BALANCE OF POWER, Among states, a most important principle of foreign policy, intimately connected with the general peace and independence of nations, but which some have treated as altogether chimerical, and others represented as having led only to pernicious results. It is more generally admitted, however, to have a real foundation in the rides of intercourse and union among states, and to have exercised a great and beneficial influence on the affairs of modern Europe. We say of modern Europe, because, though the policy in question was not wholly unknown to other ages and countries, it was nowhere systematically pursued but among the European nations of modern times. Previous to the sixteenth century there was little political connection among those nations, their circumstances not being such as to admit of any regulated attention to foreign affairs; but about the commencement of that century they began to form one grand community or federal league, of which the actuating principle was the preservation of the balance of power. The attention to this principle thenceforth influenced all the great wars and negociations, and made every foreign movement, however remote, an object of interest throughout every part of the European system.

We shall endeavour to sketch a general outline of this important subject; and, in doing so, we shall notice, though in a brief way, all the principal topics which it seems to present for discussion.

1. The ultimate intention of the system founded on the balance of power, is to secure every state in the full possession and enjoyment of all its rights, by making its safety and independence objects of interest and guardianship to its neighbours. It endeavours to accomplish this great end by teaching that it is the interest of all states to check the first encroachments of ambition, to watch every movement of foreign powers, and to unite their respective forces in support of the weak against the strong. It is called the balancing system, because its aim is to prevent any state from aggrandizing itself at the expense of its neighbours, and to counterpoise any state that may have become too powerful, by a union of the forces of others.

The metaphorical terms applied to this system seem to have given rise to some very absurd misconceptions of its true theory and purposes. It has sometimes been supposed that its object was to equalize the powers of states composing a common system; and as it is plainly impossible either to effect or to maintain such an equality, it has thence been concluded, that the whole system is founded upon a chimera. But, with a view to the objects of this system, the question is, not what amount of power above another any state possesses, provided the power so possessed be fairly acquired, but whether any state possesses its power in such circumstances as to enable it to trespass at pleasure on a weaker neighbour. If there be no other state, or confederacy of states, capable of counteracting any injurious designs which a greater power might undertake, then it is said there is no balance; but if there be such a counterpoise, this is all that the balancing system requires to produce what, in its language, is called an equilibrium. In order to make this point as clear as possible, we beg to refer to the following definitions of the balance of power, as given by Vattel and by Gentz: “By this balance,” says the former, “is to be understood such a disposition of things, as that no one potentate or state shall be able absolutely to predominate and prescribe laws to the others.” (Lau) of Nations, b. iii. c. iii. § 47.)—“What is usually termed a balance of power,” says M. Gentz, “is that constitution subsisting among neighbouring states, more or less connected with one another, by virtue of which no one among them can injure the independence or essential rights of another, without meeting with effectual resistance on some side, and, consequently, exposing itself to danger.” (Fragments on the Political Balance, c. i.)

Thus, then, it is distinctly understood that the balancing system is not grounded upon an equality among states in respect of power, but upon a union of powers to repress the enterprises of the strong and ambitious, and to counteract the effects of necessary individual inequalities by aggregate strength.

It is quite indispensable to the existence of such a system, that one state should not be permitted to obtain such a superiority of power as to enable it to overawe all opposition, and make the safety of those around it dependent on its will; and as it is the disposition of all unchecked power to extend itself, the balancing system inculcates it as the interest, as well as the right, of every state to join in opposing the first encroachments of any ambitious potentate or community. It teaches that the danger extends much further than to the party immediately attacked or menaced; that one encroachment will pave the way to another; and that it is therefore wise to meet the danger whilst yet distant, and capable of being combated with less peril or loss. The right of interference to put down a danger of this kind is, in fact, only a modification of the right to resist an immediate attack. All human experience shows, that the state which is suffered to aggrandize itself at the expense of one neighbour, will with [7:4:309] its increased means acquire stronger dispositions to encroach still further; and therefore self-defence authorizes ' us to treat as already an invader, any potentate whose conduct entitles us to conclude that he only waits a convenient opportunity to become so in effect. “As long,” says Bacon, “as men are men, and as long as reason is reason, a just fear will be a just cause of a preventive war; but especially if it be part of the case that there be a nation that is manifestly detected to aspire to new acquests, then other states assuredly cannot be justly accused for not paying for the first blow, or for not adopting Polyphemus’s courtesy, to be the last that shall be eaten up.” (Speech concerning a War with Spain.') It is peculiarly and emphatically the language of the balancing system, Principiis obsta,— in other words, look well to the safety and independence of your neighbours, even the most remote, if you wish to preserve your own.

