The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules of engagement for the CAP. He recalled feeling that it did no good to establish the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authorized to shoot if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed off on that concept. The President said he remembered such a conversation, and that it reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot. The President emphasized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft. The Vice President's military aide told us he believed the Vice President spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did not hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice President and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President, "Sir, the CAPs are up. Sir, they're going to want to know what to do." Then she recalled hearing him say, "Yes sir." She believed this conversation occurred a few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room. We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:15. Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, there is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are incomplete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not note a call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice President entered the conference room. At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports from the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft-presumably hijacked-heading toward Washington. That aircraft was United 93. The Secret Service was getting this information directly from the FAA. The FAA may have been tracking the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path to Washington, not its actual radar return. Thus, the Secret Service was relying on projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.

Who signed off after the Vice President suggested that establishing CAP was no good if the pilots didn't have clear instructions if the plane didn't divert?

Though prehistoric remains from the Paleolithic, Neolithic, and Bronze Ages have been unearthed in the Manzanares Valley, prior to Madrid's sudden elevation to capital city in 1561 its history was rather undistinguished. Over a period of many centuries crucial in Spanish history, Madrid's significance was negligible. The Romans built their most advanced outpost on the Iberian peninsula, but left nothing of consequence in Madrid. Armies of North African nomads, intent on disseminating Islam, invaded the peninsula in a.d. Within 10 years, they had overrun most of Spain. If Madrid played any role in these pivotal events, no record of it remains. The first solid references to this obscure settlement on the Castilian plateau, guarded by the looming Guadarrama mountain range, appear in the 9th century. The Arabic name for "place of many springs," variously recorded as Magerit, Mayrit or Magrit, eventually evolved into Madrid. The hamlet entered historical chronicles for its military significance; it was located near the main line of resistance to the Christian reconquest. Over centuries of struggle, the defending Moorish army built a full-scale fort, or Alcazar, on the heights of Madrid commanding the Manzanares valley. After several unsuccessful skirmishes, the Christian forces of Alfonso VI captured Madrid in 1083. The Alcazar became a fort of the crown of Castile. During a counter-offensive in 1109, the town was overrun by the Moors, but the Christianized fortress held. The Moors were expelled from the town, but they remained in control of southern Spain for almost four centuries. Meanwhile, Madrid enjoyed brief prominence in 1308 when king Ferdinand IV and his Cortes, an early version of parliament, held a formal meeting in the fledgling town. From then on, the kings of Spain began to visit Madrid, where the air was invigorating and the hunting excellent. Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic monarchs that united all the provinces of Spain, first visited Madrid in 1477.

Who had overun most of Spain?

Clarifying the Record The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of mass destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minutes' notice on the first hijacked plane, no advance notice on the second, no advance notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth. We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit on the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS commanders and officers actively sought out information, and made the best judgments they could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommending a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, in deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly. More than the actual events, inaccurate government accounts of those events made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of the hijackings, raising questions about the adequacy of the response. Those accounts had the effect of deflecting questions about the military's capacity to obtain timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they overstated the FAA's ability to provide the military with timely and useful information that morning. In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD officials stated that at 9:16, NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 from the FAA. This statement was incorrect. There was no hijack to report at 9:16. United 93 was proceeding normally at that time. In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:24, NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77. This statement was also incorrect. The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that American 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washington, D.C. In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials also stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notifications about American 77,178 United 93, or both. These statements were incorrect as well. The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 was heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but also from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled at NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other records.
What was overstated in regards to the perceived inadequacy in military response to 9/11