In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. The four incorrect answers are other holding statements. You should find the correct option. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

Ex Input:
the crime charged. If the evidence is cumulative, the trial court should more closely scrutinize its prejudicial effect. If the evidence is necessary to prove an element of the charge, the trial judge may have erred in not sustaining the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Moreover, a defendant may have a valid objection, under federal rule 611(b), that the government's cross-examination exceeds the scope of the direct. These added considerations are necessary not only to limit the impact of rule 404(b) on rule 608(b), but also to limit the prejudicial effect of allowing the government to have the last say through evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct. Smith Grading & Paving, 760 F.2d at 581; see also United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 324-25 (6th Cir.1988) (<HOLDING>). The purpose of Rule 608(b) is to prevent
Holding statements: (A) holding that proponent of 404b evidence must identify a proper 404b purpose for admission that is at issue in the case (B) holding that evidence of threats or intimidation of a witness is admissible under rule 404b to show consciousness of guilt (C) holding that a new trial was the remedy for erroneous admission of rule 404b evidence (D) holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal (E) holding that admission of rule 404b evidence was proper

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
before it was in assumpsit for attorney fees purposes. See Schulz, 67 Haw. at 436, 690 P.2d at 282. Although Higa is not directly on point, its reasoning is a compelling indication of how the Hawaii Supreme Court would rule on the attorney fee question before us. The plaintiffs also seek to distinguish Higa because it involved a client suing his own attorney, and thus in that case there was privity of contract between the two parties. In the present case, Mrs. Helfand was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the defendants and Mr. Helfand. This distinction is irrelevant. Courts have extended the right to sue for breach of contract to intended third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Dawes v. First Ins. Co. of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 117, 128 n. 12, 883 P.2d 38, 48 n. 12 (1994) (<HOLDING>); Hunt v. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii, 82
Holding statements: (A) holding that thirdparty claimants are intended beneficiaries under optional automobile liability insurance policies (B) recognizing common law cause of action as thirdparty beneficiary (C) holding that the shareholders were not thirdparty beneficiaries because they were not directly benefited by the contract between the government and the thrifts (D) recognizing noncontracting parties rights as thirdparty beneficiaries of an insurance contract (E) holding that shareholders lack standing to sue as thirdparty beneficiaries to allegedly breached contract unless the contract indicates the intent to benefit them directly independently of their shareholder status

Ex Output:
(D)

Ex Input:
federal statutory right. There is no dispute that the officers were acting under color of state law. The dispute in this ease was whether the officers unreasonably searched [Henderson's] house in violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). [1] It is axiomatic that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (concluding that state's operation of a probation system "presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements"); Ca-mara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (<HOLDING>). However, the special needs doctrine applies
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that exigent circumstances do not excuse the failure to secure a warrant when those circumstances are created by government officials who unreasonably and deliberately delay or avoid obtaining the warrant (B) holding that in criminal case a continuous chain of custody need not be proven as long as the evidence as a whole establishes that it is more probable than not that the object introduced is the same as that seized (C) holding telephonic search warrant as reasonable in certain circumstances (D) holding that a contract need not have mutuality of obligation as long as it is supported by consideration (E) holding that in certain circumstances government investigators need not adhere to the usual warrant requirement as long as their searches meet reasonable legislative or administrative standards

Ex Output:
(E)