In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: to overcome this presumption by persuading the finder of fact, by a prepon derance of the evidence, that the income tax assessments are erroneous. See Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.1980). Klimek has failed to offer any evidence that the tax assessments are incorrect in the amount the Government claims. He has never challenged in the Tax Court the Notices of Deficiency or the Certificates of Assessments and Payments for tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992. Nor has Klimek ever rebutted or even responded to the Government's requests for admissions regarding tax years 1980 through 1988 and 1990 through 1992, except to return them with the words "Refused for Fraud" scrawled across them. See Lane v. United States, 328 F.2d 602, 603 (5th Cir.1964) (<HOLDING>). Given the fact that Klimek bears the burden
Holding statements: (A) holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances (B) holding that a trial court is not required to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment where external evidence is submitted if the external evidence is irrelevant to the issue (C) holding that if no countervailing evidence is introduced the trial court is justified in fact required to enter summary judgment for the government the amount of the taxes proved to be due (D) holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence (E) holding that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is limited to the grounds raised in the motion

A: holding that a trial court may enter summary judgment for a nonmoving party under appropriate circumstances
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Q: aff'd, 683 So.2d 1042 (Ala.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1171, 117 S.Ct. 1438, 137 L.Ed.2d 545 (1997), quoting Ex parte Wilson, 571 So.2d 1251, 1261 (Ala.1990). In Brooks v. State, 695 So.2d 176 (Ala.Cr.App.1996), aff'd, 695 So.2d 184 (Ala.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 893, 118 S.Ct. 233, 139 L.Ed.2d 164 (1997), this Court stated: "[A] prosecutor has the right to indicate to the jury those parts of the evidence or testimony presented by the State that the defense has failed to contradict; that process is not an infringement of the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Duncan v. Stynchcombe, 704 F.2d 1213, 1215-16 (11th Cir.1983); Ex parte McWilliams, 640 So.2d 1015 (Ala.1993); Griffin v. State, 393 So.2d 523, 528 (Ala.Cr.App.1981)." 695 So.2d at 180 (<HOLDING>). " ' "A prosecutor's statement that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence (B) recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the state to produce evidence (C) holding that comment by prosecutor in closing argument that defense counsel did not produce evidence of the defendants innocence was not a comment on the defendants failure to testify (D) holding the prosecutors statements were not an inappropriate comment on the defendants failure to testify but rather a comment on the defendants failure to present convincing evidence to support his defense (E) holding a prosecutor may not comment on a defendants silence

A: holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to comment on the general failure of the defense to produce any evidence
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Q: light on the kind of relationship that the landlord is "suffering." If the prior relationship was a tenancy of some kind, then it may be inferred that a tenancy by sufferance continues thereafter. The absence of a prior relationship, however, may make it more difficult to draw such an inference. This deficiency, however, does not compel the conclusion that plaintiffs will be unable to establish conduct sufficient to create a tenancy by sufferance if the allegations in the complaint are proved at trial. The initial trespassory nature of plaintiffs' entry would not preclude it from being transformed into a tenancy by sufferance or some higher form of tenancy with the acquiescence of the owner. See Tunick v. Federal Food Stores, Inc., 117 Misc. 329, 331, 191 N.Y.S. 174 (2d Dep't 1921) (<HOLDING>). On the contrary, the conclusion that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that current version of rsa chapter 540 applies to tenancies at sufferance (B) holding that a landlords acceptance of rent turned a trespasser to a tenant at sufferance (C) holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property (D) holding that trespasser did not have expectation of privacy in bedroom where he did not pay rent and had been asked to leave (E) holding that increase in rent combined with friction between tenant and landlord does not establish claim under fair housing act

A:
holding that current version of rsa chapter 540 applies to tenancies at sufferance
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