GRAMMATICAL ABSTRACT, Exhibiting a Systematic View of Words, as they are commonly arranged into distinct Classes, with the Subdivisions under each Class.

All language is composed of words, each of which may be defined, a sound significant of some idea or relation. These words may be arranged into four general divisions, namely,

I. SUBSTANTIVES; which are all those words that are expressive of things which exist, or are conceived to exist, of themselves, and not as the energies or qualities of any thing else. These may be divided into two orders,

I. Nouns, properly so called, being the names of all those things which exist, or are conceived to exist. These may be divided into three kinds, each of which admits of the subdivisions after mentioned, viz.

Natural, or those which are used as the names of natural substances; such are (genus) animal ; (species) man, dog ; (individuaD Alexander, Cyrus, Cerberus, Argus. Artificial, or the several names of artificial objects; such as, (genus) edifice ; (species) house, church ; (individuaD Vatican, St Peters, St Paul’s. Abstract, or those which are the names of qualities considered as abstracted from their substances; such as, (genus) motion; (species) flight, course ; (individuaD the falcons flight, the greyhound’s course.

Nouns of all kinds admit of the following accidents, viz.

Gender, which is a certain affection of nouns denoting the sex of those substances of which they are the names. For as in nature every object is either male or female, or neither the one nor the other, grammarians, following this idea, have divided the names of beings into three classes. Those which denote males are said to be of the masculine gender; those which denote females, of the feminine gender; and those which denote neither the one nor the other, of the neuter gender. The English is the only language of which the nouns are, with respect to sex, an exact copy of nature.

Number. As there is no object in nature single and alone, and as by far the greater part of nouns are the names ofwhole classes of objects, it is evident that every such noun ought to have some variation, to denote whether it is one individual of the class which is meant, or more than one. Accordingly we find, that in every language nouns have some method of expressing this. If one be mentioned, the noun is used in that form which is called the singular number; if more than one, it is used in a different form, which is called the plural number.

Cases. All nouns, excepting proper names, are general terms; but it is often necessary to use those general terms for the purpose of expressing particular ideas. This can be done only by connecting the general term with some word significant of a quality or circumstance peculiar to the individual intended. When that quality or circumstance is not expressed by an adjective, it is in English and most modern languages commonly connected with the noun by the intervention of a preposition; but in the Greek and Latin languages the noun has cases to answer the same, and even in English the noun has, besides the nominative, one case to denote possession.

2. Pronouns, which are a species of word invented to supply the place of nouns in certain circumstances. They are of two kinds, viz.

First, the prepositive ; so called because they are capable of leading a sentence. These are divided into three orders, called the pronouns of the First person. The pronoun of this person, in English I, denotes the speaker as characterized by the present act of speaking, in contradistinction to every other character which he may bear. It is said to be of the first person, because there must necessarily be a speaker before there can be a hearer; and the speaker and hearer are the only persons employed in discourse.

Second person. The pronoun of this person, in English thou, denotes the person addressed as characterized by the present circumstance of being addressed. It is said to be of the second person, because in discourse there cannot be a hearer till there be a speaker. The pronouns of the first and second persons have number and cases, for the same reason that nouns have these accidents; but in no language have they any variation denoting gender. The reason is, that sex, and all other properties and attributes whatever, excepting those just mentioned as descriptive of the nature of these pronouns, are foreign from [7:10:684]the mind of the speaker when he utters I or thou in discourse.

Third person. The pronouns of this person, he, site, it, are employed to denote any object which may be the subject of discourse different from the speaker and the hearer. They are improperly said to be of any person; for there can be but two persons employed in discourse, the speaker and the party addressed. They are, however, pronouns; since they stand by themselves, and are the substitutes of nouns. He is the substitute of a noun denoting a male animal; she, of a noun denoting a female animal; and it, of a noun denoting an object which has no sex. All these, like the pronouns persona), admit of number and cases; but there is this peculiarity attending them, that though in every case of the singular number the distinction of gender is carefully preserved, in the plural it is totally lost; they, theirs, and them, being the nominative, possessive, and accusative cases of he, of she, and of it. Secondly, the subjunctive; so called, because they cannot lead a sentence, but only serve to subjoin a clause to another previously enunciated. Of this kind are Which and who. This subjunctive pronoun may be substituted in the place of any noun whatever, whether it be expressive of a genus, a species, or an individual; as, the animal which, the man who, Alexander who, &c. Nay, it may even become the substitute of the personal pronouns themselves; as when we say, I who now write, you who now read, thou who readest, he who wrote, she who spoke; where it is observable, that the subjunctive who adopts the person of that prepositive pronoun which it represents, and affects the verb accordingly. Who and which, therefore, are real pronouns, from substitution; and they have this peculiarity besides, that they have not only the power of a pronoun, but also of a connective of the same import with that which in English is expressed by the preposition of. The word that is now used indifferently for who or which, as a subjunctive pronoun; but it was originally used only as a definitive, and as such it ought still to be considered in philosophical grammar.

II. ATTRIBUTIVES; which are those words that are expressive of all such things as are conceived to exist, not of themselves, but as the attributes of other things. These are divided into,

1. Verbs, or those words which are expressive of an attribute and an assertion; as, I wrote.

The attributes expressed by verbs have their essence in motion or its privation; and as motion is always accompanied by time, therefore verbs are liable to certain variations called tenses, viz.

The present, which represents the action of the verb as going on, and as contemporary with something else; as, I write, or lam writing, either just now, or when you are reading. The prater-imperfect, which represents the action of the verb as having been going on but not finished in some portion of past time; as, I was writing, no matter when, yesterday, last week, or last year. The aorist of the past, which represents the action of the verb as finished in some indefinite portion of past time; as, I wrote, or did write, yesterday, or last week. The prater-perfect, which represents the action of the verb as just now finished, or as finished in some portion of time within which the present instant is comprehended; as, I have written this day or this week. The plusquam-perfect, which represents the action bf the verb as having been finished in some portion of time within which a determinate past instant was comprehended; as, I had written last week before I saw you. The first future, which represents the action of the verb as to be going on at some indefinite future time; as, I shall write or be writing to-morrow, or next week. The second future, which represents the action of the verb as to be completed at some definite future time; as, I shall have written when you come to-morrow, next week, next month, or next year.

Affirmation is the essence of every verb, insomuch that all verbs may be resolved into the substantive verb is, and another attributive. But a man may affirm something of the action of the verb directly, something of his liberty or capacity to perform that action, or something of his wish that another should perform it, To denote diese several kinds of affirmation, all verbs have what grammarians call modes, viz. the indicative, to denote the first kind of affirmation; as, I write : the subjunctive, to denote the second; as, I may or can write : die imperative, to denote the third; as, write thou, or do thou write. Besides these, grammarians have given to every verb a mode, called the infinitive ; as, to write. But this seems on every account to be improperly styled a mode. Nay, if affirmation be the essence of verb, die infinitive cannot be considered as any part of the verb at all, for it expresses no affirmation. It is indeed nothing more than an abstract noun denoting the simple energy of the verb in conjunction with time.

Verbs have likewise been distinguished into the following kinds, according to the nature of the attribute of which they are expressive, namely, 1st, Active-transitive, or those which denote an action that passes from the agent to some external object; as Caesar conquered Pompey: 2d, Active-intransitive, or those which express that kind of action which has no effect upon any thing beyond the agent himself; as, Caesar walked ; 3d, Passive, or those which express not action but passion, whether pleasing or painful; as, Portia was loved, Pompey was conquered : Cth, Neuter, or those which express an attribute that consists neither in action nor in passion; as, Caesar stood.

2. Participles, or those words which are expressive of an attribute combined with time. In English there are only two participles; the present, as writing, which expresses the action of the verb to write, as going on; and the past, as written, which expresses the action of the same verb as finished, and therefore past in time. In Greek and Latin there is a future participle, by which the attribute is represented as being in a state of exertion at some future time; as, 7jα∙ψu1, scripturus, about to write.

3. Adjectives, or those words which express as inhering in their substances the several qualities of things, of which the essence consists not in motion or its privation; as, good, bad, black, white, large, small, and the like. As attributes are the same whether they belong to males or females, to one object or to many, adjectives ought in strictness to admit of no variation respecting sex or number; and in English they actually admit of none. Some qualities, however, are of such a nature, that one substance may have them in a greater degree than another; and therefore the adjectives denoting these qualities admit in most languages of a variation which grammarians call the degrees of comparison. Thus Plato was wise, Socrates was wiser than he, but Solomon was the wisest of men. There is a species of adjectives derived from nouns, and even from pronouns; for we say, the Pompeian party, a brazen trumpet, and my book, which are phrases equivalent to “the party of Pompey, a trumpet of brass, and the book of me.”

4. Adverbs, or those words which, as they denote the attributes of attributes, have been called attributives of the second order, to distinguish them from verbs, participles, and adjectives, which denote the attributes of substances, and are therefore called attributives of the first order. Adverbs are divided into two kinds, viz.

First, Those which are common to all attributives of the first order, that is, which coalesce equally with verbs, with participles, and with adjectives. These may be divided into adverbs of intension and remission, or of quantity continuous; as moderately, vastly, exceedingly, &c. These, like adjectives of a similar nature, admit of the different[7:10:685] degrees of comparison. Of quantity discrete ; as, once, twice, thrice, &c. These are not, in strictness of speech, adverbs, being in reality the possessive cases of one, two, three, &c. Of relation ; as more, most, less, least, equally, proportionally, &c.

Second, Those which are confined to verbs properly so called, and which are of the following kinds: Of time ; as, then, when, afterward, now, Sic. : of place ; as, here, there, where, hence, whence, Sic. ; and also adverbs derived from prepositions; as, upward, downward, Sic. : of intensions and remissions peculiar to motion ; as, speedily, hastily, slowly, Sec. We have given adverbs a place amongst the parts of speech necessary for the communication of thought; but it may be doubted whether they be entitled to this distinction. English adverbs at least seem to be nothing more than corruptions of nouns, adjectives, and verbs.

III. DEFINITIVES; which are all those words that serve to define and ascertain any particular object or objects as separated from others of the same class. These are commonly called Articles, which are divided into two kinds, viz.

1. Indefinite, as a or an, which is prefixed to a noun or general term, to denote that but one individual is meant of that genus or species of which the noun is the common name. This article, however, leaves the individual itself quite indeterminate. Thus, man is the general name of the whole human race; a man is one individual, but that individual is unknown. Any is prefixed to a noun either in the singular or plural number, when it is indifferent as to the truth of the proposition what individual or individuals be supposed; thus, “any man will be virtuous when temptation is away.” Some is prefixed to nouns in the plural number, to denote that only part of the species or genus is meant, leaving that part undetermined; thus, “some men are great cowards.”

2. Definite, as the, which is prefixed to a noun, to denote one individual of the species of which something is predicated that distinguishes it from every other individual. Thus, “the man that hath not music in himself is fit for treasons.” It is used before nouns in both numbers, and for the same purpose; for we may say, “the men who have not music in themselves are fit for treasons.” This, prefixed to a noun in the singular number, denotes an individual as present and near at hand; as, “this man beside me.” That, prefixed to a noun in the singular number, denotes an individual as present but at a little distance; as, “ that man in the corner.”^[1. These two articles have plurals; thru is the plural of this, and thou the plural of that. ]

Besides these, there are many other articles both definite and indefinite.

IV. CONNECTIVES, or those words which are employed to connect other words, and of several distinct parts to make one complete whole. These may be divided into two kinds, viz.

1. Conjunctions, by which name are distinguished all those connectives which are commonly employed to conjoin sentences. These have been divided into two kinds, called conjunctives, or those words which conjoin sentences and their meanings also; and disjunctives, or those words which, at the same time that they conjoin sentences, disjoin their meanings. Each of these general divisions has been again subdivided; the former into copulatives and continuatives, the latter into simple disjunctives and adversative disjunctives. But the general division is absurd, and the subdivisions are useless. Conjunctions never disjoin the meaning of sentences, nor have any other effect than to combine two or more simple sentences into one compound sentence. If those simple sentences be of opposite meanings before their combination, they will continue so after it, whatever conjunction be employed to unite them. In nature, different truths are connected, if they be connected at all, by different relations; and therefore, when the sentences expressive of those truths are connected in language, it must be by words significant of those natural relations. Thus, accidental addition is expressed by the conjunction and ; as when we say, “Lysippus was a statuary, and Priscian was a grammarian." The unexpected junction of contrary truths is expressed by but ; as, “Brutus was a patriot, but Caesar was not." The relation of an effect to its cause is expressed by because; as, “Rome was enslaved because Caesar was ambitious.” The relation of an effect to a cause of which the existence is doubtful, is expressed by if; as, “you will live happily if you live honestly the relation of a cause to its effect, by therefore ; as, “Caesar was ambitious, therefore Rome was enslaved.” The idea of simple diversity is expressed by either and or ; “ either it is day or it is night.” Contrariety between two affirmations, which, though each may be true by itself, cannot both be true at once, is expressed by unless ; as, “Troy will be taken unless the Palladium be preserved.” Coincidence of two affirmations apparently contrary to each other is expressed by although ; as, “Troy will be taken although Hector defend it.”

2. Prepositions, or those connectives of which the common office is to conjoin words which refuse to coalesce; and this they can do only by signifying those relations by which the things expressed by the united words are connected in nature. The first words of men, like their first ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible objects; and therefore there can be no doubt but that the original use of prepositions was to denote the various relations of body. Afterwards, when men began to discern with their intellect, they took those words which they found already made, prepositions as well as others, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual conceptions.

Prepositions viewed in this light are

Either proper, or those which literally denote the relations subsisting amongst the objects of sense, such as the accidental junction of two things between which there is no necessary connection; as, “a house with a party wall.” The separation of two things which we should expect to find united; as, “a house without a roof, a man without hands.” The relation subsisting between any thing and that which supports it; as, “the statue stands upon a pedestal." The relation of higher and lower; as, “the sun is above the hills,” “to support uneasy steps over the burning marl,” “the sun is set below the horizon," “the shepherd reclines under the shade of a beech tree.” The relation between any thing in motion and that in which it moves; as, “the rays of light pass through the air.” The relation between any thing continued, whether motion or rest, and the point of its beginning; as, “the rays of light proceed from the sun,” “these figs came from Turkey,” “that lamp hangs from the ceiling.” The relation between any thing continued and the point to which it tends; as, “he is going to Italy,” “he slept till morning.” The relation between an effect and its cause; as, “I am sick of my husband and for my gallant."^[2. Conjunctions and prepositions are indeed employed only to connect sentences and words; but it may be doubted whether they be ]>arts of s)>eech distinct from nouns, verbs, and adjectives. ]

Or metaphorical. For as those who are above others in place have generally the advantage over them, the prepositions which denote the one kind of superiority or in[7:10:686]feriority, are likewise employed to denote the other. Thus ι we say of a king, “he ruled over his people and of a soldier, “he served under such a general.’'

Interjections are a species of words which are found perhaps in all languages on earth, but which cannot be included in any of the classes above mentioned; for they are not subject to the rules or principles of grammar, as they contribute nothing to the communication of thought. They may be called a part of that natural language with which man is endowed, in common with other animals, to express or allay some very strong sensation; such as, αΛ ∕ when he feels pain. In this view the interjection does not owe its characteristical expression to the arbitrary form of articulation, but to the tone of voice, and the modifications of countenance and of gesture, with which it is uttered; it is therefore universally understood by all mankind. In discourse interjections are employed only when the suddenness or vehemence of some affection returns men to their natural state, and makes them for a moment forget the use of speech. In books they are thrown into sentences without altering their form either in syntax or in signification; and in English this is generally done with a very bad effect, though the writer no doubt employs them with a view to pathos or embellishment.

