WAR.

That portion of military science which falls to be treated under this term, may be conveniently discussed, in a work like the present, under the two main and obvious divisions of War by Land, and War by Sea. We shall accordingly view the subject with reference to these divisions.

PART I.—WARLIKE OPERATIONS BY LAND.

Referring generally to the articles Army, Artillery, Fortification, and Gunnery, for much that, in a large view, belongs to the science of war, we shall under this division of the present head direct our attention to the great principles of war; and shall endeavour to give as full a view of their applications and combinations as our limits will allow.

Jomini has demonstrated that the art of war reposes upon one governing principle, or what may be termed the fundamental maxim; by the application of which all the combinations are good, and without which they are all faulty. This maxim consists in effecting, with the greatest mass of forces, a combined operation upon the decisive point. To illustrate the subject, it may be observed, that the decisive point in war, or what has been termed the primitive objective point, is obviously that in which resides the principle of strength in an enemy; and it follows, that to be able to destroy it in the shortest and most effectual manner, must be the fundamental principle adopted by his antagonist. The mode of effecting this purpose is however the difficult part of the question, because of the infinite variety of circumstances to which it is subjected. But the theory of war may nevertheless be divided into three primitive combinations; because the practice is composed of as many branches, each of which depends upon particular principles: therefore, a great operation, to he perfect, ought to include the three primitive combinations; because then they produce the complete application of the fundamental maxim. The first of these relates to what is commonly termed forming the plan of a campaign, and consists, either in an offensive or defensive view, in the art of embracing the lines of operations in the most advantageous manner. The second is the art of moving the mass of forces, in the most rapid manner possible, upon the objective point of the primitive or accidental line of operations.

This is the method of execution, or strategy. The third is the art of combining the simultaneous application of the mass of forces on the most important point of a field of battle. This branch is usually designated by the term Tactics.^[1. For the sake of perspicuity, when this term is applied to the instruction of troops, it should be distinguished by the qualifying adjective. Elementary Tactics. Thus also the phrases, science, and art of war, are used as synonymous, while we should understand by the science of war, the knowledge of the theory of all its elements; and by the art of war, the skilful application of that knowledge. ]

I.—PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

A plan of campaign depends upon six essential considerations: 1st, the political situation of both parties; 2d, the situation of the moment; 3d, the relative force and military means; 4th, the location and distribution of the armies; 5th, the natural line of operations; 6th, the most advantageous line of operations. In forming the plan, it is not necessary to have regard solely to the exact balance of the relative means of war between the parties, but to view them only as they are important. Territorial and manoeuvring lines of operations are the principal object; and though they are subject to many accessory considerations, the rules of the art must nevertheless form their basis. Originality and great boldness are not incompatible with their application; such, for instance, as the plan which Napoleon, in 1800, executed in Italy. No enterprise could be more daring, none more rich in great and decisive combinations, or more prudent and cautious; since, while it menaced the enemy with ruin, no greater misfortune could occur, in case of check, than the sacrifice of the extreme rear-guard.

Before we proceed, it may be useful to fix, by definitions, several terms, upon the comprehension of which the most important military reasoning depends.

By a base or basis of operations is meant a frontier, the course of a river, a coast, a range of mountains or fortresses, or any topographical or political extent of country, upon the imaginary line of which the corps of an army assemble, offensively, to take their departure from thence into the enemy’s country, and towards which, in case of failure, it is intended to retreat; defensively, to counteract all the measures which an invading force may pursue.

Lines of operations are divided into territorial and manoeuvring lines. By territorial lines are understood those which nature or art has traced for the defence or invasion of states. Frontiers covered by fortresses, or defended by nature with chains of mountains, great rivers, or [7:21:734]other obstacles, form their constituents. Manoeuvring lines are the dispositions of the general to traverse them offensively, or cover them defensively. Both these lines of operations are intimately connected. In offensive war, the line is an imaginary perpendicular upon the base, along which an army operates against the enemy; in defensive war, it is often the same, but still oftener parallel to the territorial line. A line of communication is either the same as that of operations, or any other by which the army receives its supplies, and communicates with the base.

Some examples will render the definitions more intelligible. France and Austria have three great lines of operations against each other; by Italy on one side, Switzerland and Tyrol in the centre, and by Germany on the other. In these the Po, the Maine, the Danube, or a principal road, constitutes the materiel of lines; which are amenable to only a few rules prescribed by their nature. Between Prussia and Austria again are three lines, through Moravia, Lusatia, and Saxony. Lines of operations are divisible into collateral or separate points. Frederick entered Bohemia by his central line, upon four points. The French invaded Germany in 1796 and 1799 upon two subdivided lines. Napoleon always operated upon one principal line, as did the duke of Wellington in Spain.

Thus far no great variety of combinations seems to perplex the view; but in the selection of the particular line, the problem becomes difficult, because a great multiplicity of circumstances, many of them not purely military, interpose. The political situation of the belligerents; their relative resources; character and situation of the fortresses; accidental strength of their forces; distance by sea; course of a considerable river; direction of a chain of mountains; nature of the country; political state of either party; jealousy of a neutral, or apprehensions of an ally; all in their turn claim consideration. In general, however, the initial application of military masses should be, when the belligerents are neighbours, upon some part of the frontier which projects into the hostile state, as Bohemia with regard to Prussia, or Silesia with regard to Austria. But it is a maxim that lines of operations have their key as well as fields of battle: in the former, the great strategical points are decisive; as, in the latter, the points which command the weak part of a position constitute the key. Where there exists a vast superiority of force on one side, the key, or great strategical point, may be sought at a considerable depth in the line of operations; but where the masses are nearly balanced, it is necessarily reduced to a relative proportion with the breadth of the base. Thus, for instance, the destruction of a French army on the frontier of the Netherlands, would not immediately produce the consequence of the victors marching to the capital, unless they had sufficient superiority to mask the principal fortresses which cover her line of defence in that quarter, or some other accidental circumstance rendered such a measure practicable. As further proofs of the relative proportion between the depth and base of a line of operations, that of Napoleon in Russia failed on both its pivots, before the summit was defeated; and those in Spain, although they were supported by intermediate fortresses, immediately contracted, when the battle of Salamanca produced consequences which endangered the western communication with the base.

Although it is absolutely necessary to move with a mass of force near the enemy, it is more advantageous to march in separate corps while still at a distance from him, if he has not a concentrated mass ready to act, and there be several roads leading concentrically towards the point intended to be occupied. It is evident that five corps, of twenty thousand men each, will move forward more rapidly towards any point, than a hundred thousand men, marching on the same road, who can only advance with the tardiness inherent in large bodies, and besides are encumbered with the immense train of their subsistence. Celerity of movement, multiplying the force of an army by enabling the mass to be carried alternately upon every point of the line, is an advantage of invaluable consequence; but this is not the only reason for recommending this method. There are two others, viz. the increased facility of subsistence, and the uncertainty into which it throws the enemy.

An army of 20,000 men can find subsistence, in central Europe, on every part of their march, by merely causing the country within some leagues to contribute to their wants; and if they convey with them biscuit for eight or ten days, that is, during the first period, while corps are in position, or manoeuvring in a contracted area with other columns, they will be enabled to subsist till the magazines are formed. Thus military operations are in a great degree emancipated from the necessity of pre-arranged magazines, and the regular encumbrance of field-ovens.

The army which commences offensive operations takes the lead in all the movements, and those of the enemy are necessarily subordinate to them. If therefore it occupies with a corps each of the great avenues leading to the enemy, he will be in a state of uncertainty along his whole line of defence or operations, and remain in suspense as to the point upon which he ought to collect his masses to oppose them. Upon these facts, the following series of maxims is founded

1. When an army undertakes an invasion, or acts offensively, it takes the lead (or, as the French term it, l’initiative) in the movements.

2. This advantage precludes the necessity of marching in mass, until near the point where the enemy is to be found and attacked. Until then it is preferable to move in several strong corps, in proportion to the collective strength of the army, and to direct them upon the communications which lead concentrically to the point.

3. The general direction can only be upon the centre, one of the extremities, or the rear, of the hostile line. An extremity will usually be found most eligible, because from that point the rear is easily attained; the centre only in the case where the enemy’s line is scattered, and his corps separated by great intervals.

4. In this case the greater number of the corps should advance upon one of the isolated parts, and endeavour to surround it, while the remainder should occupy a central point to keep the rest of the hostile army in check.

5. When the principal mass of these corps is directed into the rear of an enemy, by passing one of the extremities of his line, one corps should remain upon that extremity, in order to keep open the communication with the line of operations, while the opponent is cut off from his. This corps serves likewise to attack him in flank, and to prevent him from withdrawing out of a faulty position by a secret movement.

6. These operations are most advantageous when the enemy is at a great distance from his own base. The principle may however be applied to positions less distant (two or three marches), provided the different corps have no greater distance to traverse to the point of reunion, than that which separates them from those of their own advanced posts which face the enemy. But this rule should not be understood as applying to isolated divisions upon an extended front of ninety or a hundred miles, unable to unite on a day of action, and whose movements cannot be simultaneous upon the decisive point. The difference is easily perceived between such operations and those of several corps concentrated in a position the depth of which equals the extent of front, and whose simultaneous co-operation is certain before the enemy can make an attempt upon their line.

7. By means of this system, the army, occupying a [7:21:735]greater space, marches more rapidly, and is enabled to subsist on the roads. Cattle and biscuit alone will be required to follow each corps, in sufficient quantity to subsist it when in the vicinity of the enemy, where the other corps having likewise arrived, they are obliged to live within a smaller periphery. The stock of provision will be sufficient if equal to the time required for collecting another.

8. Magazines are then formed in the rear as the army advances. They are collected by means of regular requisitions made on the neighbouring provinces, and enforced by a few troops; contracts are entered into with the local administrations, and precautionary convoys follow from the frontiers. Cattle, rice, and biscuit are the most useful provisions; the easiest to be transported.

In this view of the theory of initial operations, such as Jomini and other authorities consider them, no great regard is paid to the waste of human life, by the frequent want or irregularity of the issue of provisions, or notice taken of the indiscipline which naturally arises when famine drives the soldier to marauding. A relentless conscription system may indeed supply recruits; but they are a very inadequate instrument when compared to formed soldiers.

It remains to examine the art of forming a plan of campaign or operations in reference to insular expeditions. In the application of masses on the base line of operations by sea, or by an insular force, much difficulty occurs, especially if that base is to be obtained by force on a hostile coast; because the line of communication from the port whence an expeditionary army proceeds to the point where debarkation takes place is lengthened, uncertain, and broken. The point of debarkation becomes a secondary base; and unless a friendly fortress, or a naturally advantageous point, left unguarded by the enemy, can be occupied, the difficulties are nearly insurmountable. It is again difficult to despatch a large force in one fleet; it is dangerous to keep it together, and dangerous to allow great intervals; the elements affect the time, connection, and order of the convoy; an independent and separate service (the navy) influences the primary organization and execution; debarkation absorbs much invaluable time, particularly that of the artillery, horses, and stores. From these causes, a practice has arisen of fitting out expeditions not sufficiently formidable, with a view of ascertaining the practicability of an object, but which by that very system is often rendered impossible; for the first landing having been effected, the enemy’s attention is no longer divided; he assembles his means of defence while the second convoy is expected, and the delay becomes decisive of the event. Yet if, in any military operation, the effect of masses simultaneously employed be of consequence, it is in those which commence on the sea-shore; for the troops have not only to debark and act offensively, but also to construct their means of security and retreat in case of failure. If we examine the primary operations of this class, from the wars of King William to the present period, we shall find that, with the exception of such as were favoured by chance or particular circumstances, the success or failure was dependent upon one or more of the following maxims, especially as applied to continental expeditions.

1. When an army is directed to make a descent upon an enemy’s coast, with the object of penetrating into the country, a point of debarkation should be selected, where the enemy possesses no local means to arrest the progress, such as a fortified city or a defensible peninsula. If however circumstances compel the descent near or upon such a spot, immediate measures should be taken to mask or capture it, and secure the success of ulterior operations.

2. If the expedition is intended to be confined solely to the coast, the point of debarkation should possess the indispensable qualifications of facility of communication with the fleet, security of retreat and reimbarkation. A point possessed of these advantages is a fit spot for a temporary base of operations.

3. An expedition intended to operate ulteriorly should be ab initio superior to the probable immediate force of the enemy, so that the success of the landing and march into the country be not problematical.

4. No combinations of invasion should be made depending on the co-operation of corps expected from distant or opposite quarters. It is important to have them collected, as much as possible, on or near one point of embarkation, to proceed from thence in mass to execute the enterprise.

5. In the plan of an expedition, no combinations should be admitted which include two or more lines of operations from separate bases. Armies transported by sea are, from that circumstance, not numerous; division renders them still weaker, and if on one point a misfortune occurs, the other division must reimbark.

6. In colonial and insular expeditions, it is only necessary to combine the means in proportion to the strength of the object, and with attention to the season and climate. But on all occasions where the reduction of a fortress is in contemplation, the engineer department should possess an adequate materiel as well as the artillery.

All these maxims are in unison with the leading principles of the art of war, or constitute mere modifications to adapt them to maritime affairs. As examples of the importance of the first rule, may be quoted the landing of the emigrants at Quiberon: being confined to a narrow peninsula, they were immediately blocked in by the enemy. The Helder expedition, though victorious in two battles, could not penetrate beyond the neck of the Haerlemmer Meer, which makes a peninsula of North Holland. At Aboukir, again, a peninsula, similar results would have ensued, but for the circumstance that a communication could be opened on the side of Rosetta, which rendered the position central against the two exterior lines of the enemy, namely, those of Cairo and Alexandria, and enabled the British to carry their mass alternately upon each, and ultimately, with inferior numbers, to reconquer that province.

In the second maxim, the causes are pointed out which allowed the expedition to Cherbourg, in 1758, to reimbark in safety, although no regular precautions insured the measure; and those which produced the disaster at St Cast, under General Bligh, notwithstanding every precaution. The Ostend expedition had the same defects, though perhaps on this occasion the object was considered of sufficient magnitude to allow a disregard of the consequences.

Inattention to the third had a preponderating influence at the Helder. The first division, having landed, was obliged to wait behind the intrenchments of the Zyp for the arrival of the main body. Meantime the enemy, now certain of the point in danger, collected his means, and arranged the plan of defence. After three battles he was only thrown back upon stronger ground, in a position where he could neither be turned nor attacked in front with probability of success. In Egypt, the expeditionary force was likewise inferior to the enemy, and if the hostile commander had sacrificed the establishments and Institut at Cairo, to collect his forces on one line, he could have resisted the invasion with success. The Walcheren expedition, considered in its primary combinations and preparatory measures, was a model; as also that of the French for the invasion of Egypt. Both were wrong in the choice of the point of debarkation; but the results were different, and, from an unconquerable propensity in man, by the results they have been judged.

The expedition to the Helder again furnishes the proofs of the fourth maxim. Had the two British and the Russian divisions arrived in time to act in mass, within a few hours after the first landing, the enemy could not have ma [7:21:736]tured an effectual plan of defence. But the combinations required easterly winds for the Russians and westerly for the British reinforcements, and both were nevertheless to arrive if possible simultaneously on the same spot. The Egyptian expedition was to be sustained by a corps from India and the Cape, by the Red Sea, which could scarcely by any chance arrive in proper time. At Copenhagen indeed the two divisions from Rugen (an island in the Baltic, where a British corps lay in transports) and from England did arrive without accident; but the successive divisions sent to the river Plate, to be successively defeated, are a further corroboration.

The fifth maxim is sufficiently obvious. Sir John Moore’s division was off the coast of Portugal when the battle of Vimiera was fought; had it sailed conjointly with Sir Arthur Wellesley’s, the result of that battle would have brought the British into Lisbon without a convention. If the division engaged had been defeated, a corps on board of ships could not have rendered the least assistance. In the next campaign, Sir John operated on several lines from Portugal, and Sir David Baird from a different base (Corunna), with the view of uniting at the distance of more than 200 miles on a point in possession of a formidable enemy. Such combinations produced their natural consequences; the hard pressed retreat of the army to Corunna ensued; and, as if another proof were wanting, no sooner were the troops compelled to fight a battle, than another division appeared to witness the conflict from the ships, and return to England.

To the deficiency of a proper establishment of sappers and miners, with the matériel required to enable the engineers to act with effect, many delays and failures may be ascribed. It has necessitated the severe system of bombardment, and repeatedly rendered the British arms odious, without thereby insuring success. Carcasses and rockets ruin the defenceless inhabitants, but have no decisive influence upon the defence of a regular fortress.

If we examine the wars in America by the rules of art, we find Lord Amherst operating by the line of Lake Champlain upon Montreal, and Wolfe by the St Lawrence upon Quebec, both successful, and yet two years without connection. Next appear isolated expeditions traversing a vast continent, deficient in numbers, and therefore always inferior to the local militias on the spot, terminating their career in defeat or capture; or else dispersed along the coast, occupied in landings for trivial purposes, and when reimbarked, leaving the enemy to boast of successful resistance. In the Canadas we behold the key of defensive operations left without a fortress. True indeed it is that a fortress does not defend a state, that an army must be looked to for that purpose; but an army is a frail instrument, and if armies defend nations, fortresses defend armies.

Reflecting on the miscarriages produced by dispersing the forces, it appears that in British military combinations it should be a maxim, never to act offensively on more than one point at a time. This rule, a fundamental principle of the Roman policy in her best days, should have been acted upon in the wars of the Spanish succession, when that question ought to have been decided in the Netherlands. The consequence of pursuing a multiplicity of offensive combinations at the same time, was never better exemplified than in the failures of the simultaneous expeditions to Buenos Ayres, Constantinople, Alexandria, and Rugen. It follows that small expeditions, hovering along hostile coasts, produce no beneficial effects. The local garrisons and militia of the country are generally superior; and a momentary debarkation produces in the mind of the enemy, not only national union, but also the ideas of victory. The debarkations at St Maio and St Cast, that under Sir James Pulteney at Corunna, most of those in America, were fraught with risks not counterbalanced by any prospects of real advantage. Those on the east of Spain were of a different character; they had a political object of importance, and served as a diversion which fixed a whole hostile army in that quarter.

It is a general rule, liable indeed to occasional exceptions, that the operations of the land forces should be confined to fixed important points, where the object is not only to land, but to conquer and maintain themselves. There is no instance in the history of the nation where a British mass of forces met with disaster, when that mass acted by itself, or with sufficient preponderance among its allies. From the nature of the sea-line of operations, expeditions, like other military enterprises, must be liable to miscarriage; but a right use of the forces will at least increase the chances of success. In the selection of the points, much must be left to the circumstances of the case, but their importance should always be in relation to the risk, expense, and time.

As these observations apply to great operations only, it is unnecessary to advert to flying corps, or such expeditions as are merely intended to alarm a coast or distract an enemy; because these, in most cases of problematical utility, should be very sparingly resorted to, and, at all events, never consist of more than a few frigates, with troops on board. The geographical extent and insular position of Great Britain afford equal facilities for defence and attack. Defence, however, when passive, is allowed to be the very worst that can be adopted in the military policy of a state; and when the national superiority at sea is considered, it becomes evident that British operations ought to be offensive. With a great number of garrisons stationed in every quarter of the world, the land forces form nowhere a considerable body; those in Britain being scarcely adequate to the local duties, and the relief of such as return from abroad. At the commencement of a war, although the militia is called out, the reinforcements required to place distant garrisons on the war-establishment absorb nearly all the infantry, and leave not only no disposable force, but even no sufficient elements to create new corps in an efficient manner. Hence three or four years of war pass in preparations on one side, and in conquests on the other. Millions are spent, and vast sacrifices made, to arrest the progress of the enemy; humiliating offers are made, which the opponent, blinded by success, has the imprudence to reject Then, forced to still greater expense, other campaigns follow, to recover what was lost in the first. By a rational system of preparation, wars might be terminated in a short period, or altogether prevented; and yet long wars, the real cause of the prodigious national debt, are occasioned by an ill-judged prejudice against a standing army, backed by still weaker ideas of economy. Since regular armies have been maintained in Europe, the obvious utility of having at least some disposable force to give weight to negotiation, requires scarcely an argument Instead of three battalions, the only applicable troops in 1792-3, which were sent to Willemstadt, had Great Britain possessed 25,000 disposable troops, the National Convention would have paused before it declared war, or this force would immediately have influenced the reconquest of Belgium. Even a year later, such a national force could have averted the consequences of the action of Hooghlede, the retreat from Dunkirk, and the final evacuation of the Netherlands. In the late war, the inability of Great Britain to act from the first with vigour, compelled her to fight twenty-one years, with incalculable waste of blood and treasure, merely to restore the balance of power; and the nation, which at first had only three battalions for service, ended, in 1814, with a mass of more than a million of men in arms.^[2. According to authentic documents, this mass amounted to 1,116,813, including navy, East India, and local militia force, but exclusively of yeomanry and volunteers. ]
[7:21:737]

In a military point of view, the economical system has been productive of immense losses to the nation; but if, under given circumstances, in time of peace, the army must be very generally reduced, care should be taken not to destroy the elements of regeneration. On a war breaking out, all the troops in the kingdom should be brigaded, with their generals, staff, field train of artillery, commissariat, and medical officers, and concentrated as much as possible, for the purpose of rapidity of execution, and creating habits of duty in large bodies, which the staff and commissariat generally begin to learn when before the enemy, at a period when all parties should be fully acquainted with them, and when mistakes may be fatal. The orders of government are thus executed as soon as issued, and that species of confusion is obviated which all who served in the beginning of the late war must have witnessed.

Till the beginning of the present century, plans of operations were usually arranged in the cabinet, by superannuated officers, on obsolete principles, or by ministers without professional knowledge, upon combinations entirely political. The Austrian government was particularly unfortunate in this system. Plans, calculated with the precision of summer manoeuvres, where every march, battalion, and detachment were prescribed, without adverting to the measures of the enemy, tied the hands of the generals, who were never successful against a formidable enemy but when they disobeyed their instructions, as Eugene did at Zenta. But when Frederick traced his own plans of campaign, although even he was not fully sensible of the laws which should regulate territorial and manoeuvring lines of operations, still circumstances and superior tact soon led him into the true system. Jomini blames, with sagacity, some of his initial operations; but he does not sufficiently consider his circumstances and his era. He compares the operations of Napoleon, with all the resources, fortresses, population, and revolutionary excitation of France, together with the adventurous gambling of his hero, to the conduct of a sovereign who had his native throne to defend, without a military frontier, with a scanty population, a barren soil, and no pecuniary means but such as arose from his economy; and yet he rose superior to all the difficulties of his situation, though under circumstances more unpromising than those which ultimately hurled Napoleon from his throne.

II.—MANOEUVRING LINES OF OPERATIONS.

The connection between manoeuvring lines and those which nature has marked out, and the views of the general-in-chief, form separate classes, each named after the nature of that connection.

1. Simple lines of operations are those when an army operates in a single direction from a frontier, without forming detached corps.

