MOORE, Sir John, a consummate British general, a fearless soldier, and an accomplished gentleman, was born at Glasgow, on the 13th of November 1761. He was a son of Dr Moore, the author of Zeluco and other works just mentioned, and received the principal part of his education on the Continent, whilst his father attended the Duke of Hamilton in his travels. Of his early years the meagre biography of his brother has supplied us with few particulars, excepting that he was “really a pretty youth,” and, in the true spirit of his country, quarrelled with French boys of his own age. In 1776, the Duke of Hamilton procured him an ensigncy in the 51st regiment, then quartered in Minorca; and he afterwards obtained a lieutenancy in the 82d, with which he served in America until 1783, when he was reduced with his regiment. By the interest of the Duke of Hamilton, he was subsequently brought into parliament for the Lanark district of burghs, which he for a short time represented. In 1787 or 1788, he obtained the rank of major in the fourth battalion of the 60th regiment, then quartered at Chatham, but afterwards negociated an exchange into the 51st. In 1790, he succeeded by purchase to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the same regiment, which, the following year, he accompanied to Gibraltar. After some other movements, he was sent to Corsica, where, owing to a misunderstanding between the military and naval commanders, General d’Aubant resigned the command to him under the most critical circumstances; and here, though still a young officer, and without parliamentary friends, he was called to fight the battles of the army against a domineering old admiral, Hood, who possessed great influence at home, and who had shown himself capable of the most outrageous violence, not unaccompanied with subtlety. By dint of firmness, however, he succeeded in controlling this daring, obstinate, clever, headstrong man; and was at length relieved from the difficult and embarrassing situation in which he had been placed, by the arrival of Sir Charles Stuart, who having assumed the command of the army in 1794, appointed Moore to command the reserve. At the siege of Calvi, which followed, the latter particularly distinguished himself, and received his first wound in storming the Mozzello fort. He gave his opinion against besieging Bastia, which afterwards surrendered after a very feeble defence, though the place was strong and the garrison numerous; but this, as a military judgment before the event, was nevertheless sound and just, for Moore never could have anticipated that General Gentili would neglect to avail himself of the means in his power, “because he wished to do his duty and no more,” and had property in England.

Sir Charles Stuart having been recalled, in consequence of a disagreement with the viceroy, Colonel Moore returned to England in 1795, and being immediately appointed a brigadier-general in the W r est Indies, he was attached to a brigade of foreign troops, consisting of ChoiseuΓs hussars, and two corps of emigrants. On the 25th of February 1796, he received orders to take charge of and embark with Perryn’s brigade, destined to join the expedition to the West Indies under Sir Ralph Abercromby; and having hurried to Portsmouth, where he had scarcely time to prepare a few necessaries, he sailed for the West Indies at daylight on the 28th, with no other baggage than a small portmanteau. He arrived at Barbadoes on the 13th of April 1796, and there waited on the commander-in-chief, who had preceded him in the Vengeance line-of-battle ship. That calm and sagacious observer soon appreciated his merit, and in the operations against St Lucia, which immediately followed, employed him in every arduous and difficult service. During the siege of Morne Fortunée, his conduct, as expressed in general orders, was the admiration of the whole army; and, after the capitulation, he was appointed to the government of the island, notwithstanding he had earnestly requested permission to accompany the commander-in-chief [7:15:451]and the troops in the reduction of the other islands. In this situation, beset with all manner of difficulties, his conduct was not less admirable than in the field, and, temperingjustice with humanity, the severity of military examples with a due consideration of the circumstances which palliated the conduct of the negroes and republicans, he subdued discontent, restored order, and re-established security. He abhorred the cruelty of punishment, and deplored the necessity of it; but whilst he inflicted it reluctantly, he did ample justice to the heroic qualities of the misguided people, whom oppression had rendered desperate. He warred against them, and punished their crimes, but he admired their courage, and he despised, reproached, and restrained the whites, whose tyranny had first sown in the hearts of the unfortunate negroes the seeds of that ferocity which it was his painful duty to repress. From certain published extracts of ajournai kept by him, it appears that he had the very worst opinion of the emigrants and proprietors of slaves, whom he speaks of with contempt and indignation; that he deplored the condition of the blacks, and threatened the emigrants with punishment for casting reflections on the submissive republicans; that he checked them for their ill treatment of the negroes, and repeatedly assured the people that royalist or republican would be neither a merit nor a demerit with him; and that he suspected the slave proprietors of wishing for detachments of troops to enable them to tyrannize over the negroes, a system he abhorred and never would sanction. “Why,” he exclaimed, “is a man to be treated harshly because he is not white? All men are entitled to justice; and from me they shall have it, whether they be white, black, royalist, or republican.” This noble language was not agreeable to the emigrants; but he had no preference for them, and wished to curb their insolence, because, instead of profiting by their misfortunes, they had only whetted their prejudices, and thirsted to gratify their revenge, by oppressing their fellow-creatures. Nor was he at all surprised that so many of the blacks should have hailed the opportunity of gaining their freedom. With the observant and humane spirit which so peculiarly distinguished him, he remarked, “that the West Indies was the only country in the world where industry and cultivation added nothing to the happiness of the people; because all was for the benefit of the few who were white, and nothing went to the comfort of the many who were black.”

