COVID-19 has upended life around the globe. At the time of writing -May of 2020 -cases have been identified in over 200 countries around the world, while the global infection rate continues to grow at exponential rates. As countries race to put in measures to confront the current crisis, there remains much uncertainty in how the situation will progress in the coming months. Alongside direct effects of disease on health and mortality, widespread social and economic disruptions will have far reaching impacts on human well-being (Bavel et al. 2020 , Summer et al. 2020 , Sibley et al.2020 . While much public attention has focused on international and national policy responses (Pena et al.2020) , these efforts will ultimately need to be carried out by local-level institutions. As such, it is the character of local institutions, and their relationship with a broader set of governance arrangements across scales, that is likely to play a central role in determining the outcomes of different interventions, with significant implications for the trajectory of infection as well as longerterm outcomes for human well-being. This article provides preliminary analysis of how local level institutions are being operationalised for both disease control and social welfare mechanisms in rural India. As a country with over 250,000 local governmental units (gram panchayats), India has undertaken what is arguably the largest and most expansive mobilization of local governments around the world to the current crisis.
There are several fundamental challenges to coordinating COVID-19 response, for which local governance is likely to be particularly important. To begin with, there is a high level of uncertainty inherent in crafting responses to a crisis for which substantial existing policy experience does not yet exist. There is clearly a great deal of uncertainty concerning epidemiological aspects of the virus itself, with fundamental issues relating to transmission, treatment, and infection trajectories not yet well understood (WHO 2020 ). Yet the ways that the virus and different control measures will interact with different societies -and different populations within them -is equally unclear. As anthropologist Veena notes, "One issue that this pandemic has brought to the fore is that the experiences of governance vary enormously across different regions of the world -indeed, that the same policies such as the lockdowns will play out very differently for the middle classes and for the poor." Economist Jishnu has pointed out the uncertainties associated with feeding data on complex human behavior into epidemiological models, especially in the Indian context; lack of basic knowledge of both the disease and human response to different policy measures raises critical questions about the validity of assumptions being used to guide planning efforts. It is indeed notable that these diverse disciplinary backgrounds -biomedical sciences, economists, and anthropologists -can all agree, at least on one thing: there is a lot we do not know, and need to know, to effectively address the present pandemic. This uncertainty highlights a critical challenge for implementing real-world responses in many administrative contexts. What kinds of subnational institutional arrangements will be responsive enough to match the standardized policy actions crafted at higher scales of government with complex, variable, and changing conditions on the ground? Indeed, simply reaching the public to coordinate responses is likely to be a monumental task in many contexts, particularly in rural areas of the developing world. While public attention to date has focused on infection hotspots, largely in densely populated urban centres, rural areas pose particular challenges for conceiving and implementing policies for COVID-19.
Inadequate health facilities, poor water sanitation and hygiene infrastructures, high rates of wage labour migration, close living quarters, and low levels of public health awareness are just some of the difficulties that public authorities face for controlling infection (Ranscombe 2020) . High rates of endemic poverty, weak food distribution networks, significant dependence on migratory wage labour, and more also suggest that economic dislocation resulting from infection control measures holds significant risk of hunger or worse (Zetzsche 2020 , Khanna et al. 2020 , Barnett-Howell and Mobarak 2020 . There is an acute challenge of operating in many rural areas, where state presence is often highly variable, and low-level bureaucrats often struggle to bridge the gap between the highly formalized work of state institutions and the informal and syncretic worlds in which policy is expected to operate (Corbridge et al. 2005 , Gupta 2013 ). In settings where access to basic, well-defined social services remains uneven at best, effectively tracing, testing, isolating, and monitoring quickly developing infections is likely to be a monumental undertaking indeed.
Under such conditions, local governance is likely to be especially important in bridging the gap between policy measures and local realities for the coordination of responses to . A focus on local institutions is, of course, not new. From the 1980s onward, scores of countries around the world have undertaken reforms for decentralization based on the belief that local governments are better able to carry many government functions than more distant bureaucratic institutions (Manor 1999 , Faguet 2014 . A large and growing body of research affirms that, while outcomes are uneven, vesting power and resources with local authorities can lead to gains in a wide variety of state functions relating to public service delivery, rural development, and the delivery of social security mechanisms (Rondinelli et al. 1983 , Heller et al. 2007 , Faguet 2012 . Local governments have also been observed to play a key role in coordinating responses to extreme climate events and other disasters (Engle and Lemos 2010 , Agarwal et al. 2012 , Tselois and Tompkins 2017 . Additionally, decentralized health systems have been shown to empower communities in health decision-making and thus making basic health care more responsive to local needs (Munoz et al. 2017 ).
