In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Input: Consider Input: or creating documents with mistakes on them and signing my name to them to make me appear as if I had been inaccurate .... " Paragraph 25: The sentence "I confidentially complained about this behavior to Bruce Smith, who, instead of taking action to prevent Burchfield from continuing her pattern of behavior toward me, apparently told Burchfield to counsel me." Paragraph 32: The sentence "I believe that this move was the beginning point of a concerted effort to remove me from the workplace based on my age." Paragraph 36: The sentence "I believe that Albertson's did not provide all of the time sheets from all vendors of temporary help." Paragraph 37: The sentence "I believe that my combination of formal college education and experience, even though I did not obtain a co h Cir.1983) (<HOLDING>). With respect to paragraphs 22, 28, 34, 39,
Holding statements: (A) holding a single conversation to be sufficient evidence of dissolution to preclude summary judgment (B) holding that mere conclusion of affiant without some supporting facts are insufficient to raise fact issue necessary to preclude summary judgment (C) holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal (D) recognizing that the plaintiffs mere assertions that the defendant had a discriminatory intent were inadequate without substantial factual evidence to raise an issue to preclude summary judgment (E) holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: Court held that a federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution begun prior to the institution of the federal suit except upon a "showing of bad faith, har-rassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief." Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, 91 S.Ct. at 754-55. In later cases, the Court has held that the Younger doctrine is "fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); see Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S his lower court view, at least by negative inference. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 467 U.S. 229, 237-39, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2327-29, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Since the Commonwealth began this eminent
Holding statements: (A) holding that because debtor retained control of property a transfer had not yet occurred (B) holding that where the dispositive issue in an administrative proceeding was whether an accident occurred as the plaintiff alleged it did collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of whether the accident was workrelated because that issue had not yet been litigated (C) holding voluntary dismissal permissible because trial court had not yet reached a decision on the merits (D) holding that younger abstention was not appropriate because eminent domain proceeding had not yet begun when plaintiffs began their federal court action (E) holding that debt collector violated fdcpa when it held debtor liable for court costs that had not yet been awarded

Output: (D)

Input: Consider Input: 28 U.S.C. 1961 (1976) for the period prior to October 1, 1982 and 943, 944 (7th Cir.1984) (per curiam) (rejecting without discussion the argument that the FCIA should apply to a November 1981 judgment for interest accruing after the judgment); see also Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st Cir.1984) (applying the state rate under former 1961 to an April 1982 judgment when the parties agreed that the state rate should be applied); United States v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., 712 F.2d 938, 940 n. 5 (4th Cir.1983) (observing that "[tjhere is no indication that the statute was intended to have retroactive effect," but noting that the parties had not raised the issue); United States ex rel. Billows Elec. Supply Co. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 557 F.Supp. 514, 516-17 (E.D.Pa.1983) (<HOLDING>), aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 1450 (3d Cir.1984);
Holding statements: (A) holding that the statute does not apply retroactively to claims accruing prior to the effective date (B) holding that the fcia rate should apply to a march 30 1982 judgment against a private party for the entire postjudgment period (C) holding that the fcia does not apply to a july 1981 judgment against a private party for inter est accruing after the judgment (D) holding that the fcia does not apply to a september 1981 judgment against the united states for interest accruing after the acts effective date (E) holding that the fcia does not apply to a june 1981 judgment against a private party for interest accruing either after the judgment or after the effective date
Output: (C)