In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: Center. v. National League of Postmasters of U.S., 497 F.3d 972, 974-75 (9th Cir.2007) (finding that Cedars-Sinai's claims were not preempted because they were "predicated not on the [service benefits] plan" but on a separate contract between the carrier and the medical services provider). Plaintiffs claim that Plaintiff never received compensation for the emergency care of B.G. directly relates to the processing and administration of the enrollee's covered claims which is governed by the Service Benefits Plan and the Contract between Blue Shield and OPM. Any obligation that Blue Shield could have to pay Plaintiff stems directly from the B.G.'s enrollment in the Service Benefit Plan and directly relates to the payment of B.G.'s benefits under the plan. See Hayes, 819 F.2d at 926 (<HOLDING>); Botsford, 314 F.3d at 396 ("Because the
Holding statements: (A) holding that tort claims arising out of the manner in which a benefit claim is handled are preempted by fehba (B) holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba (C) holding state law claims arising out of unions refusal to readmit union members preempted by 301 (D) holding that fehba does not completely preempt state law (E) holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law
[EX A]: holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was preempted by fehba

[EX Q]: 188 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Ohio E.D.1981); In re Davis, 16 B.R. 473 (D.Kan.1981). Or after a judgment has been entered: In re Young, 22 B.R. 620 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.E.D.1982); In re Breuer, 4 B.R. 499, 6 B.C.D. 136 (Bkrtcy.S.D.N.Y.1980). (5)Courts that hold that a debtor may cure a default where a foreclosure sale has been held provided that the debtor's right of redemption under state law has not expired: In re Johnson, 29 B.R. 104 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Chambers, 27 B.R. 687 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Taylor, 21 B.R. 179 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1982); In re Thompson, 17 B.R. 748 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mich.1982). 32 B.R. at 790. To the fourth group we add the following recent opinions by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits: Grubbs v. Houston First American Savings Association, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Matter of Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir.1984)
Holding statements: (A) holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally (B) holding that the debtor had the right to cure the default because the foreclosure sale was not complete under state law until it was confirmed by a court (C) holding debtor could cure after the debtor had previously made payments to the bank (D) holding that a debtor may cure a default after acceleration but expressing no limit on the right (E) holding debtor could include property because the bank accepted payments directly from the debtor and had previously allowed the debtor to cure default
[EX A]: holding debtor could cure default partly because the bank held a recourse loan and therefore could recover against the original borrower personally

[EX Q]: father of that child. Given that holding, Longoria's summary judgment motion in this case was in substance merely a motion to abate, see Carter v. Brady, 423 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the granting of which would merely give Valadez a reasonable opportunity to amend her suit to remove the obstacle to its prosecution. See Texas Highway Dept. v. Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex.1967). See also, M & M Const. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 747 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). A summary judgment should not be based on a pleading deficiency that could be cured by amendment. See Dowler v. Delta Inv. Housing, Inc., 834 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex.App.Eastland 1992, no writ). Cf. Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.1983) (<HOLDING>), citing, Texas Department of Corrections v.
Holding statements: (A) holding that issue of whether death was proximately caused by intervenihg and superseding cause was not appropriately resolved by summary judgment (B) holding that protective features of special exception procedure should not be circumvented by a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings where plaintiffs pleadings fail to state a cause of action (C) holding that whether pleadings fail to state a cause of action may not be resolved by summary judgment (D) holding that credibility determinations should not be resolved at the summary judgment stage (E) holding that pleadings cannot be regarded as summary judgment evidence
[EX A]:
holding that issue of whether death was proximately caused by intervenihg and superseding cause was not appropriately resolved by summary judgment