PROPERTY, in a general sense, is a particular virtue or quality which nature has bestowed upon some things exclusive of all others. Thus, colour is a property of light; extension, figure, divisibility, and impenetrability, are properties of body.

Property, in Law, is described to be the highest right which a person has or can have to any thing.

There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over certain external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. And yet there are very few that will give themselves the trouble to consider the origin and foundation of this right. Pleased as we are with the possession, we seem afraid to look back to die means by which it was acquired, as if suspicious of some defect in our title; or at best we rest satisfied with the decision of the [7:18:660]laws in our favour, without examining the reason or authority upon which those laws have been built. We think it enough that our title is derived from the grant of the former proprietor, by descent from our ancestors, or by the last will and testament of the dying owner, not caring to reflect, that, strictly and accurately speaking, there is no foundation in nature or in natural law why a set of words upon parchment should convey the dominion of land; why the son should have a right to exclude his fellow-creatures from a determinate spot of ground, because his father had done so before him; or why the occupier of a particular field or of a jewel, when lying upon his death-bed, and no longer able to maintain possession, should be entitled to tell the rest of the world which of them should enjoy it after him. These inquiries, it must be owned, would be useless, and even troublesome, in common life. It is well if the mass of mankind obey the laws when made, without scrutinizing too nicely into the reasons of making them. But when law is to be considered not only as a matter of practice, but also as a rational science, it cannot be improper or useless to examine more deeply the rudiments and grounds of these positive constitutions of society.

In the beginning of the world, we are informed by Holy Writ, that the all-bountiful Creator gave to man dominion over all the earth; “over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.” This is the only true and solid foundation of man’s dominion over external things, whatever airy metaphysical notions may have been started by fanciful writers upon this subject. The earth, therefore, and all things therein, are the general property of all mankind, exclusive of other beings, from the immediate gift of the Creator. And, whilst the earth continued thinly inhabited, it is reasonable to suppose that all was in common amongst them, and that every one took from the public stock to his own use such things as his immediate necessities required.

These general notions of property were then sufficient to answer all the purposes of human life, and might perhaps still have answered them, had it been possible for mankind to have remained in a state of primeval simplicity; as may be collected from the manners of many American nations, when first discovered by the Europeans, and from the ancient method of living amongst the first Europeans themselves, if we may credit either the memorials of them preserved in the golden age of the poets, or the uniform accounts given by historians of those times wherein erant omnia communia et indivisa omnibus, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium esset. Not that this communion of goods seems ever to have been applicable, even in the earliest ages, to aught but the substance of the thing; nor could it be extended to the use of it. For, by the law of nature and reason, he who first began to use it acquired therein a kind of transient property, that lasted as Jong as he was using it, and no longer; or, to speak with greater precision, the right of possession continued for the same time only that the act of possession lasted. Thus the ground was in common, and no part of it was the permanent property of any man in particular; yet whoever was in the occupation of any determinate spot of it, for rest, for shade, or the like, acquired for the time a sort of ownership, from which it would have been unjust, and contrary to the law of nature, to drive him by force; but the instant that he quitted the use or occupation of it, another might seize it without injustice. Thus also a vine or other tree might be said to be in common, as all were equally entitled to its produce; and yet any private individual might gain the sole property of the fruit which he had gathered for his own repast: a doctrine well illustrated by Cicero, who compares the world to a great theatre, which is common to the public, and yet the place which any man has taken is for the time his own.

