ARMY.

An army, says Dr Johnson,^[1. Dictionary, voce Army. ] is “a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man.” This definition, however, has little else than its brevity to recommend it. An army, it is true, is “a collection of armed men,” and such a collection” is generally “obliged to obey one man,” that is to say, it is commonly placed under the exclusive control and direction of an individual chief or leader. But it does not follow that “a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man” is the distinguishing or principal characteristic of an army, since a gang of robbers or banditti would equally answer this description. To be at all applicable, therefore, the definition of army must be at once more comprehensive and more precise; in other words, it must include the specification of those peculiar circumstances or attributes, the aggregate of which constitutes the complex idea sought to be resolved. Hence an army may, we think, be more accurately defined, a certain portion of the community selected, raised, or assembled, for the defence of the state, by means of conscription, voluntary enrolment, tenure of military service, or otherwise; armed, disciplined, and organized, conformably to a given system, which is considered best calculated for giving full development and efficacy to its collective force; and commanded by a chief or leader, with subordinate officers in regular gradation, to carry his orders into effect, and move the living machine, thus constructed, as he shall think proper to direct. It is an artificial or scientific combination of a great number of powers, individually small or insignificant, so as, by their union and concentration, to accomplish mighty and important deeds; a force which states and nations create out of the elements of their strength, as mechanicians form engines by taking advantage of and skilfully combining the action of the primary mechanical powers; an instrument, in short, so contrived as, though originally intended for the best, to be equally available for the worst purposes, being alike fitted for defence or aggression, for protection or conquest, for restraining and punishing the dishonest ambition of others, or affording the means of gratifying our own. An army, therefore, may be considered a species of movable engine, composed of a vast number of individual parts or powers, so arranged and organized as not only to act in concert, but to exert their whole aggregate force in any direction and upon any point which may be ordered or required. At the present day this denomination is applied to any given number of soldiers, consisting of artillery, infantry, and cavalry, of various descriptions, all completely armed and provided with engineers, a train of artillery, ammunition, magazines, commissariat, and other necessary adjuncts, subject to the command of a general, having under him lieutenant-generals, major-generals, brigadiergenerals, colonels, majors, captains, and subalterns:^[2. James’s Military Dictionary, wee Army. ] And an army is now composed of battalions or squadrons, regiments, brigades, divisions, and sometimes corps d’armée; two or more battalions or squadrons forming a regiment, two or more regiments a brigade, two or more brigades a division, and two or more divisions a corps d’armée. So much for definition and description.

Were we called upon to trace to its origin the history of war, we should find it necessary to ascend through every form and gradation of society to the very cradle of the human race. Admitted on all hands to be one of the greatest evils, war is also, unhappily, one of the oldest. “II est triste d’imaginer,” says a celebrated military writer, “que le premier art qu’aient inventé les hommes, ait été celui de se nuire, et que, depuis le commencement des siècles, on ait combiné plus de moyens pour détruire Thumanité que pour la rendre heureuse.”^[3. Essai General de Tactique, par Guibert, vol. i. p. 59, Disc. Prilim. Paris, 1803. ] This is a truth which cannot be disputed. The passions of rivalry, jealousy, hatred, revenge, cupidity, thirst of power or ambition, were born with the world; and these, in their turn, gave birth to war, which again produced the desire of conquering or combating with success. But, in proportion as this desire came to prevail, men would naturally be led to reflect as to the means best fitted to insure its gratification: and as experience must soon have convinced them that the battle was not always to the strong, nor the race to the swift,—or, in other words, that mere brute force, openly applied, was in many cases insufficient to secure the victory, and, in most, productive of a loss that countervailed it,—they must early have discovered that some degree of combination was requisite, and certain extrinsic qualities necessary, to render it effectual; that violence might find an auxiliary in cunning, and resistance be paralysed by stratagem and surprise. Such, accordingly, is the state of things which generally obtains amongst savage tribes, however warlike and enterprising. They seldom go down to battle openly and boldly; nor do they consider victory, when dearly purchased, as either honourable or desirable. Artifice is their main resource. The first principle of their simple tactics is to steal unperceived upon the enemy, and overwhelm him, while unsuspicious of attack and unprepared for resistance. In this and similar principles, however, we discover the origin and primary development of the military art. Its source is in the forest or the wilderness. But as war is the first art which men invented, so it is also that which was soonest cultivated and improved. It kept pace with the progress of society;—as mankind multiplied, and communities extended themselves, it received a corresponding expansion ;—more means were combined, and a greater number of men were assembled. This was the second stage of the art, where it remained long stationary, and in nearly the same state in which we find it at the present day among some of the Asiatic nations. Science had not digested nor systematized the rude and shapeless mass of knowledge which experience had supplied, or suggested new combinations of existing means. But ambition at length gave a fresh stimulus to improvement, by opening up a new theatre for its expansive energies; and successive conquerors contributed largely to the cultivation of an art which became the instrument of their glory. In their hands, accordingly, it determined the destiny of nations ;—it raised up or destroyed empires ;—it produced mighty revolutions ;—it overthrew old dynastics, and created new ones in their stead ;—and, amidst all the havoc and desolation occasioned by the pursuit of false glory, it contributed, upon the whole, to the cultivation of those sciences and arts which have a tendency to mitigate the natural ferocity of man, and ultimately to render conquest itself less destructive, and war less sanguinary.
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Results so vast leave no doubt whatever, that the art which was principally instrumental in producing them, must have made considerable progress at a very remote period of the world. It is in fact in the early and semibarbarous stage of society that the military virtues are found in the greatest perfection. The mind is then fierce, ardent, energetic, and daring; peculiarly accessible to the illusion of warlike renown, and undistracted by any of those influences or impressions which act so powerfully upon man in civilized life; while the body, unpampered by luxury, unenfeebled by indulgence, is a fit companion for such a spirit, and capable of enduring, without difficulty, the fatigues and privations incident to war. Add to this that, at the period of which we speak, the only law generally recognised and respected is the law of the strongest; that the necessity of self-defence, of protecting person and property from violence and spoliation, keeps men continually prepared to repel force by force, or to retaliate one aggression by another; that, consequently, the disorders which distract society re-act upon and foster the turbulent spirit in which they have their origin; that war thus becomes a trade which all are either disposed or compelled to pursue; that, to bold and adventurous spirits, it opens up the only path which leads to fortune and to fame, and thus holds out irresistible temptations to embark in military enterprises. At such a period all men are soldiers, and war is their natural employment; in it they live and move and have their being. But necessity is the parent of invention, and the mother of arts; and to it the science of war was indebted for its first improvements. Armies are unwieldy machines, which cannot be moved without some degree of organization, nor supported without considerable care and foresight, nor led into action with an enemy without a certain knowledge of tactical combinations. It is obvious, therefore, that wherever we read of such masses of men having been assembled, whether for purposes of aggression or defence, we may safely consider this fact as of itself conclusive, that the military art had there reached the second stage of its progress, or, in other words, had made considerable advances. History may be silent as to the precise extent to which improvement had been carried, and the records of the past may afford no clue to direct our inquiries concerning the composition and organization of the armies of remote antiquity; but if it be once admitted that such armies existed, and that they defended some countries and overran or conquered others, this admission will imply no inconsiderable knowledge of the art of war on the part of those by whom they were organized and directed.

Discipline of some kind or other is the bond which keeps together large bodies of men: without it they are a mere mob or rabble, incapable alike of action or direction, and formidable to none save the people of the country where they happen to have congregated. Even the Tartar hordes of Genghis Khan and Timour had an organization and discipline of their own, by means of which these barbarian conquerors were enabled to impel their fierce and warlike masses against the enfeebled and effeminate soldiery of countries advanced in wealth and in civilization^[4. Timour or Tamerlane, of whom unfortunately we know so little, has left an institutional or elementary treatise on war and the art of conducting armies, each page of which affords proof of a natural genius for commanding men, as well as of tact and skill in employing them to the best advantage. See Instituts de Timour, par Langles; also Jomini, Traité des Grandes Operations Militaires, tome viii. p. 678∙ Paris, 1616. ] and the same observation applies still more forcibly to the Asiatic and Turkish armies of our own time. In a word, we may adopt with some qualification the remark of Guibert, when speaking of the progress of the military art: “II précéda,” says he, “chez tous les peuples, les arts et les sciences, et y périt à mesure que celles-ci s’étendirent.”^[5. Essai Général de Tactique, vol. i. p. 60. ] The details into which we are about to enter will fully illustrate the truth of these general observations.

The earliest military establishment of which history has preserved any record is that of Egypt under the reign of Sesostris, or, as he is denominated in the monumental sculptures of that wonderful country, Rhamses;^[6. One of the difficulties which occur in our inquiries concerning Sesostris arises from the different names by which he has been designated by ancient writers. He has been variously called Sesostris, Sesoosis, Sesochis, Sesonchosis, Sethosis, Sethos, Ramesses, Ranieses, Rhamses, Ramestes,.Rampses, Vexores, and Aegyptus. But most of these appellations were probably titular. Thus, Sesostrìs may be Se-sios-t-re, which signifies, f filius domini, donum solis ; Sesoosis may, in like manner, be a corruption for Se-sios-sios,J‰s domini dominorum ; and Rhamses or Ramesses, derived from Re, sol, and Mes, gignere, may signify Begotten by the Sun. But it is not always possible to render ancient Egyptian names according to the grammatical rules established in the Coptic language, and, therefore, such etymologies as those now proposed are to be received as purely conjectural. The common designation of this monarch on the monuments is Lameses-Meíamoun, Rhamses beloved of Ammon ; or, adopting the etymology of Rhamses just proposed, Begotten by the Sun, Beloved of Ammon ; in which case both appellations would be merely titular. Vide Sir W. Drummond’s Origines, book iv∙ chap. 13, and Champoilion’s Précis du Système Hiéroglyphique, p. 223. Paris, 1824. ] who was considered the greatest of the Egyptian kings after Osiris,^[7. Manetho apud Euseb. Chron. lib. i. In Manetho apud Josephum contra Appionem, lib. i. p. 1053, this monarch is indifferently called Ramesses and Rampses. ] and has generally been supposed by chronologists to have flourished about seventeen centuries before our era.^[8. C hronologists have been unable to fix the precise date of the reign of Sesostris. Larcher, the celebrated translator of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, adopts and defends with much warmth the chronography of Herodotus; while others, rejecting the authority of the father of history, endeavour to determine the era of the Egyptian monarch from the scanty data furnished by Diodorus and Strabo. I he objections to the conclusions of Larcher, stated by Sir William Drummond in his Origines, book iv. chap. 13, appear to be perfectly unanswerable. ] But Osiris was an ideal being, the offspring of mythology, and the hero of fable, adored by the Egyptians sometimes as a deified mortal, sometimes as a personification of the Nile, and sometimes as the symbolical representative of the solar orb. Sesostris, on the contrary, is claimed by history as a real personage; and although the accounts which have been preserved of the reign of this prince, chiefly by the Greek historians, are dashed with a considerable admixture of exaggeration and romance, we cannot reasonably doubt the existence of the monarch, however we may be inclined to question the exploits of the hero and the achievements of the conqueror. The substance of these accounts, indeed, when considered in connection with the corroborative evidence supplied by the Egyptian monuments, and the traces of his expedition which remained even in the age of Herodotus, may be regarded as the more deserving of credit thdt, while scepticism has little to oppose to them except its own incredulity, the statements of the Greek historians are not only consistent with one another, but in strict accordance with the uniform tradition and belief, as well as with the records, of that country, the mother of arts and civilization, which, under this renowned [7:3:581]sovereign, is supposed to have reached an unprecedented height of military glory. _ _

Sesostris, however, did not create the military spirit to which heappears afterwards to have given such ample development. This was in a great measure the work of his father, Amenophis HL, who, shortly after the birth of his son, is said to have assembled all the male children born on the same day, and to have given them the same education. No distinction was made between the young prince and his companions. They were alike engaged in the same studies, trained to the same exercises, inured to the same hardships, and instructed in the use of the same arms. A rigid discipline prescribed unremitting exertion, while daily privations and fatigue hardened and prepared them for the duties of war. In establishing this military seminary, Amenophis appears to have intended placing around his son a faithful band of soldiers, attached to him by the associations of early friendship, and the ties of brotherhood in arms. Nor did the result disappoint his expectations. Arrived at manhood, the prince and his companions soon evinced how much they had profited by their education,—how well they merited the confidence reposed in them. With bodies rendered vigorous and athletic by labour and exercise, and with minds cultivated by the best studies, they were already fitted to act both as soldiers and as generals, to serve with energy, or to command with skill. Sent by his father at an early age to command an expedition against the Arabians, the prince, accustomed, as well as his companions, to suffer long both from hunger and from thirst, could meet upon equal terms the wandering and yet unconquered tribes, who chiefly trusted for their defence to the barrenness of their inhospitable deserts. Arabia was subdued and annexed to the Egyptian monarchy. He afterwards directed his march to the west, and his father lived to see the greater part of Libya conquered by his victorious son. When Sesostris mounted the throne, therefore, his military fame was established. The qualities of his mind, his dauntless courage, and his daring ambition, seemed to be announced by his personal appearance; and the people, no doubt, easily associated the character of the hero with the robust frame and gigantic stature^[9. Sesostris was four cubits and four palms, or about seven feet in height, and seemed formed by nature to sustain all the toils and fatigues to which his active life was afterwards exposed. Diodorus, lib. i. sect. 55. ] of their new monarch. But it is more material to state, that the success of his arms, in his wars with the Arabians and Libyans, had inspired him with the hopes of making yet more extensive conquests; and, if we may credit the Greek historians, the perilous project of subjugating the world must have been already familiar to the mind of Sesostris when he succeeded to the crown. Amidst the burning sands of Libya, and in the depth of the Arabian deserts, the phantom of universal empire showed itself, and he vowed to pursue it.^[10. Drummond’s Origines, book iv. c. 13. ]

His resolution being thus taken, no time appears to have been lost by the new sovereign in preparing his subjects for an enterprise, which could not be undertaken but in defiance of all the counsels of prudence. He caused various reports to be spread abroad, artfully attributing his project to other causes than his own ambition. His daughter Athyrtis, famed for her wisdom, as a sort of Egyptian Cassandra, proclaimed the facility with which her father would conquer the earth: the success of the enterprise was prognosticated by omens, by sortilege, and by divination: and the people were reminded that, at the birth of Sesostris, Phtha had appeared to his father in a dream, and had predicted to Amenophis that the newborn boy should one day become master of the world.^[11. Diodor. Sic. lib. i. sect. 53. ] Nor did the Egyptian king content himself with influencing opinion in his favour by means of prophecies, prodigies, and visions. His natural sense taught him that other and more rational precautions were necessary; that a king who is not popular at 'home, should not think of making conquests abroad. His first object, therefore, was to secure the affections of the Egyptians: and for this purpose he employed all those arts which, exercised by sovereigns, are so powerful in conciliating popular favour. Some he won by his munificence, others by his clemency; the selfish were secured by his liberality, the vain were flattered by his condescension and affability; even traitors to the royal authority were allowed to escape with impunity, and public debtors were liberated from the prisons in which they were confined.^[12. Diodor. Sic. lib. i. sect. 54. ] On the other hand, that he might provide for the tranquillity of his kingdom, and leave none behind him who either would or could attempt a revolution in his absence, he made a partition of power among the chief men of the nation, dividing the whole territory of Egypt into thirty-six nomes or prefectures, over which he appointed as many governors, each of whom was charged with the collection of the royal revenues, and the administration of the laws within his own particular district. He at the same time elevated his brother Armais to the rank of regent of the kingdom; and, except that this prince might not wear the royal diadem, he was permitted to assume all the pomp of a monarch; an indulgence which he so far abused as to usurp the crown in the king’s absence, and to attempt his life on his return home from his long and perilous expedition.^[13. Drummond’s Origines, loc. supr. cii. ]

Having completed these and other necessary arrangements, Sesostris next proceeded to raise an army. The peace establishment of the kingdom, as previously organized by this prince, appears to have consisted of a numerous militia, divided into two classes, denominated hala-sires and harmatopoii, and amounting, according to Herodotus, to 410,000 men, distributed throughout the different provinces as a species of military colonists, each man being allowed a portion of land adequate to the maintenance of himself and family. This formed the nucleus of the mighty force which Sesostris now raised for the conquest of the world, consisting, if we may believe Diodorus Siculus, of 600,000 infantry, 24,000 cavalry, and 27,000 war chariots; a force certainly equal to the magnitude of the enterprise in which he was about to engage, though it is difficult to conceive how the population of a small country like Egypt, supposing it ever so dense, could have supplied so vast a body of men, exceeding, by more than 200,000, the numerical strength of the army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia, and which was by far the largest ever assembled in modern times. No precise information has reached us as to the composition, organization, and discipline of this expeditionary army. We only learn, incidentally as it were, that the king chose as the leaders of his less experienced troops, the companions of his youth, trained, like himself, to the use of arms, and exceeding 1700 in number; that disgrace or infamy was attached to disobedience of orders and neglect of duty, and that meritorious or valorous deeds were liberally rewarded; circumstances which, taken in connection with the particulars above stated, seem to warrant the conclusion, that the military system of Egypt had reached no small degree of improvement, and that the science of war, in all its branches, had made considerable advances. With [7:3:582]a view to the ulterior objects of the expedition, Sesostris also collected or fitted out a fleet of 400 sail; and the ships are said to have been of large dimensions, adapted to the purposes both of war and transport.^[14. Origines, ubi supra. ]

With these immense preparations the warlike monarch at length commenced his perilous enterprise. He invaded Ethiopia, and compelled the inhabitants to pay him a tribute in ebony, gold, and ivory. Even the ferocious Troglodytes yielded to the conqueror. Advancing farther to the southward, he passed the frontiers of Ethiopia, and entered the country extending beyond Sennaar to the Mountains of the Moon, where he left various monuments both of his power and of his piety. In the Straits of Dira or Babelmandeb he joined his fleet, consisting, as above stated, of 400 sail, which had already compelled the inhabitants of the islands in the Erythrean Sea, and of the adjacent continent, to acknowledge his authority. The victorious monarch next proceeded to India, which he completely overran, extending his conquests beyond the Ganges, and subduing some of the countries which lie between that river and the Eastern Ocean. He then directed his course towards the country of the five rivers or Punjab; crossed the immense reticulation of streams, which ultimately unite their waters with the Indus; and ascended the table-land of central Asia. Nor were the Scythian nations able to resist the torrent as it rolled westward through Tartary, behind the mountains of Imaus, and north of the Caspian, to the river Tanais and the Palus Moeotis. Having entered Europe, Sesostris passed through Sarmatia, Dacia, and Moesia, nor halted until he arrived in Thrace, where he erected columns to perpetuate the memory of his victories, and to prove the extent of his conquests. From Thrace he crossed over into Asia Minor, and advanced into the plains of Colchis (rendered so famous in Grecian story by the expedition of the Argonauts and the fable of the golden fleece), where he founded a colony on the banks of the Phasis, and erected monuments, some of which were in existence in the age of Herodotus. He then marched against the Assyrian empire, which he conquered, and thus seated himself on the throne which had been occupied by Ninus and Semiramis. Finally, surrounded with the trophies of victory, and enriched with the spoils of nations, Sesostris returned to Egypt in triumph, after having been thirty years engaged in an expedition, undertaken in defiance of all the dictates of prudence, yet, if we believe the concurrent testimony of historians, terminated without a single reverse of fortune.^[15. Diodorus, lib. i. sect. 54 and 55; Strabo, lib. xvi.; Herodotus, lib. ii. c. 103 and 110; Manetho apud Joseph, contr. Apion. ; Julius Africanus apud Syncellum. In all the countries through which he passed, Sesostris left monuments behind him; and where he encountered serious resistance, the columns he erected bore this inscription: “Sesoosis, King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, has subdued this region by force of arms.” Diodorus, ibid. ] Such is the military story of the renowned Rhamses.^[16. The information given to Germanicus when he visited the ruins of Thebes, by some of the elder Egyptian priests, relative to this monarch, and the military establishment he had created, is thus recorded by Tacitus in the second book of his Annals: “Mox (Germanicus^ visit veterum Thebarum magna vestigia; et manebant structis molibus litterae Aegyptiae. priorem opulentiam com-plexae; jussusque e senioribus sacerdotum patrium sermonem interpretari referebat habitâsse quondam septingenta millia actati militari: atque eo cum exercitu regem Rhamsen Libya, ./Ethiopia, Medisque et Persis, Bactriano ac Scytha potitum; quasque terras Suri Armeniique et contigui Cappadoces colunt, inde Bithynum, hinc Lycium ad mare imperio tenuisse,” &c. The strength of the army of Sesostris, as here stated, very nearly coincides with the amount given in the text, on the authority of Diodorus. According to the latter, this army consisted of G00,000 infantry, 24,000 horse, and 27,000 armed chariots; which, as at least three men fought in one chariot, would make a total of 695,000 men, or only 5000 less than the number reported by the priests to Germanicus on the faith of the monuments. ] That it involves many improbabilities is obvious; but what portion of ancient history is free of them? Mankind, in every age of the world, have taken delight in the marvellous; and if the ancients appear to have been pleased with reading romances in history, the moderns seem equally disposed to read history in romances. The great difficulty in forming an accurate judgment as to the story of the Egyptian monarch arises from the total want of details. We hear nothing of the generals to whom he was opposed, of the cities which he besieged, nor even of the battles which he fought. Historians relate his triumphs, but are silent respecting the skill which obtained them. At the same time, it cannot reasonably be doubted, we think, that there is a large substratum of truth in the narratives which have reached us respecting this extraordinary personage. By the concurrent testimony of the ancient authors, confirmed by the evidence derived from the Egyptian monuments, he is represented as a great warrior and conqueror; as the first, and, we may almost add, the last, of the Pharaohs who pursued the phantom of military renown, and sought for glory in distant expeditions: nor are there wanting circumstances which warrant the conclusion, that he overran some countries, conquered others, and left traces of his progress in many parts both of Asia and Europe. That he established a regular army, and provided a fleet to co-operate with it in his expedition against the countries of the East, are facts which seem to be as well attested as any in ancient history.^[17. Origines, ubi supra, “It would be in vain,” says Sir William Drummond, “to deny to the traditions of ages, to the records of history, and to the authority of monuments, that Sesostris must have been one of the greatest princes that ever lived; while we may fairly confess our doubts of the extent of his conquests, and acknowledge that we cannot ascertain at what period he flourished, lhe existence of the monarch we may consider as certain; and some of the achievements of the conqueror we may admit to be probable, though ŵe. cannot fail to perceive, that the number of his triumphs has been amplified by exaggeration, and the history of his reign crowded with fictions. It is known that the great Ramesses or Ramestt⅛ created at least one obelisk, on which he announced himse to be loved and gifted by all the gods of Kgypt; but it may be questioned whether he had a right to call himself the master of the whole habitable world. We may believe that Sesostris obtained many victories, and subdued many regions; while we may still avow that we are unable to tell when this mighty monarch reigned, where were the limits of his empire, what humbled nations bowed down before his throne, or what captive kings were yoked to his triumphal car.” ]

“C’est chez les peuples d’Asie, chez les Perses surtout,” says Guibert, “que l’art de la guerre commença à prendre quelque consistance but he adds, “après la mort de Cyrus, le luxe lui fit quitter la Perse, et il passa chez les Grecs.”^[18. Essai Général de Tactique, vol. i. p. 61. ] This remark, however, must be taken with some important qualifications. As a general proposition, it , is doubtless true that the military art first assumed consistence among the Asiatic nations, particularly the Persians; for the warlike spirit of Egypt seems to have expired with its first and only conqueror. But it is utterly absurd to maintain that the death of Cyrus was productive of any change in the military system of Persia, or that this event led to the transference which Guibert has so gratuitously supposed. Cyrus, in as far as we are able to distinguish his character,' and form a judgment [7:3:583]of his achievements, appears to have been a wise prince, a warlike monarch, and a great conqueror j^[19. The achievements of Cyrus, like those of Sesostris, have been so exaggerated by historians, and embellished by fabulists, that almost every grain of truth has to be separated from a bushel of fiction. The Cyropaedia is merely a philosophical romance, with no more of truth or fact in it than is sufficient to give verisimilitude to the story. ] while the victories achieved by the Persians under his command, contrasted with the fatal reverses which they afterwards ex-erienced, may induce superficial observers to imagine that the knowledge of the art declined after the hero’s death. No opinion, however, can possibly be more erroneous; except, indeed, it be that which represents the Greek tactics as having been primarily derived from the Persian, to which, as will appear in the sequel, they bore not the slightest resemblance. The qualities of the Persian troops may, perhaps, have deteriorated, and, under the influence of luxury and refinement, the military character of the nation may have declined; but the system of organising armies and making war continued, in a great measure, unchanged: nor, as far as the military art is concerned, would it be easy to discover any material difference between the tactics of Cyrus, who was uniformly victorious, and those of Xerxes, Mardonius, and Darius, who experienced the most disastrous defeats. It should also be remembered, that the former led Asiatics against Asiatics, and that the nations he subdued were among the most effeminate and voluptuous of the ancient world: whilst the latter were called to contend with the Greeks in their best days, when their bodies were robust, their hearts strong, and their discipline admirable; and when their armies were commanded by men fired alike with the love of liberty and of glory, and not only conversant with the science of war, theoretically considered, but eminently skilful in all those resources which neutralize superiority of numbers, and enable handfuls of men to snatch the victory from masses apparently overwhelming and invincible.

The strength of the Persian army consisted in its cavalry, which was always of excellent quality, and capable of achieving great things had it been properly commanded. This was emphatically evinced at the passage of the Granicus, where its gallant conduct attracted the admiration of every officer in the Macedonian army, from the king to the humblest dilochite in the ranks·^[20. The Persian cavalry, 30,000 strong, was, on this occasion, commanded by Memnon, who drew it up in a single line of equal extent with that occupied by the Macedonian army on the other bank of the river. The ground on which it was posted sloped gradually towards the bank of the Granicus, which was here steep and difficult, and hence no position could have been chosen more favour- ⅛1 e ∕ 0r t ∣ le effective action of such a force. But its energies were paralysed, or, which comes nearly to the same thing, its full capabilities were never brought into play, in consequence of its linear formation, which admitted only of detached efforts, without ensemble 0r support. (Guischardt, Mémoires Militaires sur les Grecs et les Romains, tom. i. p. 251-258. Lyons, 1760.) ] Notwithstanding the absurd principle upon which it was formed, and the'total want of support, owing to the treachery or terror of the Greeks in the pay of Darius, who had been brought forward to sustain it, this cavalry bravely disputed the passage; drove Ptolemy, who commanded the vanguard of the Macedonian army, back into the river; charged the heads of the columns as they successively ascended the bank in order to deploy, with the utmost impetuosity; and maintained the combat until it was attacked by the formidable phalanx in front, and by the light infantry on both flanks, when it was at length forced to retire.^[21. Guischardt, ubi supra. ] The Persian infantry had none of the qualities for which the cavalry was distinguished, and seems, in fact, to have been little better than a military mob, without coherence or solidity; while the vast numbers of this arm which were commonly brought into the field impeded the action of the cavalry, which they were incapable of supporting, and served only to create confusion, and supply food for the slaughter, when opposed to disciplined armies commanded by men conversant with military combinations. Marathon, Plataea, and Mycale, all bear witness to the truth of this observation. The war-chariots formed another source of disorder and weakness. Their number, like that of the infantry, was excessive; and as these vehicles could only act upon level ground, they were altogether useless and unavailing in a broken country, or against a skilful commander. With regard to the numerical strength of the Persian armies, we have no precise information, and can only form a conjecture from the statements, almost always exaggerated, of the Greek historians as to the numbers actually brought into the field. Xerxes, who had taken by descent a hereditary hatred of the Greeks, invaded Europe, it is said, and entered Greece at the head of an army, which, with its retinue of servants, eunuchs, and women, amounted to upwards of 5,000,000 of souls; a statement which, if true, would imply that the Persian nation had risen en masse to overrun the countries of the West. Yet this vast multitude, or rather horde, was arrested in its progress by 300 Spartans at the pass of Thermopylae; and that mountain gorge would have become the scene of its total defeat and destruction, had not a base Trachinian betrayed this devoted band of heroes, and enabled the Persians to attack it at once in the front, the flank, and the rear. At Marathon, Datis and Artaphernes, lieutenants of the Great King, brought into the field 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse,^[22. The total number of Persians engaged at Marathon was, according to Valerius Maximus (1. v. c. 4), 300,000; according to Justin (l∙ n∙.c. 9), double this amount, or 600,000 men. No attention whatever is due to such extravagant exaggerations. ] which were beaten by 10,000 Athenian infantry and 1000 Plataean auxiliaries, commanded by Miltiades. At Plataea, the Persian force, consisting in all of 300,000 men, was again defeated with great loss by a handful of Lacedaemoniâns and Athenians under Pausanias. And at the battle of Mycale, fought on the same day with that of Plataea (22d September 479 B. c.), 100,000 men, the wrecks of that portion of the army more immediately under the command of Xerxes, which had just returned from the unsuccessful expedition to Greece, were completely overthrown and dispersed by a small body of Greeks, who stormed their entrenched camp, slaughtered several thousands, and carried off an immense booty. On comparing these various numbers, and making due allowance for casualties, it would appear that the Persian monarch must have entered Greece with about 600,000 fighting men; an enormous force numerically considered, but not too great to provoke incredulity, when we reflect on the mode in which the eastern nations have always made war, and further take into account the circumstance, that nearly the whole of one reign and part of another were consumed in making preparations for this ill-fated expedition.

Of the state of the Persian army in the reign of Alexander, Arrian has furnished us with many important particulars, especially in his account of the battle of Arbela, which is the more interesting, as it gives us some insight respecting the Persian tactics under the last Darius. According to this writer, who had consulted the memoirs of Ptolemy, one of Alexander’s generals, but who, nevertheless, seems to have possessed the Greek talent for exaggerating numbers, the army which Darius brought into [7:3:584]the field on this occasion consisted of 1,000,000 infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 chariots armed with scythes, and 15 elephants; a statement which appears equally incredible, whether we regard the absolute amount here assigned, or attend to the glaring disproportion between the relative numerical strength of the different arms. Quintus Curtius, who reduces the infantry to 600,000, and raises the cavalry to 145,000, exaggerates at least with method, and thus avoids an objection fatal to the numerical accuracy of the military historian. The disposition of this enormous force, as described by Arrian, shows the incongruous elements of which it was composed. According to the custom of the Persians, the king placed himself in the centre, having around him his relations and the officers of his court, with his ordinary guards, foot and horse, which sometimes amounted to 15,000 men. These he supported by a body of Greeks in his pay, upon whom he placed great reliance, and by other corps d’élite furnished by the native army. The Persians, the Susians, and the Candu-sians composed the left; on the right were the Syrians, the Assyrians, and other nations, subjects or allies of Persia; and the whole was formed into squares or masses of prodigious depth, evidently with the intention of resisting the compact formation of the Macedonian phalanx, of which the Persians had already had woeful experience. These different nations were variously armed, some with missile weapons, others with pikes, hatchets, maces, &c.; and cavalry were stationed in the intervals between the squares. The reserve was composed of those for whom no place could be found in the first line; and being drawn up too close to it, served only to augment the confusion. The infantry of the left was flanked by the main body of the Persian cavalry, and part of that of the Bactrians; together with two corps, one Scythian and the other Bactrian, a little in advance. On the right, the Armenian and the Cappadocian cavalry were posted in a similar manner, though not in equal force. Two hundred armed chariots were drawn up before the left, and fifty before the right of the infantry, while the elephants and fifty more chariots were placed in advance of the centre.^[23. Guischardt, Mémoires Militaires sur les Grecs et les Romains, tom. i. p. 2G0—61. ] Such was the disposition of the army of Darius on this memorable and decisive day. It was doubtless bad in many respects, particularly in the disproportionate crowding of all arms on the centre and left, while the right was left comparatively weak and uncovered; but its greatest defect, inseparable, perhaps, from the heterogeneous composition of the army, consisted in this, that the defeat of any one part of the line was certain to throw the whole into irretrievable disorder, and to end in a complete rout. Still it showed very considerable knowledge of the military art; while the battle which followed, and which was bravely contested, is even yet considered a study for tacticians.