Upon this point it is by no means necessary to enter into any lengthened deductions. The principle of interference to prevent the progress of a dangerous power rests, both as to right and policy, upon the most obvious dictates of experience and prudence. No state ever yet acquired a preponderating power without abusing it; and therefore it is the right and interest of all states to prevent any one from rising to such an ascendency as may endanger the common safety.

The right in question, however, is that of guarding against injury justly to be apprehended from the conduct of a state which uses improper means of aggrandizement. As far, therefore, as measures of hostility are concerned, there must be actual encroachment in order to warrant them. The balancing system does not say there shall be no alterations in the relative strength of states; for a state may fairly and honourably increase her power by wise legislation, or by the cultivation of her own internal resources. To attempt to impede a state which takes this road to greatness, would be to make war upon those very arts by the successful cultivation of which peace and happiness are spread throughout the world. The aggrandizements to which the balancing system stands opposed, are those attended with immediate violence to some, and which infer further violence to others. All that nations can do when a neighbour becomes formidable in a fair way, is to watch her, and to draw closer those ties of alliance which may enable them to counteract any bad use of her power. When Lord Bacon, in his Essay on Empire, counsels princes “to keep due sentinel, that none of their neighbours do so overgrow by increase of territory, by embracing of trade, by approaches or the like, as to become more able to annoy them than they were,” he does not mean that the growth of a state by commerce is to be prevented in the same way as in the case of its extension by a seizure of territory, but, that all great power, however acquired, is in its nature dangerous, and ought to be counterpoised by timely confederation.

There is another way in which a state may become formidable, and that of a sudden, where the balancing system does not authorize immediate hostile interference. We allude here to the case of a sovereign who acquires a great accession of power by marriage or by inheritance. “It is a sacred principle of the law of nations,” says Vattel, “that such an increase of power cannot, alone and of itself, give any one a right to take up arms in order to oppose it.” (B. iii. c. 3, sect. 43.) Grotius and Puffendorf maintain the same opinion in terms equally decided. But suppose a sovereign, who has already displayed an encroaching disposition, is about to acquire in this way an accession of power, which would render him more and more formidable to his neighbours; in this case, as Vattel shows, the maxims of the balancing system authorize an immediate interference to procure securities; or, according as the danger is imminent, altogether to prevent the impending aggrandizement. It is perhaps wholly unprecedented, as this writer observes, that a state should receive any remarkable accession of power, without giving other states just grounds to interfere; but if it should be otherwise, the only course to be pursued is that which the balancing system recommends, namely, to keep a watchful eye on all the proceedings of the formidable state, and the formation of a counterpoise by means of alliances.

These, then, are the grand expedients of the balancing system: vigilant inspection to discover, and prompt union to counteract, in their birth, all such projects of encroachment as powerful states will ever, when opportunity offers, be ready to form. By employing resident agents to procure speedy information, and by the weight of joint warnings and reclamations in every case of apprehended or of real injury, the balancing system furnishes the only peaceful means which human wisdom can devise to control the conduct of independent states; the only means which can be employed to guard against injustice, or obtain redress, without an actual appeal to the sword. It was the habitual employment of these expedients, with a view to guard against distant dangers, that distinguished the balancing system, as exemplified in modern Europe, from those momentary efforts and loose confederacies in which all nations, and even the rudest tribes, have occasionally united, in order to repel or pull down a powerful and common enemy.^[1. “The grand and distinguishing feature of the balancing system is the perpetual attention to foreign affairs which it inculcates; the constant watchfulness over every nation which it prescribes; the subjection in which it places all national passions and antipathies to the fine and delicate view of remote expediency; the unceasing care which it dictates, of nations most remotely situated, and apparently unconnected with ourselves; the general union Avhich it has effected of all the European powers obeying certain laws, and actuated in general by a common principle; in fine, the right of mutual inspection, universally recognized among civilized states in the rights of public envoys and residents.” (Brougham’s Colonial Policy, b. iii. sect. 1.) ] Without this habitual attention to foreign affairs, and constant application of the principles of counterpoise, there cannot, indeed, be said to exist any thing like a system of reciprocal guarantee of the independence of nations, such as is involved in the idea of a balance of power.