2. Double and multiplied lines, when an army acts upon the same frontier with two or three isolated corps, towards one or several objects.

3. Interior lines of operations are formed to oppose several hostile lines, and arc so directed as to possess internal connection, and enabled to move and approach each other, without allowing the enemy to oppose a superior mass to them.

4. Exterior lines, on the contrary, possess the opposite qualities. They are such as an army may form at the same time, upon the two extremities of one or several hostile lines.

5. Bines upon an extended front are those which are arranged upon a great contiguous development by isolated divisions, but still belonging to the same mass of forces, and operating upon the same object. Under this head are comprehended, likewise, lines formed by two separate corps upon one given extent. They are then double lines upon a great front.

6. Deep or lengthened lines are those which, commencing at their base, pass over a great extent of country before they can attain their object.

7. concentric lines of operations are either several or a single line subdivided, moving from distant points in order to arrive at the same object, in front or in rear of their base.

8. Eccentric lines designate a single mass starting from one point, and dividing itself in order to form several diverging lines upon isolated objects.

9. Secondary lines are those in the great combinations of two armies, which designate their relative connection while operating upon the development of the same frontier.

10. Accidental lines are produced in the original plan of campaign, when unexpected events necessitate a new direction for the operations. They are of the highest importance, and rarely adopted but by generals of the first abilities.

Formerly lines of operations were considered only as they effected the matériel of armies: it was even advanced, that armies encamped near their magazines had no lines of operations; but an example will prove the fallacy of this opinion. Supposing two French armies encamped, one on the Upper Rhine in front of Brisac, and the other on the Lower Rhine in front of Dusseldorf, with both their magazines in the safest place, that is, behind the river. These armies must have either an offensive or defensive object, and therefore have territorial as well as manoeuvring lines of operations. 1st, The territorial defensive line will extend from the point of their position to the point which they are to cover; therefore they would both be cut off if the enemy occupied that point before them. If Melas, with his army, could have subsisted near Alessandria in Lombardy after the battle of Marengo, he was no less cut off from his line of operations as long as his victorious opponents occupied the line of the Po. 2d, Their manoeuvring lines would be a double against a simple one, if the enemy concentrated his masses to crush one of the armies: it would be a double external line against a double internal, if the enemy formed also two corps, but so directed that they could be united most readily.

The article in the Edinburgh Review on the work of Jomini makes the following able remarks on lines of operations. “Among all these lines, the simple and interior are the best, particularly when combined, as being most congenial to the great principle of carrying a mass of troops upon the decisive point. A few remarks will make the truth of this apparent. If an army advances from its base of operations upon one line, it is clear that the general commanding will have but two important dangers to provide against; first, that of his troops being attacked unawares; and, secondly, that of being turned and cut off from his communications with his base. The most effectual method of guarding against either is, to attack the opposing enemy first, or, as the author calls it, prendre l’initiative; and if, in so doing, the assailants can place themselves in such a position that a victory will give them the means of utterly destroying their adversary, while a defeat will not be of material detriment to themselves, the manoeuvre must be considered as a perfect one. Now, a single and interior line has a manifest advantage over every other in aiding such an operation. An army which moves upon double, exterior, or multiplied lines, must be weakened in proportion to the number of its divisions. The general has many combinations to attend, and many dangers to guard against; his columns being on many roads, and unconnected, must also be dependent upon many persons and many orders. Obstacles will be multiplied at every step; and errors cannot be known or corrected without much loss of [7:21:738]time. The success of his plan must depend upon the exactness and concert between the different divisions; a misfortune attending any one vitiates or destroys the whole project, and yet each column, separately, will be too weak to strike an important blow if a favourable opportunity should occur. They will suffer severely from mishaps, and they cannot well take advantage of misfortunes.

“An army that manoeuvres upon simple and interior lines gets rid of all these incumbrances; the troops will be together and well in hand, with the general upon the spot, ready to rectify errors, and to superintend every movement; and upon whichever road he marches against an enemy acting upon double or multiplied lines, his combinations must be more simple, and his numbers must be superior; he will have the power of overwhelming whatever division of his adversary he may meet with, and, by thus disorganizing his opponent’s plan of campaign, enable himself to cut off their communications, or to attack their columns in detail. We will suppose however that, finding their line penetrated, they might, by great exertions, unite the remainder of their scattered corps by a retrograde movement; but they will hardly be able to cover their communications, which must be nearly as numerous as their divisions, and the attacking army will give battle in the execution of a preconcerted plan, while they will be in the confusion of a baffled one. If the great principle, however, of carrying a mass upon the decisive point has governed the general who advances upon the simple line, he will, by a victory, deprive his foe of retreat, and utterly destroy him; while, if he fail, his communications are still open, and, from want of a plan, the pursuit cannot be very vigorous.”

These remarks upon manoeuvring lines are well illustrated in modern military history. In the seven years’ war, Frederick had the choice of attacking Austria, on his left by Silesia into Moravia, in the centre through Lusatia, and on the right by Saxony, both into Bohemia. His natural territorial line was undoubtedly the first of these three; because, while his own flank was covered by the fortresses of Silesia, he could penetrate at once into the vitals of the Austrian dominions, and masking Olmutz, threaten Vienna. He did not feel the advantage of this line until the third campaign, when he was everywhere outnumbered by the enemy; and yet even then he might have had signal success, if his besieging train, &c. had been in more efficient order and better applied. From this period he became sensible of the superior utility of central lines, and from 1758 he operated successively with his principal mass in Saxony, Silesia, and Brandenburg; the same troops were victorious in all these quarters, by alternately reinforcing each corps so as to attain a superiority. Having missed the opportunity in 1757, of deciding the war by a successful invasion, he at last gloriously saved his kingdom by this new system. All these successes belong to the three first classes of simple, double, and interior lines of operations. Those of his adversaries, on the contrary, were always of the fourth and fifth exterior lines, and lines upon an extended front. For, on looking at the map of the seat of war, it will be readily observed that he operated within the triangle formed by Dresden, Breslau, and Custrin, while the enemy manoeuvred outside of that figure. After the battle of Hochkirch, indeed, when this area was broken in, he made a master-stroke, by uniting his three armies in Saxony, and thus wresting from Daun the advantages of his victory. The operations of that crisis belong to the tenth or accidental lines, in which Frederick has never been surpassed. To this class belong, likewise, his invasion of Bohemia, after raising the siege of Olmutz; his march into Silesia, and manoeuvres before and after the battle of Liegnitz, in 1760; and his central position at Buntzelwitz, by which he kept the enemy divided, in 1762.

The French operations in Hanover were not more successful. In 1758 they formed two lines of operations, in Hessia and on the Wezer, upon a development of 300 miles. Prince Ferdinand, manoeuvring upon their extreme left, had only isolated corps to contend with, and drove them across the Rhine. Marshal Contades, after the battle of Crevelt, felt the advantage of the line of the Rhine, all the fortresses being in his hands; but while he acted without vivacity on his right, Prince Ferdinand took a central direction, and broke the concert between the two hostile armies, who, at the end of the campaign, lost nearly all they had gained, having spent their time in disjointed marches, and in writing projets and counter projets. After the battle of Bergen in 1759, the French, grown wiser, united all their forces in Hessia; they made conquests, which even the defeat of Minden did not wholly repair. In 1760, Marshal Broglie, persisting in operations in mass, made a respectable campaign; but in the next two, armies were again formed at a great distance; Prince Ferdinand again was beforehand with them everywhere. At length they approached each other to attack, but, for want of concert, were defeated at Fellinghausen.

In comparing the constant difference of the lines of operations which the Austrians, Russians, and French adopted, with those of the Prussians and Hanoverians, their opposite results are at once discovered.

During the wars of the revolution, the duke of Brunswick’s march into Champagne was a simple line, but wanted corps to cover the flanks, and activity in the execution. The recovery of Belgium by the Austrians was also effected by operating in mass; but on the French frontier they wasted their time in sieges, and acted upon exterior and eccentric lines. The French operated in a similar manner, but having a line of fortresses and numerical superiority, they were at last successful, and expelled the allies from Belgium. This worthless system was then cried up, and denominated Carnot’s. Accordingly, in 1795, the French persisted in acting on double lines. They ma-nceuvred on the Rhine, by Dusseldorf and Manheim. Cler-fait operating centrally, carried his masses alternately from right to left, gained the decisive victories of Manheim and the lines of Mayence, and threw the French army of the Sambre and Meuse back across the Rhine to cover the Mo-zelle, and Pichegru under the cannon of Landau.

In 1796, the French, in their lines of operations on the Rhine, still copying Frederick’s faulty system of 1757, and their own of 1794 and 1795, were not more successful than in the preceding campaign. The armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, moved from the extremities of their base to take a concentric direction on the Danube. As in 1794, they formed two exterior lines. The Archduke Charles opposed his own in an interior direction, to be more readily concentrated, and seized the critical moment, while the corps of Count Latour was covered by the Danube, to steal some marches unperceived by Moreau, and to throw his mass upon Jourdan, who was routed at Würtzburg. This decided the fortune of the campaign in Germany, and compelled Moreau’s deep lines to retreat into France.

Meanwhile Napoleon commenced his extraordinary career in Italy, as Frederick had recommended half a century before. His system was to divide the enemy, and force the Austrians and Piedmontese to take two exterior lines. They fell into the snare, and he defeated them separately at Mondovi and Lodi. An army had assembled in the Tyrol to relieve Mantua; it was led on in two lines, separated by a lake (Guarda). The French general, raising the siege, hurried with the mass of his forces to meet the first column at Brescia, and routed it; the second column arrived soon after on the same ground, and was likewise driven back upon the Tyrol. Wurmser determined to cover the two lines of Roveredo and Vicenza; Napoleon, [7:21:739]after defeating the first and driving it into the Lawis, changed his direction to the right, passed through the gorges of the Brenta, upon the left line of the enemy, and forced the wrecks of this fine army into Mantua, where it ultimately capitulated.

In 1799, the system of Carnot again prevailed. France, twice punished for operating with two exterior lines, now adopted three. An army on the left observed the Lower Rhine, one in the centre was on the Danube, and a third occupied Switzerland. These armies could not unite till they reached the valley of the Inn, eighty leagues from their base. The archduke uniting his forces in the centre, gained the victory of Stockach, and the Helvetian army was constrained to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern Switzerland. In their turn the allies committed the same fault, Instead of pursuing the conquest of this central bulwark of Europe, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the Lower Rhine. The army in the former country was ruined at Zurich, while that in the latter was trifling about Manheim. In Italy a double line was formed by the French; one towards Naples, where 32,000 men were employed to no purpose; while the other, on the Adige, was too weak, and suffered severe loss. At length, when the army of Naples returned towards the north, it committed the fault of taking a direction from that of Moreau. Suwarow took an able central position, marched against the first of these armies, and defeated it within a few leagues of the other.

In 1800 the scene changed again. Napoleon, having returned from Egypt, displayed a new combination of the lines of operations: 150,000 men filed off on the flanks of Switzerland, opening on one side on the Danube, and on the other upon the Po. This masterly combination secured immense advantages. Modern Europe had not as yet presented such operations. The French armies, forming two interior lines, which reciprocally sustained each other, forced the Austrians to take a contrary or exterior direction, which disabled them from communicating together. By this arrangement, the reserve army cut off the communications of Melas with the base, while it preserved all its own with the army of the Rhine,^[3. Army of the Rhine, of the Sambre and Meuse, were names given to French armies, although they were not always on these rivers. ] which constituted its secondary line. A reference to the map of that seat of war will show Moreau posted at Stockach and Zürich, and Kray facing him on the north side of the Danube; in Italy, Napoleon on the Po, at Pavia, and Tortona, with a corps at Vercelli, completely insulating Melas at Alessandria; while the French commander, in case of check, had all the gorges of Switzerland, the St Bernard, Simplon, St Gothard, and Splugen open. The events of that period offer convincing proofs of the decisive effect of a proper choice of lines of operations.

In a subsequent campaign, Napoleon, breaking up from Boulogne, and directing several corps through Central Germany to approach the Danube, suddenly turned the position of Mack at Ulm, and, placing himself upon his communication, forced him to surrender. But in this campaign his fortune began to blind him. Forgetting that he had no base of operations nearer than the Rhine, he hurried forward to Vienna, and thence to meet the Russians in Moravia. Prussia was in arms, a British corps had reached the west of Germany, Bohemia had ζisen in mass, the Tyroleans made a successful resistance, and the Archduke Charles, after crippling the French army of Italy, had advanced to the vicinity of Vienna. At this moment, with only a small reserve at Frankfort, the Austro-Russians, who had every interest to temporize, hazarded the battle of Austerlitz; and his good fortune and the imprudence of the allies saved him from a dilemma from which that victory would not have relieved him, but for the pusillanimous feelings which signed the peace.

Similar manoeuvres towards the sources of the Saale produced the disasters of the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt. But in this war Napoleon became still more enamoured of deep and baseless lines of operations, the baneful effect of which he was not destined to feel till the campaign of 1812, when he invaded Russia without a true base nearer than the Rhine. His secondary base on the Vistula bore no relation to the depth of his line of operatione, intersected by the Niemen, the Dwina, and a solitary waste of endless woods and heaths. Although he operated on a simple line, the immense distance from his base left him without communications. The extremes or pivots of the secondary base were already turned and broken, when Kutusoff moved to the rear of his flank upon Kaluga, towards the Berezina, and destroyed the greatest army recorded in modern history. The next year, though his lines were shorter, circumstances were totally altered; he operated with ability in mass; but being greatly inferior in horse, and the allies manoeuvring likewise in mass, the first battles were indecisive, till his adversaries, operating upon double exterior lines,—on this occasion applicable from their great superiority in numbers and in cavalry,—moved again round the flank, and decided the question at Leipzig.

Meantime, the duke of Wellington, in the peninsula, cunctando restituit rem. Opposing a single line against a single line, he saved Portugal by his masterly position of Torres Vedras, without a battle. Next he drove the enemy from the frontier fortresses, by alternately carrying his masses across the Tagus. His line was shorter from north to south than that of the enemy, and he caused them to increase theirs by the destruction of the bridge of Al-meras. Thus he forced his opponents to operate exteriorly. After the victory of Salamanca, his march into Spain was by two interior lines; and though this operation has been hlamed, because it ended in a retreat, we forget that the enemy was obliged to abandon the south, or one half of Spain, to produce it. The next operation was upon a single and decisive line. The enemy was encountered at Vittoria before he could concentrate his forces, cut off from his base, and driven headlong into Pampeluna.

This comparison of the combinations and results of the most celebrated campaigns shows, that all the lines of operations that have been crowned with success depended on general principles, of which the following are the principal heads.

1. A double line of operations is advantageous if the enemy has likewise a double line, provided theirs be exterior, and at a greater distance than yours, and unable to unite without first risking a battle.

2. An army possessing interior lines more connected than those of the enemy, can, by strategical movements, destroy them successively, by carrying the mass of forces alternately upon each point; as was exemplified in the campaign of 1758, and subsequently at Manheim and the lines of Mayence, at Würtzburg and Emmendingen, at Lonato and Castiglione, Trente and Bassano, at Stockach and Ziirich, Abendsberg and Eckmuhl, &c.

3. In order to effect this movement, a corps should be left before the army which it is intended to keep in check, with orders not to engage, but merely to retard the march, by taking posts behind defiles or rivers, and retreating towards the army.

4. From the above premises, it follows that a double line of operations against an enemy whose corps are in closer connection, will always be unfortunate with equal numbers, if the enemy profits by the advantages of his situation, and manoeuvres with rapidity within it.
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5. A double line of operations becomes still more dangerous when its parts are separated by several days’ march.

6. Simple and interior lines, on the contrary, are always most safe; because they admit the action of the mass of forces against the isolated divisions of the enemy, if he be so imprudent as to venture an action.

7. A double line of operations, however, may be adopted with success, if the forces employed are so much greater, that superior masses can be presented to the opponents on both its parts.

8. Two anterior lines, mutually sustaining each other, and facing two exterior lines at a certain distance, must avoid being compressed into a small area; for the exterior hostile lines might thereby act simultaneously.

9. Again, they should not operate at too great intervals; for the enemy might have time to crush one of these divisions, while it is weakened by detaching to the other, and thus gain a decisive advantage.

10. It being the interest of a commander to divide and isolate the opponent’s forces, his manoeuvring lines should never have the object of drawing the whole hostile forces upon him; as Tempelhoff boasts Frederick to have done in the campaign of 1760.

By reference to the preceding sketch of the operations in late wars, the value of these rules is everywhere observable. When the details in history are examined, such as they are presented by authors acquainted with the art of war, they form a key, which opens an unerring way into all the causes of success and misfortune. Thus, in what has been said on accidental lines of operation, it might have been added, that Napoleon did not know how to avail himself of them, when he was advised to operate by the right bank of the Elbe, and change his direction upon the pivot of Magdeburg, instead of risking the battle of Leipzig, and suffering, in violation of the eighth rule, the enemy to place him between two fires; nor in Champagne in 1814, when he operated at too great a distance, overlooking the ninth rule, which gave the allies time to force the gates of Paris, thus employing the just system of throwing the mass of their forces upon the most important point. The duke of Wellington’s defensive campaign in Portugal hinged upon a prudent application of the second rule; and Napoleon, in 1814, could not have resisted so long as he did in France, but by the same system. Although the allies at that moment conducted their operations on the seventh rule, perfectly applicable under the then existing circumstances, yet the vast superiority of internal lines remained evident. But when his eccentric movement placed him out of the sphere of real operations, the allies applied the third rule with perfect success, and effected his fall.

In order to complete the view of territorial and manoeuvring lines, it is requisite to consider them as they are affected by the configuration of frontiers.

1. In order to operate with advantage, there should not be two different armies upon the same frontier; because,

2. Double lines will always fail, with equal chances, against a single line, as has already been shown.

3. Interior lines resist with advantage against exterior lines, either upon the same or upon two different frontiers. The objection that Pichegru proved successful in 1794 is not valid; because Prince Coburg did not avail himself of his interior line, but acted by detachments, while he remained inactive with his mass, inferior in strength, and unsupported by fortresses on the flanks.

4. When the hostile fortresses are scattered upon a line of great extent, the most advantageous manoeuvring line is upon their centre; as the Russians experienced to their cost in the beginning of the campaign of 1812: but on all other occasions, the best direction is upon one of the extremities, and from thence on the rear; as exemplified in 1800 in Italy, in 1805 in Bavaria, and the next year at the sources of the Maine and Saale, &c. When central masses are moved with ability against scattered corps, all other things being equal, they must always be successful, often even without a battle; as when Moreau, making demonstrations against the left of Kray, near Huningen, moved rapidly into Switzerland, whereby the greater part of Swabia fell into his hands without an action. The march of the duke of Wellington upon Madrid and Burgos produced the immediate evacuation of the south of Spain; and the movement of Kutusoff upon Kaluga forced the French from Moscow and out of Russia.

5. The configuration of a frontier may have important influence on the direction of lines of operation. Central positions, forming salient angles towards the enemy, such as Bohemia forms towards Prussia, Switzerland towards Austria or Saxony, as it was circumstanced in 1813, are the most advantageous; because they are naturally interior, and lead to the flanks and rear of the opponent’s defensive line. The sides of these salient angles are therefore so important, that all the resources of art should be added to those of nature to render them impregnable. Switzerland and Bohemia are sufficiently proved to possess these natural advantages; but Saxony appears more doubtful, because Napoleon was at length defeated at Leipzig. Yet it was his conviction of these central advantages that made him neglect to change the line of his operations upon the pivot of Magdeburg; and if we examine the character of the operations, though the allies were numerically, and especially in excellent cavalry, superior, we discover that when his defensive manoeuvres were confined to a moderate distance from the Elbe, and the ridge of the mountains of Bohemia, no impression could be made upon him; but his system was solely that of attack, and his impatience sought the Prussians deep in Silesia, the grand army beyond the defiles of Bohemia, and the northern army in the sands of Berlin, not successively, but all at the same moment. He was thus on all sides inferior, but not dislodged, till, by his own indecision, he allowed the enemy to turn both his flanks simultaneously, and to bring him to action between two fires at Leipzig. We may take occasion to revert once more to the double exterior lines of the allies here, and in 1814 in Champagne. When each of the armies operating exteriorly amounts to 120,000 or 150,000 men, they possess a consistency which obviates all need of co-operation; for, admitting the enemy to be even stronger, there is not a great disparity of force between the parties, which can be deployed and brought into action on the same field of battle: hence the weaker army can decline a battle, and in both these cases, where the allies had great superiority of cavalry, they could begin and break off a battle at their pleasure; as they proved at the first battle of Leipzig or Lützen, and at Bautzen.

6. Where no such central position or territorial projection exists, the same effect may be produced by the relative direction of the manoeuvring lines, as exemplified in fig. 1. CD, manoeuvring on the right flank of the army AB, and HI moving upon the left flank of FG, form two interior lines, CK and IK. upon the extremities of each of the exterior lines AB and FG, both of which may be destroyed by carrying the mass of forces alternately upon them. This combination presents the effect of the French campaigns of 1800 and 1809. It is also the spirit of the duke of Wellington’s defence of Portugal; for, by his [7:21:741] bridges on the Tagus, he had a direct and interior communication on both his lines north and south of the river, while the enemy, being placed on the segment of a circle, had only the precarious connection by the bridge of Alme-ras, which being destroyed, he could not advance from either Andalusia or Salamanca, without immediately placing himself in the disadvantageous position here described.

7. The configuration of the theatre of war may possess the same importance as that of a frontier; for, in fact, every theatre of war may be considered as a quadrilateral figure. To elucidate this idea, the scene of operations of the French army from 1757 to 1762, and the operations of Napoleon in 1806, may be cited. In fig. 2, the side AB being enclosed by the North Sea, the side BD by the river Weser, base of the army of Prince Ferdinand; CD representing the river Maine, base of the French, and AC the Rhine, likewise in possession of the French; their armies operating offensively on the sides AC and CD, had the third AB or North Sea in their favour, and therefore BD was the only side which they were to gain by their manoeuvres to have possession of the four sides, and consequently of the base of all the communications of their adversary.

This is more clearly exemplified in fig. 3. The French army E, proceeding from the base CD, to gain the position FGH, cuts off the allied army J from the side BD, its only communication and base. It would thus be driven into the angle LAM, which is formed near Embden by the line of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea; while the army E could always communicate with CD or the Maine.

The manoeuvre of Napoleon on the Saale, in 1806, was combined on the same principles. He moved upon Jena and Naumburg in the position FGH; and then advancing by Halle and Dessau, he threw the Prussian army J upon the side AB, formed by the sea. The fate which attended that army at Erfurth, Magdeburg, Lübeck, and Prentzlow, is well known. The great art therefore consists in combining the marches so as to arrive upon the communications of the enemy without sacrificing one’s own. Now the lines FGH, by means of the prolonged position, and the angle formed towards the extremity of the enemy, always preserves the communication with the base CD. This constitutes the application of the manoeuvres of Marengo and Jena.

