In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Q: of the offense charged but convict on the included offense. However, the mere chance that a jury may reject uncontroverted testimony and convict on the lesser charge does not require the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser charge." People v. Ramires, 18 P.3d 822, 827 (Colo.App.2000) (internal citations omitted). 184 The offense of patronizing a prostituted child requires, as relevant here, "knowingly engaging in an act" where "a child perform[s] or offer[s] or agree[s] to perform ... any [sexual] act ... in exchange for money." 18-7-406(1)(a), 18-7-401(6). Based on the language of the statute, actual performance of a sexual act is not necessary; a mere offer or agreement to perform is sufficient, provided money has been promised. See supra Part V.A; Madden, 111 P.3d at 460 (<HOLDING>). 185 Here, because the uncontrovert-ed
Holding statements: (A) holding that a mortgage transfer does not take effect until the mortgagee gives value in exchange for the mortgage (B) holding determination of property value in case to decide if assessed value was excessive is not a liquidated demand where only evidence of property value was the conclusory allegation of value in plaintiffs unsworn petition (C) holding that a party invoking a 547c1 defense must prove the specific measure of the new value given to the debtor in exchange for what was received (D) holding that patronizing a prostituted child requires some record evidence that the defendant attempted to give anything of value in exchange for sex (E) holding that under 11 usc 547c4 a later payment in exchange for new value only deprives the defendant of the new value defense if the later payment is an otherwise unavoidable transfer

A: (D)
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Q: not impliedly preempt the field of law related to the price, route, and service of motor carriers of property, and does not impliedly preempt by conflict her state-law claims. As stated above, in Kelley the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that 14501(c) preempts the field of law regarding price, route, and service of motor carriers of property. See Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1509-10 ("Here, Congress has clearly chosen ... to preempt the entire field of price, service, and route regulation of intrastate motor carrier activities."). Furthermore, other federal courts have held that 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts state tort claims relating to price, route, or service against motor carriers of property. See, e.g., Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 557 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel
Holding statements: (A) holding plaintiffs statelaw claims alleging common law misrepresentation and statutory misrepresentation under the texas insurance code art 2121 not preempted because they were not dependent on the right to recover benefits under the erisa plan (B) holding fraudulent representations to the fda could not sustain statelaw claims (C) holding that 14501c1 preempted statelaw claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and money had and received related to billing practices of motor carrier of property (D) holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient (E) holding misrepresentation claim to be preempted

A: (C)
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Q: 2252A and that a conviction for both offenses based on the same conduct violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1374-75 (citations omitted). That said, the Eleventh Circuit found in Bobb that the defendant's convictions for both receipt and possession of child pornography did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because his convictions were "based on two distinct offenses, occurring on two different dates, and proscribed by two different statutes." Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375; see also United States v. Overton, 573 F.3d 679, 697-98 (9th Cir.2009) (finding that conviction for receipt and possession of child pornography did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the convictions were based on separate conduct); United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 158-59 (2d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Wendehake, No. 06-14040-CR,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar charging the defendant with both receipt and possession of child pornography where the defendant was charged with possessing a set of files that did not form the basis for a separate receipt count (B) holding that double jeopardy clause did not apply to forfeiture proceeding before the court (C) holding that appellants specific factual denial of receipt was sufficient evidence to defeat the presumption of receipt raised by a docket entry showing mailing (D) holding that the double jeopardy clause did not bar resentencing on counts that were affirmed on appeal when a sentence of imprisonment on another count was vacated (E) holding that defendant did not have standing to raise facial challenge to validity of aggravated assault statutes for their risk of creating double jeopardy grounds because he himself was not charged in way that created double jeopardy

A:
(A)
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