What particular alliances each state ought to form, with a view to maintain this balance, is a matter of circumstances, and must accordingly vary with them. The object of the system is always the same,—to preserve such a distribution of power amidst the varying relations of states, as shall most effectually check the spirit of encroachment, and confine every potentate to his own dominions.

In the preceding observations we have had it in view to give a general idea of the nature, intention, and means of maintaining a balance of power among a number of connected nations of different degrees of power and magnitude. But before proceeding to any remarks on the history and results of this branch of policy, we shall recapitulate, in the words of Μ. Gentz, those fundamental maxims which constitute the necessary conditions of the beneficial existence of such a system as we have described. These are,—

“That no one state in the common system must ever become so powerful as to be able to coerce all the rest put together ;—

“That, if the system is not merely to exist, but to be maintained, without constant perils and violent concussions, [7:4:310]every member which infringes it must be in a condition to be coerced, not only by the collective strength of the other members, but by any majority of them, if not by one individual ;—and,

“That if ever a state attempts, by unlawful enterprise, to attain, or does in fact attain, to a degree of power, which enables it to defy the danger of a union of several of its neighbours, or even of the whole, such a state should be treated as a common enemy; and if it has acquired that degree of force by an accidental concurrence of circumstances, without any acts of violence, whenever it appears upon the public theatre, no means which political wisdom can devise for the purpose of diminishing its power should be neglected or left untried.” (Fragments upon the Political Balance, c. 1.)

2. The knowledge of the ancients in regard to these great principles of national safety, and the period when they came to obtain a decided influence among the moderns, are points of considerable historical interest. Mr Hume has proved, in a very satisfactory manner, that the principle of preserving a balance of power is distinctly to be recognised in many of the great political transactions of the ancient world. The same thing had previously been shown by Kahle, a famous physician and professor, in a learned and able work, of which a French translation by Formey, entitled La Balance de l , Europe, was published at Berlin in 1744. The anxiety of the Greeks with regard to the principle of equilibrium among states was particularly manifested in that famous league against the rising power of Athens which produced the Peloponnesian war. Athens herself showed that she both knew and practised this policy, by constantly throwing her power into the lighter scale, when Thebes and Sparta came to contend for the mastery of Greece. Mr Hume also traces the influence of this salutary principle in the contests which arose among the successors of Alexander; their attention to it having “preserved distinct, for several ages, the partitions made after the death of that conqueror.” (Essays, vol. i.) The orations of Demosthenes frequently display very clear and extensive views in this branch of policy. In that for the Megalopolitans, in particular, “we may see,” according to Mr Hume, “the utmost refinements in the balance of power that ever entered into the head of a Venetian or English speculatist ;” and by a later writer this speech is also pointed out as “containing discussions of some of the most delicate parts of the theory.” (Brougham’s Colonial Policy, b. iii. sect. 1.) All who peruse this remarkable oration with due attention must indeed perceive that it fully bears out this character. Its reasonings may be analyzed into these leading doctrines of the balancing system: that it is the interest of every state to prevent the formation of a predominating power; that to this end the first encroachments ought to be promptly checked; and that it is necessary to join even a rival against a former friend, when that friend would otherwise infringe upon the balance.^[2. There is a passage of Polybius, vyhich has been frequently quoted as pointing out the leading aim of the balancing system in terms the most explicit. she historian, after mentioning that Hiero, king of Syracuse, acted wisely in assisting the Carthaginian in the war of the auxiliaries, adds, “Nunquam enim ejusmodi principia contemnere oportet, neque tanta cuiquam astruenda es potentia, ut cum eo postea de tuo quamvis manifesto jure disceptare ex aequo non queas.” (Lib. i. cap. 83.) ]