Unwilling to interrupt the continuity of the foregoing article, or to interpolate any additions, however necessary in themselves, which might have the effect of disturbing the logical sequence of the compiler’s expositions and illustrations, we have thought it in many respects preferable to annex, under separate heads, such further explanations on several points as may appear to be requisite for their more complete elucidation, and also to supply some defects, particularly on the subjects of the relative pronoun, of comparison, and of the verb, which the learned reader will scarcely fail to detect in this elaborate treatise, notwithstanding its great and acknowledged merits. And,

1. Of the Relative Pronoun.

This subject has been pretty fully treated in the preceding article, and the general principles there stated are clearly and correctly unfolded. But whilst these principles are not always pursued to their consequences, and some important views have been omitted, there are ako not a few points which seem to require a more ample development, and which may probably be rendered more distinct by a little diversity of illustration. In endeavouring to accomplish these objects, however, we shall freely avail ourselves of the ingenious speculations of one who has done more than any other philologist of this age, or even of the last, excepting perhaps Mr Horne Tooke, to introduce the principles of a sound philosophy into grammatical investigations; and to ourselves it is a source of no ordinary gratification to think that we are enabled to do so with his own entire consent and approbation, though of course without any responsibility upon his part for errors which may be committed by us in attempting an exposition of his views.^[3. Fateamur profecto oportet, simulque nos delectat fateri, quod nihil est liocce tentamen nisi prolatio, exigua quidem, praelectio-num doctissimi atque s∙iλ√jLaλsτ. u Joannis Hunter, LL. D. in Academia Andreapolitana Litterarum Humaniorum Professoris. ]

In the learned languages the antecedent is not unfrequently repeated along with the relative. In such expressions as, ’ ∙ Erant omnino itinera duo quibus itineribus domo exire possent,”^[4. Caesar. Comment, lib. i. c. 6. ] “Urbem quam statuo vestra est,”^[5. virgil. Aen. lib. i. 1. Ö73. ] “ΌΤΣ S tu rif> σoλfμ,ψ ΣΤΜΜΑΧΟΤ2 ixniaaµ.ıða, iipillii iυ<rni, a∙nλu~ atxa<nu avrw," ^[6. Demostil. ] the antecedent is repeated along with the relative, which agrees with it in the same manner as any adjective agrees with its substantive. The relative, therefore, must be an adjective, expressing an attribute of its antecedent, and representing it in some way or other. Again, the application of the relative is universal. There is no object whatsoever to which, in use, the relative may not refer, and which it may not represent. We may say, the animal which, the man who ; the thing which, wisdom which ; George who, I who, thou who, he that ; and so in innumerable other instances. The attribute expressed by the relative is therefore extremely general, such indeed as may belong to any object whatsoever. The first matter for inquiry, then, is to endeavour to ascertain what the attribute in question really is, or, in other words, to determine the signification of the relative pronoun.

On this branch of the subject, however, it is not necessary to enlarge, after what has already been said respecting it. The analytical solution proposed by Mr Harris, on the authority of Apollonius De Syntaxi, ^[7. From his extensive acquaintance with classical literature, and the philosophical bent of his mind, Mr Harris was certainly aman eminently capable of making important philological discoveries, had he chosen, like Mr Home Tooke and Dr Hunter, to think boldly for himself, instead of esteeming it a sort of heresy to differ from the opinions of the ancient grammarians. Of these, Apollonius was no doubt one of the most learned and acute, as we shall have occasion afterwards to show; and in a question of fact, his authority is not to be disputed. But the case is very diðėrent in regard to a theory, the truth or falsehood of which must be established by evidence, derived not from the dicta of grammarians, but from the principles and usages of language. It is an excessive and misplaced deference to authority, however, which has led Mr Harris to crowd his Herme I with a multiplicity of uncouth terms and unnecessary distinctions, which, though they give an air of learned precision to many of his propositions, have an obvious tendency to darken rather than elucidate the subject which he professes to explain. ] namely, into the prepositive pronoun and the conjunction and, has already been noticed and refuted. The equation, as stated by him, and also by Dr Beattie, who adopts his view, does not consist of equivalents, either logical or grammatical. The solution is not, therefore, as it ought to be, of universal application. In some instances, indeed, it may appear to have the same effect in a sentence as the copulative conjunction and prepositive pronoun; but in others, and by far the greater number, it will be found that the effect produced by the substitution of the alleged equivalents is altogether different. Thus, if the sentence, “Light is a body which moves with great celerity,” be resolved into, “Light is a body, and it moves with great celerity,” as proposed by Mr Harris, the result is two distinct predications respecting light, viz. first, that “it is a body,” and, secondly, that “it moves with great celerity whereas, in the original sentence, “Light is a body which moves with great celerity,” there is but one predication made concerning “light,” namely, that “it is a body of great or astonishing velocity." It is also to be observed, that the prepositive pronoun in the one sentence, and the relative pronoun in the other, refer to different antecedents. Thus, in the sentence, “The magnet is a stone, and it attracts iron,” magnet is the antecedent to it; but in the sentence, “The magnet is a stone which attracts iron," stone, and not magnet, is the antecedent to which. Nor is this all. There are many instances where the resolution proposed, by introducing a double instead of a single predication, would produce either nonsense or falsehood. We can say with perfect truth, that “Legendre was the first mathematician who remarked the coincidence of symmetrical magnitudes but if this be converted into “Legendre was the first mathematician, and he remarked the coincidence of symmetrical magnitudes,” we obtain two propositions, the [7:10:687]former of which contains an affirmation erroneous in point of fact. In like manner, if the expression, “Solomon was not the son of David who rebelled against his father,” be resolved into “Solomon was not the son of David, and he rebelled against his father,” we have one negative proposition which is historically true, converted into two propositions, the one negative and the other affirmative, but both of them historically false. Mr Harris subjoins as a specious confirmation of his theory, “that the Latins in the structure of the relative seem to have well represented its compound nature, of part pronoun and part connective, in forming their qui and guis from que and is, or, as Scaliger would have it, from xα∕ and if, xa ∣ and i” But, whatever there may be in this, the foregoing examples prove that the relative has often an effect very different indeed from that which is produced by combining a connective with the prepositive pronoun.

If, however, the connective (which is nothing but an arbitrary interpolation) be kept out of view, and the relation between the different pronouns be carefully considered, it will, on examination, be found that the relative is merely a particular explanation of the demonstrative pronoun. That the article is really a demonstrative pronoun, cannot be denied by any one who has attentively considered its true nature and import. The common application of i μtt, i òt, and ro μιv, ro ðs, in Greek, renders this sufficiently obvious; and, besides, direct evidence may be produced to establish the fact. In the expression TOI μtt iaι∕Mv ∣ t tι<Sι, ^[8. Hesiod. ] “ Uli quidem sunt daemones,” õvrei might have been used instead of τω; and again, in the sentence, E∕' TO xaι TO bn∏ιβιt άχάξωπος ivnf ivx à» 0m6ant, Demosthenes. s “If this man had done that and that (such and such things), he would not have been dead,” rouro might have been used instead of ro. Nor is this confined to Greek alone. In English also the article is used as a demonstrative pronoun. Thus, when Nathan said unto David, “Thou art the man,” the expression is the same as if the warning minister of heaven had said, “Thou art that man.” And the same practice likewise obtains in the Gothic and in the Anglo-Saxon, where, according to Manning, the article put demonstratively has the same signification as hie, heec, hoc ; is, ea, id ; ille, illa, illud. ^[10. Manning, Grammat. Anglo-Sas. et Maso-Goth. ] i

But not only is the article employed as a demonstrative pronoun; in the more ancient Greek writers, particularly in Homer and Herodotus, it is frequently used as a relative pronoun. This has already been shown, and need not be further illustrated by examples, which might be produced in any number required. Θs<m TOI Ολυ/^τβ» tχou<n^[11. Odyss. . ] is manifestly the same as 0sβ∕ 'OI Ολυμπο» iχotιΛ. And, conversely, the relative is sometimes used as an article. “Imo, inquit Vigerus, absolute 'OΣ pro ’ O nonnunquam usurpatur. Th (λoyou xα∕ τλourou) τψ μt> l 01i< ∣ >f àıı χξ<uμιn>f, a<p' 'OT it nις iuμιm ∣ t iπa(χω> ‘ quorum altero recte semper utens, altero indigentibus abunde subveniens / ubi af>’ 'OT pro am TOT.”^[12. But Vigerus, though aware of the fact that it ⅛ sometimes used for ∙, does not seem to have observed that the article i is merely the relative pronoun it, the ancient form of which was τ∙t (whence τ,, τ,u, v∙,, m∙, &c.), with the final “elided. In Xenophon (Afr- morabilia, cap. 4) we find this expression: Kα< 'o∑ λφr 4 l κn, i¢s, v« m«ar· ∙w∙>, where ⅛, though it may be called a pronoun of the third person, is plainly nothing but the article, and where, also, it appears that the demonstrative, used in a particular wav, is in reality the relative pronoun. ] Anciently the article was used as tire relative pronoun in English as well as in Greek. The Lord’s Prayer, in its older form, commenced thus: “Our father the art in heaven,” where the is obviously used as a relative pronoun. And the same thing obtains in the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon, in which last, according to Manning, the put after pronouns of all the persons signifies qui, who; as Ic the, Ego qui, I who. The same author adds, “Apud Gothos similiter articulus, per omnes casus, vicem gerit pronominis relativi; ut sa in ΗΙΜΙΝΛΜ, ‘ qui in coelis.’” Again, the demonstrative pronoun that, in English, is used indiscriminately with the relative. Thus we say indifferently, “The man that endureth to the end,” or, “The man who endureth to the end “The messenger that Alexander sent to Darius,” or, “The messenger whom Alexander sent to Darius ;” “The mountain that overhangs the lake,” or, “The mountain which overhangs the lake and so universally. Upon the whole, therefore, it may be concluded that the relative is merely a particular application of the demonstrative pronoun; or, in other words, that the signification of the relative is radically the same with that of the demonstrative pronoun.

But what, it may be asked, is the precise signification of the demonstrative pronoun? When it is said, “Csesar Dumnorigem cepit atque interfecit eum,” it is evident that the eum refers to and represents Dumnorix. A question however arises, namely, under what character does it represent him? Caesar took Dumnorix; but cum does not represent him as a prisoner, and, there > s no other circumstance connected with Dumnorix which the pronoun can suggest to the mind, except the previous mention of his name. From the reason of the thing, therefore, independently of any induction, it may be concluded that ewn can only be equivalent to the said or before-mentioned; and, accordingly, it will upon trial be found that, wherever the demonstrative pronoun occurs, some such expression as said or before-mentioned may be substituted in its stead. A nd’this view is confirmed by the etymology of the demonstrative pronoun in as far as it can be traced either in Greek or in any other language.

For example, the Greek pronoun aùro¢, corresponding to the Latin ipse or idem, and often to hie, appears to be the past participle of the old verb αυω, clamo or dico formed upon the same analogy with the Latin past participle;^[13. The universal practice of the Latins in terminating their past participle in TÜS, creates a strong presumption that such formerly was also the practice of the Greeks; seeing that, at a remote period, the Latin language was unquestionably a dialect, or, at least, little else than a dialect, of the Greek. And this presumption, joined with the actual existence in Greek of a numerous classof verbal adjectives in TO∑, having a passive signification, puts it almost beyond a doubt that these verbals in τo∑ are just the old past partidples of the verbs to which they respectively belonged, several of these may indeed have undergone some change of signification, but their consequent or secondary meaning may easily be traced to their primary import, in other words, to that of the past participle. Thus E i a* l , amo, forms the old past participle ⅛a>ror, amatus, “that hath been loved,” and consequently “that may be loved,” or, amabilis ; l’taau, rideβ, forms the past participle yιλ*<rτκ, risus, “that hath been laughed at,” consequently “that may be laughed at,” and, by inference, “that is capable of exciting laughter,” or, in other words, ridiculus ; and so of the rest. The following examples, selected from many which might be produced, will be sufficient to indicate the analogy upon which these verbals are formed, and to show the propriety of regarding them as the past participles of their respective verbs: [table] ] ® so [7:10:688]that aprti, the Greek demonstrative pronoun, is in fact nothing but dictus or said. Another familiar instance is the use of the word ditto in book-keeping; as when it is said “paid ditto in full.” Ditto, as everybody knows, is the Italian detto, formed from the Latin dictus, in the same manner οsfatto from factus, ritto from rectus ; and hence the expression, “paid ditto in full,” is “paid said person in full,” or, more simply, “paid him in full.” Again, in our own language, Mr Horne Tooke has satisfactorily traced the pronoun it, anciently written hit, and still so pronounced in many parts of the country, to the past participle of the Anglo-Saxon verb haitan, dicere, nominare; whence it follows that it or hit signifies said or named. ^[14. In legal phraseology said is itself used as a demonstrative pronoun; as “ said city” and “ laid seisin” for “ that seisin. ] It may, therefore, with some confidence be concluded that said was the original import of the demonstrative pronoun; and, as the relative pronoun has been shown to be only a particular application of the demonstrative, the signification of the former must, ex paritate rationis, be identical or synonymous with that of the latter, and, consequently, equivalent to said or named.

In a learned essay, to which Dr Gray’s prize was adjudged, on the import and application of the relative pronoun, the author, Mr Ĳ. Carmichael, shows that the apparent etymology of this pronoun, in the Gothic language, affords the strongest possible corroboration of the truth of the above conclusion; inasmuch as the Gothic relative is merely, with a slight change of the aspirate into sigma,^[15. This change, natural in itself, is of frequent occurrence; thus ha th becomes ha s , see th becomes see s, doe th becomes doe s , speake th becomes speak th , and speak s , and send eth becomes send th , send s . ] the past participle of the verb signifying dicere, to say. And the admitted connection traceable between the Gothic and the ancient dialects of the Greek language suggests another conjecture, which serves to strengthen the probability of the preceding etymology, and also to confirm the truth of the general proposition above enunciated. The observation of Mr Horne t Tooke, that Anglo-Saxon verbs, having ι as their characteristic letter, change that letter, in the formation of their past tense, into a broad, is equally applicable to Maeso-Gothic verbs; thus quiman makes quam, QUITHAN quath, and so on. But as different persons pronounced differently, and also used different written characters as representatives of their sounds, this change of the characteristic letter was exhibited either by a broad, or by o, or by u; and hence it may be inferred from analogy that quath would also be pronoanced quoth, which accordingly is still met with in the colloquial dialect of several districts in Scotland. It would also appear that quoth was sometimes pronounced and written quod ; thus, in Chaucer, “Sir Knight (quod he), mymaister and my lord.” Quod and quoth have therefore been in use. But, in Anglo-Saxon, quid, dictum, frequently occurs; and from the same analogy we may infer that quith was also in use at one period. It follows, then, that quoth and quith are in reality the past tense or past participle of the verb quithan, dicere. But as the old form of the Greek relative pronoun was xo¢, different parts of which, as κou, κη, xως, occur frequently in Herodotus, it may not unreasonably be conjectured that the Gothic quoth formed the Greek xo¢ (the th becoming ♯ in the same manner as id)ι, in the imperative of the second aorist, becomes first ood, and then ðo¢), and that quid formed the Greek xz¢, afterwards written n¢, and the Latin quis. Further, it has been observed, that in the Maeso-Gothic, saei, qui, and the article sa corresponding sometimes to the Greek í, and sometimes to oùro¢, bear the strongest appearance of having formed part of a Gothic verb corresponding to the Anglo-Saxon sachan, dicere ; a circumstance which serves to confirm the truth of the position, that the real signification of the relative pronoun is said or named.

From this induction, which appears to be conclusive, we now proceed to consider the uses of this pronoun in language, and at the same time to inquire whether, in the different examples produced, the relative corresponds, in effect, to the signification which we have assigned to it. The principal uses of the relative are, first, when it renders the clause in which it stands, in some respect or other, descriptive of its antecedent, or, in other words, when the relative is equivalent to an adjective noun ; and, secondly, when it intimates that the amount of the clause to which it is prefixed is to be taken as a substantive noun.

