NAPLOUS, the ancient Sechem, a populous and flourishing city of Palestine, and the chief city of the Samaritans. In the time of Vespasian it was called Neapolis, or the New City; and it is mentioned by Pliny and by Josephus under the name of Neapolis. It continued long afterwards to be known chiefly by its Greek name, which has now been changed to that of Nablous or Naplous. It is situated in a long valley, which, according to the accounts both of Dr Clarke and Mr Buckingham, is beautiful, being covered with woods of olives, corn-fields, reservoirs of water, gardens, aqueducts in different directions, and all the marks of industry, opulence, and abundance. It is situated between the two hills of Gerizim on the south, and Ebal on the north, and completely fills up the intermediate valley, so that there is no room for its extension in breadth. The town consists of two long streets running nearly east and west through the centre of the valley, and these intersected by smaller ones mostly crossing at right angles. The town contains six mosques, five baths, a Greek church, an excellent covered bazaar for fine goods, and an open one for provisions; besides numerous cotton cloth manufactories, and shops of every description. One of the mosques, built within the precincts of a ruined church of St Helena, presents on its eastern front, which is still perfect, a fine pointed arch, supported by Corinthian columns. The inhabitants are mostly employed in the manufacture of soap; but the other products supply a very widely extended neighbourhood, and are carried by caravans to Egypt and Damascus, and to the rest of the neighbouring countries. Several relics of antiquity are here exhibited. Amongst these may be mentioned the tombs of Joseph and of Joshua, which are, as usual, hewn in the solid rock, and are thus calculated to endure. There is little doubt amongst the learned as to the identity of these relics. About three miles on the road to Jerusalem is a spot called Jacob’s Well, to which still greater reverence is attached by the inhabitants, as the place where our Saviour conversed with the woman of Samaria. The resident population of Naplous has been estimated at 10,000, though Mr Buckingham seems to think this estimate somewhat high. They are almost all Mahommedans, the few Greek Christians scarcely amounting to fifty. The town is governed by a mutezellim, or magistrate, subject to Damascus; and he has at present about 402 Arnaut soldiers. The dress of the men is partly Turkish and partly Arabic, more nearly approaching to the former than the latter. The faces of the women are covered with a coloured veil, as in the towns of Yemen; they also wear a scarf of a yellowish white, with a deep red border, which is thrown over the head and shoulders. No Jews are permanent residents in this place. It is twenty·four miles north of Jerusalem. Long. 35. 22. E. Lat. 32. 16. N.
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Napoleon Buonaparte or Bonaparte was born at Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 15th of August, in 1769. He was descended of a patrician family, which had been of some note in Italy during the middle ages; and one of his ancestors, the gonfaloniere Buonaparte of Saint Nicoas, had governed the republic of Florence about the middle of the thirteenth century. But to this fortuitous circumstance he himself attached no importance whatever. A captain who had rendered his country illustrious, and by his own merit re-established the throne of Charlemagne, had little need of ancestry. “I am the Rodalph of my race,” said he; “my patent dates from Montenotte.”

His father, Charles Buonaparte, was an advocate of considerable reputation; and his mother, Letitia Ramolini, a woman eminent alike for personal beauty and uncommon strength of character. When the Corsicans under Paoli rose in arms to assert their liberty against the pretensions of France, Charles Buonaparte espoused the popular side, and, through all the toils and dangers of his mountain campaigns, was attended by his lovely and high-spirited wife. Upon the termination of the war, the father of Napoleon meditated accompanying Paoli into exile; but his relations dissuaded him from taking this step; and being afterwards reconciled to the conquering party, he was protected and patronised by the Comte de Marboeuf, the French governor of Corsica. At the date above mentioned, the man of his age was born upon a temporary couch covered with tapestry, representing the heroes of the Iliad. He was the second child of his parents, Joseph, afterwards king of Spain, being the eldest born; but he had three younger brothers, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome, and three sisters, Eliza, Caroline, and Pauline, all of whom grew up, and several still survive. Five others appear to have died in infancy; and at the age of thirty Letitia became a widow by the death of her husband, who seems to have left his family but indifferently provided for.

Napoleon’s career has been so extraordinary, that his admirers have sought for prognostics of his future greatness in the circumstances of his infancy and youth. But these persons have deceived themselves. In his early years he betrayed no marked singularity, and when his character began to be formed, its development was too profound and t∞ essentially intellectual to attract the notice of ordinary observers. His education was such as was then usually given in all the military schools. At the age of ten years, he was admitted at that of Brienne, where he spent several years devoted to his studies, and afterwards removed to the military school of Paris, where he appears to have completed his education. That he laboured hard both at Brienne and at Paris, may be judged from the vast quantity of information which his strong memory ever placed at his disposal, and which, from the nature of his after life, must have been nearly, if not wholly, accumulated at this period. He succeeded in all that he undertook, because his will was resolute and his perseverance inflexible. His purpose was strong, and his character decided; circumstances which afterwards gave him an advantage over all the world. The will depends upon the temper and disposition of the individual; it is not in the power of each person to obtain the mastery over himself. This was singularly illustrated in the character of Napoleon. If at times an appearance of uncertainty may be discovered in his resolutions, this did not arise from any defect of will nor infirmity of purpose, but from the extraordinary force of his imagination, which, with the rapidity of lightning, presented to his mind every side or view of a subject. He applied himself to studies which might be useful to him, particularly to history and the mathematics, the former of which developes the genius, whilst the latter regulates its action. His intellectual faculties exerted themselves without any great effort on his part. He had a lively and prompt conception, a strong memory, and a cool and decided judgment. He thought more rapidly than others, and thus had always time for reflection. His mind was too active to find amusement in the ordinary diversions of youth, to which, however, he was not an absolute stranger. He commonly sought for something to interest him, and this disposition placed him in a species of solitude, where he communed only with his own thoughts; a state which afterwards became habitual to him in all the situations of his life.

His birth having destined him for service, Napoleon had just completed his sixteenth year, when, in August 1785, after being examined by Laplace, he obtained his first commission as lieutenant of artillery in the regiment of La Fere. Never did he receive any title with so much pleasure as this. He was delighted beyond measure with his promotion, and the highest pitch to which his ambition then aspired was, that he might one day wear a couple of epaulettes a bouillons. A general of artillery seemed to him the ne plus ultra of human grandeur. But if he was not yet ambitious of power, he was already desirous of fame, and had conceived the idea of making himself a name by writing the history of the war in Corsica. He communicated his intention to Paoli, at the same time requesting that that officer would furnish him with the necessary information; but an historian of eighteen did not probably inspire any great confidence, and Paoli took no notice of his proposal. His advancement, however, indemnified him for this little mortification. In the year 1789, he obtained a company of artillery; and the Revolution, which broke out immediately afterwards, seemed to open up a new and more enlarged sphere of action. This is not the place to enter into any formal exposition of the causes which ultimately produced that violent shock of interests, out of which resulted the Revolution, with its long train of crimes and innovations; still less is it our intention to trace the progress of that mighty movement from the date of its immediate commencement until the moment when the subject of this notice first appeared upon the scene. Such a task is compatible neither with the object of the present article nor with the limits to which it is necessarily restricted; nor have we yet arrived at the time when, even if the case were otherwise, it could be executed in a manner corresponding to the magnitude and the importance of the subject. It appears, however, that Napoleon, young as he was, formed a very accurate estimate of its general complexion, as well as of its true bearing and direction. Aware that revolutions almost always proceed from opinions or interests compressed, or from opinions allied with interests, he was equally convinced that, when demands founded on justice and reason remained unsatisfied; when the mass of the nation had arrayed itself against the privileged orders, and a collision had in consequence taken place; the commotion, however violent, would in time subside, leaving the field open to genius, valour, and fortune, when happily united in one individual. But in order ultimately to command events, he saw that it was in the first instance necessary to go along with them; to profit by circumstances up to a certain point; and to remain in observation until the time for action should at length arrive. Hence he declared for the Revolution, because he foresaw that with it all his hopes and prospects were identified. “Had I been a general,” [7:15:712]said he, in the evening of his life, “I might have adhered to the king; but being a subaltern, I joined the patriots.”

Happening to be in Paris in the year 1792, he witnessed the scene of the 20th June, when the revolutionary mob stormed the Tuileries, and placed the lives of the king and his family in the greatest jeopardy. He followed the crowd into the garden before the palace, and when Louis XVI. appeared on a balcony with the red cap on his head, he could no longer suppress his contempt and indignation. “Poor driveller,” said Napoleon; “how could he suffer this rabble to enter? If he had swept away five or six hundred of them with his cannon, the rest would soon have disappeared.” He was also a witness of the events of the 10th of August, when the throne was overturned, a provisional council established, the king confined in the Temple, the republic proclaimed, and a national convention called to frame a charter. At this time he was without employment, and poor; wandering idly about Paris, living at the shops of restaurateurs, projecting a variety of schemes some of them wild enough, and in a great measure dependent upon the scanty resources of his class-fellow Bourrienne. But the circumstances of the times were such that he was not suffered to remain long inactive. Being offered the command of a battalion of national volunteers destined to join the expedition to Sardinia, he readily accepted it; and, upon the return of the expedition, he re-entered the artillery with the rank of superior officer, or commandant. Till the siege of Toulon, however, he led an insignificant life. But this operation proved, in some measure, decisive of his fortunes. He saw that, from the situation which he held, as second in command of the artillery, he might have some influence on the result of the siege; and the event justified his anticipations.

When, towards the close of August 1793, Toulon, the great port and arsenal of France on the Mediterranean, had, along with the fleet, been delivered into the hands of the allies, the situation of France was truly deplorable. Lyons had raised the standard of the Bourbons; civil war raged in Languedoc and Provence; the victorious Spanish army had passed the Pyrenees, and overrun Roussillon; and the Piedmontese army, having cleared the Alps, was at the gates of Chambery and Antibes. Terror, discord, and defection reigned within; whilst, on the frontiers, one reverse followed hard at the heels of another. But the allies were not sufficiently sensible of the importance of the acquisition which they had just made. If thirty thousand Sardinians, Neapolitans, Spaniards, and English, had united with the twelve thousand fédérés in Toulon, this army of forty thousand men and upwards might have advanced upon Lyons, connecting itself by the right with the Piedmontese, and by the left with the Spanish army, and by this movement might have decided the fate of the Revolution. But the allies did not understand the real importance of their position, nor appreciate the advantages which it afforded.

About six weeks were passed in assembling the force and means necessary for the siege. On the 15th of October, a council of war was assembled at Olioulles, where the conventional proconsul Gasparin presided; and on this occasion, there was read to the council a memoir on the conduct of the siege of Toulon, which had béen drawn up by the celebrated engineer D’Arcon, and approved by the committee of fortifications. Napoleon opposed the adoption of this plan, and proposed one much more simple. It was probable, he thought, that the allies would not abandon twelve thousand men in Toulon if the besiegers occupied the two forts which commanded the roadstead at its extremities; on the contrary, as soon as the communication between the English fleet and the garrison should be seriously threatened, it might be calculated that they would either evacuate the place or be made prisoners. “Your object,” said he, “is to make the English evacuate Toulon. Instead of attacking them in the town, which must involve a series of operations, and ruin the place, endeavour to establish batteries so as to sweep the harbour and roadstead. If you do this, the English ships must take their departure, and the English troops will certainly not remain behind them. He then pointed out a promontory nearly opposite the town, by establishing batteries on which the desired effect might be; attained. “Gain La Grasse,” said he, “and in two days Tθulon will be yours.” Had this suggestion been adopted in time, the result would have been as Napoleon prognosticated; but the English had leisure allowed them to construct Fort Mulgrave, and to render it so strong that it went by the name of Little Gibraltar. Nevertheless, Napoleon’s system prevailed. Instead of attacking the body of the place, the principal effort was directed against Fort Mulgrave, the reduction of which would secure the command of the narrow passage between the port and the Mediterranean, thus rendering an immediate evacuation inevitable; and in a month the desired end was obtained. On the 18th of December the besiegers entered Toulon, but were able to save only the half of the squadron; the other half, the arsenal, and the dock-yards, having been consumed by the conflagration kindled by the English as they abandoned the place.^[1. During the siege of Toulon, Napoleon, whilst constructing a battery under the enemy’s fire, had occasion to prepare an order, and called for some one who could write with facility. A young seijeant stepped out, and, leaning on the breast-work, wrote as he dictated. The writing was just finished, when a shot struck the ground by the side of the volunteer secretary, scattering dust over him and every thing near him. “Good,” said the serjeant, laughing; “we shall this time have no need of sand.” The cool gaiety of the remark pleased Napoleon; he kept his eye on the man; and Junot—for it was he—rose in the sequel to the rank of a marshal of France, and was created Duke of Abrantes. ]

The recovery of Toulon was a service of the very first importance to the revolutionary government. It suppressed the insurrectionary spirit in the south of France, restored the credit of the republican arms, and rendered disposable the force which had been employed in the siege. But the man to whose genius alone success was due did not immediately obtain the credit of this important achievement, the absurd vanity of the representatives of the people having led them to claim the merit of expelling the English. The truth, however, was too generally known to be effectually concealed. Napoleon was appointed general of brigade, and, in the beginning of 1794, sent to the army of Italy to command the artillery. The general-in-chief, Dumerbion, was old, and incapable; the head of his staff, though a man of information, wanted talents; and, between them, war was carried on without art or skill in the Maritime Alps. Napoleon proposed a plan for turning the famous position of Saorgio. His suggestion was adopted; Saorgio, with all its stores, surrendered, and the French obtained possession of the Maritime Alps. He then proposed another, which had for its object to unite the army of the Alps and that.of Italy under the walls of Coni; an operation which would have secured Piedmont, and enabled the combined force, without any great effort, to establish itself on the Po. But it was found impossible to come to an arrangement with the staff of the army of the Alps, because it would have been necessary to fuse the two armies into one, under a single chief, and neither general was disposed to yield. Besides, such an operation could not be undertaken without the approbation of the committee of public safety, which affected to direct the war from Paris, as the aulic council did from Vienna. Napoleon, however, indemnified himself by carrying the army of Italy as far as Savona, [7:15:713]and to the gates of Ceva; by which means he disengaged Genoa, then threatened by the allies, and would have achieved more important results had not his progress been stopped by the approach of winter and the imperative orders of the committee. He was superseded on the 6th of August 1794, apparently in consequence of the labours of Aubry, who had reformed the organization of the army, in order to impart to it greater solidity.

Before the end of the year he went to Paris in order to solicit employment, but at first experienced a very cold reception, probably on account of his supposed connection with Robespierre, whose younger brother he was known to have lived with on terms of friendship. The re-action consequent on the downfall of that extraordinary personage was then at its height, and threatened France with evils not less terrible than those from which it had just escaped.^[2. It appears that Robespierre was overthrown by the party of the terrorists themselves, because he had announced that it was time to put an end to their horrid system, and to return to a less expeditious kind of justice. Terror was with him a means, not an end; and it would have ceased with his triumph, as it did in some measure with his fall. The character of this astonishing personage has not yet been well developed, and it is even probable that it will continue to be misunderstood or misrepresented in history. ] Everything was in an unsettled state, and the monthly renewal of the committee of public safety served only to increase the confusion. After a time, however, Napoleon was placed amongst the generals of infantry appointed to serve in La Vendée; but he refused to act in a situation which he considered as altogether unsuitable to him, and resolved to remain at Paris, where he might be more usefully employed. This proved a fortunate determination, and soon led to service of a more congenial kind. Kellermann had just allowed himself to be beaten in the Apennines. The committee were anxious to repair the disaster, and with this view attached Napoleon to the board of military operations, with orders to prepare such instructions as might seem calculated to bring back victory to the national standards. This afforded him an opportunity of making his talents known, and probably contributed not a little to the future advancement of his fortunes. Soon afterwards, he was appointed to command a brigade of artillery in Holland, where for some time the war had languished; but before he could avail himself of this appointment, his services were required upon a nearer and more important field of action.

Since the conquest of Holland, the armies had remained half a year inactive behind the Rhine; but though military operations were suspended, the agitation of the interior increased, and the clamours of faction became much more violent than ever. The Jacobins, wishing to resume their hold of power, which the fall of Robespierre had wrenched from their grasp, raised the faubourgs against the Convention; famine excited their adherents, and Paris was threatened with conflagration and massacre. The majority of the inhabitants, however, declared for the Convention, or, to speak more correctly, against the terrorists; the deputies were delivered from the daggers of the assassins; and Pichegru, at the head of some troops, disarmed the revolted faubourgs. But the Jacobins, though defeated, were by no means subdued. The momentary triumph of the Convention became the signal of partial re-actions; civil war raged in all the provinces of the south; and the royalists, believing that the moment for striking a vigorous blow had arrived, landed at Quiberon an expedition, consisting of the corps of emigrants in the pay of Great Britain. The result of this ill-fated attempt is well known; it was defeated by the energy and activity of Hoche; and the unhappy victims whom the sword had spared were destroyed by the proconsuls of the Convention. Still the power and influence of that body rested on a very precarious foundation. The monstrous government of the provisional committees could not last. A commission named by the Convention was charged with framing a charter; and at its head figured Siéyes, who flattered himself with the idea of establishing an equiponderance of powers, and governing the state by means of popular elections. His constitution of the year III. established a legislative council of five hundred members, and a council of ancients as a chamber of revision. The councils were renewable by thirds annually; and the executive power was intrusted to a Directory of five persons, renewable by a fifth annually, and entirely subordinate to the legislative power. Although these institutions were preferable to the revolutionary committees, yet they were not less dangerous in their application; nevertheless, they were at first received as a plank of safety by a nation fatigued and harassed with all sorts of horrors and revolutions. But the Convention, dreading the influence of their adversaries in the elections, and taking warning by the conduct of the Constituent Assembly, decreed, first, that the electoral bodies, in choosing representatives to the new councils, should be obliged to elect two thirds of the actual members of Convention; secondly, that if two thirds were not returned, the Convention should have the right to supply the deficiency out of their own body; and, thirdly, that the relations of emigrants should be excluded from the exercise of legislative functions.

