DIGNITY, as applied to the titles of noblemen, signifies honour and authority. Dignity may be divided into superior and inferior; as the titles of duke, earl, baron, &c. which are the highest names of dignity; and those of baronet, knight, serjeant-at-law, &c. which are the lowest. Nobility only can give so high a name of dignity as to supply the want of a surname in legal proceedings; and as the omission of a name of dignity may be pleaded in abatement of a writ, so it may also be where a peer who has more than one name of dignity is not named by the most noble. No temporal dignity of any foreign nation can give a man a higher title here than that of esquire.

Dignity, in the human character, the opposite of meanness.

Man is endowed with a sense of the worth and excellence of his nature. He deems it more perfect than that of the other beings around him; and he perceives that the perfection of his nature consists in virtue, particularly in virtue of the highest rank. To express that sense, the term dignity is appropriated. Further, to behave with dignity, and to refrain from all mean actions, is felt to be not only a virtue, but a duty: it is a duty which every man owes to himself. By acting in this manner, he attracts love and esteem; by acting meanly, or below himself, he is discommended and contemned.

This sense of the dignity of human nature reaches even our pleasures and amusements. If they enlarge the mind by raising grand or elevated emotions, or if they humanize the mind by exercising our sympathy, they are approved as suited to the dignity of our nature; but if they contract the mind by fixing it on trivial objects, they are contemned as not suited to the dignity of our nature. Hence in general every occupation, whether of use or amusement, that corresponds to the dignity of man, is termed manly; and every occupation below his nature is termed childish or puerile.

To those who make a study of human nature, there is a point which has always appeared intricate. How comes it that generosity and courage are more esteemed, and bestow more dignity, than good nature or even justice, though the latter contribute more than the former to private as well as to public happiness? This question, bluntly proposed, might puzzle even a philosopher; but, by means of the foregoing observations, it will be easily solved. Human virtues, like other objects, obtain a rank in our estimation, not from their utility, which is a subject of reflection, but from the direct impression which they make on us. Justice and good nature are a sort of negative virtues, which scarcely make any impression except when they are transgressed. Courage and generosity, on the contrary, producing elevated emotions, enliven the great sense of a man’s dignity, both in himself and in others; and for this reason courage and generosity are in higher esteem than the other virtues mentioned; we describe them as grand and elevated, as of greater dignity, and more praiseworthy.

This leads us to examine more directly emotions and passions with respect to the present subject; and it will not be difficult to form a scale of them, beginning with the meanest, and ascending gradually to those of the highest rank and dignity. Pleasure felt as at the organ of sense, in other words, corporeal pleasure, is perceived to be low, and when indulged to excess, is perceived also to be mean; for which reason, persons of any delicacy dissemble the pleasure they take in eating and drinking. The pleasures of the eye and ear having no organic feeling, and being free from any sense of meanness, are indulged without any shame; and they even rise to a certain degree of dignity when their objects are grand or elevated. The case is the same with the sympathetic passions; a virtuous person behaving with fortitude and dignity under cruel misfortunes makes a capital figure, and the sympathizing spectator feels in himself the same dignity. Sympathetic distress, at the same time, is never mean; on the contrary, it is agreeable to the nature of a social being, and excites general approbation. The rank which love possesses in the scale depends in a great measure on its objects. It possesses a low place when founded on external properties merely, and is mean when bestowed on a person of inferior rank, without any extraordinary qualification; but when founded on the more elevated internal properties, it assumes a considerable degree of dignity. The case is the same with friendship. When gratitude is warm it animates the mind; but it scarcely rises to dignity. Joy bestows dignity when it proceeds from an elevated cause.

If we can depend upon induction, dignity is not a property of any disagreeable passion; one is slight, another severe; one depresses the mind, another animates it. But there is no elevation, far less dignity, in any of them. Revenge, in particular, though it inflames and swells the mind, is not accompanied with dignity, not even with elevation. It is not however felt as mean or grovelling, unless when it takes indirect or cowardly measures for gratification. Shame and remorse, though they sink the spirits, are not mean. Pride, a disagreeable passion, bestows no dignity in the eye of a spectator; but vanity always appears mean, and extremely so where founded, as commonly happens, on trivial qualifications.
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The pleasures of the understanding possess a high rank ʹ in point of dignity. Of this every one must be sensible, when he considers the important truths which have been laid open by science; such as general theorems, and the laws which govern the material and moral worlds. The pleasures of the understanding are suited to man as a rational and contemplative being, and they tend not a little to ennoble his nature; even to the Deity he stretches his contemplations, which, in the discovery of infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence, afford delight of the most exalted kind. Hence it appears that the fine arts, studied as a rational pursuit, afford entertainment of great dignity, superior far to what they afford as a subject of taste merely. But contemplation, however in itself valuable, is chiefly respected as subservient to action; for man is intended to be more an active than a contemplative being. He accordingly shows more dignity in action than in contemplation. Generosity, magnanimity, heroism, raise his character to the highest pitch; these best express the dignity of his nature, and advance him nearer to divinity than any other of his attributes.

Having endeavoured to assign the true cause of dignity and meanness, by unfolding the principle on which they are founded, we proceed to explain the final cause of the dignity or meanness bestowed upon the several particulars above mentioned, beginning with corporeal pleasures. These, as far as useful, are, like justice, fenced with sufficient sanctions to prevent their being neglected. Hunger and thirst are painful sensations; and we are incited to animal love by a vigorous propensity. Were corporeal pleasures over and above dignified with a place in a high class, they would infallibly overturn the balance of the mind, by outweighing the social affections. This is a satisfactory final cause for refusing to these pleasures any degree of dignity; and the final cause is not less evident of their meanness when they are indulged to excess. The more refined pleasures of external sense, conveyed by the eye and the ear from natural objects and from the fine arts, deserve a high place in our esteem, because of their singular and extensive utility. In some cases they rise to a considerable dignity; and the very lowest pleasures of the kind are never esteemed mean nor grovelling. The pleasure arising from wit, humour, ridicule, or from what is simply ludicrous, is useful, by relaxing the mind after the fatigue of more manly occupations; but the mind, when it surrenders itself to pleasure of that kind, loses its vigour, and sinks gradually into sloth. The place which this pleasure occupies in point of dignity is adjusted to these views. To make it useful as a relaxation, it is not branded with meanness; to prevent its usurpation, it is removed from that place but a single degree. No man values himself for that pleasure even during gratification; and if it have engrossed more of his time than is requisite for relaxation, he looks back on the circumstance with some degree of shame.

In point of dignity, the social emotions rise above the selfish, and much above those of the eye and ear. Man is by his nature a social being; and to qualify him for society, it is wisely contrived that he should value himself more on being social than selfish. The excellency of man is chiefly discernible in the great improvements he is susceptible of in society. These, by perseverance, may be carried on progressively, beyond any assignable limits; and even abstracting from revelation, there is a very great probability that the progress begun here will be completed in some future state. Now, as all valuable improvements proceed from the exercise of our rational faculties, the Author of our nature, in order to excite us to a due use of these faculties, has assigned a high rank to the pleasures of the understanding. Their utility, with respect to this life as well as a future one, entitles them to that rank.

But as action is the aim of all our improvements, virtuous actions justly possess the highest of all ranks. These, we find, are by nature distributed into different classes, and the first place in point of dignity is assigned to actions which appear not the first in point of use. Generosity, for example, in the sense of mankind, is more respected than justice, though the latter is undoubtedly more essential to society; and magnanimity, heroism, and undaunted courage, rise still higher in our esteem, for the reason which has been already explained.