authority or statutory right for actions proper course was to report actions to proper legal authority (E) holding the court has the inherent authority to enter an order of confidentiality

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
second and third elements under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), the existence of a sufficient interest, and whether disposition of that interest would effectively impede the putative intervenors' ability to protect that interest. Among the interests that satisfy these criteria are injury to reputation, see Penthouse Int'l Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 373, 392 (2d Cir.1981), need to protect the attorney-client privilege, see In re Katz (Jamil v. United States), 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1980), and need to protect the attorney work-product privilege. See United States v. AT & T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1290-92 (D.C.Cir.1980), citing, Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445, 84 S.Ct. 508, 511-12, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 735 F.2d 1330, 1331 (11th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that a district court should allow intervention by a client in the first instance as soon as the attorneyclient privilege issue is raised (B) holding that the inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document does not waive the attorneyclient privilege if attorney took all reasonable steps to avoid disclosure and asserted the privilege as soon as the disclosure became known (C) holding that where an issue is raised in the district court but raised late and the district court declines to deem the issue waived the issue may be raised on appeal (D) recognizing intervention to assert both the attorneyclient and work product privileges (E) holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege

Ex Output:
(A)

Ex Input:
two theories in support of his contention: a "temporary injury" theory and a "continuing contract" theory. First, Cline argues the gas company's responses to his requests for free gas namely its assertions he was required to pay a connection fee or deposit in order to receive the gasconstituted a series of temporary injuries, each of which gave rise to a new and independent cause of action. Kansas courts have recognized a temporary injury theory in nuisance actions, where a plaintiff suffers temporary, occasional, or recurrent physical damage to his real property. See, e.g., Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 270 Kan. 468, 15 P.3d 338, 346 (2000) (allowing independent causes of action for periodic episodes of flooding); Henderson v. Talbott, 175 Kan. 615, 266 P.2d 273, 281 (1954) (<HOLDING>). Cline has cited no case, however, in which a
Holding statements: (A) holding that ordinary negligence and gross negligence are not separate causes of action (B) holding the same for the other separate rate plaintiffs in this action (C) holding that although money had and received and unjust enrichment were pled as separate causes of action they are really the same cause of action (D) holding that a forest preserve will be liable for injuries only in the case of willful and wanton negligence that proximately causes such injuries (E) recognizing separate causes of action for injuries to plaintiffs land caused by occasional flooding

Ex Output:
(E)