Having reduced the numerous bands of armed negroes who had taken to the woods, and completely re-establish-ed tranquillity in St Lucia, Moore was relieved from the command of the island, and returned to England in August 1797. In November, Sir Ralph Abercromby having received the command of the forces in Ireland, desired that General Moore should be placed on his staff, and the latter accordingly accompanied him to Dublin in the beginning of December. During the period immediately preceding the rebellion, he held an important command in the south of Ireland, which, being much disaffected, was considered as the quarter where the enemy were, in the event of an invasion, likely to attempt a landing. FIis head-quarters were at Bandon, and the troops under his command, amounting to 3000 men, formed the advanced guard of the south. When the insurrection broke out in 1798, he was at first employed under Major-General Johnstone at New Ross, but was afterwards detached towards Wexford, at that time in the hands of the insurgents. On this occasion he had only the 60th sharpshooters, 500 light infantry, fifty of Hompesch’s dragoons, and six pieces of artillery; and with these troops he had not proceeded above a mile when a large body of insurgents appeared on the road, advancing to attack him. The rebels, amounting to about 6000 men, headed by one Roche, attacked with great spirit, and maintained the conflict with much obstinacy, but were at length defeated, driven from the field, and pursued with great loss. After the action he was joined by two regiments from Duncannon, and took post for the night upon the ground where the combat had commenced. Next day, when he had resumed his march, he was met by two men from Wexford, with proposals on the part of the insurgents to lay down their arms and submit on certain conditions; but General Moore, having no power to treat, declined entertaining these proposals, and continued his march to Wexford, which he delivered from the power of the insurgents. He was afterwards employed to suppress a remnant of the rebellion in Wicklow, where many of the insurgents had taken refuge amongst the mountains and bogs, whence they issued to wage a sort of desultory warfare. Speaking of this affair in his journal, he says that “moderate treatment by the generals, and the preventing of the troops from pillaging and molesting the people, would soon restore tranquillity; that the latter would certainly be quiet if the gentlemen and yeomen would only behave with tolerable decency, and not seek to gratify their ill humour and revenge upon the poor ;” and he adds, “that he judged their harshness and violence had originally driven the farmers and peasants to revolt, and that they were as ready as ever to renew their former ill usage of them.”

These and other similar observations on the insurrection of 1798, extracted and published from General Moore’s journal, do equal honour to his head and heart, evincing the discriminating and unimpassioned sagacity of the statesman, united with that high and liberal feeling which forms the greatest ornament in the character of the accomplished soldier. “In this country,” says he, “they quell disturbances by proclaiming districts, and letting the soldiers loose upon the people, and the military are encouraged to violence against all who are called disaffected.” Again, “the giving away of militia regiments was managed so as to serve parliamentary purposes, and they were officered in the same view. Thus the most profligate of men are empowered to work any evil that their cupidity or revengeful passions prompt them to; and so complete are the ramifications of corruption, and so complicated the abuses, that the appointment of a dictator seems to be the only cure.” When the chancellor Fitzgibbon asserted in a speech he delivered at the time, “that conciliation had already been tried with the Catholics, but that it had only created discontent, and that each new concession produced new demands,” General Moore remarked, that “nothing could be more natural in the people, nothing more unreasonable than the chancellor’s complaint; that the Catholics had a right to be put on the same footing with their fellow-subjects; that they were pleased with each approach to that equality, but unsatisfied till they obtained all; that the government was impolitic and unjust to favour one part to the oppression of nineteen; and that all to whom equal rights were denied were oppressed.” He further expressed his indignation at the treatment of the poor people, and his disapproval of the system of government, which he describes as “having no other object than that of terrifying the poor, ready always to grant any power to act against them, but indulging the rest of the community in every sort of abuse and violence.” With a government acting in this spirit, with an army “formidable to every body but the enemy,” and with an exasperated faction in the heart of the country to take advantage of the one, and encourage the utmost license of the other, the wonder is not that the oppressed people, when arms were in their hands, should have committed some excesses, but that they did not rise in mass, and by one great simultaneous effort bury their oppressors under the ruins of their own tyranny. The enlightened views, the calm discernment, and the just and humane sentiments of Moore, are honourable to his memory, and worthy of the chief under whom he served, but stand [7:15:452]in striking contrast to the short-sighted policy, the ferocious prejudices, the blind bigotry, and the inhuman violence, of those by whom he was surrounded, in all departments of the public service.