This precaution was incontestably in the interest of the republicans, as it served to postpone for two years a re-action which there seemed good reason to apprehend. But the enemies of the Convention took advantage of the hatred inspired by the Jacobins in order to raise the whole population of Paris against decrees which seemed dictated only by a desire, upon the part of that body, to perpetuate their power. Of the forty-eight sections, there were at least thirty opposed both to the decrees and to the actual members of the Convention; and all of them were armed, each having his battalion in the national guards. The royalist agents were also on the watch to profit by a movement which, if successful, might in a moment change the political aspect of France. Both parties, therefore, resolved to have recourse to force; the Convention, to carry into effect its decrees; and the sections, to constrain it to dissolve itself, in terms of the constitution. In these circumstances, it was proposed to Napoleon to command, under Barras, the armed force destined to act against the Parisians. He consented, upon condition ofbeing left free from all interference, and lost not a moment in sending to Meudon for the artillery. He had five thousand men and forty pieces of cannon, a force more than sufficient to put down a riot, but not too much against a national guard well armed, and provided with artillery; and he was reinforced by fifteen hundred patriots, organized in three battalions.

On the 13th of Vendémiaire (4th of October), the sectionaries marched against the Convention. One of their columns, debouching in the Rue Saint-Honoré, advanced boldly to the attack; but it was instantly checked by the fire of the artillery, which swept the street with grapeshot, and soon afterwards it gave way in confusion. A number of the fugitives attempted to make a stand on the steps of the church of St Roche, where, owing to the narrowness of the street, they were in a great measure sheltered from the fire of the artillery. Napoleon, however, promptly brought a gun to bear upon them, and in a few minutes this crowd was dispersed, leaving behind them a number of dead. The column which debouched by the Port-Royal was not more fortunate. Exposed to the direct fire of the guns stationed below the Tuileries, and taken in flank by [7:15:714]that of the other batteries by which the bridge was commanded, all its efforts to establish itself upon the quays of the Seine proved unavailing, and, after a very short struggle, it dispersed, and fled in all directions. In less than an hour the whole was ended, and the Convention victorious. This event, so trivial in itself, and which scarcely cost two hundred men on each side, had important consequences. It prevented the revolution from retrograding; it enabled the Convention to disarm the sections; and, above all, it had a marked influence upon the future fortunes of Napoleon. The eminent service he had rendered was immediately rewarded with the rank of general of division; in five days he was named second in command of the army of the interior; and soon afterwards, on the resignation of Barras, he was advanced to the chief command. He had now passed into the order of marked and distinguished men. But the situation which he held was by no means suited to his views. He longed to make war upon a more extended theatre of action, and to profit by the advantages which fortune had thrown in his way.

It was at this time, when his residence in Paris had begun to appear insupportable to his active mind, that he became acquainted with the widow of General Beauharnais, whom he afterwards married. At the moment when the sections were disarmed, the sword of her husband, who had perished by the guillotine, a victim of the tyranny of Robespierre, had been taken from her; and she now sent her son Eugene, a boy of fifteen, to beg that it might be restored to her. Her request was at once complied with, and the boy shed tears as he received from the hands of Napoleon the sword of his unfortunate father. This scene touched Napoleon; and, having gone to give an account ofittothe mother of Eugene, he was so enchanted with her elegance and grace, that he soon afterwards made her a tender of his hand, which was accepted. Such appears to be the simple truth in regard to the origin of his relations with Josephine, concerning which so many absurd and injurious stories have been circulated. Napoleon had little relish for the society of women, which accorded neither with his tastes nor his character, and in which he experienced constraint; but, being desirous to fix himself in life, and finding in Josephine spirit and elegance united with celebrity, he resolved to espouse her. The marriage took place on the 9th of March 1796, only a few days before he set out to assume the command of the army of Italy.^[3. At one time any slanderous or infamous story derogatory to Napoleon readily gained credit in this country; indeed, the more slanderous or the more infamous the tale, the greater became the certainty that it would be believed. The credulity of national hatred was not shocked by ordinary improbabilities. For instance, it was commonly said, and, we may add, universally believed, that Josephine was a woman of indifferent character, or worse; that she possessed more than legitimate influence over Barras, the first Director; and that Napoleon, by his marriage with her, cemented his connection with the society of the Luxembourg, particularly with Barras and Tallien, then the most powerful men in France. The common belief, however, is altogether unsupported by evidence, in as far at least as we have been able to discover; and there are many circumstances which seem to show conclusively that both the imputation itself, and the inference deduced from it as to Napoleon’s views in marrying this lady, were equally false. It is not denied that her subsequent conduct was admirable and exemplary; that the influence she possessed over her husband was always exerted on the side of humanity; and that she alone could overrule, by gentleness, those ebullitions of passion to which he was liable. Why, then, on the faith of mere slanderous rumour, impeach her conduct previous to her marriage with Napoleon? Is it probable that he who so fully recognised the necessity of discountenancing immorality, and who afterwards drove from his presence and his service all women of questionable reputation, would have done so had he been conscious that he had married a person of doubtful or indifferent reputation? Can any one be so silly as to imagine that the supposed illegitimate influence of such a person was necessary to the man who had saved the government from destruction, and had been appointed commander-in-chief of the army of the interior before he knew of her existence? Napoleon, indeed, always believed that his fortunes were bound up in some mysterious manner with those of this graceful and accomplished woman. But this was the superstition of deep-rooted affection, the fatalism of a love which could never have been excited by the hackneyed endearments of a woman who had carried her virtue to market. ]

Tranquillity being now restored at Paris, the Directory had time to turn their attention to the state of affairs, particularly to that of the army of Italy, the condition of which was by no means satisfactory. It was determined to supersede Scherer, who had disappointed the expectations of the Directory, and to give it a new general; and as the chief command of the army of the interior naturally led to that of an active force, provided the individual holding it possessed the confidence of the government, Napoleon was consequently appointed general-in-chief of the army of Italy. To this command he had pre-eminent, and indeed exclusive, claims. When serving under General Dumerbion, as commandant of artillery, he had turned the important position of Saorgio, and disengaged Genoa, then threatened by the allies; when employed at the board of military operations, he had digested a plan of campaign, the result of which was the signal victory gained at Lo-ano, and the possession of the line of the Apennines, as far as Savona and the sources of the Bormida; and now, whenbrought into more direct contact with the government, he satisfied Carnot, to whom the direction of military operations was intrusted, that his plan in regard to Piedmont, which had been rejected by the committee of public safety in 1794, might still be executed, with every prospect of success. These circumstances, independently of his services at Toulon, and also against the insurgent sections of Paris, naturally pointed him out as the person best qualified to obtain that success of which the Directory, at this time, stood so much in need, in order to support its credit and consolidate its power. That his talents were fully appreciated, and that to the opinion entertained of them he was solely indebted for this splendid command, admits of no doubt whatever. “Advance this young man,” said Barras to one of his colleagues, “or he will advance himself without you.” Napoleon quitted his wife ten days after their marriage, and, after a rapid journey, arrived at the headquarters of the army at Nice. From that moment the most brilliant scene of his existence began to open. « In three months,” said he, “I shall be either at Milan or at Paris” and before a year elapsed, he had grown old in victory.

The plan which he proposed for the campaign united all suffrages; for, though at once bold and original, it was, in reality, extremely simple. It had been agreed that he should manoeuvre by his right, in order to descend by Montferrat upon Lombardy, directing all his efforts against the Austrians, in the hope of detaching Piedmont from the imperial alliance. The armies of Germany being reorganised, were to resume the offensive by the end of April, and to endeavour to pass the Rhine. Jourdan, who commanded seventy thousand men on the Lower Rhine, was to blockade Mayence with thirty thousand, and to advance into Franconia with from forty to fifty thousand. Moreau, who had nearly an equal number under him, was to mask Manheim, and advance in Suabia; and it was proposed that both should unite in the heart of Bavaria. As to Napoleon, he had no other task to perform than that of advancing on the Adige; provided he succeeded by his victories in detaching Piedmont from the coalition, or in dethroning the king of Sardinia, if the latter should refuse to make peace. In a word, this plan was merely a copy of that which Napoleon had previously drawn up for the committee, and the execution of which that body had recklessly [7:15:715] intrusted to the incapable Scherer. Its distinctive characteristic consisted in the mode by which it was proposed to gain access to the fertile regions of Italy. Former invaders had uniformly penetrated the Alps at some point or other of that mighty range of mountains. Napoleon judged that the same end might be more easily attained by turning them; that is, by advancing along the narrow gorge of comparatively level country which intervenes between these huge barriers and the Mediterranean, and by forcing a passage at that point where the last elevations of the Alps pass by gradual transition into the first and lowest of the Apennine range. The military advantages of operating in this direction will be immediately apparent.

Napoleon arrived at Nice on the 27th of March, and there found the army in a very precarious as well as destitute condition. Perched upon the summits of the Apennines, from Savona to Ormea, it was too much disseminated, and its communications with France, running along the coast in a parallel direction between the enemy’s line and the sea, were everywhere exposed; whilst the soldiers were in rags, without shoes, and a prey to almost every species of misery.^[4. The allies called the French, in derision, “the heroes in rags,” and they were right; the soldiers of the republic, though destitute of every thing, were nevertheless heroes in the best sense of the term. ] Napoleon lost not a moment in placing the army in more advantageous positions, and in announcing that he was about to assume the offensive, with a view to provide for its wants, at the same time that he consulted its glory. This announcement had the desired effect. The soldiers forgot their privations, and eagerly longed to signalise their courage and devotion under the young chief who had promised to lead them to victory. Having occupied the principal roads leading from Niee to Italy, particularly that which sweeps to the north by Saorgio, and crosses the chain of the Alps at the Col di Tende, forming the great road to Turin by Coni, the Corniche, or road leading to Genoa, along the coast between the rocks and the sea, and other lines of communication, Napoleon demanded of the senate of Genoa a free passage by the city and the Boehetta, along the road leading from Genoa to Alexandria, promising, in return, to carry the theatre of war beyond its frontiers, and to insure it the alliance and protection of the French republic. This demand was exceedingly artful. If the senate complied, Napoleon would débouché by Genoa in order to overpower the left of the Austrians, drive them back on Alexandria, take all the defences of Piedmont in reverse, detach it from the imperial alliance, effect a junction with the army of Kellermann, and pursue Beaulieu as far as the Tyrol. If the senate refused, he foresaw that that body would immediately make a merit of its refusal with the allies, and that the latter would extend their left in order to anticipate the French at the Boehetta; a movement which would place the mass of the enemy’s forces at the two extremities, near Ceva and Genoa, and thus leave the centre isolated and exposed. But before this plan could take effect, Beaulieu, excited by the aulic council, had resolved to assume the offensive, and to advance upon Genoa with the third of his army, whilst the remainder occupied the attention of the French in front.

On the 10th of April the Austrian general descended from the Apennines by the Boehetta, at the head of his left wing, and having dislodged the advanced guard of the French from Voltri, attacked three redoubts which covered the important counterfort of the Apennines that descends upon Savona. Two of these redoubts were carried, but, by the intrepid valour of Colonel Rampon, the third was maintained against enormous odds during the whole of the day, and in the night he was reinforced by the divi-

sion of Laharpe. Meanwhile Napoleon assembled the mass of his forces against the Austrian centre, which had advanced from Sassello upon Montenotte; and on the 12th, Argenteau, who commanded it, was attacked in front and reverse; defeated, and thrown back upon Dego. This first success was the more important, as it completely disconcerted the combinations of the enemy. In order to profit by it, Napoleon, leaving Laharpe to observe Beaulieu, marched against the Piedmontese under Colli, and on the 13th defeated them at Millesimo, cut off Provera with 2000 Austrians, and forced him to lay down his arms on the morning of the 14th. But the defeat of Montenotte having given the alarm to the Austrians, they now sought to concentrate on Dego. Napoleon instantly suspended his march against the Piedmontese, and returning to the Austrians, defeated them in a double combat at Dego; overpowering in succession the corps of Argenteau, and that of Wukassowich, which had hurried to his assistance. He then resumed his operations against Colli, who, pressed with superior forces in front, whilst his left was menaced by Augereau, was obliged to evacuate the camp of Ceva, and forced to retire behind the Cursaglia and the Elero. Napoleon pursued him warmly, and having again beaten him at Viconear Mondovi, drove him behind the Stura as far as Carmagnola. Another battle would have put him in possession of Turin, from which he was distant only about ten leagues, and in which disorder and terror were now at their height. But this calamity was averted by the submission of the court; and at Cherasco the conqueror concluded a sort of armistice, by which the king of Sardinia engaged to deliver up Coni, Alexandria, and Ceva, to withdraw from the coalition, and to send the Count de Ravel to Paris to treat of a definitive accommodation.

Thus, in somewhat less than a month, Napoleon, with an army destitute of everything, had gained six victories, taken twenty-one standards, fifty guns, and several strong places, conquered the richest part of Piedmont, made fifteen thousand prisoners, and killed or wounded ten thousand men; he had reduced the Austrians to inaction, destroyed the army of the king of Sardinia, detached him from the imperial alliance, wrested from his hands the keys of the Alps, and established a solid basis for his future operations. In a few days he had done more than the former army of Italy in four campaigns; he had displayed consummate genius in achieving victory, and proved that he combined with it the still rarer talent of turning it to profit, by promptly gathering up its fruits. But his hopes were not yet realised. To deliver Italy from the German yoke, and to falsify the proverb which regarded that country as the tomb of the French, was the task which he still reserved for himself, and which he hesitated the less to undertake, as the armistice had left him at liberty to direct his whole force against the isolated army of Beaulieu, now too much enfeebled to resist his attacks with any chance of success.

No commander ever appreciated more justly than Napoleon the value of time in military operations. The day after the signature of the treaty of Cherasco, he put his divisions in motion, and directed them upon Alexandria. Beaulieu, having already passed the Po at the bridge of Valenza, which he destroyed, had taken a position at Valeggio on the Ogogno, pushing detachments on the Sesia and to the left of the Tesino. By a very ingenious stratagem, Napoleon had led the Austrian general to believe that he would pass the Po in the neighbourhood of Valenza,^[5. In order to mislead Beaulieu as to his intentions, Napoleon had caused to be inserted in the armistice with the Piedmontese a clause in which it was stipulated that he should be at liberty to effect the passage of the Po in the neighbourhood of Valenza. The stratagem succeeded beyond his expectation. The intelligence was conveyed to Beaulieu, and completely deceived the unwary Austrian. ] and attack his adversary in front on the Tesino, instead[7:15:716] of operating on his rear; and, under this impression, Beaulieu directed his whole attention to the space between the Ogogno and Valenza. To confirm him in his error, Napoleon moved a detachment on Salo, as if for the purpose of passing the Po at Cambio, and, under cover of this demonstration, carried his army by its right, and rapidly descended the river, himself conducting the van-guard, in order to accelerate its march. He arrived at Piacenza on the 7th of May, closely followed by his divisions, disposed en echelons; and immediately commenced the passage of the river by means of the small craft which he found at that place and its environs. On the opposite bank the Austrians had two squadrons, which were promptly repulsed by Lannes, at the head of the van-guard, and the passage continued, though slowly, until the whole army had crossed.^[6. No operation in war is more critical than the passage of a great river in the face of an enemy; yet, singularly enough, none has more frequently succeeded. The Po, which scarcely yields to the Rhine in the breadth and depth of its bed, is a barrier difficult to pass. On this occasion, however, Napoleon, although he had no means of constructing a bridge, and was obliged to content himself with the small boats which he found on the river itself, effected the passage, with very trifling loss, and established himself upon the communications of Beaulieu. ] Meanwhile Beaulieu, being at length informed of the movement on Piacenza, manoeuvred to oppose it; but, instead of advancing vigorously against the portion of the French army which had already passed the river, he took only half measures, insufficient to arrest the progress of the enemy, and resolved to support his left on the Adda, without abandoning the line of the Tesino, where he had placed his right. On the 8th of May General Liptay, commanding the Austrian left, established himself at Fiombino, in front of the French van-guard; but being instantly attacked by Lannes, he was defeated, separated from Beaulieu, and forced back on Pizzighetone. In the night following this affair Beaulieu arrived on the ground where his lieutenant had just been beaten, and some confusion took place at Codogno, which was occupied by the division of Laharpe; but finding himself, with a few battalions, in the presence of a greatly superior force, he was obliged to withdraw, and to endeavour to concentrate his army towards Lodi, where he had a bridge on the Adda, leaving his right to gain Cassano as it best might; an attempt in which it would not have succeeded, if the difficulties inseparable from the passage of a great river had not retarded the march of the French troops.

Although the road to Milan had thus been laid open, yet the possession of that important place could be of but little avail, and would necessarily be very insecure, as long as the enemy were able to maintain themselves behind the Adda. It was therefore of primary importance to force them to retire; and with this view Napoleon marched on Lodi, at the head of the grenadiers and the corps of Massena and Augereau, leaving before Pizzighetone a division to mask that place and cover his right, and taking measures for the safety of his left, by directing Serrurier upon Pavia. On the 10th he arrived before Lodi, where Beaulieu, having retired with the main body of his army to Crema, had left General Sebottendorf with ten thousand men to defend both sides of the Adda. By means of this strong rear-guard the enemy had hoped to preserve the bridge of Lodi, which was defended by twenty pieces of cannon established on the left bank; but they soon found that they had reckoned without their host. A battalion and some squadrons which occupied the town of Lodi were, without much difficulty, dislodged, and the French reached the bridge before the enemy’s workmen had time to cut it down. Napoleon instantly formed his grenadiers in close column, and rushed along the bridge. The troops advanced with loud shouts to the attack, but, being assailed by a perfect storm of grape-shot, they hesitated for a moment, and began to waver. The generals, including Napoleon himself, hurried to the front, cheering and animating the men by their example. The effect was electric. The column dashed along the bridge in spite of the tempest of fire which thinned their ranks, overthrew all that opposed their progress, carried the enemy’s batteries at the point of the bayonet, and dispersed his battalions.^[7. The success of this attack was facilitated by the very circumstance which seemed to prognosticate instant failure. Whilst the troops hesitated under the storm of fire with which they were assailed on the bridge, some soldiers slid down by the piles into an island in the river, where they hoped to find some point of attack less exposed to the enemy’s fire. Here they discovered that the second branch of the Adda was fordable, upon which a battalion immediately spread itself out en tirailleurs, in order to turn the Austrian line; and, thus favoured, the mass of grenadiers passed the bridge at the pas de charge. ] Sebottendorf retreated upon Crema, with the loss of fifteen guns, and two thousand men killed or wounded. This, though only an affair of the rear-guard, was a daring feat of arms; and its immediate consequences were the occupation of Pizzighetone, the retreat of Beaulieu towards the Mincio, and the triumphal entry of Napoleon into Milan, where his presence had become absolutely necessary. As the French troops had been in continued motion for a month, it was judged expedient to allow them some days rest, and hence Beaulieu was not pursued.

