instruction:
In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
question:
we held that, The penetration offense alleged in the first indictment clearly required a separate and distinct act (involving appellee's sexual organ with the child's female sexual organ) from the act alleged in the second indictment (which involved appel-lee's mouth with the child's sexual organ). In this case the second indictment alleged that appellee caused the child's sexual organ to contact his mouth ency with a child statute is the prohibited conduct. Appellant concedes to this view, the plain language of the statute supports it, and so does our caselaw. See Harris, 359 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that a grammatical analysis suggests that the unit of prosecution for indecency with a child by exposure is the exposure and, ultimately, adopting that viewpoint); Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 718 (<HOLDING>); see also Wallace v. State, 550 S.W.2d 89, 91
Holding statements: (A) holding that three phrases contained within the same subsection of the indecencywithaehild statute defined three separate offenses for juryunanimity purposes when separated in the disjunctive (B) holding that a similar statute created separate offenses (C) holding that three denied promotions over the course of three years where the decisions were made by three different selection officials and involved different qualifications were not sufficiently related to constitute a continuing violation (D) holding that the federal carjacking statute as it existed when the defendant was indicted established three separate offenses rather than a single offense with a choice of three maximum penalties and recognizing that this construction avoided serious constitutional questions on which precedent is not dispositive (E) holding that the legislature can define separate offenses within the same statutory subsection even if the acts are in close temporal proximity
answer:
(A)

question:
Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 66 (3d Cir.1978); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n. 3 (2d Cir.1977). 7 .The rationale for this rule, as Judge Aldrich stated, is that "to permit copyrighting [in that case] would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms [of expression], could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance ... [and thus] the subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expression. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be checkmated." Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir.1967). 8 . As an example of where dissection was improperly used, see Apple Barrel Productions Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 387-88 (5th Cir.1984) (<HOLDING>). 9 .For example, the court may find that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that consideration supports the agreement as a whole (B) holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm (C) holding district court erroneously failed to consider copyrighted show as a whole (D) holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to strike when movant failed to show prejudice (E) holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole
answer:
(C)

question:
proceeding"). Here, the only evidence that th .Crim.App.2000) (stating, in motion to suppress context, "[T]he judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted"). Appellant's and Sanchez's after-the-fact, out-of-court averrals about appellant's ability to understand the proceedings and waivers he signed were untimely factual statements in appellant's self-interest. Even though the State did not offer affidavits to controvert appellant's and Sanchez's affidavits, it was within the trial court's discretion to disbelieve the assertions contained in those affidavits that appellant does not read or speak English. See Charles, 146 S.W.3d at 210; Shanklin, 190 S.W.3d at 167; see also Phuong Anh Thi Le, 300 S.W.3d at 327 (<HOLDING>). The trial court, and not this Court, is in
Holding statements: (A) holding that the court should make factual findings from the record evidence as if it were conducting a trial on the record (B) holding that in reviewing trial courts ruling on habeas corpus petition reviewing court must defer to all of trial courts implied factual findings supported by record (C) recognizing that the bia must defer to the factual findings of the ij unless they are clearly erroneous (D) holding that as long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence the board must defer to the hearing committees credibility determinations because they are subsidiary findings of basic facts (E) holding that appellate court must defer to all implied factual findings supported by record
answer:
(E)