pinecone/core-2020-05-10-deduplication huggingface dataset:
Protecting Sites of Special Scientific Interest: Intrinsic and Utilitarian Values

Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), originally introduced as Areas of Special Scientific Interest with the 1949 National Parks and Access to Countryside Act, provide the foundation for a major set of mechanisms protecting sites of high conservation value in Great Britain.  The vast majority of these sites are in private ownership.  The mechanisms by which SSSIs are protected from urban industrial development, which requires planning permission, and rural development (agriculture, forestry) which does not require planning permission, are contained within an assortment of legislation (listed separately in the references).  This legislation reflects the piecemeal fashion in which SSSI protection has evolved.  This paper gives an overall outline of the current mechanisms by which development can take place and the extent to which SSSIs are protected. In particular we concentrate upon the threat of potentially damaging operations arising from rural development. Two models of SSSI protection are proposed and contrasted with the current process. Our analysis pinpoints tension between intrinsic and utilitarian value systems as the reason for current unease with the existing procedures. On the basis of this analysis, possible improvements on the existing situation are advanced.
Intergroup bias in group judgment processes: The role of behavioral memories

Two experiments examined the role of memory for behavioral episodes in judgments about in-groups and out-groups. Using a minimal group paradigm, participants read either positive or negative trait-relevant behaviors performed by group members. They then were asked to make judgments about the group's trait characteristics. Results demonstrated that for groups described positively, judgments about the out-group but not the in-group were accomplished by retrieving from memory specific behaviors performed by group members. In contrast, for groups described negatively, judgments about the in-group but not the out-group were accomplished by retrieving specific behaviors performed by group members. These results suggest that basic differences in the way judgments about in-groups and out-groups are made contribute to the establishment and perpetuation of intergroup bias by decreasing the stability of negative in-group and positive out-group impressions and increasing the stability of positive in-group and negative out-group impressions. (C) 1998 Academic Press
Two problems in applying Ljung's 'projection algorithms' to the analysis of decentralized learning

We show that Ljung's projection algorthms, which we have recently been used by economists to establish convergence to  rational expectations equilibrium, do not
seem to apply to learning or forecasting behavior that one would normally call
"decentralized." If the algorithm is defined in a way that allows individuals to have
differing information. then Ljung's theorem does not apply. And even if a similar 
theorem could be proved that would allow for differing information, there remains
a Lyapunov-like condition that is central to Ljung's projection method and which
requires that individual beliefs be narrowly related to the equilibrium and to one 
another.Publicad
Risk Avoidance under Limited Liability

When the expected flow returns from an investment is positive, bankruptcy carries a cost in terms of the future profit opportunities forgone. This paper demonstrates that, under limited liability, the one-shot gain from taking risky projects is offset by the long-term loss resulting from a higher probability of bankruptcy. In a multi-period model, the incentive problems associated with limited liability is less severe than what static models would suggest. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D81, G33. © 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.postprin
Reputation in dynamic games

We analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long-lived small players in which state variables affect players' payoffs. The large player's type is private information. We give conditions under which in every Nash equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the game. While our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal government policy, we show that for the durable goods monopoly reputation may fail to improve the monopolist's payoffMarco Celentani gratefully acknowledges the financial support of DGICYT, Grant
PB92-0245 and of HCM Programme, grants ERBCHBICT 940975 and CHRXCT 940458.
Wolfgang Pesendorfer gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the National Science
Foundation, Grant SBR-9409180.Publicad
The Probability of Condorcet Cycles and Super-Majority Rules

Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!−1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing function of the super majority levelτbounded by the expressionThis expression shows that Condorcet cycles become rare events for super majority rules larger than 53%
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?

