CORN LAWS AND CORN TRADE.

I. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE CORN LAWS.

All governments, in every age of the world, have interfered too much with the affairs of their subjects. A notion has very generally prevailed, that certain branches of commerce were sometimes advantageous to society, though ruinous to those who should attempt to carry them on; and that other branches, though profitable to individuals, were frequently inconsistent with the general advantage. On a first view, this opinion, though essentially erroneous, seems sufficiently plausible. Many of the pursuits of individuals apparently conduce very little, and may sometimes even seem hostile, to the interests of the whole; and hence we are naturally enough led to infer, that the public advantage would be best consulted by their prohibition. Nothing evinces more strikingly the prevalence of this notion of the propriety of restricting and directing the operations of industry and the investment of capital, than the regulations respecting the trade in corn. This, no doubt, is only what might have been expected. To secure an adequate supply of food, and to obviate famine and scarcity, must always be an object of the first importance with legislators; and while the efficacy of the regulating system is unquestioned, it is here it will be chiefly called into action.

When legislators abandon the principle of free competition, and imagine they can give a more advantageous direction to national industry, their habits and station in society have a powerful influence in determining the regulations they adopt. Agriculturists raise corn for sale, as well as for their own consumption; and as they naturally endeavour to obtain the highest price for their produce, where their voice predominates in the legislature of a country, it is reasonable to presume, that the regulations respecting the trade in corn will be framed with a design rather to enhance than to lower its price. Whether they have that effect is an entirely different, and often a very delicate inquiry; but unless there be pretty explicit evidence to the contrary, it is not easy to imagine, that agriculturists, or those supported by agriculture, should give their consent to any law intended to lower the value of the products they have to dispose of. On the other hand, where the legislature of a country is principally composed of merchants, manufacturers, capitalists, and others depending on the profits of stock, as was formerly the case in Holland, or where it is chiefly influenced by them, it is nearly certain it will not intentionally adopt any measure which may have for its object to raise the price of corn. When it is low, such persons obtain a comparatively large quantity in exchange for their peculiar products or services. How then is it to be expected that they should voluntarily consent to any measure which they supposed would contribute to raise the price of so important an article?

Throughout the principal continental states, the regulations affecting the corn trade have been mostly framed with a view to keep down the price of corn. This fact, however, is perfectly consistent with what has now been stated. After the feudal system lost its energy, and the power of the great barons had been weakened by the rise of cities and the consolidation of the royal authority, monarchs were able to take such measures as appeared most likely to benefit the lower classes of their subjects, which it was then their object to exalt. Of these, none seems more natural, or better calculated to effect its object, than the imposing of restrictions on the exportation of raw produce. If a nation raise more corn than is required for its consumption, the first consequence of a prohibition of export is undoubtedly to lower its value. It is certain, indeed, that this effect will very soon cease; but, in early ages, men seldom attend to prospective considerations, and it is not a very easy matter, even now, to convince the bulk of mankind that the granting liberty to send abroad the necessaries of life lowers their price at home. To demonstrate, or even apprehend this principle, requires a considerable acquaintance with political economy, a Science altogether unknown when the first laws respecting the corn trade were framed in the European commonwealth. With a view still further to reduce the price of corn, its free importation was very generally allowed; and, in periods of scarcity, bounties or premiums, over and above the market price, were sometimes given by the state to the importer.

In this country’, an opposite course has been pursued. The Lords and Commons, the first depending entirely, and the latter principally, on agriculture, having attained great power and influence, we cannot be surprised at their having more frequently exerted it to increase than to lower the pricogt; of corn.

Restrictions on the exportation of corn, without being in any degree advantageous to the consumers, are eminently hurtful to agriculturists. While they exist, no market can be found for that excess of produce which an agricultural country generally has to dispose of in favourable seasons. Farmers are not, therefore, stimulated to exertion, because, in a country thus situated, a luxuriant crop, by its causing a great fall of price, is nearly as prejudicial to them as a scarcity; which, indeed, by its lessening the quantity sown next year, it seldom fails to occasion. In most countries, however, these very simple considerations have been overlooked, and the exportation of corn, unless in years of extreme plenty, has been forbidden under severe penalties. In the reigns immediately succeeding the conquest, this was done in England; but, in 1436, in the reign of Henry VI. an act was passed permitting exportation without license, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 6s. 8d. (equal in amount of pure silver to 12s. 10∣d. present money) per quarter, and barley 3s. 4d. In this act it is stated, that the previous regulations had obliged farmers to sell their corn at low prices, to the great prejudice of the whole kingdom. But, in addition to the reason assigned for this important measure, we may observe, that, for a considerable time posterior to the conquest, rents were paid in kind, and the high or low price of corn was not, therefore, a matter of so much importance to landlords, as it became after money rents were generally introduced. In Henry I. ’ s time, the rents of the crown lands were paid in corn and other farm produce, and were only converted into pecuniary payments, in consequence of the great complaints made by the tenants of the inconveniences they suffered in bringing necessaries for the king’s household from distant partsof the kingdom. (Eden’s Inquiry into the State of the Poor, vol. i. p. 55.) The same causes would doubtless affect, though in a less degree, the tenants of the great barons; and, when once money rents were introduced, it was for the advantage of the proprietors that all obstacles to a rise in the price of corn should be removed. A more favourable opportunity could not have been found for effecting their abolition. Henry, weak and irresolute, with a disputed title to the throne, and a powerful competitor, could not, had he been so disposed, have made any effectual opposition to a change [7:7:334] of the system on which the corn trade had been conducted.

At the time when this act was passed, the prices of corn were exposed to fluctuations of which we can now form a very inadequate conception; and hence it is not easy to determine whether the exportation price of 6s. 8d. was above or below the medium price. While the trade of corn merchants and corn factors was unknown, or laboured under degrading restrictions, very little providence was exercised in the distribution of the crops, and the superfluous produce of one year scarcely ever compensated for a deficiency in the crop of the next. “Purchasers,” says Sir F. Μ. Eden, “who only looked to their immediate wants, having corn cheap, were naturally wasteful and improvident in the consumption; the price, therefore, almost invariably rose as the year advanced, and was frequently at an enormous height just before harvest; and, before a fresh supply could be obtained, the stock of the preceding year was often entirely exhausted.” (^Inquiry into the State of the Poor, vol. i. p. 18.) . Of this Sir Frederick has collected many instances; and he conjectures, seemingly with great probability, that the enthusiastic joy with which the rustic feast of harvest-home was anciently celebiated, arose chiefly from the almost constant fall that then took place in the price of corn.

That the act of 1437 was advantageous to the agriculturists cannot be doubted; and having experienced the benefit of legislative interference in one-instance, they were not slow in again having recourse to it. Not satisfied with the. liberty of exporting, they procured in the following reign (1463) the enactment of a law prohibiting impôt tation from abroad until the home price exceeded the price at which exportation ceased. Had the uncertain and fluctuating policy of the times permitted the proper execution of these laws, the restrictive system would have been thus early perfected; and, with the exception of the bounty, all the refinements of modern policy would have been in full operation. In practice, however, they were nearly inoperative, and a lengthened period elapsed before the agriculturists succeeded in obtaining a real monopoly of the home market. (Dirom’s Inquiry,. p. 34.)

Until the reign of Elizabeth, these acts nominally regulated the prices at which the exportation and importation of corn might take place. In that period, however, the coin had been greatly degraded; and the value of silver, owing to the discovery of the American mines, was rapidly falling throughout Europe in the latter part of the fifteenth and in the sixteenth century. The consequent rise of prices,] as it could not, in a nearly stationary state of society, when capital was but slowly accumulating, be speedily followed by a corresponding rise of wages, was necessarily productive of much distress. But neither the government nor the people seems to have hecn at all aware of the real cause of the rise of prices, and of the extraordinary increase of pauperism in this interval.^[1. In 1436 the pound sterling contained as much pure silver as is now contained in L.l. 18s. 9d. In 1464 the value of the pound sterling was reduced to L.l. 1 Is. present money, at which sum it remained stationary until 1527, when it was reduced to L.l. 7s. 6fd. present money. In 1543 the previous value of the coin was again reduced about one seventh part, or to L.l. 3s. 3įd. present money. In the ten years subsequent to this era, the process of degradation advanced with unparalleled rapidity; the weight of the coin being not only diminished, but the standard purity of the metal itself debased; so that in 1551 the pound sterling only contained as much silver as is now contained in 4s. 7∣d. In 1552, the last year of the reign of Edward VI. the standard was restored to its former purity; but the weight of the coin, and consequently the quantity of pure silver which it contained, was at the same time reduced about one seventh part below its weight in 1543, and hence the value of a pound sterling in 1552 corresponded to L.l. 6∣d. present money. Since that period the standard has undergone almost no variation, either as to weight or purity. It therefore appears, that between 1527 and 1552, the value of the pound sterling was reduced from L.l. 7≡. 6^d; to L.l. 6∣d., or about one fourth part; and this degradation of the vaine of the coin, accompanied as it was by an extraordinary fall in the value of the precious metals themselves, leaves us at no loss to account for the distress by which the people of England were then assailed, and for the universal complaints of a rise of prices. The dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII. in 1536 and 1538 has commonly been considered as the immediate cause of the institution of a legal provision for the support of the poor in England; but it seems abundantly certain that this was really a consequence of the misery of the lower classes, caused by the degradation of the standard, and the fall in the value of gold and silver. “The principal real grievance at this time,” says Mr John Smith {Memoirs of Wool, 8vo edit. vol. i. p. 88), when adverting to some riots and complaints caused by the high prices in 1550, “of the poorer manufacturers, they do not appear to have been sensible of, and historians have since overlooked it, was the state of the coin. The debasement of the coin, which was now of several years standing, had undoubtedly given a nominal advance to all things vendible; and, though perhaps to wages too, yet probably nothing near in proportion to the difference of the coin. And, as the money in which they were paid, not containing as much silver as it did before, would not purchase the same quantity of the necessaries of life it was wont to do; that, in course, must have bore hard upon the lower sort of people especially, who had every thing to buy, and nothing to sell except their labour.” This idea has been borrowed, and illustrated, in an article of considerable merit, published in the 22d volume of the Edinburgh Review. ] It was not yet known that silver may fall in value, and that this fall must always be attended by a proportional rise in the money price of the commodities for which it is exchanged. Instead, therefore, of ascribing the enhancement of prices to the degradation of the coin, and the greater plenty of gold and silver, it was universally affirmed to be owing to the decay of tillage, and to the improper practices of corn merchants; and many (now obsolete) statutes for the improvement of tillage, with the laws against engrossing, forestalling, &c. owe their origin to the absurd attempts that were then made to lower the price of corn.

That the complaints respecting the decay of tillage were very ill founded, appears evident. The great foreign demand for English wool, the exportation of which was not then prohibited, caused the consolidation of some small farms, and the more general introduction of inclosures. But this fact, so far from being any proof of the alleged decay of tillage, affords satisfactory evidence of the accumulation of capital, and shows that some improvement had been made in agriculture.^[2. In 1553 an act was passed, restraining the number of sheep to be kept in one flock to 2000. It is mentioned in that act, that some proprietors had then flocks of 24,000 sheep. Anderson states, that in 1551 no fewer than sixty ships sailed from Southampton for the Netherlands loaded with wool. {History of Commerce, vol. ii. p. 89.) ] An increase in the size of farms is, no doubt, always disagreeahle to the lower classes; and being then attended by a great rise of prices, raised the popular indignation to such a pitch that, in the reign of Edward VI. the greater part of the inciosures were violently 7 demolished. As might have been foreseen, the statutes directing the extension of tillage effected nothing; unfortunately, however, those against engrossing were not quite so inefficient.

By the statute fifth and sixth of Edward VI. cap. 14, it was enacted, that whoever should buy any corn or grain, with intent to sell it again, should be reputed an unlawful engrosser, and should, for the first fault, suffer two months imprisonment, and forfeit the value of the corn; for the second, suffer six months imprisonment, and forfeit double its value; and for the third, be set in the pillory, suffer imprisonment during the king’s pleasure, and forfeit all his goods and chattels. And by the same law no person could transport corn from one part to another, without a license, ascertaining his qualifications as a man of probity and fair [7:7:335]dealing. Neither could corn be purchased to be laid up in granaries for home sale, unless the quarter of wheat was at or under 6s. 8d. and oats at 2s. money of the time. By the same statute the authority of three justices of the peace was necessary in order to grant a license; and even this restraint not being thought sufficient, a statute of Elizabeth confined the privilege of granting it to the quarter sessions.

That the landed interest should have made little opposition to the laws restricting the freedom of the internal corn trade, does not appear very surprising. Before the principles of trade began to be understood, it was natural for landlords and farmers to conclude that they would deal on fully more advantageous terms by selling their produce directly to the consumers, than by transacting with them through the medium of a third party. Forgetting that the profits of the corn merchants were but a fair remuneration for the capital they had engaged in the most important of all employments—that of distributing the supply of food equally throughout the year, and according to the effective demand—the farmers believed that they were acquired from the community at their expense, and, of course, felt no repugnance to the virtual annihilation of the trade of the dealer.

But as society improved, and as the principles of commerce were better understood, the bad effects of these laws became apparent. The statute of 1548 was considerably modified in 1624, and at last, by the 15th of Charles 11. cap. 7, the engrossing or buying of corn, in order to sell it again, so long as the price of wheat did not exceed 48s. the quarter, was declared lawful to all persons not being forestallers, that is, not selling again in the same market within three months; an act, as Dr Smith has justly observed, which, with all its imperfections, has contributed more, both to the plentiful supply of the home market, and to the increase of tillage, than perhaps any other law in the statute book.

The act of Henry VI. regulating the export prices of corn was again renewed, but without any variation of the rates, in the reign of Philip and Mary. As the coin, however, had in the interi n been greatly degraded, no exportation could now take place, until prices had really fallen much below the level of 1436. This act, like that against engrossing, was no doubt framed in the view of reducing the rising money price of corn, and of quieting the discontent then prevalent among the labouring classes; although, by shackling and discouraging cultivation, its real effects must have been extremely different.

In 1562 the prices at which exportation might take place were extended to 10s. per quarter for wheat, and 6s. 8d. for barley and malt. This scale, however, was soon after abandoned; and in 1570 it was enaeted that corn might be exported from particular districts; wheat paying a duty of Is. and other grain of 8d. per quarter, whenever no prohibition to the contrary was issued by government; and that the lord presidents and councils for shires, and the justices of assize, at their different sessions, should consult with the respectable inhabitants of the counties, and determine whether any exportation could with propriety be allowed.

The provisions of this act allowing corn to be exported from one part of the country, at the same time that its exportation was prohibited in another, arose from the extreme inequality of prices. At this era roads were scarcely formed ;· and as there hardly existed any communication between distant parts of the kingdom, the priées in the different cotmties differed exceedingly from each other, and from the price in London. England was then in the same situation as Spain in the present day. A particular province might be afflicted with scarcity, without deriving any assistance from the superfluous produce of its neighbours. But the complex nature of the regulations prevented their being properly executed; and they were superseded by a fresh law (35th Eliz. cap. 7), which permitted expoι ration on paying a duty of 2s. on wheat, and of Is. 4d. on all other species of corn, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 20s. per quarter, and barley and malt 12s. This act did considerable service to agriculture, by repealing several absurd statutes for the promotion of tillage, and against the enlargement of farms.

