fossil fuel subsidies, which generate both end carbon emissions and water and land pollution at sites of extraction, processing and disposal, range between US$300-680 billion per year and result in estimated global damages of US$5 trillion in reduced natural functioning, offsetting any economic advantage they confer. 11 Additionally, many governments subsidize fishing by national fleets, estimated to be over US$35 billion per year, often encouraging overfishing and exceeding the net economic benefit obtained. 12 Overall, the amount of finance mobilized to promote and preserve biodiversity is conservatively estimated to be outweighed by environmentally harmful subsidies by a factor of ten. 11 Subsidies are not in and of themselves inherently bad; they are a useful tool for governments to make investments in areas that can promote ecosystem resilience. However, many of the original goals of subsidies, such as maintaining economic viability of rural areas or supporting new industries, can be equally well achieved by promoting public goods rather than supporting over-exploitation. Yet subsidy reform is often challenged by vested interests 13 ; for example, the recent turmoil in global oil markets has increased lobbying for retaining fossil fuel subsidies rather than ending them. Studies of subsidy reforms undertaken by a handful of countries suggest the need to: act quickly when presented with windows of opportunity that may be outside the influence of domestic policy makers and unrelated to the environment (for example, current health crises); build alliances between economic and environmental interests in common; devise targeted measures to address potential impacts on competitiveness and income distribution; build a robust evidence base on the social costs and benefits of reform; and encourage broad stakeholder engagement. 14 Existing positive subsidies related to biodiversity that could be improved and expanded include support to farmers who conserve and better provision ecosystem health on their lands, an approach used in both the US Conservation Reserve Program and the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, in both cases, positive subsidies to encourage environmentally-friendly farming practices (for example, conservation set-asides, organic agriculture, integrated farm management, and preservation of landscape of high-value habitats) are usually outweighed by other subsidies that lead to overproduction, agricultural expansion, or livestock production that contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. 15, 16 To achieve benefits from positive subsidies to agriculture, evidence suggests they need to be spatially targeted to areas of high biodiversity in order to disincentivize extensification, rather than current models of enrolling volunteers or larger farms, and focus on results-based payments for the most ecologically valuable practices. 17, 18 One additional form of public subsidy that can be used to support biodiversity-friendly food production is through public procurement. Just as government purchases of medical supplies has spurred needed production for the COVID-19 response, the power of public purchasing of food grown using biodiversity-protecting approaches can increase local production of more sustainable food choices and encourage an upscaling of investments. 19, 20 While there have been strong debates about whether or not organic and other low-resource input agriculture may lead to lower yields, implying a risk of increased expansion of agricultural land, there is evidence that new forms of knowledge-intensive practices that are supported by and protect ecosystem services in agriculture can in fact deliver healthy, sustainable and affordable food, especially when combined with other measures, such as dietary changes to reduce consumption of meat and dairy. 21, 22 Specific sustainable intensification practices, depending on context, can include precision agriculture, enhanced biocontrol/integrated pest management, ecological infrastructure (e.g. grass strips or permaculture), and diversified agro-forestry or agro-pastoral systems; these approaches have in common a focus on improving agro-ecological functions such as nutrient cycling, soil conservation, and biodiversity promotion (especially for pollinators and soil health). 23
Environmental policy has a long history of using environmental taxes to reduce pollution and increase resource use efficiency, such as gas taxes or plastic bag fees; however, very few direct consumption or other taxes have been designed specifically to preserve biodiversity. Many taxes on activities or products exerting negative (and often indirect) effects on ecosystems and biodiversity rely either on the polluter-pay principle or on the user-pay principle, which can serve to nudge people towards certain behaviours, but most existing taxes are too low to significantly reduce negative impacts. 24 Well-designed pricing mechanisms serve as both consumer incentives and can raise sources of revenue for local, state and national governments. 25 A wide range of ecosystem-related taxes could be increased and expanded, including resource extraction taxes (e.g. timber); pesticide taxes; diffuse pollution taxes, including water pollution charges and taxes; air pollution and gasoline taxes, given that air pollutants harm ecosystems through acidification and eutrophication of inland waters; carbon taxes; and waste and packaging taxes. 