praj-17/QA-MCQ-Open-ended huggingface dataset:
Title: Idealism
Context: Subjective idealists like George Berkeley are anti-realists in terms of a mind-independent world, whereas transcendental idealists like Immanuel Kant are strong skeptics of such a world, affirming epistemological and not metaphysical idealism. Thus Kant defines idealism as "the assertion that we can never be certain whether all of our putative outer experience is not mere imagining". He claimed that, according to idealism, "the reality of external objects does not admit of strict proof. On the contrary, however, the reality of the object of our internal sense (of myself and state) is clear immediately through consciousness."  However, not all idealists restrict the real or the knowable to our immediate subjective experience. Objective idealists make claims about a transempirical world, but simply deny that this world is essentially divorced from or ontologically prior to the mental. Thus Plato and Gottfried Leibniz affirm an objective and knowable reality transcending our subjective awareness—a rejection of epistemological idealism—but propose that this reality is grounded in ideal entities, a form of metaphysical idealism. Nor do all metaphysical idealists agree on the nature of the ideal; for Plato, the fundamental entities were non-mental abstract forms, while for Leibniz they were proto-mental and concrete monads.

question: Who is a notable subjective idealist? 

answer: George Berkeley

question: What famous philosopher was a transcendental idealist? 

answer: Immanuel Kant

question: Who are subjective idealists opposed to? 

answer: realists

question: Along with Plato, what notable philosopher rejected epistemological idealism? 

answer: Gottfried Leibniz

question: Who believed the essence of reality to be composed of monads? 

answer: Leibniz
Title: Idealism
Context: Christian theologians have held idealist views, often based on Neoplatonism, despite the influence of Aristotelian scholasticism from the 12th century onward. Later western theistic idealism such as that of Hermann Lotze offers a theory of the "world ground" in which all things find their unity: it has been widely accepted by Protestant theologians. Several modern religious movements, for example the organizations within the New Thought Movement and the Unity Church, may be said to have a particularly idealist orientation. The theology of Christian Science includes a form of idealism: it teaches that all that truly exists is God and God's ideas; that the world as it appears to the senses is a distortion of the underlying spiritual reality, a distortion that may be corrected (both conceptually and in terms of human experience) through a reorientation (spiritualization) of thought.

question: In what philosophy was Christian idealism often rooted? 

answer: Neoplatonism

question: What philosophy influential in the medieval church was opposed to Christian idealism? 

answer: Aristotelian scholasticism

question: In what century did Christian thought begin to be influenced by the scholasticism of Aristotle? 

answer: 12th

question: Along with the Unity Church, what contemporary religious movement may be regarded as idealist? 

answer: New Thought

question: What notable idealist was responsible for a "world ground" theory? 

answer: Hermann Lotze
Title: Idealism
Context: Plato's theory of forms or "ideas" describes ideal forms (for example the platonic solids in geometry or abstracts like Goodness and Justice), as universals existing independently of any particular instance. Arne Grøn calls this doctrine "the classic example of a metaphysical idealism as a transcendent idealism", while Simone Klein calls Plato "the earliest representative of metaphysical objective idealism". Nevertheless, Plato holds that matter is real, though transitory and imperfect, and is perceived by our body and its senses and given existence by the eternal ideas that are perceived directly by our rational soul. Plato was therefore a metaphysical and epistemological dualist, an outlook that modern idealism has striven to avoid: Plato's thought cannot therefore be counted as idealist in the modern sense, although quantum physics' assertion that man's consciousness is an immutable and primary requisite for not merely perceiving but shaping matter, and thus his reality, would give more credence to Plato's dualist position.[citation needed]

question: Who regarded Plato as the oldest exponent of metaphysical objective idealism? 

answer: Simone Klein

question: What sort of dualist is Plato regarded as? 

answer: metaphysical and epistemological

question: What was another term for forms in Plato's theory of forms? 

answer: ideas

question: What branch of physics might support a worldview similar to Platonic dualism? 

answer: quantum
Title: Idealism
Context: With the neoplatonist Plotinus, wrote Nathaniel Alfred Boll; "there even appears, probably for the first time in Western philosophy, idealism that had long been current in the East even at that time, for it taught... that the soul has made the world by stepping from eternity into time...". Similarly, in regard to passages from the Enneads, "The only space or place of the world is the soul" and "Time must not be assumed to exist outside the soul", Ludwig Noiré wrote: "For the first time in Western philosophy we find idealism proper in Plotinus, However, Plotinus does not address whether we know external objects, unlike Schopenhauer and other modern philosophers.

question: What sort of philosopher was Plotinus? 

answer: neoplatonist

question: According to Noiré, who was the first true Western idealist? 

answer: Plotinus

question: What issue did Schopenhauer discuss that Plotinus did not? 

