In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
needlessly leave out of our decisions an important source of information about the child, and in the end, it is the dependent child who suffers. After all, the children count here, not the agency. I believe that we gain nothing, and lose precious information by refusing foster parents standing. Standing to sue simply ensures that a particular party has a sufficient stake in a controversy before the court to obtain a judicial resolution. It should not be a doctrine to close the court house doors on parties who have a real interest in the matter at hand. I believe that the Juvenile Act confers "standing," subject to traditional jurisprudential limits, for the agency, the grandparent, and the foster parents to file these petitions. See also Silfies v. Webster, 713 A.2d 639 (Pa.Super.1998)(<HOLDING>); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 654 F.Supp. 1567
Holding statements: (A) holding that party standing in loco parentis has standing to seek custody of child (B) holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter (C) holding that prevailing party has no standing to appeal (D) holding that grandmother in loco parentis of her three grandchildren had protected liberty interest in their future care and custody (E) holding that domestic partner who assumed a parental status over her partners child and performed parental duties with the partners permission stood in loco parentis to the child and had standing to seek partial custody and visitation

Ex Output:
holding that a grandmother who frequently babysat her granddaughter was not in loco parentis and thus lacked standing to seek custody of her granddaughter

Ex Input:
of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and part of the "unified judicial system," is an arm of the state. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000) ("All courts and agencies of the unified judicial system ... are part of 'Commonwealth government' and thus are state rather than local agencies."). As a state agency, the Board has Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. Therefore, as an arm of the state, Lucas may not sue the Board unless one of the three exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply. See MCI Telcomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 503 (listing immunity exceptions). On appeal, Lucas argues that the Ex Parte Young exception precludes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to the present action against the Board. Howe 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (<HOLDING>). Neither of these exceptions are applicable in
Holding statements: (A) holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action (B) holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action (C) holding that a remedial scheme created by congress even if incapable of addressing all of plaintiffs injuries precluded a bivens action (D) holding that existence of a detailed remedial scheme shows congressional intent to prohibit recourse to the ex parte young fiction (E) holding that young will not apply where congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a federal statutory right against a state

Ex Output:
holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action

Ex Input:
practice and protocol. We do not question that Amanda's proof is sufficient for a negligence claim against Nissan. Our review, however, extends to the enhanced culpability required for punitive damages. Proving Gross Negligence Successful completion of regulatory product testing weighs against a finding of gross negligence.' Accordingly, exceeding mandatory requirements by successfully completing more rigorous testing strongly weighs against such a finding. The logic is clear. Meeting and then exceeding base safety requirements is, at the- very least, facial evidence of exercising slight care. Federal courts applying Kentucky law have correctly- observed this standard. E.g,, Cameron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. Civ.A.5:04-CV-24, 2005 WL 2674990, at *9 (E.D.Ky. Oct. 20, 2005) (<HOLDING>). This approach has also been adopted by
Holding statements: (A) holding that the undisputed fact that manufacturer complied with federal safety standards weighed against punitive damages (B) holding that a reduction in punitive damages to comply with the due process clause is a federal constitutional issue not a fact issue requiring jury consideration (C) holding that indemnification by excess liability insurer for punitive damages imposed on drug manufacturer contrary to public policy (D) holding a court may not award punitive damages (E) holding that punitive damages could not be granted because punitive damages are a matter of substantive law and substantive state law must yield to federal limitations

Ex Output:
holding that a reduction in punitive damages to comply with the due process clause is a federal constitutional issue not a fact issue requiring jury consideration