In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: apace notwithstanding an alien's parole status 'or possibility of arrest or further imprisonment.' " Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(4)(A)). The court determined that 1231(a)(4)(A) implicitly endorsed the proposition that "deportation leaves an existing term of parole intact" because "an alien may be deported and later face incarceration for violating his parole." Id. Therefore, the court held "that, under federal law, deportation does not automatically extinguish an existing term of parole." Id. Just as in Carrasco-Mateo, the Oregon court in the instant case did not lose authority over Barrera merely because he was deported. Id. This decision is in accord with other circuit courts that have addressed similar issues. See United States v. Phillips, 413 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Williams, 369 F.3d 250,
Holding statements: (A) holding that deportation did not cut short appellants parole term regardless of appellants subjective beliefs (B) holding that deportation does not extinguish term of parole (C) holding that appellants privacy interests under the us and texas constitutions were not invaded when officer walked up appellants driveway to allow drug dog to sniff appellants garage door (D) holding that parole survives deportation (E) holding officers articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellants contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellants prior arrests for drug offenses appellants lie about his prior criminal history and appellants possession of small jewelers bags used in cocaine trafficking

A: holding that deportation does not extinguish term of parole
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Q: for a damages claim. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29. Nor can Russell change the facts that render her remaining grounds not justiciable. As long as there is no dispute that the release between Metro and American Century is not binding on Russell, and Metro and its representatives have not been awarded and do not seek attorney fees based on section 417.003 of the Labor Code, there is no way in which Russell could re-plead her claims to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. See Bonham State Bank, 907 S.W.2d at 467; WesternGeco, L.L.C., 246 S.W.3d at 781. The trial court therefore did not err in refusing Russell an opportunity to further amend her pleadings. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment. 1 . S rters, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Tex.1963) (<HOLDING>); Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 366, 190
Holding statements: (A) holding governmental immunity was not implicated in a declaratoryjudgment action seeking an interpretation of a competitive bidding statute as applied to the highway commissions policy of requiring all materials furnished under contracts be manufactured in the united states (B) holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by 14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained (C) holding a declaratoryjudgment action was proper to construe compulsory school attendance law and did not implicate governmental immunity (D) holding governmental immunity not implicated and a declaratoryjudgment action proper to seek determination of whether plaintiffs were motor carriers for purposes of tax statute (E) recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials

A: holding that a declaratoryjudgment action seeking to compel officials to perform their legal duties was not barred by 14 however a portion of the action seeking compensatory damages could not be maintained
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Q: Eleventh Amendment purposes. The problem with relying now on the decision we made in Mumford is that we nowhere addressed the issue of who would pay for a damage judgment against the court of common pleas. The Supreme Court has now explicitly told us that this is the most important factor bearing on the Eleventh Amendment question. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55 (1997) (stating "that the question whether a money judgment against a state instrumentality or official would be enforceable against the State is of considerable importance to any evaluation of the relationship between the State and the entity or individual being sued"); Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245 (1994) (<HOLDING>). This court has followed suit; we now
Holding statements: (A) recognizing the vulnerability of the states purse as the most salient factor in eleventh amendment determinations (B) recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important (C) holding that state agencies are treated as states under the eleventh amendment (D) recognizing that the most important factor in determining whether a governmental entity is entitled to eleventh amendment immunity is whether a judgment against it would be paid from the state treasury (E) recognizing the eleventh amendment does not bar the united states from suing a state

A:
recognizing that the third factor permanence is the most important
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