It seems, in short, to be no longer a question, that it was only with the phrase, and not the idea, of a balance of power, that the ancients were unacquainted. But we cannot agree with Mr Hume when he goes so far as to say that this principle, though it has been more generally known and acknowledged in modern times, has not had an authority much more extensive in practice, than it had among the nations of antiquity. (Essays, vol. i.) This opinion stands clearly refuted by all the great facts, and by the whole tenor of modern history, from the com√ mencement of the sixteenth century. It was the more constant operation of the principle in question which gradually formed the nations of Europe into one great republic or federal league, whose common bond of union was the guarantee which it afforded of their respective independence. But neither, on the other hand, can we agree with Mr Brougham, when he affirms that the. ancient states displayed nothing beyond a mere speculative knowledge in this department. ( Colonial Policy, b. iii. § 1.) It may be very true that those more enlarged ideas of foreign policy which Demosthenes disclosed in some of his orations were not generally understood or acted upon by his contemporaries; but it is nevertheless perfectly clear, from Mr Hume’s statements, the accuracy of which has never been called in question, that among the Grecian states the maxim of preserving a balance of power, though it had not produced any course of policy so regular and authoritative as the modern international system, was yet, on many occasions, the sole moving spring of their wars and alliances.

This maxim, indeed, lies so much within the sphere of common sense, that it can scarcely fail to be attended to, wherever there is a collection of states capable of observing and attacking each other. But circumstances may be more or less favourable to the growth of a consistent policy in this respect. In modern Europe, a number of considerable states were formed under such circumstances as tended peculiarly to promote a regular intercourse among them, and consequently to develope and systematize this great principle of national security. But it did not begin to manifest itself until, in the gradual and similar progress of European society, the power of the sovereigns of these states was so far consolidated as to enable them to give part of their attention to foreign affairs, and to maintain armies beyond their own frontiers. It was in Italy, where civilization was more advanced, and where there existed a number of small states and commonwealths whose safety required that their rulers should reciprocally keep watch on each other, that the modern system of interference took its beginnings. From an early period of the fifteenth century, we see the balance of power as constant an object of concern among these states as, in the next, it came to be throughout Europe. “Their jealousy of each other,” says Guicciardini, “made them watchful of every motion or measure which they conceived might any way increase the power of their neighbours;” and he presents a splendid picture of the beneficial effects, the long peace, and general independence, attendant upon this habitual attention to the balancing principle. (History of Italy, b. i.)

It was about the end of the same century that these ideas began to extend to other quarters, and to actuate the movements of greater potentates. There were now several princes possessed of large kingdoms, with powers and prerogatives which enabled them to take part in distant wars and negociations. The first great movement of an ambitious neighbour would naturally, therefore, excite their jealousy, and bring them into concert. Thus, when Charles VIII. of France, in 1494, invaded Italy and laid claim to Naples, the sovereigns of Germany and Spain saw the expediency of listening to the Italian princes, who suggested a confederacy to prevent France from gaining an accession of power which could not but render her a dangerous neighbour. Dr Robertson regards [7:4:311]The expedition of Charles as the first great exertion of those new powers with which the progress of society had invested the princes of Europe; and views the confederacy formed against him, as the first considerable extension of those ideas of a balance of power whose influence had hitherto been limited to the narrow sphere of Italian politics. “From this era,” he says, “we can trace the progress of that intercourse between nations which has finked the powers of Europe so closely together, and can discern the operations of that provident policy which, during peace, guards against remote and contingent dangers, and in war has prevented rapid and destructive conquests.” (View of the Progress of Society in Europe, § 2.) If we look only a little later, we shall everywhere see a constant jealousy of the increase of power, and a vigilant attention to all foreign operations, combined with the application of those means of safety which peculiarly distinguish the balancing system. “During that triumvirate of kings,” says Lord Bacon, in his usual expressive language, “Henry VIII. of England, Francis I. of France, and Charles V., Emperor, there was such a watch kept, that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by a war; and would not, in any wise, take up peace at interest.” {Essays on Empire.}

