TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: not issue a permit to install" a waste disposal system unless that system "[m]eets all applicable county zoning and land use requirements .... " Taken together, these provisions indicate a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to locate environmental permitting with the MDE, and zoning with local government. There is no reasonable way to construe these provisions of the Maryland Code as doing anything other than complementing local government's role in planning and zoning. If we held otherwise, we would be reading an over-broad preemptive intent into an otherwise clear statutory scheme. MRA's preemption argument fails because it does not account for the dual nature of this process. See Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986) (<HOLDING>). Preemption Based on Legislative Changes to
Holding statements: (A) holding that state court could regulate the practice of law in federal courts located in the state (B) holding that the relevant body of state law did indeed regulate many aspects of sewage sludge utilization but was not so comprehensive that the acceptance of the doctrine of preemption by occupation is compelled (C) holding that a party did not waive its preemption defense where its answer did not specifically mention preemption but contained a broader defense that was capable of encompassing preemption (D) recognizing that although there was no property in a dead body at common law the one whose duty it is to care for the body of the deceased is entitled to possession of the body as it is when death comes and that it is an actionable wrong for another to interfere with that right by withholding the body or mutilating it in any way (E) recognizing that the artful pleading doctrine in practice is subsumed by the complete preemption doctrine

SOLUTION: (B)

PROBLEM: recipient venue because their lack of standing here means it is not a district "in which [the case] might have been brought," according to the requirements of the transfer statute. 28 U.S.C. 1404(a); see also 28 U.S.C. 1406(a). Plaintiffs suggest that this court should "sensibly confirm[] that inherent in any discretionary transfer here is the idea that jurisdiction cannot be destroyed." PI. Resp. 25. The argument is artful but unpersuasive. "There is no valid reason for reading the words 'where it might have been brought' to narrow the range of permissible federal forums beyond those permitted by federal venue statutes." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 623, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); see also Carbonara v. Olmos, 1994 WL 61797, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1994) (<HOLDING>). B. Standing of SAF SAF asserts both
Holding statements: (A) holding that transfer was proper remedy for improper venue even though the issue of transfer was not raised until the motion hearing in circuit court (B) holding venue proper where proper when the action was commenced (C) holding that transfer to a district in which circuit law likely precluded standing was proper because the language of 1404a refers only to whether venue is proper and not a plaintiffs capacity to sue (D) holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (E) holding that venue is proper in any judicial district in which the corporation is doing business

SOLUTION: (C)

PROBLEM: Inc., 213 W.Va. 667, 584 S.E.2d 523 (2003) (per curiam). Syl. Pt. 3, Shafer v. Kings Tire Service, Inc., 215 W.Va. 169, 597 S.E.2d 302 (2004). Cognizant of these standards, we turn to the substantive issues presented. III. DISCUSSION A Fair Value Determination Out the outset, we may quickly dispose of appellees' argument that the instant appeal of the circuit court's fair value determination of the PRF stock is untimely. Ap-pellees argue that the circuit court's April 6, 2006, order setting the value of the shares of PRF stock "approximates a final order in its nature and effect" and, thus, was required to be appealed with four months of its entry pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Rides of Appellant Procedure. See, Syl. Pt. 2, Durm v. Heck's, Inc., 184 W.Va. 562, 401 S.E.2d 908 (1991) (<HOLDING>). However, simply because an order may be
Holding statements: (A) holding that an order was interlocutory in nature despite the trial courts certification of the order as a final appealable judgment (B) holding that an order is not a final appealable order when it does not dispose of the complaints against all of the defendants (C) holding that because trial courts order did not dispose of the defendants counterclaim that order was not a final judgment that would support an appeal (D) holding that the absence of language in an order indicating that there is not just reason for delay pursuant to rule 54b of the west virginia rules of civil procedure does not bar appeal of the order so long as this court can determine that the circuit courts ruling approximates a final order in its nature and effect (E) holding that an order which purports to become final upon the happening of an event specified in the order is not a final order and the happening of the event does not operate to render the order final

SOLUTION:
(D)