This article is intended to explore the "hidden significance" and unexplored implications of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem and its various generalizations. In particular, the existence of a deep chasm separating the goals of Hilbert's consistency program from the implications of the Second Incompleteness Theorem was evident, immediately, after Gödel published [20] 's seminal announcement. We exhibited in [46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54] a large number of articles about generalizations and boundary case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem, starting with our 1993 article [46] . These papers, which included six papers published in the JSL and APAL, showed every extension α of Peano Arithmetic can be mapped onto an axiom system α * that can recognize its own consistency and prove analogs of all α's Π 1 theorems (in a slightly different language, called L * ).
The term "Self-Justifying" arithmetic was employed in our articles. [47, 50, 51, 52, 54] . These papers were able to verify their own consistency by containing a builtin self-referencing axiom that declared "I am consistent" (as will be explained later).
In particular, our axiom systems α * used the Fixed-Point Theorem to assure α * 's self-referencing analogs of the pronoun "I" would enable it to refer to itself in the context of its "I am consistent" axiomatic declaration.
It turns out that such a self-referencing mechanism will produce unacceptable Gödel-style diagonalizing contradictions, when either α * or its particular deployed definition of consistency are too strong. This is because our methodologies only become contradiction-free when α * uses sufficiently weak underlying structures.
These weak structures obviously have significant disadvantages. Their virtue is that their formalisms α * can be arranged to prove more Π 1 like theorems than Peano Arithmetic, while offering some type of partial knowledge about their own consistency.
We will call such formalisms "Declarative Exceptions" to the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
An alternative type of exception to the Second Incompleteness Theorem, which we shall call an "Infinite-Ranged Exception", was recently developed by Sergei Artemov [4] (It is related to the works of Beklemishev [6] and Artemov-Beklemishev [5] .) Artemov observed Peano Arithmetic can verify its own consistency, from a special infinite-ranging perspective. This means PA will generate an infinite set of theorems T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ... where each T i shows some subset S i of PA is unable to prove 0 = 1 and where PA equals the formal union of these special selected S i satisfying the inclusion property of S 1 ⊂ S 2 ⊂ S 3 ⊂ ... . This perspective, which is certainly very useful, is also not a panacea. Thus, the abstract in [4] cautiously used the adjective of "somewhat" to describe how it sought to partially achieve the goals sought by Hilbert's Consistency Program (with an infinite collection of theorems T 1 , T 2 , T 3 ... replacing Hilbert's intended goal of finding one unifying formal consistency theorem).
Our "Declarative"' exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Theorem and Artemov's "Infinite Ranging" exceptions are two quite different rigorous results, which are nicely compatible with each other. This is because each acknowledged that the Second Incompleteness Theorem is a strong result, that will admit no full-scale exceptions. Also, these results are of interest because Gödel openly conjectured that Hilbert's Consistency Program would ultimately, reach some levels of partial success (see next section). We will explain, herein, how Gödel's conjecture can be partially justified, due to an unusual consequence of the Law of the Excluded Middle.
More specifically, we shall focus on the semantic tableau deductive mechanisms of Fitting and Smullyan [15, 40] and their special properties from the perspective of our JSL-2005 article [50] . Each instance of the Law of the Excluded Middle has been treated by most tableau mechanisms as a provable theorem, rather than as a built-in logical axiom. This may, at first, appear to be an insignificant distraction because most deductive methodologies do not have their consistency reversed when a theorem is promoted into becoming a logical axiom.
Our self-justifying axiom systems are different, however, because their built-in self-referencing "I am consistent" axioms have their meanings change, fundamentally, when their self-referencing concept of "I" involves promoting a schema of theorems verifying the Law of Excluded Middle into formal explicitly declared logical axioms.
This effect is counterintuitive because similar distinctions exist almost nowhere else in Logic. Thus some confusion, that has surrounded our prior work, can be clarified when one realizes that an interaction between the self-referencing concept of "I" with the Law of Excluded Middle causes the Second Incompleteness Theorem to become activated precisely when the Law of Excluded Middle is promoted into becoming a schema of logical axioms.