From the earliest times, the genius of the Greeks, adventurous and free, inclined them to war. This, at first a consequence of their position, became in time an attribute of the national character, and gave rise to institutions which, in their turn, served to diffuse and confirm the spirit in which they had originated. Divided into a number of petty states, which were separated often by imaginary boundaries, and naturally jealous of one another, Greece was a scene of never-ending contention, and the theatre of almost continual war. New causes of difference, in the shape of injuries, encroachments, or insults, real or imaginary, were incessantly arising; and as each state was alike proud of itself, suspicious of its neighbours or rivals, and, above all, watchful of its independence, the wrong done, or believed to have been done, was promptly followed by retaliation, which again provoked a repetition of the offence, and thus led ultimately to war. Such a state of things naturally fostered a warlike spirit, and gave birth to military institutions; while the necessity of self-defence, still more than the love of conquest or of glory, rendered it imperative that every citizen capable of bearing arms should be ready to appear in the field at the call of his country. But experience soon taught the important lesson that numbers did not constitute strength, and that a small body of men prepared by early training for the duties of war, and subjected to a system of regular discipline, were capable of contending, on equal terms, with great numerical pdds. When this discovery was first made, we have no means of ascertaining precisely; but it is one which must early have occurred to the rulers and governors of small states like those of Greece, the scanty population of which imposed upon them the necessity of devising the best means for rendering its disposable strength effective and available. Hence we find, that one great object of the early statesmen and legislators of this country was to organize a system of physical and moral education adapted to its peculiar position and circumstances; to engraft the military spirit on those institutions which were destined to form the general character of their countrymen; and, amidst the pursuits of peace, to prepare the minds and bodies of their citizens for encountering the fatigues, privations, and perils of war. Nor did their labours prove fruitless or vain; for the institutions thus prepared being suited alike to the genius and condition of the people, soon struck their roots, as it were, into the soil, and ere long produced those fruits which have for ages been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But less perhaps of this wonder and admiration is due to the bravery of the Greeks, eminent as it always was, than to their discipline, organization, and conduct in the field. Among them all the branches of the military art were simultaneously cultivated, and received the most important improvements. Their formation was rendered compact and formidable; combining solidity and the power of resistance, with a mobility which made these qualities available on different points, even in action. Their tactics were singularly adapted to the peculiar character of their troops, and were founded on the most certain principles of the art.^[24. Guibert, in his Discours Préliminaire, part second, underrates the tactics of the Greeks. “Je compare les guerres des Grecs, says he, “et la plupart des guerres des anciens, à celles de nos colonies dans l’autre continent. J’y vois cinq ou six mille hommes les uns contre les autres, des champs de bataille étroits, où l’oeil du général peut tout embrasser, tout diriger, tout reparer. Un bon major conduirait aujourd’hui la manoeuvre de Leuctre et de Mantinée, comme Epamlncmdas," p. 82. It will be fortunate for modern armies wne∏ their “good majors” are as skilful and as brave as Epaminondas. ] And, in later times, we find strategy recognised and taught as a science in the schools;^[25. Guischardt, Mémoires Militaires, tom. ii. p. 155. ] while, in the field, it received, in several respects, a development which no other nation, ancient or modern, has yet been able to surpass. Lastly, we may observe, that until the reign of Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, Greece had no standing army. Her strength consisted in her militia; and to this description of force she was indebted for the imperishable glories of Marathon, Plataea, and Mycale, when the myriads of the Persian invader were successively overthrown. But, from the causes above indicated, and the incessant contests in which the different states were engaged with each other, this militia had acquired the principal characteristics of a regular force, both as regards [7:3:585]organization and discipline, and consequently was of nearly equal avail against an enemy in the field.

To the institutions of Lycurgus Sparta was indebted for her military prc-eminence among the states of Greece. To exclude all refinement and luxury, to cultivate the sterner virtues of abstinence and self-denial, to inure the body to hardships and the mind to suffering, to inculcate self-sacrificing patriotism, and to form great characters, appear to have been the principal objects of this iron» hearted legislator; who accordingly laid the foundations of his institutions in a system of primary education, intended and calculated to convert the free male population of the state into a military community, and to develope to the utmost all those physical and moral qualities which render men invincible in war. Nor did the results disappoint the calculations upon which this system had been founded. Trained from their earliest years to suffer the extremes of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, to endure pain with unflinching fortitude, and to despise danger and death; habituated to the most implicit and unquestioning obedience to all placed in authority over them; and continually exercised in running, wrestling, swimming, ball-playing, and martial games of all sorts, as well as in stratagems, surprises, and ambuscades; the Spartan youth, when called to take the field, were prepared at once to enter upon the duties of war with alacrity and vigour, and to regard with indifference all the privations and fatigues of the severest campaign. Nor were their discipline and organization inferior to their military qualities. The Spartan phalanx, which formed the basis of the Macedonian, consisted of eight files in depth.^[26. There is some confusion among the ancient writers on the subject of the division of the Spartan force. Thucydides, describing the arrangement and proportions of the Spartan army at Manincia, informs us that a battalion or lochos consisted of four penteecstìes or companies, a pentecostie of four enomoties or platoons, and each enomotìe of 32 men; thus making the whole strength of the battalion 512 men. But he makes no mention of the number of battalions in a regiment, and indeed acknowledges that the subject was obscure, and his information imperfect. According to Xenophon, the Spartan mora or regiment consisted of four lochì, the lochos of two pentecostìes, and the pentecostie of two enomoties. The number included in the last denomination is not given; but, if we assume that it consisted of 32 men, as stated by the historian first named, the regiment of Xenophon would amount to 5Ĵ2 men, or 50 more than the battalion of Thucydides. How are these discrepancies to be reconciled? It is scarcely probable that the division of the Spartan force underwent any change in the interval between the time of Thucydides and that of Xenophon; but it is very probable that neither may be correct, considering that the Spartans studiously concealed from the observation of foreigners the internal organization and strength of their armies. ] The files were placed at intervals of six feet from one another when disposed in open order; in close order the distance was three feet; in locked order one foot and a half; the intervals being thus diminished one-half at each approximation. The open order was that observed on the march, and in evolutions or manoeuvres; the close order was for the attack; and the locked order was that in which an attack was received. The front rank consisted of picked men; the rear rank was also select; while those upon whom least dependence could be placed had their station in the centre, in order to give impetus and momentum to the column by their weight and physical power. The different parts of the phalanx were classed according to a regular system, and, in particular, the covering file was matched in quality as nearly as possible with the file in front; so that if the whole or any part of the front rank failed, the vacancies were supplied by the second files, without disordering the line. The arms, offensive and defensive, of the soldier, consisted of a spear or pike, a short sword or dagger, and a shield or buckler of an oval form, which was fastened round the neck and at the left shoulder by means of straps. But latterly Cleomenes changed this clumsy encumbrance for the Macedonian shield, originally invented by the Carians, which was fastened on the left arm by a ring or belt, so as to leave the soldier free to employ both hands in giving force and direction to the pike. The Spartans were also familiar with the most approved evolutions, which they performed with equal celerity and precision. The rear of the phalanx became the front, or the front the rear, by the shortest and simplest operation; while, by redoubling its formation, it became a solid square, bristling on every side with pikes, and, in locked order, wholly impenetrable to attack, except upon broken ground. Rapid changes of front even in the presence of an enemy, refusing or advancing a wing at a critical moment, turning an enemy’s flank, and many other manoeuvres, which are still considered equally delicate and difficult, were frequently executed with the most complete success by the commanders of these formidable columns. In a word, the Spartans may be regarded as the founders and first improvers of that military system, which attained its perfection under Alexander, and placed the crowns of Asia at his feet.^[27. The Spartan phalanx advanced to meet the enemy’s at a regular step, in accord with the cadence of military music, and, even when beaten, generally retired from the field in perfect order, however reduced in number. After battle, every soldier was obliged to produce his shield, as a proof that he had fought, or retired, as a soldier ought to do, bravely and steadily. If he had lost or thrown away his shield he was disgraced for ever; the brand of indelible infamy was fixed upon him. But this was of rare occurrence; for the love of military glory was the only passion which the Spartan people were allowed to cherish; and both education and discipline had combined to eradicate fear from their bosoms. It was a word unknown in their vocabulary. In this singular country all passions merged in one. The Spartan mother and the Spartan wife rejoiced when a son or a husband had fallen honourably in the field of battle, and sometimes refused to recognise as of kindred with themselves such of their relatives as had survived a defeat. The only mourners on account of the disaster at Leuctra were those whose friends and kinsmen had escaped the slaughter of that bloody day. ]

The Athenian military force consisted of three classes; first, the heavy troops, ⅛λ∕rα∕, armed with a spear, a dagger, a cuirass or corslet, and an oval shield, and reserved for the phalanx or main battle; secondly, the light troops, wiarαtfraz, armed with a light spear, a javelin, and a target, and destined for skirmishing, seizing or maintaining positions, and covering the movements of the phalanx; thirdly, irregular troops, γυμνηται, without defensive armour, but provided with missile weapons, such as javelins, bows and arrows, and slings, for harassing an enemy on his march, or performing the duties of light troops in the field.^[28. These classes may be considered as analogous, the first to the grenadiers, the second to the light infantry, and the third to the riflemen or sharpshooters of modern armies. Their armour, however, was different at different times; for the Greeks, like the Romans, made several changes in this respect; and hence the apparent discrepancies which we meet with in the accounts of historians. For example, when Arrian mentions the militia of the ancient Greeks, he speaks of the times which preceded the constitution and organization which Philip and Alexander the Great gave to their troops. The oval buckler, larger than common, and the long pike or saríssa, were introduced by these sovereigns, and found to add incalculably both to the defensive and offensive power of the phalanx. Some of the Greeks, however, piqued themselves on not adopting the changes of Alexander; but Philopoemen at length persuaded the Achaeans to lay aside their ancient arms, and assume those of the Macedonians. ] The phalanx or main battle consisted entirely [7:3:586] of natives of Attica, and was drawn up according to tribes or communities, probably with the view of exciting a generous rivalry in deeds of arms. The light armed troops were partly native and partly foreign; the slingers and archers were wholly foreign. The cavalry, like the heavy-armed infantry, consisted of natives alone, and were of a good description, being remarkably alert, intelligent, and enterprising. Thus composed, the Athenian army was prepared for every species of warfare, and equal to the most arduous achievements. The intelligence, activity, quick perception, and daring spirit of enterprise for which the native of Attica, the Frenchman of Greece, was distinguished, rendered him formidable in desultory warfare, alert in his moverńents, and prompt in taking advantage of every favourable circumstance; insomuch that the Athenian light troops foiled, and on some occasions even discomfited, the renowned Spartan phalanx. The Athenian phalanx was less compact than that of Sparta, and, owing to the character of the people, as much perhaps as to its formation, less adapted to receive and repel an attack; but in the charge it was perfectly irresistible. Its onset was terrible, and overthrew all before it. The cause of this must be sought in the difference of national character. The Spartan was chiefly celebrated for his passive, the Athenian for his active courage. Hence the one was powerful in resistance; the other formidable in attack. The Spartan was steady, devoted, and firm; the Athenian bold, enterprising, intelligent, and full of address and dexterity. If the one was less capable of resistance, the other was more ardent and impetuous; their military qualities were as opposite as their natural characters, but both were admirable of their kind; and if it had been possible to combine them together in equal proportions, perfect soldiers might have been formed, and a perfect army organized. The Athenians, we may observe, were the first of the Greeks who advanced upon the enemy at an accelerated pace corresponding to what is now called double-quick time. This innovation was first introduced by Miltiades at Marathon, in order to give increased momentum to the charge which he directed against the Persian masses; and it was consecrated in Athenian tactics by the glorious result of that ever-memorable day.^[29. It is very much to be regretted that no military or scientific description has been preserved of the battle of Marathon. The accounts which have reached us, being written by men ignorant of military affairs, are meagre, confused, and unsatisfactory; containing details, indeed, of the numbers engaged, and the amount of the slain, but giving little or no information respecting the combinations and manoeuvres which decided the fortune of the day. One thing only is certain, the victory was the result of consummate generalship on the part of the commander, and of heroic valour on that of the soldier. ]

But the very principles which had saved the states of Greece from foreign invasion, and enabled them to maintain their independence, were destined to form the basis of a military establishment, more formidable, because more complete in all its parts, than any which that or other countries had yet produced, and organized for the express purpose of serving as an instrument for subverting Grecian liberty. We allude of course to the Macedonian army in the reigns of Philip and his son Alexander the Great. The founder of this establishment, Philip of Macedon, was a man of unquestionable talents, of convenient principles, and of boundless ambition. Having improved his natural parts by associating with the scholars, statesmen, and philosophers of his age; and having been initiated into the scientific principles of the art of war under Epaminondas, the most celebrated master of the time; he was early fired with a love of military glory, and a lust of conquest and dominion. But although the brilliant period in the annals of the Greek states was past when Philip made his appearance, and these communities had already begun to show symptoms of decline, enough of the ancient spirit still remained to convince him, that, without creating new means, and organizing a force different from any which had yet existed, he could never hope to realise his ambitious projects, by rendering himself the master of Greece. The sagacity of Philip was fully on a level with his ambition. He saw that in the rude shepherds and hunters of Macedonia might be found the raw material of an army; that discipline and organization were alone wanting to convert this material into an invincible force; and that to render a military force completely effective, or, in other words, to derive from it the utmost benefit it was capable of affording, it was indispensably necessary to depart from the militia system which had hitherto prevailed, and to start from the principle that no army could be good which was not permanent. He was thus the first who fully comprehended the importance of a standing army, both as regards the efficiency of a military body itself, and also with reference to projects of conquest or ambition; and he may further claim the distinction of having been the first to organize a permanent force. In prosecuting this design he showed a skill, and a knowledge of the principles of military organization, equal to the sagacity evinced by its conception. Adopting the Spartan phalanx as the basis of his system, he gave it greater depth and solidity, so as to render it irresistible in the attack, and impenetrable when drawn up in position. He changed or improved its armour both for offence and defence; and, in particular, introduced the large oblong buckler, and the sarissa or Macedonian pike, the most formidable weapon of ancient times. The light-armed troops were also placed on a better footing than they had ever before been among the Greeks, being formed in demi-phalanges, which, without materially lessening their mobility, rendered them capable of combining their efforts in an effective manner with those of the heavy-armed infantry. The equipments, arms, and discipline of his cavalry were in like manner improved, and their organization perfected, with the utmost care and diligence. In a word, all that was excellent in the different Greek systems was combined in the Macedonian; while their defects were avoided, and improvements introduced wherever these seemed to be either expedient or necessary. Such was the general character of the military establishment which Philip created for enabling him to trample on the liberties of Greece, and which Alexander employed in subjugating the world. We shall now speak of its different parts in detail.

The phalanx was composed of files of a certain depth, and of regular combinations of those files. The lochos or file was a number of soldiers ranged in line, one behind the other, from the head to the serrefile or ouragos. The file consisted at different times of different numbers of men, as eight, ten, twelve, and sixteen. Alexander chose the last, because it formed the best proportion relative to the extent and depth of the phalanx; nor did it prevent the archers and slingers, stationed behind, from launching their missiles at the enemy, over the heads of the phalangites. If the phalanx was doubled to form a solid column, or reduced to one half in order to extend its front, the respective depths of 32 and 8 still remained proportional; but if the original depth of the file had been only 8, as in the Spartan phalanx, the latter evolution[7:3:587] ćould not have been performed with safety, because it would have reduced the depth to 4, and thus deprived the formation of its peculiar characteristic of solidity. The preference given to the number 16, therefore, was on account of its divisibility, and its admitting of evolutions consistently with the nature of the phalanx, which could not have been attempted with files composed of any other number, greater or less. The best man was chosen as the head of the file, and named lochagos or protostate ; the second was called epistate ; the third bore the same name as the first, the fourth the same as the second, and so on to the last; so that each file was composed of protostates and epistates, ranged alternately from the lochagos to the οuragos, who was also a picked man.^[30. Some authors designate a file stichos, others decuria. They who apply the latter epithet seem to suppose that it consisted of ten men, which is not true as respects the Macedonian file. We have followed, in the text, the nomenclature of Arrian, whose authority on this subject is decisive. With regard to the term enornotiβ, which has so much puzzled commentators, we have already shown that it means something different from a file, or part of a file. It was a term peculiar to the military system of Sparta, whence it passed into the other systems of Greece, including the Macedonian; but no data have been given from which its precise import can be ascertained. ] The junction of two or more files was denominated syTlochism. It was effected by placing the protostates and epistates of the one exactly opposite the protostates and epistates of the other; and one man, considered in reference to his juxtaposition with another, was called parastate. The junction of all the files formed the phalanx; of which, therefore, the lochagi, or heads of files, constituted the front rank, and the remaining parastates in alignement, as far as the ou-rαgi or serre-jiles, the depth.

The phalanx, thus composed, was divided into two equal parts; one called the right wing or head, and the other the left wing or rear. The point of separation or division was variously denominated the navel, the mouth, and the jointure of the phalanx. And as the principle of this formation was, that every combination should be divisible into two equal parts, so the phalanx, as finally constituted by Alexander, was composed of 16,384 heavy-armed men, the half of which number was considered sufficient for light troops, and the half of that again, or the fourth of 16,384, sufficient for cavalry; while the divisibility into equal parts afforded great facility for executing with precision all manner of evolutions, and extending or diminishing at pleasure the front of an army. The total number of the phalanx being, as already stated, 16,384, and each file consisting of 16 men, it follows that there were in all 1024 files. But each combination of files had its peculiar and appropriate denomination. Two files united formed a dilochie, under ĩidilochite; four files, a tetrarchie, under a tetrarch; two tetrarchies, a taxiarchie, under a taxiarch or centurion; two taxiarchies, a syntagma or xenagie, under a syntag-matarch or xenagos; ^[31. The syntagma or xenagie had four supernumerary men; a standard-bearer, an officer who marched behind and performed the duty of our major, an adjutant, and a crier to repeat the orders. This section, ranged in order of battle, formed a perfect square. (Arrian’s Tactics.) . ] two syntagmata, a pentecosiarchie, under a pentecosiarch; ^[32. The pentccosiarchie of the Macedonians answered to ↑λιelochos of the Spartans. This must be kept in mind in the perusal of Thucydides and Xenophon, otherwise both will be unintelligible. ] two pentecosiarchies, a chiliarchie ; two chiliarchies, a merarchie or telarchie ; and two Hierarchies, a phalanx of 4096 men in 256 files, which was commanded by a general, under the name of phalangarch. Again, two phalanges formed a diphalangarchie ; and two diphalangarchies, a tetraphalangarchie, or the grand phalanx, which thus consisted of two wings or diphalangarchies, four phalanges, eight merarchies, 16 chiliarchies, 32 pentecosiarchies, 64 syntagmata, 128 taxiarchies, 256 tetrarchies, 512 dilochies, 1024 files, and 16,384 men. The front might be extended by simply augmenting the distance between the files; the phalanx was closed by lessening the distances between the ranks and the files, and thus diminishing both its front and its depth. Its locked order was called synapism, in which the ranks and files were so closely approximated that the soldier could not turn.^[33. It was to this locked order that Epaminondas was indebted for the victories which he gained over the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra and at Manincia. The Theban army was formed in columns of attack, upon a front considerably less than the depth. The shock,· therefore, proved too much for the Spartan phalanx, which was only eight deep. Xenophon compares it to that of a heavy vessel striking a light one amidships with her bow, and dashing her to pieces by the collision. ] In this formation the men at the exterior of the mass held their bucklers before them; the next rank raised their bucklers over the heads of those immediately in front of them; the third rank held their bucklers over the heads of the second, and so on; thus forming a sort of roof, over which the archers in the rear sometimes passed to the front, and which, from the bucklers being joined like the scales of a crocodile, resisted and threw off the heaviest missiles discharged by the enemy. As every thing depended on the steadiness of the heads of files and their epistates of the second rank, both were gens d’élite or picked men. When the phalanx was closed for action, each man occupied only three feet of ground in rank and file. The pikes or sarissae were 24 feet in length, 6 feet being behind and 18 feet before the grasp; consequently (as the ranks were three feet separate), the second rank advanced the pike 15 feet, the third 12, the fourth 9, the fifth 6, and the sixth 3 feet; thus presenting an array of points such as never bristled along the front of any other military mass or column. The soldiers of the other ranks, as they could not employ their pikes, pushed on those before them, and, by their weight, served to augment the violence of the shock.^[34. The loss of men in the day of battle, or the necessity of sending out detachments, made no change in the form and disposition of the phalanx. The sections were always kept up to their full complement of ranks and files. The effective diminution fell, not upon the ranks and files, but upon the number of the sections, which were retrenched in proportion as they filled up the void in the phalanx. ] In this case every thing depended on the serre- files or ouragi, who were the keys of the phalanx, and, like the lochagi, picked men. Such was the Macedonian phalanx,^[35. The Macedonian phalanx, says Arrian, was as formidable in appearance as it was in reality; and Paulus Aemilius confesses, that, when he saw, for the first time, this imposing mass,’with its front bristling with the terrible sarissae, he was struck with consternation. Guischardt alleges that it was “plus terrible à l’aspect que dans l’effet and adds that Paulus “ne laissa pas que de la battre avec ses Romains épars et distribués en plusieurs pelotons.” But if Alexander had commanded it, the Roman would have told a different tale. Guischardt has himself demonstrated that the loss of the battle of Cynocephale was mainly, if not exclusively, owing to the stupidity of Philip in committing the phalanx upon broken ground, where its flanks were uncovered, and the principal advantages of its formation lost. ] which was destined to conquer the world, and to be, in its turn, conquered by the world’s conquerors. It yielded to superior tactics and greater mobility.

The light-armed infantry were drawn up in different ways, according to the nature of the ground and the disposition[7:3:588] of the enemy; sometimes before the phalanx, sometimes behind it, sometimes on both wings, sometimes only on one. Their formation was in all respects similar to that of the phalanx, and their files, eight deep, were combined upon analogous principles. The Macedonian cavalry was of various descriptions, as hataphracti, light horse, and acrobolistoe. The hatapliracti or cuirassiers were completely covered with defensive armour; the man with a cuirass and cuisses of iron scales, the horse with a frontlet and mail. Their offensive arm was the Macedonian pike. The light cavalry, unencumbered with heavy armour, carried lances and missile weapons. The acrobo-listae had no lances, and, like the Armenian or Turkish cavalry, used only the bow and arrow. They were a species of Cossacks or irregular horse, and performed the duties of such. The usual formation of the regular cavalry for attack was the cuneiform, which had been introduced by Philip, from an idea that it was the order best calculated to pierce an enemy’s line; but they were sometimes drawn up in squares, sometimes in the form of a rhombus, and sometimes also in a line.

The numerical strength of the Macedonian, like that of other ancient armies, can only be conjectured from the numbers actually brought into the field. In the time of Philip it probably never exceeded a grand phalanx, with its proportional complements of light troops and cavalry, 28,603 in all, and a few thousands of auxiliary troops. At the passage of the Ģranicus, Alexander’s army consisted of above 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry; from which we may conclude that it was composed of one grand phalanx, with its proportional complements of light troops and cavalry, and about 6000 auxiliaries. But it was afterwards powerfully reinforced; for Alexander paid great attention to recruiting, especially in Greece, and had always generals detached from the army for the purpose of raising new levies in that country. Accordingly we find that, at the battle of Arbela, the Macedonian army consisted of two grand phalanges, or 32,768 heavy armed infantry, two corps of peltasrae ^[36. For an able and learned account of the pcltasiae, who sometimes formed considerable bodies, particularly in the armies of Alexander and his successors, and whose reputation almost equalled that of the phalanx itself, see Guischardt’s note to his Translation of Arrian’s Tactics, in the second volume of his Mémoires Militaires, p. 177. ] each 8186 strong, and 4096 cavalry, including the Thessalian horse, besides several thousand auxiliaries, chiefly irregular troops; thus making a grand total, including auxiliaries, of at least 60,000 fighting men, or 54,000 regular and 6000 irregular troops.

It has been supposed by some that this army, like that of Carthage, was heterogeneous in its composition; that men of all nations were to be found in its ranks; and that a stern, unrelaxing discipline constituted the only vinculum or tie by which the naturally discordant mass was held together. There cannot possibly be a greater mistake. The Macedonians, it is true, formed but the nucleus, as it were, of the army; and, both in the reigns of Philip and Alexander, recruits were obtained in considerable numbers from the neighbouring states of Greece. But whatever shades of difference might have been produced by local circumstances and diversity of institutions, the inhabitants of all these states Were essentially one and the same people; identical in origin, distinguished by like peculiarities physical and moral, and possessing a general national character. In what respects, then, can the Macedonian army be considered heterogeneous? None but Greeks were admitted into the ranks of the phalanx, or those of the light infantry and cavalry; no barbarians were received even as auxiliaries. It was composed exclusively of people of the same country and the same general character, who all spoke dialects of the same language, shared a common temperament, and were distinguished by their physical configuration, no less than by their intellectual and moral attributes, from the inhabitants of the surrounding nations. If ever there was an army, therefore, which discipline could render more completely homogeneous than another, it was that of Macedon during the reigns of Philip and Alexander; nor do we know of any modern army to which this epithet can with equal justice be applied. The British army is composed of English, Scotch, Irish, Welch, and Highlanders; the French, of Bretons, Normans, Gascons, Alsatians, Savoyards, and many other tribes; the Austrian, of Hungarians, Bohemians, Transylvanians, Croatians, and Germans; the Prussian, of Silesians, Saxons, Poles, Pomeranians, and Brandenburgians; and the Russian, of Muscovites, Poles, Sclavonians, Tartars, Circassians, Armenians, and inny-merable other races; yet all these are considered national armies, and have each, in fact, a national character. But if such assemblages are to be regarded as homogeneous, we know not upon what principle the Macedonian army, composed exclusively of Greeks, can possibly be viewed in a different light, or supposed to have had no other bond of union than what was created by discipline alone.

The only other Greek armies which seem to require notice are those of the Thebans and of the Achaean League. The Thcban army, like Theban independence, may be said to have been created by Epaminondas, and to have expired when that great captain fell in the arms of victory upon the field of Manincia. Still it is a striking example of what genius and discipline may effect, even when called to work upon the most unpromising materials. Epaminondas found it a rabble, and he left it the most formidable military force which Greece had ever yet known. He gave it that organization which rendered it. victorious at Leuctra and Manincia, and which shook to the very foundation the power of the Lacedaemonians. Aware that the Spartan phalanx was invincible by any similar formation, and that he could only hope to prevail by bringing against it a greater concentration of physical energy, he organized the Theban army in columns upon a front less than their depth, so as to enable him to direct the whole or any part against a given point of the enemy’s line, and to bear it down by an irresistible superiority of force; and he adapted his tactics to this organization. At the battle of Leuctra, accordingly, Epaminondas, observing the Lacedaemonians advance their two wings before the centre, so as to form the order which the Greeks called the half-moon, instantly attacked the centre of one of these wings, and, having penetrated it, soon succeeded in throwing the whole into irretrievable confusion. Here the onset was made by one wing in column against another in comparatively open formation; and hence the Theban order of attack became the oblique, which is erroneously supposed to be a discovery of modern times. At Manincia the Lacedaemonians carefully avoided the blunder for which they had paid so dear at Leuctra, and kept their forces more concentrated; but Epaminondas, forming the whole of his infantry in a single column, precipitated it upon a part of the enemy’s line, overthrew it, and thus decided the fortune of the day. The Theban army, immediately after the battle of Leuctra, is said to have amounted to 50,000 men. This, however, is probably an exaggeration.—With regard to the army of the Achaean League, it continued insignificant for [7:3:589]the greater part of a century after that celebrated confederacy was entered into. Aratus was the first who placed it on a respectable footing, and taught it to conquer at Ca-phyae; and he was succeeded by Philopoemen, incomparably the most scientific commander of ancient times, who completed its organization, and led it to victory at the second battle of Manincia, where the Spartans, under Macha-nidas, were completely defeated, and the tyrant himself slain by the hand of the Achaean chief. This victory was exclusively owing to the superior tactics and dispositions of Philopoemen; who, instructed by the successes of the Romans, had contrived, with infinite skill, to combine, in the formation and arrangement of his troops, the advantages of the legionary order with those of the phalanx. The invaluable fragment of Polybius, containing a description of the battle of Manincia, gives no account of the numbers engaged. We learn, however, that Philopoemen having assembled the troops of the League, spent eight months in perfecting their discipline and organization before he ventured to commit them in the field against so experienced and warlike an enemy as the Spartans.^[37. See Guischardt’s commentary on this battle, Mémoires Militaires, tom. i. p. 177∙ ] An army is a piece of mechanism which only acts effectively when all the parts are combined and adjusted together so as to insure the most complete concert and unity of operation; and discipline is the mean by which this important result is produced. It is in fact the art of creating a new power; and so great is its efficacy that it sometimes developes in men those qualities which it only professes to direct and regulate.

This remark is strikingly exemplified in the history of the Carthaginian army. That army was almost entirely composed of mercenaries, or at least of levies drawn from countries differing in language, in manners, in customs, and in character. In its ranks were to be found Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Boians, Insubrians, Etruscans, and various other races; yet such are the fusing effects of discipline, that this apparently heterogeneous mass vanquished the Romans on the Ticino; overthrew their legions in three pitched battles, at Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannae; and, if Hannibal had known how to profit by victory, might have planted the Carthaginian standards amidst the ruins of Rome. The advantages of a truly national army are great, especially in reverses: it may be beaten, but cannot easily be destroyed: and even its disasters may teach it that experience which will ultimately conduct it to victory; as happened to the Romans in ancient, and to the Russians under Peter the Great, in modern times. But, on the other hand, many instances might be produced to show, that the most effective armies may be organized out of the most discordant and unpromising materials; and that, while nothing can supply the want of discipline, discipline can almost atone for and remedy every thing. With an army composed as we have already described, Hannibal maintained, during sixteen years, the war against the Romans in Italy, without sustaining any serious reverse; nor did he withdraw, until his presence was rendered necessary for the defence of his country; which the successive defeats of the other Carthaginian commanders, both by sea and land, had uncovered, and exposed in its turn to the attacks of an invader. Finally, he was vanquished at Zama from the same cause which had rendered him so often victorious—namely, superiority of discipline: for although his military genius never shone forth more transcendently than in his last field, and although his dispositions were in all respects worthy of his high reputation, yet the raw and undisciplined levies which formed the strength, or rather the weakness, of his army, were in no condition to contend with the Roman legions, whom sixteen years of incessant warfare had improved both in discipline and experience.^[38. We must again refer to Guischardt, tom. i. p. 216, more especially as this very able military commentator exposes the misrepresentations of Folard, who seems to have been alike incapable of comprehending the narrative of Polybius, or the dispositions of Hannibal. ] In reflecting upon the issue of this decisive conflict, which terminated the long and sanguinary struggle between the rival republics of Carthage and Rome; and, above all, in considering the precarious nature of that power which is built on the uncertain foundation of military glory; the mind insensibly passes from the contemplation of the fate of the Carthaginian chief to that of a still greater commander, which in some measure resembles it—from the days when these warlike republics contended for the empire of the world, to our own times, when, in a new field of Zama, another Scipio conquered another Hannibal.

With regard to the numerical strength of the Carthaginian army, it appears to have varied at different times. The force with which Xantippus defeated Regulus, and made him prisoner, did not probably exceed 20,000 men; and we learn incidentally that the heavy-armed infantry which the Lacedaemonian had formed in phalanx, conformably to the tactics of his country, amounted to between 8000 and 9000 men, and were all native troops. But when the Carthaginians afterwards invaded Spain, they recruited their armies from the population of the country, and that of the neighbouring provinces of Gaul, until the total numerical strength of these must have considerably exceeded 100,000 men. Livy assures us that Hannibal set out on his expedition to Italy at the head of 100,000 foot and 10,000 horse, but that he lost 30,000 men in crossing the Alps; so that, according to the Roman historian, he must have entered Italy with about 80,000 men. But the numbers actually brought into the field completely disprove this statement: for it is admitted by Livy himself that, at Trebia, Hannibal had only 30,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, and that he vanquished at Cannae with 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. We shall be nearer the truth, therefore, if we suppose that the invasion of Italy was undertaken with, little more than half the number of troops mentioned by Livy; and that the losses sustained in crossing the Alps were, in a great measure, repaired by the recruits which Hannibal drew from the Boians, Insubrians, and his other allies; a supposition which seems completely borne out by the authority of Polybius. But when the Carthaginian general set out from New Carthage for Italy he left two other armies in Spain; and, if we assume these to have been each about 30,000 strong, while the force under his own command exceeded 50,000, it will follow that, at this time, the Carthaginians had considerably more than 100,000 men of all arms in the field.— Let us now attend to the composition and organization of that strictly national force with which these well-disciplined condottieri w ere called to contend, and by which, after sustaining many reverses, they were ultimately overthrown.

The army of Rome, in the days of her conquests, was perhaps the most perfect, certainly the most formidable, which the world had yet seen; and the superiority which it ultimately obtained over the military force of every nation to which it was opposed, seems to have been exclusively owing to the pre-eminent excellence of its discipline and organization. “Nulla enim alia rc videmus populum Romanum orbem subegisse terrarum,” says Vegetius, “nisi armorum exercitio, disciplina castrorum, usuque militiae. Quid enim adversus Gallorum multitudinem paucitas Romana[7:3:590] valuisset? Quid adversus Germanorum proceritatem 'brevitas potuisset audere? Hispanos quidem non tantum numero, sed etiam viribus corporum nostris praestitisse, manifestum est. Afrorum dolis atque divitiis semper impares fuimus. Graecorum artibus prudentiaque nos vinci, nemo unquam dubitavit. Sed adversus omnia profuit tyronem solertem eligere, jus (ut ita dixcrim) armorum docere, quotidiano exercitio roborare, quaecunque evenire in acie, atque in proeliis possint, omnia in campestri meditatione praenoscere, severe in desides vindicare; Scientia enim rei bellicae, dimicandi nutrit audaciam. Nemo facere metuit, quod se bene didicisse confidit. Etenim in certamine bellorum, exercitata paucitas ad victoriam promption est: rudis et indocta multitudo, exposita semper ad caedem.”^[39. Vegetius, De Re Militari, 1. i. c. 1. Raphengii, 1GO7∙ ] The military age was seventeen; and, when the exigencies of the state required it, every citizen, from seventeen to forty-six, or even fifty, was obliged to enrol himself as a soldier. Except on pressing emergencies, however, the more youthful part of the population was preferred, as that which could be most effectually trained to the exercises and formed to the discipline of war.^[40. “Adolescentes legendi sunt, sicut ait Sallustius: nam primum juventus, simul ac belli patiens erat, in castris per laboris usum militiam discebat. Melius enim est, ut exercitatus juvenis causetur actatem nondum advenisse pugnandi, quam doleat praeteriisse. (Vegetius, 1. i. c. 4.) ] These were of the most severe description, and had for their object not merely to instruct the soldier in the use of arms, in marching, and in evolutions, but to develope and improve to the utmost his physical powers; to inure him to labour, fatigue, and hardships of all kinds; to qualify him for surmounting with ease the various obstacles and difficulties incident to a state of active warfare; to give precision and rapidity to his movements; and, above all, to create that confidence in himself, and that unbounded reliance upon the efficacy of order, subordination, and combined action, which nourish audacity, yet temper it with coolness and steadiness. Besides the use of arms, of which we shall hereafter speak, the young soldier was, accordingly, trained to the exercises of running, leaping, vaulting, wrestling, and swimming, armed as well as unarmed: he was required to perform long and frequent marches, at the rate of four miles an hour, carrying a load of sixty pounds weight: he was carefully instructed in the use of the tools necessary for throwing up all manner of field-works, particularly fortifying the camp: and, even after he had been found qualified to join the legion, he was constantly employed, while in camp, either in the practice of these manly exercises, or in acquiring greater dexterity and precision in the use of his weapons. The Roman soldier knew no intervals of idleness, and was not allowed time to indulge in dissipation. The camp was his home: war was his business: its exercises formed his amusement: its success constituted his glory. In the legion to which he belonged were concentred all his hopes, all his thoughts, and all his affections.