There are many theoretical explanations for why local government preforms better for a variety of grassroot state functions. We highlight three key reasons that local governance is likely to play an essential role in COVID-19 response. First, local governments are, quite simply, more closely connected to public and better able to navigate context-specific local conditions (Manor 1999) . In contrast to more distant state bureaucrats, local authorities are often far more knowledgeable about local needs, more able to mobilize key local actors, are better positioned to monitor activities at the grassroots, and are better able to anticipate and resolve site-specific challenges that arise (Agrawal 2007, Singh and Sharma 2007) .
Second, local authorities are themselves embedded within the societies that they serve and likely to be more responsive to the public's urgent needs. Not only are they often more accessible to the general public than more distant bureaucrats (Kruks-Wisner 2015), local authorities are embedded within an incentive structure that is likely to make them more accountable to local needs -both as a result of formal sanctions such as elections as well as the more general threat of public judgement and diminished personal reputation (Agrawal and Ribot 1999 , Faguet 2014 , Joshi & Schultze-Kraft 2014 .
Third, local government is often perceived as more legitimate than other external actors for carrying out different kinds of state regulatory functions. In electoral institutions, local authorities are directly selected by the public and thus may reflect citizens' values and aspirations, and often sense of identify (Fischer 2016 , Witsoe 2011 . Citizens' perceived ability to engage directly with their leaders may likewise increase the perceived legitimacy of their actions (Vogel and Henstra 2015) . As previous experience reveals, trust in local governance can be an important factor in effective communication management in times of disasters (Long staff and Yanh 2008) , and conversely, distrust in government institutions often stands in the way of cooperation with public health recommendations especially in crisis times, observed during the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 (Quinn et al. 2013 ).
These three characteristics -local governments' ability to negotiate context-specific local conditions, responsiveness toward the public, and perceived legitimacy to carry out state functions -are all likely to be important for the current crisis. In short, they suggest that local government may be better able to reach the public with various disease control and social security functions, with a higher degree of local cooperation as well as responsiveness to the public in delivering social security mechanisms at a time of unprecedented distress. Yet the present situation also poses particular challenges compared to other local governance activities. While local governments have been called upon to address a variety of state functions over the years, responding to COVID-19 requires a coupling of public health response with basic social security at an unprecedented scale -and this in a very short time frame. The challenges of social regulation in the context of COVID-19 may also generate tensions between different local government functions. For example, local authorities' role in working with police to enforce strict lockdowns could run counter to political pressures embedded in elected structures. Yet, local government is still likely to be better able than other administrative institutions to navigate such contradictory pressures inherent in a necessarily complex and unprecedented response in the face of COVID-19.
Perhaps never have local governments had such great and immediate importance; and quite arguably, never have their core functions been so dramatically extended in such rapid speed.
How local institutions take on these new roles is likely to have significant bearing on the longterm trajectory of COVID-19 response, with implications on disease control and infection rate, as well as the success of public support to protect the welfare at a time of severe social and economic dislocation.
It is for this reasons that the present paper examines how local-level institutions are being operationalized in the present moment. While it is far too early to know how the situation will play out from our vantage point of the early days of COVID-19 in South Asia, our paper provides a record of how low level authorities are responding to the present challenge, which may serve as a foundation for future studies into how local governance conditions shape longterm trajectories of infection response and recovery in the years to come.
India imposed a nationwide lockdown, considered one of the strictest in the world on 24 th March 2020. Initial news reports revealed unprecedented social and economic disruption, on a scale not seen since the beginning of the post-colonial era. With millions of migrants returning home from urban localities to rural areas, a sudden and drastic decline in off-farm employment opportunities, and widespread disruption of social services, the authors quickly mobilized to understand how the pandemic was being experienced at the local level -and the governance structures that were being called upon to manage this situation. Since we were unable to carry out our own field research, we reached out to a wide range of existing contacts across India in order to interview persons at the frontline of implementation of pandemic control and response measures. Despite clear methodological limitations on who we could contact remotely and the information we were able to acquire, we felt that the emerging story was much too important to not be told, and that even imperfect information was better than none at all in the quickly developing pandemic situation.