It deserves to be remarked, that the check given to cultivation by the injudicious imposition of heavy duties on the exportation of corn, and still more, the rapid depreciation of money in the reign of Elizabeth, caused an astonishing rise in the price of commodities. A contemporary author, quoted by Mr Hume, estimates this rise in the twenty or thirty years previous to 1581, at no less than fifty per cent. Wages not having increased in proportion, pauperism became very general; and this circumstance, combined with the excessively high prices of 1596, 1597, and 1598, resulting from the bad harvests of those years, occasioned the enactment of the famous statute of 1601, which has served as a basis to the whole of the present English system for supporting and managing the poor.^[3. The contemporary author quoted by Mr Hume {Hist, of England, vol. v. p. 485), and by Sir F. Μ. Eden {State of the Poor, vol. i. p. 119), says, that in 1581 it required L 200 to keep as good a house as might have been kept sixteen years before for 200 merks, orL133. 6s. 8d—“Cannot you remember,” says he, “that within these thirty years I could, in this town, buy the best pig or goose I could lay my hands on for 4d., which now costeth 12d., a good capon for 3d. or 4d., a chicken for Id., a hen for 2d., &c. Now a payre of shooes costs 12d.; yet in my time I have bought a better for Ġd.” Latimer, in his sermons, ascribes this increase of price to landlords raising their rents. “Notwithstanding,” says he, “God doth send us plentifully the fruits of the earth mercifully, according to our desertes, these rich men causeth such dearth, that poore men, which live of their labour, cannot with the sweat of their face have a living, all kinde of victuals is so dear.” ∙ A variety of passages to the same import may be found in óther contemporary authors, quoted by Sir F. Μ. Eden, and by Mr Smith in his Memoirs of Wool. This extraordinary advance of prices, caused partly by the degradation of the coin, but more by the fall in the real value of the precious metals, as it very far exceeded the rate at which capital, and consequently the demand for labour, was then increasing, must, ∙ even supposing wages had been left to find their own level, and to be adjusted on the principles of fair competition, have been attended by a very great deterioration in the circumstances of the labouring classes. But positive enactments were framed to prevent the increase of wages; so that, while the prices of all sorts of commodities were advancing with unprecedented rapidity', the sums paid the labourers were violently kept down to near their former level. By the statute 11th Henry VII. c. 22, regulating the wages of labour, a common labourer was allowed 4d. per diem, from Easter to Michaelmas; and, taking the average prices of wheat, rye, and barley at that period at 6s. 8d., 4s., and 3s. per quarter respectively, it will follow that a labourer who had 4d. a day, could earn a quarter of wheat by twenty days’ labour, a quarter of rye by twelve days’ labour, and a quarter of barley by nine days’ labour. But in the latter part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the labourer’s situation was very different. The prices of corn may be supposed to have nearly corresponded with the rates at which exportation was allowed by statute 35th Eliz. c. 7, that is, wheat probably averaged 20s. a quarter, rye 13s. 4d., and barley 12s. It appears, however, from the determination of the justices of the East Hiding of Yorkshire, in the same year, that the wages of a common labourer, without meat or drink, were limited to five pence a day, from the 1st March to the Feast of All Saints. Consequently, a common labourer could not, in the latter part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, earn a quarter of wheat by less than 48 days’ labour, a quarter of rye in less than 32 days, nor a quarter of barley in less than 28⅘ days. If barley was his common sustenance, he could have earned three times as much in 1495 as in 1593, of rye 2⅔ as much, and of wheat 2 ⅗ . As far, therefore, as the necessaries of life were concerned, the situation of the labourer was not one half so advantageous in 1593 as it had been in 1495. {Edinburgh Review, vol. xxii. p. 195.) This extraordinary rise in the price of provisions being unattended by any proportional rise in the price of labour, was the real cause of the institution of poor-rates. In the long interval between 1379 and 1530, it does not appear that any statute was passed directly referring to the maintenance of vagrants or beggars. At the latter era, however, when the prices of all sorts of commodities began suddenly to rise, pauperism became very prevalent, and engaged a considerable portion of the attention of the legislature. The following extract from Dr Burn’s Justice of Peace (vol. iii. p 608), shows in a very distinct manner the various steps by which the compulsory maintenance was established in England:—“By 22d Henry VIII. c. 12, the justices were to distribute themselves into several divisions ; within which divisions respectively they might license persons to beg. By 27th Henry VIII. c. 25, the several hundreds, towns corporate, parishes, or hamlets, were required to sustain the poor with such charitable voluntary alms, as that none of them might, of necessity, be compelled to go openly in begging, on pain that every person making default should forfeit twenty shillings a month. And the churchwardens, or other substantial inhabitants, were to make collections for them with boxes on Sundays, and otherwise by their discretions. And the minister was to take all opportunities to stir up and exhort the people to be liberal and bountiful. By the 1st Edward VI. c. 3, houses were to be provided for them by the devotion of good people, and materials toset them at work; and the minister, after the gospel every Sunday, was specially to exhort the parishioners to a liberal contribution. By the 5th and 6th Edward VI. c. 2, the collectors of the poor, on a certain Sunday in every year, immediately after divine service, were to take down in writing what every person was willing to give weekly, for the ensuing year; and if any should be obstinate, and refuse to give, the minister was gently to exhort him; if he still refused, the minister was to certify such refusal to the bishop of the dìo-cese, and the bishop was to send for him, to induce and persuade him by charitable ways and means, and so according to his discretion to take order for the reformation thereof. By the 5th Elizabeth, e. 3, if he stood out agaiust the bishop’s exhortation, the bishop was to certify the same to the justices in sessions, and bind him over to appear there; and the justices at the said sessions were again gently to move and persuade him; and, finally, if he would not be persuaded, then they were to assess him in what they thought reasonable towards the relief of the poor; and, in case of refusal, were to commit him till paid. By 14th Elizabeth, c. 5, power was given to the Justices to lay a general assessment ; and this hath continued ever since; for the statute of the 43d Elizabeth, c. 2, is only a re-enacting of former provisions, with some additional alteratipris.” In a tract published in 161 IŢ'the atithor dwells with great earnestness on the extreme dearth of victuals. They were grown more dear in price, he affirms, in the six years foregoing, than in the twenty years before See Memoirs of Wool, vol. i. p. 128. The fall in the value of gold and silver, catised by the discovery of the American mines, seems to have ceased about 1630 or 1640. ]

No alteration was made in the duties payable on the [7:7:336]exportation of corn, during the pacific reign of James I.; but the prices at which exportation might take place were, after some trifling alteration in 1604, fixed in 1623 at the high rate of 32s. the quarter for wheat, and of 16s. the quarter for malt and barley. In this and the preceding reigns, and for a considerable time afterwards, importation continued unrestricted; and notwithstanding the improvement of agriculture, the nation was partially dependent for supplies of corn on the trade with the countries round the Baltic, and others.

During the agitation of the civil wars, the people of England, intensely occupied in endeavouring to throtv off, or at least to restrict and modify, the royal authority, paid no regard to the corn trade. But this inattention does not seem to have been attended with any bad effects. The high prices of that turbulent period, if they were not altogether caused by a fall in the value of the coin, which, previously to the recoinage under Cromwell, was very' much clipped and debased, were most probably owing to the interruptions thrown in the way of agricultural labour.

On the restoration of Charles II. in 1660, an act was passed, permitting the exportation of corn on the same terms as other commodities on which duties were payable, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 40s. per quarter, barley and malt 20s., and oats 16s. But as this law laid a duty of 20s. on every quarter of wheat exported, and on other grain in proportion, it really amounted to a prohibition; and neither the agriculturists nor the revenue derived any advantage from the extent to which exportation was permitted, although both must have been somewhat benefited by the high duties it imposed on importation.

Mr Dirom’s opinion, that the prohibitory duties on exportation were the chief causes of the high prices of this and the two following seasons, seems entirely destitute of foundation. The law against exportation could not certainly raise the prices of the year in which it was framed, and this high price, as far as it was not caused by a deficiency in the crop, or by any fluctuation in the value of the coin, was unquestionably owing, not to the duties on exportation, but to the exorbitancy of those on importation, which had really secured a monopoly of the home market to the agriculturists.

This view of the matter appears to have been soon after taken by parliament; for in 1663 the high duties on importation were taken off, and an ad valorem duty of nine per cent, imposed in their stead. The exportation price of wheat was at the same time extended to 48s. per quarter, chargeable with a duty of 5s. 4d. and other grain in proportion.

This act, however, by permitting the importation of foreign grain on paying a moderate duty, not being reckoned sufficiently advantageous to the landholders, a more decided step was subsequently taken, and in 1670 exportation prices were extended to 53s. 4d. per quarter for wheat, and other grain in proportion, while import duties, amounting to a complete prohibition, were imposed on foreign wheat till the home price reached 53s. 4d., and between that price and 80s. a duty of 8s. was exigible. But this law, though extremely favourable to the agriculturists, by whom indeed it had been framed, did not perfectly correspond with their wishes. The necessities of the crown caused the continuance of impolitic duties on exportation, and the prohibition of importation was rendered to a certain extent nugatory, by the want of any proper and settled method tor ascertaining prices. Groundless complaints of the decay of agriculture, and of the evils of foreign competition, were therefore continued, and gave occasion to the act of 1685, designed more effectually to check importation from abroad, by securing correct returns of the home prices.

We have now reached a period no less memorable in the economical than in the political history of Great Britain. A bounty on the exportation of corn was granted at the revolution. The Prince of Orange could not oppose the wishes of the landed interest, who then constituted the immense majority of parliament, on this particular subject. Whether he really approved of the measure cannot now be ascertained; but whatever may have been William’s private sentiments, it was necessary for him to give way to the inclinations of those who had so lately raised him to a throne, and on whose assistance he was chiefly to depend in prosecuting his war against France. The bounty payable under the act 1st William and Mary, cap. 12, amounted to 5s. for every quarter of wheat exported, while the price continued at or below 48s.; 2s. 6d. for every quarter of barley or malt, while their price did not exceed 24s.; and 3s. 6d. for every quarter of rye, when its price did not exceed 32s.

A still more essential advantage was shortly after con- [7:7:337]'ferred on agriculture, by the act 11th and 12th William III. cap. 20, which repealed all previous duties on the exportation of corn, and prevented the operation of the bounty from being in the slightest degree counteracted.

No alteration having been made in the prices and duties regulating importation, as fixed in 1670, and these duties being rigorously exacted, the act repealing the duties on exportation completed the restrictive system. Every part of this complex machine was now in operation; and while no foreigner was allowed to contend with the home growers, the liberality of the state enabled them to contend with foreigners, even when the price of corn in Great Britain was considerably higher than its price abroad!

The policy adopted in Scotland respecting the trade in corn was nearly the same as that of England. Previously to 1663 the importation of corn into this kingdom was permitted without limitation or duties (Dirom, p. 61); but in that year it was loaded with an ad valorem duty of about forty per cent.; while its free exportation was allowed, on payment of a trifling duty, until the prices exceeded those mentioned below.^[4. Wheat, L.12 Scots per boll; bear and barley, L.8 do.; oats and peas, 8 merks. ] This duty was afterwards relinquished, and a bounty granted by the statute William, Par. 1, cap. 32. At length, by the treaty of union, the corn laws of both kingdoms were incorporated, and it was settled that “the allowances, encouragements, and drawbacks, prohibitions, restrictions, and regulations of trade, and the customs and duties on import and export, settled in England when the union commences, shall, from and after the union, take place throughout the whole united kingdom.” Oats not having been mentioned in the English statute granting the bounty, it was declared, that whenever oats did not exceed the price of lðs. sterling per quarter, there should be paid a bounty of 2s. 6d. for every quarter of oatmeal exported.

Whatever may have been the ultimate consequences of ’ the bounty act, there can be no doubt that it was framed in the view of enhancing the value of corn. In the preamble to this celebrated statute, it is stated “that the exportation of corn and grain into foreign parts, when the price thereof is at a low rate in this kingdom, hath been a great advantage, not only to the owners of land, but to the trade of this kingdom in general.” It would indeed be absurd to suppose that the landed interest should have unanimously urged the adoption of a law, had it been imagined to have any tendency to lower the value of agricultural produce.

We shall afterwards endeavour to show that the bounty had in fact no such tendency; but at present we shall only offer a few observations explanatory of the fall in the price of corn posterior to 1690, which has, as it appears to us, without any sufficient reason, been ascribed to the bounty.

It is obvious that no certain conclusions can ever be drawn as to whether the real value, that is, the expense of producing a commodity, is diminished, from the fact of its money price having declined. Before forming any accurate conclusions as to a rise or fall in the real price of commodities, from variations in their money price, it is essential to know, not only the state of the coin as to purity and weight, but also whether the value of bullion be itself stationary. A fall of money price may be as effectually produced by a rise in the value of gold and silver, as by a diminution of the cost of production; and the real price of a commodity may be increasing at the very time its money price is falling. To produce this effect it is only necessary that the real price of bullion should increase faster than the real price of the commodity with which it is compared.

That the real value of gold and silver rose in the early part of last century, has been maintained by Dr Smith, apparently on pretty good grounds. As no remarkable improvements in agriculture were then made, either on the continent or in England, the expense of producing corn may be reckoned to have remained nearly the same, or rather to have increased, as the increase of population, however slow, would cause recourse to be had to inferior soils. But during this period the money price of corn fell, not only in this country, where a bounty was given on exportation, but in those continental kingdoms where exportation was prohibited. Conclusive evidence of this fact, as far as regards France, will be found in the table of the prices of wheat, at. the Paris or Rosoy market, annexed to the work of Dupre de St Maur, entitled Essai sur les Monnoies, ou Reflexions sur le Rapport entre Ĩ Argent et les Denrées. Paris, 1746. And the table of the price of wheat at Seville, from 1675 to 1764 inclusive, published in the appendix to the Bullion Report, strongly confirms the reasoning of Dr Smith, and shows that prices declined considerably in Spain in the first fifty years of last century.

The impulse imparted to this country by the revolution, the abolition of all oppressive and arbitrary exactions, and the number of intelligent and wealthy foreigners who sought refuge in England from the persecution of intolerant and bigoted governments, coupled with the revival of trade and the establishment of the bank in 1694, caused the extension of commerce, and a considerable accumulation of capital, subsequently to the treaty of Ryswick. The wars of Queen Anne counteracted this progress; but during the long and pacific administration of Sir Robert Walpole, the increase of capital, and the improvement of every species of industry, though not so great as they afterwards became, continued uninterrupted. A rise in the money price of labour in Great Britain during that interval is not therefore inconsistent with the fact of an advance in the value of the precious metals, but, as Dr Smith has stated, is a natural consequence of the improving state of the country, and of the increasing demand for labour. In France, which had been completely exhausted by the ruinous enterprises of Louis XIV. and where, of course, the demand for labour remained nearly stationary, wages fell as the price of corn declined. ( Wealth of Nations, i. 313.)

But whatever weight may be attached to these conclusions, respecting a general rise in the real value of gold and silver in the early part of last century, there can be no question as to the fact of a rise having taken place in the value of the coin of Great Britain, in consequence of the recoinage in the latter part of King William’s reign. At that period silver constituted the English standard of value, and to such an extent had the silver currency been debased by clipping, filing, &c. that, in 1695, the common price of silver bullion was 6s. 5d. per ounce, or Is. 3d. above the mint price. A guinea then passed current for about 30s., and the nominal exchange between London, Holland, and Hamburg was rather more than twenty-five per cent, against the first. (Wealth of Nations,!. 304.) That this degraded state of the coin raised the price of every other commodity as well as bullion, might be concluded for certain, although no direct evidence of the fact had been transmitted to us. Mr Lowndes, however, in his Report on the state of the silver coin in 1695, mentions its degradation as “one great cause of the raising the price, not only of all merchandises, but of every article necessary for the sustenance of the common people, to their great grievance.” (Liverpool on Coin, p. 70.) And Mr Locke, in his answ er [7:7:338]'to Lowndes’ proposal for lowering the standard, confirms this statement, and asserts, that the “price of all sorts of provisions and commodities had risen excessively." (Idem.) The medium rise in the price of undepreciated gold coin, and of silver bullion, compared with the clipped and degraded coin, appears, from the statements of Locke and Lowndes, to have rather exceeded thirty per cent. And it is of importance to remark, that, in 1700, the year in which the new coin came into general circulation, the market price of corn, which had previously been rising, declined to very near the same extent. Ίhat this fall may in some degree have been owing to luxuriant crops, is probable; but it is quite certain that the increased value of the circulating medium would of itself have speedily lowered the money price of corn, and of every other commodity.

Mr Charles Smith, Mr Malthus, and others who contend that a bounty on the exportation of corn tends to lower its price, admit that the bounty granted in 1688 had no such effect anterior to 1700! This fact should have stimulated them to inquire whether any thing peculiar belonged to that year. They should have recollected, that a fall of money prices may be as effectually brought about by a rise in the value of the currency, as by a fall in the value of commodities. Had they kept this principle in view, and adverted to the circumstances under which the recoinage of 1G96,1697, and 1G98 took place, perhaps they would not have been so very confident in their assertions as to the effects of the bounty; and, at all events, they would not have adduced the fall of prices in 1700, and subsequently, as any proof of fheir correctness.

We do not certainly mean to affirm that the whole rise of price, from 1692 to 1G98 inclusive, is to be ascribed to the depreciation of the currency. The bounty, and, in a still greater degree, bad seasons, contributed to produce this rise; and the fair inference is, that had there been no bounty, priées would have fallen still lower after the recoinage.

In considering the effects of the bounty, it ought always to be recollected that priées were gradually falling previously to its being granted.

From 1649 to 1658, the average price of the Winches-
[table]

The bounty was given with the avowed intention of checking this fall, and it was, in our opinion, well calculated to accomplish its object. But, whatever may have been its cffeets, it cannot surely be assigned as the cause of the fall of prices between 1700 and 1746, seeing that that very fall began thirty years before it was granted, and that prices rose in the first ten years of its existence.

Perhaps part of the fall of corn in England subsequently to 1640 may be justly ascribed to the prohibition of the exportation of wool, which, after several previous attempts, was earned into full effect by the act of 1GGO. The wool formerly raised in Great Britain having much exceeded what was required for our manufactures, its price declined as soon as its exportation was put an end to; and, of course, some portion of the soil employed in rearing sheep would be brought under tillage, and a greater quantity of good land, besides an additional capital, would be turned to the raising of corn.

Although the mint price of gold had been reduced by King William, it was still rated too high as compared with; silver; and consequently the currency again became de- f ranged. The deficieney of new silver coin, caused by the I inducement to melt it down, was not immediately expe∙ [ rienced; but towards the latter part of Queen Anne’s reign, . a want of silver, and a difficulty in making payments, were universally felt and complained of. As might have been expected, prices rose, and, from 1709 to 1717 both inclusive, were much above the average of the eight preceding or of the following years. That this could not be an effect of deficient crops, is evident from the fact of a considerable exportation, forced, no doubt, to a certain extent, by the bounty having then taken place. The government did not indeed entertain any such opinion, but having wisely adopted the suggestion of Sir Isaae Newton, and reduced the mint value of the guinea, the melting and hoarding of silver ceased, and priées, as in 1700, fell to their former level.

Jn accounting for the low price of corn in the reigns of George I. and George II., after allowingfor the increased value of the coin, the relaxation of the laws against forestallers and engrossers must not be forgotten. Large capitals being engaged in the corn trade, extraordinary fluctuations of price were avoided. The home demand was rendered more steady and equal; while the perfect security of property, and the greater political influence attached to landed possessions, naturally attracted a more than ordinary portion of the accumulating capital of the country towards agriculture.