answer: whether we know external objects

question: What did the Enneads believe might not have existence outside of the soul? 

answer: Time
Title: Idealism
Context: Subjective Idealism (immaterialism or phenomenalism) describes a relationship between experience and the world in which objects are no more than collections or "bundles" of sense data in the perceiver. Proponents include Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, an Anglo-Irish philosopher who advanced a theory he called immaterialism, later referred to as "subjective idealism", contending that individuals can only know sensations and ideas of objects directly, not abstractions such as "matter", and that ideas also depend upon being perceived for their very existence - esse est percipi; "to be is to be perceived".

question: Along with phenomenalism, what is another term for subjective idealism? 

answer: immaterialism

question: Of what see was Berkeley bishop? 

answer: Cloyne

question: What was Berkeley's ethnicity? 

answer: Anglo-Irish

question: What does esse est percipi mean? 

answer: to be is to be perceived

question: What did Berkeley consider things like matter to be? 

answer: abstractions
Title: Idealism
Context: Arthur Collier published similar assertions though there seems to have been no influence between the two contemporary writers. The only knowable reality is the represented image of an external object. Matter as a cause of that image, is unthinkable and therefore nothing to us. An external world as absolute matter unrelated to an observer does not exist as far as we are concerned. The universe cannot exist as it appears if there is no perceiving mind. Collier was influenced by An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World by "Cambridge Platonist" John Norris (1701).

question: Who was known as the "Cambridge Platonist"? 

answer: John Norris

question: Who was notably influenced by John Norris? 

answer: Arthur Collier

question: When was An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World written? 

answer: 1701

question: What sort of reality did Collier believe was knowable? 

answer: represented image of an external object
Title: Idealism
Context: and proliferation of hyphenated entities such as "thing-in-itself" (Immanuel Kant), "things-as-interacted-by-us" (Arthur Fine), "table-of-commonsense" and "table-of-physics" (Sir Arthur Eddington) which are "warning signs" for conceptual idealism according to Musgrave because they allegedly do not exist but only highlight the numerous ways in which people come to know the world. This argument does not take into account the issues pertaining to hermeneutics, especially at the backdrop of analytic philosophy. Musgrave criticized Richard Rorty and Postmodernist philosophy in general for confusion of use and mention.

question: Who coined the term "thing-in-itself"? 

answer: Immanuel Kant

question: Who invented the idea of a "table-of-commonsense"? 

answer: Sir Arthur Eddington

question: Who came up with the idea of "things-as-interacted-by-us"? 

answer: Arthur Fine

question: Who spoke of the "warning signs" of idealism? 

answer: Musgrave

question: What sort of philosopher was Richard Rorty? 

answer: Postmodernist
Title: Idealism
Context: A. A. Luce and John Foster are other subjectivists. Luce, in Sense without Matter (1954), attempts to bring Berkeley up to date by modernizing his vocabulary and putting the issues he faced in modern terms, and treats the Biblical account of matter and the psychology of perception and nature. Foster's The Case for Idealism argues that the physical world is the logical creation of natural, non-logical constraints on human sense-experience. Foster's latest defense of his views is in his book A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism.

question: What sort of thinkers were Foster and Luce? 

answer: subjectivists

question: What book was written by A.A. Luce? 

answer: Sense without Matter

question: What year saw the publication of Sense without Matter? 

answer: 1954

question: Who wrote A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism? 

answer: Foster

question: Whose work is Sense without Matter regarded as updating? 

answer: Berkeley
Title: Idealism
Context: The 2nd edition (1787) contained a Refutation of Idealism to distinguish his transcendental idealism from Descartes's Sceptical Idealism and Berkeley's anti-realist strain of Subjective Idealism. The section Paralogisms of Pure Reason is an implicit critique of Descartes' idealism. Kant says that it is not possible to infer the 'I' as an object (Descartes' cogito ergo sum) purely from "the spontaneity of thought". Kant focused on ideas drawn from British philosophers such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume but distinguished his transcendental or critical idealism from previous varieties;

question: What school of thought did Berkeley belong to? 

answer: Subjective Idealism

question: What sort of idealist was Descartes? 

answer: Sceptical

question: In what section was Descartes criticized? 

answer: Paralogisms of Pure Reason

question: In what edition was there a Refutation of Idealism? 

answer: 2nd

question: When was the second edition published? 

answer: 1787
Title: Idealism
Context: In the first volume of his Parerga and Paralipomena, Schopenhauer wrote his "Sketch of a History of the Doctrine of the Ideal and the Real". He defined the ideal as being mental pictures that constitute subjective knowledge. The ideal, for him, is what can be attributed to our own minds. The images in our head are what comprise the ideal. Schopenhauer emphasized that we are restricted to our own consciousness. The world that appears is only a representation or mental picture of objects. We directly and immediately know only representations. All objects that are external to the mind are known indirectly through the mediation of our mind. He offered a history of the concept of the "ideal" as "ideational" or "existing in the mind as an image".