Immediately after quitting Ireland, General Moore engaged in the memorable expedition to Holland. The result of this enterprise is well known. The Dutch, whom we sought to rescue from the alleged tyranny of the French government, made common cause with the enemy; they received the French as friends and deliverers, because the house of Orange, aided by Prussia, had destroyed their republic, suppressing their constitution and liberties; and hence, after a short struggle, the Duke of York was obliged to capitulate. But the troops displayed their usual gallantry, particularly those under the command of General Moore, who, after being wounded in the hand and thigh, received a musket ball in the face, and was with difficulty brought from the ground. Being carried back to his quarters, a distance of ten miles, he was taken thence to the Helder, as soon as he could be moved, and embarked on board the Amethyst frigate, which arrived at the Nore on the 24th of August. Soon after his return to England, the king conferred on him the command of a second battalion which had just been added to the 52d regiment; and his wounds having closed in the course of five or six weeks, he joined his brigade at Chelmsford on the 24th of December.

Early in 1800, it had been resolved to send a body of troops to the Mediterranean under the command of Sir Charles Stuart; and General Moore willingly consented to serve under that officer, whom he greatly esteemed. The first intention was, that the expedition should consist of 15,000 men; but it afterwards turned out that the regiments destined for the service, part of which had lately been employed in Holland, mustered only 10,000 effective. About the middle of March, the first division, amounting to 5000 men, embarked under General Pigott. But at this time a change took place in the plan, if not in the destination, of the expedition. Sir Charles Stuart, having some misunderstanding with ministers, resigned his command; and Sir Ralph Abercromby being appointed to succeed him, named, as one of his major-generals, Moore, who, along with Pigott and Hutchinson, sailed about the end of April with the second division of the troops. During this expedition, which a variety of causes conspired to render abortive, General Moore had little opportunity of signalizing his exertions; nor was it until the following year, when his troops were ordered to proceed to Egypt under Sir Ralph Abercromby, that a theatre of action opened for the display of his talents. On his arrival at Malta, he was sent forward to Jaffa to inspect the Turkish army, and judge as to the amount of co-operation which might be expected from it; but his report being unfavourable, Sir Ralph determined to land in the bay of Aboukir, and to march immediately upon Alexandria. This was what is familiarly called taking the bull by the horns. In regard to the operations which followed, it is inconsistent with the object of this article to enter into any details respecting them. It is sufficient to mention, that, in the affair of the landing on the 8th of March 1801, in the combat of the 13th, and again in the battle of the 21st, where he received a wound in the leg, General Moore was actively engaged, and, as usual, greatly distinguished himself. On recovering from his wound, which occasioned him much suffering, he continued to serve with the army in Egypt until after the surrender of Alexandria, when he returned to England, where he received the honour of knighthood and the order of the Bath.

