LIBEL (libellus famosus), taken in its largest and most extensive sense, signifies any writing, picture, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but, in a peculiar sense, it denotes a malicious defamation of any person, and especially of a magistrate, made public either by printing or by writing, by signs or by pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. The direct tendency of these libels is a breach of the public peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps to bloodshed. The communication of a libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the law, and therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man is as much a libel as if it were openly printed, for it equally tends to provoke a breach of the peace.

With regard to libels in general, there are two remedies; one by indictment, and another by action. For the public offence, the remedy is indictment; because every libel has a tendency to break the peace, or provoke others to break it, an offence which is the same whether the matter contained be true or false; and therefore the defendant, on an indictment for publishing a libel, is not allowed to allege the truth thereof by way of justification. But in the remedy by action on the case, which is to repair the party in damages for the injury done him, the defendant may, as for words spoken, justify the truth of the facts, and show that the plaintiff has received no injury at all. What has been said with regard to words spoken, will also hold in every particular with regard to libels by writing or printing, and the civil actions consequent thereon; but· as to signs or pictures, it seems necessary always to show, by proper inuendos and averments of the defendant’s meaning, the import and application of the scandal, and that some special damage has followed; otherwise it cannot appear that such libel by picture is understood to have been levelled at the plaintiff', or that it was attended with any actionable consequences.

In a civil action, then, a libel must appear to be false as well as scandalous; for, if the charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to demand a compensation for himself, whatever offence it may be against the public peace; and therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the accusation may be pleaded in bar of the suit. But, in a criminal prosecution, the tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public peace, is the sole consideration of the law. Hence, in such prosecutions, the only points to be considered are, first, the making or publisning of the book or writing; and, secondly, whether the matter be criminal; and, if both these points are against the defendant, the offence against the public is complete. The punishment of such libellers, for concocting, repeating, printing, or publishing the libel, is a fine, and such corporal punishment as the court in its discretion may inflict; regard being had to the quantity of the offence, and the quality of the offender. By the law of the Twelve Tables at Rome, libels which affected the reputation of an individual were made a capital offence; but before the reign of Augustus, the punishment became corporal only. Under the Emperor Valentinian it was again made capital, not only to write, but to publish, or even to omit destroying libels. In this and many other respects, our law corresponds rather with the middle age of Roman jurisprudence, when liberty, learning, and humanity, were in their full vigour, than with the cruel edicts that were established in the tyrannical age of the ancient decemviri, or in that of the latter emperors.