Having thus descended like a torrent from the Apennines, overthrown and dispersed all that opposed him, separated Piedmont from the coalition, received the submission of the Dukes of Parma and Modena, driven the Austrians behind the Mincio, and entered the capital of Lombardy in triumph, Napoleon immediately directed his attention to the internal administration of the country, prescribed the measures necessary for the reduction of the citadel of Milan, imposed contributions, and made arrangements for establishing the republican system in Italy; that is, for destroying the ancient regime, in order to substitute in its stead that equality which formed the pole-bolt of the revolution. His career of victory had been one of unexampled rapidity, and he now sought to secure and consolidate the conquests he had made. The intelligence of his success, however, appears to have excited astonishment and suspicion in the minds of the French Directory, who perceived with alarm that their young general had already made himself master of Italy. Scarcely had he reached Milan, when he received orders to divide his army in two; to give up the command of that of Italy to Kellermann, who was to observe the Austrians on the Mincio; and with the remaining 25,000 men, forming an army of the south, to advance upon Rome, and even to act against Naples. But this division of force, at the moment when it was about to contend against all the resources of the house of Austria, was a great deal too absurd to be submitted to by a commander like Napoleon; he answered by resigning his command, and thus saved the army from inevitable destruction. Meanwhile he resolved to drive Beaulieu into the Tyrol, and with this view he addressed to his soldiers one of the most remarkable proclamations that ever proceeded from his pen. He knew well the men with whom he had to deal; he knew that the French soldiery, full of fire and enthusiasm, would be transported by an appeal which awakened in their minds heroic sentiments; he knew that such an address would produce at Rome or at Naples the same effect as it had done at Turin; he knew, also, that in proportion as he exalted the courage of his troops, he struck terror into those of the enemy, and at the same time bequeathed to posterity a monument of his talent for command. The revolt of Lombardy for a moment endangered[7:15:717] the success of his plan. On the day when he quitted Milan to advance against the Austrians, the tocsin sounded in the rear of his army; the people flew to arms, and having seized upon Pavia, put the garrison to death. The least hesitation on his part would have rendered this rising general. Without stopping the march of the army, he proceeded in all haste to Pavia, followed by 300 horse and a battalion of grenadiers, at the head of which he forced the gates, penetrated into the city, which was delivered up to pillage, ordered the municipality to be shot, and thus, by one vigorous blow, extinguished the insurrection in its principal focus. At Benasco Lannes acted with equal promptitude and severity; and at Lugo, where a squadron of French horse had been destroyed, a number of the male inhabitants were shot.^[8. We have been told that “these bloody examples,” though they quelled the insurrections, nevertheless “fixed the first dark and indelible stain on the name of Napoleon Buonaparte.” This is easily said, but is it well founded? Was no atonement due for the lives of the brave men who had been cruelly massacred by an infuriate rabble? Upon what principle can impunity be claimed in behalf of assassins? On such an occasion, clemency on the part of Napoleon would have been a crime against his army. “Il faut quelquefois un peu de sang, pour en arrêter one plus grande effusion; pardonner à des perfides qui faisaient succéder le poignard aux acclamations, c’eût été exposer le sang des nos braves à couler dans de nouvelles Vêpres Siciliennes.” (Pie de Napoléon, racontée par lui-memc, tom. i. p. 109.) ]

After the defeat of Lodi, Beaulieu had not ventured to halt behind the Oglio, nor even behind the Chiesa. He preferred the stronger line of the Mincio, flanked on the left by the fortress of Mantua, and on the right by the Lago di Garda and the mountains of the Tyrol. Behind this barrier he established his army, with his centre posted at Vallegio, his left at Goito, and his right at Peschiera, a small place belonging to the Venetians. As the wings thus rested upon two strong places, Napoleon resolved to force the centre; at the same time making demonstrations on the side of Peschiera, which covered the enemy’s line of retreat to the Tyrol. On the 30th of May, he arrived at Borghetto with the mass of his army, and immediately dislodged an advanced guard of the enemy, stationed on the left of the Mincio. Having repaired the bridge of Borghetto, which the Austrians had partly destroyed in their retreat, he was preparing to force the passage of the river, when a column of grenadiers threw themselves into the stream, carrying their arms on their heads, as the water reached to their shoulders. The enemy, believing themselves about to be attacked by the redoubtable column of Lodi, gave way, and, taking the road to the Tyrol, allowed the French to effect the passage without opposition. Beaulieu attempted to make a stand upon the heights between Villafranca and Vallegio; but having learned the movement of Augereau on Peschiera, he immediately retired beyond the Adige, and ascended the right bank by Dolce as far as Caliano. Part of his eft ascending the Mincio to join him at Vallegio, came suddenly upon the French head-quarters, and nearly captured the general-in-chief, but was soon dispersed by the troops under Massena; and the remainder of this wing, being detached from Goito, entered Mantua, the garrison of which now exceeded 13,000 men. Thus far the combinations of Napoleon had been completely successful; yet whatever might have been his desire to pursue the remains of Beaulieu’s army, he found it necessary to stop. He was not strong enough to penetrate into the heart of the Austrian states, whilst the armies of the Rhine were still behind that river; besides, he had rather overrun than conquered Italy, and the possession of Mantua could alone sstablish the French power in that country on a solid foundation. The investment of that fortress was therefore decided on; materials for the siege having previously been prepared at Alexandria and Tortona, whence they were directed in all haste on Lombardy.

Meanwhile Napoleon took measures for strengthening himself upon the Adige, where bis situation had become complicated, and in fact presented a variety of new combinations. The investment of Mantua required that he should be master of the course of the Adige; and the key of this river is Verona, the position of which forms the basis of every system upon that line of operations. He therefore took it upon him to summon the city, which was surrendered without resistance, on the 1st of June; and by this precious acquisition he procured three fine bridges on the Adige, and a strong central position, defended by bastions, and protected by two forts perched on the last slopes of the Tyrolese mountains, so as to shut up hermetically the valley of the Adige on the left bank of the river. He also placed garrisons in Crema, Peschiera, and other strong places belonging to the Venetians; and having concluded armistices with the king of Naples and the pope, occupied Leghorn, where he seized a large amount of English property and merchandise. The investment of Mantua was now converted into a regular siege, the labours of which were intrusted to Serurier’s division, ten thousand strong, whilst the rest of the army remained in observation upon the Adige, as far as the western bank of the Lago di Garda; a position in which, by concentric interior movements, the whole French force might be united on either bank of the Mincio, according to the manner in which the enemy might choose to develope any fresh attack. The trenches were opened on the 18th of July. But a new act of the drama was about to commence.

The cabinet of Vienna, justly alarmed at the progress of Napoleon, had resolved to check his career by opposing to him a new army and a new general. Beaulieu was replaced by Wurmser, who, having set out from Manheim with twenty thousand picked troops drafted from the armies on the Rhine, reached Trent towards the end of July, and there found himself at the head of more than sixty thousand combatants, including the powerful reinforcement he had brought along with him. At this time Napoleon had not more than thirty thousand men under his immediate command, and ten thousand were engaged under Serrurier in the siege. The Austrians had therefore a superiority of force which seemed to insure them the victory. In fact, they already triumphed in anticipation of success, and their calculation seemed just; but in their estimation of the respective forces, they forgot to take into account the relative values of the generals-in-chief, and this slight omission disarranged all. In the last days of July, Wurmser debouched from the Tyrol; Quasdanovich, with 25,000 men, moving by the left bank of the Lago di Garda upon Salo and Brescia; and the marshal, with the remaining 35,000, descending the Adige in three columns. Experience had not yet taught the Austrians the advantage of compact movements, and dearly did Wurmser pay for the blunder which he committed in thus dividing his force, and exposing it to be beaten in detail. Napoleon, on receiving the news of his advance, accompanied with the intelligence that Sauret had been forced back on De-zenzano, and Massena expelled from Rivoli, instantly resolved to attack Quasdanovich before he could form a junction with Wurmser on the Mincio. This was his only chance of success, and to secure it he quitted every thing. The siege of Mantua was raised; a hundred and forty pieces of cannon were abandoned in the trenches; and, by the evening of the 30th, Napoleon had assembled between Peschiera and Goito the divisions of Massena and Augereau, with the reserve of Serrurier’s division.
[7:15:718]

Next day he passed the Mincio to encounter Quasdanovich. The Austrian general, assailed by a superior force, was driven from Lonato, Brescia, and Salo, and compelled to fall back on Gavardo. But this success was not decisive, and the defeat of the Austrian plan of operations might have been repaired, if Wurmser had passed the Mincio on the 31st of July, and occupied Lopato. By this means he would have effected a junction with Quasdanovich, and Napoleon would have been forced to regain in all haste the Tesino or Piacenza. But instead of following the only course calculated to insure success, Wurmser proceeded to make his entry into Mantua, amidst the sound of bells, and did not pass the Mincio to advance upon Castiglione until the evening of the 2d of August; thus allowing Napoleon time to defeat his lieutenant, and drive him from San Marco, Lonato, and even Brescia.^[9. The Austrians seem never to have known the value of time in war. They occasionally form able plans; but it is always by the calculation of distances or of time that they misgive. ] On the 3d, Augereau’s division, supported by the reserve, advanced upon Castiglione; that of Massena directed its march on Lonato; and Guyeux received orders to débouché on Salo, in order to induce Quasdanovich to continue his retreat by threatening his communications with the Tyrol. Napoleon conceived that he was directing his effort against Wurmser, but, on the contrary, it fell upon the left of Quasdanovich, who was now making another attempt to operate his junction by Lonato, and had with this view resumed the offensive, advancing, as usual, in several isolated columns. As might be expected, the Austrian was again defeated, and, being warmly pursued, was forced to direct his columns on their former position at Gavardo. The same day Augereau attacked and defeated the advanced guard of Wurmser at Castiglione. Napoleon had as yet obtained only partial successes; but they strengthened him in his central position, and gave him the means of dealing heavier blows. The first of these was directed against Quasdanovich, who, on the very next day, was surprised at Gavardo, threatened with an attack in reverse, and obliged to fall back in great disorder upon Riva; thus definitively ridding Napoleon of a corps formidable from its strength, as well as from the strategic direction which had been assigned to it.

But if fortune seconded Napoleon in this juncture, he was at the same instant exposed to the greatest danger in the midst of his very head-quarters. Massena’s division had just quitted Lonato, where Napoleon remained with 1200 men, when all of a sudden an alarm was given that the place had been surrounded by an enemy’s corps, and soon afterwards an Austrian officer came to summon him to surrender. Happily his presence of mind did not forsake him. He presumed that this could only be one of the detachments of Quasdanovich which had been separated from the main body in the recent affair of Lonato; and he resolved to extricate himself by audacity from a situation which must have been not a little embarrassing. Assuming a menacing tone, “What means this insolence ?” said he. “Do you dare to beard the French general in the midst of his army ?” The Austrian officer was confounded, and hearing the word “fusillade” significantly pronounced by Napoleon, he became so terrified that he consented to surrender. Two thousand men, provided with four pieces of cannon, then laid down their arms, and discovered, when it was too late, that if they had stood firm, the French general-in-chief and all his staff must have been their prisoners. This corps formed the advanced guard of

Quasdanovich, which, in executing a reconnoissance with a view to a junction with Wurmser, had crossed on the march the columns of St Hilaire and Sauret, and had fallen upon the French head-quarters at the very moment when the camp of Gavardo was unexpectedly attacked by the French troops.

The combat which decided the final success of this operation took place on the 5th of August, near Castiglione. Wurmser, still infected with the mania of detachments, had pushed one in the direction of the Lower Po, and left another to blockade Peschiera, so that there remained under his immediate orders not more than 25,000 men. The divisions of Massena and Augereau, with the reserve, presented a force equal to that of the enemy, and the arrival of the division of Serrurier turned the balance decidedly in favour of the French. As soon as the latter came up, Napoleon attacked the enemy’s left with his right and centre, defeated it, and forced him to repass the Mincio with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon. Massena instantly crossed the Mincio at Peschiera, and falling upon the enemy’s right wing, established before that place, routed and put it to flight. Wurmser now perceived that a prompt retreat could alone save him, and, leaving in Mantua a garrison of 15,000 men, he fell back along the valley of the Adige, warmly pursued by the French as far as the entrance of the Tyrol, which he regained with a total loss of 12,000 men and fifty pieces of cannon.^[10. The theatre of Wurmser’s defeat was that on which Prince Eugene had succeeded so well in his celebrated campaign of 17θ5 against the Duke of Vendôme; and if these events be compared, it will be found that Napoleon displayed more ability than the general of Louis XIV. Although Vendôme bad Mantua for him, whilst Napoleon had it against him, yet he had not the skill to maintain himself on the Adige and the Mincio, and allowed himself to be assailed on the left by Prince Eugene, who transported his infantry in boats by the Lago di Garda to Gavardo. This movement lasted six days; but in half that time Napoleon would have destroyed an army which ventured to perform such an operation in his presence. ]

The Austrians, however, had scarcely re-entered the Tyrol, when, being joined by considerable reinforcements, they once more found themselves stronger than their adversaries. It was easy to foresee that they would not suffer Napoleon quietly to effect the reduction of Mantua; and Wurmser, having received positive orders to relieve that place, imagined that he could attain this end without fighting, by means of manoeuvres alone. Davidowich was to cover the Tyrol with 20,000 men disseminated from the environs of Feldkirch as far as Roveredo; whilst Wurmser himself, with the remaining 26,000, should descend the valley of the Brenta, to débouché on Porto-Legnago and the rear of the French army. The Austrian genera), who supposed that Napoleon’s views were as narrow as his own, conceived that his adversary had no other course to follow but to retire behind the Mincio, and that he would thus become the deliverer of Mantua by the sole effect of his combinations. But the young chief of the French army was not the man to allow himself to be deceived by false demonstrations. At the moment when Wurmser was meditating this false movement, Napoleon received a reinforcement of6000 men from the army of the Alps, and being thus strengthened, he resolved to penetrate into the heart of the Tyrol, and to fall upon the right of Wurmser at the moment when he was draining the Tyrol in order to manoeuvre by his left. He directed on Roveredo the divisions of Augereau and Massena posted at Verona and, at Rivoli, and these were to be joined on the march by the division of Vaubois, debouching from Salo by the western bank of the Lago di Garda; a force which could scarcely fail to overpower the corps of Davidowich, left alone to guard the Tyrol, and dispersed in several detachments. On the 4th of September, Wukassowich, who commanded his advanced guard, was expelled from the camp at Mori, and driven back, first on Roveredo, and then on Calliano, where he formed a [7:15:719]junction with the mass of the corps. The position of Calliano seemed inexpugnable; but Davidowich, being attacked by a greatly superior force, was compelled to abandon this redoubtable gorge, leaving in the hands of the assailants twenty-five guns and two thousand prisoners. The Austrians retreated in the greatest disorder, and next day the French entered Trent. Meanwhile Davidowich rallied the remains of his corps behind the Lavis; Napoleon, however, resolved to dislodge him; he was attacked by Vaubois, and having in vain attempted to defend the passage of the river, he was thrown back upon Salurn and Neumarck.

In the course of this victorious march, Napoleon learned the movement of Wurmser on the Brenta; but, far from being intimidated by it, he judged rightly that it would become to him a more certain pledge of victory. An army divided into two, with its centre penetrated, its right overthrown, and its left at once isolated and turned; what more could he desire? The occupation of Trent was the more important that, in opening to the French the head of the valley of the Brenta, it also uncovered the rear of Wurmser. Napoleon was not the man to let slip so favourable an opportunity. He resolved at once to profit by the false movement of the enemy, and not to allow him time to destroy the troops that remained before Mantua. On the 6th he directed Massena and Augereau by Levicoin the valley of the Brenta, in order to mask his own movement, and keep Davidowich in check; whilst Vaubois was left upon the Lavis. On the morning of the 7th the advanced guard of Augereau encountered and overthrew a strong detachment of the enemy, posted at Primo-lano to guard the passage of the gorges of the Brenta, and which, being pursued by a regiment of dragoons, was overtaken and obliged to surrender. Wurmser had already attained Bassano, where, finding that Napoleon was marching upon his communications, and not knowing whether to advance or retreat, he took up a position on the heights in advance of the town, placing his van-guard at Solagna and Campo-Lungo. Here the latter was attacked, on the morning of the 8th of September, and driven back in disorder on Bassano. The French instantly pursued, and reaching the town close on the heels of the fugitives, carried it by main force. Not knowing where to make head, Wurmser, with the left of his corps de bataille, retired on Fonteriva, where he passed the Brenta, and took the direction of Vicenza; whilst Quasdanovich, with the right, finding it impossible to gain the Brenta, fell back upon Friuli. In this affair, two thousand prisoners, thirty pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of baggage, fell into the hands of the French. The situation of Wurmser seemed desperate. His communications with Austria were intercepted; he had lost the greater part of his artillery and baggage; and he now found himself in a country, all the outlets of which were in the hands of the enemy, with little more than 14,000 men, discouraged by repeated discomfitures. Nothing, therefore, remained for him but to endeavour, at any sacrifice, to throw himself into Mantua, and there await the arrival of fresh succours from Austria; and such, accordingly, was the resolution adopted by the gallant veteran, who, though outwitted and out-generalled, was not dispirited by defeat.

