(CNN) -- Japan's prime minister conceded defeat in parliamentary elections Sunday, signaling the return to power of the Liberal Democratic Party and ending the brief rule of the disappointing upstart Democratic Party of Japan. Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda pledged to step down as party president after exit polls showed a smashing loss in lower house voting. The party, once seen as a breath of fresh air in Japanese politics, came to be regarded as increasingly ineffective. "We got a regrettable result," Noda said. "The result is everything in the politics. The biggest responsibility lies on me. I will quit as the partly leader of DPJ." The move clears the way for the return to power of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the current leader of the conservative-leaning Liberal Democratic Party, or LDP. "The Japanese people will be keenly looking whether the LDP can meet with their expectations," Abe said in interviews after the polling. The LDP ruled the country almost continuously since its establishment in 1955 until it was forced from power three years ago by the DPJ. Public broadcaster NHK said the LDP and its coalition partner, the new Komei party, gained at least 302 seats in the 480-seat lower house. CNN's main affiliate, TV Asahi, reports the LDP/Komei coalition gained at least 312 seats. The official count is expected to be released Monday. The LDP is inheriting a struggling economy, regional tensions and questions over Japan's role in Asia. "The economy is at the bottom. It's our first mission to turn it around," Abe said.

Question: "What year was the Liberal Democratic Party established?"

Answer: "1973"

Response: no

Recommendation: Congressional oversight for intelligence-and counterterrorism-is now dysfunctional. Congress should address this problem. We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in each house of Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities, is another. The new committee or committees should conduct continuing studies of the activities of the intelligence agencies and report problems relating to the development and use of intelligence to all members of the House and Senate. We have already recommended that the total level of funding for intelligence be made public, and that the national intelligence program be appropriated to the National Intelligence Director, not to the secretary of defense. We also recommend that the intelligence committee should have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, freed from the consuming responsibility of working on the budget. The resolution creating the new intelligence committee structure should grant subpoena authority to the committee or committees. The majority party's representation on this committee should never exceed the minority's representation by more than one. Four of the members appointed to this committee or committees should be a member who also serves on each of the following additional committees: Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Appropriations subcommittee. In this way the other major congressional interests can be brought together in the new committee's work. Members should serve indefinitely on the intelligence committees, without set terms, thereby letting them accumulate expertise. The committees should be smaller-perhaps seven or nine members in each house-so that each member feels a greater sense of responsibility, and accountability, for the quality of the committee's work. The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88 committees and subcommittees of Congress. One expert witness (not a member of the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding the department's successful development. The one attempt to consolidate such committee authority, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, may be eliminated. The Senate does not have even this. Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the kind of clear authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Department to deal with crime and the Defense Department to deal with threats to national security.

Question: "What are some of the problems Homeland Security faces right now?"

Answer: "They are overtaxed and underpaid"

Response: no

In chapters 3 and 4 we described how the U.S. government adjusted its existing agencies and capacities to address the emerging threat from Usama Bin Laden and his associates. After the August 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Bill Clinton and his chief aides explored ways of getting Bin Laden expelled from Afghanistan or possibly capturing or even killing him. Although disruption efforts around the world had achieved some successes, the core of Bin Laden's organization remained intact. President Clinton was deeply concerned about Bin Laden. He and his national security advisor, Samuel "Sandy" Berger, ensured they had a special daily pipeline of reports feeding them the latest updates on Bin Laden's reported location. In public, President Clinton spoke repeatedly about the threat of terrorism, referring to terrorist training camps but saying little about Bin Laden and nothing about al Qaeda. He explained to us that this was deliberate-intended to avoid enhancing Bin Laden's stature by giving him unnecessary publicity. His speeches focused especially on the danger of nonstate actors and of chemical and biological weapons. As the millennium approached, the most publicized worries were not about terrorism but about computer breakdowns-the Y2K scare. Some government officials were concerned that terrorists would take advantage of such breakdowns. On November 30, 1999, Jordanian intelligence intercepted a telephone call between Abu Zubaydah, a longtime ally of Bin Laden, and Khadr Abu Hoshar, a Palestinian extremist. Abu Zubaydah said, "The time for training is over." Suspecting that this was a signal for Abu Hoshar to commence a terrorist operation, Jordanian police arrested Abu Hoshar and 15 others and informed Washington. One of the 16, Raed Hijazi, had been born in California to Palestinian parents; after spending his childhood in the Middle East, he had returned to northern California, taken refuge in extremist Islamist beliefs, and then made his way to Abu Zubaydah's Khaldan camp in Afghanistan, where he learned the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare. He and his younger brother had been recruited by Abu Hoshar into a loosely knit plot to attack Jewish and American targets in Jordan. After late 1996, when Abu Hoshar was arrested and jailed, Hijazi moved back to the United States, worked as a cabdriver in Boston, and sent money back to his fellow plotters. After Abu Hoshar's release, Hijazi shuttled between Boston and Jordan gathering money and supplies. With Abu Hoshar, he recruited inTurkey and Syria as well as Jordan; with Abu Zubaydah's assistance, Abu Hoshar sent these recruits to Afghanistan for training.

Question: "Who was considered a threat to the U.S Government?"

Answer: "Usama Bin Laden"

Response:
yes