Our sample is comprised of interviews with lower level bureaucrats, Panchayat 1 Presidents, and Kudumbashree 2 leaders and heads of villages in the states of Kerala, Rajasthan and Odisha.
We interviewed three respondents from each state, who were the individuals that we could get in touch with remotely, and amidst a great increase in administrative functions that left many key actors with limited spare time for conversations. Contacts with informants was made through our existing network in the three states and subsequent referrals to bureaucrats through these associations. The interviews were conducted remotely on the phone with additional follow up questions through whatsapp messages as needed. We 1 Panchayat is the lowest system of rural local administrative government in India. ii) The operationalization of subnational and local institutions for pandemic response in practice. In order to understand the ways bureaucratic departments were engaging with local institutions, we enquired about processes of implementing orders on the ground, ways of monitoring by state governments, follow up mechanisms available to local governments, the availability of financial support to carry out key functions, and the role of various local institutions and civil society actors in managing different responses. We also asked questions on the tensions between the different levels of government in negotiating the new and unprecedented responses they were required to undertake.
iii) Actions of local governments and their decision-making processes. We sought to better understand the level of local discretion in carrying out actions mandated at higher scales as well as the extent of local governments' compliance. We also tried to gather information related to local governments' ability to adapt responses -including existing policy support mechanisms such as India's employment guarantee schemes (MGNREGA), provisions for subsidized food (through the Public Distribution System), and other social security mechanisms (emergency cash transfers) to the fast-evolving situation on the ground. iv) Finally, we focused on interviewee's self-perceptions and reflections of the pandemic situation more specific to challenges encountered, as well as perceived successes and scope for improvement.
These themes and questions were adapted to fit individual interviews within the scope of time available afforded by phone interviews with individuals in facing immense pressures on their own time to manage emerging tasks. We recognized, also, that bureaucrats would be inclined to show their "best face"; we have thus been careful not to assume responses are a fully accurate description, but a partial and suggestive account of some things happening on the ground. Still, one of the things that really struck us throughout the course of interviews was just how much, many bureaucrats wanted to talk about the situation that was clearly both extraordinarily stressful and personally frightening for many in charge. A few of the bureaucrats repeatedly asked us to not quote them when they felt they might have divulged sensitive information on the pandemic management situation, including personal accounts about being unhappy with the coordination between the state government and the district administration, the unavailability of budget to make cash transfers for the poor, and the potential risk of being exposed to the virus itself in line of duty, without the availability of personal protective equipment such as face masks. (We do not identify the specific districts in our sample to ensure anonymity of key bureaucrats interviewed in these districts.)
Based on our relatively small sample and the lack of detailed data on infection rates or socioeconomic outcomes at the time of writing, we refrain from making both broad assessments of overall governance "effectiveness" based on such accounts. To the extent possible, we tried to corroborate our interview findings from bureaucrats through informal interviews over whatsapp calls and messages with a handful of additional civil society actors within our personal networks (three in each state); these actors came from a diverse mix of backgrounds including actors employed in NGOs, social science researchers, and journalists. Throughout this period, we were also in close contact with local government and bureaucrats in other Indian states not including in this paper, especially Assam, Chhattisgarh and Himachal Pradesh where we have long-term research engagements, thus affording us a broader view of state responses in other parts of India.
The formal rank of our respondents and their roles and functions are summarised in Table 1 . under whose provisions the lockdown was imposed. During the early days of the lockdown, major notifications and guidelines relating to COVID-19 were primarily being issued by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and not the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (EPW 2020). Since the language used was mostly related to "law and order", we searched the MHA website using keywords such as "lockdowns," "curfews," "fines" and "surveillance." In addition, we carefully scoured the Government of India's websites of, the Ministry of Health extremely useful. All of these sources helped to complement our primary data, providing at least some means to triangulate our findings and contextualize them within broader processes happening across India during the period of our research.