The intuitive reason for this unusual effect is that the transforming of derived theorems into logical axioms can shorten proofs under the Fitting-Smullyan semantic tableau technology. In the particular context where §3's formalism uses selfreferencing "I am consistent" axioms and views multiplication as a 3-way relationship, these conditions will be sufficient for enacting the full power of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
The next chapter will explain how these issues are related to questions raised by Gödel and Hilbert about feasible boundary-case exceptions to the Second Incompleteness Effect.
Interestingly, neither Gödel (unequivocally) nor Hilbert (after learning about Gödel's work) would dismiss the possibility of a compromise solution, whereby a fragment of the goals of Hilbert's Consistency Program would remain intact. Thus, Hilbert never withdrew [26] 's statement * for justifying his program: * " Let us admit that the situation in which we presently find ourselves with respect to paradoxes is in the long run intolerable. Just think: in mathematics, this paragon of reliability and truth, the very notions and inferences, as everyone learns, teaches, and uses them, lead to absurdities. And where else would reliability and truth be found if even mathematical thinking fails?" The next chapter's Remark 3.5 will helpfully summarize such generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Effect.
1 Some quotes from Sacks's YouTube talk [39] are that Gödel "did not think" the objectives of Hilbert's Consistency Program "were erased" by the Incompleteness Theorem, and Gödel believed (according to Sacks) it left Hilbert's program "very much alive and even more interesting than it initially was".
Let us call an ordered pair (α, D) a Generalized Arithmetic Configuration (abbreviated as a "GenAC" ) when its first and second components are defined as follows:
1. The Axiom Basis " α " for a GenAC is defined as its set of proper axioms.
2. The second component " D " of a GenAC, called its Deductive Apparatus, is defined as the union of its logical axioms " L D " with its rules for obtaining inferences.
Example 3.1 This notation allows us to separate the logical axioms L D , associated with (α, D) , from its "basis axioms", denoted as " α ". It also allows us to compare different deductive apparatuses from the literature. Thus, the D E apparatus, from Enderton's textbook [12] , uses only modus ponens as a rule of inference, but it deploys a complicated 4-part schema of logical axioms. This differs from the D M and D H apparatuses in the Mendelson [30] and Hájek-Pudlák [25] textbooks. (They used a more reduced set of logical axioms but employed "generalization" as a second rule of inference.) In contrast, the D F apparatus, from Fitting's and Smullyan's textbooks [15, 40] , uses no logical axioms, but employs a broader "tableau style" rule of inference. AN IMPORTANT POINT is that while proofs have different lengths under different apparatuses, all the common apparatuses produce the same set of final theorems from an initial common "axiom basis" of α (as footnote 2 explains).
Definition 3.2 Let α again denote an axiom basis, D designate a deduction apparatus, and (α, D) denote their GenAC. Henceforth, the configuration (α, D) will be called Self-Justifying when i. one of (α, D)'s theorems (or possibly one of α's axioms) states that the deduction method D, applied to the basis system α, produces a consistent set of theorems, and ii. the GenAC formalism (α, D) is actually, in fact, consistent. Example 3.3 Using Definition 3.2's notation, our prior research [46, 47, 50, 51, 54] constructed GenAC pairs (α, D) that were "Self Justifying". We also proved that the Incompleteness Theorem implies specific limits beyond which self-justifying formalisms simply cannot transgress. For any (α, D) , all our articles observed it was easy to construct a system α D ⊇ α that satisfies the Part-i condition (in an isolated context where the Part-ii condition is not also satisfied). In essence, α D could consist of all of α 's axioms plus the added "SelfRef(α, D)" sentence, defined below: ⊕ There is no proof (using D's deduction method) of 0 = 1 from the union of the axiom system α with this sentence "SelfRef(α, D) " (looking at itself).
Kleene [28] was the first to notice how to encode analogs of SelfRef(α, D) 's above statement, which we often call an "I AM CONSISTENT" axiom. Each of Kleene, Rogers and Jeroslow [28, 38, 27] emphasized α D may be inconsistent (e.g. will cause this extended version of α , ironically, to become automatically inconsistent. Thus, an encoding for "SelfRef(α, D)" is relatively easy, via an application of the Fixed Point Theorem, but this sentence is potentially devastating.