But when mankind increased in number, craft, and ambition, it became necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion, and to appropriate to individuals, not the immediate use only, but the very substance of the thing to be used; otherwise innumerable tumults must have arisen, and the good order of the world been continually broken and disturbed, whilst a variety of persons were striving who should get the first occupation of the same thing, or disputing which of them had actually gained it. As human life also grew more and more refined, abundance of conveniencies were devised to render it more easy, commodious, and agreeable; such as habitations for shelter and safety, and raiment for warmth and decency. But no man would be at the trouble to provide either, as long as he had only an usufructuary property in them, which was to cease the instant that he quitted possession; if, as soon as he walked out of his tent, or pulled off his garment, the next stranger who came by would have a right to inhabit the one and to wear the other. In the case of habitations in particular, it was natural to observe, that even the brute creation, to whom everything else was in common, maintained a permanent property in their dwellings, especially for the protection of their young; that the birds of the air had nests, and the beasts of the field had caverns, the invasion of which they esteemed a very flagrant injustice, and would sacrifice their lives to preserve them. Hence a property was soon established in every man’s house and home-stall; which seem to have been originally mere temporary huts or moveable cabins, suited to the design of Providence for more speedily peopling the earth, and suited to the wandering life of their owners, before any extensive property in the soil or ground was established. And there can be no doubt, but that moveables of every kind became sooner appropriated than the permanent substantial soil; partly because they were more susceptible of a long occupancy, which might be continued for months together without any sensible interruption, and at length by usage ripen into an established right; but principally because few of them could be fit for use, till improved and meliorated by the bodily labour of the occupant, which, bestowed upon any subject that before lay in common to all men, is universally allowed to give the fairest and most reasonable title to an exclusive property therein.

The article of food was a more immediate call, and therefore a more early consideration. Such as were not contented with the spontaneous product of the earth sought for a more solid refreshment in the flesh of beasts, which they obtained by hunting. But the frequent disappointments incident to that method of provision induced them to gather together such animals as were of a more tame and sequacious nature, and to establish a permanent property in their flocks and herds, in order to sustain themselves in a less precarious manner, partly by the milk of their dams, and partly by the flesh of the young. The support of these their cattle made the article of water also a very important point. And therefore the book of Genesis, the most venerable monument of antiquity, considered merely with a view to history, will furnish us with frequent instances of violent contentions concerning wells; the exclusive property of which appears to have been established in the first digger or occupant, even in places where the ground and the herbage remained yet in common. Thus we find Abraham, who was but a sojourner, asserting his right to a well in the country of Abimelech, and even exacting an oath for his security, “because he had digged that well.” And Isaac, about ninety years afterwards, reclaimed this his father’s property, and, after much contention with the Philistines, was suffered to enjoy it in peace.

All this while the soil and pasture of the earth remained still in common as before, and open to every occupant; except perhaps in the neighbourhood of towns, where the necessity of a sole and exclusive property in lands, for the [7:18:661]sake of agriculture, was earlier felt, and therefore more readily complied with. Otherwise, when the multitude of men and cattle had consumed every convenience upon one spot of ground, it was deemed a natural right to seize upon and occupy such other lands as would more easily supply their necessities. This practice is still retained amongst the wild and uncultivated nations that have never been formed into civil states, like the Tartars and others in the East; where the climate itself, and the boundless extent of their territory, conspire to retain them still in the same savage state of vagrant liberty, which was universal in the earliest ages, and which Tacitus informs us continued amongst the Germans till the decline of the Roman empire. We have also a striking example of the same kind in the history of Abraham and his nephew Lot. When their joint substance became so great, that pasture and other conveniencies grew scarce, the natural consequence was, that a strife arose between their servants; so that it was no longer practicable to dwell together. This contention Abraham endeavoured to compose: “Let there be no strife, I pray thee, between thee and me. Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thyself, I pray thee, from me: if thou wilt take the left hand, then I will go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then I will go to the left.” This plainly implies an acknowledged right, in either, to occupy whatever ground he pleased, that was not pre-occupied by other tribes. “And Lot lifted up his eyes, and beheld all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered everywhere, even as the garden of the Lord. Then Lot chose him all the plain of Jordan, and journeyed east; and Abraham dwelt in the land of Canaan.”

Upon the same principle was founded the right of migration, or sending colonies to find out new habitations, when the mother-country was overcharged with inhabitants; which was practised as well by the Phoenicians and Greeks, as by the Germans, Scythians, and other northern people. And, as long as it was confined to the stocking and cultivation of desert uninhabited countries, it kept strictly within the limits of the law of nature.