1. With regard to the first of these uses; namely, when the relative clause can be expressed by a single term', every one must perceive that it describes or qualifies the antecedent, and is therefore equivalent to an adjective noun. Thus, in the sentence “vir sapit qui pauca loquitur,” the relative clause, qui pauca loquitur, may be expressed by the term pauciloquus, and “vir pauciloquus sapit” is therefore exactly the same as “vir sapit qui pauca loquitur that is, qui pauca loquitur is precisely equivalent to pauciloquus, or, in other words, the relative clause is equivalent to an adjective noun. But the relative is by no means restricted, in its application, to those cases where the clause which it introduces may be expressed by a single term; on the contrary, the latter may be as long and as complex as the writer or speaker may chuse, although there be no single term in the language expressive of the same combination of ideas. When, for instance, we say, “He is the happy man, who, at any moment of his existence, can reflect on a life which has been spent in the conscientious discharge of his duty the clauses, “who can reflect on a life,” and “which has been spent in the conscientious discharge of his duty,” may not be expressible by single terms; but if they were, these terms would [7:10:689]universally be denominated adjective nouns. And this leads us to observe that there are two ways by which the relative qualifies the antecedent; the first, when the relative clause is merely descriptive of the antecedent; and the second, when it ascertains to what particular class or species the antecedent belongs. Thus, in the sentence, “The emperors, glorying in nothing but oppression and cruelty, issued many tyrannical edicts, which, as might be expected, fomented discontent and excited rebellion, instead of enforcing submission to their authority it must be obvious that the whole of the clause introduced by the relative is equivalent to a compound adjective descriptive of “tyrannical edicts and that if the word said were substituted instead of which (the noun “edicts" being understood), the sense and effect of the sentence would remain unaltered. Again, in the sentence, “homo, qui sapientia caret, nil profuit hominibus,” the relative clause qui sapientia caret, qualifies homo by ascertaining to what particular class or species this “homo” belongs. But though, in the former examples, it will readily be allowed that the word said may, with perfect propriety, supply the place of the relative pronoun, yet they who have not been accustomed to make the substitution may scruple to admit it in others, or to agree that the sentence “A man, who is destitute of wisdom, is a cipher in society," is exactly equivalent to “A man, said (man) is destitute of wisdom, is a cipher in society.” Still the equivalence is undoubted; for the subject of the proposition, “a man,” is, in both cases, qualified by words which have precisely the same effect in ascertaining to what class of men he belongs; and although, in the latter case, the relative clause assumes the form of a parenthetical sentence or interjected affirmation, yet if, in pronunciation, the word said be slurred over unemphatically, or articulated in the very same manner as the relative who, every one must be sensible that these two sentences are, in effect, identical. To prevent the appearance of violence in the substitution, it is necessary to repeat the antecedent along with said; but this arises solely from our not being accustomed to use said disjoined from its substantive, as we have long been accustomed to use the relative pronoun.

2. The second use of the relative pronoun is, when it intimates that the clause to which it is prefixed is to be regarded as the equation of a substantive noun; as in the sentence, “That you are disappointed, gives me pain," where the clause “that you are disappointed” is evidently the nominative to the verb “gives,” and perfectly equivalent to “your disappointment” It is true that when the relative occupies this position, grammarians have been accustomed to call it a conjunction ; but nothing, surely, can be more unphilosophical, or better calculated to produce needless perplexity and destroy the primitive simplicity of language, than to class the same word in different categories of speech according to its position and effect in a sentence. Such a mode of procedure, whilst it is but a clumsy method of screening ignorance, tends to retard a free investigation into the real meaning of words, by deceitfully substituting a technical name instead of a ra-tional explanation; and it insidiously attempts to wrest from etymology the right of stamping upon terms their genuine signification. In opposition to the commonly received notion, however, it may safely be affirmed that, in all known languages, the neuter of the relative pronoun is prefixed to a nominative and a verb, and that the sentence thus formed is, in amount, equivalent to a substantive noun. Thus, when Homer says, Kwββιn γag Tcgι <xa>- rsf, 'O μoι γ ∣ (ter iŗxfrai αλλp, “for you all perceive this at least, that my prize is going away to another," Ό μu γcζa( i{χιraι aafy ∣ is evidently the object or thing perceived by all; and hence, if this sentence could be expressed by a single term, it would be universally denominated a noun substantive, and would be in the accusative case governed by λ≡ufftfiri. The same observations are, mutatis mutandis, applicable to the following sentence:

∆ιtfi<thκ T>γt*rxtn Ό ù emf bru( ∣ χι χu(∙t Α*tλλsn. where Ό ci aùrc; inrι ∣ ι ∣ χc %“l a í ’Ατολλω» is a complete substantive governed in the accusative by yi/rud’XAw. Again, in, the neuter of the relative pronoun inn; (compounded of ⅛, guis, and rις), is universally employed in the same manner. Thus, in the sentence, , Ajxm βcι pieůci, ìţm, touts ×aι μovov, ’ OTI ìx λu×oυ βτouaroς ×aι iocrrun iįŢìįsí xagav <rua>, “even this alone, that you have taken your head safe and sound out of the mouth of a wolf, is sufficient reward for you," if 'OTI ix λυxou sroµan; run iootro» iζτ ∣ ξ ∣ i ×aiav sua> could be represented by a single word, every one would regard it as a substantive noun, an¢ as the nominative to the verb agxu.

In the Latin language, quod, the neuter of the relative, and ut, which is just the Greek in, are used in precisely the same manner. Thus, in the passage, “Haec nuncι-antes orabant, ut opem ferret, hostemque haud dubium Romanis terra aut maritimis viribus arceret; qui ob nullam aliam causam, nisi quod immincrent Italiae, peterentur it is obvious that “ut opem ferret” and “ut hostem arceret” are compound substantives governed in the accusative by “orabant,” and also that “quod immincrent” may be considered as a substantive under the regimen of ob, and expressed thus: “Qui (scilicet Oricini) ob nullam aliam causam, nisi (ob) imminentiam Italiae, peterentur.” It is evident, therefore, that quod, when thus prefixed to a nominative and a verb, is not a conjunction, but only the neuter of the relative pronoun; that when so used, the sentence is, in amount, equivalent to a substantive noun; that no real assertion is intended to be made by the relative clause; and that, on the contrary, the nominative and verb are merely an explanation of the relative which precedes them. In the expression, “I know that you are disappointed,” that enunciates indefinitely the object known, and may apply to any object of knowledge whatsoever; but when the clause “you are disappointed” is subjoined, it limits the knowledge to a particular object, namely, your disappointment. It hence appears that, in making the words which explain that contain a real assertion, Mr Horne Tooke has admitted a fallacy into his ingenious resolution of the relative pronoun when thus employed; for, in such expressions as “I do not assert that you are disappointed,” or, “I do not believe that you are disappointed,” it would surely be absurd to maintain that I assert your disappointment, when I expressly say that I do not assert it, and do not even believe it. Upon the whole, then, it seems evident that, in this use of the relative, the pronoun itself is merely a general enuncialive of the proposition which follows; and that this proposition being the equation of a substantive noun, or an explanation of the pronoun, is to be taken abstractedly, or, in other words, to be considered not as containing a formal assertion, but merely as something said or enunciated.

2. Of Comparison.

Comparison, comparatio, is derived from comparo, to put together, a word literally intimating the mode in which one thing is compared with another, namely, by collocation or juxtaposition; and hence, in all languages, this process is expressed in nearly the same manner. The degrees of comparison are commonly said to be three; the positive, comparative, and superlative. But the positive can scarcely be denominated a degree, as it simply states the epithet, and employs no comparison whatever; thus, albus, white, pulcher, fair. The comparative states [7:10:690]a comparison between two objects only; the superlative between more than twx>. It is impossible, however, to express by different terms, or single words, the gradations or shades of difference which may exist between objects, as, for instance, in colours; and hence necessity obliged the framers of language to invent means by which these various gradations or qualities might be generally expressed. With respect to those words which admit of comparison, two things seem to be necessary; first, that they represent general ideas; and, secondly, that they represent objects which are capable of increase or decrease. In this view even nouns substantive, or generic terms, may be compared. Thus it may be said of a person possessing in an eminent degree those qualities which constitute a hero, that he is more a hero than another less liberally endowed in this respect; and, upon the same principle, we find in Greek ∕3α<r∣λju⅛ ∕3αΛλιursjoς, ∕3α<r<λwraroi. But the names of individuals, or, in other words, proper names, do not admit of comparison,.because no individual can be another, and consequently no man can be more himself than another. The same observation extends to the personal pronouns, which, although in themselves general, do not admit of comparison, because they are particular in their application. Numbers, too, are the most general of all words; yet, as they do not admit of any addition or diminution, they are not susceptible of comparison; for, if we suppose two sets of any thing, each consisting of six, the one set cannot be more six than the other. Verbs, however, may admit of comparison, thus, amat magis, he loves more ; and so also may participles as partaking of the nature of verbs. It is commonly objected, indeed, that the latter then become adjectives; but this is extremely incorrect; for, in such words as servans, servantion; amans, amantion ; the meaning is hot “loving,” “more observant of love,” but “loving al present? “ more observant of love at present” Adverbs may also be compared; thus, convenienter, convenientius, convenientissime ; eleganter, elegantius, elegantissime. Prepositions, being a species of adjectives, and oblique cases of nouns, arelikewise susceptible of comparison; thus we have in Greek ¶ţa, πgωraτι>( now «įtsnį, and, in English, before, further, foremost ; hind, hindmost. Interjections, if they be signs significant of ideas or emotions of the mind, may, in like manner, be used in degrees of comparison. The repetition of the same word denotes a comparison, as alas, alas ; and the expression ter quaterque beali, indicates a degree of comparison, perhaps the highest. Among the Hebrews the repetition of the same word, as good good, is employed to express the superlative, and hence becomes synonymous with optimus, very good or best; and children make use of the same method to express the degrees of comparison. Of conjunctions nothing positive can be said in this respect. as their nature has not yet been satisfactorily ascertained.

But there is a much more refined and less obvious view of the subject of comparison, namely, that the comparative may be recompared, and so also may the superlative; in other words, if language were fitted to express it, there may be an ascending or descending series of successive comparisons of comparatives and superlatives. Without attempting any thing of this sort, however, it may be shown that from one comparative another may be formed, and from one superlative another comparative and superlative, and so on to almost any extent whatever. Suppose three persons, John, James, and Peter: John is tall, James is taller, and Peter is tallest; but, instituting a second comparison, Peter is more taller than John than James is; that is, as Peter is the tallest of the three, and as James is taller than John, Peter, with reference to John, the common object, must be taller to a greater extent or degree than James, the intermediate subject of comparison, is. But this, which it is difficult to state intelligibly in words, may be better comprehended by the following simple diagram.

Here D is tall, and C is taller than D, but B is more taller than D than C is; and of the three, A, B, C, it is obvious that A is most the taller than D. In the first case, when we said that B is more taller than D than C is, we formed a new comparative of which the former comparative C is the positive; and, in the second case, we formed a new superlative, of which the former comparative was the positive. This may be visibly represented in the following manner:

Here we have three distinct groups or classes of objects, and A, B, and C are each the tallest of its respective class or group; yet these three in their relative excess may again be recompared. Thus B may be more the tallest of its group than A is of its group, and of the three, A, B, and C, C may be most the tallest of its group. This process, it is obvious, might be carried to any length, and we might form a triple, quadruple, quintuple, sextuple, &c. comparison; nor is there any logical incongruity in the expressions which we have employed, when these are properly applied and understood.

No limit is set to comparison in nature; the only boundary fixed is by our confined faculties. If we were to advance beyond the first, or at most the second step, we would become involved in relations so complicated that it would be impossible to conceive them; and convenience, therefore, obliges us to stop short. In English, we generally express such comparison by circumlocution. Thus, instead of saying that B is more greater than D than C is, we commonly say, that B exceeds D more than C does. But instances of the former are sometimes met with even in that language, and not unfrequently in Latin. “The Romans,” says Mr Hume, in his History of England, “ were more inferior to the Greeks in eloquence than in military glory that is, the Romans were inferior to the Greeks both in eloquence and in military glory; but they were more inferior in eloquence than they were inferior in military glory. The language of the historian, therefore, is both logically and grammatically correct, though its accuracy has been impeached by persons ignorant of the principle on which the comparison is made. Priscian the grammarian appears to have perfectly understood the rationale of such expressions; but Ruddiman, with all his ingenuity and erudition, seems to have been altogether in the dark respecting it, as is evident from the manner in which he speaks, in his Grammatica Major, of the instances of double comparisons quoted from Priscian. The resolution of all such examples, however, is, according to the principle here stated, equally certain and obvious. Thus, “Achillee Aeneà magis fortion quam justion fuit that is, Achilles was more braver than Aeneas, than he was juster than Aeneas; in other words, Achilles exceeded Aeneas both in bravery and in justice, but he exceeded him more in the one (bravery) than in the other (justice). The expression, therefore, is perfectly classical, and consistent with itself. Again, “Ajax est magis fortion Ulysse quam Diomede that is, Achilles is braver than Ulysses, and he is also braver than Diomede, but he is more braver than Ulysses, than he is braver than Diomede, or, in other words, he exceeds Ulysses more in bravery than he does Diomede. There is a passage in the historian Florus, a writer of a vigorous imagination, and whose writings accordingly exemplify that [7:10:691]characteristic, which, by reason of a double comparison, has been completely misunderstood. It is to be found in lib. iv. c. 46, of his history, and is as follows: “Sed nec minus admirabilior fuit illius exitus belli.” In none of the editions of Florus is any notice taken of this passage; and upon consulting Clarke’s translation it will be found that he has simply rendered minus admirabilior “ less admirable,” just as if it had been minus admirabilis. But it is not from the words themselves that we are enabled to make out the passage; it is from the context. Throughout the whole of it there is a train of closely-connected comparisons going on in the mind, and, in particular, three circumstances are mentioned, each having a tendency to create wonder in a greater degree, viz. Isí, “Nunquam ullo loco tantum virium populus Romanus vidit,” the forces were more numerous than at other times; 2⅛ “Nunquam imminentis ruinae manifestiora prodigia,” the presages of impending ruin were more striking than at other times; and, 3d , “Nunquam acrior neque alacrior exercitus Caesaris,” the army was keener, and evinced greater alacrity, than on ordinary occasions. The circumstance, therefore, which led the author to use the expression “Sed nec minus admirabilior fuit illius exitus belli,” was his having previously mentioned the three things first stated as more wonderful than at any other time. There is therefore a double comparison here, Sed nec minus admirabilior, &c. “But no less (or, in no less a degree) more wonderful was the issue of this war,” viz. than the issue of other wars. The three particulars above stated were more wonderful than at any other time, and this was no less more wonderful. Without the double comparatives the real meaning of the author could not have been expressed. But for the same reason that it was “ minus admirabilior,” it might have been “magis admirabilior,” more more wonderful. Magis, however, though used as a comparative, is in truth only a positive of which major is the comparative, and magissimus, i. e. maximus, the superlative; it is derived from the Greek μιγας, and literally signifies greatly ; thus, “more elegant,” was originally “greatly elegant.” The comparative, therefore, produces a different effect in language from that which it did originally, when its import was not “more,” but “greatly.”

