MARITIME, something relating to or bounded by the sea. Thus a maritime province or country is one bounded by the sea; and a maritime kingdom is one that makes a considerable figure, or is very powerful at sea.

Maritime Law is that branch of general jurisprudence which has relation to navigation and intercourse at sea. By it are determined all seafaring causes, all questions on contracts of freight, contracts for repairs and furnishings to ships, contracts of bottomry and respondentia, insurance, average and salvage, and all marine injuries and offences. This is not the place to enter on any details respecting the objects of maritime law. For these we must refer to other articles in the course of this work; and will now confine ourselves to some observations on the subject of maritime law in general, and the chief sources of that law.

Land is capable of distinct appropriation; and we see its various portions inhabited by communities, each living under its own peculiar government. But upon the great common of the ocean all nations assemble, and have intercourse together; and, as the Emperor Antoninus replied to Eudemon, “the law is the lord of the sea” (Dig· b. xiv. tit. 2, 1. 9). Whilst, therefore, the municipal code of every state rests on principles which are more or less peculiar to itself, maritime law is part of the law of nations, and maritime questions ought to be determined on principles which are acknowledged by every people. It is thus that we find so great an accordance of sentiment among different nations on this branch of law; a mutual adoption of maritime works, and the decisions of Scott and Bynkerschoeck, Roccus, Casaregis, and Pothier, received as authority not in their own countries only, but throughout the civilized world.

This leads us to notice the principal sources of maritime law; and, first of all, we shall speak of the Codes.

The most ancient maritime laws in Europe were the Rhodian laws, which were held as the law of nations amongst the inhabitants of the islands in the Aegean Sea. They were, in part at least, adopted by the Romans; in whose code we also find various other maritime regulations. The navigation of the Mediterranean by the ships of Venice, Genoa, and other states which rose on the fall of the Roman empire, led to the compilation of a digest of rules for regulating the navigation. This digestis called II Consolato de Mare, and appears to have been universally adopted on the continent in the course of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenthaenturies. Next in order of time were the Ordinances of Oleron and of Wisbeig. The origin and date of these codes are disputed, but, generally speaking, they may be taken to be of the thirteenth century; and they appear to have been long of authority in the Mediterranean, and also in the Baltic Sea. The Ordinances of the Hanse Towns come next. They were first published at Lubec in 1597, and in 1614 were revised and enlarged in an assembly of deputies from the towns, held in the same place. Next followed Le Guidon de la Mer, originally framed at Rouen in Normandy. It is compiled from the several ordonnances and codes which were then in observance in Europe; and though its origin and date are not certainly known, yet it has been received as of nearly equal authority with the ancient codes. Later in the order of time, but above all the others in authority and extent, is the Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV. It is a digest of all that was fixed in the usages and customs of maritime nations, or laid down in ancient codes; and it also determines, on general principles, several points of maritime law till then unsettled. The last code of maritime law to be here noticed is the Code de Commerce, which is a digest of the edicts of 1675 and 1681, and of the jurisprudence of the great lawyers Pothier, Valin, and Emerigon.

Next in authority to the ordonnances and customs of maritime states, are the judgments of maritime and mercantile courts. We have already referred to the most eminent of these; and, amongst them, the highest place is undoubtedly due to the determinations of Sir William Scott in the high court of admiralty of England, which are distinguished for their learning, elegance, and precision, and are everywhere received with the greatest respect.

The earliest collection of maritime laws in Scotland is that contained in Balfour’s Practicks, entitled “The Sea lawis collectit furth of the actis of parliament, the practiques and lawis of Oleron and the lawis of Wisbeig, and the constitutionis of Francois king of France, 1543-1557. The jurisdiction of the Scottish admiralty, indeed, was long very limited. It was confined to seafaring causes, and in these it had no exclusive jurisdiction; maritime causes as well as others being of old within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and particularly within the jurisdiction of the justiciar, formerly "the supreme judge in all suits whatsoever. (See Leg. Burg. c. 27; Pitcairn’s Crim. Trials, vol. i. part i. p. 129, and part ii. p. 93; and A. S. 16th January 1554.) In this last year we find that David Kintore was judge of the admiralty. He was in all likelihood the author of the book of maritime law referred to in Balfour’s Practicks, under the name of Lib. Kinlor. In the end of the same century, Alexander King, advocate, was judge of the same court. He also wrote a book on maritime law, which he entitled “Tractatus legum et consuetudinum navalium quae apud omnes fere gentes in usu habentur.” (MS. Adv. Lib.) Wellwood’s Abridgment of all Sea Lawes, London, 1613, is said by the learned author of the life of Melville (M‘Crie’s Melυ. vol. ii. p. 319) to have “the merit of being the first regular treatise on maritime jurisprudence which appeared in Britain but in forming this opinion, the works of both Kintore and King have obviously been overlooked. King’s work has this further merit, that immediately after it appeared the court of admiralty in Scotland rose into importance. By the act 1609, c. 15, the court was declared a sovereign judicatory, and letters of horning were allowed on its decrees. The reputation of the court being sustained by a succession of eminent judges, amongst whom were Atcheson of Glencairney, Roberton of Bedlay,and Lyon of Carse, all afterwards lords of session, it began to extend its jurisdiction generally to mercantile, instead of being, as before, confined to seafaring causes; and the above act was ratified by 1681, c. 16, by which also the jurisdiction of the court was further explicated and enlarged. By 6 Geo. IV. c. 120, however,jurisdiction in prize and capture was withdrawn from the court, and vested in the admiralty of England; and by 1 Will. IV. c. 69, the court was altogether abolished, and its remaining jurisdiction transferred to the court of session and sheriff-court; the court of justiciary having previously acquired, as of old, a co-ordinate jurisdiction in crimes.