26 The experience of a recent increase in the carbon tax in France, which was met by protests from the Yellow Vests movement, may seem a discouraging example, but in fact well-designed taxes that include a way to address equity concerns so that they do not unfairly fall on certain populations are likely to receive more public support. 27 J o u r n a l P r e -p r o o f For example, proposals for a carbon fee or tax that is paired with a dividend or rebate to households can help solve these problems, since a majority of mostly low and middle income families would receive more money back than they would spend in higher taxes in a progressively designed scheme. 28 Others have also suggested using carbon taxes to directly support biodiversity efforts, such as Costa Rica's fuel tax that funds payments for forest protection programs. 29 Public education efforts are essential to convey the message that environmental taxes are incentives that have measurable environmental impacts and are not merely instruments for financing the state budget. Psychological factors also matter, and one promising approach is bonus-malus (Latin for good-bad) schemes, in which negative behaviours are taxed and positive ones subsidized; such a mechanism is widely used in insurance premiums and has a proven incentive effect. In France, a bonus-malus was applied to car purchases starting in 2009 according to their CO 2 emissions, leading to an increase in buyers of small-engine cars and an even bigger drop in purchases of large ones. 30 The idea could be adapted to budget-balanced 'ecological bonus-malus' schemes that punish or reward according to the damage to biodiversity inflicted or avoided. 31 Concerningly, however, rather than seeking to increase taxes on some industries causing environmental damage or pursue novel financing strategies, some post-COVID recovery packages are actually moving in the opposite direction by reducing taxes and relaxing regulations, a short-term strategy for economic stimulus that is likely to have longer-term negative health and environmental consequences ( Figure 2 , Table S2 ). 32 Governments can also seek to reform tax havens and retain more revenue at home in an era of tightening belts. Offshore and hidden accounts reduce the amount of financing available to governments for global public goods provisioning and provide bad actors with opportunities to avoid financial scrutiny, reducing the impact of policies such as certification or supply chain monitoring. A recent study found that 70% of known fishing vessels implicated in illegal fishing are flagged in a tax haven, and that nearly 70% of foreign capital to the largest companies raising soy and beef in the Amazon, prime drivers of deforestation, were channelled through tax havens. 33 Preventing companies who use tax havens from reaping any benefits of post-COVID recovery money from public coffers is one possible approach.
In the short term, as the private sector seeks grants and loans to shore up payrolls and ensure the possibility of longer-term viability, governments can seek to prioritize support for those businesses that do not harm biodiversity and put restrictions on those that accept investment. For example, after the 2008-9 automotive company bailout in the US, the Obama administration had leverage to work with car manufacturers to increase fuel economy standards, and the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided numerous loans and tax credits towards greener vehicle development. 34 Similar plans could be required for businesses receiving COVID-19 bailout funds, including having biodiversity risk mitigation plans, requiring disclosures of impact, or building ecosystem considerations into decision-making, particularly for industries with demonstrated impacts on and risks to biodiversity (e.g. agribusiness, apparel, mining, and energy among others). 35 Other relevant examples of conditionality could include requirements for the cruise industry to minimize their considerable contribution to ocean pollution 36 while airlines could be required to tackle reduced carbon emissions as part of their receipt of public funds (currently being required in France's stimulus). So far, Canada has proposed that bailout funds to large corporations will require adherence to carbon disclosure standards, while the 'no significant harm principle' of the EU states that none of the expenditures in the budget from 2021-2027 can be spent on things that would have negative impacts on environmental priorities. Beyond these examples, currently few strings are being attached to stimulus or bailout money in other countries. Conditionality measures and standards would need to be combined with transparency as to where bailout funds and stimulus investments are being directed, so as to harness public scrutiny of these efforts. 37 While there may be concerns that conditions on bailout assistance could technically affect competitiveness, bailouts can themselves confer an unfair competitive advantage; therefore, net outcomes would depend on the balance between these forces, and it can be reasonable to limit that advantage by imposing conditionality.
