TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: of the contract, the plaintiffs claim will only sound in contract. Id. In operation, the rale restricts contracting parties to contractual remedies for those economic losses associated with the relationship, even when the breach might reasonably be viewed as a consequence of a contracting party's negligence. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986) ("When the injury is only the economic loss to the subject of a contract itself, the action sounds in contract alone."). In other words, the economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic losses in negligence when the loss is the subject matter of a contract between the parties. Coastal Conduit & Ditching, Inc. v. Noram Energy Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282, 285 (T .3d 355, 378 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, we overrule JP Morgan's fifth
Holding statements: (A) holding that subject to certain exceptions the economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for economic damages arising out of matters governed by contract (B) holding that economic loss rule precludes recovery of economic damages only in the absence of personal injury or property damage claims (C) recognizing fraud in the inducement claims independent of contract claims without discussion of economic loss rule (D) holding economic loss rule did not bar recovery of tort damages on statutory fraud claim based upon fraudulent inducement (E) holding economic loss rule did not bar negligent misrepresentation claim where parties had no contract

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: The State Defendants also cite to cases from other circuits refusing to apply Ex Parte Young in suits challenging statutorily-created private rights of action. Okpalobi, 244 F.3d at 416-24; Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Deters, 92 F.3d 1412, 1416-17 (6th Cir.1996); see also Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1342. Their holdings are unsurprising given that no state officials were charged with enforcing those laws. However, in the case before me, certain state officials are expressly charged with enforcing the law. Indeed, the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits distinguished the cases before them from cases challenging penal laws enforceable by state officials, finding the latter suitable for application of Ex Parte Young. See Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1337-41 (<HOLDING>); Deters, 92 F.3d at 1416 n. 10 (distinguishing
Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute as applied violates the commerce clause (B) holding no error occurred in excluding portion of statement offered by defendant because the rejected portion of the conversation in no manner explains or modifies that portion of the conversation which came into evidence (C) holding that an offender convicted under the bestiality portion of the criminal sodomy statute does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of die portion of the statute that criminalizes homosexual conduct (D) holding that clear language in one portion of a later may cause ambiguity in another portion to dissipate (E) holding that ex parte young applied to plaintiffs claims against the criminal portion of the statute

SOLUTION: (E)

PROBLEM: 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004); Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir.2001). In this case, the court did not remand based on 1447(c), but rather on the basis that it was declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs pendent state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3). Review of a district court's discretionary decision to remand under 1367(c)(3) is not treated as a 1447(c) remand, and therefore it is not subject to 1447(d)'s statutory bar to review. Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 152-53 (10th Cir.1995). As a logical corollary, then, 1447(d) likewise does not deprive this court of jurisdiction to reconsider its prior orders in this case. See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to
Holding statements: (A) holding a district courts power to remand pendent state claims to state court is inherent in statutory authorization to decline supplemental jurisdiction under 1367c (B) holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss (C) holding the district court retained jurisdiction to reconsider its order granting the defendants motion to dismiss notwithstanding the fact that the district court had remanded the remaining pendent state claims to state court pursuant to 28 usc 1367c (D) holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court (E) holding that district court appropriately retained pendent jurisdiction over state claims where it had invested time and resources in the case

SOLUTION:
(C)