TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: as here, the recalcitrant witness is at liberty pending appeal. In so holding, we join all of the circuits which have squarely addressed the issue. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 906 F.2d 78, 82-83 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom. Backiel v. United States, U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 509, 112 L.Ed.2d 521 (1990); In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 785 F.2d 629, 631 n. 4 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Johnson, 736 F.2d 358, 361-62 n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); In re Witness Before Special October 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir.1983); In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1982); Brown v. United States, 465 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir.1972). But see In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975) (<HOLDING>). The foregoing cases have noted that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that the deadmans statute should not be extended by judicial construction to cases not clearly within its terms (B) recognizing that denying outofeell exercise for extended periods may constitute cruel and unusual punishment (C) holding that it may not (D) holding that the statutes 30 day provision is mandatory and may not be extended and dicta that it may not be extended by release from incarceration (E) holding that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to guantanamo

SOLUTION: (D)

PROBLEM: assumed the illegible stamp was the certification. We are not persuaded by Mr. Grynberg's argument that because the certification was illegible on the e-filed copy, L & R Venture's copy of the judgment did not comply with the Act. The flegibility created by the electronic filing process did not transform L & R Venture's properly authenticated judgment into an unauthenticated one. And, contrary to Mr. Grynberg's assertion, L & R Venture's counsel's presentation of the original copy at the hearing was not to correct an improper filing, but rather to prove that the original filing was properly authenticated. See C.R.C.P. 44(c) ("This Rule does not prevent the proof of official records or of entry or lack of entry therein by any method authorized by law."); cf. Griggs, 754 P.2d at 784-85 (<HOLDING>). It may be, however, as Mr. Grynberg contends,
Holding statements: (A) holding that the district court lacked authority to enforce a foreign judgment where the plaintiff filed only an affidavit describing the foreign judgment and not a certified copy of the judgment itself in the first instance (B) holding the judgment premature citing one case holding the judgment void and another holding the judgment irregular (C) holding under texas version of the recognition act that public policy exception is not triggered simply because the body of foreign law upon which the judgment is based is different from the law of the forum or because the foreign law is more favorable to the judgment creditor than the law of the forum (D) holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to alteramend judgment where the plaintiff raised the choice of law issue for the first time after the entry of summary judgment (E) holding that a foreign judgment filed under the montana uefja may not be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment and remain consistent with full faith and credit the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment

SOLUTION: (A)

PROBLEM: This Court has recognized that "courts will not hold conduct to constitute a nuisance where authority therefor exists by virtue of legislative enactment." Smith v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 436 F.Supp. 151, 154 (E.D.Tenn.1977); accord N.C. ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 309-10 (4th Cir.2010) (operation of TVA power plants under permits required by Congress and the EPA cannot be deemed a public nuisance). Here, the TVA Act authorizes TVA to acquire and construct transmission lines and distribute electric power, and affords TVA those powers that may be necessary or appropriate to exercise that right. See 16 U.S.C. 831c(g)-(j), 831d(i); see also 16 U.S.C. 831k, 831x. Thus, the conduct complained of in the complaint cannot constitute a public nuisance. Accord id. (<HOLDING>); Morris v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 345 F.Supp.
Holding statements: (A) holding that it is the legislative authority of the union that must make an act a crime (B) holding ordinary and necessary concomitants to operating railroad terminal authorized by specific grant of legislative franchise not nuisance (C) holding that to negate coverage under an exclusion insurer must show that its construction is the only construction that could fairly be placed thereon (D) holding that substantive criminal statute could not be applied retrospectively because there was nothing in the language or the legislative history that was a clear and unequivocal expression of legislative intent to rebut presumption of prospective application only (E) holding that the construction of a hydroelectric generating facility could not constitute a nuisance because it was being constructed under legislative authority

SOLUTION:
(E)