In the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis, government-supported work programs can be essential in reducing widespread unemployment, and conservation jobs in particular can be scaled up rapidly. Just as the Works Progress Administration and Civilian Conservation Corps were used in the US during the Great Depression, jobs in ecological restoration and green infrastructure could be a source of both employment and ecological benefits. 38 Given current demands for increased racial justice, and the disproportionate impact COVID-19 has had on communities of colour in the US in particular, such employment programs can be targeted to these harder-hit areas, J o u r n a l P r e -p r o o f such as in urban ecosystem restoration and green infrastructure. 39 A recent survey of economists found that stimulus measures focused on green sectors (both biodiversity and climate) were rated among the most positive potential measures, delivering both short and long term economic and societal benefits, while airline bailouts were rated as the worst stimulus option. 7 Experience shows that these investments work; marine restoration projects funded as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009 generated more jobs per million USD invested than many other sectors, such as fossil fuels. 40 A study submitted to Australia's government estimates that AUS$4billion in conservation-oriented post-COVID stimulus would create over 50,000 jobs working on naturerelated activities. 41 Many payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs globally have been used to support employment in activities such as invasive species removal, reforestation and restoration, and other investments in both people and nature and these could be rapidly upscaled as they usually have more demand than finances allow. 42 The COVID-19 pandemic has also opened space for consideration of emergency "universal basic income" (UBI) proposals, such as paying US$2000 per person monthly until the pandemic subsides, as a quick, efficient, non-bureaucratic method to put cash into people's hands. 43 There are a range of potential variations on UBI as a way to realise a 'social protection floor', an idea that was approved at the 2012 UN Convention on Sustainable Development Rio+20 conference. UBI in developing countries can be a particularly useful way of alleviating poverty, which in turn can have knock-on effects such as preventing deforestation. 44 In developed country contexts, UBI can be more controversial, in part because of its apparent cost, and in part because of arguments that more benefit can be achieved with a given amount of revenue through more targeted or conditional benefits (e.g. meanstested welfare payments, or unemployment insurance). 45, 46 What has often gone unmentioned in these discussions is that UBI could have biodiversity impacts as well, although the overall environmental consequences of UBI are still under discussion, with little empirical evidence so far. 47 A subsistence-level UBI has been suggested as a way to facilitate simpler lifestyles with smaller ecological footprints, and to valorise unpaid work (often performed by women) such as child raising, work in the arts, or volunteer activity that typically has a lower carbon footprint than paid labour but which provide significant public benefits. 48 Recent proposals for a "conservation basic income" have made the argument that poverty alleviation and environmental goals could be packaged together and applied to everyone living near areas of high conservation value. 49 The cost of UBI subsidies could be raised via environmental sources like carbon or pollution taxes in which the revenue is then redistributed, or by redesigning development aid to recipient countries. Other related programs, such as conditional cash transfers (CCT), have shown that direct payments can result in both positive and negative environmental behaviours depending on context and thus must be designed carefully; one recent analysis of a CCT program in Indonesia shows that it reduced deforestation, although it was not designed for conservation ends 50 , while a CCT in Sierra Leone was associated with higher rates of forest clearance. 51 Overall, the effectiveness of payments (conditional or not) will be dependent on whether incentives are structured in appropriate ways, and whether the hoped-for pro-environmental outcomes are considered locally legitimate. 52
In the longer-term, both governments and market actors must aim to achieve a more sustainable economy that better integrates the protection of nature. The GA assessed a series of possibilities, based on evidence of effectiveness of existing policies and scenarios of what future worlds might look like, declaring a need for "incorporating the reduction of inequalities into development pathways, reducing overconsumption and waste and addressing environmental impacts, such as externalities of economic activities, from the local to the global scales." 1 Below we focus on some key steps that can be taken to ensure such transformative economic changes ( Figure 3 ).
