In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: customs and practices of the trade could conclude that WQIS's liability under Coverage C ceased once the Coverage A limit was reached. See Morgan Stanley, 225 F.3d at 275 (describing when a contract provision is ambiguous). First, the phrase "liabilities covered" in the Coverage C insuring provision could reasonably be read to refer only to liabilities that WQIS was required to cover under Coverage A, that is, up to $5 million per vessel. Under this interpretation, any liability above $5 million was not "covered," and - therefore defense costs incurred with respect to liabilities above $5 million did not arise from "liabilities covered." See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1219 (2d Cir. 1995), modified on other grounds by 85 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1996) (<HOLDING>). A reasonable person could conclude that once
Holding statements: (A) holding that costs are not fixed until judgment is entered and interest can only run on costs when due (B) holding that allied may not be held liable for portion of attorneys fees paid pretender of defense due to policy provision precluding reimbursement for defense costs voluntarily incurred (C) holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself (D) holding that an insurer had no duty to defend in the absence of any cause of action amounting to a potentially covered offense under the insurance policy (E) holding where an insurance policy indemnifies defense costs paid as a result of occurrences covered that the insurer need only reimburse defense costs for claims that are established to be covered through judgment and settlement and not for claims only potentially falling within the policys coverage

A: (E)
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Q: designs. Moreover, we also note that the similarity of the products need not be identical, as Exmark seems to argue, because the similarity may be defined in terms of the defect and any differences among the products may merely go to the weight of the evidence and not its discoverability or admissibility. See Jackson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070, 1082-88 (5th Cir.1986); see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire, 977 S.W.2d at 341; Davidson Oil Country Supply, Inc. v. Klockner, Inc., 908 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir.1990). We note that many other decisions from courts around the nation reject the notion that discovery in a strict product liability case is uniformly limited to the specific product at issue. See, e.g., In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1191 (10th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Brownlow v. General Motors Corp., No.
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiffs work environment was not affected by comments and conduct of which she was not aware (B) recognizing trial courts decision on discovery issues implies a finding that requested discovery was not reasonably available (C) holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law (D) holding that plaintiffs allegation that defendant had exclusive knowledge as the manufacturer did not support claim that defendant was aware of a defect (E) holding that discovery on other tires was not overbroad where plaintiffs alleged that defendant was aware of tread separation problem

A: (E)
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Q: the disposition of appellee's remaining claims. NIGRO, J., files a concurring opinion. CAPPY, J., concurs in the result. 1 . 35 P.S. 780-113(a)(16). 2 . 35 P.S. 780-113(a)(30). 3 . 18 Pa.C.S. 2702(a)(3). Appellee struck Officer Eberlein in the nose during the struggle. 4 . 18 Pa.C.S. 5104. 5 . This instruction regarding the jury's obligation to reach an agreement is in complete harmony with the American Bar Association's approved instruction which this Court specifically recommended in Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 337-38, 275 A.2d 299, 304-05 (1971). 6 . In so doing, the Superior Court found it unnecessary to address other issues raised on appeal. 7 . This Court may raise the issue of waiver sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Triplett, 476 Pa. 83, 89, 381 A.2d 877, 881 (1977) (<HOLDING>). 8 . There are comparable rules requiring
Holding statements: (A) holding that failure to raise issue in brief constitutes waiver of appeal of the issue (B) holding lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction is fundamental error that this court may properly raise and recognize sua sponte (C) holding that a court can raise the issue of res judicata sua sponte in order to affirm a grant of summary judgment (D) holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived (E) holding that although the issue of waiver as to the appellants allegation of trial court error had not been addressed by either party this court could raise the issue of waiver sua sponte

A:
(E)
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