The Indian government's decision to impose a 21-day lockdown, on 24th of March 2020, came after being urged by the World Health Organization (WHO) to take aggressive action to contain the spread of COVID-19 (Lancet 2020). The lockdown was imposed with a four hours' notice and went into effect from the midnight of 24 th of March. These sudden and drastic measures came at great shock to citizens across the country, however we learned through interviews that some administrators had prior notification that the lockdown would be imposed.
As in other parts of the world, social distancing along with restrictive mass restrictions on movement is being used as the most widely adopted strategy for mitigation and spread of infection. This nation-wide lockdown has been imposed through the Disaster Management However, the 73 rd amendment left significant discretion to India's states for its implementation, leading to very different character of local governance across the countryvariation which has been the topic of significant and ongoing analysis (Singh and Sharma 2007 , Manor 2010 , Maiorano et al. 2018 ).
There is reason to believe that these variations will also shape COVID-19 response. We have selected our study sites to encompasses some of the wide variation across India. Rajasthan and Odisha are somewhat poorer states, and despite social movements to promote more responsive governance -including activism leading up to India's Right to Information (RTI)
Act (2005) -that emerged from Rajasthan, both states have had variable success in improving the overall quality of governance as well as uneven development achievements overall (Dreze and Sen 2013). Kerala in contrast is relatively prosperous, with a very robust civil society, a history of vibrant electoral competition at the state level and is generally celebrated for its significant social development achievements, which are at or near the top of India's states in areas such as literacy, health, and nutrition (Heller 2000) . Importantly, it also has a history of very strong state support for panchayats, especially through the state's "People's Campaign for Decentralized Planning", which has been described as "the most ambitious effort to build local institutions of participatory democratic governance ever undertaken in the subcontinent" (Heller et al. 2007 ). Finally, the state's heralded Kudumbashree program, a women-focused anti-poverty program that has given women a particularly strong and institutionalized presence in local government across the state (Williams et al. 2011) .
Kerala and Odisha have also had experience in dealing with health and natural disasters which has influenced current local institutional response to COVID-19. 
The COVID-19 crisis has led the District Magistrate (DM) to play a key role in both disease control and social protection in close coordination with panchayats. Specifically, based on the NDMA guidelines, district administrations across India have constituted district-level "task forces" to coordinate administration and containment efforts through the lockdown period. (1) mitigating the spread of infection from urban centers to rural areas and (2) helping to deal with widespread economic fallout from loss of cash income and consequent food insecurity for a large proportion of the population that already lives close to the margin to begin with.
Consequently, district authorities have issued guidelines to panchayats to undertake a wide variety of functions, as summarized in the table 1. Importantly, instructions issued by the DM in order to implement policies related to disease control and social protection are ultimately The following sections further explore how local institutions have been operationalized to fulfill these activities as well as their implications -both for the structure and functions of panchayats in India as well as for the COVID-19 response and recovery. 
In the initial days of the lockdown, there was an urgent need to control pandemic while also ensuring basic welfare and food security for citizens. Under NDMA, the central government issued guidelines to the states and district administrations for concrete actions undertaken by panchayats and other local actors, such as health care and community workers. Of paramount urgency was to control the spread of infection from returning migrant laborers.
To do so, panchayats have been instructed to work together with frontline health workers like the Accredited Social Health Activist (ASHA), Auxiliary Nurse Midwives (ANM), women SHGs, local community members like teachers, and others. This is done through the formation of a committee at the panchayat or village level known as control rooms (in Rajasthan), rapid response teams (in Odisha) and Panchayat Jagruta Sammittee (in Kerala) 10 . Named differently across Indian states, the committees perform similar functions. Panchayats are also in charge of distributing cooked food to quarantine centers and households without income through community run kitchens. Since agriculture has been recognized as an essential service by the national government, the DM has also instructions to Panchayats for overlooking allocation of work through the MGNREGA, providing access to agricultural inputs for farmers and also working with district administration to ensure linkages to storage facilities for crops and transportation for distribution. The range of functions being given to panchayats is impressive, however it is important to note that India's existing experience with decentralization suggests that the extent to which they are able to follow through with these tasks is likely vary significant in different parts of the country.
Together, these tasks -and in particular of monitoring the public to halt the spread of the virus --represent a great increase in state directives being coordinated at local and district levels. Many actors in charge of these efforts did not feel prepared to assume these tasks. As a local bureaucrat (tehsildar 13 ) from Odisha described, "all of a sudden the government asked us to initiate cash transfers and also distribute food and cash…we did not have hard cash initially and banks were also not operating at full capacity due to the lockdown. We also had to figure out which local institutional machineries and actors we shall use and how in order for benefits to reach maximum number of people. It took us a about ten days just to figure out the logistics."
