Problem: (CNN) -- Tito Joseph "TJ" Jackson, who on Wednesday was named temporary guardian of Michael Jackson's three children, was inspired by his famous uncle to form a singing group with his brothers. TJ had been placed in charge of the children when the kids' grandmother, Katherine, left home on July 15 and will watch the children while the legal proceedings play out in a California court. TJ Jackson, 34, is the son of Tito Jackson and the late Delores Martes Jackson. TJ and his older brothers, Taj and Taryll, form the R&B group 3T. Jackson is married with three children, a boy and two girls. Judge suspends Katherine Jackson as guardian of Michael Jackson's children A 1995 article in People described the brothers' childhood as normal despite their famous father, uncle and aunts. Taj Jackson told the magazine: "My mom made sure that we had a real childhood, with birthday parties, baseball, family outings, all that stuff." They were close to their Uncle Michael. "He's like a third parent to us," Taj told People in 1995. Eventually the brothers went along on one of his tours and decided to form a singing group and were recording their first album in 1994 at the time of their mother's death. Initially it was believed Delores Martes Jackson, who had divorced from Tito Jackson in 1993, drowned in a swimming pool, but the case was reopened, and her sons in 1995 filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against a man they accused of killing her. Three years later, Donald Bohana was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison, according to People magazine.

Question: "What is TJ's relation to Micheal Jackson?"

Answer: "Father"
Answer: no

Problem: The CIA's senior management saw problems with the armed Predator as well, problems that Clarke and even Black and Allen were inclined to minimize. One (which also applied to reconnaissance flights) was money. A Predator cost about $3 million. If the CIA flew Predators for its own reconnaissance or covert action purposes, it might be able to borrow them from the Air Force, but it was not clear that the Air Force would bear the cost if a vehicle went down. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz took the position that the CIA should have to pay for it; the CIA disagreed. Second, Tenet in particular questioned whether he, as Director of Central Intelligence, should operate an armed Predator." This was new ground,"he told us. Tenet ticked off key questions: What is the chain of command? Who takes the shot? Are America's leaders comfortable with the CIA doing this, going outside of normal military command and control? Charlie Allen told us that when these questions were discussed at the CIA, he and the Agency's executive director, A. B." Buzzy" Krongard, had said that either one of them would be happy to pull the trigger, but Tenet was appalled, telling them that they had no authority to do it, nor did he. Third, the Hellfire warhead carried by the Predator needed work. It had been built to hit tanks, not people. It needed to be designed to explode in a different way, and even then had to be targeted with extreme precision. In the configuration planned by the Air Force through mid-2001, the Predator's missile would not be able to hit a moving vehicle. White House officials had seen the Predator video of the "man in white." On July 11, Hadley tried to hurry along preparation of the armed system. He directed McLaughlin, Wolfowitz, and Joint Chiefs Vice Chairman Richard Myers to deploy Predators capable of being armed no later than September 1.

Question: "Why was Tenet appalled?"

Answer: "Because this was happening outside of the normal military command and control, and he felt they didn't have the required authority"
Answer: yes

Problem: The after-action review had treated the CIA as the lead agency for any offensive against al Qaeda, and the principals, at their March 10 meeting, had endorsed strengthening the CIA's capability for that role. To the CTC, that meant proceeding with "The Plan," which it had put forward half a year earlier-hiring and training more case officers and building up the capabilities of foreign security services that provided intelligence via liaison. On occasion, as in Jordan in December 1999, these liaison services took direct action against al Qaeda cells. In the CTC and higher up, the CIA's managers believed that they desperately needed funds just to continue their current counterterrorism effort, for they reckoned that the millennium alert had already used up all of the Center's funds for the current fiscal year; the Bin Laden unit had spent 140 percent of its allocation. Tenet told us he met with Berger to discuss funding for counterterrorism just two days after the principals' meeting. While Clarke strongly favored giving the CIA more money for counterterrorism, he differed sharply with the CIA's managers about where it should come from. They insisted that the CIA had been shortchanged ever since the end of the Cold War. Their ability to perform any mission, counterterrorism included, they argued, depended on preserving what they had, restoring what they had lost since the beginning of the 1990s, and building from there-with across-the-board recruitment and training of new case officers, and the reopening of closed stations. To finance the counterterrorism effort, Tenet had gone to congressional leaders after the 1998 embassy bombings and persuaded them to give the CIA a special supplemental appropriation. Now, in the aftermath of the millennium alert, Tenet wanted a boost in overall funds for the CIA and another supplemental appropriation specifically for counterterrorism. To Clarke, this seemed evidence that the CIA's leadership did not give sufficient priority to the battle against Bin Laden and al Qaeda. He told us that James Pavitt, the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, "said if there's going to be money spent on going after Bin Laden, it should be given to him. My view was that he had had a lot of money to do it and a long time to do it, and I didn't want to put more good money after bad." The CIA had a very different attitude: Pavitt told us that while the CIA's Bin Laden unit did"extraordinary and commendable work," his chief of station in London "was just as much part of the al Qaeda struggle as an officer sitting in [the Bin Laden unit]." The dispute had large managerial implications, for Clarke had found Ailies in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Question: "How were liaisons involved in "The Plan" against al Qaeda cells?"

Answer: "Provided intelligence by hired case officers with increased capabilities"
Answer:
yes