In raising troops to constitute the legions, the method adopted by the Romans was that which they denominated election ; because the magistrates chose from the different tribes the citizens whom they considered best fitted for the military service. The consul or the praetor assembled in the Campus Martius, or in the Capitol, all the citizens, who were bound to concur in the formation of the legions, raised every year, conformably to a decree of the senate; and this obligation included all Romans within the age above specified, who had not served twenty campaigns as foot soldiers, or ten campaigns as horsemen or knights; with the exception, however, of the lowest class, which was exempted from military service on account of its poverty. The number of legions commonly raised was four;^[41. A consular army consisted of two legions, and of a certain number of troops furnished by the socii or allies of Rome. The infantry of the allies, according to Polybius, did not surpass in number the legionary infantry in a consular army, but their cavalry was double the number of the knights. The fifth part of their infantry and the third part of their cavalry formed a corps d’élite, called extraordinary or elect, under the immediate orders of the consul; while the remainder of the social troops were divided into two corps, one called the right and the other the left wing. Hence a consular army consisted, in Roman troops, of GOOD legionaries of the line, 2400 oelites, and G00 knights; in social troops, of G700 infantry of the wings, 1700 extraordinary infantry, 800 cavalry of the wings, and 400 extraordinary cavalry; making a total of 18,G00 men. But when Rome had a difficult war to carry on, two consular armies were raised, and both the consuls took the field; which, in fact, happened almost every year. Lastly, when urgent circumstances required it, the consular armies were doubled and united in order to contend with a formidable enemy. Thus the Romans assembi at Cannae four consular armies, oř nearly 80,000 men, to try the fortune of arms against Hannibal; and, in the heat of the second Punic war, they raised as many as twenty-three legions, or considerably more than 100,000 men. “Alors,” says Rogniat, “le≡ ar ' mées se multiplièrent en raison de ce grand nombre de legions; les deux consuls choisissaient celles qui leur convenaient, et le commandement des autres était confié à des préteurs, à des proconsuls, et à des propréteurs.” {Considérations sur l’Art de la Guerre, ] and the first step consisted in the appointment, either by the people or the consuls, of six tribunes to each legion. The conscripts being classed according to their tribes, the magistrate, charged with the levies, then elected four successively from each tribe. Of every four thus designed the tribunes of each legion in their turn chose one, whose name was immediately inscribed in its muster roll; and this operation, which established a perfect equality in the composition of the legions, was repeated until they had received their proper complement of men. On the termination of the election each legionary individually took the sacramentum or military oath; swearing to be obedient to his general, and to execute his commands in all things to the utmost of his power and ability. Nor was this a vain ceremony; for the Romans, trained up in the fear of the gods, had a peculiar reverence for the sanctity of an oath. Roman citizens alone were admitted into the legions, until the time when the civil wars led to the subversion of the republic, and the violation of all established rules. Those, however, who had completed the prescribed period of service, or had attained their fiftieth year, were no longer obliged to take arms in defence of the state, and were only liable to be called out in the event of the city being threatened with some imminent danger. But these brave veterans, habituated to a military life, frequently inscribed themselves as volunteers, and thus served both as models and examples to the young legionaries, who seldom failed to profit by their experience, and generally showed an ambition to come up to their standard.

As soon as the military oath had been administered, the tribunes dismissed the legionaries, having first indicated the time and place where they were afterwards to assemble in order to be embodied. At the general muster, on the day fixed for this purpose, the youngest and poorest in each legion were selected as velites ; the next in order were chosen as hastati ; the class immediately above constituted the principes ; and the triarii were formed of the oldest and richest citizens elected to serve in the legions; the different classes being thus arranged according to their arms, their fortune, and their age. The legion was commonly composed of 1200 hastati, 1200 principes, 1200 velites, 600 triarii, and 300 cavalry or knights; thus making its total [7:3:591]strength 4500 men. The tribunes, in concert with the centurions, divided the three classes of hastati, principes, triarii, into ten ranks, manipules, or companies each: the t√½jwere distributed in equal portions among these thirty manipules: and the cavalry were divided into ten parts, called turmae or troops. Such is the account given by Polybius, who, doubtless, describes the legion as it was constituted in his time.

The hastati, so called from the hasta or spear with which they were originally armed, commonly formed the first line in the order of battle; the principes were placed in the second line; whilst the oldest and best legionaries, classed under the name of triarii, constituted a reserve in the third line. The triarii were originally the only troops armed with the pilum, a species of heavy javelin, which will be described hereafter; and hence they are sometimes designated by the ancient historians under the name of pilani, while the principes and hastati are denominated antepilani : but these denominations necessarily ceased when the three lines adopted the same arms. The velites, distributed among the manipules, as already mentioned, were the light infantry of the legion, of which they formed about a fourth part; and known at first under the name of rorarii and accensi, they were afterwards called velites, and ultimately ferentarii But the reader must be careful not to confound these light troops, which always formed part of the legion, with the cohorts of archers and slingers attached to the armies in the time of Caesar; since the latter were merely auxiliary troops, and had nothing whatsoever in common with the legion. The legionary cavalry, composed of a body of 300 horse, denominated the ala or wing, and forming about the twentieth part of the legion, was divided into ten turmae, of thirty horsemen each; while the turma was again subdivided into three decuriae, of ten cavaliers each; and the whole was chosen from among the equites or knights, who formed one of the first orders at Rome.

When the classification had been completed, the tribunes of each legion proceeded to the appointment of centurions. They commenced by naming ten first centurions in each class, except that of the velites; after which they proceeded to the nomination of an equal number of second centurions ; and the legionary infantry being divided into ten manipules of hastati, ten of principes, and ten of triarii, among which the velites were equally distributed, they assigned a first and a second centurion to each manipule; the first commanding the right, and the second the left of the manipule, under the orders of the first, whose place he supplied in the case of absence or death. The tribunes also named three decurions in each of the ten turmae of horse; but the decurion first named had the sole command, and the two others were only his lieutenants. Thus a legion had sixty centurions or officers of infantry, thirty decurions or officers of cavalry, and six tribunes or officers of the staff. The tribunes commanded the legion each in his turn during two months; and this continued to be the practice until the epoch of the civil wars, when, for reasons sufficiently obvious, the command was intrusted to a legatus or lieutenant-general. The tribunes on service superintended the establishment and fortification of the camp, disposed the guards necessary for insuring its safety, transmitted to the centurions the orders of the general, took care that these were duly executed, and attended to the discipline and exercise of the troops; whilst the others were placed by the legatus or the consul at the head of detachments, reconnoissances, or foraging parties, and intrusted with the command of posts, or employed en particular missions, for raising contributions of money, provisions, clothing, and arms in the conquered countries; in a word, they were staff officers disposable for all kinds of service. The centurions were divided into several grades. Besides the distinction of first and second, established with reference to the manipule, they took precedence among themselves according to the relative distribution of the classes to which they belonged; so that a centurion of the triarii ranked above a centurion of the principes, and a centurion of the principes above a centurion of the hastati And the first centurion of each class, that is, the primi hastati centurio, the primus princeps, and the primipilus or primipili centurio, commanded the whole of his class, or one of the lines of battle of the legion; which accounts for the high consideration that these three superior officers enjoyed among the Romans. They were commonly admitted to the council of the general, along with the tribunes; and the primipilus, the chief of all the centurions, by reason of the pre-eminence of his class, commanded the whole legion in the absence of the tribunes. Further, each centurion and decurion chose for himself, or received from the tribunes, a sub-officer to aid him in the details of the service; and we learn from Vegetius, that there was moreover placed at the head of each squad or tent of ten soldiers a decanus or corporal, who performed the duties of that humble rank.^[42. Erant decani, decem militibus praepositi, qui nunc caput contubernii vocantur. (Vegetius, De Re Militari, 1. ii. c. 8. See also Rogniat, Considérations sur l’Art de la Guerre, p. 7, et seqq. Paris, 1820.) ]

Such was the constitution of the legion in the time of Polybius, the friend and contemporary of the second Scipio. But an important, we might almost say a radical, change in its organization was afterwards introduced; a change which has been ascribed to Marius, and which appears to have commenced at the epoch of the wars against Jugurtha. The legions then ceased to be ranged in lines of hastati, principes, and triarii ; for the last order of battle, according to the ancient formation, of which historians give any account, is that of Metellus against Jugurtha, as described by Sallust. From this period we always find the legions ranged by cohorts, without distinction of classes, in a double or a triple line. The clas sification which had been originally occasioned by difference of arms no longer served any purpose, after all the troops of the line were armed in the same manner; except to divide the legion into three large bodies of about 1600 each, including the velites, which formed part of them. But experience proving that such bodies were too numerous to be easily directed by a single commander, and too heavy and lumbering for the exigencies of Roman taetics, their place was supplied by a number of smaller and more manageable bodies, and the legion, consequently, divided into ten cohorts, each consisting of three manipules, under six officers, who preserved their denomination and command in their respective manipules. The force of the cohort was raised from 400 to 600 men, thus making the total strength of the legionary infantry 6000; and the first cohort was composed of picked men, who were intrusted with the eagle, under the orders of the primipilus. A new order of battle was also adopted, the legions being commonly drawn up in two lines of five cohorts each, leaving small intervals between each cohort. But Caesar, justly considering these lacunae dangerous, and thinking the new formation deficient in solidity, preferred a continuous alignement, and recurred to the ancient formation in three lines, placing four cohorts of each legion in the first, three in the second, and three in the third line.
[7:3:592]

The civil troubles which led to the subversion of the republic produced still further changes. For a time the legionary cavalry entirely disappeared, and their place was supplied by auxiliary horse: strangers, and even slaves, were admitted into the legions, the force of which varied from 4000 to 6000 men: and the social troops disappeared by the admission of all the natives of Italy to the rank of citizens. In the imperial times, as we learn from Vegetius, the legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry. The decimal division of the infantry into cohorts remained the same. “The cavalry,” says Gibbon, speaking of that attached to an imperial legion, “without which the force of the legion would have remained imperfect, was divided into ten troops or squadrons; the first, as the companion of the first cohort, consisted of 132 men, whilst each of the other nine amounted only to 66: the entire establishment formed a regiment, if we may use the modern expression, of 726 horse, naturally connected with its respective legion, but occasionally separated to act in the line; and to compose a part of the wings of an army.”^[43. Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. i. chap. iii. p. 13, 14, 8vp ed. ] This is at once clear and precise. But it has, nevertheless, been supposed, and not without reason, that when the legionary cavalry was augmented, the number of turmae was proportionally increased; and that no such inequality as that mentioned by Gibbon existed between the turma attending the first cohort and those attached to the others. In fact the turma or squadron, at this period, consisted of 32, or, including the decurion, 33 men; and as the total number of cavalry belonging to the imperial legion was 726, it follows that there were in all twenty-two turmoe, of which four, or 132 men, were attached to the first cohort, and two, or 66 men, to each of the remaining nine. The result in both cases, however, is the same; while Gibbon’s statement may perhaps be preferred as proceeding upon the more ancient division.^[44. “The turma of the Romans,” says the Count von Bismark, “had, according to Vegetius, eight files and four ranks; ten turmae formed a legion ; the distances between the turmae were equal to their front.” (Cavalry Tactics, p. 273, Engh, transk) It would be curious to learn in what edition of Vegetius the Count discovered that the turma of the Romans had eight files and four ranks, and that ten turmae formed a legion, or brigade of infantry and cavalry /united in very unequal proportions. Unless the Count has found out something to which the Romans themselves were strangers, he must have fancied that, in describing the formation of the infantry of the legion, Vegetius was speaking of the cavalry. ]

The armour of the Roman infantry consisted of the demi-cylindrical buckler or shield, the cuirass or pectoral, the casque or helmet, and the ocrea or greave. The demi-cylindrical buckler or shield, four feet in length by two feet and a half in breadth, and constructed in the form of a tile, was composed of two or three pieces of timber fashioned and secured together in the manner of staves, covered with leather, strengthened at each extremity by a band of iron, and provided in the middle with an umbo or boss of metal, for the purpose of turning aside the missilesand ' pikes of the enemy. The casque, helmet, or head-piece of brass was variously formed, but generally fitted with projections at the base for protecting the neck and shoulders, and attached under the chin by mxmionnieres, covered with scales of brass. The cuirass or pectoral was a hollow plate of brass about a foot square, adapted to the form of the chest, and fastened with thongs of leather protected by metallic scales; but the centurions and foremost legionaries rendered themselves still more impenetrable to the steel of the enemy by using chain armour covered with brass scales. Lastly, the ocrea was a species of boot or greave, fortified with iron, and worn on the right leg, which the soldier advanced in striking his adversary.^[45. When the Roman soldiers threw their pila or heavy darts, they had the left leg foremost; but when they engaged in close combat with the sword, they were taught to advance the right leg, which was accordingly protected by the iron-covered greave or boot above mentioned. (Vegetius, lib. ii. cap. 15 and 16; Justus Ĺipsius, lib. iii. dial. 2, De Mil. Rom. ; Guischardt, tom. ii. p. 160∙) ] Their offensive arms were the javelin, 0λq pilum or heavy dart, the pike, and the sword. The sword called Spanish^[46. The gladius Hispaniensis is thus described by Polybius :—'A^α ĥ τω iυζiω μa%aiζav, raυτ∏v ¢h πiζi <rov φiξiι µnļov. Kβιλaιιrι ĩl auτ∕ιv !BHPIKHN iχil avrn κιwnμa ⅛ιωφθζ0V, ×aι xaraφoζav ιζ aµţioiv τow µţļoiv βιaiov, 'ìia. το tov oβsλισxov uυ r τ∏s if fχ ι υξov xa,ι μι>vιμov tιm∙ The name of this weapon sufficiently indicates its origin. An unknown writer, quoted by Suidas, says that “the Celtiberians excelled all others in the manufacture of swords, strongly-pointed and double-edged; wherefore the Romans, laying aside the swords which had been in use among their ancestors, replaced them, in the time of Hannibal, with the Spanish blades. But (he adds) although they assumed the form, they were unable to imitate the temper of the steel and the beauty of the workmanship.” Josephus says that, in his time, the Romans had two swords—one of considerable length, which hung at the left side, and another about a foot long, which they carried on the light thigh; in other words, a sword and a dirk, like the Scotish Highlanders. Similar changes in the arms of the soldiery may be remarked every century. ] was common to all the infantry of the legion. It had a short broad blade of excellent temper, which served either to cut or thrust,^[47. ι τ> ^ 'θ R° mans invariably gave the point, and derided the practice of those who depended on the cut rather than on the thrust. I laeterea non cccsim, , ' says Vegetius, “ sed punctim ferire discebant. Nam caesim pugnantes non solum facile vicere, sed etiam derisere Romani. Caesa enim quovis impetu veniat, non frequenter interficit; cum et armis vitalia defendantur, et ossibus. At contra puncta, duas uncias adacta, mortalis est. Deinde dum caesa infertur, brachium dextrum latusque nudatur. Puncta autem tecto coi pore infertur, et adversarium sauciat ante quam videatur.” (De Re Militari, 1, i. c. 12.) This, we believe, is still accounted sound doctrine of fence. ] and was worn by the soldier on the right thigh. The javelin belonged exclusively to the light infantry or vdites. It was a species of dart, with a round shaft about three feet in length and an inch in diameter, shod at one extremity with iron about four inches in length, and tapering to a very sharp point. In the day of battle the light troops had each seven of these weapons, which they launched at the enemy with much dexterity and precision. When it became necessary to have recourse to the sword before the whole or any part of the javelins were thrown, the soldier passed them to his left hand, which remained free in consequence of the buckler being attached to the left arm. The light troops were also provided with bows and arrows, and slings, which they used in skirmishing at a distance. The pilum or heavy dart, intended to serve principally as a missile, was originally borne by the triarii alone, whence the name of ρilam, but was afterwards appropriated to the hastati and the principes. Its shaft was of such a thickness as to be easily grasped by the hand;^[48. This seems to be the meaning of the Greek word naaanrτιa oς, applied by Polybius to the shaft or helve of the pìlnm; for, tailing it in its ordinary acceptation, tĮie shaft of the pilnm would have been four inches in diameter; a size which, considering the length of the weapon, and the weight of its iron, would have rendered it an impracticable arm. Dionysius of Halicarnassus confirms this opinion by describing the pila as χι 1oπλnQrι or weapons that completely fill the hand. Polybius compares this formidable arm of offéní* to a boar-spear. ] and the weapon, including both wood and iron, was about seven feet in length. The iron, however, was of the same length as the wood, extending to the middle of the shaft, which was firmly inserted in it, and made fast by nails driven transversely; and it was of a square form, of an inch [7:3:593] and a half at its greatest thickness, but its diameter gradually diminished to the point, which was exceedingly sharp, and near to which was placed a hook or barb, that served to retain the weapon wherever it penetrated. Besides this arm, which was necessarily heavy, the soldiers were sometimes provided with another of the same kind, but less massive both in the wood and the iron, which they held in the left hand, and discharged immediately after the former. The pilum was a weapon peculiar to the Romans. *As soon as they came within a proper distance of the enemy, they began the combat by launching these heavy darts, with a force which, from their weight and the temper of the steel points, caused them frequently to penetrate both buckler and cuirass, so as to inflict the most hideous and desperate wounds. Having discharged these missiles, the legionaries instantly drew their swords and rushed upon the enemy with the utmost impetuosity, before he could recover from the effects of the volley of pila, by which his first ranks were generally overthrown.^[49. For a particular description of the use of the ρilurn in commencing the attack, see Caesar’s Commentaries de Bella Civili, lib. iii. cap. 92. The weight of this arm “ne permettoit pas de le darder de loin,” as Guischardt says. It was the business of the velites to harass the enemy with their javelins and other missiles before the action became general. As the hostile lines approached, the light troops retired through the intervals or by the flanks, where they generally took their station; and when the former were within a short distance of each other, the hastati and principes darted their pila, and then rushed on, sword in hand, to close combat. Hence the proverb employed by Vegetius to describe the proximity of two armies: Ad pila et spathas ventum est. ] The pike of the triarii, a weapon equally adapted for attack or defence, onset or resistance, was longer, less thick, and consequently more manageable, than Úiepilurn, which was of little use except at the moment of commencing battle. Armed with this weapon, the veteran reserve of the legion often awaited, de piedferme, the shock of cavalry as well as infantry; and Livy assures us that they seldom or never quitted their pikes in battle. “The triarii, '' says he, speaking of a particular occasion, “disfigured the faces of the Latins with their pikes, the points of which had been blunted in the combat.” These troupes d’elite, therefore, may be considered as the pikemen of the legion; although instances are to be found where they abandoned the pike and had recourse to the sword, which was always the weapon hi which the Romans placed the greatest confidence, and with which, indeed, their most celebrated feats in arms were achieved. It may be proper to add, that, although this description principally applies to the legion as constituted in the time of Polybius, and although great changes were subsequently introduced, yet the arms, offensive as well as defensive, of the legionaries, remained nearly the same; with this exception, however, that all the troops of the line were at length armed in precisely the same manner, namely, with the Spanish sword and the pilum.

The horse had very nearly the same armour as the foot, and they were latterly provided with offensive arms similar to those used by the cavalry of the Greeks; namely, with a lance, having a shaft resembling two cones joined together at their bases, and pointed at both extremities, and a long, large sword, suspended by a shoulder-belt at the right side. There was a time, indeed, when they had only slender lances, pointed at one extremity, and wore no cuirass; but experience soon showed the necessity of adopting the Greek arms and equipments. The Roman cavalry was generally composed of a superior description of men, denominated knights, who on all occasions displayed the greatest valour; but they seldom mustered in force sufficient to produce great results, and their organization appears to have been in many respects defective.

It is evident, that a man placed on the back of a horse, without a saddle, or stirrups to serve as a fulcrum for reaction, can never exert half his proper force, nor combine it effectively with the momentum acquired from the velocity and weight of his horse. “Ces cavaliers,” says Rogniat, “ne 'pouvaient être choisis que parmi les chevaliers, qui formaient un des premiers ordres à Rome. L’état leur fournissait ordinairement des chevaux; mais, peu habitués à l’équitation, ou persuadés qu’on cst plus fort à pied qu’à cheval, ils mettaient souvent pied à terre, pour prendre one part plus décisive aux combats sérieux. Telle était (he adds) l’opinion des Romains, de la supériorité de l’infanterie sur la cavalerie, que, non content de n’avoir qu’un petit nombre de cavaliers, ils les transformaient encore en fantassins dans les occasions critiques.”^[50. Considérations sur l' Art de la Guerre, p. 10, 11. Paris, 1820. ]

The Roman generals, even in the time of the consuls, do not seem to have followed any particular order of battle,but to have changed it according to circumstances, or the nature otthe enemy they had to contend with. This is evinced by the various dispositions which were made at the battles of Tunis, of Cannae, of Zama, and many others that might be mentioned. But still the chequer order or quincunx was that most frequently employed in the earlier times of the republic; owing, doubtless, to the facility it afforded of forming line or column at pleasure. Leaving the velites or light troops out of view, as constituting no part of the main battle, the reader will observe that the manipules of the first line, or the hastati, were formed upon a front varying according to the depth, which was generally ten, but not unfrequently six; and that the interval between each manipule was exactly equal to its front. Thus, supposing the legion 5000 strong, a manipule of 140 men would be ranged ten deep upon a front of fourteen; and as each soldier occupied three feet,^[51. The ranks of the manipule being also drawn up at the distance of three feet from one another, the whole space occupied by the Roman soldier was consequently nine square feet of ground; and this open order was seldom departed from, even in the charge. It is to be observed, however, that the second rank of the manipule was so disposed as to cover the intervals of the first, the third to cover those of the second, the fourth to cover those of the third, and so on to the last; in other words, the arrangement of each manipule individually was a precise type of their collective disposition in order of battle. ] the extent of front presented by a manipule would accordingly be fourteen yards. Since the first line, therefore, consisted of ten manipules, it contained of course nine intervals of fourteen yards each; exactly opposite to which, but at a considerable distance in the rear, were stationed nine of the ten manipules of the second line, or principes, drawn up in the same manner as those of the first, upon fronts of equal extent; the tenth manipule of the latter outflanking by the whole length of its front the right or the left wing, as it might be, of the first line. The triarii, of less depth than the hastati and principes, but for the most part in continuous formation, occupied the third line. Now, it must be obvious at the first glance, that this order of battle presented several important advantages. By advancing the manipules of the principes through the above-mentioned intervals,until they dressed with those of the hastati, line was at once formed: again, by moving them fourteen yards either to the right or left, the depth of the formation was doubled; while, by placing the manipules of the triarii exactly behind those of the principes, as was done when the legions were menaced by elephants, the whole was formed into columns, separated into intervals equal to their respective fronts, through which these animals, pursued and goaded by the velites, might be driven to the rear, without doing [7:3:594]any mischief. Lastly, if it was desired to form the legion in three continuous lines, this was instantly effected by simply closing up the intervals between the manipules of the first and second lines; the triarii or reserve being, as we have already said, drawn up in a continuous formation, except when it became necessary to open a passage for elephants. And all these various evolutions were performed with a rapidity and precision which have seldom been equalled and never surpassed by the troops of any other nation.

At a later period, however, the Roman tacticians employed a different order of battle, distinguished for its greater compactness and solidity, as well as for the facility and rapidity with which it might be formed from the order of march, even in presence of the enemy. According to this method each manipule of the legion formed only a single rank in its order of battle; consequently the two classes of hastati and principes, ranged each upon its first manipule as a front, formed two lines ten deep. But as each man occupied three feet every way, and as the lines were separated by an interval equal to half the extent of their front, it is obvious that each line occupied a front of 120 yards, by from ten to twelve yards in depth; and that they were separated from each other by an interval of about 60 yards. Again, at an equal distance in rear of the principes, the triarii formed the reserve of the legion in the third line; and the whole, ranged in this manner in three lines, constituted a square order, as deep as it was broad; while the turmoe of the cavalry covered the flanks of the lines, and the eagle or standard of the legion was intrusted to the keeping of Úte primipilus on the right of the line of the triarii. This order, usually denominated legio quadrata, was that adopted by all skilful generals when in presence of an enemy. But the different legions composing an army were ranged upon the same principle, with reference to one another, as the different ranks of the same legion; in other words, they were formed en echelon ; each legionary line thus making one of the sections of the column, and the baggage occupying the intervals, while the velites covered the flanks. In this order of march, if the enemy threatened an attack on the front, each legion in succession formed line with that at the head of the column; the second almost in an instant, the third somewhat later, and the fourth, or the most remote, in about seven minutes, which were accounted sufficient for developing the order of battle on the front. But the order of battle on the flank was of still more rapid formation. For, the baggage withdrawing from between the sections, and assembling on the side opposite to the enemy, each legion executed what is technically called a quart de conversion on its hastati, and the whole army immediately found itself in order of battle; two minutes being sufficient for the performance of this simple evolution. It seems evident, then, that the celebrated quadratum agmen of the Romans, which has hitherto been so often treated of, and so little understood, consisted of a certain number of legiones quadratae disposed en echelon, or at least in column, as we have just described: and, from the advantages of this order of march, particularly its rapid convertibility into an order of battle either on the front or the flank, it is easy to understand the reason why the Roman historians have censured so severely the generals who neglected to adopt it in presence of the enemy. So much, then, for Roman tactics, as connected with the elementary formation of those brigades or divisions which constituted the units of Roman armies.

The distinguishing characteristic of the legion consisted in its astonishing mobility, united with its power of preserving its order of battle undisturbed, and of constantly rallying when forced to give way. It possessed a sort of flexibility which enabled it to adapt itself to every change and variety of circumstances; and no other military body, perhaps, ever executed so numerous evolutions in the presence of an enemy. Its attack was impetuous and formidable; but if that failed, it then displayed its most characteristic excellence, by fighting in retreat. In this way it vanquished the phalanx, although it was unable to withstand the direct shock of that dense body in the open field. At the battle where Flaminius defeated Philip in Thessaly, the Macedonian phalanx gained considerable ground on the legions; but the Romans, although forced to give way, preserved their order,—returned repeatedly to the charge,—and, even while in the act of retiring, extended their line so as to gain the flank of the Greeks. Philip durst neither accelerate his march, nor send out any detachment in pursuit; so that twenty manipules had time to turn his flank and fall upon his rear, which speedily decided the fate of the battle. As the phalanx acted with long pikes, and in close order, the least derangement caused by the. ardour of the soldier in pursuit, or by inequality of ground in its march, necessarily exposed it to the legion; which, dividing itself into a number of separate corps with the same facility that it formed one corps and one line, possessed the power of attacking it on two or more sides at the same time. “La legion doit done,” says Guischardt, “être envisagée sous deux faces. Comme infanterie en bataille contre one autre infanterie, elle cut son ordonnance particulière à rangs et files ouverts, conformément à ses armes; et alors elle n’cut rien de commun avec la phalange. Lorsqu’elle a eu de la cavalerie en tête, elle cessa d’avoir son ordonnance particulière.”^[52. Mémoires Militaires, tom. i. p. 84. ] This wise distinction rendered the legion formidable alike to every nation on which Rome chose to make war;^[53. The cavalry of the Parthians, though peculiarly formidable, durst not attack the legions commanded by Marc Antony, and confined itself to harassing them from a distance with its arrows. At the battle of Nicoolis, a single legion of the army of Domitius defeated and put to flight the whole cavalry of king Pharnaces; and, with a handful of infantry and some horse, Pompey defied the numerous cavalry of king Oroses. ] but neither as infantry against infantry, nor as infantry prepared to resist cavalry, which duty was principally performed by the triarii, until all distinction of classes and arms merged in a homogeneous formation, had it any thing in common with the phalanx; for its victories, no less than its reverses, had demonstrated the inutility of deep formations, and showed that its real power depended on its distributive rather than its concentrative energies,—on its mobility and flexibility rather than on its weight or impulsion. Hence, on the day of Pharsalia, it was remarked, as an extraordinary circumstance, that Pompey had formed his legions ten deep; a novelty which, as every schoolboy knows, served no other purpose, on that occasion, except to add to the carnage.

In following the Romans in their wars under the emperors, we find their discipline and their tactics declining from age to age, in the same manner as they had advanced and improved. The spirit of change, though productive of some ameliorations, proved ultimately fatal to the legion. As long as the Romans continued faithful to the precepts and rules of the ancient masters, their infantry maintained its superiority: in proportion as these were departed from it declined; until at length, having lost all its distinctive qualities, it was constantly beaten and overthrown by the numerous cavalry of the barbarians. To ascribe the gradual declension and ultimate fall of this infantry to luxury, refinement, love of ease, corruption of [7:3:595]manners, or other analogous causes, is merely to indite silly common-places, displaying the most profound ignorance of history and of human nature. Its catastrophe was occasioned by the decay of discipline alone. For experience shows that hardy and effective soldiers may be formed in the most polished as well as in the rudest and most uncivilized periods of society; and that nothing more is necessary to produce this result than an uncompromising system of discipline. Accordingly, under Vespasian, and Titus, and Trajan, and Hadrian, and Aurelian, ancí other warlike emperors, who enforced the precepts of the ancient masters, and restored the ancient discipline, the Roman infantry regained its reputation, and proved itself as formidable as it had ever been in the best times of the republic. The corruption was not in the soldiers, but in the men by whom they were organized; in those whom the experience of so many ages, and the conquest of the world, had failed to impress with a due conviction of the value of that system of discipline by which such prodigies had been performed. “On ne peut voir sans indignation,” says Guischardt, “la mauvaise ordonnance que les Romains autems de Végece avoient substituée aux anciens modèles. Ils étoient rangés sur six de hauteur, et même quelquefois sur trois. Chaque rang avoit des armes différentes, dont la plupart étoient des armes de jet, comme des arcs et des frondes. D’un rang à l’autre il y’avait six pieds d’intervalle, et dans les files on avoit retranché les trois pied de distance, pareequ’on ne se battoit plus avec l’epée: on avoit même oublié le véritable usage du pilum. Le troisième et le quatrième rangs dévoient de teins en tems se détacher, et charger à la tête de la ligne, et revenir ensuite à leur poste. On ne sauroit rien imaginer de plus pitoyable. Ces deux chapitres de Végece marquent bien clairement l’ignorance de l’auteur, et la décadence de la bonne discipline chez les Romains.”^[54. Mémoires Militaires, prell disc, xxiv. ] From innovations like these, and others still more absurd which succeeded them, what results could be anticipated except those which history has recorded; namely, disgraceful defeats, calamitous reverses and, at length, the final overthrow of the Roman power itself? The legions, degenerated into a feeble militia, sold the empire which they were incapable of defending; and having neither the courage which sometimes supplies the place of discipline, nor the discipline which supplies that of mere courage, they fell an easy prey to the swarms of Goths, Huns, and Vandals, by whom it was successively overrun, and at last completely destroyed.

The fall of the Western Empire, like that of a colossal structure, was succeeded by a thick cloud, which overspread Europe, covering it with darkness and desolation. All that remained of science or of art perished in its ruins, and the only relic of the catastrophe was the shadow of a mighty name. But the barbarians who had subverted the Roman power appear to have brought with them, from their forests and wildernesses, the elements of a system which was destined to thicken the darkness in which it originated; to bind Europe for ages in the fetters of the most abject thraldom; nay, even to maintain a long and fierce struggle against the reviving energies of the human mind, and the regenerative powers of society. Its foundations were laid in their peculiar character and habits, as affected by their position and their wants; and, as they had fought neither from the love of glory, to which they were insensible, nor from a thirst of vengeance, which nothing had contributed to stimulate, the only fruits they dreamt of reaping from victory were the spoils of the vanquished. The countries which all had conquered were considered the property of all, and each claimed a share proportionate to his services and the number of his retainers. Subsisting rights or possessions weighed as nothing in the estimation of these wild hordes, who sought for establishments in genial climates and fertile regions. They demanded a territorial division and apportionment, which was accordingly made upon some rude principle of equalization. But, as these lands were the reward of military service, so they were to be held by that tenure alone. The common interest and the common defence required that this condition should be annexed to the allotment, or, as it was afterwards called, the feu. Each great vassal of the liege lord was bound to have in constant readiness to take the field, a certain number of men, clothed, armed, and equipped at his own expense. Hence arose tine feudal system, which, founded on military rather than civil principles, was an aggregation of petty sovereigns and petty principalities, under a nominal head, to whom all swore fealty, but few or none owned obedience; a military aristocracy, in short, under the mask of a monarchy. But this system, however well calculated to keep alive a spirit of ferocity, seemed to oppose a formidable barrier to the revival of the military art. Its maxims, necessarily hostile to the establishment of a standing army, by which the great barons might have been coerced, limited the force of the state to the contingents of feudal militia, which the crown vassals could bring into the field; a tumultuary mass, without coherence, which the first victory or the first reverse generally dispersed. During this period, accordingly, the wars of Europe were desultory and indecisive. An incursion constituted a campaign, and a foray an expedition. Armies were everywhere without order and without science; battles were gained by accident or by valour, never by discipline; while conquests, rapid as torrents, were generally as destructive and as transitory. The love of military glory was extinguished; petty wars, occasioned by baronial feuds, raged fiercely, preying upon the vitals of society; and the fruits of organized barbarism were general misery and desolation. The people were abject serfs, the barons ferocious brutes, the sovereign an absolute cipher. Anarchy, tyranny, ignorance, and spiritual thraldom, formed the characteristics of the first ages of feudalism.