Underscoring the perception of urgency in response to the current situation, war metaphors have become common. 'At the state level we have a war room with senior bureaucrats in charge and responsible for coordinating COVID-19 response in the state', recounted the Additional Magistrate of a district in Rajasthan. The bureaucrat from Odisha noted that "the government machinery is working 24*7, with military like discipline." The Kudambashree leader mentioned how they are using a 'volunteer army' of 50,000 across panchayats in Kerala to respond to the COVID-19 crisis.
13 A tehsildar also known as an executive magistrate is a tax officer with the district revenue department in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Yet, while coping with the sudden great expansion of new responsibilities, other more routine activities have been overshadowed such as health treatment of chronic diseases like tuberculosis, and routine immunization programs. The village head in Rajasthan and tehsildar in Odisha recounted that almost all development projects under India's employment guarantee scheme (MGNREGA) had temporarily stopped, while agriculture suffered since this is the harvest season and lockdown has led to breaks in agricultural supply chains. Other village development works also had to be discontinued. The village head summed it up by saying, "all development have come to a standstill".
The central government's response to the COVID-19 crisis, through the NDMA, redefined existing institutional roles with a multipronged approach that has led to an integration of several institutional actors across state with district and local administrations. We already mentioned the key role that is being played by the DMs who have been put in a position to make key binding decisions in operationalizing state guidelines. The table below highlights the functions of district level task forces set up in Odisha, Rajasthan and Kerala. The DM is in a position to issue orders to several line departments and local level institutions and make decisions regarding sealing of district borders and to restrict movement within the districts, which the DM achieves through regular patrols by lower level bureaucrats. As the Additional DM from Rajasthan recounted to us, that district administration had never faced a situation so big and it has led to the entire district level machinery to work on one platform as well as with districts in other states for inter-state movement of migrants. He also added that the success or failure in implementation depended solely on the discretion and vision of the DM given his powers under the NDMA. At the same time, DM's have faced new institutional imperatives for their actions, described as forms of 'deterrence' that, according to the Additional DM of Rajasthan, worked as a 'pushing force'. This included suspension from job if bureaucrats were not able to maintain lockdown regulations in their areas of jurisdiction. There have also been strict monitoring mechanisms imposed by DMs; in Odisha the bureaucrats we interviewed said they were required to report at least twice daily to the DM.
At the level of the panchayats, Panchayat level committees have been constituted. In both Rajasthan and Odisha, these have been constituted at the village level, knows as control rooms and rapid response forces (RRF), respectively. In Kerala, the Panchayats have more autonomy in both formulating and implementing responses related to COVID-19. In Rajasthan and Odisha, the core members constitute elected members of the panchayat, head of the village, schoolteachers, heads of Self-Help Groups (SHGs), ASHA and ANM workers. They are responsible for coordinating activities on the ground as well as reporting to district administration of any emerging issues. The core members, who also belong to various departments like Panchayat, health, education then mobilize other members from these institutions along with the public more generally as well as, at times, civic associations such as youth, women, and farmers groups. This has led to both leveraging and convergence of panchayats working together with local health, education and sanitation departments. In other words, the 'panchayat committees' link the elected authority of panchayats with other kinds of skilled individuals within the state as a linchpin to coordinate local responses.
In 
Despite these new collaborations, the Indian bureaucracy runs on issuing directives and notifications which is also how things have been set in motion in the current crisis mode. The district administration with the DM at the top issues' orders percolating to the panchayats.
This arrangement is sustained not just through perceived urgency; bureaucrats themselves could be penalized, issued show cause notices, arrested and fined if they fail to effectively implement government issues implementation procedures for lockdown. The fright of punishment percolates down to the bureaucrats and officers working below the DM, who are also compulsorily required to report to the DM twice a day, as mentioned above.
There has been a proliferation of orders or government communications, notifications and guidelines aimed directly at citizens as well as for internal communication to bureaucrats.