Shorter and more localized supply chains are likely to be inevitable in a post-COVID-19 world, as the current justin-time models have revealed themselves to be vulnerable to interruptions. 53 Many already faced systemic risks inherent in tightly connected yet fragile commodity chains and the dependency of businesses on ecosystem services that are overused or increasingly homogenized. 54 For example, over the past several decades, commodity chain verticalization in agribusiness has created the conditions for overproduction, driven in part by private equity investments that pressure many producers to cut costs, the collapse of international commodity agreements that have resulted in increased production even when not met by demand, and current trade rules that encourage unsustainable sourcing. 55 The experience from COVID-19 is likely to significantly alter a number of production systems, thus there is a need to be proactive in maximizing positive ecological impacts and minimizing negative welfare impacts of supply-chain changes.
Food production is the supply system of primary global concern; some national governments have restricted exports of food in response to the crisis, and many are now seeking to balance food security concerns with J o u r n a l P r e -p r o o f developing more localized supply chains that can contribute to food sovereignty. 56 Shortening food chains involves reducing intermediaries (such as wholesalers, processors, or shippers) and focusing on better linking supply with markets, including direct-to-consumers (e.g. farmers' markets, community-supported agriculture), expanded community food production (e.g. urban gardens, seed exchanges), and decreased corporate control (e.g. cooperatives rather than vertically-structured agribusinesses). 57 Such steps have the potential to lead to local foodsheds that increase traceability and consumer confidence, improve product quality (including freshness and health concerns), as well as to lower environmental impacts (including reduced packaging, decreased food waste, and closing nutrient cycles, although the impact on carbon emissions remain highly dependent on context). 58 However, shifting from global supply chains to more localized production will be challenging in balancing efficiency with resilience, and will need to be planned with the participation of multiple stakeholders, including consumers. While some previous studies of "buying local" have warned about decreasing welfare from less consumption due to higher prices 59 , from a sustainability perspective, this definition of welfare is inadequate. There are also non-economic social benefits of shorter supply chains that can be recognized, including reconnections of cities and neighbouring rural populations and fostering senses of stewardship, culture and place. 60 At the same time, global trade will continue to be needed, particularly as many areas cannot supply sufficient food locally. 61 Thus these efforts can be supported by reformed trade agreements, which need to shift from their dominant focus on trade liberalization towards securing fairness, equity and sustainability, including rules that provide greater policy space for governments to prioritize and support local production standards. 62 Work within WTO has aimed at eliminating economically distorting subsidies, but could be expanded by creating a true "green box" for biodiversity-friendly initiatives to encourage elimination of ecologically harmful subsidies and overproduction stimulated by trade. Other trade reforms include the EU's consideration of carbon border taxes to discourage leakage, and similar steps could be taken for green production supply chains that avoid land-based emissions and preserve biodiversity in particular. 63 Reforming global trade and production will also require multinational corporations to move away from the paradigm that their primary business aim is to maximize dividends for shareholders, which often encourages unsustainable overproduction. 64
Consumption is a major driver of unsustainable production, and the GA noted that countries could focus on "improving standards, systems and relevant regulations aimed at internalizing the external costs of production, extraction and consumption (such as pricing wasteful or polluting practices, including through penalties); promoting resource efficiency and circular and other economic models; voluntary environmental and social certification of market chains; and incentives that promote sustainable practices and innovation." 1 The COVID-19 pandemic may accelerate trends towards reduced consumption, given massively reduced travel and rethinking of what counts as a good quality of life. 65 However, many immediate stimulus measures that have been proposed focus on increased consumption, such as reductions in VAT taxes, without much attention to the ecological impacts of such actions ( Figure 2 , Table S2 ).
