In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: the defendant's applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment)." Id., app. note 1(A). In November 2007, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 706, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses under 2Dl.l(c) by two levels. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The Commission later made the amendment retroactively applicable. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. May 1, 2008). As indicated, Jefferson sought to have his sentence reduced as result of those amendments. However, they do not apply here because Jefferson was sentenced to a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d Cir.2009) (<HOLDING>). Because the District Court did not abuse its
Holding statements: (A) holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures and thus them ultimate sentences were based (B) holding that a defendant whose original sentence was based upon the careeroffender guideline and not 2d11 could not receive a sentence reduction based on amendment 706 because it did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range (C) holding that while amendment 706 was applicable to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline (D) holding that amendment 706 did not have the effect of lowering the applicable guideline range where the defendants received statutory mandatory minimum sentences and thus the defendants were not eligible for relief under 3582 (E) holding that while amendment 706 was applica ble to the defendants in question because it reduced their base offense levels a reduction was not authorized because the amendment did not have the effect of lowering their applicable guideline ranges because of the application of the career offender guideline
[EX A]: (D)

[EX Q]: box, .was too small to fit an assault rifle. 2. The package was not immediately recognizable as contraband, preventing seizure under the plain-view doctrine. 3. Deputy Barker could discover whatever lay in the back of the trunk by leaning over the speaker box and searching with his hands. 4. The compartment behind the armrest (where the cocaine was found) was'too small to contain an assault rifle. 5. Deputy Barker did not know whether the car had a trunk-access panel. We reject Mr. Mirabais first argument. Deputy Barker testified based on his mili tary experience and familiarity with assault rifles. In light -of this experience, he testified that a rifle could have fit behind the speaker box. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (<HOLDING>). The district court had little reason to
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that police officers can draw inferences from prior experience (B) holding courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (C) holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor (D) holding that triers of fact may draw only reasonable inferences (E) holding that courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor
[EX A]: (A)

[EX Q]: 130 S.Ct. 1855; Smith, 130 S.Ct. 1382; Spisak, 130 S.Ct. 676; McDaniel, 130 S.Ct. 665; Knowles, 556 U.S. Ill, 129 S.Ct. 1411; Waddington, 555 U.S. 179, 129 S.Ct. 823; Wright, 552 U.S. 120, 128 S.Ct. 743; Uttecht, 551 U.S. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2218; Schriro, 550 U.S. 465, 127 S.Ct. 1933; Carey, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649; Rice, 546 U.S. 333, 126 S.Ct. 969; Kane, 546 U.S. 9, 126 S.Ct. 407; Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 125 S.Ct. 1432; Holland, 542 U.S. 649, 124 S.Ct. 2736; Yarborough, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S.Ct. 2140; Middleton, 541 U.S. 433, 124 S.Ct. 1830; Mitchell, 540 U.S. 12, 124 S.Ct. 7; Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 1; Lockyer, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166; Woodford, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 357; Early, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362; Bell, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843. 3 . See Parker, 132 S.Ct. at 2155 (<HOLDING>); Coleman, 132 S.Ct. at 2062 (holding that the
Holding statements: (A) holding that federal circuit would henceforth apply its own law rather than regional circuit law to questions involving the relationship between patent law and other federal and state law rights (B) holding that the sixth circuit erred in finding that the state courts jury instructions were contrary to clearly established federal law (C) holding that where the supreme court has expressly left an open question circuit precedent is immaterial and there is no clearly established law for the state court to have unreasonably applied (D) holding that the sixth circuit erred by following its own precedent rather than that of the supreme court in determining what is clearly established federal law (E) holding that clearly established law is construed as supreme court or tenth circuit decisions on point or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts
[EX A]:
(D)