In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
that is presumptively constitutional). The only case of which I am aware construing DeFillippo and denying qualified immunity is Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board, 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002). But in that case "two Ninth Circuit cases [were] directly on point" because they had declared parallel statutes of other States permitting an arrest for refusing to identify oneself unconstitutional. Id. at 881. That of course does not remotely describe today's case. Nor does Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250 (6th Cir.1997), offer any refuge to Leonard. It dealt not with the question whether an officer could be denied qualified immunity for failing to predict a judicial ruling declaring a statute unconstitutional but with whether the statute covered the plaintiffs conduct. See id. at 1256 (<HOLDING>). In the end, Leonard not only asks us to take
Holding statements: (A) holding that an arrest to retrieve car keys where ownership of the car was in dispute was not supported by probable cause (B) holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same (C) holding that shouting epithets from a moving car did not provide probable cause to arrest the plaintiff under a disorderlyconduct statute (D) holding invalid warrant did not create probable cause for arrest (E) holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment

Ex Output:
(C)

Ex Input:
the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to his or her impartiality." Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So.2d 990, 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Bryant v. State, 765 So.2d 68, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). We conclude that prospective jurors Forber and Spurlin's responses were sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to their impartiality. Admittedly, the State attempted to rehabilitate these prospective jurors and they said they could follow the jury instructions and be fair and impartial. However, based on the totality of the answers given, we find a reasonable doubt as to the ability of these two prospective jurors to serve impartially in this case. Consequently, they should have been stricken for cause. See, e.g., Somerville v. Ahuja, 902 So.2d 930 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Greissman, 902 So.2d 846 (Fla. 4th
Holding statements: (A) holding that the trial court did not err by allowing the prosecution to question prospective jurors regarding their ability to announce a death sentence in an appropriate case (B) holding that prospective jurors should have been excused for cause because they did not affirmatively state that their bias against the plaintiffs would not affect their ability to render an impartial verdict (C) holding that a defendant could not establish stricklands prejudice prong because any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror the defendant does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict (D) holding that plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not sue the party with the clear ability to act (E) holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike for cause two potential jurors who had heard andor read about the case but indicated that they could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence presented

Ex Output:
(B)

Ex Input:
arises from the events of May 31, 2007. Jones alleges that he was served and ate part of a tamale pie without having been- notified of its pork contents. Nopp declares, however, that he did not order cooks to add pork to the tamale pie and that the tamale pie did not contain pork. Jones's evidence is not sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the tamale pie contained pork and or whether Nopp ordered cooks to add pork to the dish. The unsworn statements of the inmate cook who told Jones that Nopp had -directed the cook to mix pork in with the meat used in the tamale pie are hearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), and cannot properly be considered in opposition to a summary judgment motion. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4); Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). Raymond Mayes, another inmate kitchen worker,
Holding statements: (A) holding that hearsay in affidavit which would be inadmissible in evidence at trial could not be considered on motion for summary judgment (B) holding that a court may not consider hearsay contained in an affidavit when ruling on a summary judgment motion (C) holding that the affidavit in question did not satisfy the burden of the party moving for summary judgment where affiants eonclusory statement failed to indicate personal knowledge of the circumstances in question and personal knowledge could not be reasonably inferred from the contents of the affidavit (D) holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court at the summary judgment stage to consider information from an affidavit based on inadmissible hearsay rather than the affiants personal knowledge (E) holding that an affidavit consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment

Ex Output:
(D)