RIGHTS, in the common acceptation of the word, are of various kinds; they are natural or adventitious, alienable or unalienable, perfect or imperfect, particular or general. Natural rights are those which a man has to his life, limbs, and liberty; to the produce of his personal labour; to the use, in common with others, of air, light, and water.

That every man has a natural right or just claim to these things, is evident from their being absolutely necessary to' enable him to answer that purpose, whatever it may be, for which he was made a living and a rational being. This shows undeniably that the Author of his nature designed that he should have the use of them, and that the man who should wantonly deprive him of any one of them, would be guilty of a breach of the divine law, as well as act inconsistently with the fitness of things in every sense in which that phrase can possibly be understood.

Adventitious rights are those which a king has over his subjects, a general over his soldiers, a husband to the person and affections of his wife, and which every man has to the greater part of his property. The important question is, how are adventitious rights acquired? In answer to this question, the moralist who deduces the laws of virtue from the will of God, observes, that as God appears from his works to be a benevolent Being who wills the happiness of all his creatures, he must of course will every thing which naturally tends to promote that happiness. But the existence of civil society evidently contributes in a great degree to promote the sum of human happiness; and therefore whatever is necessary for the support of civil society in general, or for the conduct of particular societies already established, must be agreeable to the will of God: but the allegiance of subjects to their sovereign, the obedience of soldiers to their leader, the protection of private property, and the fulfilling of contracts, are all absolutely necessary to the support of society; and hence the rights of kings, generals, husbands, and wives, &c. though adventitious, and immediately derived from human appointments, are not less sacred than natural rights, since they may all be ultimately traced to the same source. The same conclusion may easily be drawn by the philosopher, who rests moral obligation on the fitness of things, or on a moral sense; only it must in each of these cases partake of the instability of its foundation.

Rights, besides being natural or adventitious, are likewise alienable or unalienable. Every man, when he becomes the member of a civil community, alienates a part of his natural rights. In a state of nature, no man has a superior on earth, and each has a right to defend his life, liberty, and property, by all tile means which nature has put in his power. In civil society, however, these rights are all transferred to the laws and the magistrate, except in cases of such extreme urgency as leave not time for legal interposition. This single consideration is sufficient to show that the right to civil liberty is alienable; though, in the vehemence of men’s zeal for it, and in the language of some political remonstrances, it has often been pronounced to be an unalienable right. “The true reason,” says Paley, “why mankind hold in detestation the memory of those who have sold their liberty to a tyrant is, that, together with their own, they sold commonly or endangered the liberty of others; of which they had certainly no right to dispose.” The rights of a prince over his people, and of a husband over his wife, arc generally and naturally unalienable.

Another division of rights is into those which are perfect and those which are imperfect. Perfect rights are such as may be precisely ascertained and asserted by force, or in civil society by the course of law. To imperfect rights neither force nor law is applicable. A man’s rights to his life, person, and property, are all perfect; for if any of these be attacked, he may repel the attack by instant violence, punish the aggressor by the course of law, or compel the author of the injury to make restitution or satisfaction. A woman’s right to her honour is likewise perfect; for if she cannot otherwise escape, she may kill the ravisher. Every poor man has undoubted right to relief from the rich; but his right is imperfect, for if the relief be not voluntarily given, he cannot compel it either by law or by violence. There is [7:19:243]no duty upon which the Christian religion puts a greater value than alms-giving, and every preacher of the gospel has an undoubted right to inculcate the practice of it upon his audience; but even this right is imperfect, for he cannot refuse the communion to a man merely on account of his illiberality to the poor, as he can to another for the neglect of any duty comprehended under the term justice. In elections or appointments to offices, where the qualifications are prescribed, the best-qualified candidate has unquestionably a right to success; yet if he be rejected, he can neither seize the office by force, nor obtain redress at law. His right, therefore, is imperfect.