At length, in the eleventh century, arose a monk, called Peter the Hermit, who preached with all the fervour, and more than all the success, of any known apostle, the duty of recovering the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels; and as the church lent her powerful aid to second the efforts of Peter’s enthusiasm, the contagion soon spread throughout every part of Europe, and thousands of all countries rushed forward to enlist under the banner of the cross. The history of mankind affords no parallel to the madness that was thus produced, either as regards its universality or its duration. It affected all Christendom in nearly an equal degree; and, during two centuries, army after army marched for Palestine, to melt away under the sultry sun of Syria, or to be mowed down by the swords of the Saracens. But it agitated the minds of men by a new and powerful impulse; and although its essence consisted in the wildest fanaticism which had ever taken possession of the species, yet that inexplicable frenzy, combining with a spirit of enterprise and adventure, gave birth to institutions which were destined to exert a powerful influence upon the whole frame of society, and which have left a marked impression even on the manners, customs, and feelings of modern times. Viewed in a military light, the armies of the crusaders were mere [7:3:596]tumultuary masses, impelled by fanaticism to deeds of heroic valour, but as destitute of order and discipline as their leaders and chiefs were ignorant of military science; nor had all the reverses they sustained the effect of inculcating the simplest principles of the art of war, or teaching the necessity of adopting some kind of organization. Every thing was trusted to numbers without combination, and to individual bravery exerted as chance or impulse happened to direct. And so deeply engrained in men’s minds was the spirit of feudalism, and so incompatible did that spirit show itself with the slightest advancement in the military art, that the mailed chivalry of the ages immediately succeeding the crusades, although offering the finest elements that ever existed for the organization of an invincible force, appears at no time to have had any principle of effective combination, or to have been capable of acting with unity and concert in any grand operation. Yet the principal strength of armies in the middle ages consisted in their cavalry; which, composed of men of superior grade, and formidable from its bravery no less than from the armour of proof in which it was encased, easily proved itself superior to infantry without formation, and with no other discipline than that which instinct dictates even to the most barbarous tribes.

But a new epoch approached. Gunpowder was invented, or at least improved, by Berthold Schwartz, a Franciscan monk of Cologne, and was first employed in warlike operations in the early part of the fourteenth century. This discovery, as Guibert justly remarks, did not lead to any immediate improvement in the art of .war: indeed a century and a half was necessary in order to make the use of fire-arms general; but it is nevertheless to be considered as the real cause of the complete reform which was at last effected in the constitution of armies, as well as in their discipline and tactics. Since the first employment of gunpowder, there have been seven principal periods in the history of the military art.

The first begins with the employment of cannon, and extends to Charles VIII.’s campaign in Italy; or from the early part of the fourteenth until towards the end of the fifteenth century. This period, during which the art of war began to revive from the state of barbarism into which it had sunk since the downfall of the Roman empire, includes the wars of the Spaniards against the Moors, of the English against the French, and finally, of the Italian republics against each other. The cavalry, composed of the nobility and gentry, still constituted the flower of armies, and formed the chief support of princes and their kingdoms. At the storming of fortresses, or when important posts were to be occupied and defended, and a bold, determined soldiery was required, the knights dismounted and fought on foot. They were the dragoons of that age. Each knight was attended by his esquire; and, besides these there were also archers, generally the vassals of the knights, who, being more lightly armed, and riding smaller horses, served as a kind of light horsemen. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, indeed, the distinction of heavy and light horse was common in European armies. The former, consisting of tenants in capite, holding of the crown by tenure of military service, or their substitutes (servientes), were denominated men-at-arms, from their being armed cap-a-pied ; the latter, composed of yeomen, were named hobilers. The knights rode what were denominated war-horses, which, like their riders, were covered either with chain or plate armour, or with both; and these men of iron carried a long and powerful lance armed with an iron head, a long sword, a short sword, a dagger, and a mace or battle-axe.^[55. Meyrick’s Critical Inquiry into Ancient Armour, vol. ĩ. p. 174. Chain-armour first became covered with plates at the beginning °.. θ ι I ourteent, b century; but entire plate-armour did not make its appearance until about a century after. ] Their formation for combat was exceedingly simple. They fought man to man; each armed knight singling out his opponent, and riding against him with his couched lance, in order to throw him out of his saddle, or to make him prisoner. The esquires, or armour-bearers, followed as a second rank, or at least acted as seconds to the knights, whom they assisted in battle, bringing them fresh arms and horses when required, and seeking opportunities of distinguishing themselves in order to obtain the honour of knighthood. Nothing, however, was known of scientific movements, until Charles the Bold compiled an exercise book in 1473, instructing cavalry how to attack in close and extended order, or to link the horses and fight on foot. An engagement was generally commenced by single knights riding forward and challenging opponents from the hostile army; and the result of these single combats sometimes determined the fate of the day.^[56. The only military productions of this period were the regulations of Charles the Bold, above-mentioned, with those of Louis VII. of France, and of John Ziska, general of the Hussites. ]

The second period, from the campaign of Charles VIII. in Italy to the beginning of the wars in the Netherlands, or from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the sixteenth centuries, comprises the wars of the French, Spaniards, and Germans, in Italy. During this period chivalry gradually declined, and war began to assume a new aspect. At the close of the contest with England in 1445, Charles VII. of France established the first standing army, consisting of 16,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, divided into fifteen campagnies d’ordonnance; ^[57. See Père Daniel, vol. i. p. 155. ] he appropriated funds for the payment of these troops, and appointed officers to discipline and command them; and, although apprehensive at first as to the success of the experiment, he at length succeeded in organizing a force, which enabled his successor to repress the turbulent spirit of the feudal aristocracy, to strengthen the power of the crown, and to carry on foreign operations with a consistency and vigour hitherto unknown. The Italian campaign of Charles VIII. proved the superiority of a standing army over an assemblage of feudal militia, and consequently established its reputation. With a force of about 20,000 men, he overran the whole of Italy; and, had his ambition been equal to his success, or rather had he known how to reap the fruits of victory, he might have rendered himself permanent master of that country. Ot,her nations imitated the example of France: a change took place in the military system of Europe: the practice of calling out knights ceased of itself: and mercenary, or at least paid troops, regularly disciplined and organized, became the only force that was trusted or employed. The characteristic of this period was dec/ formation, both in the cavalry and the infantry.

The third period comprehends the great war of independence, carried on by the Netherlander, in order to emancipate themselves from the yoke of Spain; and it extends from 1568 to the general suspension of hostilities in 1609. Here fought, on one side, art, and an army formed by the experience of more than half a century of war, under Charles V. and his son Philip II.; on the other, the inhabitants of the Low Countries, living only by trade and the arts of peace. A people, consisting chiefly of manufacturers and merchants, inhabiting a country of small extent, and already much exhausted by a long-continued exercise of tyranny and oppression, scrupled not [7:3:597]to draw the sword, in defence of their liberties, against the richest monarch of the age, the sovereign of Spain and the Indies, and master of the most numerous as well as the best-disciplined forces, commanded by generals distinguished above their contemporaries by their skill in the art of war.^[58. Watson’s History of Philip II. vol. i. p. 428. ] A more unequal contest cannot well be imagined; and never was the issue of any. dispute more contrary to what the parties had reason to anticipate. But the struggle was protracted; and in proportion as the Netherlanders were formed to war, the bravery and discipline of the Spaniards relaxed. Under the skilful tuition and able conduct of Nassau, the foe which had at first appeared so contemptible to the haughty Spaniards, tore the laurels from their brows, and at length drove them, defeated and disgraced, from the country which had suffered so long under their grinding oppression and their insolent misrule. This war was followed by great changes, both in the organization and tactics of armies. The cavalry was divided into cuirassiers and light horse; the use of the lance was discontinued,^[59. La lance,” says Montecuculi, “est la reine des armes pour la cavalerie.” (Mémoires, liv. i. c. 2.) And this opinion seems to be gaining ground at the present day; for experience has shown, that cavalry can never make any serious impression by means of fire-, arms, while, with swords alone, they are wholly unfit to contend with infantry. ] and its place supplied by the sword and pistol for the heavy, and the carbine for the light horse; and these were now trained to execute a variety of movements and manoeuvres at full speed. The infantry was also placed upon a better footing, both in respect to discipline and formation; although the prejudice in favour of columns or masses seems still to have continued, notwithstanding frequent experience of their inutility, as well as of the destruction to which they were exposed from the concentric fire of artillery.

The fourth period comprises the Thirty Years War, the pretext forwhich, according to Bulow, was the happiness of heaven, but the motive the goods of the earth: it extends from 1618 to 1648. The peace which had terminated the struggle for independence in the Low Countries, after a [>rotracted contest of above half a century in duration, asted only nine years; when a new war broke out, which can only be considered a continuation of the former. The hero of this war was Gustavus Adolphus; and he, like Prince Maurice of Nassau,^[60. Bismark’s Cavalry Tactics, p. 307; Guibert, Essai Général de Tactique, p. 68. ] was the creator of new tactics. This warlike monarch departed from the dense formation of his predecessors, and drew up his infantry six deep; which was considered an innovation that nothing but his success could justify. His opponents, Tilly and Wallenstein, formed their infantry in solid masses thirty deep; which, nevertheless, proved unable to contend with the linear formation of the Swedish troops. Until about the middle of this war, it still continued the practice to form cavalry in from four to eight ranks. But Gustavus also departed from this rule, and formed it in three ranks; although it appears from Harte, that, at the battle of Leipsic, it was drawn up four deep, probably on account of the dense formation of the imperial cavalry, which was formed in eight ranks. In the intervals he stationed platoons of infantry, fifty and upwards strong, as well as light guns; doubtless from a conviction that cavalry, unless supported, were unable to contend with infantry. His great object appears to have been, to give greater mobility to the two principal arms of a military force, and thus to gain in celerity of movement what he had lost in weight or impulsion. He knew that the momentum would remain the same, if the motion was increased proportionally to the diminution in weight.

The fifth period comprehends the wars of the French in Italy, in Germany, and in the Netherlands, as well as the northern and Turkish wars, and embraces a period of ninety years; namely, from 1648 to 1738. The peace of Westphalia put a period to nearly a century of war. The results of this conflict were the secularization of ecclesiastical property, the complete establishment of the Protestant religion, the recognition of mental freedom, the decay of the Papal power throughout Europe, and the triumph of national independence. But during the longcontinued struggle in Germany, two hereditary enemies appeared,—the Turks and the French, The former were expelled in a single campaign, and never again attempted any serious invasion. The latter entered upon a series of wars of which we have not yet probably seen the termination. The ambition of Louis XIV., however, and the wars to which it gave rise, rapidly developed the art of carrying on military operations, and formed generals whose names adorn military history. Opposed to a French Turenne, Luxembourg, and Condé, stand Montecuculi, Marlborough, and Eugene of Savoy: Louis of Baden may rank with Catinat or Vendôme; and many other generals of eminence illustrate this period, which was less remarkable for changes in the constitution and organization of armies than for the talents displayed in conducting their operations in the field. It was the era of great commanders. In the north the Swedes, Poles, Brandenburgians, and Muscovites, fought alternately on the plains of Poland and the steppes of the Ukraine. Under Charles XII. the Swedish infantry attained a high degree of perfection, and proved uniformly successful until it was so rashly committed at Pultowa; while the cavalry, without defensive armour, which the chivalrous monarch rejected, consisted almost entirely of dragoons.^[61. Charles XII., not content with making the cavalry, without any connection with or dependence upon other arms, but from confidence in itself, charge the enemv’s horse at full speed, without firing, led it equally against intrenchments and batteries, and always with success. “He knew,” savs Count Bismark, “that by the rapidity of motion, the natural vivacity of the majority of mankind is increased, and, often mounting to a blind fury and foolhardy enthusiasm, leaves no time for consideration or calculation of danger; that at such a moment death loses its terrors, and Victory! — but with living colours—presants itself to the soul of the wildly-rushing warrior.” (Cavalry Tactics, p. 319, 320, 321.) At the same time Charles appears to have had a love of fighting for its own sake; and it was probably this peculiarity of temperament, as much as any calculation of results, which gave to his movements that impetuosity, which neither natural nor artificial obstacles could check or resist. ] The principal improvements of this period, however, are chiefly due to the French, who made rapid advances in all the branches of military science.

The sixth period includes the three Silesian wars; namely, from the beginning of the first Silesian war in 1740, to the breaking out of the French revolutionary war in 1792. For a century previous to this, Prussia appears to have been chiefly employed in preparing herself for the brilliant part which she acted under Frederick II. To the celebrated elector, Frederick William, the Prussian military power in a great measure owed its origin. This prince grew up, as it were, in a camp, and. even in his boyish days, was present at the sieges of Breda and the Schen-kenschantze. Arrived at the government, he endeavoured to infuse a new spirit into the army; and so well did he succeed, that, in 1672, he was enabled to promise the republic of Holland an auxiliary force of 20,000 men. At the period of his death the elector left behind him a well-organized army of 30,000. When Frederick the Great (or, as he [7:3:598]is called by the Germans, der Einzige, the Unequalled) ascended the throne, he found the army about 80,000 strong, and drilled to a precision of movement, as well as a rapidity in firing, until then unknown. This was owing to the exertions of Prince Leopold of Dessau, who may be considered the founder of the modern system of tactics, having invented the iron ramrod and the equal step,— reduced the formation of the infantry from four to three ranks, thereby increasing the effect of musket fire,—and, in short, laid the foundation of the system which Frederick afterwards improved, by giving to infantry-movements greater lightness and facility. With an army thus prepared for action, Frederick took the field in 1740. But the first two wars passed quickly by; and the intervals of peace were employed in reforming whatever experience had shown to be defective in his system,—in practising a vast variety of deployments,—and, above all, in introducing that celerity of movement which had become so essential in modern armies, with reference both to their numbers and the extent of their front. When the third Silesian or Seven Years War broke out, Frederick, forsaken by his allies, and menaced on all sides by powerful enemies, seemed on the very verge of destruction. But if he stood alone, he stood unmoved, like the oak, braving the storm, and conscious of the power to weather it. Nor was he without some peculiar and decided advantages. On the one hand, his natural coup d’ceil, which was perfect; the unity and power of his will; the habit of his troops to remain firm in all situations, and to execute every movement with precision, even in the very tumult of battle; the never-shaken confidence in their leader, and the enthusiasm with which he was regarded by them: and, on the other, the division, weakness, and want of system or connection in the enemy’s plans of operation; their partial and lukewarm mode of execution; together with the inferiority of their troops in organization, and of their commanders in genius :—these were the causes which enabled Frederick to retire from this bloody seven years conflict with a prodigious increase of fame, and without the loss of an acre of territory.^[62. Bismark s Cavalry Tactics, p. 323. ] “Depuis la guerre de la Succession,” says Guibert, “on n’avoit pas vu tant d’armées en campagne et réunies contre un seul prince. Sa science et leurs fautes furent le contrepoids de tant de forces. Jamais guerre ne fut plus instructive, et plus féconde en événemens. Il s’y fit des actions dignes des plus grands capitaines, et des fautes dont les Marsin auroient rougi. On y vit quelquefois le génie aux prises avec le génie, mais plus souvent avec l’ignorance. Partout où le roi de Prusse put manoeuvrer il cut des succès. Presque partout où il fut réduit à se battre, il fut battu: événemens qui prouvent combien ses troupes étoient supérieures en tactique, si elles ne l’étoient pas en valeur.”^[63. Guibert, Essai Général de Tactique, tome i. p∙ 77, 7^· ] Such was the character of the Prussian army of this period, and such the military genius of the great monarch by whom it was commanded. Mere tactical details are foreign to the object of this article, and therefore we abstain from entering into them, excepting in as far as they may seem necessary to throw light upon the constitution and composition of armies. That of Prussia was long considered a model for imitation. Under Generals Siedlitz and Ziethen its cavalry attained a degree of perfection unequalled either before or since. “There was but one Seidlitz,” says Count von Bismark. In playing the mighty game of war, its infantry was also superior to any other of that age; and if subsequent events somewhat tarnished its reputation, it has never ceased to be one of the best organized and most completely equipped bodies of foot in Europe. The Austrians, as their wont is, only improved on compulsion, and when fairly beaten out of their old system of masses and deep formations.

The armies and the science of this period, however, were destined to be far outnumbered and surpassed in i the seventh and last, which embraces the military sys-* terns and establishments of our own times. These, accordingly, we shall now proceed to describe in detail; confining our accounts principally, if not exclusively, to their actual rather than to their former condition and strength; and commencing with the army of France, which has not only played a most conspicuous part since the commencement of the revolutionary wars, but has latterly served as a sort of model on which the other armies of Europe have been more or less formed.

From time immemorial, the Gauls were inhabited by a race of men distinguished for their bravery. Hardy and enterprising under the two Brenni, obstinate and persevering in their attacks against Caesar, we find them cutting a conspicuous figure as auxiliaries in all the wars of ancient Rome. They passed through the middle ages with equal distinction; and if they were forced to yield to the irruption of the Franks, the amalgamation of the two nations had only the effect of adding to their energy. The wars of Charlemagne and the crusades; the successive invasions of Italy by Louis XII., Charles VIII., and Francis I.; and, lastly, the struggles maintained against all Europe by Louis XIV., showed what might be expected from French armies when properly commanded. But the fatal results of the Seven Years War, the wretched intrigues of the court of Louis XV., and still more the spirit of infatuation which appears to have become endemic after the disgraceful Hanoverian expeditions, eclipsed, in an instant, ages of glory, and rendered the army of France an object of ridicule to Europe. After the peace of 1762, some measures were taken with the view, as was pretended, of remedying the supposed defects in the constitution of the army, and restoring its character. But the French ministry of that day, ignorant of the real circumstances which had led to its successive defeats, and incapable of comprehending the dispositions and strategical movements by which success in war is attained, contented themselves with searching into the most minute details of discipline and instruction for the causes of failures which were solely attributable to a bad choice of generals, and a faulty direction of great operations. They imagined that the armies of Frederick had triumphed in consequence of oblique marches, the particular cut of their uniforms, and a thousand other absurdities which it would be impossible to credit, were not the amusing discussions of that period embodied in public documents of unquestionable authenticity; they disputed about ployments and deployments en tiroirs, about tranches and plesions, about a Prussian order and a French order; they formed camps in order to judge of the advantages of these different systems;, and they fancied that they had discovered the sublime of the art in the mechanism of the instruction of platoons.^[64. “On etoit si fort engoué de tout ce qui ressemblait à la tactique Allemande,” says Jomini, “qu’il suffit á cette époque de porter un nom ludesque pour faire one fortune militaire. Un certain capitaine Pitch, sorti des rangs de l’armée Prussienne, passa pour un émule de Frederic, sur la simple présentation d’un mémoire dans lequel il donnait des idées pour aligner des bataillons sur les drapeaux; on se crut heureux qu’il daignât accepter un régiment et l’instruire suivant sa méthode.” {Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres delà Révolution, tom. i. p. 214.) Under the government which promoted Pirch, and indeed under that which succeeded it, Kleber, Moreau, and even Napoleon himself, would have been condemned to an eternal nullity. ]
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"Encore tin pas retrograde,” says Jomini, “et les troupes Françaises se fussent trouvées au niveau des soldats du pape.’”^[65. Guerres de la Revolution, ùbi supra. ] But the American war gave a check to these mischievous fooleries, and revived the spirit of emulation, which is the source of the most brilliant feats in war; while the expeditions to Grenada and St Eustatius, together with the campaigns of Lafayette, Saint-Simon, and Rocham-beau, in a great measure restored the reputation of the French arms, and prepared the way for still more important achievements. The staff, the government, and the faiseurs were still divided between different systems. But while the chiefs were perplexing themselves with theories, the troops improved both in discipline and manoeuvres; and had it not been for the repeated shocks which their organization experienced in consequence of frequent changes of ministry, and the introduction of certain radical innovations, which completely broke up the old battalions in order to amalgamate them with new levies, Louis XVI. would have possessed an army capable of defending the monarchy, and might have been able to restrain and resist that revolutionary frenzy to which he was destined soon to become a victim. In consequence of the disorganization thus introduced, the regiments of the line were in a wretched condition at the breaking out of the war in 1792. But a single measure saved them from destruction. The nomination officers taken from the tiers-état filled the ranks with an ambitious and warlike youth, burning to distinguish itself; while emulation, the chances of preferment, and the love of country, supplied for a time the want of discipline, and formed powerful motives for stimulating improvement.

At the end of the year 1791, the French infantry consisted of 105 regiments of two battalions each, 14 battalions of light troops, and 170 battalions of national volunteers; or 394 battalions in all. By the decree of the 5th May 1792, the number of the volunteer battalions was raised to 200, and the strength of each was increased from 226 to 800 men. The cavalry was composed of two regiments of carabineers, consisting of four squadrons each; 24 regiments of heavy cavalry of three squadrons each; 18 regiments of dragoons of three squadrons each; 12 regiments of chasseurs of four squadrons each; and 6 regiments of hussars of three squadrons each; in all 206 squadrons. So that the total strength of the French army at this period didnot exceed 160,000 infantry,35,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery; while 20,000 men were still wantingto bring the different regiments to their full complements. But this deficit was soon supplied by the multitude of volunteers who flocked to the national standards when the duke of Brunswick invaded France at the head of the Prussian army.^[66. Ibid. tom. i. p. 224-25. ] The revolution, however, had not yet developed its energies; nor had the world as yet any suspicion of the prodigies which the system of terror, afterwards organized, was destined to achieve. In 1795, France presented the formidable aspect of a vast camp. The decrees of the 23d August and the 5th September 1794 had hurried the whole youth to the frontiers. Nearly 1,200,000 men were in the pay of the republic; and, after deducting those employed in accessory services, and in the navy, the number of combatants in the field cannot have amounted to less than about 700,000. The official state of the force of the French armies, as at the 5th April 1794, presents an aggregate of 794,334 men, including garrisons, but exclusive of the army of the interior, whose head-quarters were at Paris; which, allowing one fifth for those in the depots and for the sick, would give an effective force, present under arms, of at least 650,000 men; the most formidable which Europe had ever seen assembled in the field, “Ce dévelopement de forces, sans exemple dans les annales modernes,” says Jomini, “tenait d’autant plus du prodige, que la nation se trouvait livrée à tous les déchiremens d’une guerre civile, et aux persécutions d’un gouvernement odieux. Mais ce ne fut pas aux levées sculement que ces efforts se bornèrent: tout ce qui compose les élémens de la puissance nationale, avoit été porté à un degré de tension inconnu dans les siècles modernes.”^[67. Ibid. tom. V. p. 20. ] Nor did the “prodigy” stop here. In the month of March 1795, France had ten armies in the field, the active force of which amounted to 449,930 combatants, besides 120,850 in garrisons, and 388,450 sick, prisoners, or detached; in all 959,190 soldiers. But the active force, or number present under arms, did not form the half of the effective, and scarcely a third of the complete military strength of France at that period; for, as 200,000 men were still wanting to bring the effective force up to the full establishment, and as the most active measures were in progress to make up the deficit, the total number of Frenchmen under arms in 1795 cannot have fallen much short of 1,100,000 men. It will not be denied, therefore, that the Comité du Salut Publique possessed extraordinary energy, and that terrorism proved the salvation of France.

But this state of exertion was too violent to be of long continuance; and neither the population of the country, nor its exhausted resources, were sufficient to maintain so enormous a force in the field. Accordingly, in the succeeding years of the republic, the aggregate of the different armies seldom exceeded 480,000 effective men, and generally fell short of this number. But when Napoleon had mounted the throne, and had organized the system of conscription, he obtained an unlimited command over the whole of that part of the population capable of bearing arms; and as he acted upon the principle, first recommended by Cato, of making war support itself, he was not only able to repair the losses sustained in his various campaigns, but, on most occasions, to take the field with a predominating superiority of numbers. The establishment of the French army, in 1805, amounted to 341,412 infantry of the line, 100,130 light infantry, 77,488 cavalry, 46,489 artillery, and 5445 engineers; making a total of 650,964 men,' or a force equal to that organized by the terrorists in 1794 and 1795. But this establishment was afterwards greatly increased; and it is calculated that, at the time of the Russian campaign, there were in the depots, in the hospitals, and in the field, not less than 1,200,000 men, of whom about 850,000 might be considered as effective. Hence, we are enabled to account for the extraordinary phenomenon of Napoleon’s appearance in Germany at the head of a new and formidable army, within a few months after the annihilation of his veteran masses amidst the steppes, snows, and frosts of Russia, and making head for more than a year afterwards against the utmost efforts of the allied powers.

One of the first cares of the Bourbons, on their second restoration in 1815, was to re-model the army, and place it on a footing adapted to the new order of things. The most obvious maxims of policy recommended a proceeding which alone could give stability to the restored dynasty. But such changes are necessarily the work of time; and we need not therefore wonder that nearly ten years should have elapsed before this important object was accomplished. The French army was re-organized, augmented, and placed on nearly the same footing on which it now stands, in virtue of three royal ordonnances, dated the 27th February 1825; the first of which relates [7:3:600]to the infantry, the second to the cavalry, and the third to the artillery and engineers.^[68. Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, tom. ii. p. 153. See also tome v. p. 117, and Annuaire de l’Etat Militaire de France pour Fannie 1828. ] The actual military establishment of France has been deduced partly from these documents, and partly from others of a more recent date, containing particulars of the modifications and changes subsequently introduced.

The infantry is composed of 6 regiments of the guards and 64 of the line, 20 regiments of light infantry, and 7 foreign regiments; in all 97 regiments. Each regiment consists of a staff and three battalions, and each battalion of eight companies, viz. one of grenadiers or carabineers, another of voltigeurs, and six of fusileers or chasseurs. The peace establishment of a battalion was fixed by the ordonnance of the 27th February 1825 at 600, and the war establishment at 900 men; nor has any very material change since taken place. The staff of all the regiments of the guard and of the line consists, in time of war as well as peace, of a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, three chefs-de-ba-taillon, a major, three adjutant-majors, a paymaster, a superintendent of clothing, a standard-bearer, a chaplain, a surgeon-major and two assistants; in all 16 officers. The officers of companies, 72 in number, consist of 6 captains of the first class, 18 of the second, 12 lieutenants of the first class, 12 of the second, and 24 sub-lieutenants or ensigns. The total of non-commissioned officers in a regiment of the guards amounts to 380, in one of the line to 259; while the entire strength of both, including officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, is very nearly the same.

The cavalry is composed of 2 regiments of grenadiers, 2 of cuirassiers, 1 of dragoons, 1 of chasseurs, 1 of lancers, and 1 of hussars, forming the two divisions of the royal guard; and of 2 regiments of carabineers, 10 of cuirassiers, 12 of dragoons, 18 of chasseurs, and 6 of hussars of the line. Each of the regiments of cavalry of the guard and of the line is composed of a staff and six squadrons. The staff consists of the colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, chefs d’escadron, major, instructor-in-chief, adjutant-majors, paymaster, superintendent of clothing, standard-bearer, chaplain, surgeons, captains, lieutenants, and sub-lieutenants, 65 in all. The non-commissioned officers amount to 167 for war, and 163 for peace; and the entire strength of a regiment of the guards is 940 and 748, of a regiment of the heavy cavalry 926 and 734, of a regiment of light cavalry 1022 and 734, for war and peace respectively.

The royal corps of artillery is composed of an appropriate staff, of artillery troops attached to the royal guard, and of artillery troops of the line. The staff consists of 390 officers, including the general officers, inspectors of this arm, who also form part of the general staff of the army,—and of 560 employes. The officers composing the staff are, 1 lieutenant-general, inspector-general of the central service; 9 lieutenants-general; 16 major-generals; 36 colonels, directors of artillery, inspectors of establishments, commanding en second the military schools, and attached to the general direction of the powder manufactories and to the central depot; 86 lieutenant-colonels, sub-directors, heads of establishments, and adjuncts to the commandants of schools and the central depot; 72 chefs-de-bataillon, sub-directors, heads of establishments, adjuncts to the central depot and to the ministry, commanding the artillery in fortified places, and aides-de-camp; 110 captains, heads of establishments or acting under them, adjuncts to the central depot and to the ministry, commanding the artillery in places of strength, and aides-de-camps; 60 in fixed residence; and 50 sub-lieutenants, pupils. The employes consist of 1 examinator of artillery; ' 10 professors of mathematics, and 10 tutors in the same branch; 11 professors of design; 15 master artificers; 290 artillery guards, viz. 16 of the first class, 64 of the second, and 210 of the third; 103 workmen; 31 controllers of the manufacture of arms, and 38 of management; 36 accountants; 3 controllers of the founderies, with 3 assistants; and 3 controllers of the forges, with 3 assistants. The troops of the artillery of the guard form a brigade under the orders of a major-general of the corps, who is permanent inspector; and this brigade is composed of one regiment of foot, one of horse-artillery, and one of the train. A regiment of foot-artillery is composed of a staff, of eight companies of cannoneers, and of a detachment of workmen; amounting in all to 916 and 668 for war and peace respectively. A regiment of the horse-artillery is composed of a staff and 4 companies of cannoneers, or 454 and 382 respectively as above. A regiment of the train of artillery is composed of a staff, with 12 companies in time of war and 6 in time of peace, or 1474 and 524 respectively. Eight employés are specially attached to the artillery of the guard for the service of the school and the direction of the materiel, viz. a professor and a teacher of mathematics, a master artificer, three guards, and one principal workman. The artillery of the line is composed of 8 regiments of foot, 4 regiments of horse-artillery, 1 battalion of a pontoon-train, 12 companies of workmen, 1 of armourers, and 8 of the train. Each of the 8 regiments of foot-artillery consists of a staff and 20 companies; each of the regiments of horse-artillery ®f a staff and 8 companies. The pontoon-train is divided in 12 companies; and each of the 8 squadrons of the train is composed of a staff with 16 companies in time of war, and 8 in time of peace.

The corps of engineers consists of three regiments, each composed of a staff and three battalions, with a skeleton company as a depot, while each battalion is formed of 8 companies, 2 of which are miners and 6 sappers. The regimental staff of each regiment of engineers consists of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 4 chefs-ded)ataillon, one of which is commandant of the regimental school, 3 adjutant-majors, 1 paymaster, 1 superintendent of clothing, 1 standard-bearer, 1 chaplain, 1 surgeon-major, 2 assistants, and 3 professors attached to the regimental school; in all 16 officers. The sub-officers and workmen are 23 in number; the strength of a company of sappers or miners is 102 in peace and 150 in war; while that of a regiment, including the cadre de la compagnie de depot, is 2604 and 3756 respectively.

It follows, then, taking the totals of the different corps d’armée conformably to this analysis, that the peace establishment of the French army is fixed at 280,270 infantry and 57,057 cavalry; and the war establishment at 395,500 infantry and 105,347 cavalry. In point of fact, however, the effective force of 1826 consisted of no more than 227,667 infantry and 47,834 cavalry.^[69. Budget des Dépensés du Ministère de la Guerre pour l’Exercise de 1826. Paris, 1825, 4to. ] Nor have these respective numbers been since materially increased; for the effective force of 1829, as estimated in the budget of that year,^[70. See abstract of the budget in the Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, tom. v. p. 177∙ ] amounted only to 232,367 infantry and 47,258 cavalry; while, in the budget for 1830, the infantry is estimated at 231,597, and the cavalry at 46,416. But some important changes have taken place since the revolution of July 1830.^[71. See budget in the Bulletin, tom. vi. p. 343. v ] The Swiss guard has been discharged; the garde royale has been dissolved; and the whole of the [7:3:601]garde du corps has been broken up. The effective force ' of each regiment of infantry of the line has also been fixed at 1500, of each regiment of cavalry at 700, and of each regiment of artillery and engineers at 1200 men. This may at first sight appear a considerable reduction; but if we take into account the numerous battalions of national guards which have been organized since the expulsion of the elder branch of the Bourbons, we shall find that the reduction is more apparent than real.

The French army is at present recruited partly by voluntary enrolment for a term of years, and partly by requisitions; in other words, on nearly the same principle which obtained before the revolution of 1790. The system of requisition is of course subsidiary or supplementary to that of voluntary enlistment; but, in the event of another war, it would unquestionably become the principal, if not the only, resource of the army. And this applies to other nations as well as to France. Modern manners, customs, habits, and pursuits, are primarily adverse to the military service; and this opposition can only be overcome by a conscription of one kind or other. Napoleon laid it down as a principle, “que la conscription est le mode de recrutement le plus juste, le plus doux, le plus avantageux au peuple.”^[72. Napoleon having established “qu’un million d’âmes fournit chaque année 7000 à 8000 conscrits, et que les besoins de l’administration et des divers états n’en réclaimait que moitié,” he therefore concluded, “qu’une levée annuelle de 3500 hommes n’of frait, deduction faite des morts, que 30,000 hommes en dix ans,” or abouta 33d part of the entire population. (See Rogniat, Réponse aux Notes Critiques de Napoleon. Paris 1823.) But the draughts ou the population of France ivere never carried’to the full extent of the principle, and seldom exceeded one in 43 or 44. ] But without being prepared to go this length, it may be admitted that it is equal in its operation; that its results are certain; and that the supplies it furnishes are of the best quality: whilst voluntary enlistment is at best a precarious resource, and sends to the ranks little else than the scum and dregs of the people. At the same time, the French army, as at present constituted, bears a much smaller proportion to "the entire population of the country, and is consequently less burdensome, than that of any other nation of Europe, England only excepted. Russia, for example, requires one man in 97 for her peace establishment, and one in 57 for war: Austria takes one in 60 during peace, and one in 40 during war: Prussia, maintaining a war establishment in peace, withdraws one man in 22 for the service of her army: whilst France requires only one in 137 for peace, and one in 80 for war.^[73. Mémoire sur l’Organisation de la Force Militaire de la France, p. 38. Dijon, 1825. ] The peace establishment of Great Britain presses even more lightly upon the general mass of the population; but, in the event of a war, the proportion would, all in probability, become as unfavourable for the people as that of the French conscription under Napoleon, namely, one in 33 or 34. Such, at least, was the case during the greater part of the last war, particularly after the rupture of the short-lived peace of Amiens.