But as the world by degrees grew more populous, it daily became more difficult to find out new spots to inhabit, without encroaching upon former occupants; and by constantly occupying the same individual spot, the fruits of the earth were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, without any provision for a future supply or succession. It therefore became necessary to pursue some regular method of providing a constant subsistence; and this necessity produced, or at least promoted and encouraged, the art of agriculture. And the art of agriculture, by a regular connection and consequence, introduced and established the idea of a more permanent property in the soil than had hitherto been received and adopted. It was evident that the earth would not produce her fruits in sufficient quantities without the assistance of tillage; but who would be at the pains of tilling it, if another might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art, and labour? Had not therefore a separate property in lands, as well as moveables, been vested in some individuals, the world must have continued a forest, and men have been mere animals of prey; which, according to some philosophers, is the genuine state of nature. Whereas now, so graciously has Providence interwoven our duty and our happiness together, the result of this very necessity has been the ennobling of the human species, by giving it opportunities of improving its rational faculties, as well as of exerting its natural. Necessity begat property; and in order to insure that property, recourse was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable concomitants; states, governments, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of religious duties. Thus connected together, it was found that a part only of society was sufficient to provide, by their manual labour, for the necessary subsistence of all; and leisure was given to others to cultivate the human mind, to invent useful arts, and to lay the foundation of science.

The only question remaining is, How this property became actually vested, or what it is that gave a man an exclusive right to retain in a permanent manner that specific land which before belonged generally to every body, and particularly to nobody? And, as we before observed that occupancy gave the right to the temporary use of the soil, so it is agreed upon all hands, that occupancy gave also the original right to the permanent property in the substance of the earth itself, which excludes every one else but the owner from the use of it. There is indeed some difference amongst the writers on natural law, concerning the reason why occupancy should convey this right, and invest one with this absolute property: Grotius and Puftendorf insisting that this right of occupancy is founded upon a tacit and implied assent of all mankind, that the first occupant should become the owner; and Barbeyrac, Titius, Locke, and others, holding that there is no such implied assent, neither is it necessary that there should be, as the very act of occupancy alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to found a title. The dispute, however, savours too much of nice and scholastic refinement. But both sides agree in this, that occupancy is the thing by which the title was in fact originally acquired; every man seizing to his own continued use such spots of ground as he found most agreeable to his own convenience, provided he found them unoccupied by any one else.

Property, both in lands and moveables, being thus originally acquired by the first taker, which taking amounts to a declaration that he intends to appropriate the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principle of universal law, till such time as he does some other act which shows an intention to abandon it; for then it becomes, naturally speaking, publici juris once more, and is liable to be again appropriated by the next occupant. So if one is possessed of a jewel, and easts it into the sea or a public highway, this is such an express dereliction, that a property will be vested in the first fortunate finder who shall seize it to his own use. But if he hides it privately in the earth, or other secret place, and it is discovered, the finder acquires no property therein; for the owner had not by this act declared any intention to abandon it, but rather the contrary; and if he loses or drops it by accident, it cannot be collected from thence that he designed to quit the possession; wherefore in such eases the property still remains in the loser, who may claim it again of the finder. And this, we may remember, is the doctrine of the English law with relation to treasure-trove.

But this method of one man’s abandoning his property, and another seizing the , vacant possession, however well founded in theory, could not long subsist in fact. It was calculated merely for the rudiments of civil society, and necessarily ceased amongst the complicated interests and artificial refinements of polite and established governments. In these it was found, that what became inconvenient or useless to one man, was highly convenient and useful to another, who was ready to give in exchange for it some equivalent that was equally desirable to the former proprietor. This mutual convenience introduced commercial traffic, and the reciprocal transfer of property by sale, grant, or conveyance; which may be considered either as a continuance of the original possession which the first occupant had, or as an abandoning of the thing by the present owner, and an immediate successive occupancy of the same by the new proprietor. The voluntary dereliction of the owner, and delivering the possession to another individual, amount to a transfer of the property; the proprietor declaring his intention no longer to occupy the thing himselfi but that his [7:18:662]own right of occupancy shall be vested in the new acquirer. Or, taken in the other light, if I agree to part with an acre of my land to Titius, the deed of conveyance is an evidence of my intending to abandon the property; and Titius, being the only or first man acquainted with such my intention, immediately steps in and seizes the vacant possession. Thus the consent expressed by the conveyance gives Titius a good right against me, and possession or occupancy confirms that right against all the world besides.