Here a question naturally offers itself to our consideration: “How comes a person to have a right to a thing, and yet have no right to use the means necessary to obtain it ?” The answer is, that in such cases the object or the circumstances of the right are so indeterminate, that the permission of force, even where the right is real and certain, would lead to force in other cases where there exists no right at all. Thus, though the poor man has a right to relief, who shall ascertain the mode, season, and extent of it, or the person by whom it shall be administered? These things must be ascertained before the right to relief can be enforced by law; but to allow them to be ascertained by the poor themselves, would be to expose property to endless claims. In like manner, the comparative qualifications of the candidate must be ascertained, before he can enforce his right to the office; but to allow him to ascertain his qualifications himself, would be to make him judge in his own cause between himself and his neighbour.

Wherever the right is imperfect en one side, the corresponding obligation on the other must be imperfect likewise. The violation of it, however, is often not less criminal in a moral and religious view, than of a perfect obligation. It is well observed by Paley, that greater guilt is incurred by disappointing a worthy candidate of a place upon which perhaps his livelihood depends, and in which he could eminently serve the public, than by filching a book out of a library, or picking a pocket of a handkerchief. The same sentiment has been expressed by Mr Godwin, but in terms much too strong. “My neighbour,” says he, “has just as much right to put an end to my existence with dagger or poison, as to deny me that pecuniary assistance without which I must starve, or as to deny me that assistance without which my intellectual attainments or my moral exertions will be materially injured. He has just as much right to amuse himself with burning my house, or torturing my children upon the rack, as to shut himself up in a cell, careless about his fellow men, and to hide ‘ his talent in a napkin.’” It is certainly true, that the man who should suffer another to starve for want of that relief which he knew that he alone. could afford him, would be guilty of murder, and murder of the cruelest kind; but there is an immense difference between depriving society of one of its members, and withholding from that member what might be necessary to enable him to make the greatest possible intellectual attainments. Newton might have been useful and happy though he had never been acquainted with the elements of mathematics.

Rights are particular or general. Particular rights are such as belong to certain individuals or orders of men, and not to others. The rights of kings, of masters, of husbands, of wives, and, in short, all the rights which originate in society, are particular. General rights are those which belong to the species collectively. Such are our rights to the vegetable produce of the earth and to the flesh of animals for food. If the vegetable produce of the earth be included under the general rights of mankind, it is plain that he is guilty of wrong who leaves any considerable portion of land waste merely for his own amusement: he is lessening the common stock of provision which Providence intended to distribute among the species. On this principle it would not be easy to vindicate certain regulations respecting game, as well as some other monopolies which are protected by the municipal laws of most countries. Dr Paley, by just reasoning, has established this conclusion, “that nothing ought to be made exclusive property which can be conveniently enjoyed in common.” An equal division of land, however, the dream of some visionary reformers, would be injurious to the general rights of mankind, as it may be demonstrated that it would lessen the common stock of provisions, by laying every man under the necessity of being his own weaver, tailor, shoemaker, smith, and carpenter, as well as ploughman, miller, and baker.

Among the general rights of mankind is the right of necessity; by which a man may use or destroy his neighbour’s property when it is absolutely necessary for his own preservation. It is on this principle that goods are thrown overboard to save the ship, and houses pulled down to stop the progress of a fire. In such cases, however, there must be restitution when it is in our power.

Rights, Bill of a Declaration delivered by the lords and commons to the prince and princess of Orange, 13th February 1688; and afterwards enacted in parliament when they became king and queen. It sets forth, that King James did, by the assistance of divers evil counsellors, endeavour to subvert the laws and liberties of this kingdom, by exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws; by levying money for the use of the crown by pretence of prerogative without consent of parliament; by prosecuting those who petitioned the king, and discouraging petitions; by raising and keeping a standing army in time of peace; by violating the freedom of election of members to serve in parliament; by violent prosecutions in the court of king’s bench; and causing partial and corrupt jurors to be returned on trials, excessive bail to be taken, excessive fines to be imposed, and cruel punishments inflicted; all which were declared to be illegal. And the declaration concludes in these remarkable words: And they do claim, demand, and insist upon, all and singular the premises, as their undoubted rights and liberties.” And the act of parliament itself (1 W. and M. stat. ii. cap. 2) recognises “all and singular the rights and liberties, asserted and claimed in the said declaration, to be the true, ancient, indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom.”