Steps to reduce excess consumption can include both incentives and regulations: targeting consumer behaviour with tools such as education initiatives, choice architecture, and collaborative consumption (such as sharing and reuse), as well as resource use caps and taxes and changes in subsidies that encourage overproduction. 66, 67 Concerns about 'individual choice' likely need to be reframed in terms of 'freedom to enjoy a good quality of life within ecological boundaries' in order to foster more support for such ideas. Universal agreement on what upper consumption limits should entail is not likely to be achieved, but work on how to operationalize concepts like 'consumption corridors' and 'doughnut economies' for acceptance by the public is gaining political traction. 68 The concepts of circular economies and decoupling resource use and economic growth (or even exploring degrowth) are also increasingly popular topics of discussion and research, but not yet widespread in empirical practice. 69 Some have posited that transitions within economic sectors, such as from resource-intensive production of natural resources to more service or financially-oriented economies (which may be accelerated by COVID-19 work-fromhome trends), would lead to smaller environmental impacts. Evidence suggests, however, that consumption by those working in the services sectors may outweigh gains from shifts in production, indicating that both production and consumption strategies need to go hand in hand. 70 Overall, the conclusion of several recent reports is that no sustainable future that meets both human needs and stays within planetary boundaries is possible without decreases in excess consumption. 71, 72 Shift fiscal policies to reflect environmental values Currently governments have a great deal of concern about how they will balance budgets and manage long-term fiscal stressors, particularly subnational authorities with yearly requirements for balanced budgets and the inability to borrow or go into debt. This is forcing hard choices that have long-term consequences; for example, New York City, facing a budget deficit of US$7 billion in lost tax revenue since the pandemic, has proposed a more than 10% cut to the city's parks department budget, despite green space having been an important physical and mental health benefit during lockdown policies. 73 In light of these challenges, ensuring that state fiscal policies continue to reflect environmental values is important, and novel financing can help subnational areas balance their budgets. For example, ecological fiscal transfers (EFT) are a policy instrument used to redistribute tax revenues among public actors based on ecological or conservation-related indicators (such as the quantity and quality of protected areas or forest areas). These fiscal redistribution formulas can be a means to compensate municipalities for their conservation expenses or paying for the spillover benefits of related areas beyond municipal boundaries. 74 To date, there are only a few countries globally that have implemented EFT (such as Brazil, India, Portugal and France), although there is good potential to do so with low transaction costs. 75, 76 For example, in 2015, India started distributing 7.5% of its national-level tax revenue based on state forest cover indicators, and from 2020 onwards will use 10%. 77 Such approaches can be encouraged and expanded to assist local governments in supporting conservation while also providing opportunities for citizens to enjoy more green spaces.
For the financial sector, including banks, wealth and pension funds, private equity, insurance companies, and others, a mix of regulations and incentives can encourage investments in industries and technologies that reduce pressures on nature. 78, 79 The FIRE sector (finance, insurance and real estate) is increasingly implicated in biodiversity loss; for example, privately funded large-scale land acquisitions in many tropical countries, particularly for export commodities, have been linked to higher rates of deforestation, even outside the investment lands 80 , and increased farmland prices resulting from investments in specialized real estate trusts may drive agricultural expansion that leads to ecosystem alteration. 81 Trends towards securitization, represented in commodity index funds, futures markets, and derivatives markets have grown dramatically, are increasingly complex and often traded in algorithmic automation, and are mostly disconnected from actual material flows of goods. 82, 83 Futures contracts are a key factor in the production and trade of agricultural commodities such as soy, coffee, and palm oil, and while they offer potential income stability to manage risks for producers, they are also an opportunity for speculation and hedging on price movements that have environmental implications. While there is a robust debate on whether agricultural derivatives markets contributed to higher and more volatile food prices in 2007-8, there is growing evidence that speculation at least played a role in exacerbating price spikes, which in turn drove investment in the expansion of production. 84 As such, a precautionary approach with respect to financial speculation and nature-related financial risk is warranted, given potentially catastrophic tail risks or tipping points that remain largely unknown and are inherently difficult to predict accurately. 