When the theatre of hostilities is not near the sea, it will be still circumscribed by some great neutral power, which guards the frontier, and encloses one side of the quadrangle. No doubt this barrier is inferior to the sea, but, in a general view, it must nevertheless be considered as an obstacle, upon which it is dangerous to be driven after a defeat, and advantageous to push an enemy. A state with 200,000 men will not suffer its neutrality to be violated with impunity; and if a beaten army ventured so to do, still it would be cut off from its base. But if an inferior power forms the limit of the theatre of war, the square of operations may then be considered as extending over it to the next great neutral power, or the sea.

To give a still more convincing proof of the justness of the preceding ideas, let us examine the scene of the campaign of 1806-7 in Poland. The Baltic and the frontier of Austrian Gallicia formed the two sides AB and CD of the above square. It was of great consequence to both parties to avoid being driven upon either of these obstacles. The configuration of the frontiers may modify the sides of the square, and convert them into a parallelogram, or a tra-pesius, as in fig. 4.

In this case, the army GH, being in possession of the sides AC and CD, would be still more favourably situated, because the base of the opponent being contracted at BD, would be more difficult to keep open. The front of the base BD having less extent, offers fewer resources for manoeuvring, and affords to the army GH the means of operating with more success; because the direction of the line CD naturally leads upon the communications of the enemy, and because the space to be occupied in order to cut him off is shorter, and therefore more easily held with concentrated forces.

The theatre of war in Prussia and Poland, previously mentioned, was precisely of this figure. The frontiers of Austrian Gallicia, extending to the Narew, formed, by the line of the Vistula, the contracted side BD; and the manner in which Napoleon embraced that line at Pultusk and Eylau was similar to the figure here shown. This operation had however its unfavourable chances; the first depending upon the doubtful trust to be reposed in the neutrality of Austria, and the second upon the great distance from the base of operations, which exposed the communications of the armies with the Oder to the mercy of the cabinet of Vienna. It depended even then upon Austria (as indeed it had the year before depended on Prussia) to put a stop to these endless invasions. The manoeuvre of the French general was good, but the operation of the statesman was only daring. These examples are sufficient to demonstrate that the manner of embracing a theatre of war is amenable to the two following principles.

1. To direct the masses upon the decisive points of the line of operations, that is, upon the centre if the enemy has been so imprudent as to scatter his forces, or upon an extremity if he is in a contiguous line.

2. To make the great effort in the latter case upon that extremity which has its back against an insurmountable obstacle, or which leads upon the communications of the enemy without sacrificing our own.

Defensive operations, in a great measure already examined in the preceding discussions, require, nevertheless, some further remarks. Passive defence offers no security to a state, nor fortresses without an army; it is confiding in a shield without a sword. Reason and experience alike prove that defensive system to be the best, which embraces the greatest number of offensive facilities; for these we refer, in particular, to interior and simple lines, and those directions of lines which best anticipate or counteract the most effectual offensive ones. But as defensive measures imply inferiority of forces, they must in a considerable degree depend upon local means to counterbalance the superiority of the enemy. Rivers and chains of mountains are the natural obstacles; fortresses, intrenched camps, and well selected positions upon the most advantageous lines of defence, the artificial means in a territorial front. Fortresses, with têtes de pont upon a river parallel to the frontier, are very advantageous; but upon a river perpendicular to the frontier[7:21:742] they are still more useful, particularly if fortified upon both banks, as Prague on the Mulda, or Maestricht on the Meuse. In the former case an offensive army must cross the river only once, but in the latter it must cross as often as the adversary thinks proper; for, placing his camp under protection of one of these fortresses, the enemy cannot pass him without being taken in flank or rear, nor besiege the place without dislodging the enemy. Hence intrenched camps, covering and covered by a fortress, add considerably to the defence of a state. The Austrians felt severely the want of these precautions on the Danube in the late wars. Thus the operation of Mack upon Ulm would have been good had he moved in time to attack from thence either on the right or left of the river; but to have rendered it secure, there should have been fortified positions on the Schellenberg at Donauwerth, Ingolstadt, and Ratisbon: for then he could always place the river between him and the enemy; and if the latter operated on both banks, he could attack with his whole mass that part which was most convenient, before the other could cross to assist it. Fortifications are also eminently useful in the defence of passes in chains of mountains. The insignificant fort of Bard, with 600 men, arrested the progress of the principal column of Napoleon, when descending the Great St Bernard into the valley of Aoste in 1800; and if the fort had been better secured, the whole plan of campaign would have failed, for Melas would have had time to arrive and defeat the enemy in detail. Again, the French emperor having constructed the fine roads into Italy, neglected to secure them by any fortifications, and the first military use that was made of them was by the Austrians in the two successful invasions of France, where the old fort of L’Ecluse, near Geneva, was the only point that could, and actually did, retard them some days.

Fortresses likewise secure the magazines, stores, and hospitals of an army, and save the matériel and broken troops after a defeat. Pampeluna saved what did escape of the French after the battle of Vittoria, as Prague did the Austrians in 1757. But in order to make them capable of producing the share of security to a state which reason can expect from them, fortresses should not be too numerous, because they absorb too great a proportion of troops for garrisons, and cost immense sums; nor small, for then they are easily embraced and overpowered by artillery; nor all on the frontiers, for if the enemy penetrate beyond them, the great arsenals, depots, founderies, &c. of the nation are no longer within reach of the defensive army, which is also deprived of the appui for a position to cover the capital, and turn the flank of the invader. In the last campaigns, France felt the want of intermediate fortresses. If such had existed about Soissons, on the Marne, and about the junction of the Seine and Aube, the avenues to Paris would have been more easily defended. Intrenched positions are often eminently useful, provided they intersect or flank the most direct lines of operations; but as they do not contain arsenals, &c. they are less so than fortresses, and the selection of their site is extremely difficult. Those of the Russians at Drissa, upon the line of Moscow, were abandoned. The intrenchments of the French on the frontiers of Spain and at Toulouse were forced; but those on the Isla near Cadiz, and at Torres Vedras, both saved kingdoms. A position ably chosen has sometimes the same effect. That of Dumouriez, near the wood of Argonne, arrested the advance of the duke of Brunswick in 1792; and that of Kutusoff at Malojaroslaf, near Tula, forced the French to retire by the road they came. Both were on the flank, and menaced the rear of the enemy. Dumouriez, in the north-east corner of the French frontier, presented a salient angle upon a simple line of operations towards the German and the Netherland fronts of defence, and was near the fortresses of Lorraine. Napoleon, in 1814, endeavoured to recover a similar line after the battle of Brienne; but it was then be yond the sphere of operations, and his march occasioned him the loss of his empire. To conclude, defensive war does not consist in covering every part of a state, but in preventing an enemy from obtaining any advantage which may enable him to accomplish his main object.

III—BATTLES.

Between a battle won and a battle lost there is an immense distance, said Napoleon, the day before the conflict at Leipzig—empires lie between them; and indeed the plan of campaign, and the strategical movements, are only so many preparatory dispositions to arrive at the great crisis of a battle. The rules applicable to battles, therefore, form the most important branch of the science of war; because, unless they are well understood, all other knowledge will be comparatively useless. In many respects this branch is less capable of being reduced to fixed principles than the others. There are however certain general rules which should govern the dispositions, and the chance of success will be increased or diminished in the ratio of their due application. Among these, the first is that of operating with a superior mass upon the decisive point, because the physical force of organized numbers in arms furnishes the unerring means of victory, when the moral qualities in both armies are equal. The means of bringing this force to bear in the most advantageous manner is the art of fighting; consequently, courage and fortune being nearly balanced, that general who can operate with the largest mass upon the most decisive point must be successful. But to effect this purpose, the combinations must be such as to produce a unity of movements, conducing simultaneously to the same object.

The following maxims are of general application: 1. No opportunity should be left till the morrow. 2. No battle should be given, but for an important object, unless the position should render it unavoidable. 3. After a victory, the enemy should not be allowed to recover—the pursuit should be incessant.

As in lines of operations, so on fields of battle, it is necessary to avoid dispositions which have generally proved fatal; such as, 1st, forming isolated divisions; 2d, ordering extended movements, which deprive the army of a part of its strength, and enable the enemy to ruin either the main body or the detachment; 3d, positions with too great an extent of front; 4th, allowing obstacles to separate the wings, or obstacles which prevent the connection of columns, and expose them to separate defeats.

The finest combinations are those which produce an oblique order of battle, those with a wing reinforced, those which out-flank the enemy, and those which form a perpendicular upon a hostile extremity, or upon a scattered centre. These are almost always successful, because they present a whole line to an extremity, and therefore a greater mass than the enemy. Thus the fundamental principle of all military combinations, namely, to effect with the greatest mass of forces a combined attack upon the decisive point, is applied; and it is easy to understand how a general of ability, with 60,000 men, may be able to defeat 100,000, if he can bring 50,000 into action upon a single part of his enemy’s line; for battles are decided, not by troops upon the muster-rolls, nor even by those present, but by those alone who are simultaneously engaged. Numerical superiority of troops not engaged, so far from being useful, only increases the disorder, as was fully exemplified at Leuthen.

There is not a great variety of measures applicable to this maxim.

I. The first is evidently that of taking the lead in the movements. The general who is enabled to have this advantage, can employ his forces wherever he thinks them [7:21:743]applicable; while, on the contrary, he who is obliged to await the enemy, is no longer master of a single combination, because his movements must be subordinate to those of his adversary, and it is too late to arrest them when they are already executing. The general who takes the lead knows what he intends to perform; he conceals his march, surprises or overpowers an extremity or a weak part of the hostile line, while the waiting army is defeated on one of its points, before the knowledge of the attack has reached its commander. Hence the following are corollaries.

1. An army taking the lead in a movement can conceal it until in full execution; therefore, when the manoeuvre takes place in the interior of its own line of operations, the commander may gain several marches of the enemy.

2. To judge soundly of military operations, it is highly important to banish all calculations which suppose that the hostile general will be informed of a movement, and will oppose it by the best possible manoeuvre, from the instant that the movement is begun.

3. When two armies combine to place the enemy between two fires, from the distance of several marches, they must ground the disposition upon a double line of operations against a simple one, and expose themselves to be defeated separately if the enemy takes advantage of his central position. Such a manoeuvre is similar to a movement made at a distance against the flanks, and should be ranged among those which cannot produce a simultaneous effect at the moment required.

II. The second consists in directing the movements against a weak point of the enemy, when that point offers the greatest advantages.

An attack to the front is always to be avoided, if a concentrated effort can possibly be made upon the extremity of an enemy’s line, for which simple demonstrations on the front are sufficient.

Against double and scattered lines of operations, it is preferable to direct the attacks upon the central points; for the mass of forces having ruined a central division, the corps to the right and left can no longer operate in unison, and are forced to retreat eccentrically; as was proved in the disasters of Wurmser, Mack, and the duke of Brunswick. Against simple lines of operations, and contiguous lines of battle, the weak points are the flanks, because they are liable to be crushed before they can be sustained. Albuera offers perhaps the only positive example to the contrary in modern history; for here the right wing of the allies was turned and routed, and yet the battle gained by the centre forming an echellon to the rear.

A deep column being attacked on the head, is in a similar condition as an extremity of a line; both the one and the other are engaged in succession and defeated, or what is termed rolled up. This was proved at Rosbach and Auerstadt. It is however more practicable to make a fresh disposition from a column than with the extremity of a line, when attacked by the enemy.

In executing a general strategical movement against an extremity of an enemy’s line of operations, or of position, a mass is not only brought to bear against a weak point, but also, from that extremity, it becomes easy to gain the rear and communications, either of the base or of the secondary line of the opponent. Napoleon’s manoeuvre in 1805, by Donauwerth and the line of the Lech, turned the line of communication of Mack with Vienna, which was his base; and it intercepted his connection with Bohemia, which was his most important secondary line, by which he expected the assistance of the Russians. Such were also the views of Soult when he turned the allies at Albuera, and of Junot in his attack upon the flank and rear of the British at Vimiera. Napoleon performed the same manoeuvre against the Prussians in 1806 by Saalfield and Gera, Kutusoff in 1812 by Kaluga and Krasnoi, the grand allied army in 1813 when it debouched from Bohemia upon Dresden and Leipzig, and Napoleon finally attempted it in 1815 by Wavre.

1. But if it be intended to remedy the deficiency of numbers, by acting with all the forces upon a single point of the enemy’s line, that line being contiguous, the point selected should be as far as possible from the centre, because the centre can be sustained immediately from both the wings; while, on the contrary, an extremity can only receive succours by degrees from the divisions nearest at hand.

2. An attack upon the centre is never advisable excepting when the hostile line is very extensive, and scattered into separate divisions: then indeed the result must be successful from the same causes, and the consequences even more brilliant, because the enemy’s corps will thereby be totally separated, and disabled from re-uniting; whereas an attack upon the flank can produce similar success only under particular circumstances.

III. The result of the preceding truths leads to the maxim, that as it is better to attack the extremity of a line, yet that both the extremities should not be attacked at the same time, unless there be a very great superiority on the part of the assailant. An army of 60,000 men forming two corps of 30,000 each, for the purpose of attacking an enemy equally numerous, is deprived of the power of striking a decisive blow; because it enables the adversary to take equal measures, or even, if the movement be extended and unconnected, to assemble his mass against one of the divisions, and destroy it by his momentary superiority. Multiplied attacks by means of a greater number of columns are still more dangerous, more repugnant to the best principles of war, particularly when they cannot commence acting at the same moment and upon the same point. But when there is a very great superiority of force on the side of the assailant, then indeed both the extremities of the hostile line should be attacked, because thus a greater number of troops is brought into action on both his wings; whereas if this great superiority were kept in one mass upon a single point, the adversary might deploy as many as the other party could bring into action, and thus engage with equal numbers. In this case it is only requisite to collect the greatest mass upon that wing where the greatest success is expected. Daun manoeuvred in this way at Hochkirch, and the whole allied forces at Leipzig.

To illustrate this maxim more fully, it is necessary to enter into some detail, and fix a few particular principles. If 50,000 men, intending to attack 60,000, should form two corps of nearly equal force, and, with a view to embrace both the extremities of their line, should extend and isolate the attacks, it is clear that the 60,000 will have the facility of moving more rapidly within the interior of their line, than the assailant’s corps with such a mass between them, as fig. 5 demon-trates. The two corps B and C might gain momentarily some ground, but the enemy A, leaving a corps to check C upon the most advantageous ground for defence which its position might offer, could throw the remaining mass of forces on the front, flank, and rear of B, which must consequently be destroyed. If B and C should have a third detachment on the centre, the result would be still more disastrous, for then separate corps would attack without union a force everywhere imposing, which could not fail to overpower them. This took place at Kollin, from inattention to the orders of the king; at Neerwinden in 1793; and at Stockach in 1799, where Dumouriez and Jourdan were defeated by Prince Coburg and the Archduke Charles. At Krevelt [7:21:744]a similar result would have occurred if the French army had been ably commanded, and exercised in great manoeuvres. At Blenheim, all Eugene’s efforts were unavailing, even when he had gained the flank, until Marlborough’s success decided the victory.

The truth of these observations is so manifest, that it may be applied to an army superior in numbers: 50,000 attacking in this manner an army of 40,000, would still incur all the same risks; and if the inferior force, after leaving a corps to mask one attack, should take a rapid offensive measure, and overtake the enemy in his preparatory dispositions, which would necessarily be calculated upon the principle of finding the opponent in his position, the heads of his columns might he turned and completely routed. But if the two hostile attacks should have between them some difficult object, a wood or river, they might each in their turn be destroyed. Examples of this kind occurred at Lonato, Castiglione, Abendsberg, Eckmuhl, and Ratisbon.

When however the attacking army is double the force of the enemy, the principle no longer holds as stated in the cases of Hochkirch and Leipzig; but, to avoid the danger of divided forces, it is requisite to have the lead, and to conceal it in such a manner that both attacks may commence nearly at the same moment. Thus two maxims, in appearance contradictory, are derived from the same principle.

1. An army intending to attack another of equal or superior force cannot insure success but by a concentrated effort upon a single point of a weakened line, which is not in a condition to be timely supported.

2. But when a superior army attacks one much weaker, two or three divisions should be formed, in order to bring all its masses into action against the inferior masses opposed; for if the attack were confined to a single point, the whole of the forces could not be brought into line, and the enemy might deploy an equal number; but it is necessary that the whole combinations centre on the same ground, and at the same instant, to produce unity of execution, and avoid partial and successive defeat.

3. As every front of operations and each position of battle contains a decisive point, it is important that the repartition of forces insure not only a general superiority over the enemy, but also that a strong reserve be appropriated to support the attack upon that principal point.

These maxims are more especially applicable to battles than to strategical operations; for with these no necessity demands that corps acting at the distance of several marches from each other should engage exactly at the same hour, and it would be impossible to do so on the same ground. But if the principle is to be enforced differently, it is still of full efficacy. It may appear that in these ideas the main stress of the argument rests upon the local superiority of numbers; but it is nevertheless true, that their combination is the chief object; for 30,000 men may be defeated by half their numbers, if, in the disposition and in the choice of the ground, some vicious arrangement take place, which produces a real disadvantage; such as La Motte experienced from Webb at Wynendael, Chevert from Imhoff at Meer, and the Austrians from Moreau in the defiles of Hohenlinden.

IV. In the strategical movement of a great mass in a combined effort upon one point, it is advisable to keep the forces concentrated within a space approaching to square, so as to have them perfectly disposable; or, in other words, that the depth of the disposition be nearly equal to the front, enabling the battalions to arrive with promptitude from all quarters towards the point attacked. Extensive fronts militate as much against good principles, as great detachments and isolated divisions deprived of the means of being sustained. The inattention of Napoleon and Ney to this maxim gave Benningsen the advantage at Eylau; and the care of the allies in 1815, notwithstanding the difficulty of guarding an open frontier, enabled them to concentrate their masses at Waterloo.

V. One of the most efficacious means of applying the above general principles, is to induce the enemy to take contrary measures. By means of small corps of light troops, jealousies may be created for some important points of his communications. If he can be persuaded that they are formidable, he will be tempted to detach strong divisions against them, and, scattering his forces, be disabled from acting with vigour himself, and be exposed to an attack from superior forces. Operations by detachments have nevertheless been in fashion. To divide and subdivide, till the main army was reduced to the secondary character of mere observing, was considered as the very summit of strategical science. In the Hanoverian campaigns, the French, with two great armies, acted upon this system; nor could they ever be undeceived, although Prince Ferdinand, with less than half their force, contrived not only to reconquer the country, but afterwards to keep them constantly at bay, and even to attack them with superior numbers. The Austrians, and the army of the empire, operated similarly in Saxony, and reaped similar fruits. But Mack, trained in the Turkish wars, was the great patron of cordons and scattered posts, with inert positions to sustain them. The Austrians have however little reason to exult in the success of their system. The least mischief which they have derived from it was, that they fought on accessory points, while the main armies, reduced in strength, were unable to do more than menace the principal objects of the campaign, wasting their time until they were attacked by superior forces.

Nor are hostile armies destroyed by merely taking positions upon their communications, and remaining inactive within them. Had Napoleon halted upon the Lech in 1805, or on the Saale in 1806, he could neither have prevented the escape of Mack by Donauwerth, nor the retreat of the duke of Brunswick to the Elbe. The art of war does not consist in incursions upon communications, but in placing the mass upon them, in order to attack the enemy with decided advantage. Detachments upon the communications of the adversary are only accessories of secondary utility.

VI. When the lead is taken in a decisive movement against the enemy, great importance is attached to an exact knowledge of the positions and movements which he may undertake. Spies are then of the utmost consequence, but partisans, thoroughly versed in watching the enemy, are of still greater utility. For this purpose the general should scatter small parties in all directions, and multiply them with as much care as he would show to restrain them in great operations. Some divisions of light cavalry, expressly organized for this service, and not included in the order of battle, are the most efficient. To operate without such precautions is to walk in the dark, and to be exposed to the disastrous consequences which may be produced by a secret march of the enemy. Generally speaking, these measures are too much neglected. The espionnage is not sufficiently organized beforehand; and the officers of light troops have not always the requisite experience to conduct their detachments.

The Cossacks under Platoff, Chernicheff, Tettenborn, &c. in Russia and Poland; these, with the Prussians under Lutzow, in Germany and France; and the Guerillas of Mina, the Empecinado, and others, in Spain and Portugal, have shown the immense advantages to be derived from such services. While they were few in number, their real importance was not fully understood; but when 15,000 or 20,000 of them appeared in the field, especially in a friendly country, they became the most formidable enemy, with respect[7:21:745] to the combinations, which a general could encounter; because those were always liable to be disjointed by the uncertainty of the timely arrival of orders. Every convoy demanded a numerous and well-conducted escort, and every march was endangered by the want of real information relative to the hostile positions. The duties, greatly multiplied, exhausted a great part of the army; and the regular cavalry was soon rendered unserviceable by their excessive fatigue.

VII. It is not sufficient for a good operation of war to convey with ability the mass of forces upon the most important points; they require moreover to be brought into action. If they remain inactive when arrived upon those points, the principle is forgotten, for the enemy may make counter-movements to defeat the project; and it is therefore indispensable that, from the moment his communications or his flank are gained, the mass of forces must march up to him and attack. This is the moment when a simultaneous employment of the troops must take place. Masses of troops present do not decide battles, but the acting masses alone have effect; the former indeed produce that consequence in strategical movements, but the latter determine the success of the action.

To insure this result, a general of ability will seize the proper moment to force the decisive point of the field of battle, and combine the attack in such a manner that all his forces will be brought into action, with the exception always of the reserve. But if the efforts emanating from this principle fail of the desired success, no other combination remains than a simultaneous general onset, in which the reserve is to be brought forward, to make a last and decisive effort.

VIII. We now come to battles proper, all the combinations of which are reducible to three systems.

The first includes defensive battles, where the enemy is expected in a strong position, with the simple object of maintaining the ground. Such were the positions of Tallard at Blenheim, Villeroy at Ramillies, Marsin at Turin, Daun at Torgau; and the events are sufficient to show their general disadvantage.

The second is the opposite system, wholly offensive. It consists in manoeuvres of attack wherever the enemy may be found, such as those of Marlborough at Blenheim, Ramillies, and Oudenarde; Frederick at Leuthen, Zorndorff, and Torgau; Napoleon at Jena and Ratisbon; Wellington at Vittoria, and the allies at Leipzig.

The third offers, in some measure, the middle term between the other two. It consists in selecting a field of battle, carefully reconnoitred beforehand in its strategical applicabilities and advantages of ground; then to wait the enemy’s attack, and to fix upon the proper moment of passing from the defensive into offensive measures with the best chances of success. In this class must be reckoned the combinations of Napoleon at Rivoli and Austerlitz, of Blucher at the Katsbach and Laon, and of Wellington at Salamanca and Waterloo.

