In Colombia, the drug-financed guerrillas trying to seize the country and destroy democracy include M-19, which Castro has clearly backed. Robert Merkel, a former U.S. attorney handling drug indictments in Florida, doesn't think for a minute that Castro's much publicized trials of high officials engaged in the drug trade mean he has broken off with the Medellin drug cartel. "If the cartel succeeds in blackmailing the Colombian authorities into negotiations, the cartel will be in control and Fidel can exploit his past relationships with them," he told the Journal's David Asman recently. The struggle against the drug lords in Colombia will be a near thing. This week, the government arrested Jose Abello Silva, said to be the fourth-ranking cartel leader. He will probably be extradited to the U.S. for trial under an extradition treaty President Virgilia Barco has revived. Later, another high-ranking trafficker, Leonidas Vargas, was arrested and 1,000 pounds of dynamite seized. Mr. Barco has refused U.S. troops or advisers but has accepted U.S. military aid. President Bush has agreed to meet within 90 days with Mr. Barco, President Alan Garcia of Peru and President Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia to discuss the drug problem. It might not be a bad idea to do that sooner, rather than later. After the Panama fiasco, they will need some reassurance. Certainly, the Colombian press is much in need of that.

Question: "Who is going to be extradited to the U.S?"

Answer: "Jose Abello Silva,"

Response: yes

After the 1998 embassy bombings, the U.S. government tried to develop a clearer picture of Bin Laden's finances. A U.S. interagency group traveled to Saudi Arabia twice, in 1999 and 2000, to get information from the Saudis about their understanding of those finances. The group eventually concluded that the oft-repeated assertion that Bin Laden was funding al Qaeda from his personal fortune was in fact not true. The officials developed a new theory: al Qaeda was getting its money elsewhere, and the United States needed to focus on other sources of funding, such as charities, wealthy donors, and financial facilitators. Ultimately, although the intelligence community devoted more resources to the issue and produced somewhat more intelligence, it remained difficult to distinguish al Qaeda's financial transactions among the vast sums moving in the international financial system. The CIA was not able to find or disrupt al Qaeda's money flows. The NSC staff thought that one possible solution to these weaknesses in the intelligence community was to create an all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center. Clarke pushed for the funding of such a center at Treasury, but neither Treasury nor the CIA was willing to commit the resources. Within the United States, various FBI field offices gathered intelligence on organizations suspected of raising funds for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. By 9/11, FBI agents understood that there were extremist organizations operating within the United States supporting a global jihadist movement and with substantial connections to al Qaeda. The FBI operated a web of informants, conducted electronic surveillance, and had opened significant investigations in a number of field offices, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, San Diego, and Minneapolis. On a national level, however, the FBI never used the information to gain a systematic or strategic understanding of the nature and extent of al Qaeda fundraising. Treasury regulators, as well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-level international fraud. Large-scale scandals, such as the use of the Bank of New York by Russian money launderers to move millions of dollars out of Russia, captured the attention of the Department of the Treasury and of Congress. Before 9/11, Treasury did not consider terrorist financing important enough to mention in its national strategy for money laundering.

Question: "What type of center did Clarke push funding for?"

Answer: "An all-source terrorist-financing intelligence analysis center"

Response: yes

American Airlines Flight 11: FAA Awareness. Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized at an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did not immediately interpret the plane's failure to respond as a sign that it had been hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb to 35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached out to the pilot on the emergency frequency. Though there was no response, he kept trying to contact the aircraft. At 8:21, American 11 turned off its transponder, immediately degrading the information available about the aircraft. The controller told his supervisor that he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neither suspected a hijacking. The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft. The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish communication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its route changed, moving into another sector's airspace. Controllers immediately began to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to look for American 11. At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11: American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you'll be okay. We are returning to the airport. The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the specific words "we have some planes." The next transmission came seconds later: American 11: Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane.

Question: "When The supervisor instructed the controller to follow standard procedures for handling a "no radio" aircraft what further steps by America 11 alarmed them?"

Answer: "Flight 11's route changed"

Response: yes

It is not enough to describe some objects by their location. We may also need to know its direction. For example, a wind blows a storm over your school. Where is that storm coming from? Where is it going? How can we describe a direction? The most common way is by using a compass. A compass is a device with a floating needle (Figure 2.1). The needle is a small magnet. The needle aligns itself with the Earth's magnetic field. The compass needle always points to magnetic north. If you have a compass and you find north. You can then know any other direction. See the directions, such as east, south, west, etc., on a compass rose. The Earth has two poles. It has a magnetic north pole. It also has a geographic north pole. These two poles are close to each other but not the exact same place.

Question: "What are the earth's two poles?"

Answer: "geographic north pole"

Response:
yes