The intrepid apostle of the Gentiles, speaking of himself, in one of his epistles, says, tμoι rω tλaχurron1if> m∙asrus rω> aγιωr, which is translated “less than the least,” probably because “more the least” would have made but an awkward appearance in English. The superlative here is formed into a new comparative. But the Greek comparative ends in -∏(0f, which, when fully traced, seems to be ιrtgtι, the comparative of t⅛, one, joined to the word denoting the subject or thing compared, and signifies not more of one, but one of two ; for we find the termination -rsjo; very frequently without any augment or increase of qualities, as ru ∣ i, ruriļoí, which of the two; tif, one, trtiof, not more of one, or more of unity, but one of two; άλλο;, another, αλλor∣foς, not more of another, but another of two; iς, who, órfgo¢, which of the two, in Latin uterus, abridged into uter ; and, in the same manner, *αλoj, fair, xaaoreξoς, the fair of the two. We may add, that whether, in English, means which of the two. Agreeably to this notion, then, the comparative being used as a partitive, major fratrum means the elder of the two brothers, or the one selected (on account of age) to the exclusion of the other.

Of the termination of the superlative no certain account can be given; it is a part of the subject on which all is conjectural; and although it could be traced, this would be attended with no practical advantage. Its Greek termination is in -ro¢, and there is some coincidence between this termination and that of the ordinal numbers rŗ/ro¢, nragrof, mμartς, &c. which do not mean the aggregate numbers three, four, five, but express each an ordinal unity ; thus rg ∣ rι>i signifies the third, and often one of the three. The same coincidence between the superlative and the numerals is observable in Latin; thus, optimus, &c. primus, quintus, &c. the first, the fifth, always denoting unity, that is, unity in a numerical series or order. Now, since in these two languages there is such a coincidence between the superlative and the numerals, let us for a moment suppose the superlative to be made up of unity, or to contain in it unity; then doctissimus Romanorum, resolved on this assumed principle, will be doctus unus Romanorum, “ the one learned or learned one of the Romans,” making thus a selection of one to the exclusion of all others. Unus is taken two ways, either definitely or indefinitely; either as one only to the exclusion of all others, or as one of any number. Horace has an example which seems to favour this view, and in which for unus potes, one that is powerful, we might substitute potissimus, the most powerful. And Quintilian says, “Demosthenes eminens unus in omni ge-ņere loquendi est,” in which expression eminens unus is the equation of eminentissimus. The superlative, like unus, is used both definitely and indefinitely; definitely when optimus, for instance, means the best ; and indefinitely when it is rendered very good. Horace, when inviting Mecaenas to a feast, desires him to write back word, “Tu, quotus esse velis, rescribe,” where quot, combined with unity, signifies “of how many you wish to be one ı” and so perhaps the superlative is composed of unity and the word expressive of that which is susceptible of comparison, namely, the positive.

Lastly, the comparative is often expressed by quam, as “Virtus est praestantion quam aurum.” But tam and quam correspond to each other as antecedent and relative, and are really such themselves; tarn being the accusative of the Greek article rov, rnr, and quam the accusative of the relative, and their effect being tarn, to the degree, quam, to which degree. Hence the expression may be resolved, “Virtue is generally excellent to the degree to which gold is,” and more. According to the idiom of the French language, it would have been “quam aurum non est,” to which degree gold is not. In certain cases of apparent comparison, it is said by many that potius and magis are understood, as “Res autem admonet cavere quam consultare,” where it is commonly said that potius ought to be supplied; but surely this would be a very violent supplement, and the more natural one, undoubtedly, would be the antecedent of quam. Thus, “Res autem admonet tam cavere quam consultare,” “Circumstances warn us to be on our guard to the degree to which they warn us to consult” or consider what is best to be done. The import of than in English, however, is not so easily ascertained as that of quam in Latin. Where potius and magis are used they seem to be of the same import with the Greek prepositions <rαjα and τgoj, and significant of apposition or juxtaposition. To in English denotes apposition and likewise comparison. “These blunders are nothing to what we find in Grenada,” that is, compared with “what we find in Grenada.”

Such is an abridged, and, we fear, very imperfect, view of the ingenious and original speculations of Dr Hunter on the subject of comparison; speculations with which all his pupils must be familiar, but which, notwithstanding their extreme refinement, have not hitherto, so far as we know, been submitted to the public, even in an intelligible abstract.

3. Analytical Resolution of the Moods and Tenses in the Greek and Latin Verbs.

The subject of the verb, and of verbal forms, has already been treated of at considerable length, but chiefly, as the reader will have perceived, with reference to the English[7:10:692] language. It may not be improper therefore to extend the application of the same principles to the resolution of the moods and tenses of the Greek and Latin verbs, and to establish, both analytically and inductively, their universality as laws of human speech, or rather of the human mind adapting language to the expression of its thoughts.

It occurred to Dr Hunter, early in life, that by separating the time from the other circumstances involved in those forms of the Latin verb called the tenses of the indicative and subjunctive moods, the explanations of the tenses, and also of these moods themselves, would be much simplified. The view which then occurred to him he continued to give annually, in his grammatical prelections, during a period of about half a century; and though, without calling in the aid of other principles, it is insufficient for the explanation of certain uses of the moods and tenses, yet, as far as it goes, it has contributed to the elucidation of a subject respecting which grammarians had, with a few exceptions, being long accustomed to wander in the dark. Mr Dawes, in his Miscellanea Critica, first published in 1745, reached the very verge of Dr Hunter’s opinion;^[16. See Miscellanea Critica, p. 85, Dr Burgess* edition. ] and Matthiae, in his copious grammar of the Greek language,^[17. Matthiae’s Greek Grammar, sect. 522. ] published in 1809, explained some passages of the Greek authors conformably to a general principle found exemplified in the structure of every language. But as he does not seem to have been at all aware of the principle itself, and of the universality of its application, Dr Hunter was induced, several years ago, to publish an introductory view of the moods and tenses of the Greek and Latin verbs, in which both the principle and its application are most clearly and beautifully unfolded, and which, with his consent and approbation, we are enabled to subjoin. Before entering on the discussion of the particular verbal forms, however, this venerable patriarch of philology premises some general observations connected with the subject, and necessary to a just view of it.

Anderst, in the polished and refined state in which the Latin language has come down to us, it is perhaps impossible to decompose tire various moods and tenses of its verbs, so as to exhibit with certainty the elements, or the generic verbs, by the coalescence or combination of which those moods and tenses have been originally formed. The surest, perhaps the only, guide, to which we can have recourse, is furnished by the decomposed state in which these moods and tenses are represented in our own or other modern languages, by means of those generic verbs termed auxiliary. Thus, scripsero, when decomposed into its simple elements, we represent, by recombining these elements in in this manner, I shall — have — written. Secondly, whosoever, therefore, shall attempt a complete and satisfactory explanation of the moods and tenses of the learned languages, which is still a desideratum in our grammars, must attend particularly to the literal import and meaning of those auxiliary verbs. But even this will not always be sufficient. He will often find that more is meant than meets the ear; and that it is further necessary to call to his aid our modes and habits of thinking, and the inferences which mankind naturally and habitually draw from the verbal statements given. In the expression I will write, all that is stated is my present will, inclination, or intention to write. There is nothing in it expressive of a future action ,∙ yet every person understands it as a declaration, or assertion, of future writing. Now, as this is not the amount of the statement literally taken, the effect must be the consequence of an inference drawn from the present volition to the future action. From the present volition the future action is inferred.

Thirdly, The verbs which our grammarians have termed auxiliary are chiefly these: am, do, have, shall, will, may, can. One or other of these we employ, or may employ, in rendering literally into English the moods and tenses of the Greek and Latin verb. These verbs, however, when combined with a noun or subject, constitute, each of them, the predicate of a proposition. They all of them express an assertion, affirmative or negative, and consequently they are all verbs in the indicative mood: as I am, I am not ; I do, I do not ; I have, I have not ; I shall, I shall not ; I will, I will not ; 1 may, I may not ; I can, I cannot. From this view of the subject, some important consequences seem deducible.

1. These auxiliaries, being thus all verbs in the indicative mood, and all of them, when combined with a noun or subject, expressing an assertion, it follows that the tenses of the Latin subjunctive, or potential, or optative, as in certain instances it has been called, as well as the subjunctive and optative of the Greek verb, which involve those auxiliaries, and are literally rendered into English by means of them, are also indicative. To consider certain of those forms or tenses as exclusively indicative or assertive, and others as not so, seems to be founded completely in misapprehension, and tends to perplex and mislead. “I may write,” “I might write,” are as much assertions, as “I do write,” and “I did write.” The thing indicated or asserted is different; but, in as far as assertion is concerned, they are completely similar, and stand upon precisely the same footing.

2. Such expressions as, “I may read,” “I may write,” “I might read,” “I might write,” “I may have read,” “I may have written,” “I might have read,” “I might have written,” are incorrectly and improperly considered as moods, or modes, of reading and of writing. It is the verb may that is generic, or the term to be modified, and the other verbs annexed to it contain the modification. The verb may predicates liberty in general of its nominative or subject; may read, may write, predicate liberty to read and to write. They express not liberty in general, but liberty modified or particularized. They ought therefore to be considered as modes or moods of the verb may, not of the verbs read and write. The same observations are applicable to all our other auxiliaries. The verb can predicates power or ability ; “ can read,” “ can write,” predicate particular power, the power or ability to perform those particular actions; and so of the rest. What has now been said of the English auxiliaries is applicable to the moods and tenses of the learned languages. If the generic verb be prefixed, as it is in our own language, it remains a separate word; and has been termed an auxiliary verb. If it be subjoined, or annexed at the end, being unemphatical, it becomes enclitic ; and, adhering to the verbs to which it is thus annexed, comes at last to be considered as a flexion, or termination. The French future J ai à or de porter, is an instance of the one process, and Je porter-ai is an instance of the other. And, in the progress of elision or abbreviation, the auxiliary may be so disguised as to be no longer distinguishable. It may even be doubted if Je porter-ois will now be recognised as a compound, or be believed to be the abbreviated form of Je porter-avois, “I had to carry.” Similar to these last examples appear to be the moods and tenses of the Greek and Latin verb. The auxiliaries, being annexed at the end, have come to adhere to the verbs to which they were annexed, and to be considered as merely changes of termination; and they are with difficulty, if at all, distinguishable as having been separate verbs. Yet the foregoing considerations and examples render it extremely probable that they were originally separate verbs, not prefixed, like the English auxiliaries, but subjoined.
[7:10:693]

and at last attached to and incorporated with the words to which they were subjoined.

But, whatever opinion may be adopted as to the origin and history of these flexions, no doubt whatever can be entertained that they are similar in their nature to our auxiliaries; that the terminations contain the generic part of the expression, and are modified by the radical part of the verbs combined with them. The forms scrib-am, leg-am, teg-am, are therefore improperly considered as moods, or modes, of the verbs scribo, lego, tego. It is the termination •am, the common part, that represents I may, or I can, and which receives modification from scrib-, leg-, teg-. The general notion of liberty or power is modified by the notion of writing, reading, and covering, with which it is combined; the termination -am, by the radical part of the verbs, not the radical part by the termination.

3. As the English auxiliary verbs determine the nature of the moods of the learned languages, and, as has already been seen, lead us to conclude, that, by whatever name they may have been distinguished, subjunctive, optative, or potential, they are all equally indicative or assertive; so they also, if we listen to their suggestions, will be found equally decisive as to the tenses or times of those moods. These auxiliaries are all verbs. They are all verbs of the indicative mood; and they are all verbs of the present time or tense, each of them having a corresponding form appropriated to past time. Thus, Pres. Am, do, have, shall, will, may, can. Past. Was, did, had, should, would, might, could.

The terminations or flexions of the verbs of the learned languages, which contain or involve those auxiliaries, should therefore also be either of the present or of the past time or tense. Whatever they predicate of their subject or nominative, whether existence, action, possession, duty or obligation, volition, liberty or possibility, ability or power, they will be found, like the auxiliaries which they involve, to have two corresponding forms, one predicating those attributes of the present time, the other of the past. If then we separate the time from the other circumstances involved in those forms of the Greek and Latin verb called the moods and tenses, the time thus separated, or separately attended to, will, in every one of them, be found to be either the present or the past. One primary object of these forms seems to have been to give the present and the past as two fixed points of time, with a reference to which all the other ideas involved in them are to be estimated and determined. They are all past, present, future, contingent, &c. with reference to one or other of these two fixed points.

These preliminary observations seemed necessary to prepare the way for the proposed elementary view of the tenses of the Latin verb; and in the sequel that view will be further illustrated and confirmed by the application of it to the moods and tenses of the Greek verb'. The tenses of the Latin verb, arranged as present and past, are as follow:
[table]
[table]

Let us adopt the words naw and then, as short and convenient expressions to indicate the present and the past. Scribo, the present, then, represents my writing as now doing, as now in progress; set∙⅛ebam, the corresponding past, as then doing, then in progress. Scripsi, ^[18. This tense Dr Clarke has, with great correctness of thought, called prcesens perfectum, the time being really the pretent. There is, however, no incongruity in combining with this form an expression of the jκιrt time at which the action wα∕ performed ; as, for example, in stating an action as now past, and at the same time as having taken place last year, or even last century ; or in stating,an event of last year: as now past. The usage of the English language does not admit of combining with the perfect, expressed by have, any expression of time that excliuķs the present: at least we do not commonly say, “I have written the letter last week," but “I wrote the letter last week." . r; j ' ] l the perfect, represents it as now done, or past; scn∕jseram his form ought to be called praθcritum perfectum, in conformity with the view on which the tenses have received their denominations, the time being really past (prateritum), and the action or verbal state represented as then finished (perfectum), and not in pro. gress. Helvctu jam per angustias ct fines Sequanorum suas copias t>ansduxebant, et in Aeduarum fines pebvenebant, eorumque agros poruLAHENTua. (Caesar ∣ n Bell. Gall. lib. i. c. 11.) The time of these three verbs is a past time, and in this instance they refer to the same point of past time; but the first two express what was then done or past, the third what was then doing. 2 as then done or past. Scribhtt, whether considered as the future indicative, or as the present subjunctive, represents my writing in the one case as now future, as a thing that is to be ∙, in the other as a thing that may be. Although there may appear to be a marked difference between these two when they are uttered separately, and not combined with another verb, yet, when they are found in combination, as generally happens, the effect of them is in most cases precisely the same. They equally present the verbal state as future, and equally present it as contingent or possible. Thus, Si jubebis or jubeas faciam, “If you order me, I will do it.” Both forms represent my doing it as depending on your ordering me; and both, at the same time, mark the relation of that order to the present time; the one as an event now future, the other as an event now contingent or possible. Jubebis, however, in this combination, leaves it uncertain whether you shall order me or not; and jubeas leads to the inference, that, if you order me at all, that order is future. What the one states as future, is at the same time stated by si as uncertain ; what the other states as uncertain, is at the same time perceived to be fiiture. The two modes of conceiving the event are so blended together, that it is often a matter of indifference whether we employ the one tense or the other; and in numerous instances the present subjunctive may be rendered by shall. It is from th⅛ affinity or similarity between these two modes of conceiving the action or verbal state, that the terms expressing them often coincide in form. Thus scr⅛AM, legsuι, audisM, tae, in all our elementary books, set down both as futures of the indicative, and rendered shall or will, and as presents of the subjunctive, and rendered may or can ; and, whilst απ∣EMUs is rendered may or can love, scribEW>s of the same termination is rendered shall or will write. It is from the same affinity of signification that both these tenses always unite, in one past form, the imperfect of the subjunctive; as scHíbrem, which, as the past lime of the future indicative, represents my writing as then future; and, as the past time of the present subjunctive, represents it as then contingent or possible, as a thing that might (may-ed) be.

