TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: in cases decided under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (characterizing the Segal standard as a "background rule under the old Bankruptcy Act, to which courts still refer in the era of the Bankruptcy Code"); Andrews, 80 F.3d at 910-11 (applying the Segal standard to determine whether post-petition payments under a pre-petition non-compete agreement were property of the debtor's estate); Ryerson, 739 F.2d at 1423 (concluding the Bankruptcy Code "follows Segal insofar as it includes after-acquired property 'sufficiently rooted in the prebankruptcy past' but eliminates the requirement that it not be entangled with the debtor's ability to make a fresh start"). But see Burgess v. Sikes (In re Burgess), 438 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir.2006) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). 13 . Although the parties frame the issue as
Holding statements: (A) holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code (B) holding that bankruptcy court is without jurisdiction to control disposition of chapter 13 debtors property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate unless the property is related to the bankruptcy proceedings of the code (C) holding that the question of whether an interest is a claim for bankruptcy purposes is to be resolved by reference to the text history and purpose of the bankruptcy code (D) holding although congress has specifically approved of segals result segals sufficiently rooted test did not survive the enactment of the bankruptcy code footnote omitted (E) holding that the bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate

SOLUTION: holding that the eleventh amendment does not bar a bankruptcy court from issuing a money judgment against a state under the bankruptcy code

PROBLEM: acts of sexual harassment by the plaintiffs co-workers, about which defendants' supervisors neither knew nor should have known, does not give rise to a cognizable sexual harassment claim and will not revive an otherwise stale sexual harassment claim. See Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) ("[Because no harassment event occurring during the violation period was ever brought to the attention of [the employer] while [the plaintiff] was still employed, there is no violation during the limitation period that can serve as the anchor for the earlier conduct."). Additionally, the plaintiff cannot rely on the continuing violations doctrine, because there is no nexus between the conduct of the coworkers in 1994 and the earlier incidents going back to 1992. See Id. (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, there being no dispute as to
Holding statements: (A) holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur (B) holding plaintiff failed to demonstrate disparate treatment because she failed to show she was similarly situated to coworker to whom she compared herself (C) holding that the plaintiff could not rely on the continuing violations doctrine because she had failed to demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between alleged touching incidents by a supervisor and the later conduct of fellow employees (D) holding that a constitutional claim against nongovernment entities only lies where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself (E) holding that plaintiff cook at a nursing home had sufficiently pled requisite public policy and a close fit where she alleged she was fired for expressing concerns that a fellow employee was contaminating the area where she was preparing food

SOLUTION: holding that plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate some nexus between infringement and profits before apportionment can occur

PROBLEM: clauses resulted in actual prejudice. 463 N.E.2d 257, 265-66 (Ind.1984). When an insured fails to provide its insurer with timely notice of an occurrence, we apply a two-part test. First, we inquire whether the insured notified the insurer within a reasonable amount of time. Second, we determine whether the insurer suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. If notice was not tendered in a reasonable amount of time, there is a rebuttable presumption that the insurer was prejudiced. Id. at 266. Other jurisdictions have held that an insured can rebut this presumption of prejudice regarding late notice by showing that the insurance company would have denied coverage on unrelated grounds even if the notice had been timely. In Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Bradley C d 842, 851 (N.D.Ill.2000) (<HOLDING>); Strickler v. Huffine, 421 Pa.Super. 463, 618
Holding statements: (A) holding that if an insurer denies coverage based on an assertion that the underlying claim is excluded from coverage there is a presumption that the insurer did not suffer prejudice because prompt notice would have merely resulted in an earlier denial of coverage (B) holding that when an insurer denies coverage on grounds unrelated to late notice a strong presumption arises that the insurer has not suffered prejudice from the late notice (C) holding that the plaintiffs asserted legal basis for coverage is irrelevant to the determination of whether the insurance policy provides coverage and instead looking to the facts underlying the claim for coverage (D) holding that in light of evidence that the insurer would have denied coverage even if it had received suit papers on a timely basis the insurer could not show prejudice (E) holding that an insurer will not be estopped from denying coverage merely because the underlying case proceeds to judgment before the declaratory judgment action is resolved

SOLUTION:
holding that when an insurer denies coverage on grounds unrelated to late notice a strong presumption arises that the insurer has not suffered prejudice from the late notice