The national character of every people is commonly developed in a very striking manner by its army. “The Frenchman,” says Count Bismark, “courageous, impetuous, nay, even terrible in attack, does not possess that coldblooded, quiet circumspection and endurance which is so indispensable in a defensive war and hence he concludes that a war against the French ought to be carried on offensively. “A cautious but not the less uninterrupted offensive, must be the ruling principle in all projects of operation against the French.”^[74. Cavalry Tactics, p. 336, Engh, transi. ] Major Beamish delivers a similar opinion. “The French,” says this officer, “have, with much judgment, generally endeavoured to become the attacking party. They thus not only derived the usual advantage of that system, but adopted the mode of warfare which was peculiarly suited to their national character. The French soldiers are impetuous; but their courage requires excitement, to which motion so much contributes. Abstract motion, however, is not sufficient to impel the French soldier into action: he must be first excited by the example of his officer; and were it not for the extreme and universal gallantry displayed by the officers of the French army, few instances of impetuous courage would be recorded on the part of the men. It has been said that i the French officers will always lead, if the men will follow and there have been instances where the former have nobly sacrificed their lives to produce this effect”^[75. See Major Beamish’s Note to the passage in the Cavalry Tactics above quoted. ] General Foy, whose endeavours to depreciate the British are at such variance with the better points of his character, says that “to Frenchmen you must always speak,” and that “the intoxication of the French is gay, sparkling, and daring; a foretaste to them of the battle and the victory.”^[76. History of the War in the Peninsula under Napoleon, vol. i. p. 158, Eng. transi. ] A still higher authority confirms these opinions. “Le Français, naturellement brave, actif, et impétueux,” says Baron Jomini, “fait aisément des conquêtes, mais il les perd avec la même facilité. Dès qu’il cesse de marcher en avant, one sorte de dégoût s’empare de lui; il est difficile de le contenir. Depuis la révolution, surtout, cette disposition s’était accrue de plus en plus: les liens de la discipline ne retenant plus le soldat, il était devenu mutin, raisonneur, et indocile.”^[77. Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution, tom. iii. p. 125. ] Colonel Napier’s opinion appears substantially to coincide with that of Jomini and other competent judges.^[78. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. i. p. 10. See also vol. iii. p. 329, where, in describing the attack of the British position on the crest of the Sierra de Busaco, 27th September 1810, Colonel Napier renders justice to the “astonishing efforts of valour” on the part of the French, and ably discriminates the respective characteristics of the troops engaged on that occasion. The onset of the French was truly terrible, and at one moment had very nearly succeeded. ] In fact, no military nation of Europe has gained so many splendid victories, and sustained so many disgraceful defeats, as the French; whose whole history, indeed, consists of an extraordinary alternation of the most brilliant successes and the most calamitous reverses, of triumphant ascendancy and abject humiliation. “Aucune nation,” says Guibert, “n’a perdu de batailles aussi honteuses, aussi décisives, que la nôtre; aucune n’en a gagné si peu de décisives et de complettes.”^[79. Essai General de Tactique, tom. L p. 176. ]

The Spanish army, which, under Charles V., Pescaira, the Duke of Alba, and the Constable of Bourbon, had 1 proved itself so formidable—extending the theatre of its exploits from the Pyrenees to the Po and the Adige on the one hand, and to the Elbe, the Meuse, and the Waal on the other—degenerated rapidly under the disastrous reigns of the last princes of the House of Austria. When Philip V. ascended the throne at the beginning of the last century, it scarcely amounted to 15,000 men. By that prince and his successors, however, it was gradually increased, until, in the year 1792, its establishment amounted to 116,000 infantry, 12,200 cavalry, with upwards of 10,000 artillery, and its effective force to about 120,000 men of [7:3:602]all arms. At present its effective amounts to 90,000, and its disposable force to 75,000 combatants. It is composed of the general active staff, of the staff of the fortresses, of the household troops and royal guard, of the infantry and cavalry of the line, with artillery, engineers, and veterans. Its staff consists of 6 captain-generals, 77 lieutenant-generals, 122 major-generals, 350 brigadier-generals, with inferior officers in proportion. There are 15 captaincies, viz. 12 territorial and 3 colonial. In Spain, and its possessions contiguous to the Peninsula, there are 150 fortresses, posts, forts, citadels, or open towns where troops are in garrison. The household troops consist of six squadrons of the body guard and a company of halberdiers: of these four squadrons are Spanish, and two foreign, called Saxons, in honour of the queen. The royal guard is organized like that of France, and consists of two divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, and three companies of artillery, one of which is horse-artillery. The first division consists of four regiments of grenadiers, each composed of two battalions, divided into eight companies of 120 men each; and the second of two regiments of the élite of the provincial militia, divided into three battalions of four companies each. The cavalry forms a division of two brigades; and the artillery consists of three companies of 100 men, each serving a battery of six pieces mounted. The infantry of the line consists, first, of 10 regiments of three battalions each; secondly, of the Swiss regiment Wimpffen, one battalion only; thirdly, of a regiment, fixed at Ceuta, composed of four companies of 100 men each, the refuse of the army. Seven regiments, of two battalions each, of the same number and composition as those of the line, form the light infantry. The militia consists of 42 regiments of one battalion each, which is divided into eight companies. The cavalry consists of 13 regiments, of which 5 are of the line, and 8 light horse, each of four squadrons, composed like those of the royal guard; together with two companies of cuirassiers at Ceuta, one formed of native Spaniards, and the other of Moors. The royal corps of artillery is divided into the theoretical and practical. The troops of this arm consist, first, of 6 battalions of foot artillery, in garrison at Barcelona, Carthagena, Seville, Corunna, and Valladolid; secondly, of 4 companies of horse-artillery, in garrison at Carthagena and Seville; thirdly, of 5 companies of artificers; fourthly, of 5 battalions of the train; fifthly, of 3 brigades and 15 companies fixed in garrison, but exclusive of the personnel in America. This arm has a splendid museum at Madrid, besides a theoretical and practical school, directed by a brigadier-general or colonel,' in the principal town or place of each province. The engineers are a corps of officers not regimented or brigaded, consisting of an engineer-general, 10 directors sub-inspectors, 17 colonels, 20 lieutenant-colonels, 34 captains, and 56 lieutenants; together with a regiment of sappers, consisting of 2 battalions of 8 companies each, viz. 5 of sappers, 1 of miners, 1 of pontoneers, and 1 of workmen. The establishments of this arm are, a topographical depot-general, or collection of maps, plans, and military memoirs; a museum, containing representations in relief of the fortresses, and different models of fortifications; and an academy for the instruction of young officers intending to enter this branch of the service, after they have passed through the primary school of Segovia. All these establislunents are situated in the capital.

The Spanish army is recruited by voluntary enrolment and, in case of insufficiency, by ballot or conscription. The term of service is eight years for the first enrolment or ballot, and two or four for the second, when the soldier becomes entitled to an increase of pay. Before the war of independence no one could attain the rank of officer without having been a cadet; and each cadet was bound to prove his nobility. But since the return of Ferdinand these proofs have been dispensed with, and serjeants now obtain a third of the sub-lieutenancies; the other two thirds being reserved for the élèves of the military school of Segovia, who have passed the customary examinations at the end of their course of study. The dress and equipment of the Spanish army are in the worst state; the pay of the troops is exceedingly irregular; and their discipline is, in consequence, as bad as it is possible to imagine, or rather, there is scarcely such a thing known.^[80. ⅛° trae snr l’A rmee Espagnole, rédigée sur El Estado Militar åe 1828 et sur un manuscrit. Paris, 1829. Bulletin des Scieneu Militaires, torn. v. p. 420. With regard to the present state of discipline, or rather of indiscipline, of the Spanish army, the author of the Notice observes, “La discipline n’a jamais subsiste' dans l’armée Espagnole. Ce n’est pas qu’il manque de règlement; il en F* ιs ∙ e un ∖ ort étendu, rédigé avec soin d’après lé nôtre (le Français) de 1792; mais C’est un frein qu’on n’a pu jusqu’ici amener 1 Espagnol a supporter. Au respect près que le soldat a pour son officier, il n’y a pas l’ombre de discipline.” ] “L’Espagnol, sobre, vigoreux, infatigable,” says Jomiιιi, “possède de grandes vertus guerrières, mais il manque d’activité soutenue. Si dans ces dernières révolutions, son caractère se soumit difficilement à la discipline, nous avons été induit à penser, en observant l’esprit du peuple, que dans les temps ordinaires, il y serait plus facilement ployé. Son courage tumultueux prêtait beaucoup à one prompte désorganisation, car la déroute est toujours compagne de cette disposition naturelle des esprits chez les peuples méridionaux.”^[81. Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution , tom. i p. 242. ] In a word, the Spaniards afford a striking illustration of the truth of Napoleon’s maxim, that in war the moral is to the physical force as three parts to one.

After the general peace of 1814, when all the powers of Europe had reduced their military establishment, Portugal alone did not follow their example, but fixed the peace establishment of its permanent army at 49,268 infantry and 5230 cavalry; which, with the militia, made a force of 59,325 men, or about 22 soldiers for every 100 inhabitants. Such a state of things, however, was much too violent to be durable. Accordingly, one of the first cares of the constitutional government of 1821 was to reform a military system so disproportionate to the population and the financial resources of the kingdom. The armed force since that period has therefore consisted exclusively of the permanent army and the militia. The permanent army is composed of a general staff, an engineer corps, 24 infantry regiments of the line of one battalion each, 6 regiments of chasseurs a pied, and 12 regiments of chasseurs à cheval of 3 squadrons each, 4 regiments of artillery, a battalion of engineer artificers, a company of soldiers of the train, a police guard, and 30 companies of veterans. The general staff consists of an indeterminate number of lieutenant-generals, 16 major-generals, 24 brigadier-generals, 6 superior officers, 6 subalterns, 12 aides-de-camp, 12 secretaries, 10 employes, and a veterinary surgeon-in-chief; in all 100. The engineer corps (corpo de engenheiros) is composed of 4 colonels, 4 lieutenant-colonels, 8 majors, 12 captains, 12 lieutenants of the first class, and 12 of the second; in all 64. Each regiment of infantry of the line and of light troops consists of 44 officers and 780 noncommissioned officers and soldiers. The effective strength of a regiment of artillery is 551 men, including 33 officers. The corps of the train of artillery (ctrtillιeros conductores), reduced to a single company by the organization of 1821, is composed of 12 officers, 30 soldiers, and 70 mules (l>estas muares). The battalion of engineer artificers consists of [7:3:603]201 men, including 12 officers. Each of the 30 companies ∕ of veterans is from 70 to 80 strong, including 2 officers. The police guard of Lisbon consists of a battalion of infantry of 8 companies and 980 men, including officers; together with a battalion of gens d’armexìe a cheval 238 strong, divided into 4 companies. The effective force of the permanent army on the peace establishment is therefore 29,645 foot, and 4411 horse. But the events of which Portugal has since 1821 been the theatre, and the circumstance of six battalions having been sent to Brazil, render it probable that, at the period of the insurrection of the Marquis de Chaves, the regular army did not exceed 24,000 or at most 25,000 men. The militia form 48 regiments of infantry, of the same strength and composition as those of the line; together with six separate corps, of which three are infantry, two cavalry, and one artillery; amounting in all to 38,542 men, and, with the army of the line, making the total of land forces 68,187 men of all kinds and arms. The ordinenzas, which formed 441 legions or capitanea mores, were abolished by the Cortez in 1822, to the great satisfaction of the nation, which justly regarded this institution as a most grievous scourge. They were a sort of levy en masse, which all individuals between the age of 16 and 60, unless serving in the regular army or in the militia, might be called upon to join at the shortest notice. The army, which is indebted for its organization to marshal Beresford, is well disciplined and instructed. Its equipment and arms are the same with those of the English troops.^[82. Notice sur l’ Armée Portugaise, extrait analytique de l’Essai Statistique sur le Royaume de Portugal et d’Algaτνc, par Adrien Balbi.' Paris, ]827. Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, tom. iv. p. 121. Some alterations have, we believe, been introduced by Don Miguel; but we have not been able to ascertain their nature or extent. f * ]

At the period when the emperor of Germany engaged in war with revolutionary France, the Austrian army was on a very effective footing, both in regard to organization and numbers. The infantry, it is true, though well trained and disciplined, wanted vivacity, and its physical was superior to its moral force. But the cavalry, which was composed of admirable materials, rivalled the Prussian squadrons in instruction, and surpassed them in other particulars. The artillery and engineers were also good, although the matériel, less perfect than that of the French, was either too heavy for pieces in position, or too light for efficient service in the field. Nor was the staff’ deficient either in erudition or in talents; but its theories were antiquated and vague, resting partly upon the system of cordons attributed to Lascy, and partly also upon certain hypotheses, which it was gravely proposed to put to the test of experiment in the field. At the commencement of the war with France, the imperial army consisted of 232 battalions of infantry and 220 squadrons of cavalry; and as the battalions were very strong, being raised by means of reserves to 1200 men and upwards each, the whole of the Austrian force at this period may be estimated at 240,000 foot, 35,000 horse, and 10,000 artillery.^[83. Jomini, Guerres de la Revolution, tom. i. p. 232. ] But the reverses it experienced in consequence of an obstinate adherence to a vicious system, and the exigencies of the long and protracted struggle with republican and imperial France, led to successive augmentations of the effective force, until at one time it considerably exceeded 700,000 men of all arms. At the general peace of 1814, however, Austria, exhausted by a war of five-and-twenty years, reduced her military establishments nearly one half; adjusting the scale of peace so as to render it commensurate with that which, it was conceived, France would adopt as soon as the Bourbons felt themselves in a condition to re-organize a permanent force. Several changes, indeed, have since been made; but the account which follows, derived from the most authentic sources,^[84. The account of the Austrian army, given in the text, is derived partly from the Allgemeine Militar-Zeitung, which appeared at Deipsig and at Darmstadt in 1826, partly from the Constitution de l’ Armée Autrichienne of Bergmayr, and partly also from the Annuaire Militaire Autrichien, together with a variety of papers in the Bulletin des Sciences Militaires, tom. iv. v. vi. and vii. 1827, 1828, 1829, and 1830. ] will be found to exhibit a correct view of the actual force and organization of the Austrian army, consisting of the troops of the line, and the militar-granzen, or military of the frontiers.

The infantry, exclusive of the 17 regiments of the frontiers, is composed of 58 regiments of the line, 1 regiment of chasseurs, 12 battalions of chasseurs, and 5 garrison battalions; besides, in time of war, the infantry of the staff and the landwehr. Of these, 3 are recruited in Lower and 2 in Upper Austria, 5 in the interior and in the Illyrian provinces, 9 in Bohemia, 5 in Moravia, 11 in Gallicia, 4 in the Venetian States, 4 in Lombardy, 12 in Hungary, and 3 in Transylvania. The different regiments are designated respectively by the names of their provinces, and those of the officers who are proprietors therein (inhaber). A regiment of the line consists, in time of peace, of a staff, 2 companies of grenadiers, and 18 of fusileers. The companies of fusileers form 3 battalions, each of 6 companies; and 2 companies make a division. In time of war a fourth battalion is organized, called that of the depot, and is composed of 4 companies. The companies of grenadiers form separate battalions, commonly consisting of three divisions or six companies; but there are at present two battalions which have only four companies. The Hungarian and Transylvanian regiments consist, in time of war, of 4 battalions of 6 companies each; and the company contains 200 men. The force of the infantry of the line amounts, therefore, on the peace establishment, to 1044 companies of fusileers and 116 of grenadiers, or 174 battalions of fusileers and 20 of grenadiers; and, during war, to 1134 companies of fusileers, or 189 battalions, and the same number of companies or battalions of grenadiers. By the military frontiers are understood the provinces and districts conterminous with Turkey, to the east and south of the empire; which, by reason of the military service, internal as well as external, that their male population is subject to, have an organization entirely military; some districts of Transylvania alone excepted. These military provinces furnisfi 17 regiments of national infantry, a battalion of tschaihists or watermen of the Danube, and a regiment of hussars (szekler), who, in as much as they are liable to be called to join the army, really form part of it, but who, in respect of their particular organization, may be considered, in time of peace, as constituting a distinct force. Military Croatia comprehends six districts, each of them furnishing a regiment, which bears the name of the chief place of the district, and consists of 12 companies. The service of these regiments in time of peace is confined to guarding the cordon. The light infantry is composed of the imperial regiment of Tyrolese chasseurs, consisting of 4 battalions of 4 companies each; and of 12 battalions of chasseurs, 4 companies each in time of peace, and 6, with a depot company, in time of war. A company of chasseurs consists of 195 men, including officers. The garrison battalions, composed of a sort of demi-invalids, unfit for the service of the line, are stationed, 1 in Buckowina, 1 in Esclavonia, 1 in Hungary, 1 in Dalmatia, and 1 in Lombardy, [7:3:604]arid consist each of six companies, with the same complementof officers and non-commissioned officers as the companies of the line. The divisions of infantry of the staff {stabs-infanterie-division), are composed in the same manner, and organized, in time of war, for the purpose of guarding the head-quarters and the magazines of the army, and of removing the wounded from the field of battle to the nearest hospitals. The number of battalions of the landwehr is seventy. In each district of country (Hungary, Transylvania, and Italy excepted) assigned for the recruitment of a regiment, two battalions of landwehr are raised and attached to such regiment; the one containing the men who are the least necessary to their families, and the most proper for the service, and the other, the surplus of those who are obliged to form part of the landwehr. The first battalion is exercised fifteen days in the year, the second only eight hours. The commandants receive their orders from the colonel of the regiment of the line to which their battalions are respectively attached. The landwehr is principally destined for the service of the interior; but it may also be sent to an active army. In either case it is paid the same as the troops of the line.

The cavalry consists of 8 regiments of cuirassiers, 6 of dragoons, 7 of light horse, 11 of hussars (exclusive of the frontier regiment), and 4 of hulans; together with, in time of war, the dragoons of the staff {stabs-dragonner) ; all raised, like the infantry, in different provinces, viz. 3 regiments of cuirassiers in Bohemia, 3 in Moravia, 1 in Lower Austria, and 1 in Central Austria; 3 regiments of dragoons in Moravia, 1 in Upper and Lower Austria, and 1 in Lower and Central Austria; 1 regiment of light horse in Moravia, 4 in Bohemia, 1 in Gallicia, and 1 in Italy. The hussars of the 11 regiments are all either Hungarians or Transylvanians. The regiments of hulans consist of inhabitants of Gallicia and volunteers. In time of peace, the regiments of cuirassiers and dragoons consist of 6 squadrons, and the other regiments of 8; making in all 260 squadrons. Two squadrons make a division; and, in regiments which have 8 squadrons or 4 divisions, 2 are commanded by the majors. The dragoons of the staff, of which there are several divisions in time of war, have the same destination as the infantry attached to it, and are besides employed in repressing disorders committed by marauders, and in other like services.^[85. Jomini has particularly remarked the superior composition, organization, and discipline of the Austrian cavalry, which has proved its excellence in many bloody encounters, and, when led with talent, has never failed to distinguish itself. At the battle of Würtz-burg, 3d September 1796, Wartensleben passed the Maine with twenty-four squadrons of cuirassiers, attacked the French cavalry under Bonneau, overthrew it, and thus decided the victory. “This brave veteran,” says the Archduke Charles, “impressed with the importance of the order which he had received, dashed into the Maine at the head of his cavalry, and swam across.” “This manoeuvre,” he adds, “was completely successful: the French cavalry, which had awaited the charge without stirring, was overthrown.” At the battle of Leipsic, the Austrian cuirassiers, commanded by Nosti tz, “covered themselves with glory.” On the 16th October, at one. o’clock in the afternoon, Nostitz, having scarcely passed the Pleisse at Gröbern, attacked the lancers and dragoons of the French imperial guard, overthrew them, and then broke several squares of infantry. Other instances of a similar kind might be mentioned. ]

The artillery is divided into three parts, or distinct corps, viz. the field artillery {feld-artillerie) ; the artillery of the arsenals and magasins {feld-zeugamr) ; and garrison artillery {garnison artillerie). The field artillery consists of a corps of bombardiers, 5 regiments of field artillery, and a corps of fire-masters. The corps of bombardiers has a staff, and õ companies of 204 men each, including officers. It is recruited by corporals of artillery, and performs the most difficult as well as important service to the army. A regiment of field artillery is composed of a staff and 4 battalions, one of 6 companies and three others of 4 companies each; making in all 18 companies. A company serves three or four batteries of 6 pieces; and each battery is commanded by a lieutenant or major-firemaster. The train of the army furnishes the horsing of the batteries, which is under the command of officers of that corps, and generally independent of the chiefs of batteries, but subordinate to them in this particular service. The corps of firemasters is established at Neustadt, near Vienna, where it is at present occupied in attempting to fabricate Congreve rockets, we know not with what success. The artillery of the arsenals and magazins, consisting of a staff and personnel of the necessary workmen, furnishes the field artillery, and the equipages of war, with the requisite arms and munitions, and it guards them when in magazine. The garrison artillery, charged with the service in fortresses, is divided into fourteen districts, determined by the provinces, and proportioned in numbers to these districts. The district of garrison artillery of Vienna comprehends an arsenal, containing all the equipage of sieges; and attached to it are a foundery, an establishment for boring cannon, and manufactories of saltpetre and gunpowder.

The engineer department comprehends a corps of engineers, with the sappers and miners. The pontoon train is attached to the staff, and is under∙ the direction of an oberst-schiffamt or chief of boats. The train or corps of military equipages (militar-fuhrwesens-corps) is wholly independent. The engineer corps is composed of 4 generals, 6 colonels, 9 lieutenant-colonels, 18 majors, 42 captains, 30 captains en second, 30 lieutenants, 30 sub-lieutenants, and 12 cadets. Each command or military division embraces a district of fortification; consequently there are fourteen such districts, to each of which is attached a director, who is taken from the generals or officers of the engineer staff. In each place there is also an engineer-in-chief, who is an officer of the staff or a captain of engineers; but in Vienna, Milan, Peterwaradin, and Venice, the director performs the functions of chief engineer. The corps of miners is composed of a staff, five companies, and a garrison detachment; and the corps of sappers, of a staff like that of the miners, six companies, and a garrison detachment. The pontoon corps consists of a staff and 2 battalions of 4 companies each. In time of war the number of battalions is three, two of which have 6 companies and one 4; besides a company in depot. The train or corps of military equipages consists, in time of peace, of 12 divisions of transport {transports-division), and 20 sets of horses for field batteries {exercier-batterie-bespannung). Each division is provided with 90 horses; and all the detachments of the corps stationed in a province are under the orders of a commandant. In time of war the military equipage train consists of seven principal divisions, viz.: 1. the artillery transport division; 2. that of pontoons; 3. that of flying bridges; 4. that of baking; 5. that of health for the transport of the wounded; 6. that of victualling; and, 7. that of general transport.

Two regiments of the same or different arms form a brigade, which is under the orders of a major-general; and two or three brigades form a division, which is commanded by a field-marshal-lieutenant. In time of war, corps d’armée are organized, each consisting of several divisions, and under the orders of a general of cavalry or artillery, or of the oldest field-marshal-lieutenant. In the Austrian army there are at present 10 field-marshals, 18 generals of [7:3:605] cavalry and artillery, 67 field-marshal-lieutenants, and 118 major-generals, in actual service; 9 generals of cavalry and artillery, 30 field-marshal-lieutenants, and 92 major-generals, unemployed. The guards form no part of the army. They are divided into the noble body guard of arquebusiers, the Hungarian body guard, the guard called tra-bans, and the civic guard. The military institutions of the first order consist of the company of cadets at Olmutz, that of Gratz, the military academy for cadets at Vienna, the five regimental schools of artillery, the school of bombardiers, and the academy of engineers. The total of the peace establishment of this army is 270,000 infantry and 50,000 cavalry, with a reserve of 250,000; while its war establishment, which can be organized in four months, may be estimated at 750,000 infantry and from 70,000 to 75,000 cavalry.

At the death of Frederick the Great, the army of the Prussian monarchy, amounting to about 200,000 combatants, was accounted the best of Europe. Proud of a struggle without example in modern annals, and of the superiority of the genius of their king, the victors of Leuthen, Rosbach, and Torgau added to this force of opinion an instruction in great manoeuvres, which the troops of no other nation approached, much less rivalled.^[86. Guerres de la Révolution, tom. i. p. 228. Notice sur le Système Militaire de la Prusse, Bullet, des Seien. Milit. tom. iii. p. 417, 461, 541, et tom. v. p. 417. See also Archiv für neuere Kriegs und Armee Geschichte, vol. i. part 1st, and Zeitschr. für Kunst, Wissenschaft, wd Geschichte des Krieges, part 2d, 1817· ] The successor of Frederick, to whom this superb army descended, though possessed neither of his genius nor his ambition, was at great pains to maintain the reputation which it had acquired; and some laurels that had been easily gathered in the Low Countries seem to have inspired him with the notion that it was still capable of equalling, perhaps surpassing, the brilliant achievements which had established its renown. In this spirit, and, doubtless, believing that the French nation might be reduced with the same facility as the insurrection in Holland, the Prussian monarch put himself at the head of the confederacy formed to crush a people who had risen in arms to assert their liberties and preserve the integrity of their territory. But the issue proved how much he was at fault in his calculation. For a mercenary and mechanical army, however perfect its discipline and instruction may be, can never triumph over a generous people, inspired by patriotism, endowed with high military qualities, and resolved to conquer or to die in defence of their liberties. Besides, the Prussian army of this period^[87. At the commencement of the French Revolution the Prussian army consisted of about 120,000 infantry, 35,000 cavalry, and from 7000 to 8000 artillery, with a most respectable corps of engineers. (Guerres de la Revolution, i. 232.) In 1806, it amounted to 260,000 men of all arms. (Etat Comparatif de l’ Armée Prussienne en 1806 et en 1827· Bullet, des Seien. Milit. tom. v. p. 417·) ] was not a national one, nor was it animated by a common feeling. The half of it, as at Frederick’s death, was still composed of deserters from all nations, or volunteers enlisted in every circle of the empire:^[88. Jomini reckons the number of foreigners serving in the Prussian army at this period at only a third part of its entire strength; but wθ agree with the author of the Notice sur le Système Militaire de la Prusse in thinking it amounted to a half. The data on which this conclusion is founded appear amply to warrant the statement made in the text. (Hist. Crit. et Milit. i. 233.) ] it was neither inspired by the genius of its chief, nor excited by any feeling calculated to improve its moral force: discipline formed the only tie by which it was held together. Nor was it long ere its inferiority was proved, and its pride severely humbled. The affair of Valmy opened the king’s eyes; and henceforth, more docile to the suggestions of prudence, he negociated for permission to withdraw to the right bank of the Rhine the wrecks of that army the glory of which had just been eclipsed in the plains of Champagne by battalions of youthful volunteers. He had been taught a lesson by which he did not fail to profit; and after the unsuccessful campaigns on the Rhine, he sneaked ingloriously out of the contest which he had been so eager to commence; leaving the empire and Austria to the undivided resentment of the conquerors. But he re-established his army, while his late ally was maintaining a deathstruggle. The parades and manoeuvres of Potzdam were resumed with their wonted éclat; confidence revived; and Frederick began to flatter himself that he alone could re-adjust the disturbed equilibrium of Europe. He failed, however, to observe the prodigious development which the military art had received in the course of the revolutionary war; or at least he neglected to profit by the discoveries to which it had given birth: and, as he had formerly deserted his ally at the beginning of the contest, so now he took the field just at the moment when that same ally was being overthrown at Austerlitz, and compelled to accept the terms dictated by the conqueror. And at Jena as at Auerstadt, at Halle as at Lubec, he paid the price of his procrastinating folly. But misfortune, a rough school-mistress, had inculcated some useful lessons. The military constitution of Prussia was changed; foreign recruitment ceased; a national army was formed; the privileges of the nobles were abridged; old institutions were reformed; discipline was improved by being simplified; the arming and equipment of the army were improved in all their branches; the best parts of the French military system were adopted; the patriotism of the nation was roused; in short, during five years, Prussia was silently but actively-employed in preparing those elements of strength which, in. 1812, delivered the monarchy from the yoke of the stranger, and re-established her at the head of the second-rate powers of Europe.

The armed force of the Prussian monarchy is composed, first, of a permanent army; secondly, of a war reserve or landwehr in two bans; thirdly, of a landsturm, or sedentary national guard. The permanent army is composed of young men of family who are destined to the profession of arms, and are named officers after undergoing certain examinations; of volunteers who clothe, equip, and support themselves for a year at their own charge; of persons between the ages of 17 and 40 who enlist voluntarily and receive regular pay; of a part of the youth from 20 to 25 years of age, raised by means of requisition; and, lastly, of veterans or soldiers who consent to remain in the service beyond the term prescribed by the law. The infantry consists of 36 regiments of 3 battalions and 9 regiments of 2 battalions, besides six battalions of chasseurs and carabineers, forming in all 132 battalions; the cavalry, of 38 regiments of 4 squadrons each, 10 of which are cuirassiers, 5 dragoons, 13 hussars, and 10 hulans, in all 158 squadrons;^[89. T he P russ ian cavalry, in the time of Frederick, was confessedly the best in Europe. “L’infanterie Prussienne,” says Jomini, quoique manoeuvrière, était cependant loin d’atteindre le degré de perfection auquel Seidlitz avait porté le cavalerie: cette dernière a ™ e t ≡nait alors le premier rang en Europe. (Hist. Crit. et Milit. i. 231. See also Cavalry Lectures, p. 329.) ] the artillery, of 9 brigades, each consisting of 3 companies of horse, 12 of foot artillery, and 1 of artificers; and the gens-d''armerie, of 8 brigades, divided each into 2 detachments.^[90. The gens-d’armerie is of three kinds: the armée gens-d’armerie, divided into detachments stationed at the head-quarters of generalsorcorps-d’armée; the land gens-d’armeric, consisting of 80 Wachtmeister and 1240 gens-d’armes, of whom 1080 are mounted; and the which assists the employés of the customs in discharging their duties on the frontiers. ] All the youth who have not served five years [7:3:606]in the active army or in the reserve form part of the first ban of the landwehr, until they attain the age of 30 years complete. The second embraces those from 32 to 40 years of age; and both classes, during time of peace, remain at home, pursuing their ordinary avocations. But, in the event of war, the first ban is destined to reinforce the permanent army; and the second, to form the garrisons of strong places, and even, in case of need, to send detachments to the army in the field. The landwehr, like the permanent army, is composed of infantry, cavairy, and artillery. In the year 1827, the infantry of the first ban consisted of 116 battalions, and the cavalry of 104 squadrons. Hence, if we include 54 garrison companies, and 18 of invalids at Berlin, Stolpen, and Rybnik, the total of the peace establishment of the Prussian army will amount to 122,000 men, while that of war would not be less than 250,000 men of all arms: and such is the admirable military organization of the country, that two months only are necessary to raise the array to the full complement of the war establishment. In Prussia the cavalry is a preponderating arm. Of the 122,000 men composing the peace establishment, 37,000 belong to this branch of the service. The landsturm is a levy en masse of men from the age of 17 to that of 50, and, in cases of imminent danger, it is called out by a royal ordonnance. It is formed into urban and rural companies, and, like the French national guard, performs, if necessary, the duties of the interior; thus leaving the whole of the permanent army and the landwehr available for the service of the field. The actual constitution of the Prussian army is strictly economical in all its parts, and the number of military functionaries is reduced to the lowest possible scale consistent with the efficiency of the service. In Prussia every man who wears a uniform works hard for his money.

All Prussians, from the age of 20 to 50, are held liable to military service, but they only serve regularly from 20 to 26. The duration of service is consequently fixed at five years; but, in time of peace, the requisitionary youth remain only the first three years under their colours, after which they return to their homes, and are not called out again, except for a few weeks towards the expiry of the fifth year, when they are inscribed in the landwehr of the first ban. The population of Prussia being 11,500,000 souls, about 98,000 males will annually attain the twentieth year of their age. Hence, if we deduct 38,000 for such as are excepted from military service on account of their age or their status in society, the total number of disposable persons, between the age of 20 and 25, will amount to 395,000. And if to this we add that portion of the male population from 25 to 32 years of age who are eventually called to the service, it will follow that Prussia, without having recourse to the second ban of the landwehr, could raise 900,000 men trained to the use of arms; while France, even since 1824, when the re-organization of her army commenced, could scarcely bring into the field more than 480,000 men, of which the one half would be nearly uninstructed in the use of arms. The annual renewal of this army by thirds renders it necessary to push, with the utmost activity, the instruction of both infantry and cavalry, and to pay little regard to that martinet precision which formerly characterized the Prussian tactics, but which is of so small use in the presence of an enemy. The showy on parade has consequently been sacrificed to the useful in the field; and the mere foppery of war has given place to movements and evolutions, which are recommended alike by their simplicity, and by the testimony which experience, the best of all instructors, has borne in their favour. So long ago as the year 1808, the degrading discipline, introduced by the father of Frederick the Great, was abolished by the kriegs∙artihel or the martial law; and military punishments are now principally confined to hard drills, confinement of various degrees, retrogradation in rank, and some others of a still milder description. Finally, the first grades are the reward of merit established by examination and as such open to all; while, from the rank of sub-lieutenant to that of general, and even beyond it, seniority, that conservative law of acquired rights, regulates the advancement of officers, and ultimately insures the veteran his reward. Thus, after sustaining the greatest disasters, the Prussian army has survived its dispersion in 1807, and risen, as it were out of its ashes, stronger and better constituted than at the period when it was so rashly opposed to the undivided pow er of France, wielded by the masterhand of the greatest warrior of modern times. “Heureux les gouvernemens,” says a French military writer, “auxquels les malheurs servent de leçons !” Nor would their “happiness” have been much diminished had such governments remembered in victory the promises made to the people in misfortune, and shown but half as much zeal to improve their condition as to rectify the defects of their military systems.