But to accomplish this object, it became necessary to force a passage somewhere on the Adige; and the Austrian general, having lost his pontoon train, seemed destitute of all means of escape, and about to be overwhelmed by the forces skilfully directed to prevent his escape. A mistake committed by Sahaguet, however, proved the means of his salvation. That officer, who was at Castellano, had received positive orders to cut down all the bridges of the Molinélla, and to avail himself of this obstacle to arrest the enemy; but, happily for the Austrian, he forgot’ that of Villa Impinta, by which Wufmser was enabled to escape the certain destruction that awaited him, and, after a series of bloody skirmishes, in which fortune divided her favours pretty equally, to throw himself into Mantua.^[11. Napoleon never forgave Sahaguet for this oversight, which deprived him of one of the fairest fruits of his victory of Bassano⅛ His plan had been so ably formed, that, but for Sahaguet’s blunder, the destruction of Wurmser would have been inevitable. ] He had flattered himself with appearing before that fortress at the héad of 26,000 victorious troops; but in reality he threw himself into the place with no more than 12,000 men, discouraged by defeat, and, instead of raising the siege, about to be themselves invested. At first he encamped his troops without the place, between the suburb of St George and the citadel, in the hope of keeping the field, and collecting supplies from the country; and, in this position, some partial advantages obtained over the troops of Sahaguet and Massena, on the 13th and 14th, inspired him with a security which Napoleon lost no time in punishing. The entire garrison having sallied out to forage on the 15th, Napoleon attacked them with his whole force; penetrated as far as St George, which he carried at the point of the bayonet; and having compelled Wurmser to retire within the body of the place, completed the investment of the city and the fortress. The charge of the blockade was intrusted to General Kilmaine, with Serrurier’s division, and the rest of the army were placed in observation before the Tyrol.

The position ofNapoleon, however, was by no means without difficulty, to say nothing of danger. The defeat of the French armies of the Rhine rendered it highly probable that Austria would reinforce her army in the Tyrol and in Friuli, and make fresh efforts to deliver Mantua; Wurmser was in his rear, at the head of an army of more than 20,000 men; the French troops were established in a marshy country, where malignant fevers usually prevail in autumn; and the political horizon of the south of Italy began to assume a very threatening aspect. On the other hand, in order to strengthen the French interest, new republics were founded; the pope, through the interference of Spain, was prevented from throwing himself into the arms of Austria; peace was concluded with Naples; a treaty was concluded with Genoa, which had agreed to shut its port against the English; and the French party had triumphed in Corsica. To counterbalance these advantages, the epidemic fevers had encumbered the hospitals, diminishing considerably the number of combatants; reinforcements arrived too slowly to repair the losses which had been sustained; and the Austrians were actively preparing once more to try the fortune of arms. By the middle of October, Davidowich had received reinforcements which raised the force of his corps to 20,000 men; that of Quasdanovich now amounted to 25,000 combatants; and the Croats were permanently organised into regiments, to facilitate the arrival of the levies drawn from the Tyrol, and the recruits raised in the interior. The supreme command was conferred on General Alvinzi, a veteran of high reputation, who, having joined the corps of Davidowich, resumed the offensive, directing that corps by Bassano on Verona, where he hoped to effect a junction with Davidowich, who had received orders to descend the Adige.

Napoleon’s situation had thus become extremely critical. He could not advance to encounter Alvinzi without abandoning Verona, and consequently enabling Davidowich to overthrow Vaubois, unite with Wurmser under Mantua, and thus establish in his rear an army superior in number to all the troops he had been able to collect. On [7:15:720]the other hand, he could not concentrate the mass of his force on Roveredo without opening to Alvinzi the road to Mantua, which, in an inverse sense, would have led to the same results. There was also an inconvenience in assembling the mass of his troops at Verona, since in this case the communication between Alvinzi and Davidowich would have been re-established by the valley of the Brenta. Nevertheless, as it had become almost equally necessary to prevent the junction of these two generals, and to oppose the union of one of them with Wurmser, the adoption of a mean term, or intermediate plan, was the only course that remained open to Napoleon.

Vaubois was too weak to defend the approach to Trent; but, in ordering him to assume the offensive, Napoleon hoped to impose on Davidowich. In this, however, he was deceived. On the 3d of November Vaubois was forced to fall back on Calliano; on the 4th Davidowich entered Trent; and on the same day the army of Alvinzi arrived at Citadella and Bassano. At the approach of the enemy Massena fell back on Montebello. Davidowich now marched on Calliano, and Alvinzi prepared to move upon Verona by Vicenza. Napoleon now decided to repeat from right to left the manoeuvre which had succeeded against Wurnι-ser from left to right; that is, after first trying to defeat Alvinzi, and drive him behind the Piave, he proposed to ascend the Brenta, in order to fall upon the rear of Davidowich. With the divisions of Augereau and Massena he advanced towards the Brenta, which the enemy had already passed, and on the 6th attacked their left under Provera at Carmagnano, and their right under Quasdanovich at Lenove, though with only partial success. Provera repassed the Brenta, and Q,uasdanovich withdrew to Bassano, without suffering any serious loss. Meanwhile Vaubois, being warmly pressed on the Adige, was, after two days’ fighting, driven from the strong position of Calliano, and obliged to retreat on La Corona. Napoleon flew to this division, harangued the 39th and 85th regiments, which had given way at Calliano, and threatened to inscribe on their colours that they were no longer worthy to belong to the army of Italy. Moved with these reproaches, the soldiers shed tears, and swore to conquer or die when next led against the enemy. Napoleon, however, found it necessary to renounce his projects, and to retire on Verona, where he established the head-quarters of the army. The whole country between the Brenta and the Adige being now in the hands of the enemy, the French general began to be closely pressed, and, not choosing to be more so, resolved once more to fall upon Alvinzi. On the 11th he left Verona with the divisions of Massena and Augereau, and next day attacked the enemy, whom he found in position at Caldiero. But a violent tempest which beat in the faces of the troops, and the strong position of the enemy, rendered all his efforts unavailing; he was repulsed with loss, and forced to return to Verona, where his situation now became more critical than ever. He was everywhere too weak; and the fortune which had hitherto so signally befriended him, seemed at length to abandon her favourite. Any other general, in his circumstances, would have thought only of repassing the Mincio, and would thus have lost Italy. But in war it often happens, that to gain all, a general must risk all. Reduced to this predicament, Napoleon determined to pass the Adige below the left of Alvinzi, and thus to act on his rear. The project was hazardous in itself; but it was nevertheless wise, because it was the only one which still left him some chance of success.

General Alvinzi, in presenting himself before Verona by the Caldiero road, had on his right impracticable mountains, on his left the Adige, and in front a place secure against a coup-de-main. The ground which he occupied, being thus closed upon three sides, had no other outlet than the defile of Villa Nova, by which alone he could retire in the event of defeat. By passing to Ronco, Napoleon would therefore approach this defile, oblige the enemy to fight face en arrière, in order to open a passage, and place his inferior army on marshy ground, traversed by three dikes, where he would have all the advantage of the defensive, joined to the individual superiority of his soldiers. It has indeed been said, that by passing at Albaredo, Napoleon would have avoided the Alpon, its marshes, and the defile of Arcole; and it is certainly true that he would thus have more easily gained Villa Nova, which was the great object of his movement. But he was not strong enough to throw himself headlong on the only road of Alvinzi; all he could do was to menace this communication, without quitting], the support of the Adige, and at the same time approaching as quickly as possible to Verona and the division of Vaubois. The movement on Albaredo would have been too wide to accomplish this triple object; and besides, it would have been too hazardous to offer battle on the Alpon at Villa Nova, facing to the rear in the direction of Verona. The project which he actually executed was sufficiently daring, inasmuch as the unsafe nature of the ground, and the narrowness of the dikes, by which alone he could advance on Arcole, rendered victory difficult, whilst a serious reverse would have decided the fate of the campaign, and that of Italy.

Having recalled Kilmaine with two thousand men from the blockade of Mantua, Napoleon confided to him the defence of Verona, which it was the more indispensable to maintain, as it barred the passage of the Adige, and prevented Alvinzi from giving his hand to Davidowich; and on the night of the 14th of November, he set out from Verona for Ronco, where he threw a bridge over the Adige. On the 15th he passed the river, with the divisions of Massena and Augereau,and the reserve of cavalry, forming in all about 20,000 men, and advanced by the three dikes which conduct to Arcole. A brigade of Croats, however, profiting by the advantages of the ground, repulsed the attack of Augereau, whose column had been directed on the bridge of Arcole, and afforded time to Alvinzi to come to their assistance. The latter also sent Provera with six battalions to attack Massena at Porcil, and with the mass of his army retrograded on St Bonifacio. But this unforeseen obstacle did not discourage Napoleon. Perceiving that if he could not attain Villa Nova by the left bank of the Alpon, he might act more directly by Porcil on Alvinzi’s line of retreat, and sensible that, with this view, as well as to secure his right, andpreventhimself from being taken in a cul-de-sac, it had become absolutely necessary to make himself master of the village and defile of Arcole, he made fresh efforts to carry the bridge. The greater part of his generals being wounded, he seized a standard, and urged his grenadiers once more to the charge. They advanced boldly amidst a tremendous fire; but the head of the column being shattered, the troops gave way, and Napoleon being thrown into the marsh, was in imminent danger of being taken. At this critical moment Belliard charged with a company of grenadiers, and rescued the general-in-chief, when about to fall into the hands of the enemy. Nevertheless, towards evening, the Austrians abandoned Arcole, on the approach of a brigade which had passed the Adige at the ferry of Albaredo, and was advancing along the left bank of the Alpon. But it was now too late; and Napoleon, not choosing to run the risk of passing the night with his troops crowded in the marshes, in presence of the hostile army deployed between St Bonifacio and San Stephano, and fell back to Ronco, on the right bank of the Adige.

The combat of the second day proved not more decisive than that of the first. It, was maintained with equal bravery on both sides; and in the evening, Napoleon, from the same motives as before, repassed the Adige. But the third conflict proved decisive. At daybreak on the 17th, the French [7:15:721]troops resumed their march to the bridge, and drove back the Austrians on Porcil and Arcole. It was not against this point, however, that Napoleon had resolved to direct his principal efforts. Leaving Robert with a demi-brigade to keep the enemy in check, he therefore directed Massena with another demi-brigade on Porcil, whilst the rest of his division remained in reserve near the bridge; and he ordered Augereau to throw a bridge over the Alpon, near the embouchure of the rivulet, so as to be in a condition to act against the Austrian left, and thus take Arcole in reverse. As Napoleon had foreseen, the Austrians, reinforced at Arcole, assumed the offensive, and drove back Robert, whom they pursued with reckless impetuosity. Proud of this success, their deep column continued to advance, and suddenly came upon the main body of Massena’s division, placed in ambuscade amongst some willows, who instantly assailed them in flank, cut off three thousand men, and forced the remainder to retire in disorder on Arcole. The decisive moment had now arrived. Augereau developed his attack, whilst some cavalry appeared on the enemy’s flank; Massena debouched by Arcole and St Gregorio; the little garrison of Legnago threatened the enemy’s rear; and the latter, unable to maintain themselves in ground favourable for acting on the defensive, were reduced to the alternative of either accepting battle in an open country, or commencing a precipitate retreat. Alvinzi durst not risk the former, and on the 18th he retired on Montebello, leaving Napoleon at perfect liberty to turn upon Davidowich.

This general, who, during eight days, had amused himself before the intrenchments of La Corona, at length attacked Vaubois on the 16th. The latter maintained his ground, but the following day retired behind the Mincio at Peschiera. On the 18th Davidowich advanced to Castel Novo. Resolved to punish him for this rash movement, Napoleon sent only the reserve of cavalry in pursuit of Alvinzi, and with the main body of his infantry fell back from Villa Nova upon Verona, which he entered in triumph. He then directed the divisions of Massena and Vaubois to attack Davidowich in front, whilst Augereau advanced from Verona upon Dolce to cut off his retreat; a combination which would have insured his destruction, had he not accidentally learned the defeat of Alvinzi, and hastened to regain Rovercdo, which he effected with much difficulty, and the loss of his rear-guard. Alvinzi, on his side, seeing himself followed only by cavalry, returned to Villa Nova; but as Napoleon had already disposed of Davidowich, and was now preparing to débouché once more by Verona on the left bank of the Adige, the Austrian, separated from his lieutenant, did not venture to keep the field, and immediately fell back behind the Brenta. Meanwhile Wurmser remained quietly in Mantua. Alvinzi, in commencing his operations, had calculated that he could not appear before Mantua until the 23d of November, and had engaged Wurmser not to make any sortie until that day. But things not having turned out as the enemy had hoped, this projected effort proved fruitless. Kilmaine had already returned with his detachment, and the corps employed in the blockade succeeded without difficulty in repulsing the besieged. The rapid combinations of Napoleon had thus rendered abortive all the efforts of Austria; a fourth army had been baffled; and for two months after the last day of Arcole, the French general remained undisputed master of Lombardy. To him this interval was of great importance, as it enabled him to take the necessary measures for consolidating his conquests, and also to procure reinforcements sufficient not only to put him in a condition to maintain himself, but also to insure the fall of Wurmser, and to strike a blow at the very heart of the Austrian monarchy.

All that Napoleon had yet done seemed like the web of Penelope; it was invariably undone by the constancy with which the cabinet of Vienna reinforced its army of Italy, and by the negligence of the Directory, which had so long delayed to afford him adequate support. In fact, he was treated by the government of France as Hannibal had been by the senate of Carthage. But public opinion forbade the sacrifice of a general and an army that had gained so many victories; and, as the battles of Arcolc showed that both were within a hair’s breadth of being expelled from Italy, it was at length resolved to adopt decisive measures. Accordingly, the fine divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas, drawn from the armies of the Rhine, were, notwithstanding the winter, directed across the Alps, and, on joining the French army, would have made its total strength about 75,000 men. On the other hand, by the end of December, Alvinzi having under his orders upwards of 40,000 men, resolved to descend from the mountains, and make another effort for the relief of Mantua. For the fourth time, therefore, the possession of that important place was to be submitted to the arbitrement of arms.

Whilst waiting the arrival of the reinforcements which he expected from the Rhine, Napoleon, apprized that Alvinzi had assumed the offensive, flew to the Adige, to watch the development of his attack. At this moment the division of Serrurier was before Mantua; that of Augereau occupied the line of the Adige from Verona to Legnago and beyond it; Massena was at Verona; and Joubert, with a fourth division, held the important positions of La Corona and Rivoli. Each of these divisions was about ten thousand strong, and Rey, with a reserve of four thousand, occupied Desenzano. The imperialists, as if determined to profit by no lesson, advanced at once on the centre and the two wings of the French army, by Roveredo, Vicenza, and Padua; but Napoleon, as he had not yet ascertained in which of these three directions Alvinzi was carrying the mass of his force, resolved to keep his positions until the Austrian general had developed his projects. On the 12th of January 1797, the column which advanced by Vicenza approached Verona, and drove in the advanced posts of Massena. But the division of that general having debouched on St Michel, the enemy was repulsed with loss; and Napoleon acquired the certainty that he was not in force upon that point. Next day, however, he received intelligence that Joubert, pressed in front by superior forces, and threatened by strong columns on his two flanks, had been obliged in the morning to evacuate the position of La Corona, and to fall back on Rivoli, whence he reckoned on continuing his retreat on Castel Novo. All doubt as to the enemy’s projects was now at an end. It was clear that the column of Vicenza, and that which directed its march on the Lower Adige, were only diversions to facilitate the march of the principal corps, which was advancing by the valley of the Adige. The great object of Napoleon, therefore, was to beat this corps, by attacking it with the main body of his army. He instantly set out from Verona, with the greater part of Massena’s division, leaving two thousand men to keep in check the column of Vicenza; and at the same time he sent orders to Rey to advance from Salo on Rivoli, where he had resolved to assemble the mass of his force. As Alvinzi had not only weakened himself by the corps directed on Verona and Legnago, but had even disseminated the troops under his immediate orders, Napoleon saw that, by occupying the plateau of Rivoli, where the*different paths which traverse that mountainous country imite, he would gain the advantage of acting in a mass against columns separated from one another by insurmountable obstacles. With this view, he sent orders to Joubert to maintain himself, at any sacrifice, in advance of Rivoli until his arrival.

When these orders reached Joubert, however, he was in full retreat; but he instantly countermarched his division, and regained the position of Rivoli, which the enemy had [7:15:722]not yet had time to occupy. Soon after midnight Napoleon arrived. It was a fine clear moonlight, and by the enemy’s watch-fires, which illuminated the white peaks of Montebaldo, he could easily distinguish five separate encampments. On the morning of the 14th he made his dispositions for battle, and commenced the attack by directing Joubert against the Austrian centre, whilst a demi-brigade was detached to keep in check Lusignan. The enemy sustained the shock with great firmness, and, becoming the assailant in his turn, forced Joubert to give way; Vial, who commanded the right, also retrograded; and the plateau seemed about to be carried. At this critical moment Napoleon, favoured by the vigorous stand made by one of his regiments in the centre, flew to the left, whither he directed the column of Massena, which had just arrived; the enemy were repulsed, and the French left established itself on the heights of Trombalora. The danger, however, was not yet past. The right was warmly pursued by the Austrians, who had descended from the heights of San Marco; Quasdanovich, having forced the intrenchments of Osteria, was also beginning to ascend the plateau of Rivoli; and Lusignan was moving by Affi upon the rear of the French. Napoleon was, in fact, surrounded; but an instant’s reflection convinced him, that if he could overpower Quasdanovich, he would have nothing to fear from Lusignan, and that matters might easily be re-established on the right. This intuitive judgment decided the fortune of the day. As soon as the head of Q,uasdanovich’s column appeared on the plateau, it was assailed on both flanks by the infantry, and in front by the cavalry under Lasalle; and being forced back into the ravine, it was thrown into complete disorder by the explosion of an ammunition waggon in the midst of the troops when crowded together in the hollow. Confusion and terror reigned supreme; infantry, cavalry, artillery, fled pell-mell by Canale. Having thus got rid of Quasdanovich, Napoleon directed his efforts to support Vial, who was now in full retreat. The Austrians, pursuing with headlong impetuosity, had got into disorder, when a charge of two hundred horse completed the confusion; the panic communicated itself to the centre, which immediately disbanded; and it was only behind the Tasso that Alvinzi succeeded in rallying the fugitivès. The fate of Lusignan was now sealed. Attacked by Massena in front and by Rey in the rear, his corps was destroyed, and he regained Montebaldo with only a few hundred men.