54, 85 As has been recently experienced with both pandemics and climate change, the potential negative economic impact of finding oneself on the wrong side of such tail risks is so high that the most economically efficient approach would be to err on the side of caution. 86 The 2008-9 market crash was partly driven by a change in asset value behaviour at the margins and consequently inspired a set of precautionary financial regulations 87 ; thus similar investments that could cause multi-trillion dollar losses through environmental harms could be considered at least as risky, and regulated accordingly. 78, 88 Given the importance of understanding and managing risk, engaging the financial sector can therefore be an important potential pressure point to curb the negative impacts of public and private actors on the environment. 89, 90 The Network for Greening the Financial System has noted that central banks can play a key role to ensure environmental standards are set and met, with the EU's new sustainable finance guidelines as one example; these standards provide for liability of banks for the socio-environmental impact of their investments, and could be accelerated in the post-COVID recovery. 91 Indeed, research shows that banks that adopt environmental standards show less exposure to risk. 92 Emphasizing the risks of 'stranded assets' (such as oil reserves) has been an effective strategy to guide divestment in the fossil fuel sector 93 ; this model could be translated to biodiversity concerns, such as by emphasizing the risks that come with agribusiness investments that might have liabilities around pesticide pollution or loss of crucial pollinators. 94 While securities, derivatives, and other speculative financial instruments can bring considerable ecological and economic risks, more secure options exist in capital markets, such as 'green' bonds, which raise funds for both private and public investment in sustainable projects, and these may seem more attractive in a recovery economy. Green bonds have raised hundreds of billions for renewable energy and infrastructure for low-carbon futures 95 ; however, similar initiatives for biodiversity are not yet in place, as less than 3% of the existing bond market goes to agriculture and forestry investments. 96 Green Investment Banks (GIBs) are another tool being pioneered, with government guarantees, insurance or minimum returns on investment as inducements to increase private financing.
While most GIBs have targeted low-carbon infrastructure, there is potential for these banks to extend their work in biodiversity investments (e.g. in ecological restoration). 97 Improved financial standards also need to be tied to public disclosure of information. Studies of corporate social responsibility standards, labelling and certification, and other voluntary actions suggest that these approaches can be effective given the right circumstances. 98 For example, a small number of asset managers and institutional investors hold considerable shares of companies implicated in ecosystem changes in the Amazon and boreal forests, which could be a leverage point. 99 Shareholder activism and socially-conscious investment around climate often uses information from the Carbon Disclosure Project to evaluate risks and impacts of participating corporate entities 100 ; similar reporting and disclosure around biodiversity and ecosystem impacts could help direct investment as well as provide reputational boosts. 101 However, these voluntary instruments are usually limited due to a lack of systematic monitoring and reporting of impacts of sourcing practices; concerns about 'greenwashing'; and insufficient economic benefits for companies to adopt sustainable practices in the first place. 102 Investment standards and statutes could expand fiduciary responsibilities to address some of these problems 103 ; for example, use of thirdparty beneficiary standing would allow outside parties to take legal action if principles adopted by companies are not followed.
Although governments will be financially strapped for the foreseeable future, there will still be a need to support global funding for conservation and sustainable development initiatives, both in the immediate short-term as well as over time. Currently, most countries spend only a fraction (less than 1%) of their GDP on 'biodiversity-related activities', either for domestic support or foreign environmental aid 104 , and while private investment has been substantial in the past, it is likely to be under strain given current economic challenges. 105 Even before the pandemic, existing funding was insufficient: for example, fully implementing activities under the existing Aichi Biodiversity Targets was estimated to require up to US$440 billion in investment to seriously tackle biodiversity loss. 106 Increasing corporate contributions towards conservation, such as from agribusiness and fishing industries that depend on healthy ecosystems, has been suggested as part of a revamped global biodiversity accord. 107 Now, needs are even greater. Rising unemployment and food insecurity in the global South as a result of COVID-19 will likely increase pressure on local ecosystems, such as expansion of agriculture or the wildlife trade, which enhances the risk of future epidemics. There is already evidence that falling ecotourism dollars and reduced ranger activity as a result of COVID-19 has had seriously negative consequences in many conservation areas. 108 Some small-scale fisheries, which employ 90% of people in the fishing industry, have virtually collapsed as China has no longer imported their products since the virus emerged. 109 Thus ensuring employment and livelihood protections for these workers in resource sectors and expanding conservation areas has been suggested by some NGOs as a priority for global aid packages. 110, 111 However, increasing funding for nature conservation alone will not be sufficient if the indirect drivers of biodiversity loss are not addressed, and therefore needs to be in concert with the other steps outlined above, some of which can raise potentially significant amounts of revenue to help close funding gaps. 112