Add(x, y, z) and Mult(x, y, z) denote two 3-way predicates specifying x + y = z and x * y = z. (Obviously, arithmetic's classic associative, commutative, identity and distributive axioms will have Π 1 encodings when they are expressed using these two predicates.) We will say that a formalized axiom basis system of α recognizes successor, addition and multiplication as Total Functions iff it can prove all of (1) -(3) as theorems:
∀x ∀y ∃z Add(x, y, z)
∀x ∀y ∃z M ult(x, y, z)
We will call the GenAC system (α, D) a Type-M formalism iff it proves (1) -(3) as theorems, Type-A if it proves only (1) and (2), and it will be called Type-S if it proves only (1) as a theorem. Also, (α, D) will be called Type-NS iff it can prove none of (1) -(3). ++ (Solovay's modification [42] of Pudlák [36] 's formalism using some of Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [31, 45] 's methods) : Let (α, D) denote a Type-S GenAC system which assures the successor operation will provably satisfy both x ′ = 0 and x ′ = y ′ ⇔ x = y. Then (α, D) cannot verify its own consistency whenever simultaneously D is some type of a Hilbert-Frege deductive apparatus and α treats addition and multiplication as 3-way relations, satisfying their usual associative, commutative, distributive and identity axioms.
Essentially, Solovay [42] privately communicated to us in 1994 an analog of theorem ++. Many authors have noted Solovay has been reluctant to publish his nice privately communicated results on many occasions [10, 25, 31, 34, 36, 45] . Thus, approximate analogs of ++ were explored subsequently by Buss-Ignjatović, Hájek andŠvejdar in [10, 23, 43] , as well as in Appendix A of our paper [47] and in [49] . Also, Pudlák's initial 1985 article [36] captured the majority of ++'s essence, chronologically before Solovay's observations. Also, Friedman did some closely related work in [16] .
Part of what makes ++ interesting is that [47, 50, 51] presented two types of self-justifying GenAC systems, whose natural hybrid is precluded by ++.
Specifically, these results involve using Example 3.3's self-referencing "I am consistent" axiom (from statement ⊕ ). Thus, they establish that some (not all)
Type-NS systems [47, 51] can verify their own consistency under a Hilbert-Frege style deductive apparatus 3 , and some (not all) Type-A systems [46, 47, 50, 52] can, likewise, corroborate their consistency under a more restrictive semantic tableau apparatus. Also, we observed in [48, 53] [4] (where an infinite schema of theorems replaces one single unified consistency theorem). We encourage the reader to examine all these articles, each of which has their own separate merits.
Our focus, in this paper, will be primarily on the next section's Theorems 4.4 and 4.5.
They show that some partial (and not full) evasions of the Second Incompleteness Effect can arise under a semantic tableau deductive apparatus. 4 The Hájek-Pudlák textbook [25] uses the notation " | x | " to designate what we shall call " Log ♠ (x) " Thus for x ≥ 1 , Log ♠ (x) denotes the number of symbols that will encode the number x , when it is written in a binary format. 5 . Root(x, y) = ⌈ x 1/y ⌉ , and also 6 . Count(x, j) which designates the number of physical "1" bits that are stored among
x's rightmost j bits.
Our papers used the term Grounding Function to refer to these six non-growth operations. Also, the term U-Grounding Function referred to a function that corresponds to either one of these six grounding primitives or the growth-oriented functional operations of Addition and Double(x) = x + x.
Our language L * , defined in [50] , was built out of the eight U-Grounding function operations plus the primitives of "0", "1", " = " and " ≤ ". This language differs from a conventional arithmetic by excluding a formal multiplication function symbol.
(Instead, it treats multiplication as a 3-way relation, via the obvious employment of its Division primitive.) This notation leads to a surprisingly strong and tempting evasion of the Second Incompleteness Effect.
In a context where t is any term in our language L * , the special
quantifiers. Also, any formula in our language L * , all of whose quantifiers are so bounded, will be called a ∆ * 0 formula. The Π * n and Σ * n formulae are, thus, defined by the usual rules, EXCEPT they DO NOT contain multiplication function symbols.
These rules are that:
1. Every ∆ * 0 formula will also be a " Π * 0 " and " Σ * 0 " formula.
A wff will be called Π * n when it is encoded as ∀v 1 ... ∀v k Φ with Φ being Σ * n−1 .