It appears from the portion of his journal which has been published, that it contains invaluable materials for a history of the campaign in Egypt. The account of the battle of Alexandria, which his brother, Mr James Moore, has had the grace to insert in his book, is in every respect admirable. It is also satisfactory to find him censuring that act of mingled vandalism and cruelty perpetrated by General Hutchinson; we mean the cutting of the dike which excluded the sea from Lake Mareotis, by which the lands of the poor Copts were swallowed up to the extent of about forty miles, without any adequate or compensating military advantage. We should have been still more gratified if his brother had given the fragment which he is stated to have written in defence of Sir Ralph Abercromby’s military conduct, which Sir John ably vindicates, in answer to the impudent observations of General Regnier. There seems to be no good reason why this interesting composition should have been withheld, unless, indeed, something of the kind may be detected in the declaration which it contains, that “English expeditions were seldom successful, and always difficult to conduct, because they were conducted by ministers who were ignorant of military affairs, and too arrogant and self-sufficient to consult military men.”

Soon after his return to England, we find Sir John Moore actively occupied in the camp at Shorn-Cliff, where his ⅛kill in training troops was proved to be equal to his daring in leading them. Many persons have been led to suppose that he was a harsh and odious disciplinarian; but this calumny has been refuted by the most irrefragable proof. “The officers of the regiments which were formed by his care,” says an able writer in the Edinburgh Review, supposed to be Colonel Napier, “were ever after his warmest admirers; his discipline it has been their object to maintain; his maxims have been their guide; his reputation has been by them considered as a part of their own; his memory is cherished in their hearts to this day, and will be as long as those hearts retain an atom of a soldier’s pride and honour.” Such is the testimony of one who knew him thoroughly; and who, besides his pre-eminent qualifications for judging rightly, had the best opportunities of understanding his views and appreciating his real character.

On the renewal of the war, after the short peace of Amiens, Sir John Moore’s talents and services pointed him out as deserving of some important employment. He was accordingly sent to Sicily, as second in command to Sir John Stuart; and, when that officer had been superseded by General Fox, he virtually acquired the chief command in that island. His superior in command was too infirm to lead an army in the field, but by no means so debilitated as to be unable to conduct the affairs of Sicily. If his talents were not of a high order, they were at least respectable; and he had the merit of not being above taking the advice of wiser men. He generally agreed with, and always yielded to, Sir John Moore’s opinion; and hence the English interests were better supported during his command than they had ever been before. Associated with such a nominal superior, Moore had full scope for the exercise of his ability and sagacity, and, indeed, his whole proceedings showed that his sense and judgment in civil matters were in no degree inferior to his talents in war. But his brother’s account of these transactions is little more than a garbled and impotent abstract, divested of every thing interesting or instructive. We look in vain for Moore’s graphic account of the Queen of Naples, and the final character which he draws of her, confirmed as it has since been by the testimony of Micichiin his Memoirs. We want more information respecting his disputes with Mr Drummond, and also some notice of the vagaries of Sir Sidney Smith. We desire to learn his sentiments upon the state of Sicily, as to the character and wishes of the people of that island; and nothing could have been more instructive than an exposition of his views respecting a descent upon Italy, which he was pressed to invade, but refused until he could offer the Italians something better [7:15:453]to fight for than the oppressions and abuses of the Sicilian court. His military criticism upon General Fraser’s expedition to Egypt, in the year 1807, might also have found a place in the life of a general, especially one written by a brother; but this, and much more, which would have thrown light on the events of that time, as well as reflected credit on his character and memory, has been most unaccountably withheld.

When Sir John Moore arrived in England from Sicily, he was immediately sent with an expedition to Gottenburg, although for what purpose, except .to get him out of the way, whilst troops were sent to Portugal under Sir Arthur Wellesley, it is difficult to conjecture. But however this may be, if the troops had been committed to the charge of a man less able, prompt, and resolute, 10,000 of the finest soldiers of England would have been sacrificed. “The contradictory instructions given by the ministers,” says the able writer already referred to, “and the silence observed by them when Moore represented the real state of affairs, were proofs of their bad intentions, and bad faith, as well as absurdity; and if any doubt could be entertained upon this head, the orders which reached Sir James Saumarez, three days after Moore’s departure from Gottenburg (orders prescribing the employment of the army to bring off the Spaniards under Romana from Holstein), would have set that doubt aside.” This is, no doubt, a strong opinion; but when it is considered, that if the king of Sweden had been only one degree less insane than he actually was, the English ministers would, at the same time, have commenced regular military operations by land against Russia in one extremity of Europe, and Napoleon in the other, it is difficult to account for their conduct upon any principle of sense or rational policy. On his return to England, Sir John Moore was received with something more than coldness by the ministers, who gave him no credit whatever for saving the troops, and seem to have been offended because their designs, whatever these were, had been baffled by his energy and decision.