At the period of the emperor Alexander’s death, the distribution of the Russian and Polish forces was that of 1 an army ranged in order of battle, with its front facing the west. 1. The advanced guard of this army was formed by the Polish army and the corps d’armée of Lithuania; presenting a mass of 80,000 combatants, under the command of the grand duke Constantine. In point of mechanical instruction, no army in Europe could be compared to it. Disposed in cantonments of about 150 leagues in length, from Lowicz to Minsk, and 146 in breadth, between Kowno and Dubno, it could be concentrated, at Warsaw or at Brzecs-Littowsky, in less than three weeks. 2. The army of the right was composed of the corps d’armée, cantoned in Courland and Livonia, of the corps of the guard, and of the first corps of the cavalry of reserve; which, united, formed also a mass of 80,000 combatants. These were perhaps the only troops which, in point of mechanical perfection, rivalled the army of the advanced guard under Constantine. Their cantonments extended from Polangen to Pleskof, about 132 leagues, and from Revel to Wilkomirsz; and eighteen days at the most were sufficient for assembling them on the Niemen. 3. The army of the left, denominated the second army, was equally formed of a mass of 80,000 combatants, cantoned in the Chersonesian governments. The greatest depth of its quarters, from Choczym on the Pruth to Czerkasy on the Dnieper, was about 106 leagues; and the greatest breadth 180 leagues, between Machnowka, near the southern frontier of Volhynia and Simpherapol in the Crimea. Three weeks were necessary for concentrating it on the Pruth. 4. The army of the centre, called also the first or grand army, formed a mass equal to the three preceding armies, and consequently consisted of 240,000 combatants. Its cantonments extended on one side to more than 234 leagues, or from Kaszin, on the frontier of the government of Tver and of Jaroslaf, as far as Saratow; and, on the other, to upwards of 320 leagues, from Ostrog to Moroum, on the frontier of the government of Vladimir and of Nijei-Novogorod. It required six weeks at least for concentrating itself in the province of Volhynia. 5. Besides these four armies, consisting of 480,000 men, Russia had also several corps, of various descriptions, amounting to more than 267,000 men; viz. the corps of Finland, of Orenburg, and of Siberia, 45,000 strong; the corps of the Caucasus, 85,000; the military colonies, 67,000; and the troops in garrison, 70,000; thus making a grand total of 747,000 men, exclusive of the Kirgishes, Baschkirs, and other Tartar hordes, of whom from 250,000 to 300,000 may in case of exigency be brought into the field. The whole military[7:3:607] force of the Russian empire, at this period, may, therefore, be estimated at about a million of men, or a forty-ninth part of the entire population; while the country, as we have just seen, was organized into one vast camp, arranged upon strategic principles, so as to render the transition from a state of peace to a state of war easy and expeditious, and, with formidable means of aggression, to combine defensive resources of almost incalculable extent.^[91. Etat des Armies Russe et Polpnnalse à l’ époque de la mort de ÎEmpereur Alexandre, ou comparaison entre ces detix armées et les autres puissances armées de l’Europe. Paris, 182G. Mauvillon, Militar Blatter for 182G, part 1st. Bulletin des· Seien.. Milit. tom. iii. p. 385. ]

The contest with Turkey in 1828 and 1829 produced no sensible derangement of this system, and only altered for a time the relative proportions in the numbers of the four principal armies, according as troops were moved upon the various strategic points in the theatre of war. But the laeunae created by the casualties of the two campaigns in Moldavia, Bulgaria, and Rumelia, have been already filled up; and ponseqnently the above account of the military organization and force of the Russian empire is as applicable in 1831 as it was from the death of Alexander in 1826 to the commencement of the Turkish war in 1828. A fact, however, is mentioned by M∙ Tolstoy, lately an officer of the Russian staff, which shows the utter groundlessness of the fears generally entertained of the aggressive powers of Russia at the commencement of the late contest with Turkey. From a variety of data, derived from authentic sources, that officer exhibits the situation and force of the Russian army at different periods of the campaign of 1828, and proves, we think to demonstration, that it never had more than 88,000 men in its first line;^[92. Répliqué à la Réponse de Μ. Magnicr aux Observations d’un officier d’étal-major Russe sur la dernière campagne de Turquie, par J. Tolstoy, ancien officier d’état-major Russe. Paris, Ledoven, 1829. Dix chapitres sur la Guerre d’Orient. Paris, Delaunay et Dupont, 1829. ] a force which was not calculated, certainly, to excite any very great degree of alarm in the minds of other nations. M. Tolstoy, it is true, alleges that political reasons prevented the employment of a greater force; and that if the Russians only brought forward 88,000 men in the first campaign, “c’était qu’ils ne voulaient point effrayer l’Europe et réveiller des jalousies qui sommeillaient.” But doser observers will perhaps see reason to believe that the real cause why the campaign was undertaken with a force comparatively so small, did not consist in any particular respect for the“slumbering jealousies” of other nations, but in the inability of Russia to take the field with a larger army; that her physical means are out of all proportion greater than her financial resources or power of developing them in a foreign war; and that, however formidable or invincible she might prove to an enemy invading her own territory, a long period must yet elapse before she can be in a condition to occasion any serious uneasiness to the nations of the south and west of Europe. Even in die campaign of 1829, when so many losses were to be repaired, and the reputation of the Russian arms, if possible, freed from the tarnish they had contracted in the course of the preceding one, Count Diebitsch was compelled to attempt the passage of the Balkan with no more than 30,000 men; and, in point of fact, he appears to have arrived at Adrianople in the month of October, with less than the third of that small force; a miracle of fortune, certainly, but, at the same time, a Conclusive proof of the exhausted state of the Russian finances, and of the inability of the czar to carry on a distant and protracted war. Diebitsch owed his success to two causes: the powerful co-operation of the fleet, and the despairing fatalism, or rather infatuation, of the Turks. But the fortunate result of the enterprise cannot blind the world as to the circumstances under which it was undertaken, nor conceal the weakness which preternatural folly, on the part of the Osmanlees, at length gilded with victory.

The Russian infantry regiments consist of3000 men each, under a pulkovnick or colonel, and are divided into three battalions of four companies, each under a chef-de-bataillon. The company consists of 200 men, exclusive of officers, sub-officers, and other persons attached to it, so that four companies make up a battalion of 1000 men; and it is under the command of a Capitan, a parooschwlι or lieutenant, a putparooschick or sub-lieutenant, and apraperchick or ensign. Four officers may appear a small allowance for a company: but, in the first place, Russian soldiers arc much more easily managed than our dare-devil fellows, in whose blood the wild spirit of freedom revels so fiercely; and, secondly, the fundamental principle upon which the army of the czar is organized is that of economy in every branch of the service, particularly in the number of officers. Hence, for an effective regular force of 747,000 men, there are no more than 14,224 officers, or one for every 52 men; a proportion, we believe, considerably lower than that which obtains in any other European army, except perhaps that of Prussia. This reduced number, however, has been found to answer well enough in practice; and, indeed, a multitude of officers is only necessary for armies like that of France, which require to be encouraged and stimulated by the example, the voice, and the gestures of its officers, when in presence of an army. Every company has a small green yaschich or waggon attached to it, containing sixty rounds of ball cartridge for each man, in addition to those he carries in his pouch, besides the company’s books and cash-chest. To each battalion there is attached one standard, beside which is kept a.drum for assembling the men. There is only one band for the three battalions composing a regiment. The imperial guard, consisting of the élite of the three arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, amounts in all to forty thousand men.^[93. Captain Alexander’s Travels, i. 100. ]

The Russian regular cavalry consists of 8 regiments of the guard, 4 of which are cuirassiers and 4 light horse; and 79 regiments of the line, 9 of which are cuirassiers, 17 dragoons, 12 hussars, and 22 hulans. Supposing each regiment, therefore, to consist of 900 men, as stated by Captain Alexander, the total number of the Russian regular cavalry would amount to 78,000. The irregular cavalry is composed of more than 20,000 Cossacks, who are only called out during time of war, and on the return of peace arc sent back to their steppes to resume their nomadic course of life. Alt the regiments of the regular cavalry which are not colonized have 6 active squadrons and one in depot; the colonized regiments, though composed of 12 squadrons, have only 6 disposable. The depot squadron may be considered the nursery of the regiment to which it belongs. The cavalry is organized upon the same principle as the infantry. It forms, including that of the guard, nine corps d’armée, of 2 divisions each; and as each division consists of 2 brigades, each brigade of 2 regiments, and each regiment of 6 squadrons, every corps d’armée of cavalry consists of 8 regiments or 48 squadrons. Two batteries of horse-artillery are attached to each division, or 48 pieces to a corps d’ärmée. The light division of the guard is composed of a regiment of dragoons, one of hulans, one of hussars, and one of chasseurs. The division of heavy cavalry of the guard consists of the regiment of chevaliers-guards, of the regiment of horse guards, and of the cuirassiers of the emperor and empress. The two last regiments, as well as the chasseurs [7:3:608]of the light division, belong to the young guard. The guard is recruited in the regiments of the line from which it draws all the finest men, and to which it never fails to send back every one who has given the slightest cause for dissatisfaction. The clothing and equipments are superb; and the greatest attention is paid to the appearance of the troops, which has of late years been much improved. Equitation is also anxiously cultivated, and vast pains have been taken to improve the men in this art. But the system pursued in Russia is considered bad, inasmuch as the ambling pace introduced into the schools is apt to spoil the horses, and to produce any thing rather than bold riders.^[94. Bulletin des Scien. Milit. tom. iv. p. 489 and 529; Allgemeine Militar Zeitung, Nos. 17, 18, and 19. ]

The Russian, like the French, artillery, is divided into horse and foot. The horse-artillery is divided into brigades or battalions, of two divisions or squadrons, each serving 12 light pieces. The foot artillery is divided into brigades or regiments, each commanded by four superior officers, and divided into two companies of battery, and two light companies. The two former are destined each to serve 12 pieces in battery; the two latter, 12 light pieces each. A brigade of foot-artillery with 48 pieces of cannon is attached to each division of infantry of 6 regiments; while each division of cavalry, composed of 4 regiments, has a brigade of horse-artillery of 24 pieces. There is also in each corps d’armée a general of artillery, who receives the orders of the inspector-general of artillery. The personnel of the companies is determined and organized according to the service which the different kinds of artillery require; so that the personnel of the battery companies is considerably stronger than that of the light companies. The train is well organized, and the attelages of the different batteries and pieces are ample. The engineer department is also on a respectable footing, though inferior in science to those of the other great military nations. The Russians have never been remarkable for skill in fortification, but their field-works have in general been judiciously executed.^[95. Ibid. tom. ii. p. 493; Zeitsch. für Kriegsmssenschaft, 1826, part 3d, p. 254. ]

The system of recruiting in Russia is exceedingly autocratical. When new levies are wanted, orders are issued to the headmen of villages; each of which is required to furnish a certain number, according to the amount of its population. The selection is made by the headman, who is perfectly absolute in the matter; and Jews are now obliged either to serve or to pay for substitutes, who are not easily procured in a country like Russia, where so few of the lower class are their own masters. Formerly, it was very difficult to prevent the men from deserting on the road to the depots; since the circumstance of being selected as a soldier was considered as tantamount to perpetual banishment from family and friends. Hence, it was no uncommon spectacle to see numbers of these wretched serfs fastened together like a cordon of felons going to the hulks, or tied on telegas or carts, and thus conveyed to the depot. But since leave has been given to soldiers to visit, at intervals, their native villages, and the period of service has been limited to twenty years, the dislike to the army has begun to abate, and recruits show less disposition to desert, although the military profession is still sufficiently unpopular. When the recruit, or rather conscript, arrives at the depot, he is immediately stripped, washed, and shaved: if he wishes to retain any article of the dress which he brought with him, he is obliged to purchase it back. The only thing he is allowed to retain, without paying for it, is the cross of silver or brass which he wears round his neck. This, superstition spares him as the only consolation of his miserable existence; and because, however passive in other respects, the most abject serf would become dangerous, if deprived of an emblem which had probably been handed down from father to son for many generations, and the loss of which is considered the greatest misfortune.

The Russian soldier is docile, submissive, and brave: like all slaves, he is supple, subservient, and cunning: like all natives of the northern regions, he is hardy, patient, and enduring. He has no other thought than to do implicitly as he is desired; and there is a pertinacity in his nature which inclines him to persevere, or to stand firm, as the case may be, without troubling himself about consequences. His courage is the result of insensibility rather than of moral force of character; and hence it is commonly more of a passive than of an active character. But there is, nevertheless, an element of indomitable ferocity in his composition: amidst all the apparatus and parade of civilization he is still three parts a barbarian. Hence his most brilliant achievements have been performed under men upon whom the force of civilization had made as little impression as on himself, and whom the instinct of sympathy had taught to develope his natural barbarism. The Italian campaign of Suwaroff affords a striking illustration of this rens ark. When that “hero, buffoon,” arrived in Italy at the head of his 20,000 Russians, to take the command-in-chief of the allied forces, General Chas-teler, head of the staff of the army, proposed to him to make a reconnaissance of the French, who had retired behind the Oglio. “Des reconnaissances !” exclaimed the Muscovite chief, “je n’en veux pas; elles ne servent qu’aux gens timides, et pour avertir l’ennemi qu'on arrive; on trouve toujours l’ennemi quand on veut. Des colonnes, la baïonnette, l’arme blanche, attaquer, enfoncer,—voilà mes reconnaissances !” At Novi, at the Trebbia, and during his extraordinary campaign in the mountains of Switzerland, this wonderful barbarian, who had the instinct of genius, and a coup d’oeil which has never been surpassed, proved that these were not empty words. By a kind of rude but infallible inspiration he discerned intuitively the true strategic points on which to move; and by the spell of his barbaric genius he rendered the Muscovite soldier invincible. Again, in the campaign of 1812, we discover another, though less striking, illustration of this peculiar characteristic of the Russian troops. Barclay de Tolly, a German and a foreigner, commanded in the early part of it; displaying a watchfulness, a prudence, and a sagacity in divining the intentions of his adversary, which proved him a great master in the art of war, and, beyond all question, saved the Russian empire. But still the army was discouraged; and Alexander felt it necessary to place at its head, as well as second in command, two of the ancient companions in arms of the conqueror of Italy. Its courage instantly revived; and the bloody day of Borodino attests how well it repaid this compliance with its wishes. Ιhe Russians have a strongly marked national character, which foreigners can never duly appreciate; nor will its best energies be displayed in war, except under the command of men who feel its influence as powerfully as the meanest soldier in its ranks. The moral force of their army consists in a certain nondescript fanatical ferocity, which such men as Suwaroff, Bagration, and Kutusoff can alone fully develope.^[96. Lieutenant-General Baron Jomini describes the Russian soldier with that predilection in his favour which may not unnaturally be expected from the aide-de-camp general de S. Μ. L'Empereur de Russie, and grand croix de pleusieurs ordres. But even while he paints en beau that infantry “qui avait prouvé à Pultava, à Kunersdorf, à Choczim, à Ismaël, et dans mille actions contre les Tures ou les Suédois, ce qu’on peut attendre de son inébranlable fermeté,” he shows his usual discrimination of military character, and makes several observations which appear to us equally striking and original. “L’opinion généralement accréditée en Europe,” says he, “que le paysan Russe, ne possédant rien, gagne beaucoup à devenir soldat, est denuée de fondement. Un grand nombre d’entre eux, outre les champs de ses maitres, cultive des fruits, des légumes, travaille et trafique à son compte. Beaucoup sont à leur aise; et la vie du soldat dans l’interieur du pays, ne leur porte pas envie au point de la désirer. Mais quand ce paysan est sous les drapeaux, il s’y attache comme à one seconde patrie Elevé de la manière la plus rude, sous un climat terrible, il est le plus robuste de l’Europe, le plus capable de soutenir les fatigues et les privations. Il ne connait rien de plus sacré que ses devoirs; soumis à l’ordonnance comme aux précepts de sa réligion, aucune fatigue, aucune intempérie, ne peut lui faire negliger les obligations qu’elle impose. On voit dans toutes les marches et durant une campagne entière, le cannonier près de sa pièce, au poste qui lui est assigné par le réglement, et à moins d’être frappé par le for ennemi ou autorisé par son chef, il ne la quitterait pour rien au monde. Le soldat du train cire son harnais au bivouac par 15 degrés de froid et au jours fixés, comme il le ferait dans un bon cantonnement pour aller à one parade. Cet esprit admirable d’ordre et de précision, joint à l’instinct naturel que le soldat a de se pelotonner au lieu de fuir quand il est enfoncé, rend les défaites extrêmement rares. Sans doute, one telle troupe est moins facile à rallier sur le terrain qu’une armée Française, où l’intelligence du soldat supplée souvent au défaut d’ordre; mais elle est aussi plus difficile à rompre Cet instinct qu’aucune des troupes de l’Europe ne possède au même degré, s’est fortifié chez les Russes par les guerres contre les Tures. Là, tout fuyard est sabré par les nuées de cavaliers qui se répandent sur les flancs et les derrières de l’armée. Ce n’est qu’en restant fermes et réunies qu’on échappe à one destruction inévitable. This is a tolerably good reason for the “instinct” of which the gallant author speaks. He adds, “La plus parfaite égalité règne dans l’armée, car one fois dans la carrière des armes, aucun obstacle n’empéche de la parcourir. Pour s’en convaincre, on n’a qu’à voir les noms des généraux distingués dans Thistoire militaire de Russie; on y trouvera autant de plébéians, ou de bas-officiers parvenus par leur mérite, que dans tout autre pays.” (Guerres de la Révolution, tom. i. p. 254-256.) ]
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In Sweden, union and confidence have always subsisted between the soldier and the citizen; and hence the desire of military service is so common among all classes of the nation, that sending a man to the army is not there, as elsewhere, a punishment. In 1811, when the peasantry broke out in insurrection against the conscription by ballot, they offered to take arms without exception in the event of war, to submit to be drilled together in time of peace, and to equip themselves at their own charge, provided the obnoxious innovation was abolished; tenders which were wisely accepted on the part of the government. The present military establishment of Sweden is considerably below what a nation constitutionally warlike might be supposed to maintain; but as the aim of the government is to husband the public money, and, if possible, to relieve the country from the pecuniary difficulties entailed upon it by the folly and extravagance of the ex-king, all the departments of the public service have been placed on the most economical footing. The actual standing army, accordingly, does not exceed 35,000 men of all arms. The militia, however, is more numerous; and, from the peculiar aptitude of the Swedes for military exercises, it exhibits a very soldier-like appearance, though only trained for a few weeks annually. Like the regular army, it is composed both of horse and foot, and must afford a ready resource in the event of war. The organization of the whole is excellent. The regiments of the line are recruited neither by voluntary enrolment nor by conscription, but by a kind of intermediate system; every landed proprietor furnishing a certain number of soldiers, to each of whom a house and a portion of land are allotted for his maintenance. The Swedes have been long and justly celebrated for their martial qualities; and no modern nation of so small extent has made so conspicuous a figure in history. They are brave, hardy, and naturally heroic men; of superior physical and corresponding moral power; and, as soldiers, equal to any in the world.^[97. Alexander’s Travels, vol. ii. p. 267· ]

The Danish army consists of rather more than 30,000 men, with a reserve of about 14,000. Of this force 2157 are divided throughout the kingdom of Denmark, and 9655 stationed in the duchies; while the remainder are employed in garrison, or occupy cantonments in the vicinity of the capital. The whole is composed of a staff of 23 officers; a corps of engineers of 32; an artillery corps of 3202 men, divided into 22 companies; 6126 cavalry, divided into ten regiments, one of which is a regiment of guards; 13,412 infantry, divided into thirteen regiments of two battalions each, one of which is also a regiment of guards; 2753 chasseurs, divided into five battalions of four companies each; and, lastly, a rocket corps, amounting to 156 men. The two regiments of guards are composed of very fine men, and have a noble appearance. In 1828 the artillery was re-organized, and placed upon a more effective footing, both as to the materiel and personnel. It now consists of eighteen batteries of eight pieces each; besides a company of sappers and miners, one of pontoon men and pioneers, with a detachment of artificers, and a laboratory establishment. These eighteen batteries are divided into two brigades of nine batteries and 72 guns each. In time of war the battalions of reserve furnish other two brigades, one Danish and the other Holstein; consisting in all of 2640 men, including officers, with a proportional allotment of guns. The Danes are naturally brave, but they have been more distinguished as seamen than as soldiers, in which capacity they have gathered few laurels.^[98. Bulletin des Seien. Milit. tom. ii. p. 417. Nyt Magazin fro Militait Videnskdbelighed, No. 2, p. 323. 1826. ]

The electorate of Saxony, with a superficies of 717 square miles, a population of 2,104,336 souls, and a revenue of about 780,000 thalers, maintained in 1792 an army of about 32,000 men, being a 66th part of the population; and on this footing it remained till 1800, when it was increased to 38,000 men, being a 56th part of the population. But Saxony having in 1802 gained a small increase of territory in consequence of the treaty of Luneville, though, at the same time, it lost about 1,778,000 thalers of revenue, the army was reduced to 31,000 men, of which 22,000 were infantry and 6700 cavalry. This state of things continued until 1806, when the military force was raised to 36,000; Saxony having then a population of 2,276,000. souls. In the year 1809 she furnisheda contingent to France of 16,000 men, who, under the command of Bernadotte, the present king of Sweden, took part in the memorable campaign of that year, and fought at the battle of Wagram; but the emperor Napoleon was so little satisfied, either with the conduct of these troops, or that of their leader, on this occasion, that he was with difficulty prevented from stigmatising both in the orders of the day. After the peace of Vienna in 1810, the Saxon army was re-organized upon the model of the French, and its contingent of 16,000 men formed the seventh corps of the grand army which invaded Russia in 1812. It was commanded by General Reynier. On the disastrous termination of the Russian campaign, its wrecks, re-organized from the troops remaining in Saxony, entered into line in 1813, after the battle of Lutzen; and on the conclusion of the armistice with the Hessian corps and that of General Durutte, it formed again the seventh division. The defection of the Saxon divisions at Leipsig, [7:3:610]on the 18th of October 1813, is known to every body. The king of Saxony having lost his liberty in consequence of the result of that disastrous day, his army was dissolved and replaced by a landwehr of from 10,000 to 12,000 men, which followed in the train of the allied armies when they invaded France. In 1815, however, the army was reconstituted to the extent of a third of its former strength; and underwent various changes until 1824, when it was finally placed on the footing on which it now stands. The infantry at present consists of two companies of grenadier guards of 100 men each, four regiments of infantry of three battalions each, two battalions of light infantry, one battalion of carabineers and one of chasseurs; in all sixteen battalions, of four companies each, or 9984 men. The cavalry·, which formerly consisted of horse guards, cuirassiers, hulans, and hussars, has been transformed into four regiments of light horse, consisting of four squadrons of two companies each, or 467 men, on the footing of peace; in all 1872. The artillery consists of one regiment making twelve companies, two of which are horse, amounting to 1060 sub-officers and soldiers, together with a train of 189 men and as many horses. A dozen officers without troops, and a company of sappers 67 strong, compose the engineer department. The institutions connected with the army are a school for cadets, and a military academy, both at Dresden. The reputation of the Saxon infantry is low; but the cavalry is better than the infantry, and is well qualified for the service of the advanced posts, which was its usual destination under Napoleon.^[99. Coup d'(Eil sur la Force et l’Organisation de l’ Armée Saxonne depuis 1792 jusqu'en 1824. Paris, 1825. Geist der Zeit. Feb. 1824. Bulletin des Seien. Milit. ii. 49. ]

The composition of the Hanoverian army was fixed by a royal decree of the 14th July 1820. The infantry consists of twelve regiments of two battalions each, and the battalion is divided into four companies. There are two of these regiments guards; and the whole are divided into three brigades, the first consisting of five regiments, the second of four, and the third of three. Each regiment consists of 42 officers and 1284 men. There are eight regiments of cavalry, two of cuirassiers of the guard, four of hussars, and two of hulans; and each regiment is composed of four squadrons, 48 officers, 433 men, and 403 horses. The artillery consists of one regiment of two battalions, each divided into three companies, one of which is horse, and contains 70 officers, 1158 men, and 210 horses. The corps of engineers and artificers consists of 19 officers and 46 men. The artillery is of the English model and calibre, and its batteries, both horse and foot, consist of six pieces and a howitzer each. The total strength of the army, therefore, including th.e staff, amounts to 825 officers, 20,091 men, and 3431 horse. The period of service in the infantry of the guard is four years only, but in all the other corps six years. The cavalry and artillery are recruited as much as possible from volunteers. The Hanoverians make excellent, soldiers; and it is well known that, during the Peninsular campaigns, no part of the Duke of Wellington’s army more frequently distinguished itself than the King’s German Legion, which was almost exclusively composed of Hanoverian volunteers.^[100. Militar Blatter, vol. i. p. 183. 1821. Bulletin des Seien. Milit. ii. 55. 1825. ]

The Bavarian is one of the largest of the third rate armies. Its infantry consists of a regiment of grenadiers of the guard in three battalions, of 16 regiments of the line in two, and of two battalions of chasseurs; presenting an effective force of 37 battalions, or 43,561 men. Its cavalry is composed of a regiment of gardes du corps, two regiments of cuirassiers in four squadrons each, and six regiments of light horse in six squadrons; forming a total of 48 squadrons, or 9549 men, and 6000 horse. The artillery corps, commanded by a lieutenant-general, consists of one regiment of cannoneers of four battalions, one battalion of train in four divisions, and four companies of artificers, pontoneers, sappers, and miners. Each battalion of artillery is divided into six companies, one of which consists of light troops; and the companies of pontoneers, miners, and sappers, have each an effective force of 100 men, including officers. The engineer corps is composed of a general, a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, two majors, two captains, eight lieutenants of the first class, eight of the second, and six conductors, and is divided among the five directions of Munich, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Wiirtz-burg, and Lindau. The Bavarian army, therefore, consists of 43,561 infantry, 9547 cavalry, 3515 artillery, 1464 train, and 150 artificers; in all 56,919 men, with 6420 horse. Every Bavarian, the clergy only excepted, is obliged to bear arms in defence of his country; but, in practice, students and persons necessary to their families are usually exempted; and permission is likewise granted to serve by substitute. The method of recruitment is conscription. Besides the permanent army, there is a reserve destined to reinforce it; and, in the event of war, the landwehr may be equally called upon to support the army, when reinforced by the battalions of the reserve, but only in the interior. The landwehr is divided into two classes, one of which comprehends those who are least capable of performing active service, and who cannot in any case be employed beyond the limits of their district. In time of peace it co-operates in the maintenance of public tranquillity, when put in requisition for that purpose, and when the troops of the line are deemed insufficient. The Bavarian army is well organized, and has always maintained a respectable character for discipline and bravery. The cavalry is considered superior to the infantry.^[101. Zeitschrift für Kriegs-Wissenschaft, No. 24, p. 242. Hof und Staats Handbuch des Königreichs Bayern. Munich, 1828. ]

The small army of Wurtemberg requires only a brief notice. Its infantry consists of 8 regiments of 2 battalions, divided each into 4 companies; its cavalry, of a squadron of guards, a squadron of chasseurs, and 4regiments of horse, each divided into 4 squadrons; its artillery, of a regiment of 6 companies, 3 horse and 3 foot, besides a garrison company: but it has no engineer corps distinct from that of the artillery. Its peace establishment is composed of 368 officers, 1504 sub-officers, and 5184 soldiers; or 6996 combatants, and 1806 horse: on a war footing it would amount to 520 officers, 2302 sub-officers, and 14,508 soldiers, or 17,330 combatants, and 5228 horse. The Wurtemberg army is recruited by voluntary enrolment and forced levies. The military age is from 18 to 30 for enrolment, and from 20 to 25 for levies; and, in both cases, the élite of the population only is taken. This little army is well-officered, and enjoys some consideration. Count Bismark, the able author of Lectures on Cavalry Tactics, is colonel of ţþe 3d regiment of Wurtemberg horse, and served with distinction as general of brigade in Napoleon’s Russian campaign.^[102. Bulletin des Seien. Milit. tom. iv. p. 402. Königb. Wurtemb. Hof und Staats ìĩandbuch. Stuttgardt, 1828. ] — The grand duchy of Baden, the seventh state of the Germanic confederation, has a superficies of 279 square miles, with a population of 1,108,000 souls, and supports a military establishment of 12,433 men, although it is only bound to furnish a division of 10,000 men (the 2d of the third corps) as its contingent.^[103. Allgemeine Militar Zeitung, No. 10, 1828. Bulletin des Seien. Milit. tom^frp. 65. ]
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The organic law of the military constitution of the Ger- ’ manic confederation, adopted on the 9th April 1821, in the fifteenth full sitting of the diet, and forming the basis on which the federal army has been organized, is exceedingly ’complex, and altogether unsusceptible of analysis within die space which the limits of this article afford. Its leading provisions, however, may be shortly stated, and are as follow :—The army of the confederation is composed of the contingents of all the states members thereof, raised according to the formation of their particular matricule or computation in the diet. The proportion of the different arms is regulated conformably to the principles of the new tactics. The federal army is formed of corps d’armée of a single nation or of combined corps, and both are subdivided into divisions, brigades, and regiments. No state of the confederation, whose contingent forms one or more corps d’armée, can combine contingents of other states with its own in the same division; and the states which have corps or divisions combined, concert together the manner of forming and organizing them, and in case of dispute the diet decides. In the organization of the federal army regard is had to the interest resulting from the particular relations of different states, in as far as can be done consistently with the general object of the confederation; and as the rights and duties of all the confederate states are the same, it is specially provided that every appearance of supremacy on the part of one state over another is to be avoided. The contingent of each state must always be completely equipped and ready to take the field as soon as it shall be called to do so; but the force and assembling of the army to be raised, as well as of the reserve, are regulated by particular dispositions of the diet. 1. The ordinary contingent of each state is one hundredth part of its population, conformably to a table prepared and rectified from time to time by the diet. 2. The proportion of the cavalry of the federal army is fixed at one seventh of the total of the troops; and two field-pieces are required for every 2000 men of the contingent, besides one for every 1000 of the reserve in arsenal. 3. The federal army consists of 10 corps d’armée, 7 simple and 3 combined, designed in the order of the digits or primary numbers; and every corps has at least 2 divisions, each division at least 2 brigades, each brigade at least 2 regiments, each regiment of infantry at least 2 battalions of 800 men each, and each regiment of cavalry at least 4 squadrons of 140 men each. The minimum of a contingent of cavalry is 300 horse, of infantry 400 men, and of artillery a battery of six or eight pieces. 4. As the contingent of each state must be ready to take the field in a month after it is called upon, all the materiel of armament and provisions necessary for the contingent must be deposited in the arsenals of each state, and all the contingents of the army must be kept up to their full complement even in time of peace. 5. The generalissimo of die confederation is chosen by the diet in ordinary assembly, and his functions cease when the federal army is dissolved. 6. The commanders of the corps of every nation or state have the rights which the sovereign whose troops they command may think proper to confer upon them, without deviating from the principles upon which the military constitution is founded. There is a great number of other dispositions and regulations, touching a variety of matters; but those above specified are the principal, and may serve to convey an idea of the military constitution of this great confederacy, organized in imitation of that which, while it seemed to strengthen the hands of Napoleon, proved eventually, by the defection of its members, one of the chief causes of accelerating his fall.^[104. Bulletin des Sciences Milit. tom. ii. p. 45. ti^prganique de la Constitution Militaire de-la Confederation Germanique, 1821. ]