3. A wff will be called Σ * n when it is encoded as ∃v 1 ..∃v k Φ, with Φ being Π * n−1 .
A sentence Ψ will be called Rank-1* when it can be encoded as either a Π * 1 or Σ * 1 sentence. Our definitions for Π * 1 or Σ * 1 formulae will differ from Arithmetic's conventional counterparts by excluding multiplication function symbols.
(This issue will turn out to be central to our evasions of the Second Incompleteness Effect.)
There will be three variants of formal deductive apparatus methods, which we will compare. The first is semantic tableau. It will receive an abbreviated name of "Tab" and correspond to Fitting's textbook formalism [15] . (Its definition can also be found in the attached Appendix.) Thus, a Tab-proof for a theorem Ψ, from an axiom basis α, is a tree-structure that begins with the sentence ¬ Ψ stored inside the tree's root and whose every root−to−leaf path establishes a contradiction by containing some pair of contradictory nodes that will "close" its path. The rules for generating internal nodes, along each root−to−leaf path, are that each node must be either a proper axiom of α or a deduction from an ancestor node via one of the Appendix's stated "elimination" rules for the ∧, ∨, →, ¬, ∀, and ∃ symbols.
Our second explored deductive apparatus is called Extended Tableau, and shall be abbreviated as "Xtab". Its definition is identical to Tab-deduction, except that for any sentence φ in our language L * , the sentence φ ∨ ¬φ is allowed as an internal node in an Xtab proof tree. (In other words, Xtab-deduction differs from Tab-deduction by allowing all instances of the Law of Excluded Middle to appear as permitted logical axioms. In contrast, Tab-deduction will view these instances only as derived theorems.)
Our third deductive apparatus was called Tab-1 in [50] . It is, essentially, a compromise between Tab and Xtab, where a "Tab-1" proof for Ψ from an axiom basis α corresponds to a set of ordered pairs (p 1 , φ 1 ), (p 2 , φ 2 ), ...., (p k , φ k ) where 1. φ k = Ψ 2. Each p j is a Tab-proof of what we have called a Rank-1* sentence φ j from the union of α with the preceding Rank-1* sentences of φ 1 , φ 2 , ...., φ j−1 .
The Rank-1* constraint ( defined by Remark 4.2 and utilized by the above Item 2) is significant. This is because Tab-1 deduction is less efficient than Xtab when the former requires φ j be a Rank-1* sentence. (In contrast, Xtab does not impose a similar Rank-1* requirement upon φ when its Law of the Excluded Middle allows φ ∨ ¬φ to appear anywhere as a permissible logical axiom, for fully arbitrary φ. )
Thus, Xtab is more desirable than Tab-1 when it can actually be feasibly (?) employed.
Let us say an axiom system α owns a Level-1 appreciation of its own selfconsistency (under a deductive apparatus D) iff it can verify that D produces no two simultaneous proofs for a Π * 1 sentence and its negation. Within this context, where β denotes any basis axiom system using L * 's U-Grounding language, IS D (β) was defined in [50] to be an axiomatic formalism capable of recognizing all of β's Π * 1 theorems and corroborating its own Level-1 consistency under D's deductive apparatus. It consists of the following four groups of axioms:
Group-Zero: Two of the Group-zero axioms will define the constant-symbols,c 0 andc 1 , designating the integers of 0 and 1. The Group-zero axioms will also define the growth functions of Addition and Double(x) = x + x. (They will enable our formalism to define any integer n ≥ 2 using fewer than 3 · ⌈ Log n ⌉ logic symbols.)
Group-1: This axiom group will consist of a finite set of Π * 1 sentences, denoted as F , which can prove any ∆ * 0 sentence that holds true under the standard model of the natural numbers. (Any finite set of Π * 1 sentences F , with this property, may be used to define Group-1, as [50] had noted.)
Group-2: Let Φ denote Φ's Gödel Number, and HilbPrf β ( Φ , p) denote a ∆ * 0 formula indicating that p is a Hilbert-Frege styled proof of theorem Φ from axiom system β. For each Π * 1 sentence Φ, the Group-2 schema will contain the below axiom (4). (Thus IS D (β) can trivially prove all β's Π * 1 theorems.)