It has been objected to Dr Robertson that he has represented “the principle of the balance of power as a discovery made by the Italian politicians in consequence of this invasion of Charles; whereas it was not to any such single event that the balancing system owed either its origin or refinement, but to the progress of society, which placed the whole states of Europe in the same relative situation in which the states of Italy were at that period, and taught them not to wait for an actual invasion, but to see a Charles at all times in every prince or commonwealth that should manifest the least desire of change.” (Brougham’s Colonial Policy, b. iii. § 1.) What is here said as to the origin of the balancing system is no doubt true. We have already stated that the principle on which it rests is a principle of our common nature, which cannot fail to manifest itself in certain situations; but that nations must have arrived at an advanced stage of civilization and intercourse before it can be acted upon with consistency and concert. It would therefore be absurd to represent that system as taking its rise in any single event, or its principle as a discovery of some long-sighted statesman. But Dr Robertson knew human nature too well to seek the origin of this principle in an accidental occurrence; and he knew history too well to fix its origin “as a consequence” of Charles’s invasion. On the contrary, throughout the whole of his masterly chapter on the progress of the nations of Europe, with respect to the command of the national force requisite in foreign operations, he speaks of this system as holding progress with the growing improvement and intercourse of these nations; and, so far from representing the principle of the balance of power as a discovery consequent upon the event alluded to, he expressly speaks of the league against the French monarch as only exemplifying an extension of those ideas which had long been familiar to the Italian statesmen “in regulating the operations of the petty states in their own country.” ( View of the Progress of Society, § 2.)

Before concluding these very general remarks on the rise of the balancing system in modern times, we shall briefly advert to a conjecture of M. Villers upon this subject, which occurs in his able work on the Reformation. Long before the states of Europe became united in a general system, Italy and Germany, he observes, had formed partial sys* o ms, with a view to restrain the members within them, each by the other, and thus maintain a balance of power. It is possible, he adds, that the idea of the general balance of Europe may have been copied from these partial confederacies. {Essai sur ι Esprit et l’Iu. fluence de la Reformation, 2de partie.) This conjecture, if we rightly understand the learned author, appears to us exceedingly unphilosophical. The states of Europe embraced the idea of a balance of power in proportion as their circumstances enabled them to act upon it, and not in consequence of any estimate of its effects, as displayed on those earlier and narrower stages of its agency.

3. It appears, then, to have been about the beginning of the sixteenth century that the principle of maintaining a balance of power came to be generally recognised and acted upon by the states of Europe; “at first,” as Μ. Gentz says, “more in a practical way, and, as it were, from political instinct, but afterwards with clear, reflecting, and methodical constancy.” {Fragments.} What the advantages were which Europe reaped from this course of policy we shall endeavour to show, after we have adverted to certain arguments generally employed by those who wish to give an unfavourable view of the balancing system.

By some this system is represented as productive only of wars; as but a convenient pretext to cover projects of ambition, or to screen the restless movements of national jealousy. Others talk of it as being merely a brilliant conception, and appeal to the many violences and usurpations which modern history records, as proofs, if not of its nonentity, at least of its inefficacy. But there is surely no great respect due to that sort of estimate of the system which is founded solely on the abuses to which it is liable, or upon imperfections from which no human institution is free. They who decry or who ridicule the balancing system should be prepared to show, not that it has sometimes afforded plausible pretexts for unnecessary-wars, or has sometimes failed to protect the weak against the outrages of the strong, but that it is wholly useless to interest ourselves in the safety of neighbouring nations; to take any trouble to avert dangers which are yet distant; or to seek to strengthen ourselves against a powerful enemy with any strength not our own. This view of things, were it to prevail, would, as Μ. Gentz observes, open the most desirable prospects to every sovereign whose power and ambition might prompt him to aspire to universal domination.