It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules by which the choice of any of these systems should be guided. The circumstances of the moment, the moral character of the troops, considered as affecting their courage, discipline, and inclinations, their national temper, and the conformation of the ground, must be taken into account.

1. Under these general considerations, it may be fixed, that the best mode is to act offensively on all occasions, when the troops are inured to war, and the ground presents no extraordinary features.

2. Where the locality of the field of battle is difficult of access, either from natural or artificial causes, and the troops of different nations not having the same unity of feeling and of discipline, it will be preferable to receive the attack in a position previously selected, with the determination of assuming the offensive when the enemy shall be exhausted by the first efforts.

3. When the strategical circumstances of the parties are such, that one is obliged to attack the other without considering localities; as, for instance, to prevent the junction of two hostile armies, or to crush an isolated corps, &c.

4. When particular circumstances, as the extreme inferiority of numbers, forbid any other than strictly defensive measures; such as Eugene took at Chiari, Abercromby on the Zyp, and Moore at Corunna.

Battles in general, whether offensive or defensive, notwithstanding all the varieties of ground and changes of position, may be classed into three systems of disposition, or what are termed orders, each subject to some modifications.

First, the simple parallel order, or that in which hostile armies are drawn up in parallel lines, to advance or receive the attack. Jomini justly observes, that accident or superior valour alone decides the contest in this class of orders, and that the soldier is entitled to all the credit; because such a disposition being the fruit of ignorance and incapacity, the general can have no part in it. Notwithstanding this censure, it is somewhat singular that the only battle in which a considerable British corps was severely handled was of this description, when Berwick defeated Lord Galway at Almanza. Accident, it must be owned, had a great share in this battle; for it is asserted that the statue of St Antonio, the nominal commander-in-chief, was shattered by a cannon ball, which instantly caused the Portuguese to retreat, and leave the British and Dutch to their fate.

The second order is the parallel, reinforced upon one or several parts of the line. In this class, especially if dispositions with an angle to the front or rear are included, most of the great victories of ancient and modern times may be reckoned. For although it is not the most perfect in theory, it is the most constantly applicable in practice, under almost every possible character of ground, or counter-disposition of the enemy.

The oblique order of battle is the third and the best class of tactical dispositions; but in the application, great simplicity of combination is necessary, and great prudence in the execution. Against a manoeuvring army ably commanded, it will always be very difficult to apply it; but when produced, the effect is instantaneous and decisive: it is the triumph of discipline and of grand manoeuvre.

IX. Orders of battle, or the most appropriate disposition for leading troops into action, should possess the inherent qualities of mobility and solidity. To attain these two objects, troops which are to remain on the defensive should be partly deployed and partly in columns, as the allied army was at Waterloo, or the Russians at Eylau; but the corps destined to attack a decisive point should be disposed into two lines of battalions, formed into columns of more or less density. Jomini proposes columns of grand divisions (according to the French formation of a battalion of six companies, making three grand divisions).

Three grand divisions would thus form three lines, and the second line three more. This order, according to his view, offers much more solidity than a deployed line, which waves too much, retards the impulse necessary for attack, and prevents the officers from managing their men. In order to facilitate the march, obviate the great density of the [7:21:746]mass, and procure a greater front, the divisions should be formed only two deep; for thus the battalions will be more moveable. The march in front, three deep, is always fatiguing to the centre rank, which, being pressed between the first and third, produces fluctuation, and consequent faintness in the onset. In this manner all the desired strength will be produced; the three grand divisions giving a depth of six ranks, which is more than sufficient; and the front being one third longer, augments the quantity of fire, if it should become necessary to use it. The enemy likewise wlll be awed by a display of greater numbers, and the artillery will have less effect than upon more solid masses.

If the proposal of Jomini were applied to the British system of battalion, the same effect would be obtained by fronts of wings of battalion, each three deep. What is said of fluctuation in the march is indeed true; but the lock-step is never, and cannot be, observed, in a charge or rapid advance to the front in action. The ranks open in those cases sufficiently to allow freedom of step. Firing three deep, though practised at drill, is, in truth, when applied in battle, not more efficient, perhaps less, than in two ranks. If therefore the expedient of forming battalions only in two ranks be resorted to, still the fronts of wings covering each other, and producing only a depth of four men, would be sufficient for troops so eminently qualified for battle as the British. This proposal of Jomini is an avowal of the inefficiency of dense columns, as they are usually formed by the French and other continental armies, in attacks and charges. If that general had been engaged against the British, he would have been still more convinced of this. During the late wars, not an instance occurred where a hostile column, au pas de charge, broke through a British line. And the charge at Maida by a brigade of light infantry, at Barossa by the 87th and three companies of the guards, at Vimiera by the 50th, and at Waterloo by the whole line, all in deployed order, two deep only, against lines or columns, demonstrates the error of supposing that a mass of human beings, possessed of individual will and feelings, can be subjected to the laws of mechanical action.

Rogniat, general of engineers, in the dispositions of the legion which he proposes, instead of battalions, contends for three ranks deployed, and the second line in columns, at quarter distance, ready to form squares when required; but both he and Jomini agree in the unprofitableness of fire from a third rank, in which they only maintain opinions that were long ago held by Folard, Saxe, and Lloyd.

Another system may be suggested, which would obviate many inconveniences under which the present labours. The present system of the infantry might be left such as habit, founded on experience, has framed it; with the exception of arming a third rank with rifled fusils, and spears about ten feet six inches in length: the fusil, when not used, to be slung on the shoulder in the manner of riflemen; and the spear with a spike to fix in the ground, and a hook about four and a half feet from the bottom, to serve for a rest in firing.^[4. As these troops would have no bayonet, they might be furnished with pontoneer swords, and saws and hatchets; both instruments of great utility in securing posts, clearing obstacles, and opening roads, and a thousand other daily warns. It is not meant that they should not have a drill of their own, and modes of formation independent of the battalion; but merely that, in giving or receiving charges in line at square, they should then constitute a third rank. ] As light infantry now form nearly one third of the foot in armies, this species of troops should perform all their duties, and be exercised accordingly. When scattered in front, their fire from a rest would be more destructive; the spear would give them more confidence and security against light cavalry. When called back into line, they would give it solidity; and in a charge, their spears, reaching beyond the bayonets of the first rank, would render it doubly formidable. Being drilled to form in front or rear, they would be the first rank when the battalion forms square to resist cavalry. In pursuits, they alone should be let loose upon the enemy. By their institution, every battalion, every detachment, would have its proportion of light infantry. Intrenchments would be more obstinately defended, and breaches more easily stormed. If a rivulet were to be forded, their spears would sound for a passage on a whole line in a moment. On the outposts, three spears and two great-coats would form a tent. The idea is not new, for the Austrian militia in Hungary have a corps (Granitzer Schutzen) thus armed. Should the cuirassiers in the armies again resume the lance,—an event of some probability, since it is asserted that the Polish lancers of the guard of Napoleon, now in the Russian service, changed their small Ukraine horses for a larger breed about two years ago, with the intention of being converted into cuirassier lancers,—it may be foreseen that the spear will again be resumed in the infantry.

X. On the extensive subject of position we can only give some particulars.

1. The best military positions cannot cover a state merely by being occupied and maintained.

2. Every position has its key or decisive point, as before observed; but this point is not difficult to find. In a scattered line, it is in the centre; in a contiguous line, it will be found on that point where the nearest connection lies with the base of operations.

3. When an army occupies a position upon a height, or any other ground fit for a field of battle, it is important to have the front and flanks most carefully reconnoitred and watched, to prevent the enemy gaining either extremity of the line by a secret movement.

4. But as it is admitted, that to employ strong corps for that purpose, causes a useless waste of force, attracts the attention of the enemy, and does not, after all, secure the army from surprise, it is preferable to place small posts of observation in all the sinuosities of the ground, with orders to communicate with each other and with the army, or the nearest intermediate corps. These two latter rules were demonstrated by the surprise and attack of the Prussian army at Hochkirchen, of Korsakoff at Zürich, and Murat at Tarutina, but especially on the first-mentioned occasion; for, next to the battle of Leuthen, no instance produces more ample proof of the terrible effects of an army being surprised and taken in flank. The whole mass of Daun’s forces was actually upon both flanks before they were discovered.

5. On ground of difficult access, such as vineyards, enclosures, gardens, steep heights, &c. the defensive order of battle should be in lines deployed two deep, covered by swarms of skirmishers. But the corps destined for attacks, and the reserves, are best in columns, formed on their centres, in the manner above described (IX.); for the reserves, being destined to fall upon the enemy at the critical moment, must advance with resolution and rapidity, that is, in column. If however it be desired to awe the enemy by a greater display of forces, the reserve may be deployed until the moment of attack.

6. A superior army should never wait to be attacked, still less wholly deploy into line, if compelled by circumstances to remain in its post. In this case no more troops should form line than are necessary to check the enemy. The remainder, formed into three or four heavy columns, should be placed ready to strike a decisive blow upon the most important point. A great army wholly deployed can no longer manoeuvre with the same facility as columns; and [7:21:747] to render troops not engaged immoveable, is repugnant to the best principles of tactics.

7. An army posted behind villages should cover the front with them, by occupying the enclosures, &c. with some battalions of infantry, and the outlets with cannon. The first line should be sufficiently near to sustain and be sustained by them, and also to provide the means of securing the evacuation of the place, in case the enemy should have gained so much ground on other points as to be able to mask them. Villages, being liable to be turned, should not be held by considerable corps of infantry, unless their topographical situation should constitute them the key of the position, as was the case at Vimiera. The battle of Blenheim deserves attention on account of the consequences produced by the neglect of the principles applicable to villages.

8. When an army occupies a position perpendicular to a river, with a wing resting on the border, that wing should not be attacked, because, if the enemy changed front in mass towards the river, the attacking corps might be driven into it. On the contrary, if the onset is directed against the other wing with the principal mass of forces, that chance is in favour of the assailants; because the wing being turned, the whole line will be pressed towards the stream, and incur the risk of being destroyed. This would have been the case with Hiller’s corps at Wagram, if a prompt retreat had not saved it. Similar would have been the fate of the united French army at Talavera de la Reyna, had they persisted in an attack upon the Spaniards; and they acted with great judgment in directing their efforts solely towards Lord Wellington’s left.

9. In the successful defence of a position, a repulsed attack should not be pursued, unless that attack had been decisive; because it might have been combined by the enemy for the purpose of drawing the defensive force out of its advantageous ground. An untimely pursuit by the Austrian right lost the battle of Prague, and by the Saxons that of Kesselsdorff, and again by the Austrian centre that of Jemmappes.

10. Positions may sometimes be so arranged, that although they be scattered, they still possess the faculty of timely reunion. Several are indicated in Frederick’s secret strategical instructions, and one occurs when he besieged Olmutz. Being greatly inferior to the enemy, who menaced him from several quarters, he posted a corps at Littau, while he remained in person with the covering army at Prosnitz; and in order to connect the two masses at will, a small corps occupied the hill of Hrad, between Namiest and Laskow, to serve as an intermediate point. Orders were given to the corps at Littau, in case of attack, to retreat towards him, and if a superior attack were made upon the covering army, he would retire towards the other; but if timely information were received, all were to unite in the position of Gross Jenitz.

11. As it is a maxim to operate against a weak part of the enemy’s line, no position should be attacked upon its strongest point, as the Austrians did at Breslau; but if the hostile position be prolonged by a detached corps, the principal effort should be directed against it; because, if that be defeated, the main body is turned, and thereby worsted.

12. Armies may sometimes be posted behind a ridge of hills with defensive points upon their summits. These should not be attacked without an exact knowledge of the position behind, and precautions to resist a counter movement. The events of Austerlitz and on the Katsbach prove the necessity of this precaution.

13. No position or disposition of attack should be made where the line is intersected perpendicularly by a difficult obstacle, such as a river or morass; because the enemy may act defensively on one side, and throw his whole mass on the other; as happened at Dresden, where the left wing of the allies was separated from the main body by the ravine of Plauen, and severely handled.

14. When an army remains immoveable in its position, both its flanks are liable to be turned. To obviate such manoeuvres, others of a similar character should be opposed to them, as was done at Albuera. These counter-manoeuvres are not difficult to execute, because the army turning a flank moves upon the arc, while the opponent takes the chord; consequently he is enabled to move a greater mass in less time, even when both parties are equal in forces. Rosbach, Vimiera, and Salamanca, are decisive examples, where the enemy moved in open day (which it is both difficult and dangerous to do in the night), and thereby rendered the counter-offensive both prompt and decisive.

15. There are positions which cannot be turned nor attacked obliquely. If the stratagem to draw the enemy out of them does not take effect, a parallel attack with the centre reinforced is likely to be the best adapted to such circumstances. The dispositions of Marlborough at Blenheim were of this class, and deserve the study of military men.

1. Between two armies equally capable of manoeuvring, the defensive one may form an angle with advantage to secure a flank from attack; but to render this precaution efficacious, the angle alone is not sufficient, because its utility is only momentary; the mass therefore should change front in the same direction, and present a whole line to the enemy.

2. If the army be sufficiently strong to assume the offensive against the assailant, a change of front, which is merely defensive, should be followed as soon as the angle is formed and the enemy checked, by placing the line in columns of divisions to the flank, and prolonging the direction from the position first occupied to gain the hostile flank. Thus taken in front by the angle, and in flank and rear by the new direction, the enemy will be defeated. In fig. 6, A is the army endeavouring to turn the left flank of B, which forms the angle C, and under the protection of this corps prolongs its line in the direction EE, by means of which the extremity of the hostile flank is gained. A cannot well oppose the execution of this movement in the presence of the angle C and of the line E, which, though it be in column, can form in an instant; hence A must fall back and change front also.

3. An angle to the front of the line or potence, such as the Austrians formed at Prague and Kollin, is not so serviceable as one thrown back to the rear; because the enemy can readily outflank its extremity from his position, while that extremity can be sustained but by slow degrees. Thus at Kollin, the Prussian cavalry turned it at the beginning of the action; and at Eylau, Benningsen repulsed the corps of Davoust on his left, and Ney on his right.

4. If a defensive position has an angle to the rear, the front will be weakened in proportion as that angle becomes more acute: but if there be a considerable interval on the summit, where the two lines should meet, the danger will be still greater; for if the enemy can establish himself on the point A, it is clear that the two wings, A C and A B, will be enfiladed, and forced to retreat; [7:21:748]if not rolled up in confusion by an actual charge on either or both of these extremities. This caused the defeat of the Austrians at Prague, and of the Prussians at Breslau. Fig. 7.

5. If two allied armies or great corps take up positions forming a re-entering angle with a space between them, and some considerable obstacle masks that space, they expose themselves to be attacked and defeated separately: this danger increases with the increase of the distance between them. The corps A D being separated from B E by a wood, lake, or other considerable obstacle at G, the enemy F H, being covered by that obstacle, may attack and defeat one before the other can arrive to sustain it. Fig.

8. This principle results from the maxims of interior against exterior lines of operations. Such positions as these were occupied by Prince Henry and Hulsen, at Freyberg and Katzenhausern, with the Tharand forest, and, what was worse (at the distance of more than six leagues), with the Mulde, between them; yet the army of the empire, superior in force, remained three months before them, until Prince Henry moved and defeated it at Freyberg.

1. To insure the success of an attack, properly combined and reinforced on the essential point, it is necessary to refuse the weaker wing. This precaution is obvious, not only for the purpose of keeping a weaker part out of reach, but also because reinforcements are readily drawn from it to the point where the effort is making. Thus, instead of exposing it to be repulsed by superior forces, there is a real advantage in keeping it reserved to secure the victory. Leuthen affords a proof of the wisdom of such a disposition; Kollin and Jöegerndorf of the consequences when it is disregarded.

2. If it be admitted that the most advantageous attacks are those which emanate from a concentrated effort upon an extremity of the hostile line, it becomes indispensable to gain that extremity by measures which mask the movement; for by neglecting this precaution, the enemy may follow the march of the columns in their endeavours to turn him, present constantly a front, or even anticipate and take them in flank, as happened at Rosbach.

3. The march may be concealed by the darkness of the night, by the conformation of the ground, or by means of a false attack on the front of the enemy. The two last mentioned arc to be preferred, because night marches are uncertain and even dangerous, slower and always more irregular, than those by day. For this purpose it is not necessary to march by lines, if the movement be masked by an attack of the advanced guard, while the mass advances towards the extremity desired, in columns of battalions at half distances. This will render it difficult to be discovered by the enemy in time to be counteracted.

4. In order to molest a greater space of front, instead of an advanced guard making a regular attack, it is preferable to employ a corps of light troops formed in parties, having points for re-assembling light cavalry, and some artillery to sustain them. This method is sure to distract the enemy’s attention, and keep his whole line in check.

An oblique attack, according to Guibert and the Journal Topographique, is a disposition by which a part, or the choice of the forces, is advanced towards the enemy, and the other kept out of his reach. This definition is not quite correct, as figs. 9, 10, 11, and 12 demonstrate. An army may be out of reach of the enemy, and therefore refused in a line nearly parallel, and strongly reinforced on a wing, without being oblique. (Fig. 9.) It may also be in an inclined line on the head of the attacks, and form a positive diagonal, without being reinforced (fig. 10); or perpendicular upon a flank, as at Kunersdorff, with a wing reinforced (fig. H); or horizontal upon the head of the columns without being oblique. (Fig. 12.) There are several modifications of these four orders (among others fig. 11); as, for example, a perpendicular angle to the front, as formed by the Austrians at Prague, Kollin, and Hochkirchen (fig. 13); the angle AC being perpendicular to the army DE, reinforces the right wing of the line AB without being oblique: so also an angle to the rear would reinforce the line without obliquity.

A parallel line, considerably reinforced upon the most important point, is no doubt good, and even very generally applicable; for it is conformable to the principle which forms the basis of all operations: but it has several inconveniences. The weak part of the line, being near the enemy, may be engaged, contrary to the intention, and be defeated; which event would balance and arrest the advantages gained on the other wing; as happened to both armies at Wagram. The reinforced wing having defeated its opponent, cannot take it in flank and rear without a considerable movement, which would separate it from the other, if already engaged. But admitting the weaker wing not to be engaged, the other cannot even then turn the flank without drawing it circularly along the hostile front, which the enemy must necessarily anticipate by being on the chord of the movement, and consequently give him the advantage of the offensive by reaching the decisive point first with the mass of his forces.

With the oblique order of Frederick, as applied at Leuthen, the effect is quite different; the extremity of the wing attacked is not only overpowered by a whole line, but the end of that wing is constantly outflanked, and the line turned, without manoeuvre, or prolongation of direction, simply by a direct advance of the oblique line. The distance of the divisions which are not intended for the principal attack, places them out of the danger of being engaged by a superior force, and yet sustains the wing in action. These effects of the open oblique attack, although known, cannot be too often presented to the reflections of military men. They offer, besides, another advantage still more decisive, in bringing the half of the army constantly into action against the extremity, probably of only two brigades, of the hostile army, which has no counter-manoeuvre to stop its progress. What troops can stand against such odds, when, besides, they are constantly outflanked and taken [7:21:749]in reverse? Is it possible that confusion and dismay should not follow in a whole line, whose flank is overthrown, and menaced with total destruction, by the progressive advance in a direction upon the rear?

Yet such must be the infallible result of an oblique attack when once it has reached the flank of the opponent undiscovered, as indicated in the preceding maxims; and when the lines are rapidly formed, according to the method of Frederick, as will be seen in the observations on marches. Fig. 14 demonstrates the mechanism more clearly. The left wing BC, of the army AC, will receive the fire of the second brigade of the army DKL, while the first brigade, or extreme right, formed in column of divisions, will turn it and decide the first attack with rapidity. The second brigade, in the oblique direction of its march, will soon be seconded by the third; and when that has passed the extremity, which must constantly recoil before a contiguous front, the fourth brigade opens its fire; and in this manner, supposing the army DF, KL, arrived at the dotted line HI, the whole will have been engaged in succession with a fourth or a third of the enemy’s line, the battalions of W'hich, being crushed one after another, will be nearly surrounded.

This demonstration is sufficient to show the great advantage of an open oblique order of attack. It is called open, because the disposition, such as that of Leuthen, was nearly at right angles with the line of the Austrians, and different in every respect from a parallel order. All these advantages arc equally applicable to masses concentrated upon the extremity which it is intended to crush. The army AB, fig. 15, instead of forming two lines, as in the former figure, may draw up the first line only, and keep the second in columns at half distances behind the right, centre, and left, prepared to manoeuvre or strike the decisive blow. These columns will be more moveable, and not being intended for the first attack, they will nevertheless cover it against counter-movements of the enemy. The battle of Salamanca offers a memorable lesson of this description, where the troops were concealed by the ground, and then suddenly brought in mass upon the enemy’s left wing. That of the Katsbach, almost the counterpart, was equally grounded upon these principles; both however with the difference, that the lead of the manoeuvres was on the side of the adversary. Jomini, habituated to the lively national character of France, lays too much stress on the value of the lead in manoeuvres, and therefore does not fully appreciate the powers of well-conducted counter-manoeuvres, which the cool firmness of British and German soldiers can develope.

The battle of Leuthen furnishes another maxim equally important, namely, that an army with the flank resting upon an obstacle, such as the great pond of Gohlau, which covered the angle of Nadasti, may still be outflanked by an oblique attack. For this purpose, it is only necessary to mask the first brigade of the enemy by the nearest of the attacking corps, and move obliquely with the next, so as to press the principal effort upon the second. For the line being broken, the obstacle is no longer of any use; and the masked Brigade is even in danger of being taken if not promptly withdrawn. But the manoeuvre is not so advantageous as when the flank is still supported and easily turned.

Marches in columns to the front, flank, or rear, which must be followed by deployment or echellon formations, are useful as parts of the elementary tactics; but never safely applicable near the enemy on a great scale, if they are at all complicated in the construction of the columns, or in the nature of the ground. Guibert devoted several volumes to their mechanism; but Tempelhoff alone has described the nature of Frederick’s columns, by means of which his dispositions were executed with so much simplicity and precision. Although the present system of moving by corps has in a great measure superseded the old method of organization by lines, and consequently rendered the march-manoeuvres, which triumphed at Rosbach, Leuthen, and Zorndorff, less applicable, they are still the best for such corps as are obliged to manoeuvre in the presence of the enemy, whether it be to engage in front or to turn his flank.

On examining the mechanism of his columns at Kollin, Leuthen, &c., it will be perceived that his army, having broken into open columns, each line forming one by a mere wheel of divisions, right or left in front, by this method the army could,

1. Execute all the movements united without danger of being attacked in detail, because the columns of lines were at no farther distance than was required for actual engagement.

2. The enemy could neither cut them off nor penetrate between them.

3. In taking the direction of the intended line, the army, when moved to the ground, is formed in a few minutes, that is, in the space of time required for the word of command to pass down the column to wheel into line. In this method, the only precaution required was to send an advanced guard to protect the march, and at the same time to keep the enemy in suspense.

4. As the army requires only two or three hundred paces between the columns, and the divisions no more than their respective distances, to form into two lines, the manoeuvre is easily executed with precision.