The bounty, by extending the foreign market, no doubt contributed materially' to the extension of cultivation, although, by forcing recourse to worse soils in order to obtain additional supplies of corn, it raised prices. In the period from 1740 to 175J, the cheapest in last century, the bounties paid on exportation amounted in all to L.1,515,000; and in 1749 alone they somewhat exceeded L.324,000. The bounty, however, had by this time been too long in operation to permit the growers or exporters to realise more than the common and ordinary profits of stock; and, therefore, had it never been granted, the quantity of corn exported, and the home price (which must have been regulated by the expense necessary to produce the increased supply required by the bounty on the poorest soils in cultivation), would both have been reduced. We shall afterwards elucidate this principle at greater length; but it is of importance to remark bow much this forced exportation must have raised the real price of corn, at the very time when it ţs supposed to have reduced it.

But notwithstanding the factitious stimulus thus given to exportation, the exports which, in 1750, amounted to 1,667,778 quarters of all sorts, rapidly diminished; and the gradual increase of the home demand, in the last ten years of the reign of George II. accompanied as it was by a rise of prices, reduced the annual average exportation, at the accession of George III. in 1760, to about 600,000 quarters. After the peace of Paris in 1763, the progress of improvement was prodigiously accelerated. The extension of industry caused by the acquisition of new branches of commerce, by the increase of our colonial possessions, and, perhaps more thgn all the rest, by the introduction of improved machinery into the cotton manufacture,^[6. Jennies were invented in 1766, by Richard Hargraves, weaver in Lancashire, who, to the disgrace of his age and nation, was suffered to pass his days in obscurity and poverty. ] was followed by a sudden increase of the population, and, as importation was prohibited, by a corresponding rise of prices.

The admirers of the restrictive system have generally reasoned as if this rise of price and the cessation of exportation[7:7:339] had been a consequence of the alteration of the corn laws in 1773. But it should be carefully observed that this alteration was an avowed, and indeed a necessary consequence of the previous rise. In 1765, .before any suspension of the restrictive system had taken place, the balance on the side of wheat exported amounted to only 77,000 quarters, and the home price in that and the two preceding years rose to an unusual height. The general and growing dissatisfaction at continuing the prohibition of importation under such circumstances, produced a suspension of the high duties in 1766; and by temporary enactments, this suspension (accompanied occasionally with restrictions on exportation) was continued to 1773, when a permanent act was framed under the auspices of Mr Burke. By this act foreign wheat was allowed to be imported on paying a nominal duty of 6d. whenever the home price readied 48s. a quarter; and the bounty and exportation were together to cease when the price reached 44s. This statute also permitted the importation of corn at any price, in order to be again exported, duty free, provided it was, in the mean time, lodged under the joint locks of the king and the importer.

The prices, when exportation was to cease, seem to have been fixed too low in this act; and, as Dr Smith has observed, there appears a good deal of impropriety in prohibiting exportation altogether at the preeise priées at which the bounty given to force it is withdrawn; yet with all these defects, the act of 1773 was a material improvement on the former system, and should not have been altered unless to render the trade perfectly free.

The idea that this law must, when enaeted, have been injurious to the farmers, seems altogether illusory. The permission to import foreign grain, when the home priées rose to a certain rate, certainly prevented their realizing exorbitant profits at the expense of the other classes, and prevented an unnatural proportion of the capital of the country being turned towards agriculture. But as this rate was fixed very considerably higher than the average price in the reign of George 1I., it cannot be maintained that it had any tendency to lower priées, which alone could discourage agriculture; and in fact no such reduction took place.

It is indeed true, that but for this act we should not have imported so much foreign grain in the interval between 1773 and 1791. This importation, however, was not occasioned by the declining state of our agriculture, for it is universally admitted that every department of rural economy was more improved in that period than in the whole course of the preceding century; but arose entirely from a still more rapid increase of the manufacturing population, and hence of the effective demand for corn.

By referring to the tables of exports and imports annexed to this article, it will be seen that, in 1772, the balance on the side of wheat imported amounted to 18,515 quarters; and in 1773, 1774, and 1775, all years of great prosperity, this balance was very much increased. The loss, however, of a great part of our colonial possessions, and the stagnation of commerce occasioned by the American contest, diminished the consumption; and this diminution concurring with luxuriant harvests, the balance was high on the side of exportation in 1778, 1779, and 1780. In 1783 and 1784 the crop was unusually deficient, and considerable importations took place; but in 1785, 1786, and 1787, the exports again exceeded the imports; and it was not till 1788, when the country had fully recovered from the effects of the war, and when manufacturing improvements were carried on with extraordinary spirit, that the imports permanently overbalanced the exports.

The growing wealth and commercial prosperity of the country had thus, by increasing the population, and enabling individuals to consume additional quantities of food, caused the home supplies to fall somewhat short of the demand; but it must not therefore be concluded that agriculture had not at the same time been very greatly ameliorated. “The average annual produce of wheat,” says Mr Comber, “at the beginning of the reign of George III. was about 3,800,000 quarters, of which about 300,000 had been sent out of the kingdom, leaving about three and a half millions for home consumption. In 1773, the produce of wheat was stated to the House of Commone to be 4,000,000 of quarters, of which the whole, and above 100,000 imported, were consumed in the kingdom. In 1796’ the consumption was stated in the House of Commons, by Lord Hawkesbury, to be 500,000 quarters per month, or six millions annually, of which about 180,000 were imported, showing an increased produce, in about twenty years, of 1,820,000 quarters. It is evident, therefore, not only that no defalcation of produce had taken place in consequence of the cessation of exportation, as has been too lightly assumed, from the occasional necessity of importation; but that it had increased with the augmentation of our commerce and manufactures.” (Comber on National Subsistence, p. 180.)

These estimates are, no doubt, very loose and unsatisfactory, but the fact of a large increase of produce is unquestionable. In the Report of the House of Commons on Waste Lands, drawn up in 1797, the number of acts passed tor inclosing, and the number of acres inclosed, in the following reigns, are thus stated:
[table]

It deserves particular notice, that from 1771 to 1791, both inclusive, the period when these great agricultural [7:7:340]improvements were principally carried on, there was no rise of prices.

The landholders, however, could not but consider the liberty of importation granted by the act of 1773 as injurious to their interests, inasmuch as it prevented prices from rising with the increased demand. A clamour, therefore, was raised against that law; and, in addition to this interested feeling, a dread of becoming habitually dependent on foreigners for supplies of corn operated with many, and produced a pretty general acquiescence in the act of 1791, by which the price, when importation could take place at the low duty of 6d., was raised to 54s., under 54s. and above 50s. a middle duty of 2s. 6d., and under 50s. a prohibitory duty of 24s. 3d., were exigible. The bounty continued as before, and exportation without bounty was allowed to 46s. It was also enacted that foreign wheat might be imported, stored under the king’s locks, and again exported free of duty; but if sold for home consumption in the kingdom, it became liable to a warehouse-duty of 2s. 6d. in addition to the ordinary duties payable at the time of sale.

Mr Comber has justly blamed this imposition of duties on the warehousing of foreign corn; but the deficient crops of 1795 and 1797, followed as they were by a great' rise of prices, superseded these provisions, and even caused the granting of high bounties on importation.

In 1797 the Bank of England was restricted from paying in specie, and the consequent facility of obtaining discounts gave a fresh stimulus to agriculture; the efficacy of which was most powerfully assisted by the great scarcity and high prices of 1800 and 1801. These may indeed be said to have inspired all classes with a sort of agricultural mania; and as the prices of 1802 and 1803 would not permit the profitable cultivation of the poor soils which had been taken into tillage during the scarcity, a new corn law was loudly called for by the farmers, and passed in 1804. This act imposed a prohibitory duty of 24s. 3d. per quarter on all w heat imported when the home price was at or below 63s.; between 63s. and 60s. a middle duty of 2s. 6d. was paid; and above 66s. a nominal duty of 6d. The price at which the bounty was paid on exportation was extended to 40s. and exportation without bounty to 54s. By the act of 1791, the maritime counties of England had been divided into twelve districts, and importation and exportation had been regulated by the particular prices of each; but by the act of 1801, they were regulated in England by the aggregate average of the twelve maritime districts, and in Scotland by the aggregate average of the four maritime districts. The averages, as at present, were taken at four periods in the year, and the ports were either open or shut for not less than three months. This method of ascertaining prices was, however, modified in the following season, and it was then fixed that importation both in England and Scotland should be regulated by the average price of the whole ,twelve maritime districts.

To prohibit the importation of the necessaries of life into a country where the supply is short of the demand, till prices rise to a certain height, has an obvious tendency to raise them still higher. In 1805 the crop was very considerably deficient, and the average price of that year was about 22s. above the price at which importation was allowed by the act of 1804. The depreciation of paper compared with bullion, being at that time about four per cent., the high price must have been ov, ing to the new corn law preventing importation till the home price was high, and then cramping mercantile operations; and to the war rendering the cost of importation unusually great. In 1806, 1807, and 1808, the depreciation of paper, compared with bullion, continued at nearly four per cent.; and the price of wheat in these years being generally from 66s. to 75s., a small importation only took place. From autumn 1808 to spring 1814, the depreciation of our currency was rapid beyond all former example; and several crops in that interval being likewise deficient, the money price of corn, influenced by both causes, rose to a surprising height. The following is a statement of the money or paper price, and the bullion price of corn, from 1809 to 1814, both inclusive:—
[table]

The crops of 1809 and 1810 were much below an average, and the bullion price of these years is a good deal higher than the importation price fixed by the act of 1804. This excess is to be ascribed partly to that law, and partly to the extraordinary difficulties then thrown in the way of importing grain. At that time no vessel could be loaded in any continental port for England, without purchasing a license; and the freight and insurance were at least Jive times as high as during peace. The same causes operated in 1812; but in the autumn of 1813 the destruction of Napoleon’s anti-commercial system having increased the facilities of importation, a large quantity of corn was poured into the kingdom; and in 1814 its bullion price was reduced below the point at which importation was allowed.

Before this fall of price, a committee of the House of Commons had been appointed to inquire into the state of the laws affecting the corn trade; and their report (dated 11th May 1813) recommended a very great extension of the rates at which exportation was formerly allowable, and when importation free of duty could take place. The recommendation of this committee was not adopted by the House; but the fact of its having been made when the home price was at least 112s. per quarter, displays a surprising solicitude to exclude foreigners from all competition with the home growers.

The lessening of the dependence of the country on foreign supplies formed the sole ostensible ground on which this committee proposed to alter the act of 1804. But after the fall of price in autumn 1813, and in the early part of 1814, it became obvious, on comparing our former prices with those of the Continent, that, without an alteration of the existing law, this dependence would be considerably’ increased; that a good deal of the poor lands, which the recent high prices had forced into cultivation, would have to be thrown into pasturage; and that rents would be materially reduced. These consequences alarmed the landlords and occupiers, and in the early part of the session of 1814 a series of resolutions were voted by the House of Commons, declaring that it was expedient to repeal the bounty; to permit the free exportation of corn, whatever might be the home price, and to impose a graduated scnle of duties on foreign corn when imported. Thus, wheat imported when the home price was at or under 64s. was to pay a duty of 24s.; when at or under 65s. a duty of 23s.; and so on till the home price reached 86s. when the duty was reduced to Is., at which it became stationary. Corn imported from the British colonies in North America was to pay only half the above duties. As soon as these resolutions were agreed to, two bills founded on them, one regulating the importation of foreign corn, and another repealing the bounty, and permitting unrestricted exportation, were introduced. Very little attention was paid to [7:7:341]the last of these bills; but that which imposed fresh duties on importation encountered a very keen opposition. The manufacturers, and every class not directly supported by agriculture, stigmatized it as an unjustifiable attempt to keep up the price of food, and to secure excessive rents and large profits to landlords and farmers, at the expense of the consumers. Meetings were generally held, and resolutions entered into strongly expressive of this sentiment, and dwelling on the fatal consequences that a continuance of high prices would have on our manufactures, in a season of peace, when we could no longer monopolize the commerce of the world. This opposition, coupled with the indecision of ministers, and perhaps, too, with an expectation, on the part of some of the landlords, that prices would speedily rise, without any legislative interference, caused the miscarriage of this bill. The other was passed into a law.

Committees of both houses of parliament were appointed in 1814 to examine evidence and to report on the state of the corn trade; and a great number of the most eminent agriculturists were in consequence examined. The witnesses were unanimous in this only, that the protecting prices fixed by the act of 1804 were insufficient to enable the farmers to make good the engagements into which they had subsequently entered, and to continue the cultivation of the inferior lands lately brought under tillage. Some of them thought 120s. ought to be fixed as the limit when wheat might be imported free of duty; others varied from 90s. to 100s.; others from 80s. to 90s.; and a few from 70s. to 80s. The general opinion, however, seemed to be that 80s. would answer; and, as prices continued to decline, a set of resolutions, founded on this assumption, were submitted to the House of Commons by Mr Robinson (now Lord Goderich), and having been agreed to, a bill founded on them was, after a very violent opposition, carried in both houses by immense majorities, and finally passed into a law (55th George 111. c. 26).

The agriculturists confidently expected that this act would immediately raise prices, and render them steady at about 80s. But, for reasons which will be afterwards stated, these expectations were entirely disappointed , and there has been a more ruinous fluctuation of prices since 1815, when it was passed, than in any previous period of our recent history. In 1821, when prices had sunk very low, a committee of the House of Commons was appointed to inquire into the causes of the depressed state of agriculture, and to report their observations thereupon. This committee, after examining a number of witnesses, drew up a report, which, though not free from error, is a very valuable document. It contains a forcible exposition of the pernicious influence of the law of 1815, of which it suggested several important modifications. These, however, were not adopted; and as the low prices and consequent distress of the agriculturists continued, the subject was brought under the consideration of parliament in the following year. After a good deal of discussion, a new act was then passed (3d Geo. IV. cap. 60), which enacted, that, after prices had risen to the limit of free importation fixed by the act of 1815, that act was to cease, and the new statute to come into operation. This statute lowered the prices fixed by the act of 1815, at which importation could take place for home consumption, to the following sums, viz.
[table]

But in order to prevent any violent oscillation of prices from a large supply of grain being suddenly thrown upon the market, it was enacted, that a duty of 17s. a quarter should be laid on all wheat imported from foreign countries during the first three months after the opening of the ports if the price was between 70s. and 80s. a quarter, and of 12s. afterwards; and if the price was between 80s. and 85s. the duty was to be 10s. during the first three months, and 5s. afterwards; and if the price should exceed 85s∙ the duty was to be constant at Is.; and proportionally for other sorts of grain.

This act, by preventing importation until the home price rose to 70s. and then loading the quantities imported between that limit and the limit of 80s. with heavy duties, was certainly more favourable to the views of the agriculturists than the act of 1815. But, unluckily for them, no species of corn except barley was sufficiently high while this act existed to bring it into operation.

In 1825, the first approach was made to a better system, by permitting the importation of wheat from British North America, without reference to the price at home, on payment of a duty of 5s. a quarter. But the act for this purpose was passed with difficulty, and was limited to one year’s duration.

Owing to the drought which prevailed during the summer of 1826, there was every prospect that there would be a great deficiency in the crops of that year; and in order to prevent the disastrous consequences that might have taken place had importation been prevented until the season was too far advanced for bringing supplies from the great corn markets in the north of Europe, his majesty was authorized to admit 500,000 quarters of foreign wheat, on payment of such duties as the order in council for its importation should declare. And when it was ascertained that the crops of oats, peas, &c. were greatly below ,an average, ministers issued an order in council, on their own responsibility, on the 1st of September, authorizing the immediate importation of oats on payment of a duty of 2s. 6d. a boll, and of rye, peas, and beans, on payment of a duty of 3s. 6d. a quarter. A considerable quantity of oats was imported under this order, the timely appearance of which had no doubt a considerable effect in mitigating the pernicious consequences arising from the deficiency of that species of grain. Ministers obtained an indemnity for this order in the subsequent meeting of parliament.

Nothing could more strikingly evince the impolicy of the acts of 1815 and. 1822 than the necessity under which the legislature and government had been placed of passing the temporary acts and issuing the orders alluded to. The more intelligent portion of the agriculturists began at length to perceive that the corn laws were not really calculated to produce the advantages they had anticipated; and a conviction that increased facilities should be given to importation becanie general throughout the country. The same conviction made considerable progress in the House of Commons; so much so, that several members who supported the measures adopted in 1815 and 1822 expressed themselves satisfied that the principle of exclusion had been carried too far, and that a more liberal system should be adopted. Ministers having participated in these sentiments, Mr Canning moved a senes of resolutions, as the foundation of a new corn law, on the 1st of March 1827. These resolutions bore that foreign corn might be imported, at all times, free of duty, for warehousing; and that it should always be admissible for home consumption on payment of certain duties. Thus, in the instance of wheat, it was resolved that, when the home price was at or above 70s. a quarter, the duty should be a fixed one of Is. a quarter; and that for every shilling [7:7:342]that the price fell below 70s. a duty of 2s. should be imposed; so that, when the price was at 69s., the duty on importation was to be 2s.; when at 68s. the duty was to be 4s. and so on. The limit at which the constant duty of Is. a quarter was to take place in the case of barley was originally fixed at 37s.; but it was subsequently raised to 40s.; the duty increasing by Is. 6d. for every shilling which the price fell below that limit. The limit at which the constant duty of Is. a quarter was to take place in the case of oats was originally fixed at 28s.; but it was subsequently raised to 33s., the duty increasing at the rate of Is. a quarter for every shilling that the price fell below that limit. The duty on colonial wheat was fixed at 6d∙ the quarter when the home price was above 65s.; and when the price was under that sum, the duty was constant at 5s.; the duties on other descriptions of colonial grain were similar. These resolutions were agreed to by a large majority; and a bill founded on them was subsequently carried through the House of Commons. Owing, however, to the change of ministers which took place in the interim, several peers originally favourable to the bill, and some even who assisted in its preparation, saw reason to become amongst its most violent opponents: a clause moved by the Duke of Wellington interdicting all importation until the home price exceeded 66s. having been carried in the Lords, ministers gave up the bill, justly considering that such a clause was entirely subversive of its principle.