It must, we think, appear obvious to every one who reflects upon the subject, that the balancing system is, upon the whole, favourable to peace. The wars which peculiarly belong to it are in the nature of a sacrifice of a smaller present, to secure a greater future good; and the tendency of the system is to render these wars -less and less frequent. The evil passions which give rise to ambitious attacks, like all other evil passions, will be more apt to be indulged the less exposed they are to opposition or restraint. And it cannot be questioned that, in proportion as the maxims of this system are vigilantly and steadily pursued, there will be less inducement, because less prospect of success, for ambitious undertakings.

Its object is to alarm, and to arm all against the prince whose power prompts him to transgress upon others; and the prince who knows that all his motions are keenly watched, and that his first successes would only expose him to a more extended contest, must see how hopeless would be any attempt to possess himself of the territories even of the weakest of his neighbours. Such is the general tendency of the system; and however it may have occasionally failed to prevent outrages, it cannot be doubted that it has proved a formidable barrier against conquest, and a rampart of defence to the weaker states.
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l The complaint of a certain class of French politicians, alluded to by Mr Burke in his Letters on a Regicide Peace·, “that Rome had frequently acquired more territory in a single year, than all the power of France, actuated by all her ambition, had enabled her to acquire in two centuries, forms, in fact, though unintended, one of the finest panegyrics that could have been pronounced upon the salutary influence of the modern system. The advocates of that system can, indeed, appeal to history for the most satisfactory of all proofs of its efficacy, in the remarkable fact, that, for a period of nearly three centuries, no European state, however small, has lost its independence from external violence. When we recollect the number of small states which, during so long a period, enjoyed an independent existence in the immediate neighbourhood of powerful nations, and reflect for a moment on those evil passions which have, in all ages, prompted the strong to prey on the weak; we must admit that, but for that salutary jealousy of power, and united resistance to its encroachments, which it was the object and office of this system to nourish and enforce, these otherwise helpless states would have been speedily absorbed, or their independence annihilated, by the mighty masses with which they were in contact. It was not the preservation of such countries as Portugal or Holland, of Sweden or Denmark, which, though small compared with many others in the system, were yet possessed of considerable means of self-defence; —it was not the preservation of such states as these merely, but of a multitude of feeble communities in Germany, in Switzerland, and Italy, which affords the proudest proof of the salutary influence of the balancing system on the fortunes of modern Europe. “Consider, for instance,” to use the impressive words of a distinguished writer and orator, “the situation of the republic of Geneva; think of her defenceless position in the very jaws of France; but think also of her undisturbed security, of her profound quiet, of the brilliant success with which she applied to industry and literature, while Lewis XIV. was pouring his myriads into Italy before her gates; call to mind that happy period when we scarcely dreamt more of the subjugation of the feeblest republic of Europe, than of the conquest of her mightiest empire; and say whether any spectacle can be imagined more beautiful to the moral eye, or which affords a more striking proof of progress in the noblest principles of true civilization.” . (Mackintosh’s Speech on the Trial of John Peltier, in 1803.)^[3. We shall here add a striking passage in reference to our subject from this celebrated oration. “These small states were, in many respects, one of the most interesting parts of the ancient system of Europe. Unfortunately for the repose of mankind, great states are compelled, by regard to their own safety, to consider the military spirit and martial habits of their people as one of the main objects of their policy, řrequent hostilities seem almost the necessary condition of their greatness; and, without being great, they cannot long remain safe. Smaller states, exempted from this cruel necessity—a hard condition of greatness, a bitter satire on human nature—devoted themselves to the arts of peace, to the cultivation of literature, and the improvement of reason. They became places of refuge for free and fearless discussion; they were the impartial spectators and judges of the various contests of ambition which from time to time disturbed the quiet of the world. They thus became peculiarly qualified to be the organs of that public opinion which converted Europe into a great republic, with laws which mitigated, though they could not extinguish, ambition; and with moral tribunals to which even the most despotic sovereigns were amenable. If wars of aggrandizement were undertaken, their authors were arraigned in the face of Europe. Iŕ acts of internal tyranny were perpetrated, they resounded from a thousand presses throughout all civilized countries. Princes on whose will there were no legal checks thus found a moral restraint which the most powerful of them could not brave with absolute impunity. They acted before a vast audience, to whose applause they could not be utterly indifferent. The very constitution of human nature, the unalterable laws of the mind of man, against which all rebellion is ruιtless, subjected the proudest tyrants to this control. No elevation of power,—no depravity, however consummate, no innocence, however spotless,—can render man wholly independent of the praise or blame of his fellow-men.” ]