There is, in like manner, so great a similarity of meaning in the forms scr⅛>SERiM and scripSEUo, that, excepting the first person singular, they coincide completely, and always unite in one past form, scripsissEM. äm/iscrim represents, not my writing, but my having written (the act of writing being conceived, not as doing, but as done), as now contingent or possible, as a thing that may be, or, which amounts to the same thing, it states my writing as a thing that may have been. ScripsEtto states my having written, the completion of my writing, as now future, or as a thing that shall be, or it states my writing as a thing that shall have been. The former is accordingly rendered by [7:10:694]Mr Ruddiman, I may have written; the latter, I shall have written. ^[20. These two, like the present subjunctive and the future indicative, approximate so nearly in signification, that it is often a matter of indifference which of the two be employed. Si sensero hodie quicquam in his to nuptiis Fallaciae conari, quo fiant minus; ———te, Dave, in pistrinum dedam usque ad necem. Ea lege atque omine, ut, si to inde exemcrim, ego pro to molam. Ter. And. I. ii. 25. In this passage the tuture and perfect subjunctive may change places without in the least varying the ultimate effect. My perception or your attempting deception is stated as now future, but to be past or to have taken place when I commit you to the grinding-bouse; and my releasing you from thence is stated as now contingent or possible, and consequently wow future, but to be past when I grind in your stead. AIy perception is conceived to stand here in a double relation: one to the present time, with respect to which it is future, and the other to the commitment, with respect to which it is to be past. Both events are represented as future with respect to the present time, but the one as past with respect to the other. The same observation is applicable to exemcrim and molam. ] Scrips issem expresses precisely the same conception with the two last, differing from them in no circumstance whatever but the time, and expressing the same thing with reference to past time which they express with reference to the present. It is the past time of set√ p scrim and senpsERo. It states my having written as then contingent or possible, I might (may-ed) have written; or as then future, I should (sceoll -ed, Saxon) have written.

Let us apply this view to the various forms in combination with another verb.

And, first, of those which have respect to present time.
[table]

This set of examples are all presents, each of them containing in itself an expression of present time with reference to which all the other ideas involved in it are to be estimated. ' “They promise now, that they will do
[table]

In this combination, imperat states the act of commanding as now present, at the time when they promise; imperavit states it as now past, imperabit as now future; imperet as now contingent or possible, as an event that may take place; imperaverit (perf.) states the having commanded as now contingent or possible; imperaverit (fut.) states the having commanded as now future.

It is necessary further to observe, that all these forms contain only the reference or relation of the command to the present time, and that all of them, excepting the first, leave the time of commanding, the time when the command is actually given, completely indefinite. Imperavit, for example, merely states the act of commanding as now past, but leaves the time of giving the command unascertained. The command may have been given last moment, last week, last month, last year, or last century. In the same manner, imperabit states the act of commanding as noví future. It expresses barely the relation of the command to the present time, but leaves the time of commanding completely indefinite. It may be next moment, next day, next week, next year, next age. If the time of the command be necessary to be ascertained, an expression of future time, or the statement of a future event, with which it shall be contemporaneous, is required for the purpose; as to-morrow morning, next week, at sunset, or at sunrise, &c.; or it may be obvious from other circumstances in the context or narrative. In like manner, imperaverit states the having commanded as an event now possible, or now future; but of itself it indicates neither the time of giving the command, nor any time or event to which the com mand shall be prior, or before which it may or shall have taken place. From the desire, however, which we have to obtain precise rather than vague information, we naturally avail ourselves of the circumstances in the context or in the combination in which it stands, to ascertain what the form itself leaves undefined. In the example given above, imperaverit may be considered as standing in a twofold connection, and as having a double reference; one to the present time, the time of the promise (pollicentur), with respect to which the act of commanding is stated as contingent or future ; the other to the future time of performing the promise (facturas), with respect to which the act of commanding shall be past. The whole statement may be fully brought into view by a paraphrastical or periphrastical development, thus: “They promise that they will execute his commands, when the act of commanding, now contingent, or now future, shall once be past, or when the command shall once have been given.” Secondly, Of those tenses which have reference to past time.
[table]

This second set of examples are all past tenses, each of them containing in itself an expression of past time, with reference to which all the other ideas contained in it are to be estimated. “They promised then, that they would do
[table]

In this combination imperabat exhibits the act of commanding, as then doing, having the same reference to past time that imperat (commands) has to the present; and therefore may justly be considered as the past time of imperat. Imperaverat represents the act of commanding as then past, and is therefore the past time of imperavit, which represents it as now past. Imperaret represents the act of commanding ,either as then future, or as then contingent or possible. In the former case it may be considered as the past time of imperabit : imperabit stating the act of commanding as now future, or future at the present time; imperaret as then future, future at a past time, which in this instance is the time of the promise. They are therefore related to each other as present and past. On the other hand, if imperaret be considered as representing the act of commanding as then contingent or possible, a thing that might be, it will be the past time of imperet ; the latter exhibiting the conception in reference to the present time, and the former exhibiting the same conception in relation to past time. The affinity of signification between the future indicative and the present subjunctive, as formerly observed, is so great, that their terminations often coincide; and hence they always unite in one past form, the imperfect of the subjunctive.

What increases the difficulty of this part of the subject [7:10:695]is, that we have in English no auxiliary verb so generalized, ' as, like the terminations of the Latin imperfect subjunctive, to include the particular meanings expressed by should and might, so as to be equally applicable to both. Neither does the English idiom always mark the relation of events to one another in respect of time, as contemporaneous, or prior, or posterior, with the same minuteness as the Latin. This last circumstance also increases the difficulty, and adds to our embarrassment in our inquiries on this subject, as we are apt to consider the different and often more vague statement of the English language as an exact counterpart of that given by the Latin.

It has already been observed, that the pluperfect subjunctive expresses precisely the same conception as the perfect and the future subjunctive, differing from these in no circumstance but that of time, and expressing the same thing with reference to past time which they express with reference to the present. These two ought therefore to be considered as present forms, and the pluperfect as the corresponding past form. Imperaverit, for instance, states the having commanded as now contingent or future; imperavisset as then contingent or future, contingent or future at a past time; but of itself it indicates neither the time of the actual command, nor any time or event to which it was to be prior, or before which it was to have taken place.' Imperavisset, however, in the connection in which it stands in the example given, is naturally, if not necessarily, conceived to have a double reference; one to the time of the promise {pollicebantur), with respect to which the commanding iras future or contingent; the other to the execution of the command {facturos) which it was to precede, and with respect to which it was to be past. “They promised that they would execute his commands, when the act of commanding, then contingent or future, should once be past." This clumsy circumlocution is in some degree requisite to bring fully into view what is so concisely and neatly expressed in the Latin.

Such are the views respecting the moods and tenses of the Latin verb which Dr Hunter has unfolded in his invaluable disquisition on that subject, and which, we need scarcely add, are expressed in his own clear and concise language; views which might be illustrated by the usage of every known language, and which, in fact, are based on principles of universal application. In a matter which appears so clear, a wide range of induction was not called for, and might have proved tedious; and hence, in the subsequent part of his disquisition, he has confined himself to some illustrations drawn from the practice of the Greek language.

The indicative forms of the Greek verb, ro⅛rω, irυτm, rirψω, τ↑nu, irυ-ψα, iruvo>, rirupa, irtrupin, &c. seem to require no particular discussion, except whether the aorist in “ought to be considered as a different form of the preterperfect, as a learned professor seems to suspect. The following observations shall therefore be restricted to those forms called the optative and subjunctive, and are intended to establish and illustrate these two positions:

1. That in all the tenses of the Greek verb (except the future, which has no subjunctive), the subjunctive is universally of the present time or tense, and the corresponding optative is the corresponding past ti me . And, 2. That the optative of the future is the z χ w < ti me of the indicative of the future, which itself is of the present time.

We shall begin with the second position. In the preceding observations we have endeavoured to show that all the forms of the Latin subjunctive are really indicative ; that Imay write is as much an assertion as Ido write, although the tiling asserted be different. It will surely not be controverted, then, that I will wr ite, I shall write, or I am tn write, have an equal title to be called subjunctive *' ,lh I may write, or I can write. As 7 s, ⅛> 7 jα√, “He says that he will write,” is incontrovertibly classical Greek, the expression having a reference to the present time. Let λ∙ 7 ∣ι be changed into iλ∙ 7 ι the past, 7 jα∙ψι<, the indicative, must be changed into the corresponding optative 7 jα∙ψ w ∙ Eλ∣ 7 w vπ yga∙ψω, “He said that he would write.” The conception in both examples is exactly the same, except as to time; the former expressing it with reference to the present time, the latter with reference to the past. Should any doubt be entertained as to what has now been stated, the following passage from the second book of Xenophon’s Hellenica will be found to contain as many examples of the optative of the future as may perhaps establish the point by induction. It is part of the defence made by Theramenes, one of the Thirty Tyrants, when he was impeached by Critias, another of them, because he would not concur in all their measures of cruelty and rapine.

. . . . “ Ετti os oiiroι ηgξavro ãľåļaf xaaoif rt xaì άγαάοϋς βυλλaμiamn, i× roórou xjγω η1ξaμηv ranan-ía τoiroις γιγvωβ- xι ∣ v łįőEIN γάξ in, àmiowi¢xovro; μnι Aíowo¢ rou 2aλaμmou, àvòįò; xaì íwo¢ xaι óoxoũwo¢ ìxavoũ limi, άδιχοΐνης S’ oùði h, ũ 'όμοιοι rourι f ι poC⅛<roiNTO∙ φoZo∙jμtvoι ai hanrioι rŗ; Si rŗ; vokirua i⅛oiNIO∙ EΓIΓN∩ΣKON S's in, ξvλλaμiaκ>μhou Nixngarou roũ Nι×iou, xaì <rλoυβioυ, xaì tùSts írŵrort Sr ∣ μonxiiv of ∣ rt aìiroũ oiirι nũ oraτξi>f τζάξαντος, of rouru όμοιοι Sυβμιnri ùµñ γι- >)⅞ffoiNTo∙ αλλά μr,ι xaì, Amfamf i ∣ φ' iιμωιι 0πoWυμhoυ t ô¢ tv rįi <ιro>iμγ δύο rpr ∣ 1tις ιοτλιούβας araξtiχιro, 'HΠIΣTA-MHN in xaì of orξiθυμoι rŗ; <riXtι γtγtw ∣ μim, ∣ rairις iιπ6πrως vµĩv tξθIEN' awsÄroľ os xaì öri rŭv μιrolxωn ha txatrov λα-CiΛ tfaβaι %gf ∣ >aι∙ t5διjaov γάξ ’ HN, in, r<Arm aonaι>μhu>, xaì of μiroixoι anavrtς <mλiμιoι rŗ; τoλιnief řffOINTO.

In this passage every one of the indicatives is of the past time, and all the verbs subjoined are optatives of the future, “Hδs∕v γaξ in, &c. I had seen, and consequently I knew, that when Leon of Salamis was put to death, the persons similar to him foζηβoiwo would be afraid, and being afraid, if fo∕vro would be hostile to this establishment of ours. I judged too {tγιγιωβ×M St) that when Niceratus, the son of Nicias, was apprehended, the persons in a similar situation with him would become {γιιηβonmi) ill-affected to you. And likewise, when Antiphon was put to death by you, who during the war furnished two swift-sailing triremes, I knew {⅛rιβτaμrf) that those who had been prompt and eager to serve the state would be suspicious of you (tκr<κrra∣i ίξω«»). And when they said that each of us must seize one of the μιro ∣ xoι, I opposed the measure. For it was manifest (siδιjaov ⅛v) that, if these were put to death, all the μιroixω would be hostile {πoλιμ ∣ oι iβonn>) to the establishment.”

Let us now imagine that, instead of this narrative recital of his conduct and sentiments, Theramenes deems it proper to urge the same considerations to his colleagues in the direct or dramatic form. Every one of his statements must now be made by verbs, not of the past, but of the present time; and the indicatives of the past being changed into indicatives of the present, the verbs suĳoined must also be changed from optatives of the future to indicatives of the future, that is, from the past to the present, so as no longer to express what was then future, but what is now future. Change ¶Stn the past into oìSa the present (I have seen, consequently) “I know that if Leon of Salamis be put to death, the persons similar to him φ< ∣ Zr l ao>raι will be afraid, and being afraid iβovraι will be hostile,” &c. In like manner, if iγιγvωβxm ∣ , ⅛nβτaμιp, sδδηλiv ⅛s, be changed into γιγvωβxω, imβraμaι, fi∣⅛λ<w tarn, the optatives ytw1<nwwo, iξoiv, ì¢oirro, must also be changed into the corresponding indicatives, γιιr ∣ iovraι iξoυβι, and t trairai, which state these events as now future. The forms stating the events as future at a past time, will necessarily pass into those stating them as future now or at the present time.

The first of the two positions may be illustrated from the same part of Xenophon’s narrative, in which he relates in [7:10:696]detail the proceedings of the Thirty, and the measures which they adopted to gratify their hatred and establish their power.

“ Τούτων oι γsvoμivωv, i>f iξov įžt) miŵ a!∕ror( i,τι ∕‰λOINTO, mλλoυς μw iχigas ivixa Α∏EKTEINON, woaλo⅛ ói χρημά των EΔOSE o' aùroĩç, κrc ∣ ιs tχOIEN xai ro⅛ fgougo/į χgημa- ra åiióvai, xa∕ rωv μeroixωv iva ιxa<rrcv λaζιn, xaι αύτούς μtv àmxnntu, rd ôi χjjμaτa uiirSw a∕roβημr ∣ vaβiou ιxiaιυos ôs xai ri>v Ongaμ'evnv λαisZn òv τna ββύλΟΙΤΟ’ i ò’ 0,mxgfoaro∙ Aλλ' où ðoxiì μoι, tφη, χαλόν twai, φάβχο'/ταζ βtλτisrouι ιϊναι aδιxω- rtga τωv βυχοφάντων łro/ŵ txtñoi μt> yag, oraį ών χgημara λa i u,CobOIEN, ζηv EI ’ ∩N, ήμιΐ; ùĭ Α∏∩KTENOTMEN jtuiáèv άδιχοΰντας, ha χfl ∣ μara ž.oeµ¢áííìMF.N” ....

Here the whole texture of the narrative shows that the author is relating past events, the verbs being all of the past time, ásrtxrtivov, spoξe, lxιλtuov, &c. The ends proposed to be accomplished should therefore, agreeably to the first position, be subjoined in the optative. “There being nothing to prevent their doing whatever they might choose (βwhonro), they put many to death out of hatred, and many on account of their money. And, that they might have (iχoitv) money to give to the guards, they thought it proper (¢óoÇě) that each of them should seize one of the μιτoι- xo∕,^[21. It is foreign to the object of these observations to enter on any discussion of the meaning of the word μwu∙ι. It seems to mean domiciliated etrangers. ] and put them to death; and they ordered (èxsXtuo») Theramenes likewise to seize whichever of them he might choose (βουλοιτο),” &c.

If the narrative be given in the present tense, the leading verbs will then be anoxitivoυ<rι, ooxtι, xιλtυoυβι, and all the optatives subjoined in dependence on them must be changed into the corresponding subjunctives; thus: “There being now nothing to prevent their doing whatever they may choose (ò, τι àv βou>.ωwaι), they put to death (acnxrιm>υβι) many out of hatred, and many for die sake of their money. And, that they may have (iχωaι) money likewise to give to the guards, they think it proper (A>xι∕ aùro/¢) that each of them shall seize one of the μtroixoι and put him to death. And they order (xthsvwei) Theramenes likewise to seize whichever of them he may choose (⅛, nva av βovanτaι).

In giving the reply of Theramenes to this requisition of his colleagues, the author makes a transition from the indirect or narrative form, to the direct or dramatic. He personates the speaker (Theramenes), and gives the ipsa verba supposed to have been spoken by him on the occasion. “It does not appear to me,” said he, “to be honourable for those who profess themselves the best men of die state, to act more unjustly than the sycophants. For they Íthe sycophants) generally sufferED those to live (hωv ζriv) rom whom they might receive money (παρ’ in χξημaτa λaμiavoιιv) ; but we are going to put to death (j ∣ μt ∣ i δι arox- τινουμιν) persons guilty of no injustice, that we may receive their money (ha χρήματα λaμζavωμtv). n

This reply of Theramenes deserves to be particularly attended to, on account of the transition from the past to the present which it contains, and the corresponding transition from the optative to the subjunctive. Had the author intended to exemplify the first of the above positions, he could not have expressed himself in terms more appropriate, or more completely adapted to the purpose.

