In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.

[EX Q]: advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant subsequently gave a statement. Id. 476. The court held that the detective's statements at the jail cell did not constitute interrogation. Id. at 479-480. The court further determined that the defendant, by stating that he wanted to tell his side of the story, " 'initiated' further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word." Id. at 480. Similarly, in Bunch v Thompson, 949 F2d 1354, 1361 (CA 4, 1991), the court held that a defendant's statement was not the product of "police-initiated interrogation" where it followed an inquiry that "amounted to nothing more than an effort to ascertain if Bunch had changed his mind about wanting an attorney." See also McCall v State, 501 So 2d 496, 500 (Ala Crim App, 1986) (<HOLDING>); State v Acquin, 187 Conn 647, 669-670; 448
Holding statements: (A) holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime (B) holding that although interrogation may not continue after a suspect has requested counsel the police legitimately may inquire whether the suspect has changed his mind about speaking to them without an attorney (C) holding that fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination requires police to notify suspect of right to counsel and to cut off interrogation once suspect invokes the right absent counsel further interrogation may not occur unless suspect initiates subsequent conversation if police initiate subsequent interrogation there can be no valid waiver of counsel even though police advise suspect of his or her constitutional rights and suspect acquiesces in the interrogation (D) holding that prosecutors who soon after arrest of suspect allegedly directed police to coerce confession from suspect were not entitled to absolute immunity because interrogation is ordinarily a police activity (E) holding that once a suspect has requested counsel interrogators may not reinitiate questioning unless the attorney is present regardless of whether or not there has been an outside consultation
[EX A]: holding that police officers had probable cause to arrest a suspect where the facts suggest a fair probability that the suspect has committed a crime

[EX Q]: abused its discretion by providing an unreasonable characterization of the record evidence. See McElwee, 896 A.2d at 18 & nn. 7-8. While SEPTA claims that this, too, necessarily entailed unwarranted fact-finding on the part of the Commonwealth Court, we believe that it aligns with the approach utilized in Sienkiewicz I, wherein this Court not only determined that no record evidence existed to support a particular factual finding central to the trial court's decision to grant relief (i.e., that Penn-DOT had installed curbing along the "Stafford Straightaway"), but proceeded to delineate the essential facts that were proved by the uncontradicted record evidence in ultimately agreeing with Penn-DOT's position that relief was unjustified. See Sienkiewicz I, 584 Pa. at 282, 883 A.2d at 502 (<HOLDING>). Under the circumstances of this case, then,
Holding statements: (A) recognizing that the evidence establishes that direct access to landowners property was always from the stafford straightaway factually there was never any direct access from the stafford curve rather this portion of the roadway like davis street and the route 81 ramps was merely part of an adjacent road system providing a convenient flow of traffic in the direction of landowners property (B) holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property (C) recognizing distinction and allowing recovery for impairment of access and not obstructed flow of traffic (D) holding that the landownerlicensee relationship ceased when the licensee left the landowners property (E) holding in an inverse condemnation case that the abutting landowners right of direct access was subservient to the city of portlands proper exercise of its governmental powers for purposes of public safety and convenience and that the elimination of access from the landowners property to the affected street did not constitute a taking
[EX A]: holding a landowner not liable for an accident on a country road caused by a tree which fell from the landowners property

[EX Q]: contract defining the relation between Norstan and Rolm. The contract clearly anticipates an agent-principal relationship whereby "Norstan is an independent contractor" who performs as "an agent of Rolm for the purpose of marketing products." Under the agreement, Rolm compensated Norstan for selling Rolm used equipment via Norstan's telemarketing capabilities. Although Rolm restricted Nor-stan to offering only certain equipment, terms, and conditions to particular entities, it did so as the principal and accordingly without offen efute Rolm's evidence that Rolm Resale is a Rolm-owned subsidiary, thereby making it incapable of acting in concert with Rolm for purposes of antitrust law. Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, if Rolm's parts are protected by
Holding statements: (A) holding that parent and subsidiary acting together is unilateral activity and not concerted action for purposes of claim brought under 1 of the sherman act (B) holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act (C) holding that a plaintiff may state a claim under the sherman act for a defendants enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the pto where the plaintiff alleges deliberate fraud and the other elements of a monopolization claim under section 2 of the sherman act (D) holding a concerted boycott to be a per se violation of 1 of the sherman act (E) holding that same activity violated 2 of the sherman act
[EX A]:
holding that plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim under section 1 of the sherman act