question: Who wrote Parerga and Paralipomena? 

answer: Schopenhauer

question: What type of knowledge did Schopenhauer believe the ideal to be? 

answer: subjective

question: According to Schopenhauer, to what can the ideal be attributed? 

answer: our own minds

question: What did Schopenhauer believe we were restricted to? 

answer: our own consciousness

question: What did Schopenhauer believe were the only things we could know? 

answer: representations
Title: Idealism
Context: Friedrich Nietzsche argued that Kant commits an agnostic tautology and does not offer a satisfactory answer as to the source of a philosophical right to such-or-other metaphysical claims; he ridicules his pride in tackling "the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics." The famous "thing-in-itself" was called a product of philosophical habit, which seeks to introduce a grammatical subject: because wherever there is cognition, there must be a thing that is cognized and allegedly it must be added to ontology as a being (whereas, to Nietzsche, only the world as ever changing appearances can be assumed). Yet he attacks the idealism of Schopenhauer and Descartes with an argument similar to Kant's critique of the latter (see above).

question: Who censured Kant for his agnostic tautology? 

answer: Friedrich Nietzsche

question: Along with Schopenhauer, whose idealism did Nietzsche attack? 

answer: Descartes

question: Nietzsche's attack on Schopenhauer used an argument similar to Kant's attack on who? 

answer: Descartes
Title: Idealism
Context: Absolute idealism is G. W. F. Hegel's account of how existence is comprehensible as an all-inclusive whole. Hegel called his philosophy "absolute" idealism in contrast to the "subjective idealism" of Berkeley and the "transcendental idealism" of Kant and Fichte, which were not based on a critique of the finite and a dialectical philosophy of history as Hegel's idealism was. The exercise of reason and intellect enables the philosopher to know ultimate historical reality, the phenomenological constitution of self-determination, the dialectical development of self-awareness and personality in the realm of History.

question: According to Hegel, what sort of idealist was Fichte? 

answer: transcendental

question: Who did Hegel see as a subjective idealist? 

answer: Berkeley

question: What sort of idealist did Hegel define himself as? 

answer: Absolute

question: How did Hegel believe historical reality to be knowable to a philosopher? 

answer: exercise of reason and intellect
Title: Idealism
Context: In his Science of Logic (1812–1814) Hegel argues that finite qualities are not fully "real" because they depend on other finite qualities to determine them. Qualitative infinity, on the other hand, would be more self-determining and hence more fully real. Similarly finite natural things are less "real"—because they are less self-determining—than spiritual things like morally responsible people, ethical communities and God. So any doctrine, such as materialism, that asserts that finite qualities or natural objects are fully real is mistaken.

question: When was Science of Logic written? 

answer: 1812–1814

question: Who was the author of Science of Logic? 

answer: Hegel

question: Why did Hegel believe natural things are less real than spiritual things? 

answer: less self-determining

question: Along with God and morally responsible people, what is an example of a spiritual thing to Hegel? 

answer: ethical communities

question: What is an example of a school of thought Hegel believed to be wrong? 

answer: materialism
Title: Idealism
Context: Hegel certainly intends to preserve what he takes to be true of German idealism, in particular Kant's insistence that ethical reason can and does go beyond finite inclinations. For Hegel there must be some identity of thought and being for the "subject" (any human observer)) to be able to know any observed "object" (any external entity, possibly even another human) at all. Under Hegel's concept of "subject-object identity," subject and object both have Spirit (Hegel's ersatz, redefined, nonsupernatural "God") as their conceptual (not metaphysical) inner reality—and in that sense are identical. But until Spirit's "self-realization" occurs and Spirit graduates from Spirit to Absolute Spirit status, subject (a human mind) mistakenly thinks every "object" it observes is something "alien," meaning something separate or apart from "subject." In Hegel's words, "The object is revealed to it [to "subject"] by [as] something alien, and it does not recognize itself." Self-realization occurs when Hegel (part of Spirit's nonsupernatural Mind, which is the collective mind of all humans) arrives on the scene and realizes that every "object" is himself, because both subject and object are essentially Spirit. When self-realization occurs and Spirit becomes Absolute Spirit, the "finite" (man, human) becomes the "infinite" ("God," divine), replacing the imaginary or "picture-thinking" supernatural God of theism: man becomes God. Tucker puts it this way: "Hegelianism . . . is a religion of self-worship whose fundamental theme is given in Hegel's image of the man who aspires to be God himself, who demands 'something more, namely infinity.'" The picture Hegel presents is "a picture of a self-glorifying humanity striving compulsively, and at the end successfully, to rise to divinity."

question: In Hegel's thought, what inner reality is possessed by both subject and object? 