Such were the results of the system founded on the balance of power. It was a bridle upon the strong and a bulwark to the weak. When it failed to prevent the in roads of violence and injustice, it yet acted as a restorative principle, and replaced injured nations in their former state of independence. It was at the memorable and fatal era of the partition of Poland in 1772 that it first lost this character; that the first example was set of a deliberate, successful, unchecked conspiracy against the independent existence of an unoffending country. It is here proper to mention, that some authors have spoken of this infamous transaction in terms which seem to imply that it was quite in consonance with the principles of the balancing system.^[4. See, for example, the terms in which Count Hertzberg speaks of the partition, in his essay, Sur la Balance du Commerce et celle du l’ouvmr. (Oeuvres, tome ι.) The language of Μ. Gentz upon this subject, in his able work, Ή Etat de l’Europe avant et après la Révolution Françoise, is extremely exceptionable; but in his later work, referred to in this article, he condemns the partition as wholly inconsistent with, and as having in fact led to the subversion of, the balancing system. ] It is indeed true, that the maxims of that system were still so far operative as to effect a relative equality in the division of the spoil. But as the whole intention of this system is to maintain the integrity and independence of nations against unlawful attacks, the partition was just as diametrically opposite to its principle, as if the whole spoil had been appropriated by one robber, instead of being shared by three. The equality of the division did not take away from the danger of the example; the example of states combining, not to uphold, but to destroy,—not to enforce respect to the great principles of national safety, but to set them at defiance; an example too soon followed by similar violences, and which, in fact, paved the way for that total overthrow of the ancient system of Europe which ere long took place.

The origin of a project so pernicious in its consequences is a matter of some interest in the history of the balancing system. We learn from Rulhière’s Histoire de l’Anarchie de Pologne, published in 1807, that the distractions of this country had suggested the project of a partition as early as 1658; that a Swedish minister, named Stippen-bach, proposed it to his own court, to Austria, and the grand duke of Prussia, whose armies were then in possession of the country; and that it would, in all probability, have been acted upon but for the discovery of the scheme by France, and the consequent interference of that power.^[5. “J’ai retrouvé,” says Μ. Rulhière, “dans les archives des affaires étrangères de France, cette anecdote importante, et jusqu’à présent ignorée.” (Tom. ι. p. 9.) t’ ’ j ] With regard to the project actually carried into execution in 1772, each party concerned was desirous to shift the blame of the first proposal on the others; but it was generally believed to have originated with Frederick, though some were of opinion that he was indebted for the idea to his brother, Prince Henry. Frederick, however, in one of his posthumous pieces (^Mémoires de 1763 jusqiia 1775), states that the scheme was devised by the empress Catharine; and this is corroborated by M. Rulhière, who asserts that she communicated it to Prince Henry during his visit to St Petersburg in 1770; a piece of information, he adds, which was detailed to him in the most circumstantial manner, by three different secretaries, who [7:4:313]accompanied the prince to the Russian court. (Tome iv. n. 151-210.) It seems to be generally acknowledged, that the proposal, when first made to the cabinet of Vienna, was opposed by that power; and that her accession would not have been obtained but for the astonishing apathy displayed by France, and, indeed, by all the other states of Europe. The silence of England during the aerpetration of this shameless plot against the independence of nations, if it can be accounted for, can never, at any rate, be excused; inasmuch as the fact appears pretty well established, that, had she, as the guardian of the political balance, raised her voice against the partition, Europe might have been saved from the fatal effects of that new system of robbery and oppression which the spoilers of Poland w ere suffered, without any sort of interruption, to exemplify. “To my certain knowledge,” says Mr Burke, “if Great Britain had at that time been willing to concur in preventing the execution of a project so dangerous in the example, even exhausted as France then was by the preceding war, and under a lazy and unenterprizing prince, she would have at every risk taken an active part in this business.” (Thoughts on French Affairs in 1791.) ’ 4. We have still to allude to the question, whether Britain, protected as she is on all sides by nature, ought to consider it as a necessary part of her policy to attend to the European balance of power? This has been considered as constituting a separate question, by some who make no doubt that the other states of Europe could not long preserve their independence secure by any other course. Taking the question generally, we do not think there is any great difficulty in regard to it. With the multitude, to be sure, it always will be popular to argue, that Britain stands in need of no other defence than what the seas and her invincible navy afford her, and that all continental connections are useless or pernicious. But the argument from the advantages of our insular situation would not in fact bear out this conclusion, even were the seas and the navy a stronger defence than it is possible they can always be. Our commerce and our colonies, the supports of that navy, render it indispensably necessary that we should more particularly observe some nations, and ally ourselves with others. Those great concerns make it, indeed, nothing less than absurd to talk of our being insulated as an empire or state, because Britain is an island. And, with regard to invasion, it is clear that we could not always be as secure and as free from uneasy apprehensions, in a state of total insulation from foreign connections, as with friends and confederates to employ or oppose a formidable enemy on his own confines.