Economic inequality is problematic on its own, but it also generates poorer environmental outcomes; for example, income inequality is associated with excess consumption and higher carbon emissions among richer classes 113, 114 and more unequal countries also tend to have higher rates of loss of biodiversity. 115 Inequality works in several ways, by both increasing risks and changing collective incentives to tackle environmental problems. For example, burdens of environmental risk also tend to fall on those of lower income classes; poorer and minority communities often face 'pollution inequity', in that they are not just exposed to more pollution but their ecological footprints are smaller and they cause less pollution. 116 Inequality can also decrease people's motivation to participate in biodiversity conservation measures if they do not see the potential benefits of doing so 117 , and can undermine democratic decision-making to protect collective public goods. 118 Traditional policies to tackle inequality, such as fairer taxation, fees on wealth transfer, and other measures, can be combined with attention to biodiversity: for example, VAT taxes on luxury goods with higher negative environmental costs. 119 Minimum wage policies also have potentially positive environmental impacts 120 , and sustainable life cycle assessments for products could, for example, include living wages for employees as a criteria. 121 Moving towards a more sustainable economy may create inequalities in and of itself, such as job displacements in certain sectors (e.g. fossil fuels). 122 The concept of just transitions captures the idea that any transformation to a more sustainable economy should not fall on the backs of those already suffering J o u r n a l P r e -p r o o f disproportionate impacts. Combining economic measures to reduce inequality with stimulus investments in major retooling of energy, land use and other sectors can help facilitate this more just transition. 123
The GA called for "a shift beyond standard economic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to include those able to capture more holistic, long-term views of economics and quality of life." 1 Changing the metrics used to assess the economy reflects the increasing evidence of the limitations and biases of dominant measures of welfare such as GDP and the ways in which they promote economic growth and associated unsustainable practices. 124 Replacing or broadening them with alternative measures of social welfare would allow inclusion of diverse values and indicators of well-being. 125 Metrics like the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare or the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) often subtract 'bads' like environmental degradation and biodiversity loss in monetary terms and add in "goods" not traditionally included in GDP, such as the value of unpaid work. 126 Other approaches such as Material Flow Accounting and Natural Capital Accounting that incorporate environment and ecosystems, and which can account for the movement of resources across geopolitical borders, have been developed in the past two decades. 127, 128 Increasingly, accounting systems such as the UN System of National Accounts are adopting these new metrics 129 , and local, regional and national governments have shown interest in these measures as well. 130 While there is as of yet insufficient empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the new environmental accounting approaches, they are helpful as a tool to facilitate dialogue on the diverse values of nature.
Disruptive change has been identified as an important impetus to dramatic sustainability transformations. 131 We currently have a unique opportunity to seize the moment and consider the economy we want and need for a sustainable, just, and equitable future in a post-pandemic world. 132 Simply tinkering with the status quo was always likely to be inadequate to meet the large-scale challenge represented by the biodiversity crisis, therefore taking advantage of the current COVID-19 situation to change course and rethink both conservation and how we manage the global economy is opportune. 133, 134 Societies now have to decide if they try to get back on the previous development path, or define a new one. Most of us have now had novel experiences around what is truly 'essential' during a pandemic, and insofar as the definition of sustainability includes providing what is necessary for a dignified and good quality of life within planetary boundaries, the baseline for this has likely shifted since early 2020.