answer: Spirit

question: What is another term for Hegel's "subject"? 

answer: any human observer

question: What does Spirit turn into when a person arrives at self-realization? 

answer: Absolute Spirit

question: What does Hegel mean by "object"? 

answer: any external entity

question: Who did Tucker argue that Hegel's philosophy involved the worship of? 

answer: self
Title: Idealism
Context: Kierkegaard criticised Hegel's idealist philosophy in several of his works, particularly his claim to a comprehensive system that could explain the whole of reality. Where Hegel argues that an ultimate understanding of the logical structure of the world is an understanding of the logical structure of God's mind, Kierkegaard asserting that for God reality can be a system but it cannot be so for any human individual because both reality and humans are incomplete and all philosophical systems imply completeness. A logical system is possible but an existential system is not. "What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational". Hegel's absolute idealism blurs the distinction between existence and thought: our mortal nature places limits on our understanding of reality;

question: Who was a notable critic of Hegel? 

answer: Kierkegaard

question: For whom did Kierkegaard argue reality cannot be a system? 

answer: human

question: According to Kierkegaard, why can't reality be a system for human beings? 

answer: humans are incomplete

question: Even though Kierkegaard does not believe in the possibility of an existential system of reality, what sort of system can exist? 

answer: logical
Title: Idealism
Context: A major concern of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and of the philosophy of Spirit that he lays out in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817–1830) is the interrelation between individual humans, which he conceives in terms of "mutual recognition." However, what Climacus means by the aforementioned statement, is that Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right, believed the best solution was to surrender one's individuality to the customs of the State, identifying right and wrong in view of the prevailing bourgeois morality. Individual human will ought, at the State's highest level of development, to properly coincide with the will of the State. Climacus rejects Hegel's suppression of individuality by pointing out it is impossible to create a valid set of rules or system in any society which can adequately describe existence for any one individual. Submitting one's will to the State denies personal freedom, choice, and responsibility.

question: Who wrote Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences? 

answer: Hegel

question: When was Phenomenology of Spirit published? 

answer: 1807

question: What trait did Climacus believe that Hegel suppressed? 

answer: individuality

question: Whose will did Hegel believe should prevail over that of the individual? 

answer: State

question: What conception of right and wrong did Climacus believe Hegel endorsed? 

answer: bourgeois
Title: Idealism
Context: In addition, Hegel does believe we can know the structure of God's mind, or ultimate reality. Hegel agrees with Kierkegaard that both reality and humans are incomplete, inasmuch as we are in time, and reality develops through time. But the relation between time and eternity is outside time and this is the "logical structure" that Hegel thinks we can know. Kierkegaard disputes this assertion, because it eliminates the clear distinction between ontology and epistemology. Existence and thought are not identical and one cannot possibly think existence. Thought is always a form of abstraction, and thus not only is pure existence impossible to think, but all forms in existence are unthinkable; thought depends on language, which merely abstracts from experience, thus separating us from lived experience and the living essence of all beings. In addition, because we are finite beings, we cannot possibly know or understand anything that is universal or infinite such as God, so we cannot know God exists, since that which transcends time simultaneously transcends human understanding.

question: What sort of reality did Hegel perceive God's mind to be? 

answer: ultimate

question: Along with Hegel, who also argued for human incompleteness? 

answer: Kierkegaard

question: According to Hegel, what form does thought necessarily take? 

answer: abstraction

question: Why does Hegel believe we cannot know God? 

answer: we are finite beings

question: If something transcends time, what does it, according to Hegel, also transcend? 

answer: human understanding
Title: Idealism
Context: Bradley was the apparent target of G. E. Moore's radical rejection of idealism. Moore claimed that Bradley did not understand the statement that something is real. We know for certain, through common sense and prephilosophical beliefs, that some things are real, whether they are objects of thought or not, according to Moore. The 1903 article The Refutation of Idealism is one of the first demonstrations of Moore's commitment to analysis. He examines each of the three terms in the Berkeleian aphorism esse est percipi, "to be is to be perceived", finding that it must mean that the object and the subject are necessarily connected so that "yellow" and "the sensation of yellow" are identical - "to be yellow" is "to be experienced as yellow". But it also seems there is a difference between "yellow" and "the sensation of yellow" and "that esse is held to be percipi, solely because what is experienced is held to be identical with the experience of it". Though far from a complete refutation, this was the first strong statement by analytic philosophy against its idealist predecessors, or at any rate against the type of idealism represented by Berkeley. This argument did not show that the GEM (in post–Stove vernacular, see below) is logically invalid.

question: Who wrote The Refutation of Idealism? 

answer: Moore

question: In his rejection of idealism, whose thought did Moore attack? 

answer: Bradley

question: Who originated the saying 'esse est percipi'? 

answer: Berkeley