The most universal and effectual way of abandoning property is by the death of the occupant, when, both the actual possession and intention of keeping possession ceasing, the property, which is founded upon such possession and intention, ought also to cease of course. For, naturally speaking, the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have any dominion; otherwise, if he had a right to dispose of his acquisitions one moment beyond his life, he would also have a right to direct their disposal for a million of ages after him, which would be highly absurd and inconvenient. All property must therefore cease upon death, considering men as absolute individuals, and unconnected with civil society; for then, by the principles before established, the next immediate occupant would acquire a right in all that the deceased possessed. But as, under civilized governments, which are calculated for the peace of mankind, such a constitution would be productive of endless disturbances, the universal law of almost every nation, which is a kind of secondary law of nature, has either given the dying person a power of continuing his property, by disposing of his possessions by will; or, in case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any disposition at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and declares who shall be the successor, representative, or heir of the deceased; that is, who alone shall have a right to enter upon this vacant possession, in order to avoid that confusion which its becoming common again would occasion. And farther, in case no testament be permitted by the law, or none be made, and no heir can be found so qualified as the law requires, still, to prevent the robust title of occupancy from again taking place, the doctrine of escheats is adopted in almost every country, whereby the sovereign of the state, and those who claim under his authority, are the ultimate heirs, and succeed to those inheritances to which no other title can be formed.

The right of inheritance, or descent to the children and relations of the deceased, seems to have been allowed much earlier than the right of devising by testament. We arc apt to conceive at the first view that it has nature on its side; yet we often mistake for nature what we find established by long and inveterate custom. It is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly a political, establishment; since the permanent right of property, vested in the ancestor himself, was not a natural, but merely a civil, right. It is true, that the transmission of one’s possessions to posterity has an evident tendency to make a man a good citizen and a useful member of society: it sets the passions on the side of duty, and prompts a man to deserve well of the public, when he is sure that the reward of his services will not die with himself, but be transmitted to those with whom he is connected by the dearest and most tender affections. Yet, reasonable as this foundation of the right of inheritance may seem, it is probable that its immediate origin arose not from speculations altogether so delicate and refined, but, if not from fortuitous circumstances, at least from a plainer and more simple principle. A man’s children or nearest relations are usually about him on his death-bed, and are the earliest witnesses of his decease. They became therefore generally the next immediate occupants, till at length in process of time this frequent usage ripened into general law. And therefore also in the earliest ages, on the failure of children, a man’s servants born under his roof were allowed to be his heirs, being immediately on the spot when he died. For we find the patriarch Abraham expressly declaring, that “since God had given him no seed, his steward Eliczer, one born in his house, was his heir.”

Whilst property continued only for life, testaments were useless and unknown; and when it became inheritable, the inheritance was long indefeasible, and the children or heirs at law were incapable of exclusion by will; until at length it was found, that so strict a rule of inheritance made heirs disobedient and headstrong, defrauded creditors of their just debts, and prevented many provident fathers from dividing or charging their estates as the exigencies of their families required. This introduced pretty generally the right of disposing of one’s property, or a part of it, by testament; that is, by written or oral instructions properly witnessed and authenticated, according to the pleasure of the deceased, which we therefore emphatically style his will. This was established in some countries much later than in others. In England, till modern times, a man could only dispose of one third of his moveables from his wife and children; and in general, no will was permitted of lands till the reign of Henry VIII. and then only of a certain portion; for it was not till after the Restoration that the power of devising real property became so universal as at present.