We come now to the expedition to Spain, which terminated Sir John Moore’s earthly career. In 1808, he was appointed to the chief command of an army to be employed in Spain; and Gallicia, or the borders of Leon, were fixed upon as the place for assembling the troops. He was ordered to send the cavalry by land, but it was left to his own discretion to transport the infantry and artillery either by sea or land; and being at the same time informed that 15,000 men were ordered to Coruña under General Sir David Baird, he was directed to give such instructions to that officer as should facilitate the junction of the whole force. Before he commenced his advance from Portugal, he was assured that his entry into Spain would be covered by from 60,000 or 70,000 men; and Burgos was the place fixed on for the junction of the different divisions. But he soon discovered that these assurances were fallacious, that little or no reliance could be placed upon the Spaniards, and that the patriotic enthusiasm which he had been taught to expect in the people had either never existed at all, or had entirely evaporated. Not only Burgos, but Valladolid, was in possession of the enemy; and he found himself with an advanced corps, in an open town, at the distance of only three marches from the French army, without even a Spanish piquet to cover his front. At this time, he had only three brigades of infantry, without a single gun in Salamanca; and although the remainder were coming up in succession, the whole could not be assembled in less than ten days. At this critical moment, the Spanish armies, instead of concentrating or uniting in a common effort with the British, were disseminated all over the peninsula; Blake had been defeated, and his army totally dispersed; Romana, equally weak and obstinate, proved incapable of undertaking any thing; and Sir David Baird, informed that the

French were advancing upon him in two directions, was preparing to retreat upon Coruña, a movement which was countermanded by Sir John Moore, upon learning that the report was unfounded. For an account of what followed, we must refer to the first volume of Colonel Napier’s History of the Peninsular War. Never was a general commanding an army placed in a more critical position than Sir John Moore; for, whilst he received information that there was now no army remaining in the field except his own, which was thus exposed to be attacked upon all sides by overwhelming numbers, he was called upon to repel the most irritating interference, to guard against open treachery, and to counteract folly, equal in its effects to treachery. Yet, even in these circumstances, he was willing to attempt something for the cause, and even to risk the danger of an advance on the capital. With this view he commenced a forward movement from Salamanca on the 12th of December, intending to attack Soult on the Carrion, draw the mass of the French force towards the north of Spain, and thus afford the Spanish armies time to rally and adopt some new plan of operations. This movement, in a strategical point of view, was ably conceived and well timed, hardy, and successful; but Sir John Moore, with 23,000 men, could not maintain himself against the whole French army; and as Napoleon, having secured the capital, was now rapidly advancing at the head of from 60,000 to 70,000 men, a retreat became inevitable. In what manner this retreat was conducted, and how gloriously it terminated, we shall leave Colonel Napier to describe.

“Lord Bacon observes, that ‘ honourable retreats are noways inferior to brave charges, as having less of fortune, more of discipline, and as much of valour.’ That is an honourable retreat in which the retiring general loses no trophies in fight, sustains every charge without being broken, and finally, after a severe action, re-embarks his army in the face of a superior enemy without being seriously molested. It would be honourable to effect this before a foe only formidable from numbers, but it is infinitely more creditable, when the commander, while struggling with bad weather and worse fortune, has to oppose veterans with inexperienced troops, and to contend against an antagonist of eminent ability, who scarcely suffers a single advantage to escape him during his long and vigorous pursuit. All this Sir John Moore did, and finished his work by a death as firm and glorious as any that antiquity can boast of.

“Put to Lord Bacon’s test, in what shall the retreat to Coruña be found deficient? Something in discipline, perhaps, but that fault does not attach to the general. Those commanders who have been celebrated for making fine retreats were in most instances well acquainted with their armies; and Hannibal, speaking of the elder Scipio, derided him, although a brave and skilful man, for that, being unknown to his own soldiers, he should presume to oppose himself to a general who could call to each man under his command by name: thus inculcating, that, unless troops be trained in the peculiar method of a commander, the latter can scarcely achieve any thing great. Now Sir John Moore had a young army suddenly placed under his guidance; and it was scarcely united when the superior numbers of the enemy forced it to a retrograde movement under very harassing circumstances: he had not time, therefore, to establish a system of discipline; and it is in the leading events, not the minor details, that the just criterion of his merits is to be sought for.

