In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: and Defendants, therefore, terminated her employment without notice and an opportunity to be heard. A 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process has three elements: "(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process." Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.2003). Thus, the Due Process Clause protects one's job only where one has a property right in that job. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was a non-probationary employee in Alabama's classified service and, therefore, had a property interest in her position. See Ex parte Moulton, 116 So.3d 1119, 1133-35 (Ala.2013) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that plaintiff can bring action under due process clause of state constitution (B) holding that the due process clause protects only those liberty interests created by the state (C) holding that a state agency created under state law was a state actor (D) holding that whether children are legitimate for purposes of entitlement to insurance benefits is determined by state law (E) holding that the federal due process clause protects a state employee who under state law has a legitimate claim of entitlement to state employment

A: (E)
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Q: carrying it during and in relation to such a crime, with additional penalties attaching if the firearm was brandished or discharged. See 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). Whether the defendant was accountable for one firearm or ten, however, is completely irrelevant to the commission of the 924(c) offense. Thus, because 924(c) pertains to particular unlawful uses of a firearm while 2K2.1(b)(l) pertains to the number of firearms involved, these two enhancements punish different types of conduct. We therefore conclude that enhancing a defendant's offense level based on the number of weapons involved in the offense underlying his 924(c) conviction does not constitute impermissible double counting under the Guidelines. Accord United States v. Terrell, 608 F.3d 679, 683-84 (10th Cir. 2010) (<HOLDING>). But see United States v. Vincent, 20 F.3d
Holding statements: (A) holding that trading drugs for a gun violates the in furtherance of prong of 924c (B) holding that evidence is sufficient for 924c conviction where it shows weapons proximity to drugs and its accessibility (C) holding that an enhancement for an express threat of death may not be applied to the sentence for robbery when the threat is related to the use of the firearm and the defendant has a 924c sentence for the same firearm (D) holding that because the number of weapons involved in the underlying offense to a 924c conviction is a separate type of offense conduct than that punished by 924c itself the district court did not engage in doublecounting when it applied an increase under 2k21bla in conjunction with the sentence for violating 924c (E) holding without discussion that the district court erred by applying the numberofweapons enhancement to an offense underlying the defendants 924c conviction

A: (D)
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Q: 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The relevant consideration is whether the justifications underlying the issuance of the injunction refer to the content of the restricted ex pression. See id. (examining content neutrality of local ordinance and concluding that "[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of the expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others"). Contrary to Scott's contentions, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that an injunction is content-based simply because it restricts only the speech of anti-abortion protestors. See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762-63, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (<HOLDING>). We conclude that the purpose of the modified
Holding statements: (A) holding that the fact that injunction at issue did not restrict the expression of those demonstrating in favor of abortion rights was justly attributable to the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor of abortion rights and noting that the state court imposed restrictions on petitioners incidental to their antiabortion message because they repeatedly violated the courts original order (B) holding that where the issue is one of arbitrability the federal presumption in favor of arbitration shifts to favor a court determination (C) recognizing that a court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction which would interfere with the rights of those who are not parties to the action (D) holding as moot appeal from circuit court injunction prohibiting abortion where abortion performed during appellate stay (E) recognizing that a court must balance the policy in favor of hearing a litigants claims on the merits with the policy in favor of finality

A:
(A)
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