In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: initially stopping the truck for failing to illuminate the rear license plate in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1706(e). See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998) ("An initial traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment ... if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc))). Wilson also does not dispute that the smell of alcohol on VanHouden together with VanHouden's admission that he had been drinking justified the further detention of the truck and its occupants in order for Deputy Watkins to conduct field sobriety tests on VanHouden. See United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>); Rogala v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 52
Holding statements: (A) holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops (B) holding that an officer has reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop even when his suspicion that a law has been violated is based on a reasonable mistake of law (C) holding that the discovery of 2000 in cash during a traffic stop supported a finding of reasonable suspicion (D) holding that an officers reasonable mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop under the fourth amendment (E) holding detection of alcohol on a drivers breath during a routine traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion

Output: holding that reasonable suspicion standard applies to routine traffic stops

Input: Consider Input: Privileges and Immunities Clause. The final interest advanced by Defendants to justify Section 470 is the availability of the remedy of attachment against nonresident attorneys. See Def. Mem. Supp. S.J. at 7 (citing Matter of Tang, 39 A.D.2d 357, 333 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App.Div.1972); Matter of Fordan, 5 Misc.2d 372, 158 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Surrogates Ct.N.Y.Co.1956)). The remedy of attachment is a disciplinary measure involving a seizure on a defendant's property in order to secure the enforcement of a money judgment. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 6201 (McKinney 2011). Under Section 470's current construction, however, an attorney need only maintain an "of counsel" relationship with an in-state office to satisfy the office requirement. Austria v. Shaw, 143 Misc.2d 970, 542 N.Y.S.2d 505 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1989) (<HOLDING>). Based on this standard, the remedy of
Holding statements: (A) holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee (B) recognizing that a prosecutors office is an entity and that information in the possession of one attorney in the office must be attributed to the office as a whole (C) holding that the district where the defendant attorneys office was located was the proper venue because the defendants omissions related to their failure to communicate from their office in savannah the details of the ongoing case (D) holding that when a judicial office is created by legislative act or municipal ordinance the office is regarded as a de facto office until the act or ordinance is declared invalid (E) holding that an outofstate attorney paying rent for a desk in an attorneys instate office had satisfied the office requirement

Output: holding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office even though the papers seized from the office were not the property of the employee

Input: Consider Input: meets the statutory requirements for restitution is a question of law that is fully reviewable by the appellate court." State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Minn.App.2011) (quotation omitted). A victim may request restitution if the defendant is convicted of a crime. Minn. Stat. 611A.04, subd. 1(a). When considering restitution requests, courts look at, among other factors, "the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the offense." Minn.Stat. 611A.045, subd. 1(a)(1) (2012). This court has interpreted the statute to require that the claimed loss be "directly caused by the conduct, for which the defendant was convicted." State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn.App.1999) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Olson, 381 N.W.2d 899, 901 (Minn.App.1986) (<HOLDING>). Willis does not dispute that P.H. should
Holding statements: (A) holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted (B) holding that restitution is proper for victims losses that are directly caused by appellants conduct for which he was convicted (C) holding that the amount of restitution is limited to the victims actual losses (D) holding that restitution is proper under 2259 only to the extent the defendants offense proximately caused a victims losses (E) holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc 3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction
Output: holding that court cannot order restitution under the mvra to persons who are not victims of the offenses for which the defendant was convicted