We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the game where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players' actions are “anonymous.” That is, we allow each small player's actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small players' actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic.Economic
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations

We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents' preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal corre- spondence when firms use undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism where the order of decisions is permuted and which implements the workers' optimal correspondence when agents' preferences are additive.Our work is partially supported by DGCYT, projects
PB 92 0590 and PB 94 1504, and Institut Valencia d'Inverstigacions Economiques. Romero-
Medina also acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Educación y Cultura
(Spain).Publicad
Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing under Economies to Scale

We consider the problem of cost sharing in the presence of increasing returns to scale and potential strategic behavior on the part of consumers. We show that any smooth and strictly monotonic mechanism for which a Nash equilibrium exists for all profiles of convex and monotonic preferences must be dictatorial. However, we propose a cost sharing mechanism, the decreasing serial mechanism, for which an interesting domain restriction ensures existence of a noncooperative equilibrium for its cost sharing game. A characterization theorem of the mechanism based on the strategic properties of existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of its noncooperative equilibrium is provided.Publicad
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relationship to other concepts and show that it is closely related to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs in an epistemic model with independent beliefs.Economic
Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings

We thank José Alcade, Carmen Beviá, Flip Klijn, David Pérez-Castrillo, Howard Petith, Alvin Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, and an associate editor for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose suggestions and comments helped to improve the paper considerably. Financial support through a grant from the Programa de Cooperación Científica Iberoamericana is acknowledged. The work of Jordi Massó is also partially supported by Research Grants PB96-1192 from the Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica, Spanish Ministry of Education, and SGR98-62 from the Comissionat per Universitats i Recerca de la Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while Alejandro Neme was visiting the UAB under a sabbatical fellowship from the Spanish Ministry of Education.Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings for firms that have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms' preferences are substitutable. In particular, we provide examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be “single” in one stable matching and matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms' preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms
Blocking efficacy of Small Coalitions in Myopic Economies

We consider a continuum economy with infinitely many commodities and show that, for any positive var epsilon, the core of the economy coincides with the set of allocations which are not blocked by any coalition with measure less than var epsilon. Actually, our main result is an extension of Grodal's (1972, Econometrica40, 581–583) result and, therefore, Schmeidler's (1972, Econometrica40, 579–580) result to economies whose commodity space is ℓ∞, for myopic preferences.1 Supported by Research Grant PB95-0729-C02 from the Dirección General de Investigación
Científica y Técnica (DGICYT), Spanish Ministry of Education.
2 Support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through a post doctoral fellowship in
1997 and from a Training and Mobility of Researchers (E.C.) fellowship in 1998 while visiting
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, is acknowledged.
3 Support from the Portuguese Ministry of Science and Technology (project Praxis PCSHC-
CEG9-96), is acknowledged.Publicad
On the core of an economy with differential information

We show that the fine core of an atomless exchange economy with differential information is a subset of the ex-post core of the economy. (This inclusion may be proper, and it does not hold for economies with a finite number of traders.) Consequently, every fine core allocation is a selection from the equilibrium corre- spondence of the associated family of full information economies. Moreover, when each trader knows his or her own utility function and his of her own endowment, every fine core allocation is a rational expectations equilibrium allocationPublicad
Aggregate Pattern of Time-dependent Adjustment Rules, II: Strategic Complementarity and Endogenous Nonsynchronization

This paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time-dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models. It identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to nonsynchronized decisions in a game-theoretic framework. The paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite-horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present, whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions. By pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized-move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric Stackelberg leadership, it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the Stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game-theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization. The results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization - two important macroeconomic features. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E30, L16. © 2001 Academic Press.postprin
Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade

We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading partner is costly, prices are determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero, even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists.Publicad
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction

In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles” to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, <i>J. Econ. Theory</i> 89, 165–185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended.Economic
Strategic complements, substitutes, and ambiguity: the implications for public goods

Author's pre-print draftWe examine the effect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate externalities. We find that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games with strategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These effects are reversed in games with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these results to Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, macroeconomic coordination, and voluntary donations to a public good. In particular we show that ambiguity may reduce free-riding. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in uncertainty will increase donations, to a public good.Research supported by ESRC senior research fellowship, Award H52427502595, ESRC Grant R00022259
On the cultural transmission of corruption