But supposing the balance of power to constitute a great national object, the line of conduct which that object imposes upon us may, no doubt, be affected by our insular situation. We may on some occasions allow other nations who are more exposed to danger, and who ought, on that account, to be more on the alert to prevent encroachments, to take the first measures, and bear the first expense of resistance. We may watch and warn, and use the influence of our remonstrances and our counsels, without having recourse, except in urgent cases, to the extremity of arms.^[6. "Other nations must watch over every motion of their neighbours; penetrate, if they can, every design; foresee every minute event; and take part, by some engagement or other, in almost every conjecture that arises. But as we cannot be easily nor suddenly attacked, it may be our interest to watch the secret workings of the several councils abroad; to advise and warn; to abet and oppose; but it never can be our true interest easily and officiously to enter into action, much less into engagements that imply action and expense.” (Bolingbroke’s Idea of a Patriot King.) ] It is only, in a word, as to the application of the general principle, and not as to its being necessary and worthy to be entertained, that there seems any fair room for difference of opinion among British statesmen. In point of fact, all our later statesmen, however differing in other respects, have distinctly assented to the general doctrine, that the balance of power was an interest of the highest importance to England. The last time, we believe, that this question can be said to have been fairly brought into debate, and fully discussed in Parliament, was on occasion of the famous armament against Russia for refusing to restore Oczakov to the Porte; and on that occasion, though Mr Fox and his followers reprobated the armament in the strongest terms, they did so, not because they denied the great principle to which the minister appealed, as the sole justification of the measuré, that the balance of power was a British concern, and gave Britain an undoubted interest to mingle in the affairs of the continent,—not because they thought that Britain ought never to guard against any distant danger,—but because there was no such degree of danger from the retention of that city and its district, as called upon this country to interfere at the risk of a war.^[7. Earl Grey, the only survivor of that illustrious group of orators and statesmen who opposed the armament, repeatedly and forcibly declared his adherence to the general doctrine; affirming, that though the epithets wild and romantic had sometimes been applied to it, he nevertheless considered the poorest peasant in England as interested in the preservation of the balance of power; and that this country ought to interfere whenever that balance appeared to be really in danger. Of all those who joined in this opposition, Mr Burke was the only statesman who did so upon a ground, as it appears to us, equally erroneous in fact and principle, namely, that Turkey never had been, nor ought to be, taken into consideration, in any question as to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. (See Delates in the House of Commons, 29th March and 12th April 1791, and 29th February and 1st March 1792.) ] Balance of Trade. See Political Economy.