In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
any physician that described her as obese, much less gave an opinion that her weight imposed additional limitations upon her or exacerbated her other conditions. Therefore, even if Reynolds' silence on the issue of obesity is not deemed to waive consideration of that issue, it does not appear that evidence existed regarding her obesity that the ALJ should have considered. The ALJ also did not err in assessing Reynolds' credibility. An ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses' de meanor and to make an appropriate evaluation as to their credibility. Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir.1997). Therefore, an ALJ's credibility assessment will not be disturbed "absent compelling reason." Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir.2001); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 (<HOLDING>). In making a credibility determination, Social
Holding statements: (A) holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference (B) holding that the courts conclusion that transfer was appropriate is to be accorded great deference (C) holding that the district courts credibility assessments are entitled to deference and reviewed for clear error (D) recognizing aljs credibility assessment is entitled to great weight and deference (E) holding that an unambiguous plea agreement is entitled to great evidentiary weight

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
was satisfied that protocols were followed after examining their case notes and the data collected. Further, Quartaro testified to the various safeguards Cellmark employed to protect against the risk of errors and to detect any such errors, if made. Accordingly, Quartaro could have been meaningfully cross-examined on the general and specific risks of error in forensic testing, whether the result of carelessness, incompetence, or fraud. See Boyd, 686 F.Supp.2d at 385 (finding no constitutional violation when only the DNA analyst who wrote the report, and not the intervening-testing analysts, testified because "the testifying expert was himself familiar with the[ ] intervening procedures and could be fully cross-examined as to their efficacy, accuracy, etc."); Munoz, 958 N.E.2d at 1174 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, Quartaro certainly could have been
Holding statements: (A) holding that an expert opinion on a question of law is inadmissible (B) holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness (C) holding that an expert who offers an independent opinion based on another analysts report can be meaningfully crossexamined on the general risk of error in forensic testing (D) recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue (E) holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
887 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Ramirez, 770 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983). Because dangerous people do not differentiate between misdemeanors and felonies, the law should not either. It is a fact that many officers are killed during traffic stops for mere infractions. But, here's the rub: the facts are disputed, and the disputed facts here should have been submitted to the jury, even when qualified immunity from suit was an issue. Issues of credibility belong to the trier of fact. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution so requires. Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 719 (9th Cir.1997) makes this as clear as the proverbial bell. See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317-18, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995) (<HOLDING>). As for LaLonde's claims of excessive force, I
Holding statements: (A) holding that the existence of genuine issues of material facts render not appealable a pretrial denial of summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity (B) holding that when there are no genuine issues of material fact summary judgment is appropriate (C) holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision (D) holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment (E) recognizing that ortiz did not address the issue of whether a denial of a summary judgment motion was appealable after a final judgment if the denial was based on a legal question rather than on the existence of material facts in issue

Ex Output:
(A)