In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: Cordova's final policymaking authority concerning the termination or transfer of employees. For the aforesaid reasons, I conclude summary judgment should enter against Singer on the 1981 and 1983 claims against the School District. B. Liability of Cordova under 1981. I have concluded the School District is not liable to Singer under 1981. I consider Defendants' additional argument concerning the 1981 claim since it remains of relevance to Singer's 1981 claim against Cor-dova. Defendants argue 1981 does not apply to religious discrimination and the claim should be dismissed insofar as it is based on such discrimination. See Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1036 n. 3 (10th Cir.1993); Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.1979) (<HOLDING>). Singer cites the holding in Shaare Tefila
Holding statements: (A) holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination (B) holding that allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex (C) holding that a violation of 1981 requires purposeful race discrimination (D) holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort (E) holding 1981 is directed to racial discrimination although not necessarily limited to the technical or restrictive meaning of race but does not apply to sex or religious discrimination
Example Output: (E)

Example Input: as an entity wholly owned by the Soviet Union's Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Raccoon relies on that portion of 1603(b) which states that "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" does not include an entity created under the laws of a third country. Raccoon's argument is without merit. Navoi has presented credible evidence showing that in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Republic of Uzbekistan's declaration of independence, ownership and control of Navoi passed to the Uzbek Government by decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. At all times relevant to the instant litigation, Navoi was an Uzbek entity created by the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers under the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan. See Gould v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 450 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). Finally, Raccoon challenges Navoi's prima
Holding statements: (A) holding that statutory good time credits must be calculated under the law in effect at the time of resentencing after an appeal of the sentence is determined (B) holding that for purpose of the fsia a foreign entitys status is determined based upon the jurisdictional facts existing at the time the act complained of occurred (C) holding state of the law must be determined at time of challenged action (D) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (E) holding that clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court under aedpa is the law at the time of the statecourt adjudication on the merits not at the time the conviction becomes final
Example Output: (B)

Example Input: to the Knoedlers' claims. In fact, despite a review of the record, this Court is unable to find any further reference to the Blinco counterclaim subsequent to the Knoedlers' answer. The trial court's summary-judgment orders left pending the Blincos' counterclaim, and there is no Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., certification that the judgments are final. Consequently, the summary-judgment orders are nonfinal judgments, which will not support an appeal. See Bon Harbor, LLC v. United Bank, supra (dismissing appeal on grounds that trial court's summary-judgment order, which left pending defendants' counterclaims, was, at best, an order entering a partial summary judgment and not a "final, ap-pealable judgment"); Hill v. Huntsville West Ltd. Partnership, 847 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (<HOLDING>). APPEAL DISMISSED. COBB, C.J., and WOODALL,
Holding statements: (A) holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal (D) holding that res judicata did not apply where a trial courts order was not a final judgment (E) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment
Example Output:
(C)