In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Example Input: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court's conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that "typically involve[s] purposeful, 'violent,' and 'aggressive' conduct." United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that "[t]he phrase
Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
Example Output: (D)

Example Input: the district court would have been de facto granting a continuance by declaring a mistrial and summoning new jurors. We decline here to find that the district court abused its discretion in denying a mistrial when the defendant's own misconduct caused the alleged impartiality of the jurors and the court took reasonable steps to ensure the jurors could serve impartially. Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 723-24 (9th Cir.2002) ("The Sixth Amendment affords no relief when the defendant's own misconduct caused the alleged juror partiality and the trial judge employed reasonable means under the circumstances to preserve the trial's fairness") (citing United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1116-18 (9th Cir.1991)). See also United States v. Harris, 2 F.3d 1452, 1456 (7th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Because the district court afforded the
Holding statements: (A) holding that law will not permit insured to profit from his own breach of contract when insured disregarded his contractual obligation to cooperate with insurer (B) holding that a bank officer who obtained for his own benefit a profit participation in a real estate venture in exchange for loaning bank money misappropriated a corporate asset (C) holding that a defendant should not profit from his own outburst (D) recognizing in context of fraudulent nondisclosure cases that a defendant may reasonably expect the plaintiff to make his own investigation draw his own conclusions and protect himself (E) holding that outofstate plaintiff had procured his own absence at trial of his case where record contained no intimation that his absence resulted from any reason other than his own volition
Example Output: (C)

Example Input: rule never presented for approval by this Court, he argues that filing a complaint should not toll the statute of limitations when a complaint is dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. 23. The plaintiffs cite Jackpot Mississippi Riverboat, Inc. v. Smith as an example of this Court applying tolling to a case previously dismissed for want of prosecution. Jackpot, 874 So.2d 959, 961 (Miss. 2004). In Jackpot, when examining the dates relevant to a determination of whether the statute of limitations had run on plaintiffs case, this Court stated: Smith and Richardson filed their "first" complaint for malicious prosecution on July 7, 1995, a little more than two months shy of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Norman v. Bucklew, 684 So.2d 1246, 1256 (Miss.1996) (<HOLDING>). On April 7, 2000, Smith and Richardson's
Holding statements: (A) holding the same for malicious prosecution (B) holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed (C) holding that tolling of the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of a claim dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution (D) holding when a motion for postconviction relief is not properly filed 2244s statute of limitations is not statutorily tolled (E) holding that the plain meaning of 2244d2 is that the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of any properly filed federal habeas corpus petition
Example Output:
(B)