TASK DEFINITION: In this task, you will be shown a prompt from a judicial decision and multiple holding statements derived from citations following text in a legal decision. Holdings represent the governing legal rule when the law is applied to a particular set of facts. There are five answer choices for each citing text. The correct answer is the holding statement that corresponds to the citing text. You should write an incorrect option. Even though there exist multiple wrong answers, we only need a single wrong answer. There is a <HOLDING> token in the position of the citing text prompt where the holding statement was extracted.
PROBLEM: with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and learned that the federal license "will not change upon renewal." 4 . The position statement included an Administrator's Memorandum, dated June 19, 1986, indicating how regional offices should handle approval of permits for hydropower purposes. The memorandum indicates that when dealing with a hydropower application coming within FERC jurisdiction, departmental staff need to be aware of FERC licensing conditions for the facility in question. An attachment to the memorandum shows standard conditions of approval for a state water rights permit and the language of one of such conditions is that which was incorporated into the license at issue in this case. The memorandum notes that an applicant "can request Department action on 0-41 (1969) (<HOLDING>). 7 . It was also after the enactment of I.C.
Holding statements: (A) holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use (B) holding that until the state issues a certificate of appropriation any right to use the water remains inchoate (C) holding that a water right is a property right created by a person appropriating unappropriated water and applying it to a beneficial use (D) holding that the legislative assembly intended the water right certificate not the permit even when followed by a beneficial use to mark the point at which a water right becomes vested (E) recognizing the right to use water to generate power

SOLUTION: holding that simply because claimants had diverted the entire run of the water at issue did not give them the ability to claim a right to all the water when they could not and had not put it to beneficial use

PROBLEM: to two judicially cognizable interests. Id. at 560. First, the partisan-elections regime makes the process of getting on the general-election ballot more costly and time consuming. As Nix argues, courts have recognized that "[s]uch ballot-access requirements impose an 'injury-in-faet,' not only because non-compliance prevents 'candidates' from 'appearing] on the ... ballot,' but also because even compliance requires 'significant amounts of time, money, personnel, and energy,' which are limited 'campaign resources' that could have been 'allocate[d]' elsewhere." Appellants' Opening Br. 19-20 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 856-58 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Second, Nix alleges that Kinston's
Holding statements: (A) holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search (B) holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance (C) holding that candidates had ample standing to challenge ballotaccess requirements (D) holding that person who is not party to contract does not have standing to challenge contract (E) holding that candidates had standing to challenge requirements for appearing on the generalelection ballot as independents even though they could have chosen to run in a party primary

SOLUTION: holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search

PROBLEM: tribal court jurisdiction." We have been unable to locate, however, any authorities that support the distinction drawn by the district court. It is well recognized that "[f]ederal question jurisdiction ... extends to ... claims that the exercise of tribal authority impermissibly exceeds the federal common-law limits imposed by the Supreme Court." Cohen 3 F.3d 1412, 1421-22 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that among the "aspects of the dispute" that raised a federal question was the fact that "this case is being directed to the Tribal Court and exhaustion within that system" and further observing that "[t]he existence of tribal court jurisdiction itself presents a federal question within the scope of 28 U.S.C. 1331"); cf. Arizona Publ. Serv. Co. v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Following the lead of our sister circuits,
Holding statements: (A) holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation (B) holding states in exercising the federal trust power over indian tribes pursuant to a federal statute authorizing them to do so may enact legislation that would be an otherwise unconstitutional exercise of state power (C) holding that federal court has neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction over civil action by nonindian against indian for events occurring on the reservation (D) holding that in context of a challenge to a tribes legislative authority over a nonindian that was allegedly limited by contract a nonindian challenging an exercise of tribal adjudicatory or legislative power states a claim that arises under federal law (E) recognizing that tribes have an interest in a uniform body of federal law in the area of tribal immunity

SOLUTION:
holding that state has no jurisdiction over civil suit by nonindian against indian where cause of action arises on indian reservation