In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: an individual has adequately stated a pri-ma facie claim. Cf. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.1995) ("An inquiry into the reasonableness of procedures ... belies a claim that liability under [15 U.S.C.] 1681e(b) must be predicated on the effect of that information once disseminated .... The district court was required to consider whether [the defendant] was liable under 1681e(b) before it determined that [the plaintiff] had suffered no recoverable damages."). Several courts have previously recognized the possibility that a claim for actual or compensatory damages under FCRA may include compensation for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury or out-of-pocket expenses. See, e.g., Bakker v. McKinnon, 152 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F.3d 957,
Holding statements: (A) holding in a fcra case that plaintiffs may not rely on mere conclusory statements rather they must sufficiently articulate true demonstrable emotional distress including the factual context in which the emotional distress arose evidence corroborating the testimony of the plaintiff the nexus between the conduct of the defendant and the emotional distress the degree of such mental distress mitigating circumstances if any physical injuries suffered due to the emotional distress medical attention resulting from the emotional duress psychiatric or psychological treatment and the loss of income if any (B) holding that under privacy act federal government waived its sovereign immunity with respect to actual damages but not with respect to damages for mental or emotional distress (C) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the incomplete and late submission of expert reports was not harmless (D) holding that under the first amendment where there is no proof of actual malice damages are limited to actual injury which excludes punitive damages but is not limited to outofpocket loss (E) holding that even in the absence of outofpocket expenses or costs incurred the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding actual and punitive damages when appellees testified about how they felt when appellant obtained their credit reports and violated their privacy thereby causing them some emotional distress
[EX A]: (E)

[EX Q]: statement "is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' " Id. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court departed from its ruling in Roberts and established a new standard for determining when hearsay statements of an unavailable witness may be admitted as evidence against a criminal defendant consistently with the Confrontation Clause. The standard set forth- in Crawford actually expanded defendants' confrontation rights beyond what was contemplated in Roberts. Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-55, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (requiring unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination to admit testimonial hearsay statements of witnesses not appearing at trial), with Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72-73, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (<HOLDING>). Prior to the decision in Crawford, this Court
Holding statements: (A) holding that witness hearsay statements may be admitted whenever they bear sufficient indicia of reliability even without crossexamination (B) holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements (C) holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence where the government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability and the court considered the reliability of the evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence (D) holding that judges may consider any relevant evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability including reliable hearsay in a probation revocation hearing (E) holding that it would have been proper to admit party opponent admissions although they were based on multiple levels of hearsay and test their reliability on crossexamination but upholding the district courts exclusion of the statements where the hearsay statements lacked any factual content and lacked any indicia of trustworthiness
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: the authority for which the section provides is being abused." The government has provided no basis upon which to distinguish the reasoning of In re Letter of Request. In addition, that reasoning finds support in decisions of at least one other circuit and the Supreme Court. See In re Letter Rogatory from Justice Court, 523 F.2d 562, 563-64 (6th Cir. 1976) ("Although it is well-established that records of account belong to the bank and that a depositor may not prevent their disclosure on [F]ourth or [F]ifth Amendment grounds, it does not follow that appellant lacks standing to challenge the district court's power to issue a subpoena under the terms of an authorizing statute." (citations omitted)); see also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964) (<HOLDING>). Consequently, the Court concludes that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that taxpayer who is the target but not the recipient of an administrative subpoena pursuant to 26 usc 7602 may challenge the subpoena (B) holding that a denial of an order to quash a subpoena not directed to a movant was a final order if the movant had no further opportunity to challenge the subpoena (C) holding that because a grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is presumed to be reasonable the burden of showing unreasonableness must be on the subpoena recipient who seeks to avoid compliance but recognizing that a court may be justified under some circumstances in requiring the government to reveal the general subject of the grand jurys investigation before requiring the challenging party to carry its burden of persuasion (D) holding that while a grand jury subpoena for the production of books and papers may implicate the fourth amendment when presented with a challenge to such a subpoena a court need only determine whether the request is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable (E) holding that the term timely should be read in conjunction with 45c2b that requires a party subject to a subpoena to object to a subpoena duces tecum within 14 days of service of the subpoena
[EX A]:
(A)