In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

until they were "in close proximity." Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at *3; see also Westport Ins. Corp. v. Bayer, 284 F.3d 489, 498 (3d Cir.2002) (according plain meaning to the district court's choice of language in affirming its "implicit" findings of fact). These findings control because they are not clearly erroneous. Rather, they are suppo a- suspect takes action that clearly indicates that he "does not yield" to the officers' show of authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. Action not passivity has been the touchstone of our an h Cir.2010) (noting that, "for a person who is moving, to 'yield' most sensibly means to stop"), or when a suspect makes suspicious motions consistent with reaching for a weapon, see United States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (D.C.Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). Unlike the suspects in those cases, Lowe
Holding statements: (A) holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded (B) holding that a suspect did not submit to a show of authority when he made continued furtive gestures including shoving down motions that were suggestive of hiding or retrieving a gun (C) holding that a suspect who continued walking when approached by a police officer did not submit until physically restrained by the officer (D) holding that evidence of appellants prior gun possession was admissible in a homicide prosecution to show malice and intent possession of a gun without more is not wrongful conduct (E) holding direct testimony tying a defendant to a gun was not required when the gun was found in the defendants truck and when the defendant had both ammunition for the gun and a rack in which it could have been kept
holding that i have a gun is sufficient to justify the sentencing enhancement because it merely requires a teller to make the reasonable inference that a robber would use the gun he claimed to have if he did not receive the money he demanded

for relief under 3582(c). Nor is Brown entitled to pursue his claims through 2241. A prisoner may proceed under 2241 if 2255 would be "inadequate of ineffective." 28 U.S.C. 2255(e); Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002) (per curiam). We have held that 2255's "safety valve" applies only in rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner's conduct non-criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997). Brown has not satisfied that standard here, as he makes no allegation that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but instead asserts only that he is "innocent" of being a career offender. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21 (<HOLDING>). Brown must obtain a certificate of
Holding statements: (A) holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under 841 and 846 was not cognizable under 2241 (B) holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor (C) holding that a 2241 petitioners claim was not cognizable under 2241 and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction (D) holding that dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge sentence via 2241 based on intervening change in sentencing law (E) holding challenge to armedcareercriminal enhancement improper under 2241
holding that prisoners challenge to his sentencing enhancement under 841 and 846 was not cognizable under 2241

for Sarvis is that even if there is a windfall vote, his complaint would still fail to raise the "reasonable inference" that Virginia's ballot ordering law creates constitutionally significant burdens. The fact remains that, "windfall" or not, the Virginia ballot ordering law still does not "restrict access to the ballot or deny any voters the right to vote for candidates of their choice." Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632, 638 (Alaska 1998). The law instead "merely allocates the benefit of positional bias, which places a lesser burden on the right to vote." Id. And contrary to Sarvis's cursory equal protection argument, Appellant's Opening Br. 12-13, it makes this allocation in a neutral, nondiscriminatory manner. Compare Graves v. McElderry, 946 F.Supp. 1569, 1582 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (<HOLDING>), with Bd. of Election Comm'rs of Chicago v.
Holding statements: (A) holding petition nominating candidate under social democratic party violated party name protection act (B) holding that the state law violated equal protection principles (C) holding that an oklahoma law placing democratic party candidates in the highest ballot positions violated the equal protection clause (D) holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause (E) holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause
holding petition nominating candidate under social democratic party violated party name protection act