A new set of resolutions with respect to the corn trade were brought forward in 1828 by Mr Charles Grant. They were founded upon the same principles as those which had been rejected during the previous session. But the duty was not made to vary equally, as in Mr Canning’s resolutions, with every equal variation of price; it being 18s. 8d. when the home price was 67s. the imperial quarter, and 10s. 8d. only when it was 70s.; a difference of 3s. in the price making a difference of no less than 8s. in the duty. The point when the fixed duty of Is. was to commence was fixed at 73s. a quarter. We subjoin a table of the duties imposed by the act founded on Mr Grant’s resolutions (9 Geo. IV. cap. 60), by which the corn trade is at present regulated.
[table]
[table]

The prices which govern the duties and regulations in this act are ascertained from the sales of corn in most of the principal towns of England. The dealers are bound, under a penalty for each omission, to make weekly returns of these sales to the corn inspectors resident in the different towns, who report them to the comptroller of corn [7:7:343]returns at London. The latter deduces from them a general average price, which is weekly published in the Gazette. Attempts have sometimes been made to falsify the average, by making reports of íietitious sales; but it is generally believed that the prices as reported have corresponded very closely with the real prices at the time.

Besides the objections which, it will be immediately shown, may be made to all protecting duties, from their tendency to force up average priées, and to render exportation in abundant years impossible, the duty imposed by the 9th Geo. IV. cap. 60, is liable to some which may be looked upon as peculiar to itself. From the way in which it is graduated, it introduces a new element of uncertainty into every transaction connected with the corn trade, producing a disinclination on the part of the merchant to import, and of the foreigner to raiŝe corn for our markets. Suppose a merchant commissions a cargo of wheat when the price is at 7Is. a quarter, in the event of the price declining only 3s. or to 68s., the duty will rise from 6s. 8d. to 16s. 8d.; and if the merchant brings the grain to market he will realise 13s. a quarter less than he expected, and 10s. less than he would have done had there been no duty, or the duty been constant '

It may perhaps be said, that if, on the one hand, the present scale of duties be injurious to the merchant when prices are falling, and when importation is consequently either unnecessary, or of less advantage, it is, on the other hand, equally advantageous to him, when prices are rising, and when the public interests require that importation should be encouraged; but the prices in the view of the merchant when he gives an order are usually such as he supposes will yield a fair profit; and if they rise, this rise would, supposing the duty to be constant, yield such an extra profit as would of itself encourage him to increase his importations to the utmost. If it were possible to devise a system that would diminish the losses of the merchants engaged in unfavourable speculations, by making a proportional deduction from the extraordinary gains of those whose speculations turn out to be unusually successful, something perhaps might be found to say in its favour. But the system we have been considering proceeds upon quite opposite principles; its effect is not to diminish risks, but to increase them; it adds to the loss resulting from an unsuccessful, and to the profit resulting from a successful speculation!

It would therefore seem, that if a duty be imposed, one that is constant is preferable to one that fluctuates. When the duty is constant, all classes, farmers as well as merchants, are aware of its amount, and can previously calculate the extent of its influence. But the effect of a duty that fluctuates with the fluctuations of prices can never be appreciated beforehand. Its magnitude depends on contingent and accidental circumstances, and it must therefore of necessity prejudice the interests of the farmer as well as of the corn-dealer.

The policy on which the corn trade of Ireland was eon-ducted during the last century, was not materially different in its principles from that followed in Great Britain. In 1707, the Irish parliament granted, by a statute framed in imitation of the English act of 1689, a bounty of Is. 6d. per quarter on every quarter of wheat exported when the price was at or under 14s.; of Is. on the quarter of barley, bear, or big, when at or under 10s.; and of Is. on the quarter of oats when at or under 9s. This act, however, did not by any means place the Irish agriculturists on the same footing with those of Great Britain. The bounty scarcely exceeded one fourth part of what had been granted in this country; and Mr Newenkam has shown, that the prices, when it became payable, were fixed much below the average rate at the time. ^Natural and Political Circumstances of Ireland, p. 124.)

Though we are very far from imagining that Ireland lost any thing by this different treatment, it shows the spirit wbich influenced thç English government in its conduct towards that country. If bounties were really beneficial, as they were then supposed to be, Ireland had a right to every advantage that could be derived from them. We had just succeeded in putting a stop to her rising progress in the woollen manufacture; and if the government of England, and its dependents in the Irish parliament, had not been actuated by a mean and illiberal jealousy of the advancement of Irish agriculture, as well as of Irish manufactures, the same encouragements to cultivation would doubtless have been held forth in both countries.

The bounty continued to be regulated by the act of 1707 till 175Ô, when its mode of payment was changed, but the amount remained nearly the same. In the reign of George III., however,, a different policy was adopted, and several consecutive laws (5th Geo. III. c. 19, 13th and 14th Ged. III. ĉ. 11, 19th and 20th Geo. III. c. 17) were enacted, by which the bounties were greatly enlarged. At last, in 1784, the celebrated statute, 23d and 24th Geo. III. c. 19, was passed, by which a bounty of 3s. 4d. was granted on every barrel of wheat weighing twenty stone exported when the home price was at or under 27s.; of Is. 7d. on the barrel of barley, bear, and big, weighing sixteen stone, when at or under 13s. 6d., and of Is. 5d. on the barrel of oats, weighing fourteen stone, when at or under 10s. These high bounties, coupled with the prohibitory duties imposed at the same time on importation, amounting to 10s. the barrel on wheat when the home price was at or under 30s., on barley 10s. when at or under 14s. 6d., and on oats ðs. when at or under 1 Is., gave an extraordinary stimulus to cultivation, and soon caused a very great increase of tillage, and of the exports of corn from Ireland.

It is extremely doubtful, however, notwithstanding the encomiums which have been lavished on the act of 1784 by Mr Newenham and others, whether this increase of tillage has not been really prejudicial. The nature of the soil, and the humidity of the climate, render Ireland much better fitted for pasture than for cropping. Mr Young, certainly a very competent judge of such matters, asserts that wheat and other kinds of grain raised in that country are decidedly inferior in quality to those of Britain; that the crops, too, even under the best management, are full of grass and weeds, and that the harvests are generally wet and tedious. Now, surely the mere extension of tdlage under such circumstances, and this was the whole effect of the bounty, could not be advantageous. If the agriculture of Ireland had been improved, if more produce had been obtained with less labour than formerly, and if the cottage system, the bane of that kingdom, had been losing ground, it might have been justly contended that the immediate effects of the bounty had been beneficial; but it has not had, and could not rationally be expected to have, any such consequences. “Perhaps,” says Mr Wakefield, “I shall be told that Ireland under the present system is improving, and that rents of late years have considerably risen. Kents will rise by an extension, as well as by an improvement of tillage;^[8. >Such improvements in agriculture as enable a greater quantity of produce to be procured with the same expenditure of capital and labour instead of incicasing, luzccr rent. It is by the investment of capital, with a diminished return, and by the bringing of poorer lands under cultivation, that rent is really raised. ]
[7:7:344]

they will rise from an increase in the price of produce; and it is well known that they have risen in consequence of an enlargement of circulating medium. To these causes I ascribe the latter circumstance, the truth of which I fully admit, though I absolutely deny the former. If any one will show me farming buildings of a late erection, or point out a single plough of a proper construction, in the hands of an Irish farmer, whose only means of support is the cultivation of the soil, I will allow that some improvement has taken place. Is any competent judge prepared to say, that fewer acres, in proportion to the whole tillage land, are cultivated with the spade, than there were twenty years ago? Some, perhaps, may consider this system as beneficial, by affording employment to the people; but it might be observed on the other hand, that to count the grains of wheat in every barrel would furnish them employment also. In every case of this kind we ought to look to the result, for employment is useful only as it becomes productive.” (Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political, vol. i. p. 582.)

It appears much more reasonable to ascribe any real improvement which may have taken place in Ireland since 1784, to the comparative degree of freedom then conferred on that country; to the abolition of various restrictions previously imposed on its industry; and, above all, to the political privileges conferred on the Catholics, rather than to the mere granting of a bounty on the exportation of corn. A great proportion of the people were formerly a degraded sect, viewed with jealousy and aversion by the ruling few, and deprived of all political power; and it was natural to expect that a very marked improvement in their circumstances should take place after they were in some measure restored to the enjoyment of their natural rights, and had become really interested in the improvement of the country. This, in our opinion, is the chief source of the recent improvement of Ireland, which, instead of being accelerated, was kept back by the bounty. By suddenly raising prices, that measure certainly stimulated the cultivation of the soil; but the want of capital, and the consequent difficulty of finding farmers capable of taking large farms, coupled with the general predilection of the Irish people in favour of small ones, have conspired to cause a still more minute division of property, and to give a factitious stimulus to population. The mere fact of an increase having taken place in the numbers of a people (and it is on this that Mr Newenham principally relies when contending for the favourable effects of the bounty), will not enable us to determine whether it has been really beneficial. If it were possible, and we trust it is not, to give the English and Scotch peasants the same habits as those of Ireland, to render them satisfied with potatoes, mud cottages, fags and wretchedness, their numbers would rapidly increase; but it would, at the same time, be indisputably certain that their situation would be altered very much for the worse. In the same way, if we could inspire the people of Ireland with the same taste for comforts, cleanliness, and good living, which so honourably distinguishes the people of England, their number would perhaps be diminished, but their social condition would be rendered far more enviable than at present. More happiness, more enjoyment, more, in short, of every thing that is either desirable or praiseworthy, will be found in a country occupied by a comparatively few inhabitants, well fed, well clothed, and well educated, than are to be found in a nation peopled with myriads of human beings pressing against the limits of subsistence, and sunk in poverty and ignorance.

The endeavour to impress on the minds of the lower classes the propriety of being contented with the simplest and cheapest fare, is extremely pernicious to the best 1 interests of mankind. Encomiums ought not to be bestowed on those who are satisfied with mere necessaries. On the contrary, such indifference ought to be held disgraceful. A taste for the comforts, the enjoyments, and the luxuries of life, should be as widely diffused as possible, and, if possible, interwoven with the national character and prejudices. This, as it appears to us, is the best mode of attempting to meliorate the condition of the lower classes. Luxurious and even wasteful habits are incomparably better than that sluggish apathy, which would content itself with what can barely continue mere animal existence. “In those countries,” Mr 11 icardo judiciously observes, “where the labouring classes have the fewest wants, and are contented with the cheapest food, the people are exposed to the greatest vicissitudes and miseries. They have no place of refuge from calamity; they cannot seek safety in a lower station; they are already so low that they can fall no lower. On any deficiency of the chief article of their subsistence, there are few substitutes of which they can avail themselves, and dearth to them is attended with almost all the evils of famine.”

The corn law of 1804, the first framed subsequently to the union, extended to Ireland; and the price at which the bounty became payable on the exportation of wheat from that country was raised to 29s. 4d. per barrel, and of rye to 20s. 4d.; the price at which the bounty was given on the exportation of oats remained the same, and almost no alteration was made on the amount of the bounties themselves.

The shackles which an absurd policy had at different. times (see 33d Geo. III. c. 65, 42d Geo. III. c. 35, 44th Geo. III. c. 65, &c.) imposed on the transport of corn be-ļ tween Great Britain and Ireland, were not removed by the' act of 1804. These impolitic restraints were, however,, abolished very soon after. The act of 1806 (46th Geo. 111. c. 97) established a perfect freedom in the corn trade between the two great divisions of the empire; and contributed more perhaps to the general advantage and prosperity, than any other enactment framed in the reign of George III.

The provisions of the existing law regulating exportation and importation are the same in Ireland as in Great Britain. The averages by which the opening and shutting of the ports are regulated, being framed with reference to the price of British corn only, it follows, as prices are always lower in Ireland than in this country, that the restriction on importation operates most efficaciously in that country.^[9. Our readers will find a very ample and instructive discussion respecting the inland bounty on the importation of corn into Dublin, in the Appendix to Mr Young’s Tour in Ireland. ]

II. PRINCIPLES OF THE CORN LAWS.

Having completed this sketch of the history of the corn laws, we shall now briefly examine the principles on which they have been founded. And as there no longer exists any difference of opinion as to the propriety of giving an unbounded freedom of exportation, we shall confine our inquiries to the policy of encouraging this exportation by means of a bounty, and of laying restrictions on importation.

That this subject may be properly understood, it is necessary to premise, that the average value of corn, like that of every other commodity, is regulated, in every stage of society, by the greater or less quantity of labour necessary to its production under the most unfavourable circum- [7:7:345]stances. ^[10. For a complete demonstration of this important and fundamental principle, see Mr Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. ] A bushel of wheat might be obtained from the rich soil in the Carse of Gowrie at a half or a third of the expense necessary to produce it in less favoured situations, and might therefore be sold for a half or a third part of the price of the other. But if the demand be such as requires the cultivation of inferior lands, the price of the produce of the richer lands is elevated so as to admit of the ordinary profits of stock being realized on the poorest. For were it not raised to this height, the cultivation of the inferior lands would be abandoned, and the necessary supplies of food would no longer be obtained.

In the earlier stages of society, and wherever the population is very limited, the best lands only are cultivated; and as they yield a large produce with comparatively little labour, its value is proportionally low. But as society advances, and as population becomes more numerous, recourse must be had to inferior soils. A greater expenditure of capital and labour is then required to produce the same quantity of corn; and, of course, its value, compared with other commodities, in the production of which no additional quantity of labour has been required, is increased.

The raising of raw produce is, therefore, very different from any other species of industry. In manufactures, the worst machinery is first set in motion, and every day its powers are improved; and it is rendered capable of yielding a greater amount of produce with the same expense. The discovery of a new machine, or of a more expeditious and less expensive mode of manufacturing, very soon supersedes the older and clumsier machinery previously in use; while the consequent competition never fails to reduce the price of commodities to the sum which the least expensive method of production requires for their manufacture.

In agriculture, on the contrary, the best machines, that is, the best soils, are first brought into use; and recourse is afterwards had to inferior soils, requiring a greater expenditure of capital and labour to produce the same supplies. Improvements in the construction of farming implements, and in agricultural management, reduce the price of raw produce; and, operating like improvements in manufacturing machinery, so far assimilate the two species of industry. Any fall, however, which may take place in the price of raw produce, as it enables every class of society to procure a greater quantity of it than before, in exchange for their manufactured commodities or their labour, raises the profits of stock, and leads, of course, to an increased accumulation of capital. But “this accumulation necessarily leads to a greater demand for labour, to higher wages, to an increased population, and consequently to a further demand for raw produce, and to an increased cultivation.” (Ricardo, Principles, &c. p. 79.) Agricultural improvements cheek, for a time, the necessity of having recourse to inferior soils; but the check is only temporary. The stimulus which they at the same time give to population, soon equalizes the demand with the supply, and, byā re-action of a different kind, raises prices, and forces the cultivation of poor lands.

The value of raw produce, therefore (though improvements in agriculture, and other circumstances, occasionally reduce it), has a natural tendency to rise as society advances. As it becomes more difficult to raise food, it necessarily exchanges for a greater quantity of other produce. Not merely its nominal, but its real price is increased; and no person can have the same command over it as before, without making a proportionally greater sacrifice of labour, or of some other equivalent.

This circumstance, and not the accumulation of capital, by raising wages, reduces the profits of stock, and cheeks, or at least retards, the progress of all old settled and populous countries. The real value of a commodity not being regulated by the price at which the labour required for its production is paid, but by the quantity of that labour, every increase in the wages of workmen obviously lessens the share of the commodity they manufacture which belongs to the capitalist, or, which is the same thing, it lessens the profits of stock.

Supposing the value of money to be invariable, and the quantity of labour necessary to produce L.1000 worth of gloves to remain the same, the gloves would continue to sell for that sum, whether tb.e wages of the labour necessary to their production amounted to L.600, to L.800, or to L.900. The rise of wages, it must be remembered, is supposed to be quite general; and hence, if theL.1000 worth of gloves freely exchanged, before wages rose, for a certain quantity of boots, stockings, coats, &c. they would do the same afterwards, unless the labour expended on these other commodities had increased or diminished; for it is evident that a rise of wages which equally affects different commodities leaves their relative values unaltered.

If the rise of wages were not universal, and if the glove manufacturer alone had to pay 10 per cent, additional on the wages of his workmen, while the manufacturer of boots, stockings, coats, Ac. paid only the former rate of wages, he would either obtain a greater quantity of these commodities in exchange for gloves, or be forced to abandon his trade altogether. But such a state of things could not continue. There would immediately be an influx of labourers into the glove manufactory; and their increase in one department of industry, and consequent diminution in the rest, would very speedily adjust wages to the same level. As soon, however, as this adjustment was effected, the exchangeable values of these commodities would be precisely the same as before the rise of wages. The glove manufacturer could not say to the stocking manufacturer that he must have a greater quantity of stockings in exchange for gloves, inasmuch as he paid a higher rate of wages, for the other would have it in his power to answer that the rise of wages affected him to exactly the same exstent. Commodities would, therefore, continue to sell after the rise for the same price as before, but that price would be differently divided. A greater share would belong to the labourer, and a less to the capitalist, or, which is the same thing, the profits of stock would be diminished.