From what has been stated, it is easy to perceive why those statements, which, in the direct or dramatic form, are given in the subjunctive or in the future indicative, are in the indirect form, or narrative recital of them, expressed by the optative, precisely in the same manner as in our own language we employ, in direct statements, the present forms may and shall, and in the narrative recital of those statements the past forms might and should. Thus, the direct or dramatic statements, “I may perhaps go to London next week,” and “I shall perhaps go to London next week,” become in the narrative recital of them, I said that I might perhaps go to London next week,” and “I said that I should perhaps go to London next week.” So, when Agamemnon had retired wounded from the field of battle, Hector, in addressing the Trojans and Lycians, employs the subjunctive, a present form:

I∕⅛ iλa 1 !,ιrι μivι ∣ χnt lrτ>ι ∣ t iφtiμκv Δλv*Sv, ‘IN* lri(τ>{n Jχ∙f «{Η2ΘΕ.

“Drive (now) your horses straight against the valiant Greeks, that you may bear away still greater glory.” But, when the statement is given in the narrative form, as a past event, the subjunctive <xgnra< is changed into the optative ⅛o∕ro, the corresponding form of the past time:

T∙vf aĩ Tiíàŵ AioµŕÌìu īlaXXìtļ A/,',, ΔΩKE μ,i"f ,«1 Htrot, ‘IN* i*inX∙f µm srien Afγliωn yi,OITO, Si Ou, lr/λ., «{ΟΙΤΟ.

“Then Minerva gave strength and courage to Diomede, that he might (may-ed) become eminently conspicuous, and might bear away distinguished glory.”

It is to be noticed, however, that Homer does not always observe this, the usual and strictly grammatical, sequence of these moods. In the speech of Minerva to Diomede, we find a past tense followed by the subjunctive, “I removed the mist from your eyes that you may distinguish (iφga γι- vωsxr,ς) a deity from a man in the field of battle.” But, in the indirect form, or narrative recital, of this speech of Minerva, given by Plato,^[22. In Alcibiad. II. prope finem. These passages are quoted both by Dawes and by Malthiae. ] it is iφga γ ∣ vωsxoι. His words are, “Homer says that Minerva removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede, that he might distinguish.” But even in Homer the expression might have been, iφga γ ∣ vω<mω(. Άφιλον iφga γιvω<naus, I removed that you might distinguish. Wherein, it will be said, consists the difference? There is none in the ultimate effect. Tivωβxo ∣ ς would be used in reference to the time of removal, expressed by dptao>, a verb of thepost’ time, to which it would correctly correspond. Homer has chosen, however, to change the reference, and to substitute the subjunctive, a form of the present time, thereby marking a reference to the time of Minerva’s speaking, not to that of the removal. I (just now) removed that you may (now, or hereafter) distinguish. ’ Aφtaov states the removing as past, and may be used with equal propriety, whether the removal took place a moment or a century before. This appears to be a more correct view of the passage than that given by Dawes, who, to preserve a correspondence in the times, is obliged to make a<pιλov a preterperfect. Such changes of reference are, we believe, to be found in every language, and they are strikingly frequent in the Greek. A person speaking of himself might say in English, “I laboured hard in my youth, that I may enjoy ease and repose in the evening of life.” These changes of reference too are often alternate, as, in historical narrative, a transition is often made from the past to the present time, and from the present to the past.

In the course of this discussion, it has been stated that all the tenses of the subjunctive mood are indicative or assertive. If that observation be admitted to be just, it will supersede the controversy, whether the futures in -ro belong to the indicative or the subjunctive mood. It has also been suggested, that what have been considered as the modes or moods of the Latin verb are incorrectly so conceived; that these flexions are either generic verbs themselves, or equivalent to generic verbs, indicating liberty, power, &c. ; and that, instead of modifying the radical part [7:10:697]of the verbs to which they are annexed, they are really modified by it. It has been shown, that all the tenses, both of the indicative and of the subjunctive mood, whatever they may further involve, are every one of them either of the present or of the past time ; that they express of themselves one or other of these times, and may be classed in two sets, the one containing those forms which are of the present time, and the other those of the past time; that the present and past are two fixed points, with reference to which all the other ideas contained in those complex forms, called moods or tenses, are to be estimated; and that these other ideas are to be estimated as past, present, future, contingent, Sic. with reference to these two fixed points.

This is the elementary view which it was proposed to give of the tenses of the Latin verb. It contains, as far as we are competent to judge, the only ground on which a complete and satisfactory account of these tenses, in all their various occurrences and applications, can be raised as a superstructure; and, if admitted, it will enable us to decide several grammatical-controversies; as that, for example, between the acute and bold Sanctius and his learned editor Ferizonius, concerning the tenses of the infinitive and the participles, in which the former maintained, that, strictly speaking, time or tense does not belong to these, and that they are found of all limes. It is obvious that the infinitive and participles do not, like the definitive forms, contain in themselves the two fixed points of estimation above mentioned; but, on the contrary, that their statements, when they are estimated at all, are to be estimated either from the verb with which they stand connected, or from some circumstance given in the context. They are always estimated from something extraneous, and not, like those of the definitive forms, from any fixed point of time which they themselves express. Thus scribere represents the act of writing as doing or in progress, but contains in itself no expression of the time when doing. The time may be any whatsoever. past, present, or future. It is generally, but not always, determined by that of the verb with which the infinitive is combined. Thus, in dico te scribere, dixi te scribere, dicam te scribere, the time of the writing is determined, not by the infinitive itself, but by that of dico dixi, and dicam, the verbs with which it is here combined, and is different in each of these examples. The same observation is equally applicable to the participles, as is manifest from the following examples: video to scribentem, vidi to scribentem, cras videbo to scribentem. It has been said above, that the time of the infinitive is not always determined by that of the verb with which the infinitive stands combined. Dicote scribere may equally signify, 1 say that you were then writing, as that you are now writing ; and dico te scripsisse may equally signify, I say that you had then written, as I say that you have now written, if any circumstance in the context require it to be so understood.

In further illustration of the subject, it has been stated, that through the whole of the Greek verb except the future, the subjunctive and corresponding optative differ only as present and past; consequently, if the subjunctive be rendered by may, or may have, the optative will be rendered by might, or might have ; and when the subjunctive is rendered by shall, or shall have, as frequently happens, the optative will be rendered by should, or should have. It also appears that the future of the Greek verb may be considered as itself subjunctive, and of the present time, and the optative of the future as the corresponding past time.

These views the very learned and ingenious author has sought to establish by facts; and if the inductive conclusion appear to be founded on too limited a number of examples, the number of these may be increased by any person ad libitum. He proceeds:

The celebrated Matthiae has attempted to explain the common use of the subjunctive mood, when combined with certain particles of time, by the hypothesis, that it then expresses an action frequently repeated at the present time. But meeting in Homer with these words, addressed by Andromache to Hector, A γ∙( i√ ∙λλs

Emu 3nλro(n, iru it rυγι wtτμet i<rwwyt, he is obliged to admit, that the subjunctive with these particles does not always express an action frequently repeated; and for this good reason, that a person can die but once. Yet that learned author does not seem to perceive that this single instance in Homer is fatal to his hypothesis.

Mr Seyer of the university of Oxford, in his work on the syntax of the Latin verb, has assumed, that, in certain cases, the subjunctive is strictly synonymous with the indicative, and has proposed to distinguish it in such cases by the appropriate name of the False Subjunctive. Nothing could have been devised more unphilosophical than this proposal, which, had it been successful, and generally adopted, would have effectually dashed all spirit of inquiry, and prevented all further investigation of the subject. Can it for a moment be supposed that an enlightened people, provided with two forms of the verb for the expression of two different and distinct conceptions, should reject the form appropriate to one of them, and employ in preference the other form, Which did not correctly and adequately express the conception? If the learned author had seen the following example, of authority that will not be questioned, “I regret that it should have been found necessary to add to the burdens of the people,”^[23. The Prince Regent’s speech in proroguing the Parliament in July 1819. ] he might perhaps have been induced to pause a little, and to ask himself whether delicacy of feeling, arising from some peculiarity in the circumstances of the speaker, or in those of the party addressed, or in the occasion, may not have led him to employ the subjunctive form, should have been found, in preference to the indicative forms, has been found, and was found. ^[24. subjoin here Dr Hunter’s conclusive reply to the objections stated by Professor Dunbar in his work on the Greek and Latin Languages. Xt is reprinted from the postscript to Dr H’s. Disquisition on the Latin and Greek verbs. “Mr Dunbar, the learned professor of Greek in the university of Edinburgh, in a work entitled An Inquiry into the Structure and Affinity of the Greek and Latin Language· (p. 250), has made some animadversions on one part of the foregoing essay. I subjoin the passage in his own words :—‘ I must here state that Dr Hunter’s ideas respecting the subjunctive mood appear to me not well founded. He has derived ids notions of it from the English auxiliary verbs may, can, &c. which he says are all indicative or aeicrtive. This is no doubt true of these verbs when taken by themselves; but when joined with others, they evidently convey the notion of some condition or contingency, arising either from ability, inclination, duty, or obligation, in the same manner as those parts of Latin verbs that are subjoined to the tenses of the indicative, and give them a conditional meaning. It is surely not the same thing to say, I am writing, and I may or can write. The one implies the prêtent act unconditionally; the other, a future act, and conditional. I may write if I please. I can write to him, »/you wish it,’ &c. “I must observe, that there is nothing in language more subtle than the use of our auxiliary verbs, and of the verbal forms of the Greek and Latin which contain or involve them. They require more depth of thought, and more patient investigation, than yet appears to have been bestowed upon them. I cannot, therefore, at present enter on the subject further than to observe, that, as far as I am competent to judge, the strictures of my learned critic are founded in misapprehension, and completely erroneous. The sen tence, I may write, states my present liberty to write. It states that there is at present no external hindrance to prevent my writing. The words contain a proposition true and complete in itself, without further addition; and my learned critic is obliged to annex to it the conditional clause, if I please, to make it suit his purpose; not aware, it should seem, that it is the actual writing that is dependent on my pleasure, not the present liberty to write. In like manner, 7 con write, states my present power or ability to write; and this capacity exists independently of your wishes. My actual writing may depend on your wish, but not my ability to write. 7 con write whether you wish it or not. The freedom from external preventive and the inherent power or capacity frequently exist together; but either may exist without the other. 'Eξ∣vr, μu γoa1>tι., aλλ ’ >ι> imaμaι i u ∙m∙ %ti(ay(us. There is from without no hindrance to my writing,’ but I am unable to do it because of the gout in my hand. 'Eξ∣vτ<, sed non lnrr∣; I have the iξnma, but not the ðiouµif. “My learned critic, under a misapprehension for which it is difficult to account, has found fault with my calling the future in -ro the future of the subjunctive, imagining, from my employing that designation of it, that I intended to exclude that future from the indicative mood. 1 must observe, however, that although, to prevent being misunderstood, I was obliged to call the future in -rv by the name by which it was generally known, and by which it is distinguished in our elementary books; yet the general tenor of my essay, and even the following paragraph of it alone, ought to have prevented all possibility of misapprehension on the subject: ‘ ín the course of this discussion it has been stated that all the tenses of the subjunctive mood are indicative or assertive. If that observation be admitted to be just, it will supersede the controversy, whether the futures in -ro belong to the indicative or to the subjunctive mood.' P. 14. “I have stated (p. 4) that ‘ one primary object of these forms called the moods and tenses seems to have been to give the present and the past as two fxed points of time, with reference to which all the other ideas involved in them are to be estimated and determined. They are all past, present, future, contingent, &c. with reference to one or other of these two fixed points.’ And I have there given a scheme of the tenses of the Latin verb arranged, agreeably to that principle, as present and past. This unfortunate future in -ro, however, Professor Dunbar has, in exhibiting that scheme, studiously transferred from the class of presents to that of pasts, and has thereby marred instead of mending the consistency of the scheme of arrangement. For it is quite evident that, as ιerib-am states my writ-ing as now future, and therefore, as he admits, is properly arranged as n present ; so, for the same reason, scrips-ero, which states my having written, or the completion of my writing, as now future, must also be arranged in the class of presents ; the completion of my writing being future relatively not to the past, but to the present time.” We have only to add, that when Professor Dunbar says, “It is surely not the same thing to say, 7 am writing, and 7 may or can write,” he not only misunderstands Dr Hunter, but confounds two things not very difficult to distinguish; namely, assertion generally, and the thing asserted or indicated in particular verbal forms. Dr Hunter never said or imagined that, “I am writing,” and “I niay or can write,” are identical propositions, what he really stated, and has always maintained, is, that “I may write,” “I might write,” are equally assertions as “I do write,” “I did write.” The thing asserted or indicated is nιΓFEHENT; but, in as far as assertion is concerned, these expressions are completely similar, and stand upon precisely the same footing. ]
[7:10:698]

4. On tin Analogy observed in the Formation of some Tenses of die Greek Verb.

Of all the philological speculations of Dr Hunter, one of the most beautiful, perhaps, is that concerning the analogy observed in the formation of some of the tenses of the Greek verb, of which, under the modest title of “Conjectures,” he published an outline in the ninth volume of the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. The importance of this speculation, which, notwithstanding the beading given to it, is very far indeed from being merely “conjectural," consists in the advance it makes towards establishing juster rules for the formation of the tenses in some instances, and particularly in accounting for certain forms of the verb in Homer and Hesiod, which, being apparent violations of the usual analogy, have perplexed grammarians, and reduced them to the necessity of imagining new presents, without authority, and for no other reason but to account for such anomalous forms. The following is the clear and concise statement of his views on this matter, given by Dr Hunter himself.

“1. The perfect middle has not a middle signification. (See Küster De Voce Media, sect, i.) Its form, too, is active; and therefore it probably belongs to the active voice, which, on this supposition, becomes more regular and uniform, having a double preterite, as well as a double future and aorist. Thus,

í rvψω fr-j∙ψα τιτjφa 1. Prêt.

ļ ru¢r¢u frικrαικ vsswa 2. Prêt.

“It is no objection to this account, that the second preterite may sometimes be found in a middle signification; for active verbs in all languages are sometimes used as middle, the reciprocal pronoun being conceived, though not expressed. Thus μιταβαλλω in Greek, accingo in Latin, prepare in English: ‘ omnes accingunt operi,’ they all prepare (themselves) for the work.

“2. Ο in the second preterite, or preterite middle, uniformly arises from t in the present, and from nothing else, asyω, λtaoya--∣3λsirω, βtβλ<,era. atiarω, λtλoκra — trιι6ω, πtnoit>a.

That φititω, μιiξω, aγι ∣ gω, and other such verbs having a liquid before ω, make iφ ∣ )wa, μtμoξa, ∙f ∣ γoξa, and not µiµoiea, iφ6ωξa, r ∣ γo ∣ ξa, is no exception from the rule. For all such verbs probably had of old not t ∣ , but t only, in the penult. Thus φ6ιiξω seems to have been of old p0sjjω, whence the old or Aeolic future φDtoβw. So µiiiu was μtigω, whence µtįo;, pars ; and the old or Aeolic form aγt⅛a> is still to be found. In like manner, βtβoλa seems, as Dr Moor has observed, to be formed, not from βαλλa∣, but from the old verb βfλλa∣, whence βιλoς, jaculum.

“3. Although the first preterite, or perfect active, generally follows the analogy of the first future, yet it sometimes, too, observes that of the second. Thus,

, ∫ not ⅛rtaxα, from βnλω, 1. Fut.