Group-3: The final part of IS D (β) will be a self-referencing Π * 1 axiom, that indicates IS D (β) is "Level-1 consistent" under D's deductive apparatus. It thus amounts to the following declaration:
# No two proofs exist for a Π * 1 sentence and its negation, when D's deductive apparatus is applied to an axiom system, consisting of the union of Groups 0, 1 and 2 with this sentence (looking at itself ).
One encoding for # as a self-referencing Π * 1 axiom, had appeared in [50] . Thus, Line (5) is a Π * 1 representation for # when:
a. Prf IS D (β) (a, b) is a ∆ * 0 formula indicating that b is a proof of a theorem a from the axiom basis IS D (β) under D's deductive apparatus, and b. Pair(x, y) is a ∆ * 0 formula indicating that x is a Π * 1 sentence and y represents x 's negation.
For the sake of brevity, we will not provide exact details about how Line (5) can be encoded under the Fixed Point Theorem. Adequate details are provided in [47, 50] . were entirely incorrect when their statements * and * * suggested some form of the Consistency Program would likely be viable. Moreover Gerald Sacks's YouTube talk [39] , as well as some added comments by Anil Nerode [32] , have reinforced this point. This is because Gödel repeated analogs of * * 's statement on several occasions, during the later part of his career. Thus, the contrast between Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 provides possible evidence that a fractional portion of what Hilbert and Gödel had advocated, might become feasible. This paper will not have the page space to go into the full details, but the next several sections will summarize the gist behind the proofs for Theorems 4.4 and 4.5.
Let us recall the acronym "Tab" stands for semantic tableau deduction. This was defined by Fitting [14, 15] to be a tree-like proof of a theorem Ψ from an axiom basis α , whose root consists of the temporary negated assumption of ¬ Ψ and whose every root−to−leaf path establishes a contradiction by containing some pair of contradictory nodes that "close" its path. Each internal node along these paths must either be a proper axiom of α or be a deduction from an ancestor node via one of the "elimination" rules associated with the logic symbols of ∧, ∨, →, ¬, ∀, or ∃ (that are illustrated in the Appendix.) The intuition behind this change can be roughly summarized if we let x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , ... and y 0 , y 1 , y 2 , ... denote the sequences defined by:
For i > 0 , let φ i and ψ i denote the sentences in (7) and (8) respectively. Also, let φ 0 and ψ 0 denote (6)'s sentence. Then φ 0 , φ 1 , ... φ n imply x n = 2 n+1 , and ψ 0 , ψ 1 , ... ψ n imply y n = 2 2 n . Thus, the latter sequence shall grow at an exponentially faster rate than the former. It turns out that this change in growth speed causes the IS M Tab ( • ), and IS Tab ( • ) to have quite opposite self-justification properties.
In particular, let the quantities Log( y n ) = 2 n and Log( x n ) = n + 1 represent the lengths for the binary codings for y n and x n . Thus, y n 's coding will have a length 2 n , which is much larger than the n + 1 steps of ψ 0 , ψ 1 , ... ψ n (used to define y n 's existence). In contrast, x n 's binary encoding will have a sharply smaller length of size n + 1. These observations are significant because every proof establishing a variant of the Second Incompleteness Effect involves a Gödel number z encoding a capacity to self-reference its own definition.
The faster growing series y 0 , y 1 , , ... y n should, intuitively, have this self-referencing capacity because y n 's binary encoding has a 2 n+1 length that greatly exceeds the size of the O(n) steps used to define its value. Leaving aside many of [48, 53] 's further details, this fast growth explains roughly why a Type-M logic, such as IS M Tab , satisfies the semantic tableau version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem, unlike IS Tab .
Our paradigm also explains why IS Tab 's Type-A formalism produces boundarycase exceptions for the semantic tableau version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. This is because [50] showed that it was unable to construct numbers z that can self-reference their own definitions (when only the more slowly growing addition primitive is available). In particular assuming only two bits are needed to encode each sentence in the sequence φ 0 , φ 1 , ...φ n , the length n + 1 for x n 's binary encoding is insufficient for encoding this sequence.
Leaving aside many of [50] 's details, this short length for x n explains the central intuition behind [50] 's evasion of the Second Incompleteness Theorem under IS Tab .
It arises essentially because of the sharp difference between the growth rates of the two sequences of x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ... and y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ... .