Fluctuations in the value of money obscure, but do not in any degree affect, the relation of profits and wages. A rise or a fall in the real wages of labour, the only one we are here considering, results entirely from a greater or less proportion of its produce going at one time to workmen and at another to capitalists. When a greater share is assigned to the workman, his wages are really augmented, and when a smaller share, they are as really diminished, whatever may be the state of money wages.

It has, indeed, been contended, that the price of labour has no connection with the price of food, and that the former being regulated solely by the supply and demand, a rise in the price of corn does not necessarily cause any increase in the wages of labour, nor consequently any reduction in the profits of stock. But the cost of rearing and maintaining labourers, independent of all other considerations, determines the lowest limit to which the price of labour can permanently fall. In a manufacturing country the rate of wages is, no doubt, exposed to great fluctuations, and a stagnation may take place in trade at the [7:7:346] same time that corn is rising, so that the labouring class may at once experience an increase in the price of provisions and a fall of wages. But if the rise in the price of corn be of a permanent nature, and if the demand do not occasion a corresponding rise in the price of labour, the principle of increase will be affected, and the number of workmen will be gradually reduced, until wages be raised to their proper level.

It may perhaps be objected, that in countries where labour is well rewarded, and where not more than a third or two fifths of the wages of workmen are expended in the purchase of corn, an increase in the price of bread and meal would act rather as an inducement to retrench from what was not essentially necessary, than in diminution of the rate of increase. Few, however, of the countries of Europe are in this situation; and as· labourers constitute by far the greatest portion of every society, no system of policy should be recommended which has any tendency to diminish their hard-earned coinforts. The experience of all ages has shown that a needy populace lose a just sense of their dignity and rights as men, and become depraved and enslaved. It is in vain to expect industry where it does not meet with a suitable reward; men will not submit to privations and labour, unless in the hope of securing corresponding comforts.

According to Mr A. Young, to whose meritorious exertions we are indebted for much valuable information respecting political and rural economy, the mean price of agricultural labour in 17G7, 1768, and 1770, was about 7s. 6d. per week, or Is. 3d. per day. Mr Young further states the mean price of labour in 1810 and 1811 at 14s. 6d. per week, or 2s. 5d. per day, being a rise of nearly cent, per cent, on the former period. But he estimates the average rise on bread, meat, butter, and cheese, during the same interval, at 135 per cent.; and, consequently, wages were really higher in 1770 than in 1810, by the difference, or 35 per cent.

Since 1813, however, the prices of bread, butcher’s meat, cheese, butter, sugar, candles, and most articles of provision, have fallen at an average from 40 to 50 per cent. But during this period the wages of some sorts of labour have hardly declined any thing; while, though the fall in other departments has been considerable, it has been decidedly less than the fall in the price of provisions. This circumstance satisfactorily accounts for a part at least of the rise of profits during the war, and of their decline since the peace; for the previous statements make it quite clear that during the war the labourers were receiving a less share of the produce of their industry than they received before it began, or since its termination.^[11. M ς Culloch⅛ CoŵmerciňZ Dictionary, art. Prices. ] The improvement in the condition of the labouring class since 1815 is indeed too obvious to admit of dispute. It is true, that in some districts of the south, where the pernicious practice of mixing poor-rates and wages has been adopted, the situation of the lower classes is far from satisfactory. This, however, is only a local, and, it is to be hoped, also a temporary evil; for it has been shown again and again that a stop may be put to its further progress, and that it may be rooted out, by merely reverting to the system of poor-laws established previously to 1795. Throughout all the north of England, in Scotland, and wherever, indeed, the practice of eking out wages by allowances from the poor-rates has not obtained, the poor are decidedly better off at this moment than at any former period of our history.^[12. EΛιnlmrgh Review, No. Ill, pp. 57—G4. ]

If the number of labourers were suddenly increased when wages rise, or suddenly reduced when they fall, such fluctuations would have very little influence over their condition. But the number of labourers, though notfixed, can, speaking generally, be increased or diminished only by slow degrees. When wages rise, the condition of the labourers is improved; for the stimulus given to population by such rise cannot have any sensible influence on the supply of labour for more than twenty years, and during this lengthened period the labourer has time to acquire improved tastes and habits; the standard of his enjoyments is raised; and he hesitates about marrying unless he supposes he can maintain his wife and children in the improved condition to which he has attained. The opposite circumstances take place when wages fall. The labourers are in that case obliged to economize; to descend, as it were, to a lower station, and to content themselves with inferior accommodations; so that when wages rise after having been for a considerable time depressed, a good deal of the influence of the rise, or perhaps the whole, is exhausted in elevating the labourers to the point whence they had been sunk by the fall.

Hence, in stating that money wages are always governed by variations in the price of food and other necessaries, the proposition must be understood with its necessary limitations∙ There is in all cases a vis inertiae to be overcome, that prevents any change of prices from having what may be considered its proper effect on wages. When the former rise, money wages do not immediately rise in the same proportion, nor do they immediately fall when prices fall. But they always vary in the. same direction, and depend mainly upon and are materially influenced by each other.^[13. For a further development of this principle, see the chapter on Wages, in the article Political Ecoaomy in this wort. ]

If, therefore, speaking generally, a bounty on exportation, or restrictions on importation, raise the exchangeable value, or real price of corn, they will also raise the rate of wages. But as the exchangeable value of manufactured commodities is not enhanced by a rise in the price of labour, it is evident that the profits ∙of stock, and the power of accumulating capital, must be diminished proportionally to the fictitious increase in the price of corn.

By extending the market for corn, when a bounty is first granted, the money 7 price of raw produce is raised, and , agricultural profits being elevated above the general level, 1 there is an influx of capital from other departments, until· they are again reduced. Thus far a bounty accomplishes, its object, and gives at least a temporary stimulus to cultivation. If the newly employed capital rendered the same returns as the capital previously 7 engaged in raising corn, its real price would not be increased. But, as we have already observed, this cannot be the case for any considerable period. Discoveries in agriculture may, for a while, prevent recourse being had to poor soils; but the constant increase of population will in the end force their cultivation. Now, the bounty has in this respect precisely the same effects as an increase of population. Both increase the demand for corn; and as by this increase we areat length forced to employ inferior machinery, or worse land, in order to raise the additional supplies, their value must be augmented.

Were the prices of corn in Britain and Spain, for example, nearly on a level, no exportation would take place from the one to the other. But if, when prices are in this situation, a bounty of 5s. per quarter were granted by our government, corn would be immediately poured from England into Spain. Limits would, it is true, be soon set to its exportation. The competition which [7:7:347]3 takes place among exporters, as among every other class of traders, prevents then* realizing more than the ordinary 'profits of stock, so that grain would be exported from England to Spain, not in the expectation of realizing the whole bounty as profit, but in the view merely of securing the ordinary rate of profit on the capital employed in its transfer. A rise of prices, though not to the whole extent of the bounty, would therefore immediately take place in this country, 'and a corresponding fall in Spain. Nor would this rise and fall be temporary. Corn would be permanently reduced in Spain, because the unusual cheapness of the foreign supplies would throw the poorest lands out of tillage; and it would be permanently raised in England, because the increased demand would stimulate the bringing of them under cultivation. A bounty to the extent ŵe have supposed would perhaps depress prices 2s. 6d. per quarter in Spain, and raise them as much in Britain. To the Spaniards it would be extremely advantageous, as it would enable them to purchase the most indispensable necessary of life at so much less than they could otherwise do; in Britain, however, its effects would be directly opposite. A few more of our heaths and bogs might be cultivated, but every class of persons, landlords alone excepted, would find it more difficult to procure food than before. The higher price of corn (supposing it not to raise wages and diminish profits, which it would most unquestionably do) would obviously be of no advantage, and could not enrich the public, since it would in the end be exactly proportioned to the greater difficulty experienced in raising the additional quantity.

Every bounty is objectionable, as producing an unnatural distribution of the national capital; but a bounty on a manufactured commodity does not increase the quantity of labour necessary for its production, and would not, of course, raise its exchangeable value. In this respect, a bounty on the raising of raw produce is the most impolitic of any, inasmuch as it not only occasions a faulty distribution of capital, but also raises the cost of production, and, consequently, the real price of the articles produced.

The argument that Dr Smith has brought forward against granting a bounty is not therefore tenable. The nature of things has not, as he imagined, stamped upon corn a real and unalterable value. The variations in its exchangeable worth, excluding the effects of scarcity and of extraordinarily luxuriant crops, though somewhat slow, are extremely perceptible at distant periods. Wheat raised at an immense expense from a worthless bog or morass, must have a greater value than that which, in an earlier stage of society, is raised almost spontaneously from rich alluvial lands. “It is natural,” as he has himself observed, “that what is usually the produce of two days’ or two hours’ labour, should be worth double of what is usually the produce of one day’s or one hour’s labour.”

“If good land existed in a quantity much more abun- ’dantthan the production of food for an increasing population required, or if capital could be indefinitely employed without a diminished return on the old land, there could be no rise of rent; for rent invariably proceeds from the employment of an additional quantity of labour with a proportionally less return.” (Ilicardo, Principles of Political Economy, p. 58.) Now, as bounties force recourse to poor soils, and consequently diminish the productive power of fresh capital when applied to land, they contribute to raise rent, and are in so far beneficial to the landlords. But the other classes of society, besides being burdened with the tax necessary to pay the bounty, and compelled to pay an additional price for their most indispensable necessaries, derive a less return from their capitals. Farmers may, indeed, reap during the currency of their leases some advantage from a bounty, but it cannot be permanent. An increase in the cost of raising raw produce reduces agricultural as well as all other profits. At the expiration of the farmer’s lease his rent is raised, and' he is obliged to employ an additional number of labourers, and to pay them higher wages, while the rise in the price of produce, as it is proportioned only to the rise of rent, or to the additional number of labourers, does not compensate the farmer for the rise in the rate of wages.

In as far, therefore, as bounties on exportation, or restrictions on the importation of corn, tend to raise its real price; or to prevent it from falling, they tend to diminish the general profits of stock, or to prevent their rising to what they would be did no bounties or restrictions on importation exist.

But bounties in every case, and restrictions on importation where, as in Britain, they are effectual, not only tend to lessen the profits of stock, and to check the accumulation of capital, but they stimulate its transference toother countries. The love of country, the thousand ties of society and friendship, the ignorance of foreign languages, and the desire of having one’s funds employed under their own inspection, will no doubt in many cases render capitalists satisfied with a less rate of profit in their own country' than they might derive by employing their funds in another. But the love of country has its limits. The love of gain is a no less powerful and constantly operating principle; and if capitalists be once assured that their stock may be laid out with equal security, and with considerably greater advantage, in foreign states, its transference to a greater or less degree will unquestionably·take place.

Mr Malthus has dwelt at considerable length on the superior advantages enjoyed by a manufacturing country possessing great resources in land. (Essay on Population, 5th edition, vol. ii. p. 24fi.) He conceives that such a country “would go on increasing in riches and strength, although surrounded by Bishop Berkeley’s wall of brass.” When manufacturing capital became redundant, and manufactured commodities too cheap, it would have no occasion to wait for the increasing raw produce of its neighbours. Its own redundant manufacturing capital would be transferred to land; and, on the same principle, when the price of raw produce fell too low, the capital employed in raising it would be consigned to manufactures. In this way the national prosperity might, in Mr Malthus’s opinion, be indefinitely prolonged.

Had Mr Malthus extended this reasoning to the world at large, or at least to the commercial part of it, it would have been unexceptionable. But unless this particular country were actually surrounded by a wall of brass, capital would be withdrawn from it as soon as the increase of population forced the cultivation of poorer soils than those cultivated in its immediate vicinity, or as soon as the real price of its raw produce had become comparatively high. Mr Malthus would readily admit that no capitalist would rest satisfied with a less rate of profit in Devonshire, and would not continue to pay his labourers at a higher rate in that county’, than in Yorkshire: but would affirm, with every one else, that either the profits of stock must increase, and the rate of wages be reduced in Devonshire, or that capital will be transferred from it to York. And had lie recollected that the laws which regulate the distribution of capital between different provinces of the same kingdom, are the same with those which regulate its distributicn among different and independent kingdoms, he could not have failed to perceive the erroneousness of his conclusions when applied to the case of a nation having any intercourse with its neighbours.

This is the worst view that can be taken of bounties and restrictions. To establish their impolicy, it is sufficient to [7:7:348]show that they necessarily check the increase of that capital which alone supports labour and sets it in motion, and by whose extent the extent of the industry of the country must be regulated. But if they do not merely check the accumulation of capital, but also force it abroad, we must be satisfied that they are among the very worst expedients to which, in order to secure some temporary advantage, or to remedy some temporary difficulty, a shortsighted policy can have recourse.

It has, however, been contended, that although the first effect of the bounty may be to raise prices, yet that, by attracting an unusually great capital to land, it ultimately causes a glut of the market, and a fall of price. That this statement may to a certain extent be consistent with fact, and that a glut of the market, sufficient to cause a temporary depression of prices, may be produced by a bounty, we do not mean to deny; but such depression cannot last for any lengthened period, unless the real price of corn, that is, unless the labour necessary for its production, be diminished.

When an unusual demand is experienced for corn, and capital is in consequence moving from manufactures to land, prices may subsequently be higher, lower, or the same as before. Their rise or fall depends entirely on the circumstance of equal quantities of this newly employed capital being less or more productive than the capital previously engaged in agriculture. The fresh capital cannot, however, be more productive, except from an improvement in the manner of working land, or from a saving of labour, which it is evident might take place without any bounty, and cannot be occasioned by it; and if it be expended unaccompanied by any such improvement, it must either raise prices or be in a great measure lost to the proprietors; for if the poorest soils in tillage do not yield the ordinary rate of profit, their cultivation must be abandoned.

In reference to a glut of the home market caused by a bounty, it may be observed that that will very seldom happen, except in seasons when there is an extraordinarily luxuriant crop, and of course very low prices, in the country to which the grain exported by means of the bounty is usually sent. Were Great Britain regularly in the habit of exporting corn, either by a bounty or otherwise, to Spain, the average prices of both kingdoms would ere long become nearly stationary, at a rate such,'that the cost of a quarter of wheat in Spain would exceed that of a quarter in England, by the cost of transporting it from the one to the other, including in that cost the profits of the capital employed, insurance, &c. But though such would be the case in ordinary years, it would be very different when there was any great diversity in the crops in either country. When prices suddenly fell in Spain, owing to a luxuriant harvest, exportation from England would as suddenly cease, and would not be renewed until the fall in this country, caused by the cessation of the foreign demand, had been as great as in Spain. A nation which exports corn is liable to fluctuations of price, not merely from the state of its own harvests, but also from those of its customers; and inasmuch as a bounty gives a factitious extension to exportation, it must also tend to render prices less steady.

But supposing the accuracy of this statement to be admitted, it may still be contended, that a nation which exports an extra quantity of corn by means of a bounty, has at least a greater resource in years of scarcity than a nation in a different situation. This idea, however, though plausible, and to a certain extent correct, is in the main fallacious. If the deficiency of the crop did not exceed the ordinary quantity of corn exported, there would not certainly be any considerable rise of price; but if the deficiency exceeds that quantity, the situation of an exporting country must evidently be a good deal worse than that of a regularly importing one. In the latter, a slight rise of prices would occasion a much greater importation; but in an exporting country, prices must not only be raised by the whole cost of the carriage from foreign ports, but by an additional sum, sufficient to determine importation into new channels.

Thus, a deficiency of the crop of Poland not exceeding the quantity of corn ordinarily exported from that country would not have any material effect on prices; but no importation to make up for a larger deficiency could takeplace, until prices had risen, not merely higher than ordinary, but decidedly higher than the prices of the countries to which Poland is in the habit of exporting.

Again, in seasons when there is a luxuriant crop in a country exporting by means of a bounty, it operates with double effect, and very little of the surplus is stored up to answer the home consumption in case of future exigencies. By forcing exportation, it hinders, as Dr Smith has observed, the plenty of one year from relieving the distresses of another, and therefore occasions, in years of scarcity, a greater importation than would otherwise be necessary.

These conclusions do not depend on theory only. If we compare the prices from 1688 to 1766, the period of the operation of the bounty, and when the exports almost always exceeded the imports, with the prices of the period from 1765 to 1792, when the corn trade enjoyed a tolerable degree of freedom, and when importation and exportation were regulated nearly by the state of the supply and demand, we shall find that prices varied a great deal more in the former period than in the latter. Keeping out of view the years in which the coin was degraded, or its value fluctuating, in 1724 the price of the Winchester quarter of middling wheat was 32s. lθfd. and in the following year it had risen to 43s. l∣d.; in 1727 it fell to 37s. 4d. and in 1728 it rose to 48s. 6d. The average price of 1740 and 1741 was 43s. 4d. and of 1743 and 1744 only 22s. Id. a fall of almost cent, per cent. And, again, in 1754 and 1755, the average price was 30s. 5d. and in 1756, 1757, and 1758, it was as high as 46s. 8d. ‘ The greatest difference of price from 1711 to 1765 is that between the price of 1744, or 22s. Id., and that of 1757, or 53s. 4d∙, amounting to no less than 148 per cent. On the other hand, the lowest price of the period from 1765 to 1792 is that of 1776, or 36s. 2d., and the highest that of 1773, or 59s. 2d., a difference of 86 per cent. So much for the bounty equalizing prices.