-r≡λλω makes ( bu1 , ιβτaλχa1 from tfraλi , g Fut In the same manner, rtwu, xrtivω, xιιpω, tm ∣ ξω, &c.

“4. On the other hand, although the second preterite, or perfect middle, generally follows the analogy of the second future, yet it sometimes, too, observes that of the first. Thus, _ ,. 1 f not tdrr ∣ λa, from <rraau, 2. Fut.

2πλλ " makes ļ but fr θ m; Fut

In the same manner, rs∕vw, xnnω, xιιgω, etrtiļw, &c.

Nay, from t in the penult, there often arises o in the first preterite, or perfect active. Thus, <xtmμφa, λ∣λoχα, x«x-λofa, óeao/xoe. from <xιμeros, λtχω, xλκrrω, iιιiω, &c. And this seems of old to have been still more frequent, and to have extended also to the passive voice. Thus, µiµoijat, Ttircįåai, in the old or Aeolic dialect, from µthu (t. e. μι ∣ ξu) and σιοΰω.

“5. In the same manner, although the first aorist generally follows the analogy of the first future, yet it also seems, particularly in the more early periods of the language, to have sometimes followed that of the second future. Thus, χιω, iyta ; so item, r l nγ×a, or nvtixa, αλeυα- μwoς, ixr ∣ a, &c.

“Since, then, there are in the Greek verb two futures, and two preterites, each of which preterites follows the analogy of either future, and since there are two aorists, and that the first aorist also follows the analogy of either future; would it not, from these facts, be rather probable than otherwise, that the second aorist should also follow the analogy of either future; that, as from rwa) there is formed {rυ<ro>, so from rυ∙ψω there should be formed irvψ<n? And, [7:10:699]if this were admitted, would it not account for such words ' as xaraβ∏mo, touetn, λιξto, iļdio, iitι, hifιτω, aξt-rω, &c. which have so much perplexed the celebrated Dr Clarke (see Notes on Iliad, B. 35. E. 109; I. 613), in a manner more satisfactory than is done by the arbitrary method of imagining new presents in -<r⅛∣, from which these forms may be deduced? For it is only to account for such anomalous forms that these new presents have been imagined; and the grammarians would no doubt have assumed imaginary new presents also, to account for such first aorists as tχια, ixr,a, if, by so doing, these aorists could have been reduced to the usual analogy.

“Now this supposition, namely, that the second aorist, as well as the first, follows the analogy of either future, which is thus rendered in some degree probable, has actually taken place, at least in some instances. Thus the compounds of τsμrω,

from the first future αποτιμώ has in τoτιμvω √ the second aorist part, άποτιμων, as well

as from the second fut. άποταμω, άποταμων.

So ∕ξo>, they came, II. 23, v. 38; xanβηβιn, II. 24, v. 191, both of which follow the analogy of the first futures, viz. iζω (from ixω, venio) and xaraβη<roμas. And every person acquainted with the elements of Greek is aware, that, as μnω is the primary form, whence, by the common reduplication, arises, first, μtμιιω, and then, dropping the short ι, by what the grammarians call syncope, μιμvω, and as γms is the primary form, whence, in like manner, is derived γιγιω (Latin gigno) and yιγnμaι ; so <nra> is the primary form, which, by like reduplication and syncope, gave birth to ¢n¢rr¢u, cado, from which primary form itirω, making in the first future <snβω, there is formed the second aorist “re«», in common use; which, in so far, both illustrates and confirms the foregoing hypothesis.”

These observations were written about thirty years anterior to the date of their publication in the Edinburgh Transactions (1823), and, of course, before either Villoison’s or Heyné’s editions of the Iliad were published. Subsequently to their appearance. Dr Hunter judged it proper to subjoin some facts contained in these two celebrated editions, together with a few observations suggested by these facts, and tending to confirm the opinion which he had been led to form of the anomalous flexions above mentioned of the Greek verb. The additional illustrations, derived from these sources, together with the critical remarks by which they are accompanied, we shall now place before our readers. (See Edinburgh Transactions, ubi supra.)

“From the ancient scholia, quoted by Heyné in his observations on the various readings of the Iliad, and from the large volume of scholia published by Villoison (as well as from those contained in Barnes’s edition of the poems of Homer, published in 1711), it seems to be clearly established, that, in the days of the Ptolemys, this form of the second aorist, following the analogy of the first future, was more frequent in the writings of Homer than that of the first aorist, formed upon the analogy of the same future; and that it was the reading received and approved by the most eminent of the Alexandrian grammarians, by Zenodotus, the keeper of the Alexandrian library, and by Aristarchus himself.

“Whilst, however, the Greek scholiasts have recorded these as the ancient and genuine forms used by Homer, they have, I suspect, greatly erred in their manner of accounting for them. After the lapse of so many centuries, these Homeric forms had, in a great measure, become obsolete,^[25. ' ϊ.θΐθ instance, however, of this ancient Homeric second aorist occurs in Theocritus, and another in Callimachus; and perhaps by an attentive observer more might be found.” ] and the other form, that of the first aorist, had come into general use; and those grammarians could devise no other method of accounting for these old and now obsolete forms, but by imagining new presents in -βω, of which they supposed these forms to be the regular imperfects. This manner of solving the difficulty has been implicitly followed by Eustathius, in his Greek Commentary on the Poems of Homer, and (lam sorry to be obliged to add) by my late invaluable friend Lord Monboddo; of whom, and of the dies Attici, now long gone by, in which I enjoyed his learned and elegant society, I never can think but with an indescribable feeling of satisfaction and regret.

“If, however, we acquiesce in this solution of the difficulty, we must be content to abate somewhat of our admiration of the Greek language, which has been heretofore held to express, with the utmost clearness and precision, all the various and diversified conceptions of the human mind, even to their minutest shades of difference. Indeed, that the Greeks, or any enlightened people, should employ those forms of their verbs as presents, which were familiar to every ear as appropriate expressions of the future, or, as Eustathius often expresses it, should draw back the future to express the present, is, when duly considered, a supposition in itself so unreasonable, not to say absurd, that it would require better and more conclusive evidence to support it, than has yet been produced. Besides, where was the necessity of such an innovation? what advantage was to be gained by it? The original presents remained in common use. Why then employ the futures, iι>βoμa ∣ and iξoμaι, for example, as presents, when iuω and ivoμa ∣ , and ixω and ìxoµou, present forms in common use, would answer the same purpose?

“There is still another consideration, to which, in a question like this, due weight ought to be given. There is no evidence whatever that those present-futures, or future-presents, in -βω and -eoµas, ever existed. They are not to be found in the poems of Homer or Hesiod. They are not to be found in the Greek authors posterior to Homer and Hesiod; and of Greek authors prior to the age of Homer and Hesiod we know absolutely nothing.

“From these considerations, it seems to be evident that the existence of these future-presents is merely a gratuitous assumption of grammarians, to account for the Homeric forms βf ∣ Aro, iυ<κro, &c. which they could in no other way reduce to any known analogy of formation.

“ This, however, the learned Dr Clarke had too much acuteness and good sense to admit; and, accordingly, we find him regarding these presents as altogether fictitious. His words on the passage '∩; ⅛α φomιβat, aπ∙.3r l βan, are these: ‘ Editi plurimi habent άitiβηβιη, a verbo feto άπο- βr l βoμa ∣ . ’ And, to obviate the difficulty, he changes àm-βnfftro here into amβnsaro ; and, when βηιnτo, or any of its compounds, occurs, his general practice is to substitute the form of the first aorist, βη<raro. But, even if it would remove the difficulty, this change is unauthorized. The other form in -in is attested as genuine by the Alexandrian grammarians, is supported by the Greek scholiasts, by the ancient manuscripts of the highest authority, and by the early editions. In Villoison’s edition of the Iliad, which bears to be an exact transcript of a manuscript of the tenth century, in the library of St Mark at Venice, the form is uniformly -tn, except in a single instance, and in that one instance I suspect -an to be an error of the press.

“Dr Clarke, however, soon finds that this change of -sro into -are, violent and unauthorized as it is, will not remove the difficulty. In the address of Diomede to Sthenclus, he meets with the imperative, xaraβησto, [7:10:700]’ O(fi,rin> Kanmiaim *araβ<ιrit 3 ∣ f(∙ι>. Iliad, v. 109.

which he attempts to account for in this manner: ‘ Videtur mihi imperativus ex futuro deductus, licet id non agnoscant grammatici; errareque eos, qui verbum hic in praesenti fingunt xaraβrtβoμaι. Quanquam, analogia haud dissimili persaepe usurpare visus est Homerus verbum i∙oβoμaι, δυaeo, ìòufíro,’ &c. Nothing can show more strongly the difficulty which Dr Clarke must have fielt in accounting for these forms, than that he is here obliged to have recourse to another gratuitous assumption of an imperative of the future, a thing unheard of before; and almost to admit ňusoµai as a present, from which to deduce lδuβtn as an imperfect. The fact is, that he found the authorities in favour of δuβtn and ε0⅛<rεro to be so numerous, and of such weight, that he did not venture, in these examples, to change -tn into -an.

“Afterwards, however, he found himself obliged to abandon this hypothesis of an imperative of the future, as well as his original position, that these new presents in -σa and -st>μa ∣ are imaginary; and he appears at last (he or his son, it is uncertain which) to adopt, in its full extent, the explanation given by Eustathius. That commentator, whose remarks would have been invaluable had his taste and judgment been equal to his means of information, if I rightly understand him, has this observation on v. 154 of the 20th book of the Odyssey: ‘ 'O ∣ atrι is sanctioned by a poetic rule of formation (noir l rixωt xanvιζtraι) as the imperfect of the verb wω, the future having retrograded into a present. For, of lκsv, the imperfect is 0<ffov, the third person iigí, the imperative the same in sound, also iιβι, of which the plural is 0∕<rers. ’ Dr Clarke or his son adds in continuation: ‘ Atque analogia quidem haud dissimili saepe usurpare videtur poeta verba δυqoμaι, βr ∣ aoμaι, βr ∣ σtn, &c. Vide autem ad II. c. 109 ’ (where, however, he reprobates the hypothesis of these new presents in -βoμaι). ‘ Occurrit eadem vox (viz. i>ι<sιπ) II. γ. 103, ó. 718, et apud Theocritum, Idyll, xxiv. 48. Porro fuerunt, teste Barne-sio, qui i∕<rαrs ubique legendum statuerunt, sed nullo profectu. Nam, uti ipse annotat, occurrit apud Homerum ò/ff¢ in imperativo, numero singulari, ubi isti emendationi locus nullus est, &cet apud Callimachum, φtζt βraχυv, iiit 0iξ ∣ βμw. Hymn, in Cer. v. 137.’

“All the attempts, however, to account for these forms in particular verbs are partial and unsatisfactory. As the facts to be accounted for are all similar, the true solution must be general, and such as will embrace them all. Whether the method which f have ventured to suggest be of this description, does not belong to me to determine. It possesses at least this indispensable requisite, that it accounts for all the phenomena in question.

“It would be tiresome to enter upon a particular examination of every individual verb of the kind which we are considering. It may not be improper, however, to select one example for the purpose of illustration.

“There are not many verbs of more frequent occurrence in Homer than iχω, venio, in one or other of its parts. It is found in the present:

E,∕ι, (e Cypro) îs on !ιt>{< τΛ 'IKil, rnμartι rxextn. Odytι. f. 444. and the future, iξoμou, occurs once in Hesiod, and ten or twelve times in Homer; and, in not one of these instances, can it by any sophistry be tortured into a present, or forced into an expression of present time, in the sense in which present time is generally understood. I shall note the places of occurrence, that any person may, if he chuses, examine them, and judge for himself. They are these: Hesiod. Op. et Dies, u. 477. II. a. 240; ζ. 363, 502; λ. 182; o. 505; -ψ. 47; u. 728. Od. δ. 515; 0. 198; X. 2Ί6.

“ 'lζβμα(, the future of ixu, then, must be decidedly excluded from the catalogue of new presents, devised by the

Greek scholiasts to account for the supposed imperfects, so frequent in Homer. And yet a new present, iξω, is equally necessary in this, as in any other verb of the kind, to account for iξm, they came, the past tense, formed upon the analogy of the first future; which, though not noticed either by Dr Clarke or by Heyné, is no less frequent in Homer than the future itself. Thus, ’ Aλλ ’ «τι Tξwι,√I≡0N, rtraμt ∣ n fiι>τι. II. ι. 773.

At quando jam Trojam VENERUNT, /«»İoíju¢ labentet.

See also II. x. 470; ξ. 433; φ. 1; ω. 692. Od. γ. 5, 31, 495; ò. 1; ». 194. Hymn, in Apoll. 411, 438, 230, 278.

“Nor is there a single unequivocal example of the first aorist of this verb to be found in the poems either of Homer or of Hesiod, except one, viz. iξaς, which occurs in the Hymn to Apollo, v. 223. In that same hymn, however, there are no fewer than four examples of the form in -o> (iξw), and another still in the Hymn to Mercury, v. 398.

“This instance of iξw, so frequent in Homer, may therefore be fairly admitted to be, in the language of the celebrated Bacon, an instantia crucis, clearly pointing out the true method of accounting for all the other Homeric forms of the same description. If so, there will no longer be any necessity for the gratuitous assumption of new presents in -βa> and -soμaι, to account for these forms; nor for supposing, with Dr Clarke, that xaraβηβu is an imperative of the future ; nor for changing, as he has generally done, the second aoriste βηβtn, xaraβr ∣ rin, &c. into regular first aorists in -an. We ought rather to restore the Homeric second aorists in -tn, recognised as the genuine readings by the grammarians of Alexandria, and the Greek scholiasts, and confirmed by the ancient manuscripts of highest authority, and the early editions.

“If the view which I have ventured to give of these Homeric forms in -ιrs be well founded, it will hardly be necessary to notice the canon of criticism attempted to be established by the learned Heyné, in his voluminous edition of the Iliad, as to -eto and -an, and the reasons for preferring the one to the other in particular passages. Of the futility of that attempt every classical scholar who will read with sufficient attention the last seventeen verses of the third book of the Odyssey, will be fully convinced. The learned German has adopted, without scruple or hesitation, the explanation of these Homeric forms given by the Greek scholiasts; and, in allusion, I presume, to the difficulty felt by Dr Clarke, in admitting the existence of new presents in -sa> and -βoμaι, he states his opinion, and the grounds of it, with decisive confidence, in the following words: “Esse autem talem formam praesentis βr l mμa ∣ dubitari nequit; nam est v. c. ®. 105. Aλλ' aγ, ěµur δ∙χtωt i'r ∣ βr l oii.O, ’ p. 506, v. 4. And on B. v. 35, he makes the following remark, not quite consistent with itself: ‘ Quid hoc loco intersit, non video; nisi quod aitiβrμnn antiquioris vocis speciem habet: nova forma subnata, ut δυβsμaι, lδuβoμr,v, et alia.’ How the nova forma should have antiquioris vocis speciem, I do not clearly comprehend. But a gleam of truth will sometimes burst through the darkness of inveterate prejudice.”

These views, which to most persons will probably appear to carry their own evidence along with them, have, however, had the misfortune to incur the disapprobation and censure of Professor Dunbar, who, in his very meritorious work on the Greek and Latin languages (p. 188, et seqq. Edinburgh, 1827, in 8vo), has treated “one of the most acute scholars and grammarians of the present day” (these are his own words) with far less consideration than might have been expected from such an admission, and who contradicts speculations which it is impossible to refute, in a peremptory tone, neither called for by the subject itself, nor much in keeping with the courtesy [7:10:701]that usually obtains amongst men of letters. It may not ' be improper or unnecessary, therefore, to show,’ by a few examples, that the critical strictures of Professor Dunbar are as deficient in point of accuracy, as his mode of expressing himself is, we are sorry to say, wanting in that respect which is due to the venerable age and to the great attainments of“the most acute scholar and grammarian” of his time.