There is obviously insufficient space for this extended abstract to provide more details, here. A fully detailed proof of Theorem 4.4 is available in [50] . It establishes (see 5 ) that Peano Arithmetic can prove β's consistency implies both the consistency and also the self-justifying property of IS Tab−1 (β).
Our more modest goal, within the present abbreviated paper, has been to merely summarize the intuition behind Theorem 4.4's surprising evasion of the Second Incompleteness Effect. It arises, intuitively, because of the striking difference in the growth rates between the two series of x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ... and y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ... .
A formal proof of Theorem 4.5 is complex, but it can be nicely summarized. This is because this proposition's proof is similar to the formal justification for Remark 3.5's Invariant of ++ . (The latter's insight has come from the combined work of Pudlák, Solovay, Nelson and Wilkie-Paris [36, 42, 31, 45] . It was, also, subsequently verified by several other authors [10, 16, 23, 43, 47] in slightly different forms.)
The crucial aspect of the Hilbert-Frege deductive methodology is that its modus ponens rule assures thar a proof of a theorem ψ from an axiom system α has a length no more than proportional to the sum of the proof-lengths used to derive φ and φ → ψ . This "Linear-Sum Effect" does not apply also to Tab-deduction (because the latter lacks a modus ponens rule).
The Xtab deductive methodology is , however, quite different from the Tab form of deduction, in that only Xtab supports an analog of the prior paragraph's "Linear-Sum Effect". This is because any node of an Xtab proof-tree is allowed to store any sentence of the form φ ∨ ¬ φ (as a consequence of its allowed use of the Law of Excluded Middle). This added feature will allow an Xtab proof for ψ to have a length proportional to the sum of the proof lengths for φ and φ → ψ . In particular, such an Xtab proof for ψ will consist of the following four steps:
1. The root of an Xtab proof for ψ consists of the usual temporary negated hypothesis of ¬ψ (which the remainder of the proof tree will show is impossible to hold).
CANNOT KNOW whether β is consistent when β = P A. Thus, unlike the quite different formalism of IS Tab−1 (P A) , the system of PA shall linger in a state of self-doubt, about whether both PA and IS Tab−1 (P A) are consistent. The main point is, however, that we humans believe PA is consistent, and we can use this fact to confirm that IS Tab−1 (P A) is BOTH consistent and able to verify its self-consistency via its "I am consistent" axiom.
Excluded Middle of the particular form φ ∨ ¬ φ .
3. The relevant Xtab proof tree will next employ the Appendix's branching rule for allowing the two sibling nodes of φ and ¬ φ to descend from Item 2's node.
4. Finally, our Xtab proof will insert below (3)'s left sibling node of φ a subtree that is no longer than a proof for φ → ψ , and likewise insert a proof for φ below (3)'s right sibling of ¬ φ .
The point is that the very last step of the above 4-part proof has a length no greater than the sum of the two proof lengths for φ and φ → ψ. (This is analogous to the proof expansions resulting from a conventional modus ponens operation.) Its first three steps will have entirely inconsequential effects that increase the overall proof length by no more than a tiny amount, that is proportional to the trivial sum of the lengths for the two individual sentences of " φ " and " ψ ".
Hence, the preceeding "Linear-Sum Effect" allows us to construct an analog of Remark 3.5 's earlier Theorem + + for Xtab deduction. It is formalized by the statement below:
Any axiom system A is automatically inconsistent whenever it satisfies the following three conditions:
A can verify Successor is a total function (as Line (1) formalized).
A can prove addition and multiplication (viewed as 3-way relations) satisfy their usual associative, commutative, distributive and identity-operator properties.
A proves an added theorem (which turns out to be false) affirming its own consistency when the Xtab deductive apparatus is used.
It is not possible to provide a short proof for statement because it will rest upon the very detailed "Definable Cut" machinery from pages 172-174 of the
Hájek-Pudlák textbook [25] . The intuition behind is, however, quite simple.
It is that statement causes ++'s mechanism to generalize from Hilbert-Frege deduction to Xtab (because both satisfy the Linear-Sum Effect).
The nice aspect of is that its machinery establishes Theorem 4.5. This is because if β satisfies Theorem 4.5's hypothesis then IS Xtab (β) will satisfy 6 the conditions I-III that cause IS Xtab (β) to become inconsistent.
