In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). The Supreme Court has recognized that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). However, the Supreme Court has permitted exceptions to the warrant requirement when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (allowing school officials to conduct warrantless searches of student property without probable cause); see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (<HOLDING>); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74,
Holding statements: (A) holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable (B) holding neither the warrant requirement nor the probable cause requirement should apply to noninvestigatory workrelated purposes or for investigations of workrelated misconduct (C) holding a person may consent to warrantless searches as a condition of a suspended sentence (D) holding 1983 action lies for warrantless arrest without probable cause (E) holding that government employers may conduct warrantless workrelated searches of employees offices without probable cause
[EX A]: holding searches conducted without a warrant based on probable cause are presumptively unreasonable

[EX Q]: of record rather than the alien. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also favor notice of counsel of record rather than actual notice of the client. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b) (stating that "whenever service under these rules is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court"). Case precedent also indicates that actual notice of an alien is not required under the INA. See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 669 n. 6 (3d Cir.1990) (noting in dicta that notice to attorney comprised actual notice to alien); Reyes-Arias v. INS, 866 F.2d 500, 502-3 (D.C.Cir.1989) (finding actual knowledge of attorney constitutes reasonable notice); Newton v. INS, 622 F.2d 1193, 1194 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). Anin received notice as required by the INA.
Holding statements: (A) holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city (B) holding that notice to the attorney of record constitutes notice to the petitioner (C) holding that actual notice fulfills a notice requirement that an applicable federal regulation be conspicuously posted because actual notice is the best notice (D) holding that a defendant is not entitled to relief from default judgment because notice to an attorney of filing of motions and orders is constructive notice to the client even when the client did not have actual notice (E) holding that notice to original attorney not formally withdrawn comprised proper notice
[EX A]: holding that notice to supervisor is notice to city

[EX Q]: would seem to be an outstanding liability of CCI that would affect its net worth and, therefore, Jeff's total net worth as a CCI shareholder. 7 . We are cognizant that our refusal to consider this issue now could lead to more litigation in the future, given the litigiousness of these parties, but this does not permit us to ignore jurisdictional rules. See In re Guardianship of Hickman, 811 N.E.2d 843, 850 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. We further note that even if the trial court revisits the question of modifying Jeff's child support obligation upon termination of this appeal, such modification could only be made effective upon the date the trial court reobtains jurisdiction following certification of this appeal as final. See Harris v. Harris, 800 N.E.2d 930, 937 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (<HOLDING>), trans. denied. 8 . Despite the Crider
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court was permitted to rule on child support modification request filed before appeal was certified as final but that effective date of modification could be no earlier than when indiana supreme court denied transfer on appeal and trial court reobtained jurisdiction (B) holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed (C) holding that since district court of appeal properly found that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a 3850 motion during the pendency of a direct appeal the district court of appeal should have vacated the order rather than affirming on the merits (D) holding that where the issue of sanctions was not before the court of appeals when the appeal was filed the district court retained jurisdiction (E) holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal
[EX A]:
holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed