In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: Corpus Christi 1977, no writ); Hagemeister v. Vanity Fair Properties, 508 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Tex.Civ.App.Tyler 1973, writ dism'd). Thus, collateral estoppel dictates that venue of any subsequent suit involving the same subject matter and the same parties as the initial suit be governed by the venue determination in the initial suit. See Orozco, 681 S.W.2d at 245-46; Pinney, 558 S.W.2d at 36. First, Miller II involves the same parties as the Windsor suit. Both State & County and Windsor were parties to the Windsor suit. Although Ledbetter and Curtiss were not named in the Windsor suit, as officers of State & County, they were in privity with a party; thus, collateral estoppel would apply to them as well. Cf. Getty Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied sub nom. Youell & Cos. v. Getty
Holding statements: (A) holding that defendant in second suit was in privity for res judicata purposes because his interests were aligned with those of defendant in first suit which concerned same facts (B) holding that res judicata applies when the question of jurisdiction is raised and determined (C) holding that res judicata applies in deportation proceedings (D) holding that the doctrine of res judicata applies to deportation proceedings (E) holding res judicata also applies to those in privity with parties
[A]: (E)

[Q]: requirements under UFTA, Gulf and Security nevertheless contend that as a matter of law and of public policy the statute of limitations should not have commenced in this action until they obtained the default judgment against Clark in August of 1997 in California. 24 As far as the law is concerned, Gulf and Security vigorously argue under the mistaken assumption that a creditor may not assert an UFTA claim until after the underlying judgment is entered. This persistent assumption represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law under UFTA. 25 Gulf and Security base their theory on our decision in Murphy v. Atkinson (1993), 262 Mont. 164, 864 P.2d 273, as well as a recent appellate court decision from California, Cortez v. Vogt (Cal.Ct.App. 1997), 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 853-54 (<HOLDING>). In Murphy, we determined that a cause of
Holding statements: (A) holding that the twoyear time limitation of rule 3850 does not commence until the sentence becomes final (B) holding that statements and charges by municipality may not be amended in light of legislative purpose of shielding police and similar employees from harassment (C) holding that in view of legislative statements of policy and purpose of the ufta as a cumulative and additional remedy limitation period did not commence until debtorcreditor relationship existed after judgment was made final (D) holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence (E) holding that statements made in the course of negotiation were not contracts and such statements were merged into the final written agreement
[A]: (C)

[Q]: interest exists here; the surety has a $75,000 financial obligation composed of two separate bail bonds. And there is also little question that there is a significant governmental interest here: the efficient operation of judicial and bail-bond systems and the need to ensure the attendance of defendants at court proceedings. We conclude that there was a complete failure to provide procedural safeguards to protect appellants' interests in this case because of the failure of the administrator to provide any notice to appellants that the bond was initially forfeited. This failure to follow rule 702(e) meant that appellants never knew that defendant had absconded and issued a second bond without notice of the first forfeiture. Cf. McElwain v. Van Beek, 447 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Minn.App.1989) (<HOLDING>), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1989).
Holding statements: (A) holding that an alien must establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged error in order to prevail on a due process claim (B) holding that the defendant did not require advance notice where he could not show how he was prejudiced by late notice or how he could have been helped by additional notice (C) holding the tenday requirement was ministerial and the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay (D) recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance (E) recognizing in summaryjudgment context that party must show he was prejudiced by lack of notice or other procedural irregularities to prove he is entitled to relief from district courts ruling
[A]:
(E)