7 More Elaborate Forms of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5
Our results in Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate self-justifying methodologies apply to "Tab"', but not also "Xtab" deduction. (This is because Xtab treats the the Law of Excluded Middle as a formal schema of logical axioms, and the latter activates the power of the Second Incompleteness Effect.)
Our goal in this section will be to view this machinery in more meticulous detail. Thus, we will explore at what exact juncture the boundary is crossed between generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem and its permissible exceptions.
Definition 7.1 Let L * again denote the base arithmetic language (that was defined in §3 ), and Z denote an arbitrary set of sentences appearing in the language L * (such as its set of Π * 2 sentences). Let us recall that the Appendix defined a semantic tableau proof of a theorem Ψ from α's axiom system. Then a Z-Enriched modification for a semantic tableau proof of a theorem Ψ, from α's set of proper axioms, will be defined as the particular refinement of the Appendix's proof-tree formalism that allows Line (9) as an added permissible logical axiom, for any Υ ∈ Z.
Definition 7.2 It is also of interest to consider a slight modification of the preceeding nomenclature, where Z is a set of formulae that are allowed to be free in the single variable of x (instead of representing a sentence that contains no free variables). In this case, Υ(x) will designate a formula, within the subset of Z, and Line (10) will replace Line (9) as the added permissible logical axiom that can be allowed to appear inside a "Z-Base Variable Enriched" proof.
A fully detailed justification will not be provided here, but it turns out our results from [47] can be expanded to show that their evasions of the semantic tableau version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem can be extended to both the cases of Z-Enriched and "Z-Base Variable Enriched" mechanisms, when Z represents the ∆ * 0 class of formulae. We can also extend our results from [49] to show that the comparable evasions of the semantic tableau version of the Second Incompleteness Effect will fail at and above the Π * 2 level.
We conjecture the preceeding ∆ * 0 evasions of the Second Incompleteness Theorem will continue at the Π * 1 level, but this fact has not yet been formally proven.
A fascinating aspect about this subject is that semantic tableau deduction satisfies its particular variant of Gödel's Completeness Theorem [15, 40] . Thus, the set of theorems proven by an axiom system α , via a conventional (unenriched) version of semantic tableau deduction, is identical to those theorems proven by a Z-enriched deductive mechanism. Yet despite this invariance, the proof-lengths change, quite
sharply, under the Z-enriched formalisms of Defintions 7.1 and 7.2. This extreme change in proof-length causes the deployment of an "I am consistent" axiom to become fully infeasible when Υ in Line (9) is allowed to represent any arbitrary Π * 2 sentence (see footnote 7 ).
For the sake of simplicity, the previous sections had focused on the semantic tableau deductive apparatus. However, it is known [15] that resolution shares numerous characteristics with tableau. Therefore, it turns out that Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 do generalize when resolution replaces semantic tableau.
In particular, let us say a theorem T has a Res−proof from α 's set of proper axioms when there is a resolution-based proof [15] of T from α . Also, the term Xres−proof of T refers to the obvious extension of a Res−proof that allows all instances of the Law of Excluded Middle (from the base language of L * ) to appear as formalized logical axioms.
It turns out Xres differs from Res in the same manner Xtab differed from T ab.
Thus, the obvious generalizations of Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 hold for Res and Xres.
In particular, IS Res ( • ) is a consistency preserving transformation, but IS Xres ( • ) again is not.
Some logicians may, also, wish to examine special speculations in [55] 's arXiv article. It contemplated an alternative approach, where self-justifying arithmetics employ an unconventional "indeterminate" functional object, called the Θ primitive, to formalize the traditional properties of an endless sequence of integers.
If a conjecture stated in [55] is correct (as we are almost certain it is), then such a self-justifying machine will be plausible for constructing the entire set of natural numbers, without encountering the usual incompleteness difficulties that the Theorem ++ (of Pudlák and Solovay) associated with Type-S formalisms (that recognize merely Successor as a total function). Interestingly, the θ function primitive of [55] should allow a substantial Type-NS arithmetic to exist that can simultaneously recognize its own Hilbert-Frege consistency and possess a formalized ability to constructively enumerate the full infinite collection of integers 0, 1, 2, 3, ....
