HANNIBAL, a Carthaginian general, son of Hamilcar Barcas, was born 247 b. c. in the eighteenth year of the first Punic war, the same year in which his father first took a prominent part in public affairs. His family was one of the most distinguished in Carthage, and, claiming to be descended from the ancient kings of Tyre, it ruled its native city with almost regal power. The history of Hannibal forms an epoch in the destinies of Rome. We can have little difficulty in forming a true estimate of his character when we know that, almost unaided by his countrymen, he sustained for upwards of sixteen years a struggle for the empire of the world with a nation which had hitherto been victorious in every contest it had undertaken, and had at its disposal the resources of the greater part of Italy. It was the last struggle which the republic of Rome maintained for i existence; and there was none which called forth more conspicuously the energies of her mighty warriors, or displayed more fully their unconquerable perseverance and undaunted bearing in the most untoward circumstances. If Hannibal had been properly supported by his countrymen at home, the star of Rome would probably have set for ever, and Carthage would then have stood forth as the conqueror of the world, and the source of civilization. The key to all Hannibal’s proceedings is to be found in his hatred of the Romans, a feeling indelibly impressed upon his mind by his father, when he made him swear at the altar of his country that he would pursue the Romans with unrelenting hatred.

The military education of Hannibal must have commenced from boyhood, but of his early years we have no detailed account. He was eighteen years of age on his father’s death (229 b. c.), and probably spent the greater part of the next eight years in the camp of his brother-in-law Hasdrubal, who had succeeded to the command of the troops in Spain on the death of Hamilcar, and who pursued the same line of policy as his predecessor, in trying to obtain entire possession of the resources of Spain as a means of attacking Rome. Private revenge cut oft' Hasdrubal in the midst of his career (221 b. c.), and the soldiers by acclamation raised Hannibal to the vacant command. The appointment was ratified by the senate at home, and from this moment Hannibal regarded Italy as his province, and war with Rome as the only object worthy of his attention. The conciliatory measures of Hasdrubal had succeeded in uniting the greater part of the nations of Spain to the dominions of Carthage; and those who still maintained independence Hannibal determined to reduce at once by the energy and activity of his proceedings. He led his troops into the country of the Olcades, a people who seem to have been situated in the mountainous district of Cuença, near the sources of the river Xucar; and having taken their chief city, he entirely defeated them. He was equally successful in his attack on the Vaccaei, a people inhabiting the country round Salamanca; and having subdued all the nations south of the river Ebro, except the Saguntines, he was prepared to complete his conquests by the reduction of their city.

The attention of the Romans, which had latterly been much occupied with the affairs of the north of Italy, was now drawn towards Spain, and they became alarmed at the proceedings of Hannibal. An embassy from Saguntum roused them to active measures, and deputies were hurried off to remonstrate with Hannibal for his interference, contrary to treaty, with an ally of the Roman people. Polybius enters into a discussion whether we ought to consider this attack on Saguntum as the real cause of the second Punic war, and wisely, we think, decides that it was merely the pretext. We must go farther back, and search more deeply, to discover the real motives which induced the Carthaginians to support Hannibal in his attack on Rome. It was the unfair advantage that had been taken to wrest from them Sardinia, that had made an indelible impression on the minds of the Carthaginians; and the Barcine faction, which was now headed by Hannibal, used all its influence to keep alive the national feeling of hatred to Rome. There was indeed a party for peace, headed by Hanno, but the still small voice was drowned amidst the din of warlike preparations. Hannibal was already busily engaged in the siege of Saguntum, a city situated on the east of Spain, about one mile from the sea, and the ruins of which are still to be seen near Murviedro (Muri Veteres), when the Roman deputies made their appearance, and demanded an audience. This was refused by Hannibal, under pretence that he could not guarantee their personal safety in the midst of so many barbarous nations; and the deputies found themselves obliged to continue their journey to Carthage.
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Here they were not more successful, and immediately returned to Rome to hasten the preparations for war. Meanwhile Hannibal continued the siege of Saguntum, which was defended with all the obstinacy for which the Spaniards have ever been distinguished; but it was at last taken, after a brave resistance of eight months, and delivered over to all the horrors of a captured city. Thus the way was cleared for an attack on Italy; and though the Romans had evidently never imagined it possible that such a daring measure would for a moment be entertained, it is quite clear that Hannibal, from the first day of his command, had resolved to put it into execution without delay. The Romans intended that Spain should be the scene of action; but Hannibal boldly determined to attack them in the very centre of their power, on the plains of Italy.