5. The army having reached the flank of the enemy by concealing the movement, as before noticed, and wheeling into line, will not allow the enemy time to form an angle, or to change front; consequently he will be overpowered in succession along his line.

6. To conclude, if two columns of the length of the line of battle are not immediately desired, or the ground requires a modification, four columns may be formed, by doubling up the lines, or by marching by wings, without increasing the difficulty of forming. The four columns being constructed of the two lines doubled, when arrived near the point where they are to form, the second and fourth halt until the first and third have proceeded so far [7:21:750]as to disengage from each other. While halted, they protect the march of the others, and when cleared by them, they follow in their rear, and thus are prepared to wheel into line with them.

If the columns are formed by wings, they will again fall into two lines by a simple change of direction, executed by all the heads of columns of each line at the same time to the right or left, and then leading into the rear of the preceding. But this transition of columns of wings into columns of line should take place at some distance from the enemy. At Leuthen, this manoeuvre introduced the battle: fig. 16. A, the advanced guard masking the march of the army in four columns; B B B B, the heads of the four columns forming the first line; and C C C C, the heads of the second line (now in rear of the first), all changing direction by a wheel to the right at the same instant, and consequently forming two open columns ready to wheel into line. The advance mean time either halts in position to alarm the enemy on another point, or continues to open the march by preceding and covering it.

It is however evident that these kinds of marches must be made on open ground; for in countries deeply intersected, great movements are impracticable; and it thus becomes necessary to arrive by the openings which are known, and engage more or less in columns. By Guibert’s and the regulation systems, the army being broken into several columns, they move with their heads often out of sight of each other at the distance of more than a mile, and yet they are expected to keep their alignments and relative distances. When ordered to form, they either close and deploy, or march by echellons to fit into an exact alignment. All this is evidently impossible before the enemy, who must discover the tedious manoeuvre, and have time to act as he pleases while the numerous errors are rectifying; and if the centre divisions should be chosen for the points of deployment, half the columns must turn their backs upon his fire to perform it. Frederick, during the whole seven years’ war, attempted these movements only twice; first in a combination with Bevern to attack Loudohn, which failed by the premature arrival of one column; and, secondly, at Torgau, which, as far as that manoeuvre was concerned, failed also; for Zieten’s column came too late, and was isolated. At Minden the French manoeuvred in the same manner, and were a great part of the night and the next morning employed in rectifying the errors, which gave Prince Ferdinand time to arrive. It is true, he moved likewise in columns, but he had previously sent all the generals to reconnoitre their routes and points of formation, and cut openings and fix marks to insure the exact direction. Such precautions surpass even the underhand tricks to help the manoeuvres in a camp of instruction; and the very precautions prove the impossibility of applying them in ordinary cases. During the revolutionary wars of France, all the belligerents met with failures from vain endeavours to apply them, notwithstanding that the new organization of corps and the use of swarms of skirmishers greatly facilitated their execution.

Lehwald’s manoeuvre at Jöegerndorf is worthy of notice, as particularly applicable in intersected ground. His infantry advanced in a double column from the centre, and formed to right and left without risk of confusion; the cavalry moving at some distance, easily took up the alignment.

The order of march on Frederick’s system must however be considered only as a manoeuvre, and not to be applied to marches in great operations.

As this order of march is best calculated for attacks against lines, so is it also upon columns in march. An attack upon an army while on the march is advantageous, for the same reasons as an attack upon an extremity of a line; because the army attacked on the heads of its columns is precisely in the same situation, relatively to the enemy, as one assailed in flank. The battle of Rosbach furnishes an illustration. A B, fig. 17, represents the army of the king, C D that of the French. Supposing them both in line, CD would still be attacked perpendicularly, and outflanked on one of its wings, exactly as it was on the head of its columns. The advantage of both these manoeuvres lies in the necessity to which the enemy is reduced of bringing his battalions in succession to the front, while the opponent, acting with vigour, defeats them, one after another, by the superior pressure of his mass, provided its march be onward in an appropriate direction; horizontally if the column moves perpendicularly, and perpendicularly if the march is horizontal. The object for producing, as nearly as possible, an opposite direction, is to present a whole line to a head of a column, or to an extremity of a line; because, if both moved in a direction to meet with the heads of their columns, both would be obliged to deploy, and a parallel order would be the consequence, without tactical advantage to either army. In fig. 18, the columns AB meeting those of the enemy CD in the same order, both, fearing to be attacked, will immediately deploy; A B will therefore form the line FG, and CD the line HI, which gives no advantage to either party.

The battle of Rosbach offers a further illustration. As an angle must necessarily be formed when the heads of columns are attacked, to check the first efforts of the enemy, the advanced guard or leading brigade should deploy, while the rest of the army should take a new direction of march, clear of the enemy’s flank, in order to protect the retreat of the advance already engaged, and to gain a station for acting offensively. See fig. 19. If the advanced guard or leading [7:21:751]brigades AB of the columns HI be attacked, a deployment must take place according to the direction of the attack CD. This manoeuvre having checked the enemy FG, the army in the rear being thus momentarily protected, should immediately change direction exteriorly, by filing the divisions into a new alignment IL; or by altering the direction of the columns in a similar manner, so as to produce a prolongation beyond the enemy’s flank KK. It is however clear, that if the columns are left in front, the operation is according to rule; but if the right be in front, a direction to the left would present the reverse flanks to the enemy. There would be no time for a countermarch, and still less for wheeling up in succession. It therefore appears that the columns should change the pivots of divisions, and wheel to the right into line; for though this manoeuvre would be against the letter of the regulations, no disorder would ensue, and it is actually practised, at least by cavalry, in some of the continental armies. There is no want of proofs of the occasional necessity of this manoeuvre in every campaign; but the battle of Laswaree will suffice for an illustration. The British infantry advanced in a single column by the right, and after crossing the Mahnus Nye, a deep sunken rivulet, found itself opposite the enemy’s right. To have prolonged the movement, was to produce a parallel order of battle; advantage was therefore taken of a ravine which led to the hostile right flank, and could conceal the movement. The head of the column turned to the left, and gained the flank; but when ordered to wheel into line, the pivots being reversed, some of the Sepoy troops, adhering to the letter of the rules and regulations, wheeled with their backs to the enemy.

This method of converting a probable defeat into an offensive movement and oblique attack, will probably intimidate the enemy, and check his pursuit of AB, from the moment he perceives the menaced attack against his own flank. As a manoeuvre it is also more rapid and simple than a change of front, which would only tend to a parallel formation. Although the existing modifications in the structure of armies, as already observed, renders this kind of attack more rare, and the organization by corps and divisions is advantageous to prevent them, it is nevertheless true, that the Prussians lost the battle of Auerstadt, and the French were placed in the most critical situations at Marengo, Eylau, and Lützen, because they were attacked on the march before they expected a general action.

The battle of Waterloo, unquestionably the most decisive event of the late awful contest, offers so many instructive circumstances, and so much matter for deep meditation, in the position and manoeuvres, and in the exhibition of the soundest maxims of war, that it may be considered as a general illustration of the advanced state of the art of war at the present period. Without entering into details, the minutiae of which are apt to confuse, we shall content ourselves with merely pointing out the principal dispositive features which it displays. As there are many plans more or less correct, and the ground is generally known, the remarks which we are about to offer will be readily understood by those who have any elementary knowledge of war. When Blucher had retreated from Ligny, and the duke of Wellington had fallen back from Quatre Bras, he occupied the position of Mont St Jean, determined to risk a battle with the forces he could collect on that point. Exclusively of the Prussians, whose severe loss in killed, wounded, and stragglers, could not immediately be reorganized or replaced, but by the expected arrival of the corps of Bulow, the duke’s army consisted of about eighty-one battalions and eighty-seven squadrons; which, with the artillery, may have amounted to 66,700 men. Of these upwards of thirty battalions and as many squadrons had never been in action.
[7:21:752]

This mass of forces was posted with the centre diagonally across and in front of the forking of the two causeways from Brussels to Charleroy and to Nivelles; the right centre behind the chateau of Goumont, and the left, considerably refused, passed in rear of La Haye Sainte, along the cross road in the direction of Ohain. Behind the right centre, Lord Hill placed his corps, en potence, in columns, prepared to manoeuvre to his right, on the small plain of Braine la Leud; or to his left, to sustain the centre. In and about Braine la Leud was a Netherland division, with the right thrown forward, and covered by the rivulet Hain, and leaving the small plain open; a kind of gorge to tempt the enemy between the two sides of the re-entering angle of the right wing. The Prussians were expected to debouche through the woods of Lasne towards Planchenois, which would form the left into another gorge, or re-entering angle. Thus the position formed a kind of open W (fig. 20, A A A A, B B) with the chateau of Goumont at the summit of the salient angle, covered by a plantation of wood and enclosures, occupied by six or eight battalions; so that the enemy could not enfilade from behind that plantation, either of the faces of the centre, nor approach on either of the causeways which passed through the centre, without presenting his flank. Besides this point, La Haye Sainte, a stone farm close to the chaussé of Charleroy, and farther on the left the farm of Papelotte and chateau of Frichermont, were occupied. The whole front offered a gentle slope towards the enemy, and in the rear the cavalry was distributed in brigades, each in two lines, covered by the rising ground; and the artillery, all the field-pieces of which were nine-pounders or twelves, formed a line of almost contiguous batteries along the front, interspersed with howitzers and rockets.

By the returns found after the battle, it appears that the enemy had debouched from Charleroy with 122,000 men,^[5. The return was dated the 13th, according to the assertion of a Prussian officer of the staff. The whole force brought over the frontier must therefore have amounted to nearly 150,000 men. ] exclusive of the reinforcements that joined after the 15th of June. Of these he produced on the field of battle about 80,000 men, formed in concentrated masses on both sides of the chaussé of Charleroy, and gradually advancing the right parallel to the British left (CCCC); but as he was jealous of the woods on the right, he formed an angle to the rear, and kept his reserves far back. He had made a demonstration with a corps of cavalry beyond the British right towards Hal, where he found the corps of General Colville, and Prince Frederick of Orange, with two divisions posted at Tubise, Clabbeck, and Braine le Chateau, to cover that avenue to Brussels. Another corps, 42,000 strong, under Grouchy, was detached to his right upon Wavre, to turn the allies, pursue or arrest the Prussians, and prevent the timely junction of Bulow. Thus the dispositions of both the commanders were combined with consummate ability; Napoleon operating on the system of throwing two thirds of his masses alternately on either side, and the allies in combining manoeuvres to bring a superior mass on the decisive point. On the field however the problem was difficult to solve. The communication with France was open only by the roads of Charleroy and Nivelles, hence the enemy could not quit them in the attack; nor could he gain Brussels by any other avenue than that of Waterloo; therefore, to possess the chateau of Goumont, without which he could not arrive at the position, was the natural object of the attack. As this was sustained by the mass of the allied army, and could not be enfiladed, his attacks failed. All those directed on the road of Charleroy to the left centre were necessarily oblique, and exposed to the fire in flank before they could reach their opponents. To have risked a general onset of all his masses, before the British were thinned and exhausted, he knew, under the circumstances of the moment, to be too hazardous. The plain of Braine la Leud appeared open. He could arrive by it; but that very circumstance proved that the enemy was prepared on that side. To have turned the force thither would in the first place have caused the loss of the communication by Charleroy, and next facilitated the junction of the Prussians; and, besides, the corps on the other side of the Hain flanked the advance, and could in a short time be sustained by the two divisions in its rear, and which he knew to be at hand. He would therefore have been placed between two fires, and have lost his point of retreat upon Charleroy; and the road by Nivelles might, meantime, be cut off by the troops left behind at Mons. Again, if he threw his masses towards the left, he only went to meet the Prussians, and left the British masters of the road of Nivelles, and possibly, if he advanced far, of that of Charleroy. He entangled himself in woods and defiles, where his superior cavalry could not act. The character of his opponent bespoke immediate offensive movements from the moment his right would be at liberty, therefore the chances were again in favour of the enemy; yet this was the only advantageous side, because it brought him nearer Grouchy, and in case of defeat he could take a new line of retreat by Namur. He however preferred the experiment which the enthusiastic valour of his troops might enable him to make; and this committed him so deeply, that, when at length the Prussians appeared, a retreat was no longer possible.

These observations disprove the ignorant assertion, that little skill was displayed on either side. The generals and the soldiers equally did their duty: the veteran Blucher behaved with just prudence in keeping so long back from the dangerous manoeuvre which was assigned him; and when he saw the hostile cavalry destroyed, he acted with vigour and skill. As for Grouchy, who wasted his time in forcing the position of Wavre across the Dyle, everywhere fordable, his manoeuvres show that he felt the danger of his movement, and he wisely remained on the banks. Much might be added upon the judgment which posted the corps at Wavre and another at Hal, on the several lines of retreat which the allies could take in case of defeat, on the dispositions of the artillery, the squares and lines formed and reduced repeatedly, the disposition and effect of the charges of cavalry, the counter-offensive of the Prussians, the general charge to the front, and fate of the enemy’s squares; but enough has been stated to recommend the study of a battle where three of the greatest commanders and the best manoeuvring armies in Europe gloriously struggled for victory; and, let it be added, notwithstanding the assertions to the contrary, where none committed a positive fault, and where Napoleon, in particular, who has been condemned by some of his own partisans, operated with all the skill and vigour which the circumstances of the moment allowed.

This unpleasant operation in war requires as great a display of skill and firmness as any. The Austrians have often conducted theirs with sagacity; and it is perhaps owing to the persevering spirit of their retreats, that, after twenty unfortunate campaigns, the monarchy was as formidable as in the commencement. Their generals are not then controlled by cabinet orders, and therefore always operate with precision. Among the retreats which deserve the study of the soldier, are that of Schulemburg with the Saxons, the duke of York’s out of Belgium, the two retreats of the Archduke Charles, that of Moreau from Bavaria to the Rhine, the Russian retreat upon Moscow and Tula, and, lastly, the fine movement of Prince Eugene Beauhamois in Italy.

In the choice of a position, it is not sufficient to have a [7:21:753]strong front and secure flanks; the means of retreating must also be considered in case of defeat. Lloyd, in his “Reflections on the Battle of Kollin,” observes that a defeated army retires with greater facility by dividing itself into as many corps as the nature of the country will allow; because, 1st, if the enemy form an equal number of divisions, he cannot operate vigorously upon any, and the retiring army having the facility of reuniting, may totally defeat one of the hostile corps; 2d, if the enemy operates en masse, it can be only towards one, and the others fall back unmolested: that division, however, covered by a strong rear guard, avoids serious actions, and having the faculty of moving more rapidly, because it is less numerous, can escape likewise without great loss. Bulow, taking up this question mathematically, advances the opinion that the columns should move outwards or eccentrically, from a point towards the periphery; but Jomini combats both so far victoriously. He observes, that Lloyd admits that the division of the pursuing forces exposes them to defeat; why then recommend such a manoeuvre to a retreating army, which must be already inferior to the enemy? He quotes the fine concentric retreat of the Archduke Charles, and might have added the Russian and both Lord Wellington’s. But in examining the mechanism of these movements, it appears that none of them was the consequence of a defeat, and especially such defeats as the modern system of attack inflicts; they were merely armies manoeuvring back towards their base upon their own lines of operations, watching a favourable opportunity to resume the offensive; or retreats after battles where both parties had claims to the victory, as Benning-sen’s after Eylau, and Kutusoff’s after Borodino. The difference between Lloyd and Jomini is merely in words; for the former points out the facility of uniting two corps, which, if he meant the eccentricity applied by Bulow, would be impossible.

But an army completely defeated is no longer in the hands of the general, whether he be the duke of Brunswick or Napoleon. A check, such as the Austrians suffered at Fleurus, and the allies at Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden, does not prevent the commander from executing the best measures that circumstances will allow. Thus, in the three former, the armies retired in mass; in the latter, they divided into several columns, and thereby not only covered themselves by the mountains of Bohemia, but also applied Lloyd’s maxim, in uniting two corps to destroy one of the pursuer’s at Kulm. Hence circumstances must govern the measure; and if, after a real defeat, a broad river, chain of mountains, or range of fortresses, can be gained in two or three marches, the division of a routed army may be applied as a safe rule.

A retiring army is not always obliged to fall back upon its own frontier; it may sometimes change the direction of its operations, as Frederick did after the siege of Olmutz in 1758, when, instead of returning into Silesia, he changed his line, and marched into Bohemia. This measure was also proposed to Napoleon before the battle of Leipzig. He was advised to approach the Elbe, call in the corps of St Cyr from Dresden, cross the river about Wittemberg, and descend by the right bank towards Magdeburg. The Prussian and northern armies, being on the left of the Elbe, could not have prevented the destruction of Berlin, Potsdam, and Brandenburg. And from Magdeburg, reinforced with its vast garrison, and connected with the Danes and the corps of Davoust at Hamburg, he could have operated by a new line, having his communications open by Wesel, Cassel, and all the fortresses of Holland; the sterile country to which the allies must have followed him could not have subsisted their vast cavalry; and the sandy roads would hardly have allowed sufficient transport of provision to maintain the troops. There were however many, and probably superior reasons, which made him reject the proposal.

If the art of war consists in applying the superior force of a mass upon a weak point of the enemy, it follows that a defeated army should be pursued with the utmost vivacity. Never delay till to-morrow, is an ancient military maxim, applicable especially in pursuit; for the strength of an army consists in its organization, in the unity resulting from the connection of all its parts with the main-spring which makes it move. After a defeat, this unity no longer exists. The harmony between the head which combines, and the body which executes, is broken; their connection is suspended, often destroyed. To pursue and attack is to march to a certain triumph. All the late campaigns offer signal examples of this truth. Generals of mediocrity often neglect this maxim, and their victories are scarcely more than a forcible removal of troops. The direction of the pursuit, though guided by circumstances, should always however aim at gaining the hostile line of communications, and cutting off the enemy from his base; because, by so doing, he may be thrown upon such obstacles as to force him to surrender.

Sieges, according to Lloyd, should never be undertaken but with the following views: 1st, when fortresses are situate upon the passages which lead to the enemy, so as to render it impossible to penetrate without capturing them; 2d, when they intercept the communications, and the country is unable to furnish the necessary subsistence; 3d, when they are wanted to cover magazines formed in the country, and thereby to facilitate the operations; 4th, when the enemy has considerable depots within the fortress, of which he is absolutely in want; 5th, when the capture of a fortress produces the conquest of a considerable tract of country, and enables the besiegers to winter in that vicinity. To these may be added, 6th, the recapture of a fortress essential in the defence of a frontier.

1. As victory is best secured by taking the lead in an operation, an army covering a siege should never wait to be attacked by the enemy, but endeavour to anticipate him; for, by defeating the forces which aim at raising the siege, the place is sure to fall.

2. If the enemy approach the covering army with an imposing mass, the siege should be raised, all the forces united, and an attack in force directed against him.

3. When the relieving army is defeated, the siege should be resumed, while the pursuit continues, and the enemy is not in a condition to return before the capture of the place.

4. When an army besieges a place, in consequence of offensive movements and anterior success, the covering army should not remain in a position near the place, but drive the enemy as far as possible forward; for the relieving army will find the difficulty of raising the siege increased with the distance it is removed from the place; but if at length that army should arrive so near as to furnish the probability of raising the siege, the besieging corps should then rapidly join the covering army, and make a united effort to defeat it.^[6. Oeuvres de Guibert. Jomini, Traité de Grande Tactique. Guerres de la Revolution. Lloyd’s History of the seven years’ War. Tem-pelhoff, Geschichte des sieben järigen Kriegs. Frederic, Histoire de mon Temps. Instructions à ses Généraux. Instructions Secrettes. Art de la Guerre de Main de Maitre. Rogniat, Considerations sur l’Art de la Guerre. Oeuvres du Général Warnery. Venturini, An-gewante Taktik. Die Bellona. Die Minerva. Schamhorst, Militairisches Taschenbuch. Militairisches Journal. Nahere Beleuchtung des Mack zugeschriebenen Operations Plan. Bulow, Betrachtung über die Kriegs Kunst. Geist des neurn Kriegs System. Le Prince Charles, Principes de la Strategie, traduit par Jomini. Campagne de 1799. Vaudoncourt, Campagnes d’Italie en 1813 et 1814. Dumas, Précis des Evenemens Militaires. Core’s Life of Marlborough. Pasley’s Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire. Janes’s Journals of Sieges. The foregoing part of this article was written for the Supplement to the former editions, by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hamilton Smith. The part that follows, on Naval Tactics, was written by one of the contributors to the fourth edition, but of whose name we are not accurately informed. ]
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PART II—WARLIKE OPERATIONS AT SEA.

Referring generally to the articles Admiral and Admiralty, Docks, Navigation , NaW, Seamanship, Ship - Building, Signals, and Telegraph, for much that appertains to naval war, we shall here direct our attention to that branch of the subject which is commonly designated Naval Tactics. By this term is understood the art of arranging fleets or squadrons in such an order or disposition as may be most convenient for attacking the enemy, defending themselves, or of retreating with the greatest advantage. Naval tactics are founded on those principles which time and experience have enabled us to deduce from the improved state of modern naval warfare, which has occasioned, not only a difference in the mode of constructing and working ships, but even in the total disposition and regulation of fleets and squadrons. We here propose to lay down the general principles of naval tactics, and to describe, as briefly as is consistent with perspicuity, the most improved systems which have been adopted in modern times.

Fleets are generally divided into three squadrons, the van, centre, and rear, each under the command of a flag-officer. The admiral of the fleet, or chief in command, leads the centre division, while the van is usually commanded by a vice-admiral, and the rear by a rear-admiral. Each squadron is distinguished by the position of the colours in the ships of which it is composed. Thus, the ships of the centre squadron carry their pendants at the main-top-gallant mast head, while those of the van division have their pendants at the fore-top-gallant mast head, and those of the rear at the mizen-top-mast head. Each squadron, as far as possible, consists of the same number of ships, and as nearly as may be of the same force. In large fleets, the squadrons are sometimes again divided in a similar manner; the van and rear of the squadron being headed by rear-admirals, or senior captains, called commodores. In the usual mode of forming the lines, each commanding admiral arranges his ship in the centre of his own squadron, and thus the admiral of the fleet is in the centre of the line. When no enemy is in sight, the sloops, store-ships, fire-ships, and other small vessels, are dispersed to wind-ward of the fleet, that they may be more easily supported, and more readily answer signals. The frigates lie to wind-ward of the van and rear of the convoy, thus keeping a good look-out, and keeping the small vessels in their proper station. When the fleet sails in three columns, the centre still keeps in the middle, while the van and rear form the starboard or the larboard column, according to circumstances. These arrangements are called orders of sailing, and will be better understood from the following definitions.