On the evening of the battle, however, Napoleon learned that Provera, having forced the centre of Augereau’s division, scattered along the Adige, had succeeded in passing the river at Anghiari on the 13th, and was directing his march on Mantua. On the 14th the Austrian general was at Nogara, and on the 15th he arrived before Mantua, into which he hoped to make good his entrance by the suburb of St George. But finding it retrenched and occupied by the besiegers, he next day attacked the post of La Favorita, whilst Wurmser sallied out against that of San Antonio. Serrurier, however, succeeded in maintaining his ground; Wurmser retired into the body of the place; and Provera, assailed on all sides by the forces which Napoleon had promptly directed against him, was forced to lay down his arms. Meanwhile Joubert, acting with equal vigour, pursued Alvinzi without intermission, turned both his flanks, and getting upon his line of retreat, made 5000 prisoners. Having lost half his army, the Austrian general now withdrew the remainder behind the Piave, leaving only 8000 men for the defence of the Tyrol; and the French army resumed the positions which it had occupied before the combats of Arcole. Such, then, was the famous battle of Rivoli, in which Napoleon, with only thirty thousand men, made twenty thousand prisoners. But its most important result was the capitulation of Mantua, which surrendered on the 2d of February, thus rendering the French undisputed masters of Lombardy. The terms granted to Wurmser were much more favourable than he had any reason to expect, with a garrison reduced to the last extremity, and suffering from almost every species of privation and misery.^[12. At the time of the surrender, the garrison, though much weakened by disease, amounted still to 13,000 men under arms, who were declared prisoners of war, and sent to Trieste, to be there exchanged. In Mantua, Napoleon found the battering train which he had abandoned in the trenches at the epoch of .Castiglione, and 350 pieces of cannon on the ramparts or in the arsenal. On this occasion the French general acted with equal delicacy and generosity towards his gallant but unfortunate adversary. When the aged veteran came out to surrender his sword, he found only Serrurier ready to receive it, Napoleon having generously avoided being present to witness his humiliation. The terms granted to Wurmser were also more favourable than the Directory approved. But the victorious general treated their remonstrances with scorn. “I have granted the Austrian,” said he, in reply to their expostulations, “such terms as were, in my judgment, due to a brave and honourable enemy, and to the dignity of the French republic.” This is one of the most pleasing traits in his history, and gives a favourable impression of the natural character of the man. ]

Whilst Napoleon was at blows with Alvinzi, the court of Rome, seduced by the instigations of Austria, had broken the armistice concluded in the month of June immediately preceding, and raised a considerable body of troops, the command of which was intrusted to General Colli, whom the cabinet of Vienna had sent for the purpose. Thinking it necessary to punish this hostile demonstration, partly as an example to others, and partly also to get rid of an enemy seldom dangerous but always inconvenient, Napoleon formed a division, which he placed under the command of Victor, and directed to march upon Imola in the Romagna, where it arrived on the 2d of February, the very day on which Mantua capitulated. The campaign was neither long nor bloody. A corps of 4000 papal troops, which attempted to defend the Senio, was totally routed; Faenza was carried at the point of the bayonet; and Colli, with about 3000 men, were made prisoners. On the 9th Victor arrived at Ancona, where he compelled 1200 men to lay down their arms; on the 10th his van-guard entered Loretto, and rifled the treasury of the Santa Casa; and by the 18th he had reached Tolentino, where his progress was stopped by the conclusion of peace. The terms were such as Napoleon thought fit to dictate. The pope confirmed the cession of Avignon, the Comtat, and the legations of Ferrara and Bologna; he also ceded the Romagna, obliged himself to pay a contribution of L. 1,200,000, and agreed to execute, in the fullest manner, the provisions of Bologna respecting works of art. These stipulations were too harsh not to render the holy see an irreconcilable enemy; but they were not severe enough to deprive it of all means of future hostility.

The splendid victory gained at Rivoli, the surrender of Mantua, the evacuation of Corsica by the English, the peace with Naples and Rome, and the approach of powerful reinforcements, having completely changed the face of affairs in Italy, Napoleon, being now definitively assured of that country, hastened to carry the war into the hereditary dominions of Austria. The divisions drawn from the army of the Rhine having arrived in the course of the month of March, he found himself at the head of 75,000 veteran troops; but of this number he was obliged to detach about 20,000 to garrison strong places, and to observe the southern part of the peninsula. With the remainder, however, he resolved to advance against the enemy; and the Directory, with a view to second him, ordered Moreau to repass the Rhine at Kehl, whilst Hoche, after re-organizing the army of the Sambre and Meuse, should again advance upon the [7:15:723]Meyn. The cabinet of Vienna had entertained the idea of carrying the theatre of the war into Italy; but it was not till after the capture of Kehl by the Archduke Charles, and the disaster of Alvinzi at Rivoli, that it was resolved to act upon this principle. Accordingly, about the middle of January, the archduke, who had just distinguished himself by a masterly campaign, set out with three divisions of chosen troops, to traverse the Tyrol, and to oppose the conqueror of Italy. Meanwhile, as the divisions of Bernadotte and Delmas had actually joined the French army, whilst the Austrian reinforcements were as yet only traversing Bavaria, Napoleon, finding himself ready to take the field before the enemy, resolved to profit by this advantage, anticipate his adversary, and attack him à outrance, before his whole force should be assembled. Having arranged his plan of operations, and recalled Victor from Ancona to the Adige in order to cover his communications, he put his army in motion on the 10th of March, and with the mass of his force advanced towards the Tagliamento.

To give the details of the sixth campaign, which now commenced, would only be to repeat the story which has already been five times told. The archduke, fettered, it is said, by the aulic council, found himself obliged to execute a plan which he had judgment enough to condemn; in other words, to repeat the error, which had so often proved fatal, of acting on a double line of operations. But there is no reason to believe that he was thus trammelled by any preconcerted plan. His first interest was to avoid a decisive battle before the arrival of those reinforcements which were marching to join him; and upon this principle all his movements were regulated. On the other hand, the plan of Napoleon had for its main object to force him, at all hazards, to fight, or so to cripple him that the arrival of the divisions from the Rhine would have no material effect upon the results of the campaign. In order to attain this end, he had the choice of two lines of operations; one to the north, by the valley of the Adige or the Tyrol; and the other to the east, by Friuli and Carniola. Both of these lines, which form a right angle having its vertex at Verona, were occupied by the Austrians; but Napoleon preferred the latter for various reasons, more especially because, if the enemy should attempt to defend Friuli behind the parallel positions of the Piave, the Tagliamento, and the Isonzo, his right wing, in rear of which was his only line of retreat, might be turned by the coast, and his army defeated and driven into the Adriatic. This consideration alone determined the choice of Napoleon. Besides, as the reinforcements from the Rhine had not yet joined, the Austrian army did not exceed 35,000 men; whilst Napoleon had under his immediate command 38,000, supported by three divisions under Joubert amounting to 17,000 men.

As already mentioned, Napoleon put his army in motion on the 10th of March, and advanced straight towards the Tagliamento, whilst Massena was directed to move on Feltre, in order to push the brigade of Lusignan, left in observation on the Piave, and also to menace the right of the archduke. This secondary movement was immediately successful. Lusignan retired, ascending the Piave; but on the 13th, his rear-guard, being overtaken at Longaro, was overpowered, and the general himself made prisoner. Satisfied with having thrown the Austrian brigade on Cadore, Massena now directed his march on Spilimbcrgo and Gemona, in order more effectually to turn the Austrian right, and occupy the important route of Poteba, of which the enemy might take advantage in order to retire upon Villach. On the 16th Napoleon arrived at Valvasone, on the Tagliamento. The archduke had already commenced his retreat, leaving only a rear-guard on the Tagliamento.

But the river being fordable, the French columns rushed into the stream, overthrew the enemy, and pursued them along the road leading to Palmanova. Prince Charles having now divided his army, he himself fell back on Goriza; one of his columns, commanded by Gontreuil and Bayalitsch, with the greater part of the matériel, moved by Cividale and the valley of Natisono upon Caporetto; and Ocksay, with the brigade of Lusignan, covered the road from Villach to Chiusa-Veneta. But the Isonzo, from its source as far as Goriza, flows between two chains of mountains which are nearly impassable on the side of Krainburg. Napoleon, therefore, manoeuvred against the left flank of the archduke, with the view of throwing him back into the valley of the Isonzo, where his army would have found themselves in the Caudine Forks; and, for a moment, he entertained some hope of accomplishing his object. The left of the enemy was covered by the town of Gradisea, occupied by four battalions. On the 17th Bernadotte attacked the place in front; whilst Serrurier, passing the Isonzo between the city and Montefalcone, took it in reverse, and forced the garrison to capitulate. Directing Guyeux by Cividale on Caporetto, Napoleon now ascended the left bank of the Isonzo, for the purpose of cutting off the enemy from the road of Czernita, or obliging him to plunge into the valley of the Isonzo by Canale. But as soon as the French general had developed his movement, the archduke fell back, in all haste, upon Laybach, taking the road by Czernita and Adelsberg, closely followed by Bernadotte. Disappointed in one object, Napoleon instantly turned his attention to another, and directed all his efforts against the column of Gontreuil and Bayalitsch, which, being headed by Massena at Tarvis, was thrown back into the gorges of Oberpreth, and being there surrounded, was forced to lay down its arms. On this occasion, 4000 prisoners, twenty-five pieces of cannon, and 400 baggage waggons, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

From Laybach the archduke had marched by Klagenfurth on St Veit, where he was joined by the first of the reinforcements sent from Germany; but not believing himself even yet in a condition to deliver battle, he fell back upon Neumarck, and on the 30th Napoleon arrived at St Veit. On the 2d of April Massena forced the gorges of Dirnstein, and at Neumarck and Hundsmarck defeated the enemy’s rear-guard, consisting of the grenadiers who had just arrived from the Rhine. The archduke continued his retreat on Vienna, and on the 5th Napoleon arrived at Judenburg. But the contest had now reached its term. Two days afterwards, the Austrians, who had received instructions from Vienna touching a letter which Napoleon had addressed to Prince Charles from Klagenfurth, manifesting a desire of accommodation, demanded an armistice, with a view to treat of the preliminaries of peace. To this proposal Napoleon gladly consented. His position was in fact more brilliant than solid. He had not sufficient force to strike a decisive blow against the Austrian monarchy; the armies of the Rhine, notwithstanding the superiority which they had acquired since the departure of the archduke, still remained inactive in their cantonments; he could not for a long time hope for any effectual co-operation on their part; a suspicion even crossed his mind that the government wished to sacrifice him, by causing him to be beaten; and, besides all this, he had just cause of disquiet in regard to his communications, which were seriously endangered by an alarming insurrection in his rear. In these circumstances, the negociations speedily advanced towards a favourable issue; and, on the 18th of April 1797, the preliminaries of peace were signed at Leoben, to which the French head-quarters had been transferred.^[13. The views of Napoleon, on this occasion, were admirably seconded by the cabinet of Vienna; and the precipitation it displayed in the negociations disclosed the terror which his successes had inspired. With his characteristic penetration, he availed himself of the anxiety thus manifested to dictate the law in regard to the provisional treaty. ]
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The conclusion of peace with Austria was almost immediately followed by the annihilation of the republic of Venice. The government of that state had done every thing to call down the vengeance of the conqueror. Being exasperated by a democratical movement which occurred at Brescia and Bergamo, it had taken advantage of the approach of an Austrian column under Laudon, to excite a general insurrection in rear of the French, and thus endanger the communications of the army whilst engaged in a series of complicated and critical operations. A repetition of the Sicilian Vespers had also taken place at Verona, where every Frenchman found in the streets or houses was butchered in cold blood, and the commandant, General Bal-land, forced to retire into the castles with 3000 men. But when the armistice of Judenburg had recalled Laudon to the Tyrol, the Venetians, being thus abandoned to their own resources, were completely defeated by a corps of 15,000 men under Victor, and the insurgents everywhere dispersed. Napoleon now hastened to regain his communications, by re-entering the Venetian territory, and also to pour the full storm of his wrath on the devoted republic. The senate, in despair, made the most abject offers of submission; but it was too late. The archduke, on whose success they rested all their hopes, had shared the fate of Beaulieu, Wurmser, and Alvinzi; and Napoleon resolved that the Lion of St Mark should lick the dust. Besides, the acts of hostility committed by the senate of Venice were actually to him a piece of good fortune. At Leoben he had promised Austria compensation for the loss of Belgium and Lombardy; but he would have been much puzzled where to find the means of indemnification, if the Venetians had not furnished him with an occasion for disposing of part of their states. The price paid by the republic for its perfidy and cruelty was the surrender of large territories on the mainland, and five ships of war; the payment of three millions of francs in gold, and as much more in naval stores; and giving up twenty of the best pictures, along with five hundred manuscripts.^[14. Napoleon has been severely censured for his conduct to Venice, which some have represented as a species of felony; and Botta the historian, after mentioning with admiration the philippics of the priests who preached insurrection and recommended assassination, seems to think it very culpable in the French to have treated these persons as enemies. French blood had been treacherously shed; but for this, it seems, no reparation was due, no punishment exigible. In its last agony, the senate of Venice attempted to propitiate the conqueror, by offering him a purse of L.300,000. He rejected the offer with scorn, telling them that if they could offer him the treasures of Peru, the atonement would be insufficient. Yet he is represented as a monster, because he refused to huckster for the blood of his murdered soldiers; and it is thus that history is sometimes written. ]

After the occupation of Venice, and the dissolution of its oligarchical government, Napoleon established his headquarters at Passeriano, near Udine, where he awaited the arrival of the plenipotentiaries which the emperor was to send to treat of a definitive peace. In order to accelerate théprogress of the negociations, he had, on the 24th of May, signed a preliminary convention with the Duke de Gallo; but the cabinet of Vienna having refused to ratify this act, he repaired to Milan to hasten the organization of the Cisalpine Republic, by annexing to it Modena, Reggio, Brescia, Bergamo, Ferrara, and Bologna, the whole destined to constitute a single state, with about three millions of inhabitants. He also profited by his stay at Milan to direct the democratic revolution, which overturned the oligarchy of Genoa, and placed all the friends of change in entire dependence on France; an event which was soon followed by the establishment of another mushroom state, under the name of the Ligurian Republic. Napoleon regarded Genoa as the most useful dependency which France could then procure to consolidate his work in Italy; and, as political propagandism was the order of the day, he appears to have judged correctly.^[15. Cette fortresse immense, perchée sur des rocs contre lesquels il serait difficile de pousser les travaux réguliers d’une siège, pouvait être le clef de la Lombardie alors que le Piémont n’était pas à nous, et que la route du Simplous n’existait pas encore.” (Vie de Napoleon, tom. i. p. 217∙) ]

In the meanwhile the negociations with Austria made no progress whatever. Scarcely had the preliminaries been signed when misunderstandings arose. The plotters of counter-revolutions had, by means of the elections, succeeded in forming a powerful party in the councils, at the head of which were Pichegru, Villot, and Imbert-Colomès; and a violent struggle was about to take place between the depositaries of the executive power and the legislative body, which last, far from seconding, sought to embarrass the operations of the government. These disorders revived the hopes of Austria. It was believed that some new crisis was approaching in France; the conspiracy of Baboeuf encouraged this notion; the royalists corresponded with the exiled princes and the imperial government; the Directory held its power by an uncertain tenure, amidst so many elements of opposition; and every thing seemed to prognosticate that some important change was at hand. But the events of the 18th of Fructidor (4tb of September 1797) destroyed all these illusions. The Utopian constitution of the year III. was dissolved; Pichegru and other royalists in the assemblies were arrested and sent into exile; Carnot and Barthélemy, who had opposed the majority of the Directory, were likewise banished; and the government for the moment recovered the semblance of security. Astonished at this sudden revolution, and conceiving that it could no longer calculate upon a royalist re-action, the cabinet of Vienna immediately despatched the Count de Cobentzel with full powers to treat; and henceforth the negociations proceeded in a fair train towards a definitive adjustment of differences. The result was the treaty of Campo-Formio, concluded on the 3d of October 1797, and so called from the village at which it was signed. By this act Austria yielded to France Belgium and the boundaries of the Rhine and the Alps, recognised the Cisalpine Republic, and received, as an indemnification for the loss of territory, Venice and her Italian provinces; whilst France assumed the sovereignty of Dalmatia and the Ionian Islands. This peace was glorious, and might have been solid, because, whilst France attained her natural limits, Austria had received ample compensation for the provinces which she ceded in virtue of the treaty. Peace having been thus concluded with Austria, it still remained to negociate with the princes of the empire; and for this purpose a congress of all the German powers was summoned to meet at Rastadt, whither Napoleon repaired as head of the French legation. But perceiving that the discussions would be protracted, he abandoned to his colleagues the conduct of the diplomatic business, and quitted Rastadt, after having provided, by a military convention, for the execution of the treaty of Campo-Formio, in as far as regarded the evacuation by the imperialists of Mayence and the other places on the Rhine.