We have now said enough to show the pernicious tendency of a bounty'. At present, indeed, we arc secure against its operation, should it be attempted to renew it, as nothing but an extremely large bounty, or, which is the same thing, the imposition of an extremely heavy tax on the country, to force exportation, could render our corn, in ordinary years, sufficiently cheap for the foreign market. The following remarks shall therefore be directed solely to the restriction of importation ; and as we have already shown that restrictions, wherever they prevent access to the cheapest markets, and thereby fictitiously keep up the price of corn, are, as well as the bounty, exposed to the fundamental objection of diminishing the profits of capital and forcing it abroad; we shall now advert, first, to the security which the restrictive system is supposed to afford, of furnishing an independent and ample supply of provisions; and, second, to its influence in maintaining prices uniformly at a high level.

I. Where one nation has been for a series of years in the habit of iŕńporting corn from another, it must have exported some more acceptable produce as an equivalent The farthers of the corn-growing country will, after this [7:7:349] commerce is established, calculate as much upon the demand of the importing country, as on that of their own 'citizens. - They will cultivate an additional quantity of land, raise larger crops, and consequently pay higher rents, solely, because they are assured of this vent for their produce. The benefits of this intercourse are. therefore reciprocal, and the corn growers, as much as the corn buyers, are interested in a continuance of the traffic, and would suffer as much by its cessation. “When we consider,” says Mr Ricardo, “the value of even a few weeks consumption of corn in England, no interruption could be given to the export trade, if the Continent supplied us with any considerable quantity of corn, without the most extensively ruinous commercial distress, distress which no sovereign, or combination of sovereigns, would be willing to inflict on their people; and, though willing, it would be a measure to which probably no people would submit. It was the endeavour of Bonaparte to prevent the exportation of the raw produce of Russia, more than any other cause, which produced the astonishing efforts of the people of that country against the most powerful fbree, perhaps, ever assembled to subjugate a nation?’ (Essay on the Profits of Stoch, p. 19.)

But when a nation adopts a policy like that on which we are now acting, and refuses to admit any foreign corn, except when the home price reaches a height indicating scarcity, she must then, it is obvious, contend in a market to which no,corn has been brought, with a view to answer her demand. The difficulties we have occasionally experienced in importing have been greatly exaggerated; but they result, in fact, from the nature of our own policy respecting it. Perpetually fluctuating between bounties, restrictions, and prohibitions, no foreign country can ever calculate on our continuing to import their corn. We may buy a million of quarters to-day, but we may buy no more for a couple of twelvemonths. If our demand were steady, if we regularly imported, additional supplies would be raised for our market; rents would be increased; and foreign farmers, landlords, merchants, shipowners, &c. would be deeply interested in procuring us whatever quantity of corn we might require; but at present we enter the foreign market as strangers only. Our orders may be expected, but they cannot be reckoned on. Whatever supplies we may procure are withdrawn from the ordinary stoch; so that prices abroad are unnaturally raised, exportation checked, and the home price allowed to reach a comparatively great height.

Most foreign states have indeed fixed a statutory price at which exportation shall always cease. But this price is much higher than the average; and were our corn trade unrestricted, the importations into this country would not have so much effect in raising prices abroad as is commonly supposed, as a greater production would universally take place; and it is probable that foreign powers, becoming sensible of the advantages of a free trade, would soon repeal this limitation.

When a merely temporary liberty is granted to import, the operations and the enterprise of merchants are alike cramped. They cannot safely order corn from distant countries, lest the price should fall before it arrives, and the ports be shut. They are compelled to have recourse to countries in our immediate vicinity; their orders must be given on the spur of the moment, and all that consideration and combination necessary to insure the success of every complex transaction are unavoidably excluded.

The law of 1815, and those enacted since, give liberty to import and warehouse foreign grain duty free, either for re-exportation or for home consumption, when the price reaches the limit at which it is admissible; but this liberty is not of so much consequence as might be sup posed. Corn is at once a bulky and a perishable commodity; and capitalists seldom employ large funds in importing it, unless there be at the time a strong probability that prices will very soon attain the limit when it may be sold. Corn will at all times be stored up for a market like Amsterdam, because it may be disposed of aţ the pleasure of the holder, and its sale is not regulated by any contingent circumstance. In this country the case is very different. An unforeseen change of weather often checks a rise of prices at the very time that a further rise was confidently expected; and even the warehousing of any considerable quantity of foreign grain would of itself have a similar, though a less effect. By giving little freedom to mercantile operations, and preventing the importer from disposing of his commodity when he thinks proper, this system, in ordinary years, tends to suppress warehousing altogether, and, consequently, tends to deprive the country of one of its main securities against a sudden rise of prices in deficient years.

It may be further observed, that the wider the surface from which a country derives its supplies of food, the less is it exposed to fluctuations of price arising from favourable or unfavourable seasons. A general failure of the crops of an extensive kingdom is a calamity that but seldom occurs. The weather that is unfavourable to vegetation in one species of soil is frequently advantageous to it in another. If moist clay lands suffer from a wet summer, the crops are rendered more luxuriant in dry rocky districts. The excess of produce in one province compensates for its deficiency in another; and, except in anomalous cases, the total supply is nearly the, same; but if this be generally true of a single nation, it is always true of the world at large. No instance of universal scarcity darkens the history of mankind; but it is constantly found, that when the crops of one country fail, plenty reigns in some other quarter. A freedom of trade is alone wanted to guarantee a country like Britain, abounding in all the varied products of industry, in merchandise suited to the wants of every society, from the possibility of a scarcity. The nations of the earth are not condemned to throw the dice to determine which of them shall submit to be starved. There is always abundance of food in the world. To enjoy a constant plenty, we have only to lay aside our prohibitions and restrictions, and to cease to counteract the benevolent wisdom of Providence.

The case of Holland strongly corroborates the truth of this statement. In the days of her greatest prosperity she was chiefly fed with imported corn, and the prices at Amsterdam were extremely moderate, and, what is of infinite consequence, were steadier than in any other market of Europe. Even during the convulsions of the late war, and when her former commercial connections were almost all dissolved, prices fluctuated very little.

II. But, independently altogether of the circumstances already alluded to, it is easy to see that restrictions on the importation of corn into such a country as this must necessarily occasion ruinous fluctuations of price, raising it sometimes far above, and at other times sinking it as much below, the common level.

The ability to export is indispensable to the equality of prices in a country that grows nearly its own supply of corn; for, without such ability, all the increased produce of an unusually luxuriant harvest being thrown upon the home market, prices are sunk to such an extent as to be destructive of the interests of the agriculturists. But the mere absence of any legal obstacle will not insure the power of exportation. This maybe aboutas effectually prevented by the influence of restrictions Qn importation, as by a prohibition of export. Suppose that a country, either more, densely peopled, or less abundantly supplied [7:7:350] with fertile land, than her neighbours, lays a restriction oil importation, and that, in consequence, her average prices are raised 10s. or 15s. a quarter above those of the surrounding states: This increase of price will give such a stimulus to agriculture, that the corn produced at home may, and most probably will, at no distant period, become adequate to supply the consumption. But should such be the case, it is plain that the first unusually productive harvest would cause a glut of the borne market; and that it would be impossible to set about relieving this glut by exporting to other countries, till the prices fell to their level—that is, till they had sunk 10s. or 15s. a quarter more than they would have done, but for the previous enhancement caused by the restriction on importation.

The practical operation of the principle thus hypothetically stated, has defeated the expectations and baffled all the efforts of the landholders of England to keep up prices since 1815. Owing to the extraordinary encouragement given by the high prices to agriculture during the latter years of the war, we grew, in 1811, 1812, and 1813, a sufficient supply for our own consumption, the imports in these years being fully balanced by the exports to the Peninsula on account of the British army. This showed conclusively that the restrictive system had attained its maximum degree of influence; and any one who attended to the circumstances might have foreseen that the first particularly luxuriant crop would inevitably occasion a heavy fall of prices. No one, however, seems to have taken this view of the matter; and, in consequence, the agriculturists entertained the most unfounded expectations of relief from the act of 1815. They imagined that the exclusion of foreign corn till prices reached 80s. a quarter, would make them immediately rise to that level, and prevent them from again sinking materially below it. Had the home supply been decidedly under the consumption, or had it been impossible to cultivate any considerable portion of the lands under tillage in 1813 at so low a rate as 80s., the anticipations of the agriculturists might have been realized; but such was very far indeed from being the case. The home production had become about equivalent to the demand; and experience proved that a price considerably under 80s. was sufficient to enable the culture of the greater part of the inferior lands, that had been broken up during the war, to be carried on. It is no doubt true, that a good deal of the fall of price in 1814 and 1815 was apparent rather than real, and resulted as much from the rise that then took place in the value of the currency, in consequence of the destruction of country bank paper, as from an increased·supply of corn. Still, however, the fall in the value of corn, brought about by the rise in the vaine of money, contributed equally with that occasioned by increased production, to disappoint the agriculturists. The exclusion of foreign corn till the home price reached 80s. rendered its price in ordinary years, though considerably under that limit, a good deal higher than in the surrounding European countries. But when, as in 1816 and 1817, the crops were materially deficient, the restriction operated with increased efficacy, and powerfully contributed, in the way already pointed out, to stint importation, and consequently to increase the pressure of the scarcity, and to raise prices. Unlooked for, however, as it certainly was, this effect of the restriction proved in the end quite as injurious to the agriculturists as to the other classes; for by adding materially to that rise of prices which a scarcity must under any circumstances occasion, the stimulus it gives to agriculture is proportionally augmented; so that when a luxuriant crop again occurs, the market is much more overloaded than it would have been under a free system, and prices sink in a corresponding degree.

Owing partly to the deficient crop of 1816, but more to the obstacles in the way of importation, the price of corn in 1817 rose to 94s. 9d. and in 1818 to 84s. Id. Now mark the effects of these high prices. They revived the drooping spirits of the farmers, who imagined that the corn laws were at length beginning to produce the effects anticipated from them, and that the golden days of 1812, when wheat sold for 125s. a quarter, were about to return! This, however, was only a transient gleam. The increased prices led to a fresh extension of tillage, improvements were recommenced with new energy, vast additional sums of capital were expended upon the land; and these circumstances conspiring with luxuriant harvests, and the impossibility of exportation, sunk prices to such a degree, that they fell, in October 1822, so low as 38s. Id., the average price of that year being only 43s. 3d.!

It is nugatory, therefore, to attempt to obviate the recurrence of periods of low prices and agricultural distress by imposing restrictions on importation. Freedom is the only effectual security against injurious vicissitudes. Restrictions occasion the very evils they are said to remove or palliate. By preventing importation in ordirtary years, and raising average prices above the common level, they make exportation in favourable seasons impracticable, till prices have sunk unnaturally lowi This is a defect inherent in .the restrictive system, which nothing but the adoption of the Dutch plan of destroying a portion of the produce of a plentiful harvest will ever be able to get rid ofl Protection cannot be carried farther than monopoly; and monopoly cannot sustain prices in abundant years in countries where the supply and consumption are nearly balanced, nor prevent the consequent destruction of agricultural capital, and the ruin of a large proportion of the agriculturists.

We should mistake, however, if we supposed that the injury resulting from a heavy fall of prices is confined to the agriculturists. It is idle, indeed, to suppose that a system ruinous to the producers can be otherwise to the consumers. A glut of the market, occasioned by luxuriant harvests, and the want of the power to export, cannot be of long continuance; for, while it continues, it can hardly fail, by distressing all classes of farmers, and ruining many, to check every species of agricultural improvement, and to lessen the extent of land in tillage. When, therefore, an unfavourable season recurs, the re-action is for the most part appalling. The supply, being lessened not only by the badness of the season, but also by a diminution of the quantity of land in crop, falls very far below an average, and a severe scarcity’ generally ensues. Restrictions on importation turn what ought to be a blessing into a curse. They make an abundant crop productive of great injury to the farmer, and go far to render two or three such crops in succession sure forerunners of scarcity, and perhaps of famine!

The principles now laid down are so obvious, and are so completely corroborated by the history of the period since 1814, that it is unnecessary’ perhaps to enlarge further on this part of our subject. But the following extract from a speech of Mr Huskisson in 1825 exposes the principal defects of the existing system, in so forcible, and at the same time so popular a manner, that we shall take the liberty’ to lay it before the reader:

“He had always understood that the great desideratum in this important question was to provide for steady prices, and to guard against excessive fluctuations from the vicissitudes of trade. How did the present law provide for these ends? By limiting the markets from which we draw our supplies, by destroying the vent which we should otherwise ĩiave for our produce whenever we are blessed with a superabundant harvest, or by exposing us [7:7:351]to an alternate fluctuation of high and low prices. To say of a system which affected the price of labour and the comforts of the labourer, and which cramped the resources, not only of the‘manufacturer, but of the farmer himself—to say of such a system, that it 44 worked well,^[14. Alluding to the statement of a preceding speaker. ] ” was so completely refuted by the fact, that he was surprised that any man should be bold enough to make it. What did they think of its working well in 1822, when corn was as low as 38s. a quarter? Within two years and a half the price of corn had varied from 112s. to 38s. a quarter. Such fluctuations deprived the farmer of all security, and converted his business into mere gambling. The man who engaged in a long lease could not at present be aware of the conditions on which he was taking it, nor of the results which it might produce upon his family arrangements. But this was not the only inconvenience of the system. Look at the situation in which we were placed when a bad harvest made, it necessary for us to go to the foreign markets. The price of corn immediately advanced then. The foreign government, seeing our demand for it, laid a tax upon the article; this further increased the price; and the result was, that our exchanges were suddenly altered, so that we obtained the required supply under the greatest possible disadvantages. He had heard it said, and by gentlemen who had reflected on the subject, that if we had great fluctuations, there was in them, notwithstanding, a ĵ¾î’r average price . ’ He wondered what this phrase meant when applied to the subsistence of the people. He should like to know how any gentleman accustomed to eat a good dinner every day would like to be kept a week without food, and to be supplied the next with twice as much as he wanted. Would he be satisfied with being told that he had got a fair average quantity of provisions for each day in the two weeks? He thought that the gentleman would not be satisfied; that he would find such an average system was neither wholesome to his constitution nor pleasant to his stomach.” (Debates, 2èth April 1825.)

The previous reasonings and statements have sufficiently established, 1st, That the laying of restrictions on the importation of corn into a country that would generally or occasionally import, occasions an increased cultivation of bad land, and by so doing raises prices and depresses profits; 2d , That any obstacle to the free importation of corn tends in so far to throw a country on her own resources, and lessens her ability to profit by the provision made by Providence for equalizing the deficiencies in the harvests of particular countries by a corresponding surplus in others; 3cř, That the prevention of importation in ordinary years, by raising the average price of corn to a comparatively high level, renders exportation in a peculiarly abundant year impossible, till prices sink so as to be productive of great agricultural distress; and, ⅛th, That this distress, by defeating the plans of the cultivators, discouraging improvements, and lessening the quantity of land sown, tends materially to diminish the home supply; and when the produce of a year, diminished by these causes, happens also to be diminished by a bad season, the combined influence of the two is most disastrous, and there is both an enormous increase of price, and the severest pressure upon the industrious classes.

Such being the inevitable consequences of restrictions on the corn trade, it is surely high time that they were abolished, and a return made to a free system. The increased importation that would take place were the ports always open as soon as any considerable deficiency in the crops was apprehended, would prevent any exorbitant rise of prices; while, on the other hand, when the crops were universally luxuriant, a ready outlet would be found for the surplus in foreign countries, without its occasioning any very heavy fall. ' To expect to combine steadiness of prices with restrictions on importation, is to expect to reconcile what is contradictory and absurd. The higher the limit at which the importation of foreign corn into a country like England is fixed, the greater will be the oscillation of prices. If we would secure for ourselves abundance, and avoid fluctuation, we must renounce all attempts at exclusion, and be ready to deal in corn, as we ought to be in every thing else, on fair and liberal principles.

We are, however, willing to admit, that the restrictions imposed on the corn trade during the last ten years have not been so productive of disastrous consequences as we should have been led, looking as well to experience as to theory, to anticipate. This modified action is, we believe, principally ascribable to the very great increase of the imports from Ireland. Previously to 1806, when a perfectly free corn trade between Great Britain and Ireland was, for the first time, established, the imports did not amount to 400,000 quarters a year, whereas they now amount to 2,400,000; and any one who has ever been in Ireland, or is aware of the wretched state of agriculture in it, and of the amazing fertility of the soil, must be satisfied that a very slight improvement would occasion an extraordinary increase in the imports from that country; and notwithstanding the disturbances that have recently grown out of the collection of tithes, which, it is to be Imped, may be speedily abolished, it is believed, by those best qualified to form an opinion, that improvements are at present going forward with considerable spirit. The settlement of the catholic question, and the disfranchisement of the forty-shilling freeholders, by putting an end to degrading distinctions, promoting tranquillity, and taking away one of the principal inducements to the pernicious practice of splitting farms, have already had great influence in accelerating the progress of industry, and will, it maybe presumed, eventually lead to the most material improvements. Hence it is by no means improbable that the growing imports from Ireland may at no distant period reduce our prices to a level with those of the Continent, and even render this an occasionally exporting country. These, however, are contingent and uncertain results; and, supposing them to be ultimately realized, the corn laws must in the mean time be productive of great hardship, and must, in all time to come, aggravate to a frightful extent the misery inseparable from bad harvests.