These are also long and phrased in ways that are difficult for either panchayat leaders or many field-level officers to comprehend. The national and state governments till 3 rd of May had issued over 4000 government communications ranging from, specifying what one could buy or sell, determining the number of people who could attend a marriage or a funeral, or even whether one is allowed to leave the house to feed a stray dog. To give an example, the lockdown necessitated the closure of public spaces like village markets, places of worship and industries and enterprises, ensuring that essential enterprises and services remain open. But what constituted essential was also revised over the course of the lockdown. While alcohol was considered a non-essential commodity initially, it was deemed essential for a few days in the states of Assam and Kerala, and then classified as unessential once again.
These standardized procedures often present their own complications. In our conversation with a village headman in Rajasthan, for example, we learned that although the village was allocated a budget to procure a certain number of masks by the district administration, the headmen would have to place a requisition with the district administration to procure these masks from the district headquarters; on its own the panchayat was not allowed to procure the masks. In Odisha, although the tehsildar we interviewed was legally permitted to impose fines on those violating lockdown, but he would have to pass an ordinance in order to impose and collect these fines.
The top-down nature of bureaucratic institutions notwithstanding, local governments have a significant role in the current and fast evolving crisis. Panchayats are clearly doing more than just providing relief measures; they are leveraging their positions as an institution of legitimacy with elected representatives to converge with other local institutions in addressing issues spanning from disease control, to monitoring of mobility, providing agricultural support, managing of quarantine centers and more.
Strikingly, our interviews showed a pervading sense of fear about the spread of the disease and increasingly so with the returning of migrants to villages. As a local bureaucrat in Odisha described to us, when the district administration ordered the panchayats to set up quarantine centers in villages for returning migrants, several villagers protested out of fear of infection spread and wanted to seal off entry. Only after the panchayat called meetings with local community and explained the situation, then they were given consent by the villagers. This
illustrates not just how important inter-personal relationships in the community have been for making public health measures work, but also the very intimate ways in which local governments are often able to navigate social realities at a time of great fear and uncertainty.
Panchayats have also played a critical role assessing needs for the delivery of relief measures which was carried out by panchayat level committees. In Kerala, Rajasthan and Odisha, the panchayats helped identify individuals and households who were outside of the government welfare schemes and in need of social support. In Kerala, the panchayat president described to us how households in the village who are facing financial distress have approached elected panchayat leaders directly, who could then identify sources of public funding or social support mechanisms to help the household.
At the same time, panchayats have been called upon to help implement various measures for social control which was done in close coordination with the police department. Across India, the police have a central role in enforcing lockdown restrictions through activities ranging from asking violators to go home, using the threat of force to vacate public spaces, drawing lines to space people out in front of shops in markets, standing at the naka (barricade) to check cars at the state and even district borders, and arresting offenders. At times this has been accompanied by excessive force and even brutality such as beatings, as documented in the national media. Our interviews with village heads across show that panchayats have the dual role of providing social security while implementing social regulations which sometimes put them in an awkward position, when police had to be called upon to report both violations of lockdown and/or isolation of suspected COVID-19 cases. Our interviews also show that in some villages police personnel also joined the local COVID-19 management committee in patrols to enforce lockdown.
One of the most striking things that we found in course of our interviews was the extent to which the present moment has spurred people at the district and grassroots level into action, expressed through a sentiment of social responsibility to confront present challenges. We found most of the bureaucrats we spoke with to be genuinely concerned about their districts and the general wellbeing of people. Bureaucrats said to us that they themselves were scared due to the lack of protective gear and daily exposure in course of their duty, yet they still prioritized disease control. Village headman and Panchayat presidents also expressed a sense of fear and yet lauded the efforts of thousands of volunteers and grassroots health workers who went door to door.
This was particularly true in the case of the Kudambashree in Kerala, which has been explicitly recognized as a part of Kerala's response strategy. The Kudumbashree is a poverty eradication program modeled through formation of women Self Help Groups (SHGs). It is built on an extensive network with participation from nearly four million economically women who implement programs and projects aimed at livelihood security and wellbeing. One of the key themes in the development of Kudumbashree as an institution has been its convergence with Panchayats across the state for planning, implementation, and sharing of resources. In short, the Kudumbashree works together with the Panchayats and is not a subordinate to it, which has served as a key channel for many women to gain prominences in local governance activities throughout the state.
