In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

partially agreed with this argument and ordered the plaintiffs to serve Rosemary with a summons and copy of the amended complaint. It then gave her an opportunity to respond to the plaintiffs' arguments. Shortly thereafter, the Butcher defendants filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. In that motion, they argued that the district court's order, which imposed the constructive trust, was void because the court had no authority to assert personal jurisdiction over Rosemary after entering a final judgment. Contrary to the Butcher defendants' arguments, the district court had the authority to amend its judgment based on its mistaken belief that Rosemary had been served in her individual capacity. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd., v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>) We agree with this reasoning, and conclude
Holding statements: (A) holding that when the district court mistakenly ordered prejudgment interest and a motion to amend was made more than one year after entry of judgment no relief was available under rule 60b6 because rule 60b1 clearly applied (B) holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions (C) holding in a case where the plaintiff had argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend its judgment more than ten days after entry because that is the time limit under federal rule of civil procedure 59 that a district court can amend its judgment because of mistake or inadvertence months after judgment has been entered pursuant to rule 60b of the federal rules of civil procedure (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that district court has limited authority under rule 59 to alter or amend judgment sua sponte so long as court acts within 10 days of entry of judgment
(C)

as late as February 1994, although the wife stated that she did not think that she lived with them for longer than one year. The wife testified that, during the time that she lived with the husband's parents, they helped her financially. It appears that the trial court may have considered the husband's obligation to support the wife suspended during the time that she lived with his parents, as the order reflects that it calculated arrearage beginning in February 1994. Alimony arrearage is a final judgment as of the date due and is not subject to modification. Harris v. Harris, 553 So.2d 129 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). In some instances alimony obligations can be satisfied by means other than direct payment from the husband to the wife. See, Swindle v. Swindle, 429 So.2d 601 (Ala.Civ.App.1983) (<HOLDING>); Frazier v. Frazier, 455 So.2d 883
Holding statements: (A) holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate (B) holding that insurance obligation was primary to indemnity obligation (C) holding that the standard fire policy and a broader homeowners policy were so intertwined that the prescriptive period in the standard fire policy applied to nonfire perils (D) holding that obligation to pay mortgage on home was satisfied by payment of fire insurance proceeds where husband maintained fire insurance policy (E) holding that when the house is destroyed by fire and there exists thereon a policy by insurance the money arising therefrom stands in the place instead of such house the proceeds of the policy therefore take the place of the property loss
(D)

convictions are impermissible when they rest on the same "unit of prosecution," i.e., when they "punish a defendant twice for continuous possession of a firearm in furtherance of co-terminous predicate offenses involving essentially the same conduct." United States v. Wallace, 447 F.3d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, predicate offenses are distinct in time and conduct, however, involvement of the same weapon will not bar consecutive sentences. See United States v. Salameh, 261 F.3d 271, 277-79 (2d Cir.2001) (upholding consecutive sentences for 924(c)(1) violations involving same bomb, where predicate offenses were not co-terminous and punished defendant separately for carriage and use); see also United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d at 205-06 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, overwhelming trial evidence showed
Holding statements: (A) holding that conviction of and punishment for both the underlying predicate offense and continuing criminal enterprise does not violate double jeopardy (B) holding motion for attorneys fees was necessary predicate (C) holding that conspiracies can serve as predicate acts for a rico conspiracy (D) recognizing that deprivation of a right was a necessary predicate to 1983 conspiracy liability (E) holding that single conspiracy connecting multiple assaults does not preclude treating assaults as separate predicate offense nor does fact that assaults are clustered in time and space merge them into one predicate crime
(E)