Napoleon having thus terminated the most wonderful series of campaigns recorded in the history of war, set out for Paris, where he arrived in the beginning of December. The reception which he met with, on this occasion, was such as would have elated the most modest, and encouraged the least ambitious. It was easy to see that he might aspire to every thing in France. Nevertheless, the time had not yet arrived to profit by his fame, and take advantage of his popularity; it was necessary to wait until the Directory had completed its discredit with the country, and [7:15:725]lost all hold of public opinion. France had indeed proclaimed him as its hero; but this was not enough, and to become the head of the state, it was necessary to be at the same time its deliverer and restorer. Whatever might be his claims to national gratitude, these could not give him a right to overturn the established government, to which he had been indebted for his rapid advancement and part of his glory ;—it was essential that it should destroy itself by its incapacity, and by the disasters which it brought on France ;—then only could he appear on the scene in the character of the deliverer of his country. And as he knew well with whom he had to do, he did not doubt that sooner or later this would occur; for, independently of the weakness of the individuals composing the Directory, he was convinced that the actual state of affairs could not endure long, and that, in any view, the fall of that body was inevitable. Still the part which he had in the meanwhile to play was sufficiently embarrassing. The pompous but empty title of general-in-chief of the army of England had indeed been conferred upon him; but at this time no preparations had been made for effecting a descent upon England; and all that could have been done would have been to throw twenty or thirty thousand men into Ireland, an enterprise which, however advantageous in itself, was by no means suited to his views. Napoleon, however, was too important a person to remain at Paris with his arms folded, a mere passive spectator of events.^[16. On his return to Paris, Napoleon took up his residence in the same small and modest house which he had occupied before his departure for Italy, in the Hue Chantereine, where he resumed his favourite studies and pursuits; contented, apparently, with the society of his friends, and carefully avoiding any act which might seem intended or calculated to invite popular notice or distinction. His society was much courted in the highest circles, and he occasionally received company at home; but pride as well as policy led him to shun notoriety, and shrink from being stared at in the streets or saloons as the wonder of the day. On one occasion, when greeted rvith some noisy demonstration of popular favour, “Bah,” said he, “they would crowd as eagerly around me if I were on my way to the guillotine.” At this period he was reserved and thoughtful, like one too much occupied with serious designs to take any pleasure in the elegant frivolities of fashionable conversation. Wherever he appeared he was the man of Lodi, of Arcole, and of Rivoli, disdaining to disguise his military bluntness in those brilliant circles where a man of an inferior stamp of character would have been ambitious to shine. Piqued by this haughty demeanour, Madame de Staël made various attempts to enlist him amongst the number of her votaries, but without success. “Whom,” said she, one day addressing herself to the victorious soldier, “whom do you consider as the greatest of women ?” insinuating a compliment, in expectation of an equivalent. “Her,” replied Napoleon, dryly, “who has borne the greatest number of children.” This keen retort was not forgotten, and the daughter of Necker became his declared enemy. In the camp, as well as in the capita], he had maintained a similar reserve, especially with his officers. It has been said that his character changed with his elevation, and that, in proportion as fortune lavished on him her favours, his coldness and reserve increased. But this is evidently a mean and narrow view of his conduct. No great captain was ever more beloved by his officers, as well as by all who served under him; but to those who were immediately about him, he felt it necessary to observe a certain degree of dignity in his demeanour, in order to insure that ready, unquestioning obedience which is all-important in war. With the common soldiers, however, he often put himself on a footing of perfect familiarity. In the field, he disdained not to share the rations, or to drink from the canteen, of the sentinel; and the French private soldier, often as intelligent as those whom fortune has placed above him, used to accost the general-in-chief with more frankness than he would have ventured to display in addressing his own captain. In his despatches, and particularly in his conversations at St Helena, he often mentioned the pleasure he derived from his intercourse with the men, and at the same time gave many instances of their intelligence and observation. On one occasion, during his Italian campaigns, a common trooper addressed him, as he was riding past, and told the general that he thought he could suggest the movement which ought to be adopted. Napoleon listened to him, and heard him detail some operations which he had himself resolved on but a little before. In this way he won the hearts of the soldiers, and encouraged the display of talent and genius, which, throughout his whole career, he missed no opportunity of rewarding. No one perhaps ever possessed, in the same degree, the secret of calling forth, at his pleasure, all the energies, physical, mental, and moral, of those under his command, and of sustaining the courage and perseverance of his troops on occasions of the severest trial, where, under any other chief, defeat would have been inevitable. ] For although the Directory had mingled its acclamations with those of all France, be knew that Rewbel and Merlin cherished secret enmity towards him, arising, no doubt, out of their fears; that they blamed the resolution which he had taken of concluding the peace of Campo-Formio without waiting for authority from the government; that they accused him of having treated with Austria, instead of marching to Vienna, which, according to these sages, would have revolu-tioned Germany, and afforded them the gratification of constructing some democratical republics out of the ruins of the holy Roman empire. These declamations were no doubt sufficiently absurd and revolting; but it was not the less necessary on that account to adopt some course, especially as the most opposite factions came daily to knock at his gate. An alternative presented itself, which was, either to conspire against the Directory, or to make common cause with it. He chose to do neither; and the only reasonable part which remained for him to take was to withdraw for a time, but to do it in such a manner as to fix attention upon himself, and by his achievements to keep his name in the mouths of the country.

During the negociations at Campo-Formio, Napoleon had suggested the idea of a descent upon Egypt, though he did not then think of undertaking it himself. The project had been relished by Talleyrand, who, after Fructidor, had replaced Charles Delacroix in the ministry of foreign relations. Napoleon now offered to carry it into execution. The results of such an enterprise might be immense, and this sufficed to render the task worthy of his talents and ambition. On the other hand, the majority of the Directors, to whom his presence gave umbrage, gladly entertained a proposition calculated to rid them of a pacificator whose popularity they dreaded. They were, in fact, enchanted to find him outrunning their wishes by a voluntary exile. Some statesmen, it is true, wished to retain him, representing that, by the force of circumstances, he would be called to take the helm of affairs. But he replied that the pear was not yet ripe, and that he was going to establish new claims to their confidence. Besides, the East presented a field of conquest and glory on which his imagination delighted to dwell. Europe he considered as but a mole-hill in comparison of Asia, whence “all the great glories” had come. And from the view which he took of the state of India at the time, he conceived, that in undertaking to open a direct communication with that country, he was taking the surest means to strike an effective blow at England. The expedition to Egypt had three objects: first, to establish on the Nile a French colony, which, without having recourse to the system of cultivation by slaves, should supply the produce of St Domingo and the sugar islands; secondly, to open new outlets for French manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and to obtain, in return, all the productions of these countries; and, thirdly, setting out from Egypt as a base of operations, to carry an army of fifty thousand men to the Indus, and make common cause with the Mahrattas, the Hindus, the Mussulmans, and all the oppressed races of the Indian peninsula.
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The last was the grand and ultimate object aimed at. An army composed, one half of Europeans, and the other half of natives, transported by ten thousand horses and as many camels, carrying with them provisions for fifty or sixty days, water for five or six, and one hundred and fifty pieces of field artillery, with a double allowance of ammunition, might arrive in four months on the Indus, and in less than as many more decide the fate of India. The desert, he thought, would be no obstacle to any army provided with abundance of camels and dromedaries. Such an enterprise would give a high idea of the power of France; it would fix attention on its leader; it would surprise Europe by its boldness; and, if attended with success, it might be productive of mighty results. Such were the motives which appear to have actuated Napoleon in proposing an expedition which, from very different views indeed, was now determined on by the French government.

Egypt, it is true, was then a tributary of the Porte, one of the most ancient allies of France; but as the Mamlukes were the real masters of the country, and in open revolt against the Sultan, it was thought that the Divan, already occupied with the war against Paswan Oglou, pasha of Widin, and that against the Wahabees, and obliged, from weakness, to tolerate the independence of a number of refractory pashas, would not, for a mere shadow of sovereignty, throw itself blindly into the ranks of the enemy. The preparations were accordingly carried on with great activity, but with the utmost secrecy. All was under the direction of Napoleon, and his characteristic energy everywhere appeared. To draw the attention of England from the ports of the Mediterranean, he visited those of the Channel, and affected to occupy himself with the project of crossing it, when his thoughts were directed towards the invasion of Egypt. At length, all being ready, he repaired to Toulon on the 10th of May 1798, and, on the 19th, sailed from that port with thirteen ships of the line, six frigates, and a fleet of transports, having on board25,000 men. He was joined at sea by the squadrons which had sailed from Bastia, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia, with from 7000 to 8000 men on board, destined to form part of the expedition; and on the 9th of June the whole arrived before Malta. The subsequent history of the expedition, until the return of Napoleon to France, is fully detailed under that head; and in the article Egypt will be found an account of the final conquest of that country by the British under Abercromby and Hutchinson. To these articles the reader is therefore referred for ample information respecting both branches of the subject. It is clear, indeed, that, after the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir, all the chances of success were changed. It is no doubt true that Napoleon might still hope to maintain himself in possession of the country, provided he succeeded in attaching the inhabitants to his cause. But two serious obstacles presented themselves to the attainment of this object; namely, the maritime blockade, which obstructed all exportation; and the peculiar nature of the Mahommedan religion, which forbids all obedience or submission to an infidel power. Nor were these difficulties lessened by the failure of the attack on St Jean D’Acre, which, in proving that the invaders were not invincible, encouraged resistance and invited hostility.^[17. There are two points connected with this expedition, in regard to which it may be necessary to say a few words. These are, first, the massacre of Jaffa; and, secondly, the poisoning of the plague patients, at the same place, during the retreat from St Jean d’Acre to Egypt- First, as to the massacre, it has been urged, that Jaffa having been taken by storm, the garrison might, in the heat of the assault, have been put to the sword. But, on that occasion, about two thousand men, the remains of the garrison, were made prisoners; and the question then arose, how they were to be disposed of. On the one hand, the French army was too weak to admit of detaching sufficient escorts to guard them. On the other, it would have been worse than imprudent to send away on parole men amongst whom the point of honour had no existence; and, besides, a part of the prisoners consisted of Janissaries, who, having been taken at El-Arish, had been liberated on a promise not to serve against the French during the war. In these circumstances Napoleon ordered them to be shot, and the whole perished in consequence. Judged according to the principles of the law of nations, this revolting butchery was wholly unjustifiable. At the same time, some allowance must be made for the circumstances in which he found himself placed. Situated as he was, the safety of his army appeared to him to constitute the supreme law; a supposed necessity alone rendered him cruel. Besides, had the case been reversed, these barbarians would have done the same thing; they would have put their prisoners to death, and gloried in sending their heads to Constantinople. These and other circumstances may in part account for and excuse, but can never justify, the deed; and it cannot be denied that it leaves a deep stain on his memory. Next, as to the poisoning of the plague patients, this is a subject in regard to which the most extravagant exaggerations have been disseminated. The facts are few, and may be briefly stated. Having raised the siege of St Jean d’Acre in order to return to Egypt, he caused the hospitals containing the sick and the wounded to be evacuated, every means being put in requisition to transport them across the desert. But fifty, who had been seized with the plague, were not in a condition to be removed; they might have spread the pestilence in the army; and if abandoned to the ferocious Djezzar, they would certainly have been massacred. In these circumstances, Napoleon caused opium to be distributed to them, in order to give them death without suffering. He did wrong, and he confessed it. But that he was actuated by a sentiment of humanity, and did to these men what, in like circumstances, he would have wished done to himself, seems beyond doubt. This is proved by his conduct during the siege, as well as during the retreat. V hen the plague was raging in the army, and the name of this horrible scourge shook the nerves of Europeans; when the sick despaired utterly, and the healthy, filled with indescribable horror, trembled to minister to them in their misery; Napoleon went through the hospitals, breathed hope into the sufferers, rebuked the cowardice of their attendants, and with his own hands relieved the foul ulcers which no one dared to touch. On the retreat to Egypt, his attention to the sick was equally conspicuous. He issued an order that every horse should be given up for their service; and he himself marched on foot, exhibiting to the whole army an heroic example of endurance and compassion. That Napoleon judged wrong in regard to the plague patients, we, however, readily and fully admit He should have left them to the mercy of the Turks, since such was the rigorous fate which their destiny reserved for them. ] The truth of this was soon exemplified by the landing of a Turkish army of 15,000 men in the peninsula of Aboukir, the fort of which they immediately stormed and carried, putting the garrison to the sword. But they paid dear for this momentary success. Napoleon pounced on them like an eagle on its prey, and, by one blow, annihilated a force which, if joined by the Mamlukes (who had re-appeared in Lower Egypt) and by the insurgents of the country, might have proved too formidable to be resisted with any prospect of success. This victory, gained on the 25th of July 1799, gave the more pleasure to Napoleon, that it served to wipe out the stain which the signal defeat sustained by the French fleet under Brueys had attached to the name of Abonkir.

The destruction of the Turkish army having consolidated the position of the French in Egypt, Napoleon decided on returning to France. Even when before St Jean d’Acre, he ascertained that a new coalition had been formed; and at a later period he received, through Sir Sidney Smith, several English journals, and the French gazette of Francfort, which informed him of the reverses sustained by the armies of Italy and the Rhine, as well as of the successive revolutions which had completed the disorganization and debasement of the Directory. The consummation which he had contemplated before leaving France seemed to have at length arrived; and no obstacle stood in the way to prevent his return to that country. A letter which he had received from the government announced that Admiral Bruix was to sail from Brest, in order to rally under his flag the Spanish squadrons and that of Toulon, and, having [7:15:727]thus gained an ascendency in the Mediterranean, to bring back the army of Egypt, if circumstances rendered it necessary to do so. Napoleon was at the same time authorized to return to France. But Bruix had not appeared, nor was there any probability that he would, considering the force and vigilance of the British squadrons. What motive, then, could Napoleon have had to remain in Egypt? On the one hand, he felt himself capable of restoring to his adopted country the lustre of victory, and the benefits of internal and external peace. It was evident that the people were sick of the Revolution, and that the time had arrived for putting an end to it by securing the fruits of that mighty convulsion. On the other hand, all] that remained to be done in Egypt was to colonize a conquered country, for which the principal dispositions had already been made; and Kleber was as capable of completing the enterprise as Napoleon, provided success were still possible. The latter conceived that he could be more serviceable to his country in Europe; and, besides, having resolved to return to France, the moment seemed propitious for carrying his design into effect. This proceeding has been made the subject of vehement declamation and virulent censure, but, as it appears to us, without a shadow of reason. At first Napoleon had received carte blanche from the Directory; next he had obtained express authority to return; and, in either case, it was perfectly competent for him to do so. But, not to rest altogether upon this, the expedition was either desperate, or it might still sustain itself. In the one case, all that remained to be done was to sign a convention of evacuation, which the humblest officer in the army could do as well as its chief. In the other, Kleber, who succeeded to the command, was capable of contending against all the enemies then existing in those countries, as he fully proved by his subsequent conduct, particularly by the victory he gained at Heliopolis.^[18. “Ce général, instruit, spirituel, vaillant, était un des plus beaux hommes de l’Europe. C’était l’idéal du dieu Mars; terrible dans les combats, calme pt froid dans les combinaisons, grand administrateur, cheri du soldat, il ressemblait en tous points au Maréchal de Saxe. S’il n’cut pas l’occasion de se placer parmi les capitaines du premier rang, il avait l’étoffe pour le devenir; peut-être n’entendait il pas la stratégie dans toute l’étendue de ses combinaisons, mais il y fût parvenu par son ge'nie et Thabitude de commandement.” ( pie de Napoleon, &c. tom. i. p. 302.) But all these high expectations were cut short by the dagger of an Arab assassin, hired to revenge the defeat sustained by the Turks at Heliopolis. ] In these circumstances, Napoleon, having left the chief command to this distinguished veteran, sailed from Alexandria on the 24th of August 1799, with a small squadron of four ships, and, after a passage full of marvellous escapes, landed at Fréjus on the 6th of October. His presence excited the enthusiasm of the people, and was considered by them as the certain pledge of victory. His progress to the capital had all the appearance of a triumphal procession, and, upon reaching Paris, he found that every thing was ripe for a great change in France.

The circumstances attending the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire (9th of November) have been narrated in the article France. That event was not produced, but only accelerated by the return of Napoleon. The necessity of a change in the existing order of things had, for some time, been generally felt and acknowledged. The constitution of the year HL, with its preposterous anomalies, was universally detested, and the authorities which it had produced were deficient in capacity; but it was more easy to indicate the evils which it had produced than to suggest the remedies proper to be applied. At first view, the most simple and regular mode appeared to be, to confide to the legislative body the important task of modifying the constitutional compact. But, in adopting this system, there was reason to apprehend that the councils, eager to encroach on the executive power, would seek every opportunity to abridge it; whilst, on the other hand, if the initiative in these changes were intrusted to the executive authority, the danger became still more imminent that, on one pretence or another, the independence of the legislature would be destroyed, and the councils driven to commit an act of suicide similar to that which had decimated the legislative body on the 18th of Fructidor. Besides, what confidence could be inspired by any reform, the duration of which depended upon the caprice of magistrates whose powers and duties the constitution had so imperfectly fixed and defined? On the arrival of Napoleon, however, the difficulties which had presented themselves in a great measure disappeared, and the idea of reforming a bad system by means of itself was at once abandoned by all parties. The Directorial government having lost all hold on public opinion, and become equally feeble and contemptible, it seemed necessary to replace it by an imposing authority; and there is none so much so as that which is founded upon military glory. Napoleon perceived this in all its force. The Directory could only be replaced by him or by anarchy; and, in such a case, the choice of France could not for a moment be doubtful. Accordingly all parties now ranged themselves under two distinct banners: on the one side were the republicans, who opposed his elevation; and on the other all France, which demanded it. A coup düétat was nevertheless necessary to produce the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire; and this was effected by the employment of the troops, although without spilling a drop of blood. Napoleon had for a moment hoped that the projected change would be carried by acclamation. He was disappointed. But, after a short and noisy struggle, the republic, born amidst anarchy, and baptized in blood, expired in clamour and uproar, Siéyes assisting in the demolition of his own work; and the Directory was replaced by a provisional consulate, with Napoleon at its head. The dissolution of the councils was followed by the appointment of a legislative commission, and to a committee of this body was assigned the task of preparing a new constitution, which was afterwards denominated that of the year VIII.

