In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: evidence showing that the defendants used the mark selectively or that they failed to use it pervasively in all their commercial dealings, even if these dealings were low in volume. Furthermore, though the Allard Court granted ownership rights to the defendants based only on oral testimony of various "solicitations" and insubstantial documentary evidence of prior use, the Court noted that there was also good evidence of widespread public recognition of the defendants' use of the service mark. Evidence of public recognition is only necessary in cases requiring proof of secondary meaning, but such evidence may be probative of a party's actual use of a mark in cases where secondary meaning is not required. See id.; see also Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F.Supp. 428, 431 (M.D.Fla.1971) (<HOLDING>). Public recognition is probative of a party's
Holding statements: (A) holding that the burden is on the plaintiff (B) holding that for the purposes of standing to bring an action to recover on a contract privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff (C) holding that the plaintiff established a right to a slogan based on evidence of public recognition of its use by the plaintiff (D) holding that a plaintiff had established a primafacie failuretohire case notwithstanding evidence that the position sought by the plaintiff was ultimately filled with a person of the same race as the plaintiff (E) holding that mere use of a road will not make a road a public road even though such use is with the knowledge and consent of the landowner unless the use is accompanied by recognition by public authority or by its maintainance sic

A: (C)
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Q: F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir.1975). Anderson's condition at the time of the statement was described as excited, nervous and scared, and he appeared as if "he did not know what to do." Moreover, his statement directly related to an exciting event, the shooting. Thus, based on the evidence and circumstances known at the time of its ruling, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the exciting event witnessed by Anderson was the shooting itself. Accordingly, to the extent the trial court based its ruling on the fact that Anderson personally perceived the shooting, we find no abuse of discretion. We further note that the startling occurrence that triggers the excited utterance need not necessarily be the crime itself. See Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154-55 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (<HOLDING>); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court could have found startling event or condition was declarants sustaining an injury or the pain she later experienced (B) holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unre lated prior condition satisfied the rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the plaintiffs claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or event unrelated to the defendants negligence (C) holding that a lower court properly admitted a fouryear olds hearsay statement although she made it 1215 hours after the startling event (D) holding that statement must be product of a startling event (E) holding a condition precedent is an act or event that must be performed or occur after the contract has been formed before the contract becomes effective

A: (A)
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Q: threat, as long as one does so with a corrupt purpose. See United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cir.1998) (sustaining a conviction under 1512(b) where an employer told an employee not to talk to investigators so that she would not be bothered, finding that a jury could reasonably have inferred that the employer was attempting with improper motive to persuade the employee not to talk to investigators); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 126-27 (2d Cir.1998) (sustaining defendant's conviction of witness tampering based on evidence showing defendant had substantial influence over witness because he was her landlord and her employer, and had paid for an attorney to help her prepare her testimony); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619,
Holding statements: (A) holding that witness grand jury testimony was admissible when defendant waived his constitutional right of confrontation by making witness unavailable by threats to his life (B) holding that where witness refused to take the oath and testify his grand jury testimony should not have been admitted because he was not subject to cross examination before the grand jury (C) recognizing that defendants attempt to persuade a witness to make false exculpatory statements is probative of guilty knowledge and intent (D) holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose (E) holding that defendants attempt to mislead a client by providing it with false information was illegal witness tampering because defendant was trying to corruptly persuade or mislead the client with the intent of influencing its potential testimony before the grand jury

A:
(E)
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