The military power of the United Provinces dates its commencement from the middle of the fifteenth century, when, after a long and sanguinary struggle, they succeeded in emancipating themselves from the yoke of Spain; and, in the following century it received considerable development in consequence of the wars which they had to maintain against Louis XIV. In 1702 they had in their pay upwards of 100,000 men, exclusive of 30,000 who were in the service of the Dutch East India Company. But this period may be regarded as the highest condition of the army of Holland, which subsequently declined both in number and reputation; so that in 1775 it did not exceed 30,000 men, fully one third of whom were foreigners. In 1789, Holland, with a population of 2,340,000 souls, inhabiting a country of 625 square miles, supported an army of 36,000 men, consisting of40 regiments of infan try and 10 of cavalry; and with this force it joined the first coalition against the French republic. In 1792 the Dutch army had been increased to 39,000 infantry, 3450 cavalry, 1560 artillery, and 260 miners and pontoneers; making a total of 44,270 combatants. But in the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 they afforded the Prince of Orange occasion for displaying considerable military talents, put his army to a decisive test, and impressed all with a conviction that its degeneracy in moral force was equalled only by the radical defects of its organization. The conquest of Holland by the French, however, was followed, in 1795, by the reorganization of the army on new bases; and so great was the effect of the changes thus introduced, that the Batavian troops, led by Dumonceau and Daendels, rivalled the French, by whose side they fought, both in discipline and valour, and at Alkmaër, on the Rednitz, and on the Danube, bravely upheld the ancient reputation of the Dutch arms. At the peace of 1815, Belgium having been united to Holland in order to form a constitutional monarchy, and England having restored the greater part of the Dutch colonies which had fallen into its hands during the republican and imperial regime, the new kingdom of the Netherlands at once, and as it were per saltum, took its place among states of the second order, with a continental superficies of 1165 square miles, and a population of 6,166,854; and lost no time in organizing a military system suited to its position and rank among the nations of Europe. This system rests on a permanent army of about 50,000 men on the footing of peace, and 82,000 on that of war; with an eventual army of national guards estimated at 40,000 during peace, and 124,000 on a war establishment. The kingdom is divided into 6 great and 17 provincial commands, 6 directions of artillery and engineers, and 50 cantons for the levy of the militia and the organization of the national guard. The great commands are confided to lieutenant-generals, the provincial commands to major-generals, the directions of artillery and engineers to general officers, and the militia cantons to old officers of a superior grade. The infantry consists of 18 divisions of 4 battalions from 3 to 6 companies each, with a depot company; the cavalry, of 9 regiments 4 squadrons each, of which 4 are cuirassiers, 2 light dragoons, 2 hussars, and 1 lancers; the artillery, of 10 battalions, 4 of the line and 6 of the militia, each of 6 companies, a corps of light artillery, and a battalion of the train; and the engineers, of a battalion of miners, sappers, and pontoneers. There is also included in the army a colonial depot, to which are attached 2 correctional divisions, 5 garrison companies one of them artillery, and 9 companies of maréchaussée, stationed in the southern provinces of the kingdom. The army of the Netherlands is recruited exclusively from the natives of the country, first, by voluntary enrolments; [7:3:612]secondly, by engagements and re-engagements for two, four, and six years, with a bounty; thirdly, by calling out the whole or part of the militia; and, lastly, by the rccal of men absent on leave, or by having recourse to the reserve. The militia is composed of youth between the ages of 19 and 23, and draughts are made every year in the month of March, in the presence of the commissaries of militia and the local authorities. Advancement is principally regulated by seniority; but every soldier distinguished for intelligence and good conduct may aspire to the rank of officer. The army of the Netherlands has still a character to make for itself. As a national force it has never as yet been put to the test. But it has been organized with great care, and unless political dissensions interfere to destroy its morale, there can be little doubt that it will conduct itself respectably when called to serve in the field. The Belgian troops, it is true, behaved ill at Waterloo; but they were evidently disaffected to the cause for which they were called to fight.^[105. Notice sur l’ Armée Néerlandaise: Extrait d’un ouvrage inédit de MM. Urbain et Geehender, capitaines Néerlandais. Bulletin de Sciences Milit. tom. viii. p. 1, 81. The above account of the Netherlands army was written before the revolutionary convulsions in Belgium had effected the separation of that country from Holland; but we allow it to remain unaltered, because, finding it impossible to tell what now is, we have judged it best to leave the reader to infer what may be from that which has recently been, and to form an estimate for himself of the military force of each of these countries separately, from that which was either organized or capable of being brought into the field under their federative union. ]

The kingdom of Sardinia, containing a superficies of . 1363 square miles, and a population of 4,334,000 souls,^[106. On the continent Sardinia has only 918 square miles of territory, and 3,839,000 souls. The terra firma of this kingdom, situated between Switzerland, France, and Italy, forms, on the side of the last-mentioned country, a great basin, which the principal chain of the Alps separates from Savoy, the department of the Isère, and the county of Nice. It may be considered a vast entrenched camp, having, on the side of France, Savoy and the county of Nice as advanced posts. In fact, these transalpine provinces have a free communication with each other only by the plain of Piedmont, where the debouches from Savoy are by the Great and Little St Bernard, and from thθ county of Nice by the Col di Tende and the route of La Corniche. This position, which constitutes the king of Sardinia the natural guardian, or porter of the Alps, as he has been called, causes his alliance to be eagerly sought for both by France and by Austria, particularly the latter, who, conscious that her hold of Italy is by no means firm, has an interest in raising up every obstacle to prevent h rance, in the event of a war, from attacking her on her weakest side. ] supports an army of about 31,000 men on its peace establishment, and 62,000 during war, exclusive of militia. The permanent army consists of the household troops, the royal guard, the troops of the line, and the carabineers. The household troops consist of four companies of horseguards, called the Savoyard, the Piedmontese, the Sardinian, and the Genoese. The royal guard is composed of a brigade of grenadiers, and a regiment of chasseurs a pied, of the same composition and force as a regiment of the line. The infantry of the line consists of 9 brigades of 2 battalions each in time of peace, and 4 during war; the cavalry, of one regiment of dragoons, two of light horse, and one of the line, each consisting of 8 squadrons or 4 divisions. The carabineers amount to 3100 men, including officers and 100 élèves, and form a sort of nursery for the army. Since the 3d January 1823, the corps of artillery has consisted of 4 battalions, of which 2 are of the line, 1 light artillery, and 1 partly garrison artillery and partly artillery of the train. The royal corps of engineers is composed of a supreme council, a staff, a company of miners, and some sappers. At the beginning of the French revolution, the Sardinian army amounted to 30,000 infantry, 3600 cavalry, and upwards of 2000 artillery and engineers. In the year 1815, its total force, exclusive of the royal guard, was not less than 70,000 men. “La Piémontais,” says Jomini, “est un excellent soldat; la service des regimens provinciaux a familiarise toute la nation avec les armes; la peuple, comme la plupart des habitans des montagnes, est frugal, endurci à la fatigue, et brave.”^[107. Guerres de la Révolution, tom. i. p. 244. ] But the cavalry is much inferior to the infantry; for the horses are bad, and the men ill adapted by habit and character to this branch of the service.^[108. Etat Militaire de la Sardaigne depuis la Restauration en 1814. Paris, 1824. Zeitsćhr. für Kunst, Wiss. und Gesch. des Krieges, No. ð, o. 197· Bulletin des Seien. Milit. tom. ii. p. 1 and tom. viii. p. 297. ] —The Neapolitan army is scarcely deserving of notice, either in a political or military point of view; for, next to the soldiers of his Holiness the Pope, those of Naples are beyond all dispute the worst in Europe. In 1792 the Neapolitan army amounted to 30,000 troops of the line, as they were called, and 15,000 militia; a force which was increased, in 1799, to 60,000 men of all arms; 40,000 of whom invaded the Roman states during the campaign of that year, and conducted themselves rather like banditti than a regular army. Formidable only to its allies, and to the country which it serves to retain in abject servitude, this army has since experienced the most violent mutations; but its number at present may be estimated at from 35,000 to 40,000 men of all arms.

At the period when the Ottomans first became formidable to Europe, they may be said to have composed one immense army. Every Osmanlee was a soldier, and from the age of sixteen to sixty held himself at the disposal of the state; whilst all were animated with a martial fanaticism, which in fact constituted the main sinew of their strength. They were brave, ardent, enterprising; and if their services in the common cause (which they could not withhold as long as they were able to bear arms) remained unpaid, they were not unrequited. A third of the conquered land was distributed amongst them, and held on the tenure of military service; the peasantry cultivated the fields thus ceded to the soldiery, and paid the rents to their military landlords; and the holders of the ziarnets and timars, or greater and lesser grants, received from the fund of conquest rewards proportioned to their services. But this system, although it placed a large numerical force at the disposal of the chief, was nevertheless attended with serious inconveniences. It created a sort of feudal militia, but was incompatible with the existence of a permanent force; it supplied means for a short expedition or campaign, but a continued series of operations was constantly liable to be paralyzed by the soldiers returning to their homes while these were still in progress. To obviate this evil, it was resolved to raise a body of mercenaries, whose services should be at all times available. Accordingly, sultan Amurath, at the suggestion of his vizier, claimed as his right the fifth part of the Christian youth captured in Bulgaria, Albania, Servia, and Bosnia; who, being instructed in the law of the prophet, and inured to arms, formed a body of soldiers totally distinct from those liable to serve in virtue of their military holdings, and unconnected with the rest of the empire by the ties either of birth or of kindred. Such was the origin of the janissaries. Organized into a regular force, at a time when the armies of Christian powers consisted of a disorderly militia, and uniting courage and enthusiasm with a species of discipline, and a blind obedience to the will of their commanders, this powerful body swept all before them, and spread far and wide the terror of the Ottoman arms. Nor did the splendour [7:3:613] of their achievements suffer any eclipse as long as Christian captives could be obtained to fill the vacancies in their ranks. But when the janissaries ceased to form a class distinct from the great mass of the nation; when they were allowed to marry and enrol their children; and when the odas or regiments became encumbered with men who preferred inglorious ease in the bosom of their families to the toilsand dangers of the battle-field; they at the same time ceased to be formidable to their enemies, and, like the praetorian cohorts of ancient Rome, were dreaded only by their emperors. They could raise an insurrection in the capital, demand the head of an obnoxious vizier, and depose or murder an unpopular sultan; but “the yellow-haired Giaours” had learned to despise them in the field; and, in their degeneracy, they seemed destined to accelerate the ruin of that empire which, in their better days, they had contributed so largely to extend and consolidate.

On this class of men, however, did the Porte, until recently, depend in a great measure for defence against her enemies; and although their inefficiency was daily becoming more apparent, and reform more necessary, every attempt to effect a change of system, and regenerate these Osmanlee praetorians, had proved either abortive or disastrous. In vain did Selim try to remodel them, and restore discipline. The attempt cost him his life. In vain did Mahmoud, on his accession, manifest an intention to enforce the regulations of Suleiman the Magnificent. An insurrection was the consequence. During three days the streets of the capital ran with blood; and the sultan, in order to save his own life, was obliged to command the execution of his brother. But Mahmoud was not of a disposition to be daunted by this failure, although it induced him to change his mode of proceeding. He now saw that nothing less than the complete destruction of the janissaries would enable him to improve the condition of his empire, by carrying through the reforms which he already meditated; and he waited patiently until he could strike the blow with a certainty of success. In 1826, the janissaries, who perceived the storm gathering, again mutinied. But it was now too late. They found the sultan prepared for them; and, in raising the cry of insurrection, they only gave the signal for their own destruction. The artillery-men and other troops, faithful to Mahmoud, surrounded them in the Etmeidan: they attempted to defend themselves, but without success: 20,000 perished in the conflict; and the janissaries as a body were from that moment annihilated. This achievement, though accomplished at a terrible sacrifice of life, was in reality an act of humanity as well as of sound policy; and, viewed in its proper light, it reflects equal honour on the wisdom and firmness of the sultan, who planned so judiciously and executed so vigorously a measure full of peril in itself, yet absolutely indispensable as a preliminary step to improvement of any kind.

The suppression of the corps of janissaries having left Mahmoud at liberty to remodel his army conformably to the principles of European science and tactics, he hastened to supply the void occasioned by the destruction of the force to which the country had hitherto trusted for its defence; and orders were immediately issued directing the enrolment of a certain number of men in every province of the empire, excepting Albania, Bosnia, and the African states. But the sultan experienced greater difficulty in raising new troops than he had probably anticipated; for, although the law which places the services of every Moslemin at the disposal of the sultan existed in full force, it applied only to a state of war; and on no previous occasion had such a system of enrolment been resorted to during time of peace; a circumstance which rendered it exceedingly obnoxious to the populace. Another obstacle to the speedy reconstruction of the army consisted in the necessity of excluding from the new corps all persons suspected of what may be called janissarism; and as it had been customary for every Moslemin, on attaining the age of manhood, to inscribe his name in some oda or regiment of janissaries, the only method by which Mahmoud could hope to secure his troops from the contamination of that proscribed sect was by enrolling none but boys in his army. But the adoption of such a plan necessarily created a proportionate difficulty in filling the ranks; while, to add to the embarrassments of the Ottoman reformer, the new system had scarcely been twelve months in operation when Russia declared war against the Porte. That this was a politic proceeding on the part of the Muscovite government, no one can doubt. Mahmoud was caught in the very act of transition from a bad system to a better one; the regiments of the Ottoman army were still incomplete; and the unpopularity of the contest, with a dread of the Russian arms, acted as an additional check to enlistment, and thus aggravated the evils with which the sultan had to contend. The new troops were, however, brought into action. They were as yet too ignorant of the advantages of discipline to benefit by the instructions they had received; their manoeuvres served but to confuse them; the officers were superior to the men only in name, and the generals were equally destitute of talent; the interior organization of the army was lamentably defective; and the troops had but little confidence either in their officers or in themselves. Ye∙, with all these disadvantages, the first campaign terminated favourably for the Turks; and it cannot reasonably be doubted that the second one (that of 1829), would have had a similar result, if the Osmanlees had been commanded by a man possessed even of ordinary military talents and enterprise. The grand vizier was unquestionably a brave man; and, unlike Yusuff Pasha, he was faithful as well as brave. But, with 40,000 regular troops, superior to any that the Porte had ever sent into the field, he allowed himself to be surprised at Kiulewtscha or Kuleftscha, and, having lost more than the half of his force, was compelled to retire to Shumla with the remainder. The succeeding events of the campaign were the natural corollaries of this disastrous battle: But without dwelling upon these, which are foreign to the objects of the present article, we shall proceed to give some account of the Ottoman army as it is at present constituted.^[109. Trant’s Narrative of a Journey through Greece in 1830, p. 364, et seqq. We take this opportunity of acknowledging our obligations to Captain Trant’s work for a very considerable portion of the details respecting Sultan Mahmoud’s military reforms, as well as the present condition and strength of the Ottoman army. There are many points, in regard to which it could have been wished that Captain Trant had been somewhat more specific; but on a subject where exact information was not easily attainable, military men ought to be grateful for what this respectable officer has been able to collect concerning it. ]

The Ottoman army is composed of regular and irregular infantry and cavalry, a corps of artillery, and a regiment of bombardiers or miners. The Assahiri Mansnrei Mohamediyes, ^[110. Literally, “victorious troops of Mohammed.” ] or regular infantry, are said to amount to 50,000 men, of whom 10,000 compose the imperial guard, quartered in and around Constantinople. They are recruited from the mass of the people without distinction; and although Mahmoud did not oblige the children of his nobility to enter into the service, yet, at the beginning of the late war, many enlisted voluntarily, and even some of the Ulemas, or expounders of the law, forsook their peaceful profession and enrolled themselves. The black and white [7:3:614]subjects of the sultan are alike received as soldiers; and, in a single regiment, may be seen every shade of “the human face divine,” from the jet-black complexion of the Ethiopian or Nubian to the white-visaged inhabitant of Rumelia. ^[111. “Ah !” said a janissary to Captain Trant, while observing a bddy of troops marching past, “what kind of soldiers are these? You see every race and every colour on earth amongst them!” Granted; but martial qualities are not necessarily connected with colour; and discipline, if rigorously enforced, will in time mould even these variegated elements into a fine and formidable army. ] 1 Once enrolled, a soldier is obliged to serve for life; but it frequently happens that discharges are granted. The regular troops are organized on the model of the French army, and are divided into corps d’armĕe, divisions, brigades, and regiments. The corps d’ armée is commanded by a seraskier, the division by a pasha of three tails, the brigade by a pasha of two tails, the regiment by a miri-alaÿ or colonel, and the battalion by a bimbashee or chef de bataillon. A regiment consists of a regimental staff (including the miri-alaÿ or colonel, the caimacan miri-alaÿ or lieutenant-colonel, and the alaÿ-eminy or major) and three battalions, each composed of one bimbashee or chef de bataillon, one sagh-col-aghassy or adjutant-major, one sol-col-aghassy or adjutant, 8 yuzbashees or captains, 16 mulazims or lieutenants, 32 tchiaoucłies or Serjeants, 48 on-bashees or corporals, and 720 men; making a total of 2484 officers and soldiers, exclusive of a drum-major, an imaum or chaplain, and a kiatip or clerk. The inveterate prejudices of the Moslemins against the employment of European officers in the service have prevented Mahmoud from placing any foreigners in command of his troops; and these have hitherto been disciplined, partly by officers who had served under Selim in the Nizam Djedid, partly by persons sent from the Egyptian army. The only footing on which the Turks will consent to tolerate an European officer is as an instructor; and in this capacity Signor Calosso, a ci-devant captain of dragoons in the Italian army of prince Eugene Beauharnois, has been employed by the sultan to superintend the discipline of his cavalry. But the infantry have not been equally fortunate, and are consequently labouring under very great disadvantages. The officers, taken from the same class of society with the common soldiers, differ from them in nothing but rank and name: in the Turkish army there is no one to look up to, no natural aristocracy created by superiority of condition and of knowledge: the same ignorance and the same prejudices pervade all ranks: and, having the benefit neither of examples nor of models, their progress in discipline has been necessarily slow. The Turks seem to think that performing the manual and platoon exercises with tolerable precision, marching in companies instead of independently, and wearing a peculiar uniform, is sufficient to class them with disciplined troops. But, in their anxiety to attain the end desired, they have overlooked some of the most essential means. The soldier, for example, is placed in the ranks before he knows how to march; and provided he goes through the manual and platoon exercises, it matters not whether his carriage be steady or the reverse. When in the ranks, the men talk and laugh without restraint, and even address themselves to their officers; whilst the latter, instead of checking, encourage these improprieties, by joining in or retorting the rude ribaldry of the troops. Field-officers are indeed treated with the most obsequious respect by their inferiors; but the line which has been drawn betwixt the privates and subaltern officers is by no means sufficiently distinct; and it is easy to perceive throughout, that the hand of a master is wanting to combine all the elements of discipline, which are now but imperfectly understood, and to impress upon the higher ranks the necessity of studying their profession, in order to qualify them for discharging the duties of command, as well as to ensure the respect and obedience of the troops.

The Turkish cavalry had so long been celebrated for its gallantry and enterprise, that the policy of remodelling it seems exceedingly questionable. This, however, has been attempted, though, as it appears, with very indifferent success. Four squadrons of dragoons are attached to the guard, and compose the only regular cavalry in the empire. These are mounted and equipped in the European fashion; but the horses are small in size, ill-conditioned, and badly groomed;^[112. This may seem singular, considering the ideas generally entertained of Turkish horses: but, in the first place, these are very much exaggerated; and, secondly, the government were obliged to purchase horses wherever they could be found—in Asia, 1tumelia, and Wallachia. The best horses belong to the irregular cavalry. ] and the men find so great difficulty in accommodating themselves to the European method of riding with long stirrups, that their seat is loose and ungraceful, and they are not unsrequently thrown from their saddles, to their own infinite mortification. The scimitar, so effective in the hand of a Turk when mounted in the fashion of his country, has also been exchanged for the French light dragoon sabre; a weapon so differently balanced from that which the Osmanlees have long been accustomed to handle, that they are not likely soon to acquire much dexterity in the use of it. These changes, in fact, seem the very wantonness of innovation; for whilst they have destroyed all that is national or characteristic in this description of force, they have substituted nothing effective in its stead; and Mahmoud will probably find to his cost that he has sacrificed a superb light cavalry for wretched dragoons. His policy should have been, to leave to the Turks their national horsemanship and their national weapons, and to direct his attention exclusively to field tactics and manoeuvres, in order to give unity and effect to those daring charges which they are so admirably fitted to execute effectively in their own way. Without firmness in their saddles or confidence in their weapons, the new troops may make a tolerable appearance on parade; but if sent into the field, they will, in all probability, be found unable to contend with the worst description of horse to which they may be opposed.

The artillery is of two kinds, viz. foot and horse. The topejees or foot artillery are said to be at present 6500 strong; and although their new organization has not taken place, it is understood to be the intention of the sultan to form them as soon as possible into regiments. The horseartillery, though in a very inefficient state compared with ours, has made considerable progress in discipline. It is divided into two regiments of four troops each; and every troop consists of one captain, three subalterns, 180 men, 180 horse, and 10 guns; thus making the total effective strength of a regiment 786 men, 720 horses, and 40 guns, which are commonly nine-pounders and five-and-a-half-inch howitzers. The officers are supplied with horses by the government; and the forage allowed to each horse is nine pounds of barley and twelve pounds of chopped straw per diem. The corps of bombardiers and miners amounts to about 2000 men; but they are still quite undisciplined, and as ignorant of the scientific as they are negligent of the practical part of their profession; their gun carriages, platforms, and ammunition waggons, being in a shameful state, and totally unfit for service. The education of artillery officers has hitherto been entirely neglected; but a college has recently been established for their instruction in the theory and practice of gunnery.

The irregular army may be said to comprise the whole [7:3:615]Mahommedan population of the Ottoman empire; since, as already stated, every Moslemin, if required, is obliged to join the army during time of war. The irregular cavalry is raised by the Znaims andTimariots, who hold feudal grants from the Porte on tenure of military service. The irregular infantry is assembled by the pashas and inferior officers in the provinces. Sixty years ago, the irregular cavalry constituted by far the most formidable and effective force belonging to Turkey; but the country whence it was derived having been wrested from the Porte by Catherine II., her enemies now use it with great effect against her.^[113. During the last campaign the Turks had generally bad information, frequently none at all, respecting the movements of the Russians; whilst clouds of Cossacks scoured the country in every direction, cut off the Ottoman οdαvrewrs, explored all the routes and even bye-paths, and conveyed to head-quarters prompt intelligence of the slightest movement on the part of the enemy. ĭt was this entire command of the communications which gave Diebitsch so great a superiority during the latter part of the campaign, and enabled him to surprise the vizier at Kiulewtscha, to mask the celebrated march by which he turned the barrier of the Haemus, and to acquire for himself the well-merited distinction of Zabalkansky, or Passer of the Balkan. The troops sent to intercept him in the mountain gorges arrived too late, and Zabalkansky was thus enabled, with a handful of troops, to dictate peace in the ancient capital of the empire. ] The Khans of the Crimea were most useful tributaries of the Porte, and were at all times ready to take the field with from 40,000 to 50,000 horse of the very best description, considered as irregular troops. Brave, hardy, accustomed to support fatigue and privation, inured to riding from their infancy, and obedient to their leaders, the Crim Tartars formed the main strength of the Turkish armies; and, superior to the Timariots, who had become enervated by peaceful habits, were prepared for all kinds of service, nay even to encounter the best regular cavalry that could be brought against them. The loss of the Crimea, therefore, and of the enterprising troops it supplied, inflicted a severe, if not an irreparable, injury on the military resources of Turkey. The irregular cavalry.is now principally drawn from the Asiatic provinces; but as the Mahommedan population has much decreased, this force is consequently less numerous than formerly. The irregular infantry, called Seimens, is furnished by the pashas, ayans, mous-selims, and voivodes; and, during the last war, some regiments so raised received pay from the Porte. The men were drawn from Rumelia and Asia; and it is not a little remarkable, that of those who distinguished themselves most in the field, the majority had belonged to the proscribed corps of janissaries, many of whom are still to be met with in all parts of the empire, notwithstanding the severe measures adopted for their extermination. The spirit of janissarism, indeed, is still latent in a large portion of the population. The sultan has scotched the snake, not killed it; and the utmost vigilance will be necessary on his part to prevent its resuscitation.

The military establishments of Turkey have yet, in a great measure, to be created; but the sultan is indefatigable in urging on improvement to the utmost extent of his crippled means. The only founderies for casting cannon are in Constantinople. They are three in number: one of two furnaces, attached to the military arsenal at Tophana; another, also of two furnaces, near the naval arsenal; and a third of one furnace at Hassquiou, the bombardier barracks. In one of these establishments sufficient metal can be melted to cast from five to seven guns at a time; but in all, the tools are of the coarsest description, and every thing is effected by manual labour, without the aid of machinery. The workmen are Turks and Armenians. The military arsenal at Toph ana contains a large stock of artillery of various calibres, and some of extraordinary length.^[114. Near the seraglio are several enormous guns carrying stone balls like those fired at our fleet when passing the Dardanelles in 1808. But cannon of this description can only be discharged with effect when the object passes their line of fire, as they are not mounted upon carriages, but built in a wall. Some of the guns at the Dardanelles carry balls twenty-six inches and a half in diameter. ] The field-pieces are in tolerable order, but the guns have neither sights nor scales. -A manufactory of muskets has existed for some years; but although as many as 120 can be made daily, the supply is found insufficient, and the troops are mostly armed with French muskets purchased at Marseilles. There are eight handsome barracks in and near Constantinople, viz. Daoud Pasha, Ramah Chiflic, the Seraskiers, Tophana, Scutari, Hassquiou, and the two Pera barracks, which have been erected either by Selim or Mahmoud, and are said to be capable of containing 72,000 men, although this is most probably an exaggeration. They are by far the most splendid edifices in Constantinople, and are considered equal to any structures of the kind in Europe. Schools or colleges of medicine, of the marine, of music, and of military instruction, have been recently established at Constantinople. The medical school contains about 100 students, and the number will probably be soon increased, as each regiment is to have both a physician and surgeon attached to it.^[115. There was nothing in Turkey which stood more in need of reform than the healing or rather the killing art. With all their predestinarian prejudices, the Osmanlees place unbounded faith in the skill and knowledge of physicians; and although they have been at all times ready to acknowledge the superiority of Europeans in the science of medicine, they have nevertheless for the most part been obliged to intrust the welfare of their bodies to empirical adventurers, whose knowledge had been acquired much in the same manner as that of the learned hakim Yacoob, so admirably described in “Anastasius.” Mahmoud’s medical school, if it prosper, may in time have the effect of putting down those pernicious quacks. ] Between three and four hundred young men are instructed at the military school, which is under the superintendence of the chief bombardier, in mathematics and the principles of fortification and gunnery; and some few French works upon military subjects have been translated into Turkish for the benefit of the students. Sultan Mahmoud has also established a kind of commissariat department, under the control of the Asker Nazirÿ, or superintendent of the troops; but the establishment is yet in its infancy, and the arrangements are very imperfect. Greater progress has, however, been made in reforming the pay department, in which enormous abuses formerly prevailed; the troops and the sultan having been alike plundered by the knaves intrusted with this important branch of the public service. But since the management of the finance, commissariat, and general organization of the army has been vested in the Asker Nazirÿ, conjointly with the seraskier and other high official persons, matters have been placed on a much better footing, and the soldiers have now little to complain of. The new military code has been modelled upon that issued by Sultan Suleiman, when he reformed the corps of janissaries, and restored their ancient discipline; and although it is still in many respects imperfect and defective, it seems, upon the whole, calculated to ameliorate the moral condition of the Ottoman soldier.

The reforms effected by Sultan Mahmoud in the military organization of the Turks rendered it expedient for the Greeks to attempt to form regular corps, in order to keep on a level with their enemy in point of discipline and tactics. Accordingly, on the 27th February 1827, the president ordered a military force to be organized in regiments (chiliarchies) of two battalions (pentacosiarchies), divided into five companies (hecatoncharchies) each; a regiment to consist[7:3:616] of a colonel Çchiliarclt), two chefs de bataillon {penta- ' cosiarchs), 10 captains (hecatontarclis), 20 lieutenants (pen-tacontarchs), 40 sub-lieutenants Çeikosi-pentarchs), 80 serjeants Çdodecarchs), 160 corporals Çpentarchs), and 800 soldiers; in all 1122 men. Another decree of the 17th October ordains the formation of a battalion of artillery of six companies, with a suitable cortege of officers; and embodies in it a sort of provisional code of military law. But little or no progress has as yet been made in the organization of a standing force; for the battle of Navarin and the war between Russia and Turkey removed the immediate stimulus of fear, which alone can make the Greeks carry through any thing; whilst the favourable turn which affairs have since taken, and the certain establishment of Greek independence, have rendered the measure in some degree unnecessary. We may add, that the decrees are drawn up in a very crude manner, and make no mention whatsoever of the number of chiliarchies or regiments which it was intended to raise.^[116. Abeille Greque, 18th September 1828. ]

The American armies require only a very cursory notice. That of the United States, exclusive of militia, does not amount to 10,000 men. It consists of seven regiments of infantry, four of artillery, some engineers, and a sort of general staff; and it is formed into three divisions, each under the command of a general officer. That called the eastern, under the orders of major-general Gaines, is composed of 53 companies, consisting of 233 officers, and 2662 non-commissioned officers and privates. The western division, commanded by Brigadier-General Atkinson, is also composed of 53 companies, amounting in all to 2463 men, including 178 officers. The third division, which has no relative territorial denomination, consists solely of recruits enlisted for the regular service in different parts of the union, and does not exceed 2500 men. The republicans of the west have a great aversion to a standing army, and only maintain a sort of skeleton, to be filled up, in case of need, from the militia force. The troops of the United States excel in bush-fighting; but they have neither organization nor discipline, and on any other soil than their own would be any thing but formidable.^[117. Documents accompanying the President’s Message to Congress at the commencement of the first Session of the 19th Congress-Washington, 1825. General Report on the Army of the United States, extracted from documents communicated to Congress, Niles’ Register, January 1830. ] —The Mexican army is considerable. A few years ago it consisted of 3 brigades of artillery, 12 battalions of infantry, 13 regiments of cavalry, 31 garrison companies, and 12 fixed companies of infantry and cavalry; making a total of 22,750 men: besides a militia of 42,017 men, of whom 21,577 were in active service. At the period referred to, therefore, the whole armed force of Mexicoamounted to 64,697 men, of whom 44,327 were then in active service. Menaced with invasion by the mother country, and torn by contending factions, this new state cannot at present have fewer men under arms than at the time when the returns were made from which this brief notice has been drawn up.^[118. Memoria del Secretario de Estadο y del Despachο de la Guerra. Mexico 1826. Bulletin des Sciences Milit. tom. iii. p. 386. ] —The black army of Hayti consists of the president’s guard, with the infantry and artillery of the line. The guard, which ranks at the head of the army, consists of two regiments of infantry, one grenadiers and the other chasseurs, and three regiments of cavalry, one of carabineers, one of grenadiers, and one of chasseurs. There are 33 regiments of infantry of two battalions each, and every battalion has six companies, viz. one of grenadiers 80 strong, one of chasseurs 50, and four of fusileers 44 men each. Attached to this infantry, and distinct from the guard, are two regiments of dragoons of two squadrons, divided into two companies of 70 men each. The artillery consists of' five regiments of two battalions, divided into nine companies of 50 men each, including officers. There is also an engineer corps, with 26 companies of 50 men each of artificers and pioneers. The whole of the Haytian force, therefore, including the staff and the president’s guard, amounts to about 26,000 or 27,000 men.^[119. Almanach National pour 1827. Bulletin des Seien. Milit. tom. v. p. 473. ] —We are not in possession of any accurate details respecting the composition and force of the various South American armies. The Brazilian is estimated at from 35,000 to 40,000 men, including militia; the Colombian or Venezuelan åt from 15,000 to 20,000; the Peruvian at 20,000; and the Chilian at from 10,000 to 12,000 men of all arms. But these numbers are in a great measure conjectural. The military force of the Argentine republic is probably not greater than that of Chili or Venezuela; while that of Paraguay amounts to about 5000 regulars and 20,000 militia.^[120. Essai Historique sur la Révolution du Paraguay, par MM. Rengger et Lonchamp. Paris, 1827. ]

From time immemorial the inhabitants of the British Islands have been distinguished for a determined bravery, united with a degree of physical power, which belongs to the people of no other nation; and hence, as soldiers, they have never yet, when properly commanded, found their match in the field of battle. “L’Angleterre,” says Count Turpin, in his commentaries on Montecuculi’s Mémoires, “est elle peut-être la nation où la bravoure se soutient depuis le plus long temps.” “Our nation,” observes Dr Johnson, “may boast, beyond any other people in the world, of a kind of epidemic bravery, diffused equally through all its ranks; we can show a peasantry of heroes, and fill our armies with clowns whose courage may vie with that of the general.” The valour of a Briton is innate. It is a national instinct, co-existent with and inseparable from the man himself, and requiring no artificial excitement to bring it into action; and it is as powerful at the present moment as it was in the chivalrous days of Cressy, Poictiers, and Agincourt. Hence, although the fortune of our arms may have varied, the character of the soldier has always remained the same; and at Waterloo as at Blenheim, and Ramifies, and Malplaquet, he established his superiority in all those high military qualities which render a nation invincible. But, from various causes, the reputation of the British army, which the campaigns of Marlborough had raised to the highest pitch, and which the various actions of the Seven Years War had gloriously sustained, began subsequently to decline; while the disastrous results of American revolutionary war created an opinion, which succeeding events appeared to confirm, of its total unfitness for prosecuting a lengthened series of operations, or contending with any prospect of success against the armies of other nations, particularly those of the Continent. It was conceived to be little better than a body of marines, well qualified to co-operate with the navy in partial expeditions, or in making descents on the seacoasts of any country with which Great Britain happened to be at war, but incapable of maintaining itself in the field, or of engaging in regular campaigns; and, to say the truth, there were not wanting plausible reasons which might be alleged in support of such an opinion. For, as if they had been determined, not merely to countenance this impression, but really to render the army as inefficient and as utterly destitute of consistence and energy [7:3:617]as it was generally believed to be, the British ministry persisted for a series of years in wasting its strength in paltry expeditions, or in effecting partial descents upon this or that country, instead of combining one great effort calculated to influence the general result of the contest. Yet, in 1795, the regular army, including the force under the Duke of York in North Holland, exhibited a total of 119,000 men, besides about 42,000 employed in the colonies, in Corsica, in Gibraltar, and in Portugal; a force which, directed with skill and judgment, might have saved the country from many humiliations, prevented an enormous accumulation of debt, and accelerated the termination of a sanguinary and ruinous contest, from the effects of which the nation is still suffering. The campaign of Egypt, i∏ 1801, showed, it is true, some small degree of energy, and, above all, afforded the army an opportunity of proving its undiminished excellence. But, unfortunately, on the renewal of the war in 1803, the old system was resorted to, and all the prejudices which had previously existed against the army were revived with tenfold force ;— prejudices which outlasted the first successes of the Peninsular campaigns, and which were only at length overcome by an unexampled series of victories, obtained over the ablest generals and the best troops of which France could boast.