“Was the retreat uncalled for? Was it unnecessarily precipitate? Was any opportunity of crippling the enemy lost? Was any weakness to be discovered in the personal character of the general? These are the questions that sensible men will ask: the first has been already examined; the second is a matter of simple calculation. The rear guard quitted Astorga on the 1st of January; on the [7:15:454] 3d it repulsed the enemy in a sharp skirmish at Calcabe-los; the 6th it rejoined the main body at Lugo, having three times checked the pursuers during the march. It was unbroken, and lost no gun, suffered no misfortune; the whole army offered battle at Lugo for two successive days; it was not accepted; and the retreat recommencing, the troops reached Betanzos on the morning of the 10th, and Coruña on the 11th: thus, in eleven days, three of which were days of rest, a small army passed over a hundred and fifty miles of good road. Now Napoleon, with fifty thousand men, left Madrid on the 22d of December, the 28th he was at Villapando, having performed a march, on bad roads, of a hundred and sixty-four miles in seven days. The retreat to Coruña was consequently not precipitate, unless it can be shown that it was unnecessary to retreat at all beyond Villa Franca; neither can it be asserted that any opportunity of crippling the enemy was lost. To fight a battle was the game of the French marshal; and if any censure will apply to his able campaign, it is that he delayed to attack at Lugo; victorious or beaten, the embarrassments of his adversary must have been increased; Sir John Moore must have continued his retreat encumbered with the wounded, or the latter must have been abandoned without succour in the midst of winter.

“At Coruña the absence of the fleet necessarily brought on a battle. That it was honourable to the British troops is clear from the fact that they embarked without loss after the action; and that it was absolutely necessary to embark notwithstanding the success, is as certain a proof how little advantage could have been derived from any battle fought farther inland, and how prudently Sir John Moore acted in declining an action the moment he had rallied his army at Lugo, and restored that discipline which the previous movements had shaken; but, notwithstanding the clamour with which this campaign has been assailed, as if no army had ever yet suffered such misfortunes, it is certain that the nominal loss was small, the real loss smaller, and that it sinks into nothing when compared with the advantages gained. An army which, after marching in advance or retreat above five hundred miles before an enemy of immensely superior force, has only lost, including those killed in battle, four thousand men, or a sixth part of its numbers, cannot be said to have suffered severely; nor would the loss have been so great, but for the intervention of the accidental occurrences mentioned in the narrative. Night marches are seldom happy; that from Lugo to Betanzos cost the army in stragglers more than double the number of men lost in all the preceding operations; nevertheless, the reserve in that, as in all the other movements, suffered little; and it is a fact, that the light brigades detached by the Vigo road, which were not pursued, made no forced marches, slept under cover, and were well supplied, left, in proportion to their strength, as many men behind as any other part of the army; thus accumulating proof upon proof that inexperience was the primary and principal cause of the disorders which attended the retreat. Those disorders were sufficiently great; but many circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of suffering and disorganization which was not real. The intention of Sir John Moore was to have proceeded to Vigo, in order to restore order before he sailed for England; instead of which, the fleet steered home directly from Coruña; a terrible storm scattered it; many ships were wrecked, and the remainder, driving up the channel, were glad to put into any port. The soldiers, thus thrown on shore, were spread from the Land’s End to Dover. Their haggard appearance, ragged clothing, and dirty accoutrements, things common enough in war, struck a people only used to the daintiness of parade, with surprise; the usual exaggerations of men just escaped from perils and distresses were increased by the uncertainty in which all were as to the fate of their comrades; a deadly fever, the result of anxiety, and of the sudden change from fatigue to the confinement of a ship, filled the hospitals at every port with officers and soldiers; and thus the miserable state of Sir John Moore’s army became the topic of every letter, and a theme for every country newspaper along the coast. The nation, at that time unused to great operations, forgot that war is not a harmless game, and, judging of the loss positively, instead of comparatively, was thus disposed to believe the calumnies of interested men, who were eager to cast a shade over one of the brightest characters that ever adorned the country. Those calumnies triumphed for a moment; but Moore’s last appeal to his country for justice will be successful. Posterity, revering and cherishing his name, will visit such of his odious calumniators as are not too contemptible to be remembered, with a just and severe retribution; for thus it is that time freshens the beauty of virtue and withers the efforts of baseness; and if authority be sought for in a case where reason speaks so plainly, future historians will not fail to remark, that the man whose talents exacted the praises of Soult, of Wellington, and of Napoleon, could be no ordinary soldier.