The starboard line of hearing is that line on which the arranged ships of a fleet bear from each other on a close-hauled line, whatever course they may be steering, so that when the ships haul their wind, or tack together, they may be on a line close hauled upon the starboard tack. The larboard line of bearing is that line on which the ships, when hauling their wind, or tacking together, may be formed on a line close hauled on the larboard tack. The ships of a fleet are said to be on a line abreast when their keels are parallel to each other, and their main-masts lie in the same straight line. Ships are said to be in a line on the bow or quarter when they are arranged in a straight line cutting their keels obliquely in the same angle, so that, reckoning from any intermediate ship, the ships towards one extremity of the line will be on the bow of that ship, while those towards the other extremity will be on her quarter. When several ships in the same line steer the same course, while that course is different from the line of sailing, they are said to sail chequerwise.

When the ships of a fleet arranged in any of the orders of sailing, and on the same line, perform successively the same manoeuvre, as each gets into the wake of the ship that leads the van of the line or squadron, tacking or veering, bearing away or coming to the wind in the same point of the wake of the leading ship, they are said to manoeuvre in succession.

There are usually reckoned five orders of sailing, exclusive of the line of battle, the order of retreat, &c. In the first order (see figs. 1 and 2), the fleet is arranged on the starboard or larboard line of bearing, all the ships steering the same course. In these cases the fleet, by hauling the wind when in the starboard line, as in fig. 1, will be ready to form the line on the starboard tack; and when ranged on the larboard line of bearing, as in fig. 2, it will, by tacking, be ready to form the line on the larboard tack. The arrows annexed to the diagrams mark the direction of the wind, as in ordinary charts.

This first order of sailing is now seldom employed, except in passing through a narrow strait. In the second order of sailing, the fleet steering any proper course, is ranged in a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind, as in fig. 3. This second order, besides being equally defective with the former, is subject to the additional disadvantage of rendering it extremely difficult for the ships to tack, without each ship falling on board that next astern.

In the third order of sailing, the whole fleet is close hauled, and ranged on the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of twelve points, having the admiral’s ship (A, fig. 4) in the angular point, and the whole fleet steering the same course. Thus, supposing, as in the figure, the wind at north, the starboard division of the fleet will bear W. N. W. of the admiral, and the larboard E. N. E. This order in small fleets or squadrons is superior to either of the former; but when the fleet is numerous, the line will be too much extended.

In the fourth order, the fleet is divided into six or more columns, and is thus more concentrated. The commanders, ranged on the two lines of bearing, have their squadrons astern of them, on two lines parallel to the direction of the wind; the first ships of each column being, with respect to the commander of the squadron, the one on his starboard and the other on his larboard quarter. The distance between the columns should be such that the fleet may [7:21:755]readily be reduced to the third order of sailing, and from that to the order of battle. This order is adapted for fleets or convoys crossing the ocean, and is represented in fig. 5. But as it requires much time to reduce a fleet from this order to that of battle, it is defective when in presence of an enemy.

In the fifth order, the fleet, close hauled, is arranged in three columns parallel to each other, the van commonly forming the weather, and the rear the lee column. See fig. 6. Fig. 7 represents the same order, except that each column is here subdivided into two, with the ship bearing the commander of each squadron in the centre of each subdivision.

In forming the order or line of battle, the ships of the fleet are drawn up in a line nearly close hauled, standing under easy sail, so that each ship may be at a certain distance from the ship immediately ahead, as a cable’s length, or half that distance. The fire-ships and frigates ahead and astern, form a line parallel to the former, and to the windward of it if the enemy be to the leeward, but to the leeward if the enemy be to windward. This order is denoted by fig. 8, where the fleet is sailing on the starboard tack, with the wind at north.

When a fleet is compelled to retreat before a superior force, it is usually arranged in an order the reverse of the third order of sailing; the divisions of the fleet being ranged in the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of 135° or twelve points, the admiral’s ship being in the angular point, and the frigates, transports, &c. included within the wings to leeward. See fig. 9, where the fleet is sailing right before the wind. Though any other direction may be taken, the two lines still form the same angle.

The order of convoy is that in which the ships are all in each other’s wake, steering in the same point of the compass, and forming a right line. If the fleet is numerous, it may be divided into three columns, which are to be ranged parallel to each other, that of the admiral occupying the centre, and all steering the same course.

Having thus described the ordinary positions of a fleet, we must explain the manoeuvres by which they are produced, and we shall begin with the orders of sailing.

To form a fleet in the first order of sailing, supposing the ships to be in no particular order, that ship which is to lead on the proposed line of bearing for the order of sailing, runs to leeward of the greater part of the fleet, and then hauls her wind under an easy sail. Each of the other ships then proceeds to take the proper station, by chasing the ship which is to be ahead of her, and when in the wake of the leading ship, adjusts her quantity of canvass so as to preserve the proper distance. The ships thus arranged astern of each other are in the line of battle; and from this the first order of sailing is formed, by each ship bearing away at the same time, and all steering the proposed course.

In forming the second order of sailing, the leading ship runs to leeward of so many of the fleet that each ship may readily fetch her wake, and then steers a course eight points from the wind, under an easy sail. The line is formed by each ship in the same manner as in the first order, except that, before bearing away, the line is perpendicular to the direction of the wind, or each ship has the wind on her beam.

As, in the third order of sailing, the admiral’s ship is in the centre, to produce this position, the fleet being formed in a line on one of the lines of bearing, and the ships steering in each other’s wake, ten points from the wind, the leading or leewardmost ship first hauls her wind. The second ship does the same as soon as she gets into the wake of the former; and this is done by each ship till the admiral’s ships haul their wind, when they reach the wake of the leading ship. At the same time that the admiral’s ship hauls her wind, the sternmost half of the fleet does the same. The ships are now in the third order of sailing, from which the fleet can be formed in the line of battle on either tack.

To form the fourth order of sailing, the commanding admirals range themselves on the two lines of bearing, at a proper distance from each other, steering the proposed course; and the ships of the several columns take their respective places, parallel to each other, and forming lines in the direction of the wind.

To form the fifth order, the three leading ships of the divisions take their posts abreast and to leeward of each other, keeping their wind under an easy sail; then the ships of each squadron make sail, and take their respective stations at the proper distance astern of their leaders, while the commanders of each division, and the corresponding ships of each, keep mutually abreast of each other.

1. In forming from the first order of sailing, if the ships are running large on the tack that answers to the line of bearing on which they sail, and if the line is to be formed on the same tack, all the ships haul their wind at once, or as quickly as possible after the next to windward; but if they be on the other tack with respect to the line of bearing, they all haul their wind and tack or veer together, If the line of battle is to be formed on the other line of bearing, the ship most to leewards veers or tacks, and hauls her wind, while [7:21:756] the rest of the fleet veer or tack at the same time, and steer with the wind four points free, and each ship hauls her wind as soon as she gets within the wake of the leader. See figs. 10 and 11.

Suppose the fleet running before the wind in the second order of sailing. To form the line from this position, all the ships haul up together on the proper tack, presenting their heads eight points from the wind at the line on which they are arranged; the leading ship then hauls her wind, immediately making sail or shortening sail, so as to close or open the order, and the same is done successively by all the rest. See fig. 12.

In a fleet running large in the third order, the line of battle is formed by the wing which is in the line of bearing corresponding to the tack on which the line is to be formed, and the ship at the angle, hauling their wind together, while the ships of the other wing haul up together eight points from the wind; each ship moving in this direction till she reach the wake of the other wing, when she hauls close up. See fig. 13.

In forming the line of battle on the same tack from the fifth order of sailing (as the fourth is not calculated for forming a line of battle), the centre brings to, so as only to keep steerage way; the weather column bears away two points, and when it gets ahead of the centre, hauls its wind, while the ships of the lee column tack together, and crowd sail to gain the wake of the centre, when they retack together, and complete the line (see fig. 14); or the weather column brings to, while the centre and lee tack together, and bear away two points free. When the ships of the centre column have gained the wake of the van, they retack together, and bring to; and when those of the lee have gained the rear line, they retack together, and all stand on; or, lastly, the lee column brings to, the centre runs under easy sail two points free, to get ahead of the rear squadron, while the rear bears away under a press of sail two points free, to get ahead of the centre division.

2. Suppose the weather and centre columns to interchange. To form the lee under these circumstances, the centre stands on, while the weather column bears away eight points, and having reached the wake of the centre, which now forms the van, hauls up; the ships of the lee column tack together, and run under a press of sail, within two points free, so as just to gain the rear of the line when they retack together (see fig. 15); or the lee column brings to, while the centre squadron bears away three points under easy sail, and having reached the wake of the van, hauls up to form the centre division.

3. Suppose the centre and lee columns to interchange. The lee column stands on close hauled under an easy sail; the weather column bears away two points under a press of sail, till it reach the head of the line, when it hauls up; and the centre bears away eight points, and when in the wake of the lee, now the centre, hauls its wind. See fig. 16.

4. If the weather and lee columns interchange, the lee column stands on under a press of sail close hauled, while the centre, under easy sail, bears away two points, and when it reaches the wake of the now van squadron, hauls its wind; and the weather column bears away eight points, hauling up when in the wake of the centre. See fig. 17.

5. Suppose the centre column to form the van, and the weather the rear division. Here the lee column brings to, while the centre bears away two points, forming the line ahead of the former, now the centre; and the weather column veers away seven points on the other tack, forming the rear squadron. See fig. 18.

6. To form the line so that the lee column may form the van, and the centre the rear, the lee column is to stand [7:21:757]on under a press of sail, while the weather bears away three points under easy sail, and the centre bears away eight points, the ships of each column hauling their wind when in the wake of the now van division. See fig. 19.

7. If the line of battle is to be formed on the other tack, so that the weather shall form the van division, as in the first case, the ships of the weather column first tack successively, while those of the centre and lee stand on, the former under easy sail, and the latter shortening sail, the leading ships tacking when in the wake of the now van, taking great care that the ships of the centre and lee draw not too near to the sternmost ships of the van, or to each other. See fig. 20.

8. To form the line on the other tack, when the centre and weather columns interchange, the weather column brings to, while the centre column stands on, till the leading ship be fully able to clear the weather column, when the ships of the centre tack successively as they reach the wake of the van. The lee column stands on, tacking successively as the ships get into the wake of the van, under moderate sail. See fig. 21.

9. In forming the line on the other tack, when the centre and lee interchange, the centre brings to, while the ships of the weather tack under shortened sail, and the lee under a press of sail stands on; the leading ship having gained the wake of the line, tacks, and is followed in succession by her division. The centre column fills and stands on, when the first ship of that column, and the last of the lee, bear from each other in a direction perpendicular to that of the wind. See fig. 22.

10. To form on this same tack, so that the weather and lee may interchange, the weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail till it can pass ahead of the weather column, when the ships tack in succession. As soon as the leading ship of the centre, and the last of the lee, bear from each other in aline perpendicular to the wind, the centre fills, and tacks in succession when in the wake of the now van; and the ships of the weather column do the same when their leading ship and the last of the centre are under similar circumstances. See fig. 23.

11. Suppose the centre is to form the van, and the weather the rear, in forming the line on the other tack. The weather brings to, while the other columns make sail till they can pass ahead of the former on the other tack, when they tack successively. The weather column, when the others have passed it, fills, and tacks to form the rear. See fig. 24.

12. Suppose now the lee column is to form the van. The weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail, and tacks when it can pass ahead of the weather column. When the last ship of the now van has passed to windward of the former weather column, the van shortens sail, to give time for the other columns to form, and the weather and centre fill at the same time, to gain the wake of the van, when they tack in succession. See fig. 25.
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We must now show how a fleet may be disposed in the principal orders of sailing from the line of battle; and here, as before, we have several varieties.

1. To form the first order of sailing from the line of battle on the same tack, all the ships are to bear away together as many points as the admiral may direct, keeping in the line of bearing for the proper tack. The sternmost first bears away, and the others follow in quick succession, to avoid running foul of each other.

2. If they are to form on the other tack, the leading ship bears away four points to leeward, and the rest follow in succession. The sternmost ship having bore away, the whole haul up, and will be in bearing for the line on the other tack. See fig. 26.

3. To form the second order of sailing from the line of battle, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, so that when the headmost ship, which first presses sail, shall come abreast of the second ship, the second ship must adapt her sail to keep in this bearing, and so in succession, each taking care to keep the preceding ship in a line with herself, perpendicular to the direction of the wind. The whole fleet will now be before the wind. See fig. 27.

4. To form the third order, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, the head-most half, including the centre ship, carrying a degree of sail to preserve their line of bearing, while each of the remaining ships is successively to shorten sail, so as to form the other line of bearing with respect to that on which they were before arranged. See fig. 28.

5. To change from the line of battle to the fifth order on the same tack. Of this evolution there are several varieties, but we shall mention only two; first, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, and the fleet to keep as much as possible to windward. In this case the van and centre tack together, and run close hauled in bow and quarter line, while the rear proceeds in its former course under easy sail. When each ship of the centre is abreast of the corresponding ship of the rear, the centre retacks, while the van stands on till the centre and rear come up, when it also retacks, and all the columns regulate their distances. Secondly, when the van is to form the lee, and the rear the weather column, the van bears away under easy sail, and goes at right angles with the line ahead, while the centre runs two points free, each ship steering for that ship of the van which is to be abreast of her when in column. The distance must be determined by the leader of the van, who is not to haul up with her division till she and the sternmost ship of the centre column are in a line at right angles with the wind, when both stand on under easy sail, while the rear crowds sail to pass to windward of both.

6. To form the fifth order of sailing from the line of battle on the other tack. Of this there are also several varieties, but we shall confine ourselves to two. First, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, the van tacks in succession, while the leading ship of the centre is to tack when the leader of the van passes him exactly to windward, in which she is followed by her division, and the rear manoeuvres in the same manner with respect to the centre. Secondly, when the rear is to form the weather and the van the lee column, the van tacks in succession, and when about, either shortens sail or brings to, to allow the other columns time to form. The centre and rear then crowd sail, and tack in succession; the former tacking when its leader has the centre of the lee column in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre passes astern of the lee column. When the centre has tacked, it regulates its rate of sailing by the lee, and both wait for the rear to pass to windward. The rear tack: when the leader has the first ship of the lee in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre ship passes astern of the centre column.

There are various evolutions or manoeuvres performed by a fleet when in line of battle, some of which we must here describe.

Sometimes the fleet has to form the line on the other tack, by tacking in succession. To do this, the leading ship of the fleet tacks first, after making more sail, or after the second has shortened sail, to increase the interval between them. When the first ship is about, either the second makes more sail, or the third shortens sail, and as soon as the second gets into the wake of the leader, she tacks, putting down the helm just as she opens the weather quarter of the first ship, already on the other tack. In the same manner, each of the other ships tacks when in the wake of the leader; and the ships already about must preserve their proper distances, by shortening sail, if necessary, till the whole fleet be on the other tack. If a ship should miss stays, she must immediately fill again on the same tack, and make sail with all possible expedition, taking care not to fall to leeward. Thus she will get ahead and to windward of the following ships, which will successively perform their evolutions in the wake of the ships that are already on the other tack, standing on rather farther than if the ship ahead had not missed stays.

But suppose the ships are not to tack in succession. To form the line on the other tack, the whole fleet veers together; the rear ship hauls her wind on the other tack, and stands on, while the rest go two points free on the other tack, and haul up as they successively gain the wake of the leading ship.

If the line is to veer in succession, the van ship veers, and stands four points free on the other tack, hauling her wind when clear of the sternmost ship, and the rest follow and haul up in succession.

Sometimes the fleet has to turn to windward while in line [7:21:759]of battle. The best way to do this, when there is good sea-room, is for all the ships to tack together, when the fleet will be in a line of battle on the one board, and in bow and quarter line on the other. If however the fleet be turning to windward in a narrow channel, it is best for the ships to tack in succession, as, were they all to tack together, the van would be soon in with the land on one side, while the stern ship, soon after the fleet had retacked, would be too near the land on the other side.

If the van and centre are to interchange, the van is to bear away a little, and then bring to, while the centre passes on to windward, edging a little to get ahead of the former van on the same line; the rear, coming on under an easy sail, edges away likewise, to gain the wake of the now centre squadron.

If the van and rear are to interchange, the van and centre are to bear away a little, and then bring to, so that the van may bear away a little more to the leeward than the centre. The rear stands on to gain the head of the line; and when abreast of the former van, the centre fills, and both standing on, form ahead of the now rear, by edging down till they are in a line with it.

If the centre and rear are to interchange, the van stands on under an easy sail, while the centre bears away a little, and brings to, and the rear at the same time carries a press of sail to pass the centre to windward, and get into the wake of the van. The van and centre then edge away to gain the line with the now rear squadron, which then fills.

Several evolutions are required while a fleet is in the fifth order of sailing, and of these we shall notice some of the more important.

When the columns are to tack in succession, the ships of the lee must tack first, as they have most distance to run; and when the leader of the centre comes abreast of the leader to leeward, or at right angles with the close-hauled line on the other tack on which the leader of the lee is now moving, she tacks, and is followed successively by the ships of her division. The weather column manoeuvres in the same manner, paying the same regard to the centre. Here the weather column is still to windward, and should the columns have closed too much, or be too far asunder, the order may be recovered, either by the lee or windward column bearing away, so as to make an angle equal to that proposed between any column, and a line joining the leader of that column and the sternmost ship of the next.

When all the columns are to tack together, the sternmost ships put in stays together; and when in stays their seconds ahead put down their helms, and so on through the whole fleet. Each column will then be in bow and quarter line.

When the columns are to veer in succession, the leader of the lee column must steer four points free on the other tack, followed by the ships of that division; and when she is clear of the sternmost ships of that division, she hauls up. The same evolution is performed by the centre and weather ships successively standing on till they bring the point at which the lee column began to veer to bear in a right line to leeward of them. They likewise successively spring their luffs when the point at which the lee column hauled its wind bears right to leeward.

Suppose the fleet, when in the fifth order of sailing, is to turn to windward. Let the ships be so arranged that the leaders and corresponding ships may be in the direction of the wind. The van ships must tack together, and must be followed in succession, each by the remaining ships of the division, when they reach the wake of their leaders, or the same point when they tacked; so that there will always be three ships in stays at once, till the whole fleet is on the other tack. The fleet then stands on to any proposed distance, and retacks as before.

When the weather and centre columns interchange, the weather and lee lie to, or only keep steerage way. The centre column tacks together, and forming a bow and quarter line, goes close hauled to gain the wake of the weather column; it then tacks together, and stands on, while the weather column bears away to its new station in the centre, and the lee column fills.

When the weather and lee columns are to interchange, the centre column must bring to, while the lee stands on under a press of sail; and when its sternmost ship can pass to windward of the van of the centre column, that is, when the centre ship of the lee is in a perpendicular line to the direction of the wind with the van of the centre column, the lee column then tacks together, and stands on close hauled till it comes in a line with the centre column, when it goes large two points to get into the situation which the weather column left, and then veers together, hauling the wind for the other tack. At the beginning of the evolution the weather column bears away together under little sail, and goes large six points on the other tack, to get into the wake of the centre column; it then hauls to the former tack, going two points large, till it comes abreast of the centre column, when it brings to, and waits for the now weather column.

Suppose the weather column is to pass to leeward. The weather column is to stand on under easy sail, while the centre and lee tack together, carrying a press of sail till they reach the wake of the weather column, when they retack, and crowd sail till they come up with it. The weather column, when the others have gained its wake, bears away two points to gain its station to leeward, when it brings to till the other columns, now the weather and centre, come up.

Suppose the lee column is to pass to windward. The weather and centre columns bring to, while the lee column carries sail and tacks in succession as soon as the leading ship can weather the headmost ship of the weather column; and when arrived on the line on which the weather column is formed, it retacks in succession, forms on the same line, and either brings to or stands on under easy sail. If it brings to, the other two columns bear away together two points, to put themselves abreast of the column now to windward; but if the now weather column stood on under an easy sail, they may bear away only one point, to gain their proper stations.

It is of the greatest importance that each ship of a fleet or squadron preserve her proper station and distance with respect to the rest. These may be regulated in two ways, either by observation with the quadrant, or by what is called the naval square. This square is usually constructed in the following manner.

On some convenient place in the middle of the quarterdeck is described the square ABCD, fig. 29, having the sides AD and BC parallel to the keel of the ship. Through the centre G, the line EF is drawn parallel to AD or BC, and the diagonals AC and BD are drawn. The angles EGD, EGC are bisected by the straight lines GH, GI, and thus the naval square is completed. Now the angles FGD, FGC are = four points each, being each half a right angle, therefore the angles EGD, EGC, the complements of these angles, are each = twelve points, and consequently the angles EGH, EGI are each = six points, being each half of the last angles. Now, if a ship be running close hauled on the starboard tack, in the direction FE, the direction of the wind will be IG, and her close-hauled course on the other tack will be GC; but if she be running close hauled on the larboard tack in the same direction, her direction when close hauled on the starboard tack will be GD.

Now, to apply the naval square to the keeping of ships in their respective stations, suppose the fleet formed on the fifth order of sailing, close hauled, the corresponding ships [7:21:760]of the columns coinciding with the direction of the wind, in order to run to windward with greater facility. The corresponding ships in the column must be kept in the direction of GH or GI, according to the direction of the wind and the tack they are on, while all the ships of the same column must be in the direction of EF.

(See fig. 30.)

Again, suppose the ships arranged in three columns on one of the lines of bearing, and close hauled on the other tack. The ships of each column will be in the direction of one of the diagonals, while the corresponding ships of the other columns will be in the direction of the other diagonal.

Sometimes the line of battle is disordered on the wind’s shifting, and requires to be restored. Of this there are several cases, a few of which we shall notice.

1. When the wind comes forward less than six points. In this case the whole fleet except the leader brings to. The leading ship, that the same distances between the ships may be preserved on restoring the line, steers a course as a b (fig. 31), so as to be at right angles with the middle point between the former and present direction of the wind. His required course may be known by adding half the number of points the wind has shifted to eight points, and applying this sum to the former close-hauled course When the leader has arrived at the new close-hauled line with respect to the second ship ahead, this ship immediately fills and bears away as many points as the leader; and when both these have reached the close-hauled line with respect to the third ship, she also fills and bears away; and thus with the rest in succession; and when they have got into the close-hauled line b c with the stemmost ship, they all haul their wind together, and the stemmost ship fills and stands on close hauled.

This may be expeditiously performed if the whole fleet fall off as soon as the wind shifts the same number of points, and the leader bear away eight points from the middle between the former and present directions of the wind; or when the wind shifts nearly six points, if the leader bear away eight points from the present direction of the wind, and hauls her wind as soon as the stemmost ship bears from her in the close-hauled line, while the second ship bears away when she reaches the wake of the leader, and hauls her wind when she has again gained his wake. The third, fourth, &c., ships bear away, and also haul their wind in succession, till the stemmost and the whole line be formed again.

2. Suppose the wind comes forward less than six points, and the order of battle is to be re-formed on the other tack. In this case all the ships are to veer round till their heads come to the requisite point with respect to their former course, when the rear ship, now become the van, hauls close by the wind, followed successively by the other ships. Should the wind come ahead more than six points, but less than twelve, the fleet is to manoeuvre as before; but if it shift exactly twelve points ahead, the tack must be changed.