Social tipping points are defined as the emergent thresholds where small socio-economic changes may suddenly shift into nonlinear outcomes, often driven by positive feedback or cascading mechanisms. 135 Although there is disagreement as how these tipping points emerge, examples of these 'contagious processes' include rapid technological uptake, changing social norms and behaviours, and economic shifts that are hard to predict but often take on a life of their own. 136, 137 External shocks may (but not always) precipitate such tipping points, and there are numerous examples of both positive and negative policy change in the aftermath of crises, including the passage of the Clean Water Act in the US after widely-publicized river disasters, or Germany's shift away from nuclear power after the Fukushima nuclear accident of 2011. 138, 139 What these 'focusing events' have in common is that they are nonroutine, such that existing interest groups become disrupted and new coalitions come about, political and policy learning rapidly increases, and crisis management becomes valued in the aftermath. 140 Thus successfully translating shifts in norms or new baselines for action into agenda setting and policy diffusion for sustainability is likely to require new interest group engagement, diffusion of ideas through social networks, and acknowledgement of the value of multiple scales for action. 141, 142 At the same time, corporations seeking transformative change have utilized strategies that have included a mix of information sharing on new practices, corporate leadership, and political coalition building. 143 (Figure 4) To date, however, paths toward a remade post-COVID world have been limited. While there was extremely rapid policy action in the stay-at-home orders and enormous budgets that were passed for economic relief, the fact that we are not seeing significant progress on tying stimulus measures to more fundamental recalibration is worrisome, and indeed, some post-COVID recovery measures are taking us in the wrong direction. Reducing taxes, subsidizing fossil fuel production, and relaxing environmental regulations are all 'recovery' steps currently being taken by countries from Canada to Vietnam (Figure 2 , Table S2 ). Even more ambitious proposed policies, like the Green New Deal in the US, which focuses on investments in both low-carbon infrastructure and ecological restoration, tackles problems primarily through a vision of expanded Keynesian economics. 144 Such an approach does not adequately address the larger issue of how to reform the global economic drivers of biodiversity loss and climate change we have outlined here, such as telecoupled international trade and financialization of production.
Integrating nature across economic and public sectors will require bold visions that few countries seem willing to undertake, although a handful of roadmaps to 'build back better' have been proposed by influential organizations. 145, 146 Piecemeal steps, particularly those that treat biodiversity, climate and COVID as separate problems are unlikely to bring about transformative change, and there is evidence for public support in the US at least for combining climate, social, and economic policies together. 147 A toolbox approach, such as that presented here, in which a range of options are assessed and deployed in policy mixes is likely to be more effective than single silver bullet solutions, and clear linkages between short-term recovery and longer-term investment is needed. 25 This is because our existing problems are complex with numerous drivers and hence many tools are needed over time, but also because political necessity requires a range of options that appeal to different audiences and which can be taken up by different actors. 31, 54 How to move policymakers or business leaders to increase their ambitions remains a crucial question, but major environmental reports, including the GA and the recent finding that countries have missed all twenty Aichi targets, have drawn attention to the lack of progress towards sustainability, revealing the limits of our current approaches and the slowness of change. 148 The COVID crisis may have provided an opening for possibilities that were not available even six months ago, as the public has increased their expectations of engagement from multiple levels of government and the private sector. Overall, envisioning and implementing a new economic paradigm that tackles the many challenges we face will be a substantial task, requiring a transformative vision that takes advantage of this unique crisis situation before us; such an approach will entail a reshaping of the multiple incentives and policies that steer the global economy in ways that preserve, rather than undermine, biodiversity and which sets our world on a path to ecological and social sustainability.
The Global Assessment identified five main direct drivers of ecosystem change over the past 50 years (orange circles), leading to different aspects of nature decline (green circles). Economic pressures were identified as a key indirect driver in the GA, and important elements of changes in economic supply and demand that drive ecosystem loss are shown here (blue circles).
As of September 15, 2020, a number of governments have adopted or proposed economic recovery packages, including stimulus funding, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Only a limited number of countries have included climate or biodiversity measures in their packages, and a number have introduced measures that would have negative impacts (such as reducing environmental taxes or regulatory enforcement). Data on recovery proposals for selected countries can be found in a public dataset as noted in Resource Availability. 