In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[Q]: waived those rights. Accordingly, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements. Defendant argues that the trial court made numerous errors in its order. Generally, an appellate court's review of a trial court's order on a motion'to suppress is limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence and, in turn, whether the findings support the trial court's ultimate conclusions of law. E.g., State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). However, here, as noted above, the State argues that defendant failed to preserve the issue because he did not object at trial. Defendant coun ters that no objection was necessary, distinguishing our recent opinion in State v. Oglesby, 361 N.C. 550, 554, 648 S.E.2d 819, 821 (2007) (<HOLDING>). Defendant's contention is that the judge who
Holding statements: (A) holding a general ruling by the trial court is insufficient to preserve a specific issue for appellate review (B) holding that although a defendant filed a motion in limine on an evidentiary issue a failure to object to the evidence at trial waives the issue for appeal (C) holding that a party failed to preserve error by not pursuing a ruling at trial where the courts motion in limine ruling invited the party to attempt to admit the evidence during trial (D) holding that general objection did not preserve error on appeal (E) holding that a trial courts evidentiary ruling on a pretrial motion is not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal unless a defendant renews the objection during trial
[A]: (E)

[Q]: clause. We conclude that reckless battery is a violent crime under the force clause, an issue not addressed by the Holloway opinion. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 20 & n.10 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538 (2012). We further note that the Holloway court's conclusion with respect to reckless battery accorded with then-binding instruction from the United States Supreme Court that the residual clause is limited to an offense that "typically involve[s] purposeful, 'violent,' and 'aggressive' conduct." United States v. Holloway, supra at 260, quoting Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008). Last year, however, the Supreme Court retreated from this characterization of the residual clause. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2270, 2277 (2011) (<HOLDING>). The Court iterated that "[t]he phrase
Holding statements: (A) holding that under indiana law fleeing an officer in a vehicle constitutes a violent felony under begay because the flight must be done knowingly or intentionally (B) holding massachusetts conviction for larceny from the person constitutes violent felony under the residual clause of the acca (C) holding that burglary is violent felony (D) holding that vehicular flight from police officer after order to stop is violent felony under residual clause (E) holding that ohios thirddegree burglary statute constituted a violent felony under the residual clause of the armed career criminal act
[A]: (D)

[Q]: 215. As the modified categorical approach is "merely a 'tool for implementing the categorical approach,' " we concluded that it too did not apply. Id. at 216 (quoting Descamps v. United States, U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 2284, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013)). Contrary to Baboolall's assertions, Rojas did not discard the modified categorical approach in drug possession and distribution cases. Rather, we held that neither the categorical nor the modified categorical approach was in play because there was no comparable federal statute and the record was silent as to the precise drug involved. Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215-16. In this case, N.Y. Penal Law 220.39 is analogous to 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). See Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403, 405 (2d Cir.2013) adhered to on reh'g, 723 F.3d 156 (2d Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>). As the IJ recognized, because there are
Holding statements: (A) holding that a felony conviction in new york state court for possession of cocaine constituted an aggravated felony where the conviction would have also been punishable under the controlled substance act even though the crime would have only constituted a misdemeanor under federal law (B) holding that a conviction under 22039 for attempted sale of cocaine qualifies as an aggravated felony (C) holding second simple possession conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony regardless of whether it was actually prosecuted as recidivist possession (D) holding that a conviction under 22039 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the categorical approach (E) holding that conviction under 2702a3 or 4 is an aggravated felony under 101a43f
[A]:
(B)