Hannibal spent the winter of 219 b. c. in preparations for his gigantic undertaking, and omitted nothing which he thought likely to forward his object. He allowed many of his soldiers to visit their homes, as it might be their last opportunity; he drew up instructions for the use of his brother Hasdrubal, whom he intended to govern Spain in his absence; and prudently secured the maintenance of peace in both Africa and Spain, by an exchange of the troops of the two countries. Neither did he neglect to make himself acquainted with the feelings of the people through whose territory he must pass in his way to Italy, and sent secretly to Cisalpine Gaul to secure the co-operation of the disaffected tribes as soon as he should make his appearance amongst them. He discovered also that the passage across the Alps was practicable, though it might be attended with great difficulty.

Having thus made his preparations, Hannibal began his march from Carthago Nova, now Carthagena, in the beginning of spring 218 b. c. with an army of ninety thousand foot and twelve thousand horse. As the river Ebro had been made by treaty the boundary between the Roman and Carthaginian portion of Spain, he found all the tribes at the foot of the Pyrenees ready to dispute his passage, and, he did not reduce them without a considerable diminution of his forces. He found, besides, many of his Spanish soldiers frightened at the dangers which lay before them, and, making a virtue of necessity, he sent a considerable portion of them back. The troops that passed the Pyrenees were thus reduced to fifty thousand foot and nine thousand horse; but they were mostly men whose bodies were inured to hardships by a long course of war. Hannibal had reached the banks of the Rhone before the Romans were aware that he had moved from Carthagena; and Publius Scipio, who had been dispatched with sixty ships towards Spain, was much surprised to find, on reaching the mouths of the Rhone, that Hannibal was in that neighbourhood. He landed his troops, and prepared to attack Hannibal; but the energy of that general had anticipated his intention, and the first slopes of the Alps were already ascended before Scipio moved from his position. The road which Hannibal pursued across the Alps is a much disputed point, but this is not the place to enter at any length into such a subject. We feel more confidence in the statements of Polybius, who tells us (iii. 48) that he had examined the passages of the Alps with great care, than in those of Livy, who, though admirable for the beauty of his style, has no pretensions to geographical accuracy. Yet, even from Polybius, all that we can gather with certainty is, that Hannibal passed the Alps to the north of the river Isara (Isère), and descended into the Insubrian territory in Italy. It was therefore across the Alpes Graiae (Little St Bernard), that he passed, and not the Alpes Cottiae (Mount Genevre), as Livy, and Strabo (iv. 209), evidently think. But be this as it may, Hannibal succeeded in crossing the Alps in fifteen days, though not without great difficulty, and the loss of many of his troops. He found on examination that he had not more than 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry. The whole journey from Carthago Nova had occupied five months.

Scipio had no sooner convinced himself that Hannibal was serious in his intention of crossing into Italy, than he hurried back with part of his troops, and, to the astonishment of Hannibal, was ready on the banks of the Po to oppose his progress. It was necessary for Hannibal that a conflict should immediately take place, to confirm the wavering minds of the Gauls; and the battle fought on the banks of the river Ticinus, in which he defeated Scipio, and compelled him to retire beyond the Po, was the signal for a general rising. Hannibal pursued Scipio across the river, and found that he had taken up his position on the banks of the river Trebia, near to Placentia (Piacenza). Scipio now saw that his true policy was to weary out Hannibal, and to give him no opportunity of attacking; but the Roman general was wounded, and could take no active part in the proceedings. His colleague Tiberius Sempronius, elated by some partial success, ventured beyond the intrenchments, and the result was the speedy and complete defeat of the Romans. Placentia soon afterwards fell into his hands; and thus, within a couple of months, the whole of the north of Italy was at his disposal. The Romans heard this intelligence with great dismay, but took active measures to maintain the contest. The two consuls now took a position where they could watch the proceedings of Hannibal, who would naturally advance to the south as soon as the rigour of the winter months had abated. Accordingly, in the beginning of spring 217 b. c. Hannibal crossed the Apennines into Etruria, by a road, the position of which has been as much disputed as that by which he passed the Alps. We are satisfied with Vaudoncourt, who has minutely examined this point, that he crossed the Apennines by the road which leads from Parma to Pontremoli and Sarzana, and that the marshes, where Hannibal had nearly lost his life, are those now called Paludi di Fuccechio, a little above the place where the Arno falls into the sea.

