Input: The Bush administration did not develop new diplomatic initiatives on al Qaeda with the Saudi government before 9/11. Vice President Cheney called Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5, 2001, to seek Saudi help in preventing threatened attacks on American facilities in the Kingdom. Secretary of State Powell met with the crown prince twice before 9/11. They discussed topics like Iraq, not al Qaeda.U.S.-Saudi relations in the summer of 2001 were marked by sometimes heated disagreements about ongoing Israeli- Palestinian violence, not about Bin Laden. The confirmation of the Pentagon's new leadership was a lengthy process. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was confirmed in March 2001 and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith in July. Though the new officials were briefed about terrorism and some of the earlier planning, including that for Operation Infinite Resolve, they were focused, as Secretary Rumsfeld told us, on creating a twenty-first-century military. At the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton did not recall much interest by the new administration in military options against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He could not recall any specific guidance on the topic from the secretary. Brian Sheridan-the outgoing assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC), the key counterterrorism policy office in the Pentagon-never briefed Rumsfeld. He departed on January 20; he had not been replaced by 9/11. Rumsfeld noted to us his own interest in terrorism, which came up often in his regular meetings with Tenet. He thought that the Defense Department, before 9/11, was not organized adequately or prepared to deal with new threats like terrorism. But his time was consumed with getting new officials in place and working on the foundation documents of a new defense policy, the quadrennial defense review, the defense planning guidance, and the existing contingency plans. He did not recall any particular counterterrorism issue that engaged his attention before 9/11, other than the development of the Predator unmanned aircraft system. The commander of Central Command, General Franks, told us that he did not regard the existing plans as serious. To him a real military plan to address al Qaeda would need to go all the way, following through the details of a full campaign (including the political-military issues of where operations would be based) and securing the rights to fly over neighboring countries. The draft presidential directive circulated in June 2001 began its discussion of the military by reiterating the Defense Department's lead role in protecting its forces abroad.
"What position was vacant from January 2001 and had not been replaced before 9/11?" is "Commander"?
Output: no
Input: With a budget of $329 million, LSC provides civil legal assistance to low-income people in every county in America, Kleiman said. NLAP was created in 1968. A decade later, the agency used a $50,000 LSC grant to buy a building at 438 King St. in Charleston and $33,000 to buy a building at 201 King St. in Georgetown, according to Erlenborn's letter to Kaynard. In 1980, NLAP used $63,000 in LSC funds to buy property at 607 Main St. in Conway, the letter said. On Nov. 14, 2001, NLAP transferred title of the King Street building in Charleston to the Charleston County Bar Association, according to county property records. The local bar paid $5 for the building, which sits between a redeveloped office building and an antique shop. The local bar said it would maintain the building for "legal services to indigent residents of Charleston County and coastal South Carolina," the records said. The King Street building appears to be vacant. Notices at the entrance direct visitors to the equal justice center on West Montague Avenue in North Charleston. E. Douglas Pratt-Thomas, president of the local bar, was not available for comment. Charleston County has not appraised the King Street property because it is tax-exempt. But Randall Goldman, managing partner of Patrick Properties, which owns buildings from 440 to 456 King St., said he estimates 438 King St. would sell for between $700,000 and $900,000. "That building, which was purchased solely with federal legal aid dollars, should be used to provide legal services for poor people in South Carolina," Kleiman said. LSC wants the title to go to the equal justice center in Charleston or "we want 100 percent of the proceeds from the sale of the building to stay in Charleston. We are not contemplating taking that money out of South Carolina," he said. Kleiman said if the neighborhood legal program in Charleston "had honored their obligation, this would not be an issue."
"How many years after its creation did NLAP buy up some property at 607 Main St. in Conway." is "10"?
Output: no
Input: While this process moved along, diplomacy continued its rounds. Direct pressure on the Taliban had proved unsuccessful. As one NSC staff note put it, "Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is not so much a state sponsor of terrorism as it is a state sponsored by terrorists." In early 2000, the United States began a high-level effort to persuade Pakistan to use its influence over the Taliban. In January 2000, Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth and the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, Michael Sheehan, met with General Musharraf in Islamabad, dangling before him the possibility of a presidential visit in March as a reward for Pakistani cooperation. Such a visit was coveted by Musharraf, partly as a sign of his government's legitimacy. He told the two envoys that he would meet with Mullah Omar and press him on Bin Laden. They left, however, reporting to Washington that Pakistan was unlikely in fact to do anything," given what it sees as the benefits of Taliban control of Afghanistan." President Clinton was scheduled to travel to India. The State Department felt that he should not visit India without also visiting Pakistan. The Secret Service and the CIA, however, warned in the strongest terms that visiting Pakistan would risk the President's life. Counterterrorism officials also argued that Pakistan had not done enough to merit a presidential visit. But President Clinton insisted on including Pakistan in the itinerary for his trip to South Asia. His one-day stopover on March 25, 2000, was the first time a U.S. president had been there since 1969. At his meeting with Musharraf and others, President Clinton concentrated on tensions between Pakistan and India and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, but also discussed Bin Laden. President Clinton told us that when he pulled Musharraf aside for a brief, one-on-one meeting, he pleaded with the general for help regarding Bin Laden." I offered him the moon when I went to see him, in terms of better relations with the United States, if he'd help us get Bin Laden and deal with another issue or two." The U.S. effort continued.
"Why did the Secret Service and the CIA think it was a bad idea to visit Pakistan?" is "The tensions between India and Pakistan"?
Output:
no