Some of those who assisted in the revolution of Brumaire seem to have supposed that Napoleon, satisfied with the elevation he had attained, would not concern himself about civil affairs, and would leave in their hands a large share of the authority and patronage of the state. Great as had been the ability displayed by him in the field, they little expected that he would evince equal talents and aptitude for government. But these persons, amongst whom were Siéyes and Talleyrand, speedily discovered their mistake. At the very first meeting of the consuls, a lengthened discussion took place concerning the internal condition and foreign relations of France, and the measures not only of war, but of finance and diplomacy, which it either was or might be expedient to adopt. To the astonishment of Siéyes, Napoleon entered fully into all these subjects, showed perfect familiarity with them even in their minutest details, and suggested various resolutions which it was impossible not to approve. “Gentlemen,” said Siéyes, on reaching his house, where Talleyrand and others awaited his arrival, “1 perceive that you have found a master; one who can do and will do every thing himself.” The Abbé was in the right. Napoleon had obtained the first place in the state; and it soon became evident, that whilst he fully understood the nature and duties of his position, he claimed the undivided exercise of the supreme authority. The mass of the nation confided in him, because it knew that the Revolution could have no better guarantee than his; that his elevation held out the prospect of victory abroad, and of a stable government at home, under which life and property would enjoy security; and that whilst he had no [7:15:728]force except in placing himself at the head of the interests which the Revolution had created, he would employ every means to repress that anarchy under which the nation had so long groaned. Nor were these expectations disappointed. The work of reform proceeded rapidly and surely; order was everywhere established, and vigour infused into all the departments of the state. The situation of France, however, occasioned him some disquietude; and, notwithstanding the chances of success in his favour, he resolved to sue for peace, which he could then do in good faith, because the misfortunes of the preceding campaigns were not his work. But Pitt turned a deaf ear to the application, and never did statesman commit a greater fault; for that was perhaps the only moment at which the allies could with safety have concluded a peace, as France, in suing for it, virtually acknowledged herself vanquished. By this refusal, the English minister obliged Napoleon to enter upon that course of victory and conquest which ultimately extended his empire over the greater part of the Continent.^[19. The form of the refusal was somewhat extraordinary. Napoleon had addressed himself directly to the king of Great Britain, but his letter remained unanswered. The secretary of state for foreign affairs, however, transmitted a note to Talleyrand, in which he indicated the return of the Bourbons to France as the only means of putting an end to the troubles of Europe. It was, to say the least, curious to see a government which had twice treated at Lille, and recognised both the Republic and the Directory, refusing to treat with a more solid authority, sanctioned and supported by all France, and deposited in the hands of a man whom victory had illustrated. ]

War being thus inevitable, the First Consul issued a decree, dated the 7th of January 1800, ordaining the formation of an army of reserve, to consist partly of veterans, who were ordered to rejoin their respective corps, but principally of a new levy of 30,000 conscripts. At this time France had three armies on the frontiers, exclusively of the force under General Brune, which watched the partisans of the house of Orange in Holland. The army of Italy, reduced to 30,000 men, had taken refuge on the rocks of Genoa; 10,000 more guarded the Cottian Alps and Dauphiné; and the army of the Rhine, which reckoned above 100,000 combatants, was cantoned in Alsace and Switzerland, from Strasburg to Schaffhausen. In the presence of the superior forces which the enemy had assembled in the valley of the Po, the French durst not venture to repass the Alps; but it was nevertheless essential either to penetrate at once into Italy and Germany, or to strike such a decisive blow on the Danube, that the peninsula might there be reconquered by dictating peace to Austria in the heart of the hereditary states. In the one case, a double plan of operations would be necessary; in the other, Mantua, Alexandria, and Milan, were to be recovered at Vienna. Napoleon did not long hesitate as to the course to be adopted. He called out the conscripts; caused arms to be forged; appealed to the sentiment of national honour, which is never altogether dormant amongst the French; and assembled an army, young, it is true, but full of enthusiasm. The miserable state of the army of Italy has already been noticed; but that of the Rhine, when united to the army of Italy, presented a fine and formidable body of men, the command of which Napoleon intrusted to Moreau, at the same time sending him the recruits necessary to complete his different corps, and to put him in a condition to assume the offensive. The remainder of his disposable troops was directed on Dijon, where he organized an army of reserve, amounting to 40,000 men, which, from that central point, might be ready to march into Suabia, Switzerland, or Italy, according as circumstances should require. The nucleus of this army was formed by two fine divisions, originally drawn from that of General Brune, and which had just completed the subjugation of La Vendée.

Napoleon’s first thought was to leave the army of Massena in defence on the Apennines, and to carry the army of reserve and that of the Rhine into the valley of the Danube. As the constitution of the year VIII. did not permit the consuls to command the army in person, his intention was to intrust that of the reserve to a lieutenant, and to leave the grand army to Moreau, but at the same time to accompany the head-quarters of the latter, and thence to direct the operations of both. This, however, was warmly opposed by Moreau, who refused to command under Napoleon if the latter should come to his army, and at the same time objected to the plan of operations which the First Consul had proposed.^[20. The plan proposed by Napoleon was, in a military point of view, preferable to that adopted by Moreau. He wished the latter to pass the Rhine at Schaffhausen, to take Kray in reverse, and to cut him off from Vienna, by driving him into the angle formed by the Mayn and the Rhine; in a word, to operate against the left of the Austrian general, as he himself did five years afterwards against the right of Mack at Donawerth. Had this plan been adopted, the French would have marched without difficulty on Austria, and would have reconquered Italy in Germany, perhaps at Vienna. ] Being not yet sufficiently strong to break with a man who had numerous partisans in the army, and who, had he possessed energy, might have occupied the first place in the state, Napoleon was obliged to yield; and, accordingly, leaving to his rival the command of the finest army which France had yet seen, with full power to direct it on the Danube in his own way, he then decided to conduct his conscripts by the St Gothard into Lombardy, ordering Lecourbe to second his operations as soon as Moreau should have developed his plan of campaign, and gained the first success. Finding, however, that the attention of Melas was exclusively fixed on Genoa, into which Massena, with the remains of his force, had been obliged to throw himself; and being anxious, if possible, to relieve that place, which was closely invested; he resolved to give the preference to the shorter route of the Great St Bernard, leaving that of the St Gothard to be followed by the corps which were on their march from the Rhine. In the beginning of May Napoleon set out for Dijon, and on the 8th he arrived at Geneva, where he made the necessary dispositions for effecting the passage of the Alps. The operations which followed have been pretty fully detailed in another place. (See the article France.) By a series of well-combined manoeuvres and demonstrations, Napoleon deceived Melas as to his movements, descended like a torrent from the Alps upon his line of communications, and, by a single march, conquered Italy. Genoa had indeed surrendered; but the battle of Marengo, fought on the 14th of June, repaired every thing, and, by a victory snatched from the enemy, after he thought the fortune of the day decided, completed at one blow the conquest of Italy. Never as yet had Napoleon been in such imminent peril, noteven at Arcole; never had genius and fortune more happily conspired to change the fate of battle. The victory was glorious, and its results were immense. A convention was entered into, by which Melas obtained permission to retire with his army behind the Mincio; and, in return, he consented to give up Coni, Alexandria, and Genoa, with the fort of Urbino, the citadels of Tortona, Milan, Turin, Pizzighetone, Piacenza, Ceva, and Savona, and the castle of Arona. The armistice of Alexandria was soon afterwards extended to the armies of Germany, and negociations ensued, which, however, in the end proved unsuccessful.

Meanwhile both parties continued their preparations for a renewal of the contest; and as all hopes of peace had entirely vanished, Napoleon resolved to put an end to the armistice in the middle of November, and, notwithstanding the severity of the season, to recommence hostilities. [7:15:729]Moreau and Brune accordingly received orders to denounce the armistice, and between the 17th and the 27th all the French troops were put in motion. Leaving the army of the Rhine to the conduct of Moreau, Napoleon had conceived the daring project of attacking the Austrians under Bellegarde on the Mincio, by causing Macdonald, with the army of the Grisons, to clear the whole chain of the Rhaetian Alps, in order to débouché upon Trent, and drive back the Austrians on the lagoons of Venice, at the same time that Brune assailed them in front. And this plan was, to a certain extent, executed. Macdonald effected the passage of the Splugen, at a time when the mere traveller dreads to expose himself amidst its snows, ice, and storms, with every customary precaution; 1 ^[21. When the project for effecting the passage of the Splugen was communicated to Macdonald, he declared the enterprise impracticable, and sent the head of his staff to state his objections, as well as to explain the inadequacy of his means. Napoleon listened attentively to the statement of this officer, and, after interrogating him on a variety of matters, and at the same time analysing the different hypotheses which the vast theatre of the Alps suggested for his combinations, he replied, “Je ne changerai rien à mes dispositions. Retournez promptement; je vais rompre l’armistice. Dites à Macdonald qu'une armée passe toujours, et en tout saison, partout où deux hommes peuvent poser le pied. Il faut que, quinze jours après la reprise des hostilités, l’armée des Grisons se trouve aux sources de l’Adda, de l’Oglio, et de l’Adige.” ] and Brune, being thus joined by the army of the Grisons, defeated the Austrians, and advanced to within a few miles of Venice. But these were, after all, only secondary operations. The fate of the contest was to be decided in Germany, where hostilities recommenced towards the end of November; and, in a few days afterwards, Moreau obtained a decisive victory at Hohenlinden. The battle was obstinate and bloody, but never for an instant doubtful; indeed it is one of the few instances to be met with in war where complete success was obtained by the literal execution of the plan previously devised by the general-in-chief. Moreau lost not a moment in taking measures to improve his success. The Austrians were vigorously pursued, and being driven from Salzburg, and other positions on the Inn, where they had endeavoured to make a stand, were forced to sue for an armistice, which was concluded at Steyer on the 23d of December; the cabinet of Vienna having consented to detach itself from England, and to treat for a separate peace. The operations of the army of Italy were also suspended, in consequence of an armistice which Brune had taken it upon him to conclude at Treviso; and, early in February 1801, a definitive treaty of peace was signed at Lunéville, by which France secured the boundaries of the Rhine and the Alps. This treaty, in fact, differed but little from that which, in 1797, Napoleon had concluded at Campo-Formio.

But amidst all these successes, the event of the 3d of Nivose (24th of December) convinced Napoleon that he was still upon a volcano. This conspiracy was unforeseen; indeed it was the only one which the police had not baffled beforehand. It took effect, because the conspirators had no confidants. The plan was simple, for it consisted in obstructing the progress of Napoleon’s carriage as it passed along the Rue St Nicaise, and in the same instant exploding a machine crammed with all sorts of combustibles, and hence called the infernal machine. Napoleon escaped by a miracle; and the interest evinced by the people in his preservation amply indemnified him for the danger to which he had been exposed. The time had not been well chosen by the conspirators, for in France nothing was yet ready for the Bourbons. The assassins were tried, condemned, and executed, glorying in their design, and lamenting that it had not been successful.

The second coalition being thus dissolved, England alone maintained an attitude of hostility to France; but the progress of events soon developed a prospect of an accommodation. Pitt, sensible that the war had no longer any legitimate object, retired from the ministry; and his successor in office lost no time in renewing with Μ. Otto the negociations which had been broken off towards the close of 1800. The aspect of affairs had, in the interval, been completely changed. On the one hand, victory had again declared in favour of the French arms; Austria had been compelled to conclude a separate peace; Naples had been forced to receive the law of Foligno; an accommodation had taken place between the consular government and the court of Rome; the Emperor of Russia had thrown himself into the arms of France; and the new order of things established in that country had acquired a consistency which justified its formal recognition. On the other hand, England had obtained important advantages. The northern confederacy had been dissolved, or rather destroyed, by the victory of Copenhagen, followed, as it had been, by vigorous demonstrations against Russia; and the ultimate expulsion of the French from Egypt was no longer a matter of doubt. On both sides there existed the strongest motives for accommodation, because neither had apparently any thing more to gain by continuing the contest, and because each could now treat without any great sacrifice of honour or of dignity. Egypt and Malta were at first stumbling blocks in the way of an arrangement; but the conquest of the one led to an adjustment respecting the other; and at length, after a tedious negociation, preliminaries of peace were signed at London on the 1st of October 1801, and these were afterwards followed by a definitive treaty, which was concluded at Amiens on the 27th of March 1802. But the peace of Amiens, like that of Campo-Formio, proved merely an armistice. It was signed in the midst of mutual suspicion; and, before the ink was dry, difficulties arose, and from day to day accumulated the elements of a speedy and inevitable rupture. It is not our business here, however, to enter at all into these matters; and in what remains of this article we must confine ourselves exclusively to what is personal to Napoleon.

During this short cessation of arms, the attention of the First Consul was occupied with the re-establishment of religion, and the arrangement of a Concordat with the pope. The churches were deserted and in ruins; and, since the famous civil constitution of 1791, the clergy had been in a state of complete schism. His object was to restore the one and to reconcile the other, but without suffering them to acquire the power and influence they had formerly possessed; and, in pursuing it, he was actuated by the same motive which had led Henri IV. two centuries before to espouse the Catholic religion. His next measure was the establishment of a system of National Education, the necessity of which had been much felt ever since the universities and schools under the management of the clergy had been broken up amidst the first violence of the Revolution; and this was followed by the commencement of the great and difficult but highly important task of providing France with an uniform Code of Laws. Innumerable works of public utility were likewise begun. Roads and bridges were planned; museums were founded; and the vain were gratified with rising monuments of magnificence, whilst the reflecting recognised in every such display the depth and forecast of a genius formed for empire. This was more fully evinced in the measures by which Napoleon sought to secure the prolongation of his power. The establishment of the consulate for life, which was decreed on the 2d of August 1802, proved a grand step towards the completion of his design, and formed the primary base of the edifice which it yet remained for him to construct. This dignity [7:15:730]had already been prorogated for ten years by a senatusconsultum of the 6th of May; but on referring the matter to the people, it was decided that the consulate should be conferred upon him for life. He was now virtually sovereign of France. His task was to terminate the Revolution by giving to it a legal character, that it might be recognised and legitimated by the public law of Europe. But he knew, that before proposing to do so it was necessary to establish its principles, consolidate its legislation, and destroy its excesses. He believed himself strong enough to succeed in this, and he did not deceive himself. The principle of the Revolution was the extinction of Castes, not that of Ranks; it was the equality of Rights, not that of Classes; and by legislating in this spirit, Napoleon maintained all that was worth preserving. With the same view, and in accordance with the same principle, he instituted a new order of chivalry, called the Legion of Honour, which, if it served to further his scheme of empire, did not militate with that equality which alone he sought to maintain.

This is not the place for entering into any disquisition respecting the causes which so soon led to the rupture of the hollow truce of Amiens. Where a pretence is wanted for coming to blows, it will always be found. Napoleon insisted on the evacuation of Malta, in terms of the treaty, declaring that he would rather see the English encamped on the heights of Montmartre than see them in possession of that island. The British government, on the other hand, professing to discover, on the part of Napoleon, a desire to colonise Egypt, refused to give up Malta; and, after much diplomatic discussion, they presented an ultimatum, in which, as the French ministers had offered to subscribe any arrangement which might satisfy England on the subject of Egypt, they consented not to retain Malta as a possession, but only to reserve the right of occupying it for a period of ten years; at the same time stipulating that the French troops should evacuate Holland and Switzerland, and that an indemnity in Italy should be secured for the king of Sardinia. On these conditions they offered to recognise the king of Etruria and the Ligurian Republic. But, firm in his resolution not to deviate from the conditions of the treaty of Amiens, Napoleon rejected all these different articles, and nothing remained but again to have recourse to arms. On the 18th of May 1803, Great Britain declared war against France; and that fierce contest recommenced which, after an unexampled career of victory on the part of Napoleon, was destined to terminate in his downfall. His first measures were, the occupation of Naples and of Hanover; the one undertaken in the view of excluding English commerce from the ports of the south of Italy, and the other for the purpose of holding that hereditary possession until England should discover the necessity of fulfilling the article of the treaty of Amiens respecting the surrender of Malta. His next project was one of a far more daring and formidable character, namely, that of invading England, and thus striking a blow at the heart of his inveterate and implacable enemy. This operation, though difficult, he always regarded as practicable; the various chances he had carefully analysed and investigated; vast combinations were formed with a view to facilitate the descent; and enormous preparations were made for the purpose of carrying it into effect. During the years 1803 and 1804, the French coasts opposite England were covered with camps, in which troops to the amount of 160,000, mostly veterans, were assembled; considerable squadrons were prepared at Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon; and vast flotillas, intended to convey the troops across the Channel, were formed and exercised at various ports, particularly at Boulogne. On the other hand, the spirit of England was effectually roused, and immense preparations were made to repel the threatened invasion. The menaced descent rendered it necessary to organize a system of de fence which entailed enormous burdens on the country, and this to Napoleon was so much gained.

But notwithstanding the vast extent of the means called forth for the defence of the country, the English ministry were not without serious apprehensions as to the result of the threatened invasion; and, to cause a diversion, they are said to have countenanced the unwarrantable warfare of plots and conspiracies. The projects of Pichegru, Georges Cadoudal, and others of the same stamp, are all well known, and have already been described in the article France. That assassination was contemplated by most of them, appears, from the evidence produced, to admit of no doubt whatever; indeed Cadoudal candidly and boldly admitted the fact, at the same time expressing his regret that the project had failed. This must be kept in view in order to judge fairly of what followed. Finding himself exposed to the attempts of desperadoes who aimed at his life, Napoleon resolved to deal a decisive blow, which he considered as indispensable, at once to strike terror into his enemies, and to fix the opinion of those millions of Frenchmen who had adhered to the Revolution, and combated in its defence. A distinguished Bourbon was at the gates of Strasburg; the police pretended to have discovered evidence which implicated him in the designs of those who had plotted against the life of the First Consul; and, under the first excitement produced by this information, the fatal command was issued to seize the prince and bring him to Paris. The order was promptly obeyed, and the Duke d’Enghien, having been seized at Ettenheim, in the territory of Baden, was carried to Paris, where, on his arrival, he was tried by a military commission, as an emigrant who had borne arms against France, condemned, and shot almost immediately after the sentence had been pronounced. This was the most unwarrantable occurrence in the life of Napoleon. Throughout the whole affair he seems to have been hurried on by a species of fatality, which blinded him to the true character of the proceeding, and prevented him from reflecting on the consequences of which it was certain to be productive. That he was misled by the infamous reports of the secret police, and by the perfidious suggestions of those around him, may perhaps be true; indeed there is good reason to believe that such was the case. He was likewise kept in ignorance of the afflicting circumstances which accompanied the catastrophe; and the appeal made to his clemency by the unfortunate prince was infamously withheld until after the sacrifice of the ill-fated victim had been consummated; but, with every allowance which can justly be made, it must nevertheless be admitted that, in commanding the seizure of the duke in a neutral territory, he became answerable for all the consequences which ensued, and that he had the double misfortune to incur the guilt of a public crime, and at the same time to commit a political error of the greatest magnitude.

The conspiracies intended to subvert the power of Napoleon, however, served only to confirm it; and the necessity of restoring to France an hereditary and stable government had now become equally obvious and urgent. An elective authority gives occasion to continual convulsions; it is contemptible even where it is connected with a legitimate dynasty, as in Poland and in the Germanic empire; and in a country situated like France it would have been the height of absurdity. A motion was accordingly made and carried in the Tribunate, that the imperial dignity should be conferred upon Napoleon; the legislative body without hesitation adopted the proposition; and a senatus-consultum appeared, in which he was declared Emperor of the French, with remainder to his male line, or, in the event of his having no children, to any son or grandson of his brothers whom he might chuse to adopt as his heir. This decree was sent down to the departments, and, on the 1st of December 1804, the prefects reported that [7:15:731] between three and four millions of citizens had subscribed their assent to the proposed measure; a result which certainly indicated the approbation of the French people. By the army the elevation of Napoleon was hailed with enthusiasm; and when he visited the camp at Boulogne, he was received with an excess of military devotion. His coronation took place at Paris on the 2d of December, amidst all that was most splendid and illustrious in that capital. The ceremony was performed in the cathedral of Nôtre-Dame, where the pope officiated on the occasion, and consecrated the diadems, which Napoleon placed on his own head and on that of the Empress Josephine. In like manner, on the 25th of May 1805, he placed on his head the iron crown of the Lombard kings, in their ancient capital, and henceforth styled himself Emperor of the French and King of Italy; announcing, however, that the two crowns should not be held by the same person after his death. Never was any revolution so easily effected as that which overturned the French republic, in defence of which so much blood had been shed. And the reason is plain; the substance of all that had been fought for was maintained; the name only was changed.