“The French army,” says Colonel Napier, “was undoubtedly very formidable from numbers, discipline, skill, and bravery; but, contrary to the general opinion, the British army was inferior to it in none of these points save the first, and in discipline it was superior, because a national army will always bear a sterner code than a mixed force will suffer. With the latter the military, not the moral crimes, can be punished; men will submit to death for a breach of great regulations which they know by experience to be useful, but the constant restraints of petty though unwholesome rules they will escape from by desertion, or resist by mutiny, when the ties of custom and country are removed; for the disgrace of bad conduct attaches not to them, but to the nation under whose colours they serve. Great, indeed, is that genius that can keep men of different nations firm to their colours, and preserve a rigid discipline at the same time. Napoleon’s military system was, from this cause, inferior to the British, which, if it be purely administered, combines the solidity of the Germans with the rapidity of the French, excluding the mechanical dulness of the one, and the dangerous vivacity of the other; yet, before the campaign in the Peninsula had proved its excellence in every branch of war, the English army was absurdly underrated in foreign countries, and absolutely despised in its own. It was reasonable to suppose that it did not possess that facility of moving in large bodies which long practice had given to the French; but the individual soldier was (and is stilD most falsely stigmatised as deficient in intelligence and activity, the officers ridiculed, and the idea that a British could cope with a French army, even for a single campaign, considered chimerical. The English are a people very subject to receive and to cherish false impressions. Proud of their credulity, as if it were a virtue, the majority will adopt any fallacy, and cling to it with a tenacity proportioned to its grossness. Thus an ignorant contempt for the British soldiery had been long entertained before the ill success of the expeditions in 1794 and 1799 appeared to justify the general prejudice. The true cause of those failures was not traced, and the excellent discipline afterwards introduced and perfected by the Duke of York was despised. England, both at home and abroad, was, in 1808, scorned as a military power, when she possessed, without a frontier to swallow up large armies in expensive fortresses, at least two hundred thousand^[121. At the period in question the British army consisted of 30,000 cavalry, 6000 foot-guards, 170,000 infantry of the line, and 14,000 artillery; in all 220,000 men. Of these between 50,000 and 60,000 were employed in the colonies and in India; but the remainder were disposable, because from 80,000 to 100,000 militia, differing from the regular troops in nothing but the name, were sufficient for the home duties. If to this force we add 30,000 marines, the military power of Great Britain, at the time referred to, must have exceeded 400,000 men, exclusive of local militia and volunteers. ] of the best equipped and best disciplined soldiers in the universe, together with an immense recruiting establishment, and, through the medium of the militia, the power of drawing upon the population without limit. It is true, that of this number many were necessarily employed in the defence of the colonies; but enough remained to compose a disposable force greater than that with which Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz, and double that with which he conquered Italy. In all the materials of war, the superior ingenuity and skill of the English mechanics were visible; and that intellectual power that distinguishes Great Britain amongst the nations, in science, arts, and literature, was not wanting to her generals in the hour of danger.”^[122. History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814. By W. F. P. Napier, C. B. Lieutenant-Colonel, H. P., 43d regiment, vol. i. p. 10 and 11. ]

It is almost needless to add how conspicuously this brave and unequalled army disproved the calumnious prognostications of its contemners and revilers; how gloriously it established, in seven campaigns and more than twenty pitched battles, its superiority over the veterans of France, crowned with the laurels of a hundred victories, and accounted invincible till called to contend with the men of our soil. Let us now direct our attention to its composition and organization.

By the constitution of this country the king is the supreme head and captain-general of the army, which can receive no orders except such as emanate from him, and is bound to obey all his orders, unless at variance with the fundamental laws of the land; in which case submission to his authority would be declared rebellion against the constitution of the state, and the nation at large. To him belongs the power of declaring war and concluding peace, of granting subsidies to his allies and indemnities to his enemies: but no treaty is valid or binding unless it be signed by a responsible minister; and without the authority of parliament he cannot touch a sixpence of his subjects’ money for this or any other purpose. Further, it is expressly declared in .the bill of rights, and annually repeated in the preamble to the mutiny-act, which forms the martial law of the British army, “that the raising or keeping a standing army in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of parliament, is against law in other-words, no military force can be raised or maintained in this country, except with the consent of the three estates composing the legislature, by which, in their collective capacity, the sovereign power of the state is exercised. But in regard to the existing army, all measures and all acts deemed necessary for its regulation, direction, and employment, are decided upon by the king in council; and it is the duty of the commander-in-chief of the forces for the time being to direct the execution of such measures or acts, in all those operations which are executed within the united kingdom, as well as to superintend the organization, instruction, and discipline of the troops belonging to the different branches of the service.
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The secretary at war is, by the terms of his commission or appointment, bound to give effect to the orders of the commander-in-chief, issued with the approbation and consent of the sovereign; excepting in as far as these shall appear to be contrary to the rules of the service, or to make any alteration in the expenditure of the army: in which cases it is his duty to make reference to the lords of the treasury, and to act in strict conformity to their instructions. This minister, in fact, who is not a member of the cabinet, is specially charged with the administration of the war department in all its branches. He is the organ of communication between government and the army on the one hand, and between the army and the government on the other; and he acts as a check upon the commander-in-chief, while he is in his turn restrained by his responsibility to parliament, to the country, and to the laws.

The departments exclusively military are those of the adjutant-general, the quarter-master general, the barrackmaster-general, the commissary-general, the paymastergeneral, and the board of ordnance.

The adjutant-general’s department consists of the adjutant-general himself, the deputy-adjutant-general, the assistant-adjutant-general, and the deputy-assistant-adjutant-general, with ten or eleven clerks, three messengers, and a keeper. The adjutant-general belongs to the personal staff of the king, and accompanies his majesty and the commander-in-chief in all their reviews and military inspections. He is named directly by the king, on the recommendation of the commander-in-chief, and has the rank of lieutenant-general, though for the most part only a major-general. The deputy-adjutant-general is also appointed by his majesty; but the secondary offices of the department are filled by persons nominated by the adjutant-general himself. This officer may be considered as the director of the personnel of the British army. Every thing relating to the effective or non-effective state of the troops; to formation, instruction, and discipline; to the direction and inspection of the clothing and accoutrements of the army; to recruitment, leaves of absence, or bounties to soldiers; to the employment of officers of the staff; and to ordinary or extraordinary and official returns relative to these different matters, whether required by his majesty, by the ministry, by the secretary at war, or by parliament; falls within the province of the department over which the adjutant-general presides. He is the regular channel through which commanders of corps communicate with the commander-in-chief; and all orders, special instructions, and general regulations issued by the commander-in-chief, relative to the organization, discipline, or instruction of the army, are prepared, addressed to the commanders of corps, and published by the adjutant-general, conformably to the direction of the commander-in-chief of the forces, acting in the name and on behalf of his majesty. The troops stationed in Scotland, however, instead of communicating directly with the adjutant-general’s office in London, address themselves to the deputyadjutant-general who resides at Edinburgh; and Ireland has an adjutant-general of its own. It is also the duty of the adjutant-general to prepare, weekly, for the commander-in-chief and the king, returns of the troops stationed in Great Britain and Ireland; and, monthly, for the commander-in-chief, the ministers, and the king, a general statement of all the forces both at home and abroad.^[123. Dupin, Force Militaire de la Grande Bretagne, 1. ii. p. 54. ]

The quarter-master-general holds the same rank, and is appointed in the same manner, as the adjutant-general. His principal duties are to prescribe routes and marches, to regulate the embarkation and disembarkation of troops, to provide quarters for them, to mark out ground proper for encampment, to execute military surveys, and to prepare plans and arrange dispositions for the defence of a territory, whether such defence is to be operated by the troops alone or by means of field-works. Every British army on service has a quarter-master-general, with deputies and assistants, who perform functions altogether analogous to those which are discharged in the department of quarter-mastergeneral of the British forces; and it is admitted on all hands that, during the Peninsular campaigns, this branch of service was, under the very able direction of Sir Georθ ’ e Murray, carried to a high degree of perfection. Whenever the army, established for the time in any position whatever, had to move in advance and in a given direction, all the officers of the quarter-master-general’s staff, charged with the reconnaissances, immediately set out and spread themselves over the ground, each individual taking the direction indicated to him, and pushing his reconnaissance to the extent of a day’s march of the army. About five in the afternoon these officers returned to head-quarters; and by combining their different partial sketches, a general plan was prepared, according to which the quarter-master-general and the commander-in-chief traced the routes to be followed, and the positions to be taken up, by the troops who were to march on the morrow. This was the duty of every day while the army was in motion; and no better evidence can be produced of the ability with which it was performed, than the circumstance that, during the whole of the Peninsular campaigns, the army never once took up a position in which it could be assailed by the enemy, however superior in numbers, with the remotest chance of success. Attached to the office of quarter-master-general of the forces is a board of topography, with a depot of maps, plans, and military memoirs, and a library containing the best military works that have been published in different countries.^[124. Ibid. 1. ii. p. 59. ]

The barrack-master-general’s department is a numerous one, consisting of ninety functionaries in London, and eight in Edinburgh, exclusive of barrack-masters, store-keepers, hospital-store-keepers, barrack-sergeants, and clerks. His principal duty is to provide barracks, permanent as well as temporary, for the reception of the troops; to superintend their construction or repair; and, generally, to take care that the troops are properly accommodated, both as to room and otherwise. Subordinate to him, of course, are all the local barrack-masters, whose duty it is to furnish bedding and other necessaries for the troops in their respective barracks. Ever since 1805, Great Britain has had 84 barracks built of stones or bricks, 12 constructed of timber, 75 temporary barracks, and 48 hired for rent, in all 212; which, it is calculated, are sufficient for affording accommodation to 100,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry.

The commissariat department, when complete, consists of a commissary-general, a deputy-commissary-general, an assistant-commissary-general, and a deputy-assistantcommissary-general, with upwards of two hundred subordinate functionaries. The head of the department is the commissary-general, who resides in London, and directs the whole of this branch of the service, whether at home or abroad. Subordinate to the treasury in as far as regards financial matters, he is at the same time under the control and direction of the war-office in reference to military operations. His duties, which have been greatly increased since the report of the special committee of finance in the year 1797, consist in supplying provisions, forage, and camp as well as barrack equipage, to the troops; [7:3:619]in providing the materials of the medical department of the service; and, generally, in directing and superintending all those furnishings which usually enter into the army extraordinaries of the year, of which he prepares a monthly account for the treasury, and an annual return to be laid before parliament. Three months after the close of every year, he also lays before the auditors of public accounts a financial statement of the receipts and disbursements of the preceding year; before the comptrollers of the army, a general view of the receipt, deliverance, and consumption of supplies furnished by his department; and before the lords of the treasury, a detailed account of the various items of expenditure, of the pay and half-pay of persons attached to the commissariat, as well as of the expense of field-works and signals. All the furnishings of provisions, forage, &c. made to the troops stationed in Great Britain arc supplied by army contractors; but, for other articles, the commissariat finds it more advantageous to pass a contract at the moment of need, and for the quantity required, than to enter into any permanent engagement beforehand for the supply of particular articles. The accounts of the contractors, after being compared with the regimental receipts, as certified by the commanders of corps, are then transmitted to the war-office to be again compared, by the superintendent of army accounts, with the effective force and distribution of the different corps, as well as with the regimental returns; and the concordance of these different verifications serves in the first instance as a guarantee to the ministry. The commissary-general has neither the custody nor the delivery of any supplies or materials whatever; nor does he keep any account of disbursements made out of Great Britain.^[125. Dupin, Force Milit. de lα Grande Bretagne, 1. iv. c. iii. p. 149. James’s Military Dictionary, voce Commissary-General. ] Every army in active service has its own commissariat, under the orders of a commissary-general, who is responsible, in the first instance, to the general-in-chief, for the regular supply of the troops under his command. In Portugal and in Spain, the provisioning of the army was effected by all the means to which recourse could be had in countries so poor and exhausted; but the greater part of the necessary supplies was obtained by purchases effected by commissaries stationed at different places or attached to brigades, and paid from funds supplied by the commissary-general of the army, consisting partly in cash, and partly in bills or debentures on the English government. Immense abuses appeared to have prevailed in the commissariat department during the early part of the peninsular campaigns. This is evident from the repeated orders of the day issued by the Duke of Wellington against malversations on the part of subordinates in this department; and not less so from the fact that, notwithstanding all the care and vigilance exercised by his Grace, many of these functionaries managed to realise fortunes.^[126. La trésorerie (says Μ. Dupin) faisait toutes les avances de fonds à l’armée d’Espagne sur les estimations anticipées du commissaire-général, vues et approuvées par le général en chef, et par lui transmises (comme duplicatum) au sécrétaire d’état de la guerre et des colonies. Ensuite le commissariat payait moitié en espèce, moitié en obligations du gouvernement Anglais.” (Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne, prém. part. Force Militaire, p. 153.) From the ignorance of the Spaniards, however, or rather perhaps from their experience of the faithlessness of their own government, these “obligations” or bills became speedily depreciated to the extent of 26 or 30 per cent., and were purchased from the peasantry and farmers at this discount by the commissaries, who, of course, realized an enormous profit on these transactions. At one period of the Peninsular war the depreciation exceeded 50 per cent.; but the avidity of the commissaries to purchase the debentures increased the confidence of the people in their validity, and thus reduced the depreciation to the amount above stated. ]

The paymaster-general is 'the head of the army payoffice, whence the issues for the payment of every description of military service are made. This office consists of the paymaster-general himself, two deputies, an accountant-general, a cashier, book-keepers, clerks, and other subordinates; and there are several deputy-paymasters abroad subordinate to the general department at home. The paymaster-general has no active control over the expenditure of the public money. His duty is merely to make payments ministerially and without discretion, in pursuance of the warrants directed to him by the secretary at war, the treasury, or both, as the case may be; or in honour of the drafts of the deputy-paymasters abroad, for the ordinary services of the army. The pay-office must therefore be looked upon as an office of account merely, and as affecting the public expenditure only in as far as it performs the duties of an office of accounts with regularity and expedition. The materials and documents, which compose a considerable part of the account of the paymastergeneral, originate with persons over whose conduct he exercises no manner of control. Indeed there is a regular succession in preparing them, from the regimental paymaster to the agent, and from the agent to the secretary at war, who finally delivers them at the pay-office. Different classes of accounts and documents are delivered in at certain periods prescribed by the pay-office act. But large balances of the public money are not now, as formerly, allowed to remain in the hands of the paymaster-general, or at his credit in the bank; nor can he derive any profit from the custody of the public money, the balances being confined within the narrowest possible limits. The establishment of a regiment, with the king’s regulations and warrants, is in fact the instrument which regulates the pay of the army, and is consequently the basis of all the documents which enter or go out of the pay-office under that head of the service.^[127. James’s Military Dictionary, voce Pay-office. ] Other details are foreign to the immediate object of this sketch, which is merely to give a brief outline of the constitution and functions of those departments immediately connected with the army.

The ordnance department, which comprehends the artillery and engineers, is administered and commanded by a master-general, assisted by a council or board, composed of the lieutenant-general of the ordnance,^[128. This office it is now proposed to abolish. ] who in the absence of the master-general directs the military part; of the inspector-general, who, with his agents, has the control of the munitions and stores, as well as of the accounts; of the commissary, who has the direction of the accounts both in money and materials, and who prepares every month for the treasury, and every year for parliament, the ordnance estimates; of the principal storekeeper, who is responsible for the existence and conservation of the whole matériel; and of the clerk of deliveries, who has the superintendence of whatever goes out of the magazines. The written orders of the master-general are of course exe-cutary in all the branches of this department; but he commonly intrusts to the board the administration of the materiel anA of the expenditure. Ip case of absence or vacancy, and when the master-general does not of himself exercise any part of his authority, the board in like manner officiates in his stead. The ordnance has a special paymaster or treasurer, who advances the fιmds necessary for the department, on orders or drafts, signed by at least three members of the council. Almost all the officers of the board are at the same time members of the House of Commons.
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The sums voted for the support of this department proceed upon estimates of the ordinary and extraordinary service, and of services unprovided for. The ordinary service comprehends the provision for the ordinary establishment, civil and military, for the year ensuing; the extraordinary includes every service known beforehand, of a temporary and contingent nature, during the currency of the year; and the services unprovided for consist of services which have either been actually paid for in the course of the past year, or which are supposed to have been paid, but which were not foreseen when the estimates of the preceding year were prepared. Among these unforeseen expenses are included various exceedings which may have occurred in the individual services voted in the ordnance estimates of the previous year; to which are commonly added such sums as may be considered necessary to make up the deficiency of the sum allotted to the ordnance for the use of the naval service. So much for the military departments.^[129. Dupin, 1. V. c. 1, p. 175. ] Let us now attend to the composition of the army itself.

The British army consists at present of 8818 cavalry and 95,786 infantry; but of this force 2804 cavalry and 17,312 infantry are employed in the East India Company’s territories; leaving an available force provided for in the estimates of the year 1830 of 6014 cavalry and 78,474 infantry, or 89,284 men of all arms, including officers. This force is divided into cavalry, infantry, artillery, engineers, and some corps immediately connected with the two latter branches of the service, as the royal artificers, the artillery-drivers, and the royal waggon train.^[130. Estimates of Army Services for the year 1830 (Parliamentary paper). ]

The cavalry on home service consists of the first and second regiments of life-guards, and the royal regiment of horse-guards (blue), each of 344 rank and file and 274 horses, with nineteen other regiments of dragoon-guards and dragoons; namely, seven of dragoon-guards, three of dragoons, and nine of light-dragoons, including lancers and hussars, amounting to 5897 rank and file, with 4892 horses; or, including the regiments of life-guards, 6919 rank and file, and 5714 horses. In this enumeration, however, the cavalry serving in India, the waggon-train, and the Cape corps of mounted riflemen, are not included. The first regiment of dragoon-guards consists at present of 407 rank and file, and 307 horses; but the remaining regiments of the cavalry of the line have only 305 rank and file and 253 horses each. The officers and non-commissioned officers of a regiment of life-guards, on its present establishment, amount to 89; of a regiment of the cavalry of the line, to between 60 and 70.^[131. Army Estimates for 1830. ] Thus, supposing the latter to consist of 368 privates, divided into 8 companies or squadrons, such a regiment would have 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 8 captains, 8 lieutenants, 8 cornets, 1 paymaster, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, 1 surgeon, I assistant-surgeon, and 1 veterinary-surgeon, or 35 officers in all; besides 28 sergeants and 8 trumpeters; making a total of 71 officers and non-commissioned officers, and raising the entire strength of the regiment to 439 men. And the same relative proportion obtains, whatever be the footing in point of effective force, on which the regiment is placed.

Since the peace of 1815, various changes have been made in the arms and equipments of our cavalry. In the first place, armour was given to the life-guards, immediately after they had proved its total inefficiency in the field of battle, and torn the laurels of Waterloo from the redoubted cuirassiers of France. That armour must prove a decided impediment to the efficiency of a dragoon on service, is what no one can for a moment doubt. Its enormous weight,^[132. The largest sized cuirass worn by the life-guards weighs 15 pounds; the smallest 12 pounds 6 ounces. A life-guardsman, in marching order, weighs upwards of 25 stone, supposing the man personally to weigh 13 stone! Besides, these cuirasses are as ugly as they are weighty, and give to the really fine men who are compelled to wear them an appearance of being hump-backed . ] the constant cleaning which it requires, the pain which its inflexibility must occasion under fatigue, and the obstacles it opposes to the free and full action of the muscular powers of the human body, greatly detract from its advantages. These, moreover, have been overrated; and we are much mistaken if it will not one day be shown that the life-guards, encumbered with the cuirasses, are immeasurably less formidable than they were when their natural strength, weight, and activity, had full freedom of action allowed them. In the next place, four of our regiments of light horse have been converted into lancers. We agree in opinion with Montecuculi that the lance “est la reine des armes pour la cavalerie ;” and we also think, with Major Beamish, that lancers should constitute the standard cavalry of England. But we do not the less object to the particular kind of lance introduced into our service, and the description of cavalry to whom it has been assigned. No nation possesses such materials as Britain for the formation of redoubtable lancers; no nation has the command of such means of bringing them to perfection: and if solid squares of infantry are ever to be penetrated by cavalry, it must be performed by cavalry armed with the lance. But this will never be achieved by such a weapon as that at present in use. It must be effected by a lance of sufficient length to overcome the infantry bayonet, which, thus opposed, would no longer be formidable; and this lance must be put into the hands of our heavy cavalry, particularly the household troops, which, thus armed, would be able to contend on equal terms with the best infantry in the world, and would un questionably be capable of penetrating its closest formation.

The British infantry on home service is composed of 3 regiments of guards, viz. the 1st or grenadier regiment, the Coldstream regiment, and the 3d regiment, amounting together to 5104 rank and file; of 79 regiments of the line, consisting of 1 battalion each, 740 strong; of one regiment (the 60th foot) and the rifle brigade, two battalions each; of 2 West India regiments, the royal waggon train, 2 companies of the royal staff corps, 3 Newfoundland and 3 royal veteran companies, the African corps, the Ceylon regiment, and the Cape corps of mounted riflemen; making a total of 66,240 men, exclusive of the guards. The regiments of infantry of the line have only one battalion as a constant nucleus. When additional battalions are raised, they are employed separately, and commanded each by a lieutenant-colonel. With regard to the colonelcy of a regiment, it is in a great measure a sinecure. The ordinary staff of a battalion of 800 men, rank and file, consists of 1 lieutenant-colonel, 2 majors, 10 captains, 12 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, 1 paymaster, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, and 1 surgeon with 2 assistants; in all 39 officers. The petty staff is composed of a sergeant-major, a quarter-master sergeant, a paymaster sergeant, an arm sergeant, a schoolmaster sergeant, 10 colour sergeants, 30 sergeants, a drum-major, and 21 drummers; in all 106 men. Hence the total strength of such a battalion would consist of 39 officers, 106 non-commissioned officers, 40 corporals, and 760 soldiers, or 906 men in all.^[133. Army Estimates for 1830. ]

The force at present serving in India consists of 4 regiments of light dragoons, each 701 strong, or 2804 in all; [7:3:621]and 21 battalions of infantry, each 740 strong, or, including supernumeraries and others, 17,312 in all.

The royal artillery forms only one corps, which is absurdly denominated a regiment, since, in time of war, it is increased to more than 24,000 men. The master-general of the ordnance has the title and powers of colonel of the regiment of artillery; the lieutenant-general of the ordnance is lieutenant-colonel; and a general officer, with the title of deputy-adjutant-general, performs the functions of head of the artillery-staff, but is in no way dependent upon the adjutant-general of the British forces. The board of the deputy-adjutant-general of artillery is at Woolwich, which may be considered the head-quarters of the ordnance. The royal artillery corps consists of the brigade of horse-artillery, and of the artillery serving on foot. The horse-artillery is subdivided into companies tolled troops, varying in number from six to ten. Of these two served in the Peninsula in 1808, five in 1813, and seven at Waterloo in 1815. It is under the orders of 2 colonels commanding, 2 colonels en second, 2 lieutenant-colonels, and 1 major; while each company or troop is commanded by a captain of the first rank, a captain of the second, and 3 lieutenants. The foot artillery is divided into battalions of ten companies each, under the orders of 2 colonels, first and second, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quarter-master, and a surgeon with 2 assistants in time of war, and 1 during peace. In the year 1792, there were 4 battalions of foot artillery of 820 men each, with one of invalids containing 483; making 3707 in all. In 1814, there were 16,157 artillery-men, forming 11 battalions of 1459 men each. In 1819 there were only 9 battalions of 8 companies and 638 men each, or 5742 in all; which is pretty nearly the actual strength of this arm. The rocket corps is attached to and forms part of the artillery; and the same thing holds of the royal artificers, the royal waggon train, and the artillery drivers.^[134. Dupin, Force Milit. de la Grande Bretagne, 1. v. c. 4, p. 196. ]

In the war which preceded the peace of Amiens, and even in the early campaigns in Portugal, the engineer department was in a very ineffective condition; particularly from the want of the necessary means of transport, and partly also from a deficiency both in the number and quality of military artificers. In order to remedy these inconveniences, the Duke of Wellington, in 1814, caused a brigade of engineers, consisting of a company of sappers and miners, with horses, cars, and drivers, to be attached to each division of the army, and to be regularly trained and exercised in field duties, as well as in those which might be required of them in sieges. A captain and a certain number of subalterns were specially attached to each brigade, and were held responsible for the effective condition both of the men and the horses. Thus the remainder of the engineers, free from any embarrassments relative to the matériel and personnel of that department of the service, were enabled to give their undivided attention to important military operations, and to contribute, in a most essential manner, towards the success of the succeeding campaigns. Five companies of sappers and miners also served with the pontoon-train, which consisted of eighty pontoons, besides forges, waggons, &c. drawn by about 800 horses; the whole under the orders of a major of the brigade of engineers. Since the peace great attention has been paid both to the instruction and organization of this important branch of the service; which, in the event of another war, will be found on a very different footing, in point of efficiency, from that on which it stood during the greater part of the Peninsular campaigns. Experience taught important lessons, which have been suitably and effectually improved.

The portion of the British army presently serving in India amounts, as we have already seen, to about 20,000 men. The European troops in the company’s service consist of 8000 infantry and 4000 artillery; while the native regular troops are, according to the best information, composed of 10,000 cavalry, 130,000 infantry, and 8000 artillery; and the native irregular force, of 7000 cavalry and 17,000 infantry. Our Indian army, therefore, may be considered as amounting to 19,000 cavalry, 168,000 infantry, and 12,000 artillery, or, in all, about 200,000 men. The organization of the native army being, in all essential respects, the same as that of the British army, no particular description of it seems to be required under this head.^[135. Dupin; Army Estimates for 1830; and Bulletin des Sciences Militaires. ]

The character of the British army has been earned in battle and attested by victory. Wherever it has been even tolerably led, it has conquered; nor is there any army in the world which has sustained so few serious reverses. The elements of which it is composed are such as, if fairly developed in action, must, on any thing like equal terms, insure victory; for not only are the soldiers more robust, and possessed of greater physical power (or, as it is technically called, bottom), than those of any other nation, but they are also distinguished by an unflinching, indomitable courage, which may be safely reckoned upon at all times and in all circumstances; which it is often difficult to restrain, but never necessary to excite; and which always rises to a pitch of sublime elevation at the prospect of the charge and the close combat. They are the only troops in the world who look with indifference on naked points, and who are constantly impelled by a powerful instinct to close with their enemy; who maintain the distant battle with unyielding stedfastness, yet rejoice when the moment arrives that is to rest the issue of the conflict on the bayonet’s point, and a struggle hand to hand with the enemy. Hence their fire is close, steady, and destructive; their charge, where it can be given, irresistible. “Les troupes Anglaises,” says General Jomini, “se distinguent par leur bonne discipline et leur sang-froid; le soldat s’y enrôle pour la vie [this is a mistake; soldiers may enlist for any period], ce qui est bien extraordinaire chez un peuple si jaloux de sa liberté, mais ce qui ne surprend pas moins, c’est qu’il est docile et soumis: ces qualités essentielles qui constituent une armée solide, sont peut-être préférables à one valeur brillante mais passagère. Les unes sont permanentes; l’autre, justifiant le proverbe Espagnol, dépend de tel jour et de telle circonstance. La résignation et la discipline unies au courage froid, ont des résultats invariables et sûrs; elles produisent l’ensemble sans lequel il n’est point de véritable force.^[136. Jomini, Guerres de la Révolution, tom. ii. p. 252. ] Μ. Dupin, in that part of his able work in which he treats of the military force of Great Britain, delivers an opinion somewhat similar to that expressed by Jomini, though shaded by certain qualifications and abatements.

“Il faut de dire,” says he, “après les Français, tels qu’ils ont été pendant vinq-quatre ans dans nos armées, les Anglais sont les militaires les plus actifs de tout l’Europe; ils le sont d’une manière qui leur est propre. Leur activité n’a pas les élans prodigieux dont nous avons tant fois offert de mémorables exemples; mais elle n’a jamais d’intermittence, et se montre toujours la même. Cela lui fait produire, au bout d’un temps donné, one somme de résultats plus grande qu’on n’aurait pu le prévoir, d’après la vue d’une action [7:3:622]isolée même la plus brillante. Le soldat Bréton a généralement moins d’esprit naturel et de pénétration que le soldat Français; mais l’immobilité de son imagination rend ses actions plus mesurées. Moins distrait par la vue des objets extérieurs, par les souvenirs du passé, par les espérances ou les terreurs de l’avenir, il est toujours tout entier au moment présent. Plus attentif au commandement actuel, il compense ainsi l’infériorité de son intelligence. Incapable de juger les grands mouvemens qui s’exécutent, et surtout ceux qui vont s’exécuter, pour ou contre lui, le danger futur ne se peint pas même à sa pensée. Il va done à la mort présente sans s’inquiéter de la mort a venir. Voilà pourquoi le moral de l’armée Britannique est presque impossible à détruire par la mauvaise fortune.”^[137. Dujxn, vol. ii∙ L 1, c. ], p. 3, 4. . ]

In this passage there is some truth, mixed up with much nonsense and misrepresentation. The British soldier, it seems, is inferior to the French soldier in intelligence. And why? Because he does not concern himself about “grand movements executed and to be executed and because he is more attentive to command, and goes to present death without disturbing himself about death to come. These appear strange grounds upon which to rest the alleged superiority of the French or the inferiority of the British soldier in point of intelligence. That a native of this country, admitted on all hands to be at least one of the most intellectual on the face of the earth, should be at once metamorphosed by a red coat into a mere automaton or lump of living but impassible matter, would indeed be an extraordinary phenomenon; nor must it appear less singular that the French armies, with all their intellectual superiority, and all their attention to “grand movements,” should have been constantly overthrown by our animated machines. But the plain fact is, that the assertion is wholly erroneous. The English soldier is inferior to no other that ever existed in point of intelligence; and even the late General Foy, whose book appears to have been written chiefly for the purpose of calumniating our army, makes admissions which show that such was his own real opinion, while maintaining a contrary one. This officer repeatedly says that the non-commissioned officers of the British army are superior in activity, intelligence, and zeal to those of the same rank in any other army, not excepting the French; and that this superiority was conspicuously evinced throughout the whole of the Peninsular campaigns. But these persons are taken almost indiscriminately from the ranks, and of course must represent the average amount of intelligence and activity diffused amongst the private soldiers; a circumstance which General Foy had not adverted to when he made the admission in question; for he was too good a Frenchman to allow British soldiers any merit which he could decently and with any show of probability deny them.

But thebest answer to all his captious and querulous strictures is to be found in his own description of the conduct of the British regiments at Waterloo. “The cavalry which supported them,” says he, “was cut to pieces [this is not true], the fire of their artillery completely silenced. The general and staff officers were galloping from one square to another, not knowing where to find shelter. Carriages, wounded men, parks of reserve, and auxiliary troops, were all flying in disorder towards Brussels. Death was before them, and in their ranks; disgrace in their rear. In this terrible situation, neither the bullets of the imperial guard, discharged almost point-blank, nor the victorious cavalry of France, could make the least impression on the immovable British infantry. One might have been almost tempted to fancy that it had rooted itself in the ground, but for the majestic movement which its battalions commenced some minutes after sunset, at the moment when the approach of the Prussian army apprised Wellington that—thanks to numbers, thanks to the force of inert resistance, and as a reward for having contrived to draw up brave fellows in battle—he had just achieved the most decisive victory of our age.”^[138. Foy, History of the Peninsular War, vol. i. p. 224, English translation. ] The British army can desire no better panegyric than this, pronounced by a beaten enemy; and if the French shall continue to comfort themselves with the idea that the British soldier is deficient in intelligence, because he possesses that strength of mind which no danger can appal, and that tenacity which carries off the prey by sticking to it to the last, it would certainly be a pity to deprive them of any slender consolation which they may derive from cherishing such a delusion. But instead of adding any thing further of our own, we shall conclude by citing an authority which, on this as on all other military subjects, is universally admitted to be of the highest order.

“That the British infantry soldier,” says Colonel Napier, “is more robust than the soldier of any other nation, can scarcely be doubted by those who, in 1815, observed his powerful frame, distinguished amidst the united armies of Europe; and, notwithstanding his habitual excess in drinking, he sustains fatigue, and wet, and the extremes of cold and heat, with incredible vigour. When completely disciplined, and three years are required to accomplish this, his port is lofty, and his movements free: the whole world cannot produce a nobler specimen of military bearing; nor is the mind unworthy of the outward man. He does not indeed possess that presumptuous vivacity which would lead him to dictate to his commanders, or even to censure real errors, although he may perceive them; but he is observant, and quick to comprehend his orders, full of resources under difficulties, calm and resolute in danger, and more than usually obedient and careful of his officers in moments of imminent peril.

“It has been asserted that his undeniable firmness in battle is the result of a phlegmatic constitution, uninspired by moral feeling. Never was a more stupid calumny uttered. Napoleon’s troops fought in bright fields, where every helmet caught some beams of glory; but the British soldier conquered under the cold shade of aristocracy: no honours awaited his daring, no despatch gave his name to the applauses of his countrymen; his life of danger was uncheered by hope, his death unnoticed. Did his heart sink therefore? Did he not endure with surprising fortitude the sorest of ills, sustain the most terrible assaults in battle unmoved, and, with incredible energy, overthrow every opponent; at all times proving that, while no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount of honour was also full and fresh within him?

“The result of a hundred battles, and the united testimony of impartial writers, of different nations, have given the first place amongst the European infantry to the British; but, in a comparison between the troops of France and England, it would be unjust not to admit that the cavalry of the former stands higher in the estimation of the world.”^[139. History of the War tn the Peninsula and in the South of France, vol. iii. p. 271, 272. London, 1831. ]