“ ‘ Sir John Moore,’ says the first, ‘ took every advantage that the country afforded to oppose an active and vigorous resistance, and he finished by dying in a combat that must do credit to his memory.’

“Napoleon more than once affirmed, that if he committed a few trifling errors, they were to be attributed to his peculiar situation, for that his talents and firmness alone had saved the English army from destruction.

“‘In Sir John Moore’s campaign,’ said the Duke of Wellington, ‘ I can see but one error; when he advanced to Sahagun he should have considered it as a movement of retreat, and sent officers to the rear to mark and prepare the halting-places for every brigade; but this opinion I have formed after long experience of war, and especially of the peculiarities of a Spanish war, which must have been seen to be understood; finally, it is an opinion formed after the event.’"^[1. Napier’s History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. i. p. Ô25-530. ]

The fall of Sir John Moore is thus described by Captain, now Sir Henry, Hardinge: “I had been ordered by the commander-in-chief to desire a battalion of the guards to advance; which battalion was at one time intended to have dislodged a corps of the enemy from a house and garden on the opposite side of the valley; and I was pointing out to the general the situation of the battalion, and our horses were touching, at the moment that a cannon-shot from the enemy’s battery carried away his left shoulder, and part of the collar-bone, leaving the arm hanging by the flesh. The violence of the stroke threw him off his horse on his back. Not a muscle of his face altered, nor did a sigh betray the least sensation of pain. I dismounted, and, taking his hand, he pressed mine forcibly, casting his eyes anxiously towards the 42d regiment, which was hotly engaged; and his countenance expressed satisfaction when I informed him that the regiment was advancing. Assisted by a soldier of the 42d, he was removed a few yards behind the shelter of a wall. Colonel Graham of Balgowan (Lord Lyndoch) and Captain (now Sir John) Woodford, about this time came up, and, perceiving the state of Sir John’s wound, instantly rode off for a surgeon. The blood flowed fast, but the attempt to stop it with my sash was useless, from the size of the wound. Sir John assented to being removed in a blanket to the rear. In raising him for that purpose, his sword, hanging on the [7:15:455]wounded side, touched his arm, and became entangled between his legs. I perceived the inconvenience, and was in the act of unbuckling it from his waist, when he said, in his usual tone and manner, and in a very distinct voice, ‘ It is as well as it is; I had rather it should go out of the field with me.’” When the surgeons arrived, he said to them, “you can be of no service to me; go to the soldiers, to whom you may be useful.” As he was carried slowly along in the blanket, he made the soldiers by whom he was borne frequently turn him round to view the field of battle, and listen to the firing, and he seemed pleased when the sound grew fainter. On arriving at his lodgings, he suffered great pain, and could speak but little; at length, however, he said to Colonel Anderson, who, for more than twenty years, had been his friend and companion in arms, “Anderson, you know that I always wished to die in this way.” He frequently asked, “Are the French beaten ?” and when he was told that they had been defeated at every point, he said, “It is a great satisfaction for me to know that we have beaten the French adding, “I hope the people of England will be satisfied; I hope my country will do me justice.” To Major Stanhope he said, “Stanhope, remember me to your sister ;” and having mentioned the name of his venerable mother, for whom he seemed anxious to offer up his last prayers, he lost all power of utterance, and in a few minutes afterwards expired without a struggle.

Thus fell, on the 16th of January 1809, in the forty-seventh year of his age, after gaining a victory which saved the remainder of the army from destruction, and which, in all’its circumstances, was perhaps unparalleled in the annals of war, Lieutenant-general Sir John Moore, a perfect model of a British soldier at a time when such models were few, and a hero cast in the true classical mould, being equally a stranger to fear and reproach, yet one whom the rancorous malignity of faction basely attempted to deprive of his just fame, whilst venal pens were hired to depreciate his achievements, and servile poets vainly sought to exclude his name from the list of the brave who had fought and fallen in the same struggle. But his country was well disposed to acknowledge his merits, and history has already placed his character and actions beyond the reach of ever being affected by contemporary injustice. (a.)