1. After citing the greater part of the fifth paragraph of the first quotation above introduced, Mr Dunbar observes, “Dr Hunter then gives as an example the compound verb à¶artµvu, from the first future of which, says he, comes the second aorist participle åvronµw, as well as from the second future aroraμω, airoraµon. Where Dr Hunter found, the second aorist participle άτοημων, I do not know, as I never observed it; the other form, dworaμw, occurs often in the Greek authors." Now, it will not be very difficult to show where Dr Hunter found cùrenµaiv, or at least sufficient authority for employing it, and where Mr Dunbar might have made the discovery. In the Cyropoedia of Xenophon (lib. v. c. 2, 1. 29), there is the following passage :—’ Αλλα rouς µm àŴHŨora; iia ⅛⅜<ζw, n bu'λsγsm∙, in>ς os ânðįos <roau ivvurωrtξoυ, į tγω, υ∕β, xou ixum∙J ira/įo» ιora, ùmį π» iμov, βvμmxnra “of taυτ< t ι <rua-λα,3ao ESETEMEN, ώ; μικ r ∣ nς ιφaβao, x. r. λ. for a reason which will be obvious to every scholar, we abstain from translating this passage, in which Gobryas describes the treatment to which a certain ancient lover of surgery was in the habit of subjecting some of his boon companions. But as we have here ∙ξmμ∙, the participle of which is iξsrtμω*, it is difficult to conceive why Mr Dunbar should proscribe α%oπμs, or at least àmriµun, which only differs from the word employed by Xenophon in having the preposition àsn instead of the preposition ix or tξ prefixed to it. ’ Airorιμκr means to cut away or cut off; iξιnμtiv signifies to cut mit, or, in other words, indicates a somewhat more radical and complete form of the operation. If it be good Greek to use such a form of the verb as iξιτι-μιo, it can scarcely, we should imagine, be bad Greek to employ àmrtµtio, the same verb, in the same tense, varied only in its sense by the preposition prefixed.

2. “I am, however, decidedly of opinion,” continues Mr Dunbar, “that no first aorist was ever formed from a second future; and in the examples which the doctor has given, he has assumed what never existed" Here again the learned professor cuts a little before the point; for the “assumption” on which Dr Hunter has grounded his ingenious solution of these apparent anomalies, so far from being gratuitous and unauthorized, as Mr Dunbar asserts, is distinctly countenanced by Apollonius of Alexandria, whom Priscian calls summus auctor artis grammatica, and Mr Harris, in his Hermes, describes as “the most acute author that ever wrote on grammar.” In his treatise De Syntaxi (lib. i. c. 36, p. 76), this learned and acute grammarian, speaking of imperatives, says,

“Quid est igitur cur non ridiculi existimentur, qui negant esse verba imperativa futuri temporis, cum omnia cogantur ad futuri sensum Ĩ nam ea imperamus, quae aut non fiunt, aut non facta sunt. Quse autem non fiunt, aut non facta sunt, et tamen ut fiant apta nata sunt, ea futuri temporis sunt: siquidem et ea quae imperata non fiunt, enunciantur cum negante particula, et sensu futuri; ⅛ 3υ- nηβoμaι, lυ aoιηdω. Nam etsi dicimus etiam illo modo lu δύναμαι 8aβmfaι idem tamen valet atque lu bornβoμa>. Ergo ex futuri sensu imperamus ut fiat aliquid, aut non fiat, addita negante particula; imperfecte quidem, ut βxamru raς αμwtaouς; perfecte vero, ut <nca∙ψαrω raς àµrtXouį. Quid autem decepit eos qui admiserunt futuri imperativa ? l’ja∙ψ∙ tru tantum, et β<A dwiovygw; quae quanquam absolutius a nobis in libro De Imperativis diluuntur, tamen quia locus etiam hic idem exigit, pauca quaedam adjungemus. Nimirum illud yfa∙ψ∙rω et iitt poetica licentia per enallagen fuisse usurpata pro voce yja∙ψαr*ι et φtξt ; non direrso tempore, sed dilectu verbi, quod, utra voce velis, recte profertur; quemadmodum in indicativo modo quoestio ejusmodi ante orta est; in inquam, vel iγga∙ψtς, quandoquidem in istis nullum temporis discrimen est, sed tantum in scriptura; quae assumi potest non sine ratione probabili, sicut demonstramus in capite De Verbis." ^[26. To prevent mistakes, and obviate cavils, we shall subjoin the original of the passage translated from Apollonius: '' nSs o!∙ où y<λ.7< l urn u į|Uĵi] mXnßotTlt μμ<oτn Tζomnon*a μιλλo,τot χζooou, ⅛<> γι χ∙α.τα n>M>Suτα< lit mo Toũ μlλλnrol tooino ∣ lr< γr( μη γmμtootf i μn γιγororn n rftrvniif τn μo γnoμ tta ⅛ µ„ γιγmτn, lnmiiuτητa ïl iχc∙τn ùt to lnr!hu, μιλλ∙m> lvm>, it γι mu τSo τ1orτκχμι,ru, <r. μ∏ 7 j, *r i,,β λaγι,'iχu μιτu AΤοφαηοι; Mu τns rev μιλλoιτot iκr∙iΛi, où iumroμou, où rur>rn. xi, γao oùru φaμl, t où )vιβμeu 0<rταnu, i» ĩrn lm rũ ou àuomµtu. ut to γnir^ou ou, . γιur3aι ń rζorrnζ t γairao, iτoφo^xoμwn Áro rit toũ μιλλoorot i,oo At, Uf μιr <«¢ar*r.», norriro root iμτι. Xout, uι ìl mτlλuurn, <rxa∙ψ. τβ T « ( iμorιλ i v s . T< J< τ∙ <r<{<ξα> r»v; rrtaìlļrµlooui μlλλnrot TI ιritriui ; to ytoo^lToo mu τourι Αllioo ooriζ AToaιnτΛ ι,τιλιrτi1oo 1, r f riļi rtimtmũ,, AmroSorot 5ι >?» Toũ λ∙y∙ι∕ iλιγa n(rSoroμι3a, in τo,m∙om(o, μι, r∙ «Tn *β√ l ,xΛλ≈ y ,, ,, i , uw ¢,.,. TÏ( y fβψlτβ bju „ , i , atx f ,,, χζβfβτ i ttΛτβt it t×λβγnv οναματος, isro∙rtζav ⅛ ×XTvçĩh¢µiw, kλ3λ∙ Ţijĵdí; τβιawf ζf t τf r ις i v T įļ įn ld’rt>t ŋ iy*λjru v 1γζΛ∙ψttς ⅛ iy^α∙ψif, βi> ìtAtoçãf ∙Str∏ς ŗçavi×ĩif, avr∙ Ĩí μβvβf γζ∙φτis, iwΛμtn ls tu» βr∕θαwjf į, ιri ^ μμart>κ (Apollonii Alexandriiii De Constructione Orationis lib. iv. ex recens. Im- ∏ιanuelis Bekken, p. 70, 71, Berlin, I8i7,1n 8vo.) ]

From what is here stated by Apollonius, particularly if it be taken in connection with other parts of his work, to which reference is expressly made by him, and in which his views are more fully explained, it appears that, according to this learned grammarian, the circumstance which has misled those who admit imperatives of the fiiture is the occurrence of such forms as γξa∙⅛trω and lift ; that γpa∙↑aτω and bβι, though used, poetica licentia per enallagen, for ygaψαraι and ptjs, are not to be considered as thereby undergoing any change in point of time, but merely as variations in the form of expression, and perfectly equivalent in their effect (non diverso tempore, sed dilectu verbi, quod, utraque voce velis, recte profertur) ; that, in short, between ∕jαψsrw and γgaψaτω, iγga∙ψ ∣ i and b ’ f≈∙ψ-αj, there is no difference whatever in point of time (nullum discrimen temporis), but only in the writing: and that those verbal forms which Mr Dunbar has arbitrarily denominated imperfects, are truly aorists in the strictest acceptation of the term. With regard to the ratio probabilis here alluded to as explained in the chapter on Verbs, though it is not very clearly developed by the Alexandrian grammarian, it seems, in effect, to be nearly the same with the principle so distinctly brought out by Dr Hunter; namely, that the second aorist, as well as the first, follows the analogy of either future, and that, in some instances at least, second aorists have been formed upon the analogy of the first future, as stated by Dr Hunter. Mr Dunbar, however, is “decidedly of opinion" that no second aorist was ever formed from the first future, and conversely; in other words, he is at issue with Apollonius, who states facts to the contrary, as well as with Dr Hunter, who unfolds the only principle on which these facts can be accounted for, consistently with the genius and idiom of the Greek language.

3. Professor Dunbar proceeds thus: “The whole mistake has arisen from not considering, or not knowing, the genuine form of the second future. But, says Dr Hunter, how are we to account for such forms as xaraZnβn, iownro, ojao, list, iξ<n, and some others, if these are not to be considered as second aorists derived from first futures; because no person can show that the futures of [7:10:702]such verbs were ever employed as presents? I hope to be able to prove, both from example» and analogy, thaï the old established opinion, viz. that the futures of certain verbs, whose original presents had become obsolete, were sometimes used as presents, and that those forms which the doctor supposes to be second aorists, were imperfects, used, however, as aorists, i. e. with indefinite time?' We shall have occasion immediately to examine some of the “examples” and “analogies” by means of which the learned professor labours to establish his position. It will be sufficient here to advert to the confusion of ideas which reigns in the passage we have just cited. How, says Dr Hunter, can you account for such forms as xaraβnmo, ìiusvro, òįfte, òiffi, iξm, and the like, if they are not to be considered as second aorists formed on the analogy of the first futures of the verbs to which they belong? Perfectly, responds Mr Dunbar; they are neither first nor second aorists (Apollonius, as we have just seen, thought otherwise), but only imperfects, “used, however, as aorists," and performing all the functions of these particular verbal forms; that is, they are not aorists, but imperfects, which imperfects, however, are in reality aorists. Nor is even this all. The learned professor, misled apparently by the literal meaning of the term, is betrayed into an entire misconception in regard to the time indicated by the aorist, which he considers as “indefinite.” He could not easily have committed a greater mistake, as has already been shown in treating of the verb. The time of the aorist, strictly considered, is absolute past, and if it ever appear to be “indefinite,” as it unquestionably in some instances does, that arises, not from any vagueness or uncertainty in the tense itself, but from an inference drawn by the mind from those particular predications which it is employed to express. Thus, όλ/yo¢ χgow{ ra¢ r*w φαύλων euv¶ùnai inauβi, “A short time dissolved (or did dissolve) the associations of bad men.” This is all that the words actually express. But, as we know from experience that the laws of nature, moral as well as physical, are uniform, we infer that what occurred formerly, happens now, and will take place hereafter ; and hence, by an easy and gradual coalition of the secondary inference with the primary and invariable signification of the verb, we come at length to say that “a short time always dissolves the associations of the wicked.” The expression in Scripture, 'Oι∕roς ten i İm; ijmj 0.γa.'rr,πς it ώ iυδoxn<ra, rightly translated in our version, “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am always well pleased” and all others of a similar description, are to be resolved and explained upon precisely the same principle.

4. In rejecting Dr Hunter’s solution, which proceeds upon ascertained and determinate data, Professor Dunbar adopts one which he admits to be purely imaginary. “ I believe,” says he, “the present of i ∣ <rω is nowhere to be found in the language, because it must have been the same in appearance and sound as riω, puto : φtgω is commonly used instead of it. But Pindar, in his fourth Pythian Ode (v. 181), employs o!eι ∣ > as a present.

.... λ)βrxβλjα*

Xl/¢ffVØf A19M. if rçoði γκξ HΛ∕Aβtl ∏Aξ XaξiΛλ9tς. I say that I obtain instruction from Chiron,” &c. In this passage Professor Dunbar appears to have committed several mistakes. Without adverting to his contradictory expressions in regard to dβω, we may observe, in the first place, that if Pindar had really employed ω<rs∕v here “as a present,” the language which he puts into the mouth of Jason would, upon that supposition, have conveyed a statement contrary to the fact. Jason, it is true, was educated by Chiron; but long before the period referred to in this passage, his education had been concluded; and there is nothing said to warrant the assumption that, on his return from the Argonautic expedition, which is celebrated in this ode, he had resumed his studies under the Centaur, and was, at the time of speaking, actually “obtaining” or receiving “instruction from Chiron.” He had no doubt, according to his own statement, been to visit that famous personage; but his object, as we shall presently show, was not for the purpose of being taught, instructed, or educated by Chiron (that had been accomplished long before), but to obtain information from the Centaur to enable him to make good his claims, which, it seems, had been disputed. Adjured to speak the truth, Jason accordingly says, “I will relate what I have learned (òibu¢- xaaιav) from Chiron: for I have just come from the cave near Chariclo and Philyrae and, in conformity with this declaration, he proceeds to state the substance of the information he had obtained from the Centaur respecting his rights. In what follows there is not a word said respecting “instruction" or education. The narrative of Jason relates to a subject of more immediate interest to him, one indeed in regard to which he had engaged that he would produce (iιβιιv) what he had learned (iuiiaoxaajav) from Chiron during the visit to his cave, and tell nothing except on the authority of his old master, or in accordance with the information which he had received from him. In our view, therefore, the common interpretation of this passage, Institutus sum a Chirone, is erroneous, notwithstanding it has been adopted by so distinguished a scholar as Heyné, who conceives 0 ∣ ba,β×aλ ∣ av Xs/jtone; tient equivalent to ⅛aαχi⅞ra∕ ∙ταjα Xιιgωκ>(. But, however this may be, it is evident from the words here quoted, that the celebrated German scholar does not consider i ∣ et ∣ t “as a present” tense; and that, whether our interpretation of the passage be right or wrong, Heyné, in adopting the ordinary one, has distinctly corroborated the view which we have taken of iιeto.

But, not to dwell longer on this, other examples of the nature of instantiae crucis may be produced to disprove Mr Dunbar’s assertion that ωβt> is used “as a present.” In the ninth Pythian Ode of Pindar (1.104) we meet with the following passage :—

Tu£h τ<i^3β τtζιrΛ ∣ , if κλυrβt, 'E¢ąã? , Eυ4ξ91H9if 'ūçxtrt AΛl ΓβUΛ t Jkviattf ΦtλΛf iκr∙ fAΛTtζ9g t ’ OI2EΓ.

In this sentence, if iιβt ∣ be a present, as Mr Dunbar contends, how is its time to be reconciled with that of πξtra∕p If the learned professor be right, Pindar has, in this case at least, been guilty of a gross anachronism. Again, in the seventh book of the Iliad (1. 81), Hector says, ’ E,Jl »’ 1y∙, rn iλ∙>, iţ. il fuι luχ<i 'Aa∙∙λλ.,, 1⅛∙ rua,r.,. ’ OIIΩ r.τ< Ίλ», ⅛,,, Kau A^lμΛf, rar, anta 'Araaλw,a, iaaraι,.

“Sin ego illum interfecero, dederitque mihi gloriam Apollo, arma detracta feram ad Ilium sacrum, et suspendam ad templum Apollinis longe jaculantis “But if I shall be fortunate enough to slay him, and Apollo give me the glory of such a victory, then, having stripped him of his arms, I will carry them to sacred Ilium, and will hang them up at the temple of the far-darting Apollo." By no sophistry can the verb o⅛w in this passage be tortured into a present; and the same observation equally applies to ùsu in the foregoing extract from Pindar. But if w⅛ω be a first future, as it undoubtedly is, can it for a moment be doubted that o⅛s is an aorist formed upon the analogy of that future; and if so, is it not clear that, in some instances at least, the second aorist follows the analogy of the first future?

( aA [7:10:703]