3. Lastly, suppose the wind to shift oft; if less than two points, the leader hauls her wind, while the fleet stands on as before, each successively hauling her wind as she gains the wake of her leader. If the tack is to be changed, the whole fleet tack together, and the stemmost ship, now the leader, hauls up, while the rest bear down and haul up in succession.

Should the wind change sixteen points, all the ships immediately brace about for the other tack, by which means the fleet will be going four points large; then the ships instantly tacking or veering together, the order of battle will be restored or formed again on the same tack as before the wind changed.

Having described and illustrated the principal evolutions which are performed by fleets or squadrons under ordinary circumstances, we are prepared to consider the nature and consequences of a naval engagement.

In forming a fleet for battle, it is proper to consider the size and number of the ships of which it is to consist, and the distance at which they are to be placed with respect to each other. In the present system of naval warfare, it is generally deemed of advantage to have the ships that are to form the principal line as large as possible; for though large ships are not so easily and expeditiously worked as those of a smaller size, they are most serviceable during the action, both as carrying a greater weight of metal, and as being less exposed to material injury, either from the enemy’s shot or from the weather. In boarding, too, a large ship must have greatly the superiority over a smaller, both from her greater height, and from the number of hands which she contains. With respect to the number of ships, it is of advantage that they be not too numerous, as, if the line be too extensive, the signals from the centre are with difficulty observed.

In arranging a fleet in line of battle, it is proper to regulate the distance so that the ships shall be sufficiently near to support each other, but not so close that a disabled ship may not readily be got out of the line without disturbing the rest of the fleet.

It has long been deemed a point of great consequence with the commander of a fleet to gain the weather gage, or to get to windward of the enemy, before coming to action. In deciding on the propriety of this, much will depend on the relative strength of each fleet, and on the state of the weather at the time. We shall state the advantages and disadvantages of the weather gage, as they are commonly laid down by writers on naval tactics, though we may observe by the way, that if a fleet be much superior to its opponent, it is seldom of consequence whether it engages to windward or to leeward.

A fleet to windward of the enemy is thought to possess the following advantages. It may approach the leeward fleet at pleasure, and can of course accelerate or delay the beginning of the engagement. If more numerous, it may send down a detachment on the rear of the enemy, and thus throw him into confusion. It may also readily send down fire-ships on the enemy’s fleet, when thrown into confusion or disabled. It may board at any time, and is scarcely incommoded by the smoke of the enemy. The reverse of these circumstances of course acts against a leeward fleet.

The disadvantages of being to windward of the enemy respect chiefly the circumstances attending a retreat, should this be necessary. The windward fleet can seldom retire without passing through the enemy’s line; and if, in attempting to retreat, the windward ships tack together, those of the leeward fleet may do the same, rake the weather ships in stays, and follow them on the other tack, having now the advantage of the wind. In stormy weather, the windward ships can seldom open their lower deck ports, and the lee guns are not easily managed after firing. Again, any disabled ships cannot easily quit the line without disordering the rest of the fleet, and exposing either that or themselves [7:21:761]to be raked by the enemy to leeward. A leeward fleet has the advantages of serving their lower-deck guns in all weathers; of being able to retreat at pleasure; of drawing off without difficulty their disabled ships; of forming with more readiness the order of retreat, or of continuing the action as long as convenient; of having it in their power, when superior in number, to double the enemy; and of cannonading with great effect the windward ships as they bear down for the attack.

As an engagement between two adverse ships is in some measure an epitome of an engagement between two fleets, we shall first briefly describe the former, as it takes place under ordinary circumstances, and shall then notice the usual manner of conducting a general engagement.

A naval engagement may be divided into three stages, the preparation, the action, and the repair.

When an enemy’s ship heaves in sight, and it is thought advisable to bring her to an engagement, orders are first given to clear for action, which is begun by the boatswain and his mates piping up the hammocks, in order to clear the space between decks, for the more easy management of the guns, as well as to afford the men on the quarter-deck, &c., a better protection against the enemy’s shot, the hammocks being stowed in the nettings above the gunwale and bulwarks. After this the boatswain’s mates go to work to secure the yards, which is done by fastening them with strong chains or ropes in addition to those by which they are suspended. They likewise get ready such materials as may be necessary for repairing the rigging, if it should be cut away, or otherwise damaged, by the enemy’s shot. In the mean time the carpenter and his mates prepare shot plugs and mauls, to stop any dangerous shot-holes that may be made in the hull near the surface of the water, and provide the necessary iron-work for refitting the chain-pumps, if their machinery should be injured during the engagement; while the gunner and his mates, and the quarter gunners, examine the guns to see that their charges are dry, and provide every thing that may be required for supplying the great guns and small arms with ammunition. The master and master’s mates see that the sails are properly trimmed, according to the situation of the ship, and increase or reduce them as may be found necessary; and the lieutenants visit the different decks to see that all is clear, and to take care that the inferior officers do their duty.

When the hostile ships have approached within a proper distance of each other, the drums beat to arms; the boatswain and his mates pipe all hands to quarters. All the men who are to manage the great guns repair immediately to their respective stations. The crows, handspikes, rammers, sponges, powder-horns, matches, and train-tackles, are placed in order by the side of the guns; the hatches are immediately closed, to prevent sculkers from getting below; the marines are drawn up on the quarter-deck, &c., the lashings of the guns are cast loose, and the tompions withdrawn. The whole artillery above and below is run out at the ports, and levelled to the point-blank range, ready for firing.

When these necessary preparations are completed, and the officers and crew ready at their respective stations, and when the two ships are sufficiently near each other, in a proper relative situation for the shot to take full effect, the action commences with a vigorous cannonade from the great guns, accompanied by the whole efforts of the swivels and small arms. The firing is seldom performed in vollies, as that would shake the ship too much; but the guns are loaded and fired one after another, with as much despatch and as little confusion as possible, care being taken to fire only when each gun is properly directed to its object. During the firing, the lieutenants traverse the decks, to see that the battle is prosecuted with vivacity, and that the men do their duty; while the midshipmen second their injunctions, and give the necessary assistance where required, at the guns committed to their charge. The youngest of these inferior officers are generally employed to carry orders from the captain. The gunners are all this time employed in the magazines, filling cartridges, which are carried along the decks in boxes by the boys of the ship. When the action has continued so long, or has produced such an effect, that one of the ships must yield or retreat, if the vanquished ship cannot get off, she acknowledges her inferiority by striking or hauling down her colours, when she is, as soon as possible, taken possession of by the victor, the commander of which sends a part of his own crew into the captured ship, and brings away most of her officers and men on board his own ship, as prisoners of war.

The engagement being concluded, they begin to repair. The guns are secured by their breechings and tackles, with all convenient expedition. Whatever sails have been rendered unserviceable are unbent, and the wounded masts and yards struck upon deck, to be fished or replaced by others. The standing rigging is knotted, and the running rigging spliced where necessary. Proper sails are bent in the room of those which have been displaced as useless. The carpenter and his mates are employed in repairing the breaches made in the ship’s hull, by shot-plugs, pieces of plank, and sheet-lead. The gunner and his assistants are busied in replenishing the allotted number of charged cartridges, to supply the place of those which have been expended, and in refitting whatever furniture of the guns may have been damaged by the action.

A general engagement between two adverse fleets obviously involves a greater variety of circumstances, and requires greater judgment and more comprehensive skill in the commanding officer.

When the commander of a fleet has discovered an enemy’s fleet, his principal object, if he be sufficiently strong, is to bring it to action as soon as possible. Every inferior consideration gives way to this important object, and all necessary preparations are immediately made to prepare for such an event. The state of the wind and situation of the enemy will in general regulate his conduct with regard to the disposition of his ships on that occasion. To facilitate the execution of the admiral’s orders, the whole fleet is disposed in three squadrons, and each of these classed into three divisions, under the command of different officers. Before the action begins, the adverse fleets are drawn up in two lines, as formerly described. As soon as the admiral displays the signal for the line of battle, the several divisions separate from the columns in which they were disposed in the usual order in sailing, and every ship crowds sail to get into its station in the wake of the next ahead; and a proper distance from each other is regularly observed from the van to the rear. The admiral however occasionally contracts or extends his line, so as to regulate the length of his line by that of his adversary. This is more particularly necessary, to prevent his being doubled, by which his van and rear would be thrown into disorder. When the hostile fleets approach each other, the courses are commonly hauled upon the brails, and the top-gallant sails and stay-sails furled. The movement of each ship is regulated chiefly by the main and fore-top sails and the jib; the mizen-top sail being reserved to hasten or retard the course of the ship, and, by filling or backing, hoisting or lowering it, to determine her velocity. The signal for a general engagement is usually displayed when the fleets are sufficiently near each other to be within the range of pointblank shot, so that the guns may be levelled with some certainty of execution. After the battle has commenced, it is carried on much in the same manner as between two ships, except that each vessel of the fleet, besides attending to her own movements, has to observe the signals made by the commanding officer, and repeated by the frigates on the van and rear. The chief object of the admiral is to keep [7:21:762]his line as complete as possible, by ordering ships from those in reserve to supply the place of such as may have been disabled, and to annoy the enemy as much as possible, both by strengthening the feeble parts of his own line, and, if circumstances admit of it, by sending down fire-ships upon that of the enemy. When the engagement draws near a close, either by the defeat of the enemy, or by the disabled state of either fleet, signals are made from the admiral to take possession of such of the enemy’s ships as have struck, to tow his own disabled ships into a place of security, and either to chase the remainder of the enemy’s squadron, or, if that be impracticable, to draw off his own ships to be refitted.

Such are the general incidents attending an engagement at sea, modified of course by numerous circumstances, of which a general description can convey no idea. There are however various movements and evolutions connected with a naval engagement, which it will be necessary for us to notice.

Where the weather-gage is deemed of sufficient importance, it is often an object with two fleets to dispute it with each other. When the enemy is to windward, and it is wished to gain the weather-gage of him, the fleet to leeward should avoid extending itself the length of the enemy’s line, in order to oblige them to edge down upon theirs, if they intend to attack them; which will be the means, if they still persist in doing so, of losing the advantage of the wind. It is impossible for a fleet to leeward to gain to windward, so long as the enemy keep the wind, unless a change happens in their favour; and therefore all that a fleet to leeward can do must be to wait with patience for such a change, of which they will undoubtedly avail themselves, as well as of any inadvertency the enemy may commit in the mean time. And as long as the fleet to leeward does not extend its line the length of the enemy’s, it will be impossible for the latter to bring them to action without running the hazard, by bearing down, of losing the advantage of the wind, which both fleets will be so desirous of preserving. That an admiral may take advantage of such shifts of wind as occasionally happen, he must endeavour to get his ships into situations where these shifts most frequently take place. It is well known to experienced naval officers, that particular winds reign most on certain coasts, or off certain headlands. Here therefore the admiral should await the approach of the enemy; and though by this plan he may sometimes be unsuccessful, he will more frequently gain a material advantage. The disposition of projecting headlands, and the setting of tides and currents, often contribute materially towards gaining the wind of the enemy. The fleet to windward should keep that to leeward as much as possible abreast of it; and thus, unless the wind changes considerably, they will preserve the advantage which they have gained. They should also force them to keep their wind, unless they think it prudent not to engage, in which case it would be better to keep altogether out of sight.

When the enemy appears desirous of avoiding an action, there are various methods of attempting to force him to engage; as, first, when he has the weather-gage. In this case the lee fleet, w ι hich is desirous of bringing on an engagement, must keep always on the same tack with the enemy to windward, taking care to keep their own ships so exactly abreast of the enemy as to prevent losing sight of them; and hence be ready to take advantage of the first favourable shift of wind to make the attack. An alteration of the course may be best attempted in the night. The lee fleet must have frigates on the look-out, and these must continually give notice by signal of the manoeuvres and course of the retreating fleet to windward. Thus the weather fleet is always exposed to pursuit, without being able to escape unseen; and hence must sooner or later be compelled to engage, unless they can get into some friendly port, or should be favoured by a gale of wind sufficient to disperse both fleets, and thus prevent the possibility of a general engagement.

Secondly, when the enemy is to leeward. If the lee fleet keep close to the wind in the order of battle, the fleet to windward is to stand on in the same manner till it be abreast of the enemy, ship to ship, and at the same time to bear away, and steer so as to bring their respective opponents on the same point of the compass with themselves. Thus the adverse fleets will be sufficiently near each other to begin the action, by each ship’s presenting her bow to the ship abreast of her in the order of sailing, which may be easily changed for the order of battle, by all the ships hauling together close to the wind in the moment which precedes the action. If the fleet appear inclined to engage, it may bring to, to prevent losing time, and after this they will fill as soon as the action commences, because it is of advantage to a lee line to be advancing ahead. As the lee fleet fills and stands in close by the wind, the weather line should keep abreast before it bears away, to come within the requisite distance, that the van ship of the weather fleet may always keep to windward of the leading ship of the lee line, and be guarded against any shift of wind ahead.

If the lee fleet bear away four points to move their order of battle on the other tack, and avoid the action, filing off in succession in the wake of the van ship, the weather line, by bearing away all together eight points, cannot fail, as both fleets are supposed to sail equally, to pass through the middle of their line, and force them to fight with disadvantage, if their extent be double the distance between the two fleets. If the extent of the fleet be less than the above limitation, then the weather fleet will divide the lee fleet more unequally; and if the distance between the fleets be considerable, the weather fleet will be able to break through the line. If the lee fleet bear away four points all together, being of equal extent with the fleet to windward, and their distance from each other equal to that of the length of one of the lines, should the weather fleet bear away at the same time eight points, they will approach very near the sternmost of the retreating fleet, but they will not have it in their power to cut off any part of that fleet, even with an equality of sailing; so that the only advantage gained by this manoeuvre will be an ability of attacking the rear, and bringing it to action.

If the van ship and the rest of the weather fleet had a sufficient velocity to keep the centre ship of the lee line on the same point of bearing, in that case the leading ship may break through the enemy’s line about the middle ship of the centre division; for, supposing the fleets in the order of battle, on the starboard tack, steering east, with the wind at south-south-east, being at two leagues distance from each other, both the lines being four leagues in extent, then the lee line bearing away all together four points, will run north-east, while the fleet to windward, bearing away all together eight points, will steer north, the van ship of which will keep the centre division of the lee line in the point of bearing north-west. As she is supposed to be able to continue in this position, it follows that the van of the weather line must close the centre of the flying line to leeward after having run four leagues. The time and distance necessary to cut off a retreating fleet may always be known according to the last supposition. If the lee fleet should get on the other tack, and run large, still in the order of battle, they will be sooner forced to action by the weather fleet, who have only to bear away eight or nine points on the same tack, or run right before the wind.

As in forcing a fleet to action, there are two principal cases in which a fleet may avoid an action, where circumstances are not sufficiently favourable; first, when the enemy is to windward, and, secondly, when he is to leeward. In the former case, the lee fleet should form the order of [7:21:763]retreat, if the enemy are in view, and run on the same tack as their leading ship; but if he is still out of sight, and they have received intelligence of his approach by their frigates on the look-out, they may bear away large, without confining themselves to keep the wind directly off, unless when in the order of retreat. In the second case, it seldom happens that the weather fleet can be forced to an engagement, because it can always stand on that tack which increases its distance from the enemy; that is, by standing on one tack while the enemy is on the other. The windward fleet must not keep too near the enemy, and must take all possible means of avoiding being abreast of him.

It is often of advantage to double the enemy; that is, to bring a part of the fleet round upon his van or rear, so as to place him between two fires. This manoeuvre also resolves itself into two principal cases; first, when the enemy is to windward; secondly, when he is to leeward. In the first case, the lee fleet that attempts to double the enemy should extend itself abreast of him, so that its van or rear may extend beyond his line, in order to overreach him, by tacking in succession, so that the extended part of the line may get up to windward. If this manoeuvre be properly executed, it will be impossible for the ships of the weather line long to maintain their stations, for no vessel closely attacked by two others of equal force can long resist.

It is of some consequence to determine whether the attempt to double should be made on the van or the rear of the enemy, as on the propriety of adopting the one or the other of these measures may in a great measure depend the issue of the battle. In the present case, it is most easy to double the van of the enemy, because, if they are engaged by the ships abreast of them, those which are advanced ahead will be able, by making all sail, to get in the perpendicular to the direction of the wind with the van of the enemy, and to tack in succession to gain the wind of them on the other board, thus keeping them to leeward; and when they are come sufficiently to windward, they are again to go about, in order to keep the two headmost ships of the enemy’s line continually under their fire. If there be two or three ships to tack in succession and gain the wind of the enemy, they may edge down on the van of the weather line at pleasure, keeping themselves a little to the windward of it; and as that van is already engaged by the other ships abreast on the other side, she must necessarily soon be disabled. If they bear away they must drop upon the line with which they are engaged to leeward, while the ships to windward still continue to cannonade them. If they attempt going about, in order to attack more closely the ships to windward, they will be raked, while in stays, by their opponents to leeward and to windward, who enfilading them with whole broadsides, which they cannot return, must complete their disorder. If they make sail, in order to frustrate the design of the ships inclined to double, those with which they are engaged abreast to leeward have only to perform the same manoeuvre, and keep them under their fire; while the others, after having harassed them as much as possible, will do their best to perform the same manoeuvre on the succeeding ships.

If any of the ships in the van of the weather line are disabled in the masts or yards, they will drop astern, and run foul of the next succeeding ship, and these again on the next astern. Thus the enemy’s order of battle will be broken, while on the other hand the lee line is preserved; and those ships which have gained the wind of the enemy will, without engaging more ships than they can manage, contribute to increase the confusion.

When the enemy is to leeward, and the weather fleet attempts to double, the ships of the weather line must extend their van beyond that of the enemy, and then veer in order to bring the headmost ships of the lee line between two fires. It must not however be concealed, that it is much more dangerous to the ships engaged in this service to attempt doubling a fleet to leeward than to windward, as, if disabled, or separated too far from their own fleet, they cannot so easily extricate themselves and rejoin the fleet.

When one fleet attempts to double another, this latter will of course do all in their power to avoid the impending danger; and this they will the more readily do, according to their number or their situation. If the fleet thus threatened be to windward, one of the methods proposed to avoid being doubled, is to extend the line towards the point threatened, so as to leave a greater space between the ships; but in doing this there is a risk of having the line broken by the superior enemy. Another method suggested is, for the flag-ships of the windward fleet to oppose themselves to those of the lee line, which is supposed to render several of the enemy’s ships in the intervals of little use; but one great inconvenience of this manoeuvre is, that it leaves the van and rear most exposed to the enemy’s fire, and that the rear division in particular is in great danger of being doubled. To remedy these defects, the largest ships should be placed in the van and rear of each division, and the fleet must regulate its sailing in such a manner that its rear shall never be astern of the rear of the enemy.

When the enemy is to leeward, the weather fleet is to keep astern of the enemy, so that the van of the weather fleet may be opposed to and attack the enemy’s centre. Hence the enemy’s van will become useless for some time; and should it attempt to tack and double on the weather fleet, much time will be lost in performing that evolution; and it also runs the risk of being separated by the calm which often happens in the course of an engagement, occasioned by the discharge of the guns. A considerable interval might also be left between the centre and the van, if necessary precautions be taken to prevent the van from being cut off.

There are several circumstances of importance to be considered in the subject of chasing, i . e. when one ship or fleet pursues another, called the chase, either to bring her or them to action, or to oblige them to surrender.

When a single ship chases another, it is to be presumed in general that one of them is the better sailer, though this is not always the case, and still by proper manoeuvring the chasing ship, or chaser, may gain on the chase. In the following observations however we shall suppose the chaser to sail faster than the chase. The manoeuvres of the chaser will depend on her being to windward or leeward of the chase.

When the chase is to windward, it is evident, that as soon as she perceives a strange ship which she takes for an enemy, she will haul her wind, in order to prolong the chase, as otherwise her retreat would soon be cut off. The chaser then stands on nearly close hauled, till she has the chase on her beam: she then tacks, and stands on close hauled till the chase is again on her beam, and then retacks. In this manner she continues tacking every time she brings the chase perpendicular to her course on either board; and by thus manoeuvring, it is certain that the chaser will, by the superiority only of her sailing, join the other in the shortest time. For since the chaser tacks always as soon as the chase is perpendicular to her course, she is then at the shortest distance possible on that board; and since the chaser is supposed to be the faster sailer, these shortest distances will decrease every time the chaser tacks. It is therefore of advantage to the chase to keep constantly on the same course, without losing her time in going about, as tacking cannot be so favourable to her as to her adversary, whose sailing is superior. If the captain of the chaser should so little understand his profession as to stand on a long way, and tack in the wake of the chase, the best thing she can do is to heave in stays, and pass to windward of [7:21:764]him on the other tack, except she should find herself likely to gain advantage by going large; for if the chaser persists in tacking in the wake of the other ship, the pursuit will be very much prolonged.

When the chase is to leeward, the chaser is to steer that course by which she thinks she will gain most on the chase. If, after having run a short time, the chase is found to draw more aft, the chaser should then bear away a little more; but if the chase draw ahead, the chaser should haul up a little, and thus the course may be so regulated that the chase may always bear on the same point, and then the chaser will get up with the chase in the shortest time possible; for if any other course were steered, the chaser would either be too far ahead or too far astern, and hence the pursuit would be prolonged. The chase should run on that course which will carry her directly from the chaser, and should consider which is her best trim with respect to the wind, that she may move with the greatest possible rapidity from the chaser; for some ships have more advantage in going large, others with the wind right aft, and others when close hauled.

Another method has been proposed for chasing a ship to leeward; that is, by constantly steering directly for the chase. In this case, the tract described by the chaser is called the line or curve of pursuit. To illustrate this, let

A (fig. 32) represent the chaser, and B the chase directly to leeward of her, and running with less velocity than the pursuer, in the direction BC, perpendicular to that of the wind. Now, to construct this curve, let B b be the distance run by the chase in any short interval of time; join A b , and make Al equal the distance run by the chaser in the same time. Again, make bc, cd, de, er, &c. each equal to B b; join 1 c, and make 1 2 = A 1; join 2 d, and make 2 3 equal to A 1; proceed in like manner till the two distances carried forward meet as at C, and a curve described through the points A, 1, 2, 3, &c. will represent nearly the curve of pursuit; and the less the interval Al is taken, the more accurately will the curve be formed. In this particular case, the length of the distance BC may be found as follows, provided the distance AB and the proportional velocities of the two ships be known.