Wills, therefore, and testaments, rights of inheritance, and successions, are all of them creatures of the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are in all respects regulated by them; every distinct country having different ceremonies and requisites to make a testament completely valid. Neither does any thing vary more than the right of inheritance under different national establishments. In England particularly, this diversity is carried to such a length, as if it had been meant to point out the power of the laws in regulating the succession to property, and how futile every claim must be that has not its foundation in the positive rules of the state. In personal estates, the father may succeed to his children; in landed property, he never ’ can be their immediate heir by any the remotest possibility. In general, only the eldest son, in some places only the youngest, in others all the sons together, have a right to succeed to the inheritance. In real estates, males are preferred to females, and the eldest male will usually exclude the rest; in the division of personal estates, the females of equal degree are admitted together with the males, and no right of primogeniture is allowed.

This one consideration may help to remove the scruples of many well-meaning persons, who set up a mistaken conscience in opposition to the rules of law. If a man disinherits his son, by a will duly executed, and leaves his estate to a stranger, there are many who consider this proceeding as contrary to natural justice; whilst others so scrupulously adhere to the supposed intention of the deed, that if a will of lands be attested by only two witnesses instead of three, which the law requires, they are apt to imagine that the heir is bound in conscience to relinquish his title to the devisee. But both of them certainly proceed upon very erroneous principles: as if, on the one hand, this son had by nature a right to succeed to his father’s lands; or as if, on the other, the owner was by nature entitled to direct the succession of his property after his own decease; whereas the law of nature suggests, that on the death of the possessor, the estate should again become common, and be open to the next occupant, unless otherwise ordered, for the sake of civil peace, by the positive law of society. The positive law of society, which is with us the municipal laws of England and Scotland, directs it to vest in such person as the last proprietor shall by will, attended with certain requisites, appoint; and, in defect of such appointment, to go to some particular person, who, from the result of certain local constitutions, appears to be [7:18:663]the heir at law. Hence it follows that, where the appointment is regularly made, there cannot be a shadow of right in any one but the person appointed; and, where the necessary requisites are omitted, the right of the heir is equally strong, and built upon as solid a foundation as the right of the devisee would have been supposing such requisites were observed.

But, after all, there are some few things which, notwithstanding the general introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably remain in common, being those in which nothing but an usufructuary property is capable of being had; and therefore they still belong to the first occupant, during the time he holds possession of them, and no longer. Such, amongst others, are the elements of light, air, and water, which a man may occupy by means of his windows, his gardens, his mills, and other conveniencies; such also are the generality of those animals which are said to be ferae naturae, or of a wild and untameable disposition, and which any man may seize upon and keep for his own use or pleasure. All these things, as long as they remain in possession, every man has a right to enjoy without disturbance; but if once they escape from his custody, or he voluntarily abandons the use of them, they return to the common stock, and any other man has an equal right to seize and enjoy them afterwards.

Again, there are other things in which a permanent property may subsist, not only as to the temporary use, but also the solid substance; and which yet would frequently be found without a proprietor, had not the wisdom of the law provided a remedy to obviate this inconvenience. Such are forests and other waste grounds, which were omitted to be appropriated in the general distribution of lands: such also are wrecks, estrays, and that species of wild animals which the arbitrary constitutions of positive law have distinguished from the rest by the well-known appellation of game. With regard to these and some others, as disturbances and quarrels would frequently arise amongst individuals contending about the acquisition of this species of property by first occupancy, the law has therefore wisely cut up the root of dissension, by vesting the things themselves in the sovereign of the state, or else in his representatives appointed and authorized by him, being usually the lords of manors. And thus our legislature has universally promoted the grand ends of civil society, the peace and security of individuals, by steadily pursuing that wise ‘and orderly maxim, of assigning to everything capable of ownership a legal and determinate owner.

Literary Property. See Copy-Right.