TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: stored on a BBS pending delivery). Because subsection (A) applies only to messages in "temporary, intermediate storage," however, these courts have limited that subsection's coverage to messages not yet delivered to their intended recipient. See DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 512; Fraser, 135 F.Supp.2d at 636. Defendants point to these cases and argue that messages remaining on an ISP's server after delivery no longer fall within the Act's coverage. But, even if such messages are not within the purview of subsection (A), they do fit comfortably within subsection (B). There is no dispute that messages remaining on NetGate's server after delivery are stored "by an electronic communication service" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 2510(17)(B). Cf. DoubleClick, 154 F.Supp.2d at 511 (<HOLDING>). The only issue, then, is whether the messages
Holding statements: (A) holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca (B) holding that email messages stored on a computer but not yet read were in electronic storage (C) holding that an individuals reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of email communications is not vitiated by an understanding that the thirdparty service provider will maintain independent access to them noting that electronic communication is as important to fourth amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations has been in the past (D) holding that defendants communications sent into tennessee did not constitute purposeful availment because all were in response to communications initiated by the plaintiff (E) holding that subsection b did not apply because the communications at issue were not being stored by an electronic communication service

SOLUTION: holding that emails stored by employee on hard drive of companyissued laptop were not in electronic storage as contemplated by the sca

PROBLEM: susceptible to many meanings. Although there is no direct statement that Mooney failed to perform his duties with regard to assisting his clients with their investments, this is the clear import of the specific language used. "Only knew" clearly implies that Mooney knew nothing about anything else. What was implied in that statement is made express in the next "didn't know anything about investments." "Hated helping clients" also unambiguously indicates that Mooney was not interested in executing his duties to his clients. These statements embody a "pejorative implication" that a reasonable listener would perceive "as an assertion that the [plaintiff] failed to perform his duties as an advisor." Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 958 N.E.2d 598, 609 (Ohio Ct.App.2011); see Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 707 (<HOLDING>). The statement "invested her in all of the
Holding statements: (A) holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement (B) holding that where the appellant remained at the scene rendered aid and gave his name to the police the evidence was insufficient to convict him under section 3742 even though the appellant initially lied about his involvement in the accident (C) holding no error in rejecting the appellants proffered instruction even though that statement was based on language from case law when the amci instruction was a proper statement of the law (D) holding that though there was no express statement that the appellant had committed perjury the clear impact of the specific language in nine sentences was that the appellant lied while under oath which weighed in favor of an actionable statement (E) holding that hearing officer had no obligation under 38 cfr 3103c2 to advise appellant as to physicians statement because that statement would not have helped prove the claim that is that statement would not have provided a nexus with the veterans service

SOLUTION: holding trial court reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to withdraw his plea where court erroneously stated appellant could appeal motion was in fact not dispositive and appellant was entitled to rely on the courts statement

PROBLEM: for Dr. Crabtree's ultimate post-award refusal to continue the counseling relationship by threatening to sue Dr. Crabtree and press charges against him before the licensing board. The District Court's statement that the arbitrator could not address the reasons for the breakdown in the counseling relationship upon remand could be understood as a direction to the arbitrator not to consider the Hospital's contention. We see no legal reason why the arbitrator, who will be advised of the contingency that has rendered the award ambiguous, should not also be able to hear the Hospital's explanation for the breakdown in the counseling relationship, if he so chooses. The District Court's statement may be interpreted as a judicial determination of the appropriate procedures to be u 48-49 (<HOLDING>). We conclude, therefore, that nothing in
Holding statements: (A) holding that district court erred in ruling that a particular item of evidence must be admitted in the arbitral proceeding (B) holding that the district court erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim where the district court had simply discounted plaintiffs admissible evidence as less probative than defendants (C) holding that district court erred in issuing injunction against future work stoppages based on arbitral award prohibiting one such stoppage (D) holding the district court erred by reviewing the evidence and making an evidentiary ruling on secondtier review (E) holding that the district court erred in not making an inequitable conduct determination prior to ruling on the exceptional case issue

SOLUTION:
holding that the district court erred in ruling that a plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to survive summary judgment on its discrimination claim where the district court had simply discounted plaintiffs admissible evidence as less probative than defendants