In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: (citations omitted). Kaul believes that because the Court did not include seizing cigarettes fi*om Indians inside a reservation on this list, Stephan lacked jurisdiction to execute the search warrant at Kaul's store. However, we do not read Oklahoma Tax Commission and Colville as necessarily prohibiting state officers from conducting search and seizure operations within a reservation's borders under the authority of a federal grant of criminal jurisdiction to the state. Instead, these opinions merely offer several options that state officials may employ to enforce regulatory cigarette tax statutes. Here, Kaul waived the argument that the Kansas statute was regulatory in nature because she did not raise that issue below. Thus, for purposes of this appea 3, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693 (1990) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has long held
Holding statements: (A) holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction (B) recognizing the inherent power of indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all indians (C) holding that indian tribes lack tribal jurisdiction over crimes committed by nonmember indians within the tribes reservation (D) holding that indian tribes could only exercise criminal jurisdiction over tribal members and not other indians (E) holding that an indian tribes exercise of criminal jurisdiction over nonindians is inconsistent with the domesticdependent status of the tribes and that tribes may not assume such jurisdiction without congressional authorization
[A]: holding that a nonmember who files a civil claim in an indian tribal court consents to tribal jurisdiction

[Q]: claims); see also Stewart, 104 N.M. at 748, 726 P.2d at 1378 ("An insurance policy is a contract and is generally governed by the law of contracts, and the rights and duties of the parties are to be determined by its terms." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, we held that 8.75% was the proper interest to be assessed on the contract damages. {40} Like the trial court in Teague-Strebeck, the trial court in our case awarded damages based on the insurance contract $100,000 in UM coverage. See 1999-NMCA-109, 63-64, 127 N.M. 603, 985 P.2d 1183 (observing that the plaintiff "was awarded the benefit of its bargain, the extent of insurance coverage promised by [the defendant's agent]"); cf. Ellis v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Cos., 1999-NMSC-034, 1, 128 N.M. 54, 989 P.2d 429 (<HOLDING>). We therefore conclude that 8.75% is the
Holding statements: (A) holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract (B) holding that this courts sixyear statute of limitations is jurisdictional (C) holding that sixyear statute of limitations in 65314 is applicable to violations of 7202 (D) recognizing a sixyear statute of limitations on claims filed under the coal act (E) holding that the sixyear statute of limitations on a written contract is applicable to a cause of action based on a um policy
[A]: holding that sixyear contract statute of limitations did not apply reasoning that an action to recover damages for personal injuries based on breach of warranty is only nominally based on contract

[Q]: denial of his motions in Leo, Mr. Leo filed his second suit in the Kansas federal district court (No. 10-2495-JTM), in which he used the aforementioned 70,000 word opening brief/"Supporting Analysis" as his complaint. In a memorandum and order dated March 22, 2011, 2011 WL 1097759, the district court concluded that Mr. Leo's second suit was barred by the doctrine of res judicata based on the earlier suit and granted Garmin's motion to dismiss. In the same order, the court denied Mr. Leo's motion for the entry of a default judgment against Garmin and granted Garmin's request for sanctions. In a subsequent memorandum and order dated April 15, 2011, 2011 WL 1457937, the district court awarded Garmin $ Practice and Procedure 4433, at 78-85 (2d ed.2 , 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 (10th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). We nonetheless have examined each of the
Holding statements: (A) holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them (B) holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed (C) holding that although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their pleadings pro se litigants must follow procedural rules (D) holding that although a pro se litigants pleadings are construed liberally a pro se litigant must still follow the same rules that govern other litigants including the requirement of constructing and supporting arguments with legal authority (E) holding that pro se litigants must follow the kentucky rules of civil procedure
[A]:
holding that although pro se briefs are liberally construed even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them