Perhaps the most imposing of the arguments urged against an unrestricted corn trade proceeds on the assumption, that ultimately every agricultural nation will manufacture for itself, and will cease purchasing from abroad. But surely it is not meant to be insinuated that, in the progress of society, there will be no interchange by different nations of manufactured commodities for raw produce. It is evidently impossible such a state of things can ever exist until the cost of raising raw produce in different countries becomes the same. America may, and it is most probable will, at some future period, manufacture cotton goods for her own consumption; but while the cost of raising wheat is less in that republic than in England, it will be sent thither in return for some species of our produce. Nothing but the revival of the enactments of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and prohibiting exportation al together,-can possibly prevent corn finding its way to those places where its value is greatest.
[7:7:352]

Ιhat the profits of stock are diminished by the accumulation of capital, is supposed by many. This opinion is, however, fundamentally erroneous. Commodities being, in every case, bought by commodities, their multiplication cannot occasion any fall in the value of each other. If, under any circumstances, a pair of gloves exchange for a pair of stockings, and a quarter of wheat for a pair of boots, they will continue, provided they are all increased in the same proportion to the demand, to preserve precisely the same exchangeable value one with another, to whatever extent their quantities may be augmented. Thus, supposing the capital engaged in the different branches of trade and industry is adjusted in such a manner that, all things considered, every branch yields nearly the same rate of profit, it is evident that any additional capital invested in them all, according to the same ratio of distribution, would not sink the price of any one article; each would sell for precisely the same sum as before; and if wages remained stationary, the profits of stock would neither be increased nor diminished. If too much of one commodity, as of cotton, be manufactured, its relative value will fall, and the profits of the stock employed in the cotton trade will be reduced; but such an effect can only be temporary. Some other department must, at the same time, be understocked, and, yielding larger profits, will attract the surplus capital employed in the cotton manufacture. We have therefore no reason to be alarmed at the effects of competition in any department. The manufacture of one commodity opens a market for the exchange, that is, for the sale of some other commodity; and no commercial nation has any thing to fear from the progress of its neighbours. What it has to fear is, that the average profits of its capital should fall below the average rate of profit in the surrounding nations. If this be the case, its future progress will be retarded, and it will ultimately languish and decline. Neither the skill, industry, and perseverance of artisans, nor the most improved machinery, can permanently bear up against a constantly diminishing rate of profits. And let it be recollected that such comparative diminution of profit is sure to be produced by a fictitious enhancement of the price of corn.

The most popular defence of the corn laws, and the only additional one we shall notice, rests on the ground that, as exclusive advantages are granted to different manufactures, agriculture ought in justice to be placed in the same favoured situation. But it was long ago demonstrated that it cannot be for the interest of a state to manufacture at home what it may purchase cheaper abroad. If, therefore, any of onr manufactures could not exist were a free trade allowed, it would be for the general advantage that they were abandoned, and the capital vested in them employed in some other way. The manufacturers of Gloucestershire, in their resolutions against the corn bill of 1815, expressed, in the strongest manner, their acquiescence in the doctrine of free trade, and stated their perfect willingness to sacrifice whatever exclusive privileges they enjoyed to the attainment of that desirable object. It is, indeed, beyond all question that a free trade would be very much for the advantage of all those manufactures of which any part is at present exported. The fall it would occasion in the price of provisions would much more than compensate any disadvantage that even the silk or linen manufacturers might experience from the gradual withdrawal of their protection.

“Because,” says Mr Ricardo, referring to this argument, “the cost of production, and therefore the prices, of various manufactured commodities, are raised by one error in legislation, the country has been called upon, on the plea of justice, quietly to submit to fresh exactions. Because we all pay an additional price for our linen, mus lin, and cottons, it is thought just that we should pay also an additional price for our corn. Because, in the general distribution of the labour of the world, we have prevented' the greatest amount of productions from being obtained by that labour in manufactured commodities, we should further punish ourselves by diminishing the productive powers of the general labour in the supply of raw produce. It would be much wiser to acknowledge the errors which a mistaken policy has induced us to adopt, and immediately to commence a gradual recurrence to the sound principles of an universal free trade.” (^Principles of Political Economy, &c. p. 444.)

Notwithstanding the restraints on importation that have existed since 1815, the fall of prices originating in the circumstances already described, has been such as to occasion the cessation of tillage.on some of the poorer soils that were broken up between 1809 and 1814. Had the restraints referred to not been imposed, the fall of prices would have been decidedly greater; but the facts and statements collected in a subsequent part of this article show that prices, even under a perfectly free system, would not have fallen to any thing like the extent that is commonly believed; and supposing that a duty of 7s. or 8s. a quarter had been laid on importation, the fall during the last ten years would have been quite inconsiderable, and any loss the agriculturists might have sustained from it would have been far more than balanced by the greater steadiness of prices. But though it were not so, is a system that is vitally injurious to the well-being of the community to be kept up for the sake of a particular class? The rents of the landlords are not to be maintained at an artificial elevation by means that depress profits, and occasion an incessant alternation of glut and scarcity. It was not contended, when the steam-engine, or when Sir R. Arkwright’s cotton-mill was introduced, that they should not be employed, because the old clumsy machinery would be superseded, and the capital vested in it lost. No such ridiculous notion was ever entertained; but in what respect would it have been more absurd than to persist, for the sake of a trifling advantage to the landlords, in raising produce from a poor soil at an immense expense, when we may purchase plentiful supplies at a cheaper rate elsew here? Why should not the best machinery be employed in raising corn as well as in spinning cotton. If an expenditure of L.1000 suffice to manufacture cottons or hardware at Glasgow or Birmingham, that would exchange for 400 or 500 quarters of Polish or American corn; and if the same sum, applied directly to the raising of corn, would not in this country yield more than 250 or 300 quarters, what folly can be greater than to continue so disadvantageous a production, and to refuse to buy corn from foreigners with manufactured goods? Were private interests in such cases not to give way to the general good, society would at once come to a stand, and mere routine take the place of genius and invention. “Certainly,” says Mr Malthus, who is by far the ablest defender of the restrictive system, “the legislature has nothing to do with securing to any class of its subjects a particular rate of profits in their different trades. This is not the province of à government ; and it is unfortunate that any language should have been used which may convey such an impression, and make people believe that their rulers ought to listen to the accounts of their gains and losses.”

The unparalleled weight of our taxation, provided it be equally imposed, and the comparatively high wages of labour in this country, furnish no apology for the restrictive system. Equal taxes affect every part of the community, and do not fall heavier on the agriculturists than on any other class. It is only in the event of taxation [7:7:353]being unequal, of its pressing with greater severity on those engaged in a particular business than on their neighbours, that it affords an adequate ground for laying a duty on the importation of the produce of the overtaxed class, though it can never be a reason why it should be prohibited. We shall immediately inquire into the degree of influence that ought to be attached to this principle in legislating as to the importation of corn into Great Britain.

It is generally alleged that the landlords are interested in the support of the existing system of corn laws, and that they would be materially injured by its repeal or modification. But though it is probable that many landlords are themselves of this opinion, we look upon it as wholly destitute of foundation. There is not at bottom any real opposition between the interests of the owners of land, and those of the other classes. To borrow the just and forcible expressions of Sir Josiah Child, “Land and trade are twins, and have always, and ever will, wax and wane together. It cannot be ill with land but trade will feel it, nor ill with trade but land will fall.” To those only who take a superficial view of the question, their interests may seern to be opposed; but those who look ever so little below the surface, and reflect on the motives which stimulate the different classes to industry and enterprise, will be satisfied that they are really identical. What is the genuine, and, indeed, only effectual encouragement to agriculture? What is it that stimulates the occupiers to adopt the best system of cultivation, or to make the ground yield the largest crops? Can any one doubt that it is the demand of the other classes for their peculiar products? Flourishing manufactures and commerce are indispensable to a flourishing agriculture. To suppose that the latter should exist without the former, is to suppose that men may be industrious without*a mo-five—that there may be an effect without a cause. But we have seen that every artificial enhancement of the price of corn lessens the rate of profit, and the power to accumulate capital, at the same time that it occasions its transfer to other countries. It must therefore be exceedingly injurious to the buyers of corn, that is, to those classes whose prosperity is essential to the prosperity of the agriculturists. Hence it is obvious that any advantage gained in the first instance by the landlords from the restriction of importation, can only be evanescent and illusory. It may be compared to the influence of doses of brandy or opium on the human body, which, while they intoxicate and exhilarate, enfeeble and shatter the constitution, occasioning premature old age and death.

At the time when the law of 1Ö15 was enacted, the derangement which must always attend a sudden fall of prices was nearly over. Bents were generally reduced, a considerable portion of inferior land was sown down with grass seeds, and wages were on the decline. To have opened the ports under a reasonable duty would, in these circumstances, have been attended with very little inconvenience. Occurrences beyond the reach of control had paved the way for the introduction of a liberal system of policy, and it must ever be lamented that the opportunity was not embraced. But the restrictive system might at present be relinquished with still less difficulty. It will be immediately seen that priées during the last six or seven years have been such, that the opening of the ports, with a duty sufficient to balance the excess of taxes laid on the agriculturists, would give no sudden, nor even considerable shock to agriculture, while it would afford the best attainable security for moderate prices, and against injurious fluctuations in future.

When this happy event shall have taken place, it will be no longer necessary to force nature. The capital and enterprise of the country will be turned into those departments of industry in which our physical situation, national character, or political institutions, fit us to excel. The corn of Poland and the raw cotton of Carolina will be exehanged for the wares of Birmingham and the muslins of Glasgow. The genuine commercial spirit, that which permanently secures the prosperity of nations, is altogether inconsistent with the dark, selfish, and shallow poliey of monopoly. The nations of the earth are like provinces of the same kingdom, a free and unfettered intercourse being productive alike of general and of local advantage.

Though advocates for the entire repeal of the restrictive system, and of all regulations framed for the sake of protection, we are not of the number of those who propose throwing the ports open without any duty. We should do this if we were satisfied that the agriculturists were not more heavily taxed than the other classes; for, however heavy, if taxes press equally on all businesses, no one in particular has any right to be protected more than others; and to attempt to protect them all would be absurd. But though the question be by no means free from difficulty, we incline to think, that owing to the parochial and other burdens laid on the land, those occupying it are really subject to heavier taxes than most other classes. It is very difficult, or rather perhaps impossible, to estimate with any degree of precision what the excess of taxes laid on the agriculturists, beyond those laid on manufacturers and merchants, may amount to; but we have elsewhere endeavoured to show, that if we estimate it as making an addition of 6s. or 7s. to the quarter of wheat, we shall certainly be up to, and most probably beyond the mark. (Wealth of Nations, M ς Culloch’s edition, iv. p. 369.) However, we should in a ease of this sort reekon it safer to err on the side of too much protection, than of too little, and would not therefore object to a fixed duty of 6s. or 7s. a quarter being laid on wheat, and a proportional duty on other species of grain. Under such a system the ports would be always open. The duty would not be so great as to interpose any very formidable obstacle to importation. Every one would know beforehand the extent to which it would operate, at the same time that the just rights and interests of the agriculturists, and of every other class, would be maintained unimpaired. It will be seen from No. VIII. of the following accounts, that the duty actually levied on the very large quantity of wheat admitted under the present law, has amounted at an average to 6s. Id. a quarter. Nothing, therefore, can be a greater error, than to suppose that, with the proposed constant duty, the importations would be excessive. It may in fact be doubted whether they would be materially increased. Additional facilities would be given to the regular dealer; but the temptation to gambling adventurers would at the same time be materially diminished.

When a duty is laid on the importation of foreign corn, for the equitable purpose of countervailing the peculiar duties laid on the corn raised at home, an equivalent draw ∙ back ought to be allowed on its exportation. “In allowing this drawback, we are merely returning to the farmer a tax which he has already paid, and which he must have, to place him in a fair state of competition in the foreign market, not only with the foreign producer, but with his own countrymen who are producing other commodities. It is essentially different from a bounty on exportation, in the sense in which the word bounty is usually understood; for by a bounty is generally meant a tax levied on the people for the purpose of rendering corn unnaturally cheap to the foreign consumer; whereas, what I propose, is to sell our corn at the price at which we can really afford to produce it, and not to add to its price a tax which shall [7:7:354]induce the foreigner rather to purchase it from some other country, and deprive us of a trade which, under a system of free competition, we might have selected.” (Ricardo on Protection to Agriculture, p. 53.)

A duty accompanied with a drawback, as now stated, would not only be an equitable arrangement, but it would be highly for the advantage of farmers, without being injurious to any one else. The radical defect, as already shown, of the system followed from 1815 down to the present moment, in so far at least as respects agriculture, is, that it forces up prices in years when the harvest is deficient, while it leaves the market to be glutted when it is abundant. But while a constant duty of 7s. would secure to the home growers all the increase of price which the regard due to the interests of others should allow them to realise in a bad year, the drawback of 7s., by enabling them to export in an unusually plentiful year, would prevent the markets from being overloaded, and prices from falling to the ruinous extent that they now occasionally do. Such a plan would render the business of a corn dealer, and of agriculture, comparatively secure, and would therefore provide for the continued prosperity of them both. We are astonished that the agriculturists have not taken this view of the matter. If they be really entitled to a duty on foreign corn, on account of their being heavier taxed than other classes of their fellow-citizens, they must also be entitled to a corresponding drawback. And it admits of demonstration that their interests, as well as those of the community, would be far better promoted by such a duty and drawback as w¢ have suggested, than they can ever be by any system of mere duties, how high soever they may be carried.

The principal objection to this plan is, that it would not be possible to levy the duty when the home price became very high, and that consequently every now and then it would be necessary to suspend it. But this objection does not seem to be by any means so formidable as it has sometimes been represented. It may, we think, be concluded on unassailable grounds, that were the ports constantly open under a moderate fixed duty and an equivalent drawback, extreme fluctuations of price would be very rare. Supposing it were enacted, that when the home price rises above a certain high level, as 75s., the duty should cease, we believe the clause would very seldom come into operation; and those who object that it is not fair to the farmers to deprive them of the full advantage to be derived from the highest prices, should recollect, that in matters of this sort it is not always cititer possible, or, if possible, prudent, to carry the soundest principles to an extreme length; and that, generally speaking, the public interests will be better consulted by guarding against scarcity and dearth, than by securing at all hazards a trifling though just advantage to a particular class.

III. PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH CORN TRADE.

It has sometimes been attempted to estimate the quantity of corn raised in a country, from calculations founded on the number of acres in tillage, and the average produce per acre. But no accurate account can be obtain- ∣ed of the extent of land under cultivation. It is perpetually changing from year to year; and the amount of produce varies not only with the differences in the seasons, but with every improvement of agriculture. This method, therefore, has been very generally abandoned, and statisticians are now in the habit of estimating the growth of corn by its consumption. But although this is certainly the preferable mode, still the conclusions to wh;ch it leads are necessarily very loose. The consumption varies considerably from one year to another, according as the ability of the consumers to purchase happens so be greater or less. And supposing this to remain the same, the average quantity and species of corn consumed by each person can only be ascertained by approximation. Mr Charles Smith gave a great deal of attention to this important investigation (Tracts on the Corn Trade)·, and his estimate of our aggregate produce deserves particular attention, from its having been corroborated, in its more important particulars, by subsequent researches both at home and abroad, and from its forming the groundwork of almost all the estimates that have been more recently framed. Having taken the population of England and Wales in 1765 at 6,000,000, Mr Smith reckoned the consumers of each kind of grain, the quantity consumed by each individual, and hence the whole consumed by man, as follows :—
[table]

This estimate, it will be observed, does not include either Scotland or Ireland, and later inquiries have rendered it probable that Mr Smith underrated the population of England and Wales by nearly a million. The allowance for seed is also too small.

Mr Chalmers, availing himself of the information respecting the numbers of the people, furnished under the population act of 1800, estimated the total consumption of the different kinds of grain in Great Britain at that epoch at 27,185,300 quarters, whereof wheat constituted 7,676,100 quarters. The crops of 1800 and of 1801 being unusually deficient, the importation in these years was proportionally' great; but excluding these scarcities, the total average excess of all sorts of grain imported from Ireland and foreign countries into Great Britain over the exports, had previously amounted to about a million of quarters, which, deducted from 27,185,300, leaves 26,185,300, to which, if we add one seventh as seed, we shall have 29,925,057 quarters as the average growth of Great Britain in 1800.

The population of Ireland amounts at present to about 8,000,000. The greater portion of its inhabitants are, it is true, supported by the potato, and seldom or never taste bread, but we shall probably be within the mark if we estimate the number of those fed by the various kinds of corn (principally oats) at three millions, and the average quantity consumed by each individual at two quarters. This would give 6,000,000 of quarters as the total consumption of Ireland.

The population of Great Britain has increased, from [7:7:355]about eleven millions in 1800, to about sixteen and a half millions in 1831. Mr Western and Dr Colquhoun concurred in estimating the average consumption of the whole empire in 1812 and 1814 at about thirty-five millions of quarters.