The history of the wars of the empire belongs to that of France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, to which the reader is accordingly referred. To give details of these various contests would fill many volumes, and even the most meagre abridgment would occupy a space far exceeding the limits prescribed to this article. The Emperor Napoleon again made an offer of peace, which was rejected, and a new coalition, being the third, was formed against France. The ostensible objects of this league were to restore the independence of Holland and Switzerland, to free the north of Germany from the presence of the French troops, to deliver Piedmont, and to compel the evacuation of Italy; but its grand aim and design, in as far as concerned England, was to find employment for the French troops on the Continent, and to avert, for a time at least, the dangers of a threatened invasion. The hopes of the allies were, however, speedily crushed by the decisive victories of Ulm and Austerlitz; and Napoleon would soon have been at liberty to turn his arms against England, had it not been for two events, one of which served in a great measure to counterbalance his successes in Germany. We allude to the battle of Trafalgar, in which, on the 21st of October 1805, the very day after Mack surrendered at Ulm, the French grand fleet was annihilated by one mighty blow, and the means of effecting a descent on England completely destroyed. The other event above referred to was the declaration of war by Prussia, after Austria had been crippled and forced to receive the law from the conqueror, and whilst the Russian army was still behind the Vistula. This rash and headlong conduct was dearly expiated at Iena and Auerstadt, and the dismemberment of the Prussian monarchy formed a just retribution for the double perfidy and presumptuous confidence of the cabinet of Berlin. The campaign of 1807, after a prodigious effusion of blood, terminated with the battle of Friedland; and the peace of Tilsit, which followed, not only confirmed the humiliation of Prussia, but appeared to throw Russia into the arms of France. The French emperor had already made a gigantic stride towards the establishment of an European monarchy, and the effectual exclusion of English commerce from the ports of the Continent, by which means he vainly hoped eventually to reduce Great Britain to the necessity of listening to terms of accommodation.

In prosecution of this system, which ultimately proved the main instrument of his ruin, when, to all human appearance, it seemed about to be crowned with success, Napoleon commenced his aggressions on Portugal and Spain, and thus entangled himself in a struggle which, like a festering ulcer, continued to gnaw at the vitals of his power, and became the proximate cause of his ultimate overthrow. In vain did he bring all his means to bear upon this unhappy contest; in vain did he drive the English under Sir John Moore out of Spain. If permitted to finish his task, the subjugation of the Peninsula could not have been long deferred; but the formation of a fourth coalition again called him away into Germany, where Austria, scarcely dissembling her aversion to the continental system, was actively preparing to take up arms, in the hope of recovering what she had lost, and freeing herself from the yoke of France. The attempt, however, proved unsuccessful; and though accident gave her a temporary advantage at Aspern, the battle of Wagram placed her once more at the feet of the conqueror. At this moment the power of Napoleon seemed irresistible. No enemy opposed him on the Continent except the insurgents in Spain, aided by the English; and had he instantly directed his whole energies to terminate the war in the Peninsula, it is probable that his power would have remained unshaken by any reverse likely to befall him. But he judged otherwise; and, in seeking to attach Austria to his interests by a marriage with a princess of the imperial family, he became involved in a system of policy, the ultimate term of which was the abdication of 1814. From this moment his ascending movement was stopped; he had reached the culminating point of his greatness; and though his genius had as yet lost nothing of its vigour, his power began to decline.

The events of 1810 and 1811 belong chiefly to the history of Spain, where the impassible system of Wellington was gradually but steadily breaking down all opposition, and maturing a resistance which every day became more formidable. Those of 1812 were fraught with the destiny of Napoleon. He had long regarded a war with Russia as inevitable. The co-existence of two such empires as those of France and Russia seemed to him incompatible; and differences speedily arose which prognosticated a terrible collision. The preparations on both sides were immense; the fate of Europe, or rather of the empire of the world, was about to be decided in a single campaign; but Napoleon contemplated the conflict without dread, because, in his view, it afforded the only means of terminating for ever the long struggle which had consumed his life. Russia was too strong ever to enter voluntarily into the European system, such as Napoleon wished to reconstruct it, with France as its pivot; but the development of that system he considered as indispensable to his own safety, not to mention the stability of his power; and hence war seemed to him to be inevitable. Russia, on the other hand, resolved sternly to abide the terrible onset, and to trust to her cause, her climate, and her arms. The result is known to all. Amidst the frozen steppes of the Scythian wilderness perished those invincible legions which had carried the imperial eagles in triumph to Vienna, to Berlin, to Warsaw, and to Moscow. No such catastrophe had ever been witnessed in modern times; all preceding examples of suffering and disaster in war sank into nothing in comparison with it.^[22. The causes which led to the disastrous termination of Napoleon’s Russian campaign appear to have been various. 1. The necessity of advancing beyond Smolensko in the first campaign, a necessity imposed by circumstances which only left to Napoleon the choice of proceeding further or retracing his steps. 2. The circumstance of no decisive battle having taken place between Wilna and the Dwina, within which limits a repetition of Austerlitz or of Friedland would have placed Europe at 1ιis feet. 3. The imbecile conduct of Jerome, in not destroying Bagration after he had been cut off by the movements of Napoleon. 4. The indifference of the Poles of Volhynia and Podolia, who did not second Napoleon’s projects with the ardour he expected, though it was undoubtedly their interest to aid him by every means in their power. 5. The total want of resources in Lithuania, occasioned partly by the deficient harvest of the preceding year, and partly by the contributions levied to fill the Russian magazines. 6. The distance of the French magazines established at Königsberg, which were twenty-five marches in the rear, so that it required fifty days for a convoy to go and return, a circumstance which prevented the possibility of regular distributions. 7∙ The inexplicable delay at Wilna, where Napoleon remained fifteen days inactive, instead of pushing at once on Glubokoë and Polotsk, or falling upon Bagration at Minsk, either of which would have led to important results, though the false direction given to the principal Russian army on Drissa pointed it out as the main object of attack. 8. The inefficient conduct of Murat, in command of the van-guard, who, with thirty thousand horse, failed to make any serious impression on the enemy during their retreat. 9. The tactical error committed at Borodino, in crowding the troops into masses; a circumstance which prevented the extreme left of the Russians from being assailed with sufficient vigour by the old Smo- 1ensko road, where success would, in all probability, have been decisive. 10. The discontinuing the pursuit of the Russian army on its departure from Moscow, when it was much weakened in numbers, and greatly shattered by the dreadful conflict in which it had recently been engaged. 11. Want of knowledge of the country, the existing maps of which were detestable, and often served to mislead, whilst no accurate information could be obtained from the inhabitants. 12. The peace with Turkey, and the alliance of Bernadotte with the Russians, which altered all the chances, by giving two armies more to the enemy. 13. The progress made by the Russians in the art of war, which was particularly evinced in the conduct of the retreat from Drissa, and subsequently in the movement which united the different masses of the Russian troops on the Berezina, one of the most remarkable military operations of the age. 14. The capital fault committed by Napoleon, in not uniting under one vigorous and able chief the corps of Macdonald, Oudinot, St Cyr, and Victor, and in leaving, disseminated on the Dwina, 100,000 men, who, if united, would have destroyed Wittgenstein, and rendered his position secure. 15. And, lastly, the great efforts made by the Russian nation, and the resolute character displayed by the Emperor Alexander. Such appear to us to have been the principal causes which led to the disastrous termination of Napoleon’s Russian campaign. The whole calamity has usually been attributed to the cold; but this was so far from being the primary cause of failure, that it continued to be very supportable till the arrival of the French on the Berezina, where, out of 300,000 men whom Napoleon had either moved on the Dwina or carried to Moscow, not more than 50,000 remained in a condition to fight. ] Yet Napoleon, undismayed by the magnitude of. the calamity, displayed the almost miraculous resources of his genius in repairing the losses he had sustained; and his appearance in Germany[7:15:732] early in 1813, at the head of a powerful army, is perhaps the most astonishing circumstance in his extraordinary career. But fortune had now completely changed sides. Victorious at Lutzen, at Bautzen, and at Dresden, he was, through the treachery of his allies, and the faults of his lieutenants, defeated at Leipzig, and forced to retreat beyond the Rhine. Still he maintained the struggle with incomparable energy and perseverance; and never did his transcendent genius for war display itself more resplendency than in the astonishing campaign of 1814, when, by incredible efforts, he struggled, though in vain, to expel the invaders from the territory of France. But the battle of Montmartre, followed by the capitulation of Paris, decided the fate of the campaign, and with it that of Napoleon. He might indeed have retired behind the Loire, and there rallied under his banners Soult, Suchet, and Augereau, with a mass of from 120,000 to 130,000 men; but the marshals were tired of war, the spirit of the nation had sunk under its misfortunes, the people demanded that a term should be put to their sufferings, and Napoleon himself shrunk from entailing upon France the still greater calamities of a civil war. In these circumstances, he resolved to abdicate, and, on the 18th of April, signed an instrument by which he renounced for himself and his heirs the thrones both of France and of Italy.

The allies having left Napoleon the choice of his retreat, he chose the island of Elba, near to Corsica, where he was born, and close to Italy, the first theatre of his glory; and set out, accompanied by four commissioners, one from each of the great allied powers. He was allowed to retain the title of Emperor, and to take along with him a small number of those veteran soldiers who had accompanied him in so many dangers, and whose attachment was not shaken by his misfortunes. In traversing France on his way to the place of his exile, he had occasion to observe the extreme divergence of opinion respecting himself; for in proportion as he was beloved and regretted in the environs of Paris and the provinces of the east, he was detested in those of the south, where even the respect due to misfortune was denied him; and he was more than once obliged to put himself under the protection of the stranger, to defend his life against the people who had been so often intoxicated with his triumphs. On the 4th of May he landed in Elba, wherein, being separated from his wife and son, and without any projects for the future, he seemed to regard himself as politically dead to Europe, with no other task remaining for him to perform but that of writing the history of the rise and fall of his power.

But the march of events advanced so rapidly, that he was surprised by them even in his retreat. He perceived that Louis XVÎIĬ. had not discovered the secret of his age; he was convinced that the majority of France desired to secure the results of the Revolution; and he knew that this majority would ultimately dictate the law. Louis XVIII. had no doubt granted a charter, which was excellent in itself, as all charters are when taken by themselves; but such acts are valuable only with reference to the authority charged with defending them; and in France the king was not so much the head of the state, as the head of a party which regarded the charter with aversion, as a concession to the revolutionary principle, and hoped to destroy it piecemeal, according as opportunities offered for doing so. Napoleon anxiously watched the progress of events, which outrun his expectations; he was also well informed as to what passed at the congress of Vienna; and having learned in time that the ministers of Louis XVIII. had proposed to the congress to remove him from Elba, in order to send him in exile to St Helena, he conceived a project which will appear audacious in history, but which, in reality, circumstances indicated as the only reasonable course to be followed. He resolved to return to France.

His preparations were not long; he brought nothing with him but arms, and trusted that France would provide the rest. After a passage of five days, he landed without opposition at Cannes, near the spot where, fifteen years before, he had disembarked on his return from Egypt. This memorable event took place on the 1st of March 1815. He had no determinate plan, because he wanted particular data as to the state of affairs; his intention was to be guided by events, making provision only for probable contingencies. Nor was he at all embarrassed as to the route he should take; for he required a point of support, and as Grenoble was the nearest fortress, he lost no time in directing his march on that place, which opened its gates to receive him. The enthusiasm of the troops knew no bounds, and the reception which he everywhere met with confirmed him in his project. In fact, his march to Paris was throughout a triumphal procession. In twenty days this new revolution was terminated without having cost a single drop of blood. Amidst the acclamations of all France, Napoleon was reinstated on the throne. The grandeur of his enterprise had effaced the recollection of his misfortunes; it had restored to him the confidence of the French people; and he was once more the man of their choice.

Napoleon had refused the peace which was offered him at Châtillon, because he was then on the, throne of France, [7:15:733]and the terms proposed would have made him descend too much; but he could accept that which had been granted to the Bourbons, because he had just returned from Elba, and because one at the head of a great movement may stop short when ascending, but never when descending. Peace, however, was denied on any terms. It was declared by the Congress of Vienna, in^ a proclamation published by them to all Europe, that Napoleon, “by appearing again in France, had deprived himself of the protection of the law, and manifested to the world that there could neither be peace nor truce with him.” Nothing remained, therefore, but to commit the future destiny of Europe to the arbitrement of arms. The most active preparations were accordingly' made on both sides; by Napoleon, to repel the threatened aggression; and by the allies, to overturn the government which had been so suddenly reconstituted in France. Various attempts were made to open a negociation with the allies, but all proved abortive; and as Napoleon had no intention to await the onset of his enemies, he resolved to fall upon the Anglo-Prussians, before the troops of Austria or Russia could be in a condition to take part in the conflict. By the end of May he had about 180,000 ready to take the field, and by the middle of July this number would have been increased to 300,000; but by transporting the seat of war into Belgium, he would save France from invasion, draw on the enemy six weeks sooner than he would have come of his own accord, and perhaps also take him unprepared. These considerations decided him to become the assailant. On the 12th of June he set out from Paris, and on the 14th he established his head-quarters at Beaumont, where, in order to profit by the dissemination of the enemy, he judged it necessary to open the campaign without a moment’s delay.

Accordingly, he passed the frontier of Belgium on the 15tb, and on the following day advanced to Fleurus, where he discovered the Prussian army ranged in order of battle between St Amand and Sombref. Ney had received orders to push forward with 42,000 men by the Brussels road as far as Quatre Bras, an important point situated at the intersection of the roads leading to Brussels, Neville, Charleroi, and Namur, and there to keep the English in check, and prevent them from advancing to the aid of the Prussians, whom Napoleon proposed to attack with the 72,000 men that remained under his command. The battle of Ligny followed, in which the Prussians were defeated; and so complete was the rout, that, of 70,000 men, their generals were never afterwards able to assemble more than about 30,000. A night pursuit would have annihilated them. But Ney had been much less fortunate at Quatre Bras, where he displayed great infirmity, neither bringing his whole force to bear on the English, nor throwing himself back on Bry to act on the rear of the Prussians. The Prussian army being thus defeated, Grouchy was detached in pursuit of it with 35,000 men, whilst Napoleon proceeded to turn his efforts against Wellington. We have no space to detail the operations which followed, nor even to describe that fierce conflict which decided the fate of Napoleon, and with it that of Europe. The result, more fatal to France than that of either Agincourt or Poictiers, is known to every one. By the timely arrival of the Prussians, who had given the slip to Grouchy, and their junction with the English, the French army was not only defeated, but totally dispersed. In the conduct of the battle Napoleon certainly committed faults, particularly in forming his troops into too deep masses, and also in employing his cavalry too early in the action; but these sink into nothing compared with the gross blunders of his lieutenants, by which both the French army and himself were utterly undone.

He returned to Paris, in the hope that the national spirit might be roused, and that all good Frenchmen would unite in defending their country against another foreign invasion. But he soon found that he had deceived himself. Misfortune had deprived him of all consideration; he experienced opposition where he least expected it; the chambers rose in a state of insurrection against him; and, in a short time, he was compelled to sign a second abdication. He then decided to retire to America, and at first proposed to embark at Bordeaux, where his brother Joseph had hired a merchant-vessel for the purpose. But he afterwards changed his purpose, and set out for Rochefort, where he arrived on the 3d of July. Finding it impossible, however, to put to sea, and nearly equally perilous to return to the interior, he took the resolution of throwing himself upon the generosity of the prince regent of England; and, on the 15th, embarked on board of the Bellerophon, in Aix roads. It is universally known in what manner this appeal was answered. By a formal decision of the English government, he was sent as a prisoner of war to St Helena, where he pined away in hopeless exile, until death put an end to his misery on the 3d of May 1821. In his will he had expressed a desire that his body should be conveyed to France and buried on the banks of the Seine, “amongst the French people, whom he had loved so well ;” but this request could not, it seems, be complied with; and he was interred in a spot near Longwood, the place of his residence in the island, where a huge block of stone uncarved with a name covers the remains of him who needs no epitaph.

Posterity will judge of the treatment which Napoleon experienced at the hands of England. A prisoner in another hemisphere, he laboured to defend the reputation which he knew history was preparing for him, and which various parties exaggerated or blackened, according to the dictates of their respective prejudices or passions. But death surprised him at the moment when he was putting his commentaries into shape, and he consequently left them imperfect. They contain much, however, that is not only valuable in itself, but calculated to dispel prejudice, and to throw light upon some of the most important events in his life; and no one can read them attentively without experiencing a feeling of respect and sympathy, mixed with admiration. No man, perhaps, was ever made the object of such unsparing abuse, such bitter detraction, such inveterate and unrelenting rancour; but it is already certain, that neither envy, nor malice, nor hatred, nor slander, vzill ultimately succeed in depriving him of his just fame. By his victories of Montenotte, Castiglione, Rivoli, the Pyramids, Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Iena, Friedland, Abensberg, Ratisbon, Wagram, Dresden, Champaubert, Montmirail, and Ligny, he acquired enough of glory to efface the single disaster of Waterloo; and his five codes embody a system of jurisprudence, in the formation of which he had a principal share, and which has not only proved a boon of inestimable value to France, but is even at this day received as authoritative in a great portion of Europe; thus justifying his own proud anticipation, that he would go down to posterity with the codes in his hand. The monuments which he has left in France and in Italy will also attest his grandeur to the most remote ages; and though he can never be freed from the reproach of ambition, yet, in extenuation of this “glorious fault,” he might say, like Mahommed,
Je fus ambitieux ...
Mais jamais roi, pontife, ou chef ou citoyen,
Ne connut un projet aussi grand que le mien. (A.)
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