Let the velocity of the chase be denoted by a fraction, that of the chaser being unity. Multiply the given distance AB by this fraction, and divide the product by the complement of the square of the same fraction, and the quotient will be the distance run by the chase B. Suppose AB, the distance of the chase directly to leeward of the chaser, be taken at twelve miles, and suppose the velocity of the chase three fourths of that of the chaser, what will be the distance run by the chase before she is ****over- 19 y 4 9 ls 4

taken? Now = — = 9 × — = 20- miles; and 1 —⅜∣ TIT 7 '

since the velocity of the chaser to that of the chase is as 4 to 3, hence the distance run by the chaser will be =

2 3 3

20- × - = 27- miles. As the chaser alters her course at every point, and probably sails better with the wind in one direction with respect to her course than when the wind is in another direction, her velocity will be different at different points of the course. Thus, suppose her to sail faster when the wind is on the quarter, her velocity will constantly increase to a certain point, and will then diminish. Hence in real practice the curve of pursuit will not be exactly what is laid down in the above problem, and of course the measure of BC will differ a little from what we have there laid down. See Resistance of Fluids, and Seamanship .

If the whole fleet is to give chase, the admiral will make the proper signal, and then each ship will instantly make all the sail possible. If the retreating fleet is not much inferior to the other, a few of the fastest sailing vessels only are to be detached from the superior fleet, in order to pick up any stragglers, or those ships which may have fallen astern; and the remaining part of the fleet will keep in the same line or order of sailing as the retreating fleet, so that they may, if possible, force them to action. But if the retreating fleet is much inferior, the admiral of the superior fleet will make the signal for a general chase, and then each ship will immediately crowd all the sail possible after the retreating fleet; or, if the chase be still less numerous, the admiral will detach one of the squadrons of his fleet, by hoisting the proper signal for that purpose, and he will follow with the remainder of the fleet. The squadron that chases should be very careful not to engage too far in the chase, for fear of being overpowered; but at the same time to endeavour to satisfy themselves with regard to the object of their chase. They must pay great attention to the admiral’s signals at all times; and in order to prevent separation, they should collect themselves before night, especially if there be any appearance of foggy weather coming on, and endeavour to join the fleet again. The ships are diligently to observe when the admiral makes the signal to give over chase; and each regarding the admiral’s ship as a fixed point, is to work back into her station, so as to form the order of line again as quickly as the nature of the chase and the distance will permit.

When a fleet is obliged to run from an enemy who is in sight, it is usual to draw up the ships in that form or order called the order of retreat; and the admiral, when hard pursued, without any probability of escaping, ought, if practicable, to run his ships ashore, rather than suffer them to be taken afloat, and thereby give additional strength to the enemy. In short, nothing should be neglected that may contribute to the preservation of his fleet, or prevent any part of it from falling into the hands of the conqueror.

We have now gone through the principal evolutions of fleets and squadrons nearly as they are described in the “Elements of Rigging, Seamanship, and Naval Tactics,” and other approved publications on similar subjects. We have indeed omitted the method of forcing an enemy’s line, and of avoiding being forced, because the former will be readily understood from what we have to add on the improved method of tactics of M. Grenier, and Mr Clerk of Eldin.

Various defects have been observed in the tactics usually employed at sea, especially in a line of battle, and in the mode of bringing an enemy to action. The usual order of battle first introduced by the duke of York, afterwards James II. of England, is defective from its length. Its great extent makes it difficult for the admiral to judge what orders are proper to be issued to the ships stationed at the extremities, while his signals, however distinctly made, are liable to be mistaken by the commanders of these ships. Besides, the extremities of a long line, especially if it be to leeward, are necessarily defenceless, as the enemy may [7:21:765]throw himself with a superior force on the van or rear, and cut either of these off before it can be properly supported by the other squadrons. Viscount de Grenier, who was, we believe, one of the first to notice these defects, proposed to remedy them by introducing a new order of battle.

The leading principles of De Grenier’s tactics are founded on the following considerations. It is evident that each ship of a fleet must at all times occupy the centre of a certain horizon. This horizon De Grenier divides into two unequal parts, calling the greater the direct and graduated space, and the less the indirect, crossed, and ungraduated space. The reason of these appellations is, that on the greater segment of the horizontal circle there are twenty different points, which may be marked by degrees from one of the close-hauled lines to the other, and to which a ship may sail from the centre by so many direct courses without tacking; whereas from the other twelve points, including that from which the wind blows, she cannot arrive but by steering cross courses, which must necessarily delay her progress. Suppose now a fleet to leeward, so disposed that only a part of it can fight with another equally numerous, and ranged to windward in a single line, and let the lee fleet be ranged on three sides of a lozenge a b, c d, e f.

The squadron a b, which is most to windward, being drawn up in line of battle, cannot be fought but by an equal number AB, CD, EF. All the rest of that fleet therefore must remain inactive, unless the ships which are not engaged should try to pass to leeward of the fleet ab, cd, er. But should the ships of the weather fleet, which are placed between B and F, bear away, as they appear in the figure, between C i and F i, the ships between A and B, which are fighting to windward, cannot bear away with them. Suppose now that the ships between C i and F i have passed to leeward, the squadrons c d, e f which are ranged according to De Grenier’s system, and have not yet been engaged, should come to windward, and join with their friends a b against that squadron of the enemy AB which is still to windward and engaged; it is almost impossible but that the squadron AB must be destroyed by so great a superiority, before it could receive assistance from the ships to leeward between C i and F i.

De Grenier proposes only three orders of sailing; one, when a fleet is to pass a strait; a second, when it steers in open sea, on the look-out for an enemy, or with a view to avoid him; and a third, when on an extensive cruise, disposed so that it cannot be easily surprised or broken. Of these three orders, only the second and third differ from the usual orders of sailing. The former of these is represented by fig. 34, where the columns, a b, c d, e f, are disposed on three sides of a regular lozenge, on the two close-hauled lines. The ships of the two divisions cd, er, sometimes to windward, as in fig. 35, and sometimes to leeward as in fig. 34, of the third division a b, are to be formed on two parallels of one of the close-hauled lines in the wakes of their respective headmost ships; while the third division a b is to be ranged ahead or astern of the others on the other close-hauled line, steering chequerwise the same course as the other divisions.

When a b is to windward of c d and e f (fig. 34), De Grenier calls that the windward primitive order of sailing; and when to leeward (fig 35), the fleet is said to be in the leeward primitive order of sailing. These are the two principal positions in almost every case, and, with very little variety, may become the order of battle, of chasing, &c.

His third order is illustrated by fig. 36, where the divisions a b and er are supposed at the distance of about six leagues from each other; c d and e f resting on the extremities of the base of a triangle STV, while the centre ship of the division a b rests on its summit T: none of the divisions could be cut off by an enemy, however formidable, seen from its centre ship at the distance of six leagues. For if, on the proper signal, the division a b should steer from T toward X, on the course opposite to the close-hauled line it steered before, and the two divisions c d and er steer from V and S towards X likewise, it is plain that each of these divisions would have only three leagues to run in order to join the other two, while the enemy, which was first perceived at the distance of six leagues, must run nine before he can come up with the nearest of these squadrons.

To form De Grenier’s order of battle, represented in fig. 37 and 38, it will be sufficient for the ships of the three divisions ranged in the windward primitive order of sailing, to heave in stays all together, and get on the other tack on the opposite line of bearing (fig. 37); or for the ships in the leeward primitive order at once to haul the wind on the same tack as they steer; and they will find themselves in order of battle, fig. 38. When the two columns c d and er are to leeward of the third division a b, ranged in order of [7:21:766]battle, this is called the natural order of battle; and when c d and e f are to windward of a b, this is called the inverted order of battle. The former of these is calculated for a fleet combating to leeward, and the latter for a fleet which must fight to windward.

To explain the advantages of these dispositions, let us suppose the line AB, CD, EF, fig. 39, to represent an enemy’s fleet to windward in the usual order of battle, on the close-hauled line, and on the starboard tack; and let a b be one of the divisions of a fleet disposed according to the now natural order, on the starboard tack, while the lines c d, e f represent the other two divisions standing on chequerwise on the same tack, but formed on the opposite close-hauled line. When the enemy comes to attack this latter fleet on a supposition that it is inferior to their own, their divisions AB and EF, in order to attack the ships a or b, must bear away. Now, to prevent the attack, each of the divisions c d, er, must make the following evolutions, according to their respective situations and the manoeuvres of the enemy. 1. The ships of the division a b are to slacken as much as possible their headway, and form a very close line, till the enemy makes a movement to attack the headmost or sternmost ship of that division. 2. The ships of the division c d are to make sail till they come under the second or third ship of the rear of the line of battle a b, when they will take the same sail as the ships of that division, to preserve that position until the hostile ships make their evolution to attack the rear ships of that division. In this situation the ships of the division c d will be able to observe the manoeuvres of the enemy, in order to change tack, and form themselves in order of battle on the opposite board as soon as the hostile ships shall have run over a certain space; because the ships of the division c d, steering afterwards close hauled in the wake of the sternmost ship of the division a b, will be able to cover the rear ships of that division, and get the weather-gage of the hostile divisions which are bearing away; rake their ships; run alongside of them; double their rearguard, and put it between two fires, if those hostile ships are following in the wake of each other; divide it if they bear away chequerwise; or gain to windward, and put between two fires the enemy’s division CD, while engaged with the division a b. 3. The division e f may abandon their post, and run chequerwise under a press of sail, as soon as the enemy falls ahead of a b; that if the enemy’s division AB attempts to fall on e f or on the van of a b, they may, by going about, steer in order of battle close hauled on the opposite line, and cover the ship a, double the hostile division CD ahead, or divide AB, which is running chequerwise on the opposite tack.

Fig. 40 marks another method of manoeuvring by the divisions c d, e f when the enemy’s ships are arranged in a single line not well formed.

Figs. 41 and 42 illustrate De Grenier’s method of placing the admiral’s ship, and the frigates and transports attached to a fleet. A, fig. 41, is the admiral placed ahead of the fleet, at a short distance from the headmost of the second division, and in the same direction of the wind as the headmost ship of the first division ∙, ff are two frigates observing the same rule and position with respect to the van ship of the third, and rear of the first division. When the fleet is in order of battle, as in fig. 42, the admiral’s ship A is in the centre of the lozenge, and two of the frigates, f f, are on the fourth side of the lozenge. The transports and store-ships, when the fleet is in order of sailing or convoy, occupy the space circumscribed by the lozenge, but in order of battle they are disposed in a line opposite to that of the enemy.

For a full exposition of this system, we must refer to the original work, entitled L’Art de Guerre en Mer, ou Tactique Navale, &c. par M. le Viscompte de Grenier, or the extracts from it contained in the Elements and Practice of Rigging and Seamanship.

We must now turn our attention to the improvements in tactics suggested by our countryman Mr Clerk; improvements which have received the approbation of several distinguished officers of the navy, and to hints derived from which we are in a great measure indebted for some of the most signal victories which have reflected new honour on the naval power of Britain.

Before entering on an explanation of Mr Clerk’s tactics, we must briefly state his objections to the usual method of bringing ships to action, by the weather ship or fleet steering directly down upon the enemy. By doing this, the enemy to leeward often has an opportunity of completely disabling the ships making the attack, as the former can use all their guns on one side, while the latter can only use their bow chases. Suppose B, fig. 43, to represent a ship of eighty guns to windward, in sight of an enemy’s ship of equal force F to leeward. Now, if B bears down directly upon F, the latter, by lying to, as in fig. 44, will present a broadside of forty guns, all bearing for a considerable time on B, while the latter coming down headwise, can only bring the two light guns of her forecastle to bear on F, not to mention that F, by lying broadside to, will have her masts and rigging little exposed to the enemy’s shot, while B, standing head on, is exposed to be raked by every shot from F, and in particular her rigging is in the utmost danger.

Instead of this objectionable mode of attack, Mr Clerk proposes that B, having the wind, should run down astern as in the dotted line at fig. 45, till she gets into the course of F, near her wake, or in such a position [7:21:767]as will bring her parallel to F’s course, and within a proper distance, when she can run up close alongside of F, and engage on equal terms; or, that she should shoot ahead, then veer, and run down on the weather bow of F, as in fig. 46, till she can force the chase to bear away to leeward, keeping close by her, on equal terms, taking care in both cases not to put it in the power of F to bring her broadside to bear on her without retaliation.

Fig. 47 is employed by Mr Clerk to illustrate the different procedure of a French and a British man of war in firing, the former at the rigging, and the latter at the hull of the enemy, with their effects. Let F represent a large ship desirous of avoiding a close engagement, but lying to, to receive with advantage an enemy’s ship B, of equal force. Suppose that F, by firing at the rigging of B, may have carried away some of the principal stays, several of the windward shrouds, a fore-topmast, or other rigging of less consequence, without having wounded a single man; and suppose a second ship, consort to F, receiving an enemy’s ship like B, but firing only at her hull, so as to kill thirty or forty men, without damaging her rigging. Now, when F and her consort wish to avoid a close engagement, it is evident that the ship B which has lost part of her rigging, is much more disabled from coming to close action than her consort whose rigging is entire, though she may have lost a great number of her men.

By the scheme at fig. 48, it is intended to illustrate the impossibility of one ship being exposed to the fire of many ships at one time. Let I, H, F, H, I, represent five ships in line of battle ahead, about a cable’s length, or 240 yards, asunder, and suppose the length of each ship to be forty yards, so that the whole space between the head of one ship and the head of that next adjacent equals 280 yards. Let the perpendicular line FK, extending from the beam of F six cables’ lengths, or 1440 yards, be divided into six equal parts. It is evident that any ship stationed at E in the line FK, 720 yards distant, cannot long be exposed to the fire of more than the centre ship F of this squadron. For if we suppose that H and K, ahead and astern of F, can bring their broadsides to bear on E, by putting themselves in positions for that purpose, they will not only disorder their own line, but one will leave her head and the other her stern exposed to a raking fire from the opposite ships BB in the enemy’s line. If B can suffer little from the two ships H, H, at the distance of 720 yards, it is evident that she will suffer still less from these ships as she approaches nearer the enemy’s line. Again, if instead of a cable’s length asunder, we suppose the ships I, F, I, two cables’ length asunder, to bear on the ship B, it is evident from the figure that in this case B will not be more exposed to the fire of I and I at the distance of 1440 yards, than she was to that of H and H at half that distance; and so in similar cases.

In explaining the principles on which we are to judge of the advantages or defects of different modes of bringing ships to action, Mr Clerk supposes a fleet of ten, twenty, or more ships, of eighty guns each, drawn up in line of battle to leeward, as at F, fig. 49, and lying to with an intention of avoiding an action; while another fleet, as B, of equal number and force, also drawn up in line of battle three or four miles to windward, wishes to make an attack, and come to close quarters on equal terms. The fleets being thus disposed, should the fleet at B attempt running down to attack the fleet at F, each ship standing head on to the opposite ship in the leeward line, it is to be expected, from what we have already stated, that the attacking ships will be disabled at least in their rigging before they can come to close action; but suppose that the commander of the weather fleet, though his ships have been disabled in their rigging during their course a a a to leeward, fig. 50, has made them bring to at a great distance, but sufficiently near to injure F, this latter fleet, which has been endeavouring to avoid an action, will now bear away with little in jury to a new station, as G, and there remain out of the reach of B’s shot, and this fleet must repair its rigging before it can make another attack.

Again, suppose that the fleet B, instead of standing head on, were to run down in an angular course, as in fig. 51. It is plain that if any ship in this angular line should be crippled, her defect in sailing will occasion a confusion of several of the other ships in that line. It may be said that the stoppage of one ship ahead will not necessarily produce a stoppage of every ship astern of her, because they may run to leeward of the disabled ship; but we must observe that by this time the ships ahead in the van A may be engaged, and consequently, not having much headway, are nearly stationary, so that each ship astern, in attempting to bear down as at D, D, may be confined to a certain course, and must run the risk of being raked in coming down before the wind, and consequently of being disabled before coming up with the enemy.

Thirdly, the van of the fleet B having attained their station at A, abreast of the van of F, fig. 52, and having begun the action, the van ships, of F, with a view to retreat, may throw in a broadside on the van of B, and then bear away in succession, as at H, followed by the rest of the fleet F, which, after exchanging broadsides with the van of B, may draw up in a new line two or three miles to leeward at 11, fig. 53.

Suppose, again, for further illustration, that B, fig. 54, [7:21:768]represents a fleet putting before the wind, each ship intending, when brought to at a determined distance at A, to take up her particular antagonist in the line of the enemy F to leeward; and let F be supposed at rest, without any motion ahead. It is easy to conceive, that while the alternate ships of F’s line, under cover of the smoke, withdraw from battle to GGG, the intermediate ships left behind them in the line will be sufficient to amuse even the whole of B’s fleet, till the ships G shall form a new line H as a support from the leeward. In such case B, after being disabled, and not having foreseen the manoeuvre, will neither be able to prevent the intermediate ships with which he is engaged from bearing away to join their friends, nor, were he able, would it be advisable to follow them; for the same manoeuvre, with equal success, can again and again be repeated.

To explain the relative motion of these two fleets, let F, fig. 55, represent a fleet of twelve ships in line of battle, a cable’s length asunder, and suppose the length of each ship from the end of the jib-boom to the stern to be 36 2 / 3 fathoms. The whole fleet will occupy a space of two English miles; and if it be supposed to sail in the direction FG, at the rate of four knots an hour, it will in an hour have moved to G, four miles from its former position.

Now let there be an opposite fleet B, also twelve ships, situated four miles to windward, and let the point A be a quarter of a mile right to windward of the point G. Then, if B, by bearing away in the direction BA, gain the point A at the same time that the leeward fleet F has arrived at G, B will have moved nearly at the rate of 5½ miles an hour, and the angle contained between the direction of its line of bearing and its present course will be nearly four points.

Secondly, in fig. 56, if F, by carrying more sail, move at the rate of six miles an hour from F to G, then B, with a more slanting course, will have more difficulty in keeping the line abreast while coming down to the attack, owing to the additional obstruction which will attend each succeeding ship in such a slanting course. Again, if the leeward fleet shall lie up one point higher, as FG, fig.

57, the rears of the two fleets will be removed to a much greater distance, and the van A must be sooner up with the enemy’s van, and of course so much farther from support, while F, bringing up his ships in succession, may disable the van of A, and afterwards bear away at pleasure with little injury, as at H. Now B being supposed disabled, and having his rear D distracted, will be unable to prevent F from escaping.

From these considerations, it appears that a fleet to windward, by extending its line of battle with a view to stop and attack the whole line of an enemy’s fleet to leeward, must labour under considerable disadvantages, and will scarcely succeed in the attempt.

On these principles Mr Clerk explains the reason why the French fleets so repeatedly escaped from the British without any serious defeat or loss, viz. by avoiding a general engagement, and disabling the British van as it bore down to attack them. He therefore recommends a different mode of attack from the windward, which we shall proceed to illustrate by proper diagrams.

Let F (fig. 58) represent a fleet in line of battle, under easy sail, willing to avoid an action, but ready to receive an attack, in the usual way, from another fleet B, three or four miles to windward, arranged in three columns. How shall B make the attack on F, so as, without aiming at the improbable advantage of taking or destroying the greater part of this fleet, they may secure three or four of the stemmost ships? Mr Clerk advises that a sufficient strength be detached to secure these ships, while the admiral keeps aloof with the rest of his fleet, disposed as in the figure, ready to make the necessary observations, and give the requisite support to the detached ships. If F continues to avoid an action by standing on in line, the detachment, coming into the position BA, will secure the three ships at I; and if the headmost ships of F were to tack, and be followed by the rest in succession, as at fig. 59, not only the three ships at I will be left at the mercy of the ships detached from B, but two more, as G, will be exposed to an attack from an other squadron of B at C. If all the ships of F tack together, as in fig. 60, the delay, and probably the confusion, [7:21:769] consequent on this manoeuvre, will still more endanger the stemmost ships, or will bring on a general and close action. Again, if F attempts to haul off, beginning with his sternmost ship G, and then runs to leeward, as at fig. 61, he will expose his ships to a raking fire from B, and still endanger his stemmost ships, by getting too far to leeward for their support; or if the headmost ships at H, fig. 62, veer first, to be followed by the rest astern, the danger would be still greater. Thus it appears that, in every assignable case, a fleet to leeward, avoiding an attack from an equal or superior to windward, as here advised, by preserving the line, will risk the loss of three or more of their stemmost ships.

Now, let us suppose that F, while standing on a line on the larboard tack, when threatened with an attack on his rear from B, veers and passes on opposite tacks to leeward (see fig. 63). The consequence of this will be, that his headmost ships will be forced to leeward by B, and compelled to engage under disadvantageous circumstances; and the disadvantage to F will be much the same, whether he again veers and resumes his former position, as at G, fig. 64, or stands on before the wind, as at P, fig. 65.

We have hitherto supposed that the wind has been fixed in one point; but let us suppose it to shift, and let us inquire what will be the effect of such a circumstance on the two lines F and B. While the fleets are in the former position, F in line, and B in four divisions, B, B, B, A, steering east, with the wind at north, fig. 66, let the wind shift to the west. The only consequence of this will be, that F will be thrown still farther to leeward, to its greater disadvantage. But let the wind shift to east, so as to be ahead, as in figs. 67 and 68; still, if the admiral of B manages properly, and carefully watches the motions of F, this change will produce no advantage to the latter. For B has nothing to do but veer as the wind comes round, so as to bring his ships to windward of the three sternmost ships of F, and to leeward of the rest of his line, so as to cut off the three stemmost ships.

If the wind should be supposed to veer from point to point all round the compass, so that the fleet F, maintaining the weather-gage of B, shall make a circuit round B to leeward; still, if B act cautiously, F will lose the three threatened ships.

Lastly, suppose the wind should instantly shift to a point opposite to what it was at the commencement of the attack, as from north to south. Before it can be ascertained whether such a change will be to the advantage or disadvantage of F, the relative situations of the two fleets must be considered. Suppose that the van and centre be separated at some distance from his rear, and that in consequence this fleet shall have taken such a position as is shown at fig. 69. Though in this case he will have got to windward, his three ships can never be regained or preserved from the attack of B. The most favourable situation for F would be when the fleets were in the position denoted by fig. 66, as then he could not only support his three ships with advantage, but even threaten and cut off a part of B’s detachment. In attempting this, however, he incurs the risk of coming to a close engagement, which we have supposed him to be sedulously avoiding.

Besides this method of attack from the windward by detachments from the main fleet, Mr Clerk shows how a successful attack may be made by a fleet to leeward, by its breaking the enemy’s line, and this either near the rear, near the centre, or not far from the van, of which cases the two former will be most likely to prove successful. The enemy’s line can only be cut when the two hostile fleets veer on opposite tacks. The most simple method of effecting this is for the van ship of the attacking squadron, instead of ranging parallel to that of the enemy, and to lee [7:21:770]ward of him, to pass through the first interval that offers, followed by the rest of the line, which is thus led across that of the enemy. In consequence of this manoeuvre, the van of the leeward fleet will be to windward of the enemy’s rear, and thus the attacking squadron will have its line entire, while that of its adversary is divided. Again, the ships of the rear division, having their progress obstructed, will probably crowd on each other, get into confusion, and be driven to leeward. We cannot detail the different cases mentioned by Mr Clerk; but for these, and many other valuable suggestions on the subject, we must refer to his well-known and ingenious Essay on Naval Tactics.