Across its statewide membership, the Kudumbashree comprises over 50,000 people. We interviewed a Kudumbashree leader named Lalitha 15 , who explained to us their close relationship with those in, home isolation and also in quarantine facilities. They make phone calls to individuals in quarantine to monitor their health status and follow up for seven days post quarantine period. She also noted that it was not difficult to find volunteers; indeed, people have been ready and willing to work without remuneration simply for the good of their communities. She explained how daily calls to check up on quarantined individuals often led to friendship. She told us, with laughter in her voice, that even after the completion of quarantine, "They still call me and say, 'how are you doing Lalitha, we have not heard from you in a while?'"
Although the imagery of the state in India is often considered to be distant, apathetic and anonymous, our interviews indicate that the mobilization of volunteer groups, frequent home visits, close planning and monitoring with the community has been underscored by an ethics of care. These examples are perhaps one of the strongest reasons that local governance is needed at the moment: it provides an avenue to harness the interests and concern of committed individuals toward public needs. The Kerala case in particular highlights how sustained commitment toward supporting institutions can create a favorable relationship that are especially conducive to channeling these kinds of positive outcomes. Working through the Kudumbashree has, as an effect, brought an intimate ethic of care channeled through interpersonal relationships into disease prevention and control.
The aforementioned case material shows some of the ways in which responses to have been coordinated through a combination of low-level administrative authorities, elected village governments, and other state and civil society groups. In aggregate, these activities represent a mammoth undertaking that has, at least for the time being, not only greatly expanded the roles and functions of local governments but also led to new forms of institutional interaction with administrative authorities across scales. The evidence presented here has several key implications for understanding institutional dimensions of policy response efforts in the present moment.
To begin with, the material illustrates just how important local governance has been for carrying out response to COVID-19. While administrative authorities like the DM are ultimately in charge, they rely heavily on local level institutions for many different aspects of response. There are many actions that only local institutions have the knowledge, legitimacy, and coordinating capacity to do. Accordingly, disease response is not simply the straightforward application of predefined biomedical guidelines; the character of governance -the nature of institutions, their capacities, and legitimacy -shapes how state responses will unfold over the long-term. As we have argued, such factors deserve at least as much attention in the trajectory of COVID-19 as biology, demography, economy, or other factors in understanding the spread of virus and its impacts upon society.
Second, the effectiveness of local governments in carrying out responses to COVID-19 are rooted in broader histories of policy interventions. India's 73 rd constitutional amendment and subsequent interventions that have expanded the roles and capacities of local governments have all provided an important foundation for the efforts observed above. In the case of Kerala in particular, especially robust, long-term support for local governments as a key arena for empowered local governance has made these institutions into a formidable force for confronting the present pandemic (Isaac and Sadananda 2000) , exemplified by a strong degree of trust and collaboration between state actors and citizens present in our data. These histories of institutional support over the past two decades may be as important for COVID-19 responses as any of the policies quickly designed since the emergence of the virus.
Third, the experience of coordinating responses to COVID-19 shows how large shocks can serve as a key force to propel institutional change. This is particularly notable in contexts such as India, which has a notoriously inflexible bureaucratic machinery. In the present context, the urgent need for rapid responses in conjunction with central directives to coordinate actions through integrative governance arrangements have led to new kinds cross-sectoral and multi-scalar collaborations for the implementing of response actions down the village level. Such emergent forms of collaboration across established institutional divides seem likely to afford greater flexibility to negotiate actions on the ground. Whether and to what extent these novel forms of coordination may leave a lasting imprint on local institutional practice remains to be seen.
Our case material -drawn from three states representing a diversity of social, economic, and political contexts -shows just how central local government has been to the story of COVID-19 in India. As the local institutional foundation to carry out response measures, they are likely to play a critical role in confronting COVID-19 in many other parts of the world as well.
The future, of course, remains highly uncertain. As disease trajectories and recovery continues to be analyzed for years to come, analysis of local institutions will be important not just for understanding why different kinds of policy responses were adopted, but also the mechanics through which they have been brought into being at the local level. The present case provides some evidence of how local governments have been operationalized in the early days of COVID-19 in India, which can serve as a foundation for future studies of how local institutional dynamics, their histories, and the government policies they are called upon to carry out influence the long-term success of disease control and livelihood support as the pandemic proceeds.