The initial 19-page draft of this article was accepted by the LFCS-2020 conference and was published by Springer [57] , shortly before the Covid crisis commenced. During This ironic chronology is, perhaps, worth briefly recollecting because of the connection between Theorem 4.4 with the new world of computing that is now, currently, emerging.
Thus, mankind will likely become increasingly dependent upon computers in the future. For instance, the spread of a serious epidemic can be more effectively con-tained, when staffs at medical facilities are computerized, as much as feasible. (Then a patient, suffering from a virus, will be less contagious, when virus particles bounce off sterile computerized robots, instead of encountering vulnerable human staff members.) Also, transportation networks and factories processing food-materials will be safer if they are run by computerized robots, rather than depend upon human beings (who breathe out air containing dangerous virus contagions).
Our point is that a large variety of forms of Artificial Intelligence will likely become increasingly prominent in the future. Thus, AI-based machines should become more effective, if their actions are both consistent and display the maximal amount of awareness about their self-consistency (that is plausible under anticipated future generalizations of our self-justifying formalism).
It is clear that AI-based computers will exhibit a broad variety of automated skills, many of which will be only partially related to Theorem 4.4's self-justifying IS T ab mechanism. (For instance, future AI-machines will, certainly, need automated skills that master the arts of visual learning, motion planning and several forms of decision-making.) Nevertheless, a quite fascinating point is that the early 20-th century predictions of Hilbert and Gödel, in * and * * , will gain some new positive interpretations, when they anticipated significant benefits from future generations of thinking machines being aware about the consistency of, at least, their specialized restricted forms of mathematical knowledge.
We do not wish to pursue these points further, here, because there will, certainly, be many other types of unanticipated events, which also advance the need for more elaborate forms of Artificial Intelligence in the future. These future events should be consistent with, at least, the broad predictions that Hilbert and Gödel made in their famous statements * and * * .
Our main results in this article are surprising because it is quite unusual for an initially consistent formalism α to become inconsistent when its initial schema of theorems (establishing the widespread validity of the Law of the Excluded Middle) is transformed into being a schema of logical axioms.
This unusual effect arose because the meaning of a Group-3 "I am consistent" axiom changes, quite substantially, when theorems are transformed into logical axioms (as illustrated by footnote 9 ). Thus, unacceptable diagonalizing contradictions can occur when an "I am consistent" axiom is able to reference itself in the context of a SUFFICIENTLY POWERFUL mathematical machine. Thus, while there is no doubt that the Second Incompleteness Theorem will be remembered for its seminal impact, its part-way exceptions are also significant. This is because futuristic high-tech computers will better understand their self-capacities, if they own some partial awareness about their own consistency.
There is no page space to delve into all details here. However, the distinction between the initial "IS(A)" system, from our 1993 and 2001 papers [46, 47] , with the more sophisticated IS Tab−1 (β) formalism of our year-2005 article [50] should, also, be briefly mentioned. Our older "IS(A)" formalism was actually simpler, but it was substantially weaker because it only recognized the non-existence of a proof of 0 = 1 from itself. In contrast, IS Tab−1 (β)'s Group-3 axiom can corroborate that no two simultaneous proofs exist for a Rank-1* sentence and its negation. This is an important distinction, because the First Incompleteness Theorem indicates no decision procedure exists for separating all true from false Rank-1* sentences. (See [51, 52, 54, 55] for other particular refinements for our "IS(A)" formalism.)
In summary, the main purpose of this article has been to explore the contrast between the opposing Theorems 4.4 and 4.5. The latter theorem, thus, provides another helpful reminder about the millennial importance of Gödel's seminal Second Incompleteness Theorem. Yet at the same time, Theorem 4.4 illustrates how some partial exceptions to Gödel's result do arise, as Hilbert and Gödel predicted in their statements * and * * .
In essence, the 2-way contrast between Theorems 4.4 and 4.5 may be as significant as their individual actual results. This is because the Second Incompleteness Theorem is fundamental to Logic. Many historians have, thus, been perplexed by the partial reluctance that Hilbert and Gödel had expressed about it in * and * * . A partial reason for this reluctance is, perhaps, related to the contrast between these two opposing theorems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: I thank Seth Chaiken and James P. Torre, IV for several quite helpful comments about how to improve the presentation.