Hannibal found the consul Flaminius posted at Arretium, a city situated on the slopes of the Apennines, and ready to dispute his advance. He laid waste the country on every side, and drew Flaminius into an ambuscade which he had laid for him on the banks of the Thrasymene Lake, where the consul fell, and his whole army was defeated. The road to Rome was now open to him, and it has often been matter of surprise that he did not march directly upon the city, and by one bold stroke put an end to the war. We have no means of knowing the reasons which deterred him from this obvious proceeding; but he turned to the east, at the city of Spoletium (Spoleto), and proceeding through Umbria and Picenum, where he seems to have met with no resistance, he entered .the rich province of Apulia, where he wintered. The following year, 216 B. c., he found himself opposed by the cautious policy of Fabius; and though Hannibal used every means to provoke the Roman general to action, his temper and prudence were proof against every attack. Towards the end of the year, however, Hannibal again asserted his superiority; and the battle of Cannae, fought at a small village of Apulia, on the banks of the Aufidus, on the 2d of August, was as celebrated a defeat as the Romans had ever sustained. Fortune now again seemed to point the way to Rome; and it seems impossible not to feel convinced that Hannibal committed an unpardonable blunder in not attacking the city itself. He wintered at Capua, and the enervating luxury of that district is said to have entirely changed the character of his soldiers. The progress of Hannibal was by no means so rapid as might have been anticipated from his victories. Many of the cities of [7:11:135] Campania made a successful resistance; and the obstinacy with which they maintained their alliance with the Romans, proves that the sway of that people must have been by no means burdensome. It appears to us that the failure of Hannibal was chiefly owing to the small number of his troops, which did not enable him to garrison the cities which he took, or to station bodies of men in various parts of the country to repress insurrectionary movements. Nor do the Carthaginians seem to have entered into the contest with that spirit which the greatness of the prize might have fully justified. Had the number of his men enabled him to follow up his victories by active measures, there can be no doubt that Rome must have fallen into his hands.

The next year produced no action of any importance on either side, though Hannibal gradually lost ground. He pressed earnestly for reinforcements; and his brother Hasdrubal crossed the Alps with a considerable body of troops, 207 B. c. which might again have changed the aspect of affairs. Fortune, however, had deserted him; for Hasdrubal fell in an engagement on the banks of the river Metaurus, and his army was entirely defeated. Hannibal was now left to his own resources, and he was obliged to confine himself to defensive measures. Meanwhile Scipio had commenced his career of conquest in Spain, and had subdued the whole country as far as Gades. He crossed into Africa, and, assisted by Masinissa, attacked the Carthaginians in their own territory. Hannibal was thus obliged to return to the defence of his country, 203 B. c., after he had maintained his footing in Italy for sixteen years. The battle of Zama, fought in Africa 202 B. c., in which Hannibal was completely defeated, left nothing for the Carthaginians but humble submission to the conqueror. Peace was granted, though on hard conditions, and Hannibal now took an active part in the domestic arrangements of his country. He attempted to reform the numberless abuses which had crept into the constitution; but he at the same time excited the enmity of the great body of the aristocracy, who were ready to seize the first opportunity of banishing him. They accused him to the Romans of keeping up an active communication with Antiochus, king of Syria, then supposed to be preparing war against them; and when the Romans sent three commissioners to take cognizance of the affair, Hannibal did not choose to await the result, but fled towards the east, and reached Tyre in safety. Here he staid a few days, and was received with much honour, whilst at Carthage his property was confiscated, and his house razed to the ground. He then proceeded to Ephesus, where he was kindly welcomed by the king, and consulted as to the best mode of attacking the Romans. With Antiochus he remained several years, though his advice was by no means always listened to. At last, when Antiochus was defeated, 190 B. c., the king was unable any longer to protect him from the vengeance of his enemies: he therefore fled first to Crete, and afterwards to Prusias, king of Bithynia, where he resided several years, and assisted him in his war against Eumenes, king of Pergamus, the ally of the Romans. Here too the vengeance of his enemies reached him. Ambassadors from Rome demanded that he should be given up; and as Prusias was ungenerous enough to accede to the demand, Hannibal resolved,,to free himself from all further persecution, and swallowed poison, which he always carried with him. In what year he died is a point in which the ancients do not agree. According to Atticus (apud Nep. Hannib. c. 13), and Valerius Antias (apud Liv. xxxix. 56), and Cassiodorus, it was 183 b. c., the same year in which Philopoemen and the elder Scipio died. Polybius, however, makes it 182, and Sulpicius 181 B. c. Thus died the most celebrated of the Carthaginians, the only man who could have saved his country from ruin, and restored it to its ancient glory.