TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). In Landgraf, the Court noted that a statute only truly operates retroactively if applying it would "impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Id. 114 S.Ct. at 1505; see also RTC v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 30 F.3d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir.1994)(analyzing retroactivity of lease repudiation damage limitation provision of FIRREA). Thus, like other courts that have analyzed similar FIRREA provisions, we must address prior banking law to determine whether application of the damage limitation provisions of 1821(e)(3) would have the retroactive effect defined in Landgraf. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit, 30 F.3d at 1388 (<HOLDING>). We conclude that, in the Crafts' case, it
Holding statements: (A) holding that the act is not retroactive (B) holding that firreas damage limitations for repudiation of leases worked no substantive change in the law and thus their application was not retroactive (C) holding retroactive application (D) holding no retroactive application (E) recognizing that the application of a retroactive amendment is discretionary

SOLUTION: holding that the act is not retroactive

PROBLEM: venue, the propriety of venue is fixed in the county chosen by the plaintiff. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. 15.063 (Vernon 1986); Tex.R.Civ.P. 86-1. If a defendant objects to the plaintiffs venue choice and properly challenges that choice through a motion to transfer venue, the question of proper venue is raised. Tex.R.Civ.P. 86. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that venue is maintainable in the county of suit. Id. 87-2(a). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the trial court must transfer the lawsuit to another specified county of proper venue. Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. 15.063(1) ("The court ... shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if ... the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county...."); Tieuel, 654 S.W.2d at 775 (<HOLDING>). If the plaintiff meets the burden, the trial
Holding statements: (A) holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings (B) recognizing that the plaintiff has the right to file suit in any permissible county (C) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (D) holding that even if venue was improper the case should have been transferred not dismissed (E) recognizing that if the plaintiff files suit in a county where venue does not lie the plaintiff waives the right to choose and the defendant may have the suit transferred to a proper venue

SOLUTION: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings

PROBLEM: 2707(a) (2006) provides that a party "aggrieved" by a violation of the Act may pursue a civil remedy against "the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation . . . ." 18 U.S.C. 2708 (2006) states, "[t]he remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter." The United States District Court for the District of Columbia analyzed the same issue presently before this Court and held that even if the State does not comply with the provisions of the Stored Communications Act, "the statute does not provide for a suppression remedy." United States v. Ferguson, 508 F.Supp. 2d. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2007); see also United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (<HOLDING>), superseded on other grounds, Konop v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that the stored communications act does not provide an exclusion remedy it allows for civil damages and criminal punishment but nothing more (B) holding that 42 usc 1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations (C) holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action (D) holding that civil settlements have no bearing on decisions of criminal punishment and imposition of a restitution order is a form of punishment and part of a criminal sentence (E) holding that 1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law

SOLUTION:
holding that 42 usc 1983 does not provide a remedy for flsa violations