The following is Dr Colquhoun’s estimate :—
[table]

Dr Colquhoun has made no allowance for seed in this estimate; and there can be no doubt that he has underrated the consumption of oats by at least half a quarter in the consumption of each of the 4,500,000 individuals he supposes fed on them, or by 2,250,000 quarters. Adding, therefore, to Dr Colquhoun’s estimate 5,500,000 quarters for seed, and 2,250,000 quarters for the deficiency of oats, it will bring it to 42,750,000 quarters; and taking the increase of population since 1813 into account, it does not appear that the annual average consumption of the different, kinds of grain in the united kingdom can now be estimated at less than forty-four millions' of quarters exclusive of seed, and at fifty-two millions when it is included. Assuming this estimate to be correct, and the proportion of wheat to amount to twelve millions of quarters, the progressive consumption will be as follows :—

Consumption of Wheat and other Grain in the United Kingdom, in a Year, Six Months, a Month, a Weck, &c.
[table]

The total imports of foreign corn in 1831 amounted to 3,541,809 quarters, being the largest quantity ever brought to Great Britain in any one year. Now, as this quantity does not amount to one fourteenth part of the entire produce, it would seem as if the greatest importation could have but a very slight influence on prices; but a very large proportion, we believe fully a half, of the entire corn produced in the empire is never brought to market, but is partly consumed by the agriculturists, and partly used as seed, and in the feeding of farm horses, <⅛c. Hence, if we are nearly right in this estimate, it follows that an importation of 3,500.,000 quarters is really equivalent to about one seventh part of the produce brought to market in an average year, and must consequently have a very material influence in alleviating the pressure of scarcity in a bad year, and in checking the rise of prices.
[7:7:356]

Tables showing the Prices of the different Sorts of Grain in Great Britain, the Quantities imported and exported, ^c.

I.—Account of the Prices of Middling or Mealing Wheat per Quarter at Windsor Market, as ascertained by tue Audit-Books of Eton College.
[table]
[7:7:357]
[table]

II.—Account of the Average Prices of British Corn per Winchester Quarter, in England and Wales, since 1792, as ascertained by the Receiver of Corn Returns.
[table]
[7:7:358]

IΠ.—Account of the Average Prices of British Corn per Imperial Quarter, in England and Wales, for Eleven Years ending December 1830, each Year, and in Periods of Five Years.
[table]

N. B The Winchester bushel contains 2150∙42 cubic inches, while the Imperial bushel contains 2218∙1 ’ J2 cubic inches, being about one thirty-second part larger than the former.

IV. Account of the Quantity of Wheat and Wheat Flour exported, and of Foreign Wheat and Wheat Flour import ed, in the following years (Winchester Measure).
[table]
[7:7:359]

V. Account specifying the total Quantities of all sorts of Grain imported into Great Britain from different Countries in each Year, from 1801 to 1825 both inclusive; the average Quantity of all sorts of Grain, and the average Quantity of each particular species of Grain, as Wheat, Rye, Barley, &c. imported in each of the above Years, from each different Country, in Winchester Quarters.
[table]

VI.—Account of the total Importation of all sorts of Corn and Grain, Meal and Flour, from all Countries except Ireland, during the Six Years ending with the 10th of October 1830.
[table]
[7:7:360]

VII.—Account of the Quantities of Wheat, Wheatmeal or Flour, Barley, Oats, Oatmeal, and all other sorts of Grain, imported from Ireland into Great Britain during the Ten Years ending with the 10th October 1830, in Imperial Quarters and Cwts.
[table]

VIII.—Account of the total Quarters of Foreign Wheat that have paid Duty for Consumption in the United Kingdom, under 9 Geo. IV. c. 60, since that Act came in force in 1828, to 1st July 1831, and the total Amount of Duty received thereon; and showing, from the total Quantity of Quarters, and the total Amount of Duty so received thereon, what the Duty was equal to per Quarter, on the Average, for this whole period: the same Account for Foreign Barley, Rye, Peas, and Beans, Wheatmeal and Flour, Oatmeal, and Maize or Indian Corn, Buckwheat, Beer or Big: and the same Account for all these, the produce of and imported from any British Possession in North America or elsewhere out of Europe. (Pari. Paper, No. 120, Sess. 1831.)
[table]
[7:7:361]

IX.—Account of the Quantity of all sorts of Grain imported into Great Britain from Foreign Ports in 1831, specifying the Countries whence it was brought, and the Quantity and Species brought from each.
[table]
[7:7:362]

X.—Account of the Value of Foreign Corn and Meal imported each year from the year ending 5th January 1815 to 5th January 1832; distinguishing the amount imported from the British Colonies and from Ireland. (Pari. Paper, No. 423, Sess. 1832.)
[table]

IV. PRESENT STATE OF TΠE FOREIGN CORN TRADE.

1. Polish Corn Trade. Dantzic is the port whence we have always been accustomed to import the largest supplies of corn; and it would seem fully established by the data collected by Mr Jacob in his tours, that 28s. or 30s. a quarter is the lowest price for which any considerable quantity of wheat for exportation can be permanently raised in the Corn-growing provinces in the vicinity of Warsaw. Its minimum cost price, when brought to London, according to Mr Jacob, would be as under:
[table]

It ought, however, to be observed, that the premium paid the underwriters does not cover the risk attending damage from heating or otherwise on the voyage; and it ought further to be observed, that the freight from Warsaw to Dantzic, and from Dantzic home, is here charged at the lowest rate. Mr Jacob supposes that an extraordinary demand for as much wheat as would be equal to twelve days’ supply of the markets of England,^[16. It is necessary, as already observed, to distinguish between the supply of the markets and the entire consumption of the kingdom. The latter is most probably equal to at least twice the former. ] or for about 216,000 quarters, would raise the cost of freight on the Vistula from thirty to forty per cent.; and as such a demand could hardly be supplied without resorting to the markets south of Warsaw, its minimum cost to the London merchants could not, under such circumstances, amount, even supposing some of these statements to be a little exaggerated, to less than from 50s. to 53s. or 55s. a quarter.

It appears from the consular returns, that the price of wheat per Winchester quarter, at Dantzic, in November and December 1830, was 35s. 4d. The exports of grain from the port during that year were:
[table]

We subjoin an account, furnished by Mr Jacob, of the total annual average quantity of wheat and rye exported from Dantzic, in the periods of twenty-five years each, for the 166 years ending with 1825.
[table]

“The average of the whole period,” Mr Jacob observes, “gives an annual quantity of wheat and rye, of 279,794 quarters; and this surplus may be fairly considered as the nearest approach that can be made, with existing mate-
[7:7:363]
[table]

rials, to what is the usual excess of the produce of bread corn above the consumption of the inhabitants when no extraordinary circumstances occur to excite or check cultivation.” {Report, p. 49.)

We, however, have been assured by gentlemen well acquainted with the country traversed by the Vistula, thatwere the free importation of corn under a duty of 6s. or 7s. permitted in England, the exports from Dantzic might be fairly estimated at from 350,0C0 to 450,000 quarters.

Mr Grade of Dantzic furnished the committee of 1821 with the following table of the average prices of corn at that city, free on board, in decennial periods, from 1770 to 1820.

√4rerage Price from Ten to Ten Years, of the different species of Com, free on board, per Quarter, in Sterling Money, at Dantzic.

In 1823, 1824, and 1825, prices, owing to the cessation of the demand from England, were very much depressed; but during the last three years they have recovered their former elevation. In September 1830 the best high mixed wheat cost 44s. to 48s. free on board, and the ordinary from 34s. to 37s.; so that it could not, allowing for freight and a duty of 6s. or 7s. a quarter, be sold in this country in ordinary years for less than 56s. a quarter.

2. Corn Trade of the Elbe, &ĵc. Next to Dantzic, Hamburg is perhaps the greatest corn market in the north of Europe, being a depot for large quantities of Baltic corn, and for the produce of the countries traversed by the Elbe. But the excess of w heat exported from Hamburg over that which is imported, is less than might have been expected, and amounted, at an average of the ten years ending with 1825, to only 48,263 quarters a year. The average price of wheat at Hamburg, during the six years ending with 1822, was 47s. 4d. a quarter. Bohemian wheat is occasionally forwarded by the river to Hamburg; but the charges attending its conveyance from Prague amount, according to Mr Jacob, to full 17s. a quarter, and prevent its being sent down, except when the price is comparatively high. We, however, are inclined to think that Mr Jacob has underrated the supplies of wheat that might be obtained from Hamburg were our ports constantly open under a reasonable duty. In 1830 there were shipped from Hamburg for British ports 271,700 quarters of wheat, 1900 of rye, 18,200 of barley, and 2800 of oats. Prices that year were lower than at Dantzic, but the quality of the grain is inferior.

Mr Jacob mentions, that the quantity of wheat exported from Denmark in the six months which followed the abundant harvest of 1824 amounted to only 57,561 quarters; and he doubts whether there were 20,000 quarters instore in that kingdom in October 1825. {Report, p. 10.) Undoubtedly, however, a greater quantity of grain would be obtained from Denmark were our ports constantly open; and perhaps we might, did our prices average about 50s. import in ordinary years from 250,000 to 300,000 quarters of wheat from Denmark and the countries intersected by the Weser and the Elbe.

Amsterdam is merely a dépôt, though a very important one, for foreign corn; a small part only of its consumption is supplied from corn of the growth of Holland, so that prices there are for the most part dependent upon the prices at Dantzic and the other great northern markets.

3. French Corn Trade. It appears from the accounts given by the Marquis Garnier, in the last edition of liis l translation of the Wealth of Nations, that the price of the hectolitre of wheat at the market of Paris amounted, at an average of the nineteen years beginning with 1801 and ending with 1819, to 20 fr. 53 cents, which is equal to 30 fr. 80 cents the septier; or, taking the exchange at 25 fr. to 45s. 6d. the quarter. Count Chaptai, in his valuable work Sur ιIndustrie Françoise, tom. i. p. 226, published in 1819, estimates the ordinary average price of wheat throughout France at 18 fr. the hectolitre, or 42s. 10d. the quarter. The various expenses attending the importation of a quarter of French wheat into London may he taken at a medium at about 6s. a quarter. France, however, has very little surplus produce to dispose of; so that it would be impossible for us to import any considerable quantity of French corn without occasioning a great advance of price; and in point of fact our imports from France have been at all times quite inconsiderable.

The mean of the different estimates framed by Vauban, Quesnay, Expilly, Lavoisier, and Arthur Young, gives 61,519,672 septiers, or 32,810,000 quarters, as the total average growth of the different kinds of grain in France. (Peuchet Statistique Elémentaire, p. 290.) We, however, took occasion in a former article on this subject to observe, that there could not he a doubt that this estimate was a great deal too low; and the more careful investigations of late French statisticians fully confirm this remark. It is said that the mean annual produce of the harvests of France, at an average of the four years ending with 1S28, amounted to 60,533,000 hectolitres of wheat, and 114,738,000 ditto of other sorts of grain, making in all 175,271,000 hectolitres, or 62,221,205 Winchester quarters. Of this quantity it is supposed that sixteen per cent, is consumed as seed, nineteen per cent, in feeding different species of animals, and two per cent, in distilleries and breweries. (Bulletin des Sciences Géographiques, tom. XXV. p. 34.) This estimate is believed to be pretty nearly accurate; perhaps, however, it is still rather under the mark.

The foreign corn trade of France has been regulated during the last few years by a law which forbids exportation except when the home prices are below certain limits, and restrains and absolutely forbids importation when they are above certain other limits. The prices regulating importation and exportation differ in the three different districts into whiclκthe kingdom is divided; and it has not unfrequently happened that corn warehoused at a particular port where it was either not admissible at all, or not admissible except under payment of a high duty, has been carried to another port in another district, and admitted duty free. But by an ordinance dated the 2d June 1831, some of the regulations in this law were suspended; and it is believed that a new law will speedily be enacted, admitting importation at all times under a graduated duty.

4. S1)anish Corn Trade. The exportation of corn from Spain was formerly prohibited under the severest penalties. But in 1820 grain and flour were both allowed to be freely exported, and in 1823 this privilege was extended to all productions {frutos') the growth of the soil. There is now in fact no obstacle whatever, except the expense [7:7:364] of carriage, to the conveyance of corn to the sea-ports, and thence to the foreigner. Owing, however, to the corngrowing provinces being principally situated in the interior, and to the extreme badness of the roads, which renders carriage to the coast both expensive and difficult, the exports are comparatively trifling; this difficulty of carriage frequently gives rise to very great differences of prices at places in all parts of the country only a few leagues distant.

5. Corn Trade of Odessa. Odessa, on the Black Sea, is the only port in southern Europe from which any considerable quantity of grain is exported. We believe, indeed, that the fertility of the soil in its vicinity has been much exaggerated; but the wheat shipped at Odessa is principally “brought from Volhynia and the Polish provinces to the south of Cracow, the supplies from which are susceptible of an indefinite increase. Owing to the cataracts in the Dnieper, and the Dniester having a great number of shallows, most part of the corn brought to Odessa comes by land carriage. The expense of this mode of conveyance is not, however, nearly so great as might be supposed. The carts with corn are often in parties of 150; the oxen are pastured during the night, and they take advantage of the period when the peasantry are not occupied with the harvest, so that the charge on account of conveyance is comparatively trifling.

Both soft and hard wheat are exported from Odessa; but the former, which is by far the most abundant, is only brought to England. Supposing British wheat to sell at about 60s. Odessa wheat in good order would not be worth more than 52s. in the London market; but it is a curious fact, that in the Mediterranean the estimation in which they are held is quite the reverse; at Malta, Marseilles, Leghorn, &c. Odessa wheat fetches a decidedly higher price than British wheat. -

The hard wheat brought from the Black Sea comes principally from Taganrog. It is a very fine species of grain; it is full ten per cent, heavier than British wheat, and has less than half the bran. It is used in Italy for making macaroni and vermicelli, and things of that sort. Very little of it has found its way to England.

The voyage from Odessa to Britain is of uncertain duration, but generally very long. It is essential to the importation of wheat in a good condition, that it should be made during the winter months. When the voyage is made in summer, unless the wheat be very superior, and be shipped in exceedingly good order, it is almost sure to heat, and has sometimes indeed been injured to suelva degree as to require to be dug from the hold with pickaxes. Unless, therefore, some means can be devised for lessening the risk of damage during the voyage, there is little reason to think that Odessa wheat will ever be largely imported into Britain. (See the evidence of J. H. Lander, Esq. and J. Schneider, Esq. before the Lords’ committee of 1827, on the price of foreign corn.)

The entire expense of importing a quarter of wheat from Odessa to London may be estimated at from 16s. to 19s. In December 1830 prices at Odessa varied from 22s. 4d. to 34s. 6d. a quarter.

6. American Corn Trade. The prices of wheat at New York and Philadelphia may be taken at an average at from 37s. to 40s. a quarter; and as the cost of importing a quarter of wheat from the United States to England amounts to from 8s. to 12s. it is seen that no considerable supply could be obtained from that quarter were our prices under 50s. or 52s. It ought also to be remarked, that prices in America are usually higher than in the Baltic; so that but little can be brought from the former except when the demand is sufficient previously to take off the cheaper wheats of the northern ports. The usual price of wheat in Canada, when there is a demand for the English market, is about 40s. a quarter; but taking it as low as 35s. if we add to this 10s. a quarter as the expenses of carriage, it will make its cost price in Liverpool 45s.; and being spring wheat, it is not so valuable, by about 6s. a quarter, as English wheat.

We may therefore conclude that, in the event of all restrictions on the importation of foreign corn being abolished, the price for which it could be obtained would not, in ordinary years, be less than 48s. a quarter, and would most probably range from 50s. to 55s.

Now it appears, from the official accounts laid before the House of Commons, that the average price of wheat in England and Wales, for the ten years ending with 1829, amounted to 58s. 4^d. a quarter; and lest we should be accused of overstating the ordinary importation price of foreign wheat, we shall estimate it at the low rate of only 46s.; so that, provided it were burdened, as we have already shown it ought to be, with a fixed duty of 7s. a quarter, it might still be sold at an average price of 53s.; and, even on this most reasonable hypothesis, there is no ground whatever to suppose, in the event of the ports being thrown open, that prices would be reduced more than 5s. or 6s. a quarter below the average of the last ten years.

We feel pretty confident that the statements now made cannot be controverted; and they show conclusively how erroneous it is to suppose that the repeal of the existing corn laws, and the opening of the ports for importation, under a duty of 7s. would throw a large proportion of our cultivated lands into pasture, and cause a ruinous decline in the price of corn. The average price of wheat in England and Wales in 1802, 1803, and 1804, years of decided agricultural improvement, was exactly 6Is. a quarter, being only 8s. or 9s. above its probable future average price under a free system; while the greater cheapness of labour, and the various improvements that have been made in agriculture since 1804, would enable corn to be raised from the same soils at a much less expense in this than in that year. It cannot be justly said that even 1823 was by any means an unfavourable year for the farmer; and yet the average price was then only 51s. 9d., being at least Is. a quarter less.than its future probable average price under the system we have ventured to propose. The landlords and farmers may therefore take courage. Their prosperity does not depend on restrictive regulations, but is the result of the fertility of the soil which belongs to them, of the absence of all oppressive feudal privileges, and of the number and wealth of the consumers of their produce. The unbounded freedom of the corn trade would not render it necessary to abandon any but the most worthless soils, which ought never to have been broken up, and would consequently have but a very slight effect on rent; while it would be in other respects supremely advantageous to the landlords, whose interests are closely identified with those of the other classes.

These details with respect to the foreign corn trade have been extracted from the Corn Trade and Corn Laws in M‘Culloch’s Commercial Dictionary, first edition. In it the reader will find accounts specifying the different items of chargeon the importation of corn from Dantzic, Odessa,&c.; and to it he is referred for further particulars, (c. c.) [7:7:365]