We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D10, J13
Strategic Teaching and Equilibrium Models of Repeated Trust and Entry Games

This paper tests a model of strategic teaching in repeated trust and entry games with incomplete information.  The model assumes 'short-run' players follow a one-parameter learning model (functional experience-weighted attraction).  'Long-run' players either realize how others are learning and ‘teach’ by maximizing their long-run payoff, or always behave honestly or aggressively.  For precision, the fraction of honest/aggressive types was first measured in an experiment with one-shot games.  Using data from 28 experimental sessions of eight-period trust and entry supergames (25,000 observations), the model fits modestly better than a quantal-response equilibrium benchmark, and both models predict much more accurately than chance.  Estimates show most players are sophisticated, and become more sophisticated with experience.  Direct measures of subjects' beliefs are weakly correlated with implicit model beliefs, but are extremely accurate and do not show the overconfidence found in many psychological studies.
The psycho-spatial dimension of global environmental problems

There has been little research on the differential aspects of the local/global dichotomy, yet there is every suggestion that such a distinction could be crucially important in terms of understanding the public's perceptions and attitudes towards environmental problems as well as understanding their subsequent behaviour. This research sought to address three questions. First, are people only able to relate to environmental issues if they are concrete, immediate and local? Second, do people consider environmental problems to be more serious at a global or a local level? Third, what is the effect of the public's perceptions of the seriousness of environmental problems on their sense of responsibility for taking action? Three studies were undertaken in Australia, England, Ireland and Slovakia. The results of each study con sistently demonstrate that respondents are not only able to conceptualize problems at a global level, but an inverse distance effect is found such that environmental problems are perceived to be more serious the farther away they are from the perceiver. An inverse relationship was also found between a sense of responsibility for environmental problems and spatial scale resulting in feelings of powerlessness at a global level. The paper concludes with a discussion of various psychological theories and perspectives which informs our analysis and understanding of what might be seen as environmental hyperopia. (C) 2000 Academic Press
Martingale convergence of generalized conditional expectations

We prove that the martingale convergence theorem for generalized conditional\ud
expectations in von Neumann algebras holds in the weak topology without \ud
restrictions.\ud
The situation is therefore different from the strong topology case,\ud
where there are restrictive conditions which distinguish between increasing\ud
and decreasing sequences of von Neumann algebras. Moreover known \ud
counterexamples show that in the decreasing case the strong martingale \ud
convergence theorem might not hold
On the Existence of Feller Semigroups with Boundary Conditions, II

This paper is devoted to the functional analytic approach to the problem of construction of Feller semigroups with Ventcel′ (Wentzell) boundary conditions. The problem of construction of Feller semigroups has never before been studied in the characteristic case. In this paper we consider the characteristic case. Intuitively, our result may be stated as follows: We can construct a Feller semigroup corresponding to such a diffusion phenomenon that one of the reflection and viscosity phenomena occurs at each point of the boundary
Local Derivations on Operator Algebras

AbstractWhen attempting to find sufficient conditions for a linear mapping to be a derivation, an obvious candidate is the concept of a local derivation. Local derivations on operator algebras have been investigated in recent papers of Kadison (J. Algebra130(1990), 494–509) and Larson and Sourour (Proc. Symp. Pure Math.51(1990), 187–194). A local derivationηis a (norm continuous) linear map from an operator algebra A into an A-bimodule M which agrees with some derivation at each point in the algebra. We show that if A is the direct limit of finite dimensional CSL algebras via *-extendable embeddings (e.g., a triangular AF algebra), then a local derivation on A must be a derivation. Further, we show that for many finite dimensional operator algebras, any inner local derivation must be an inner derivation
Standard Duals of Operator Bimodules

AbstractIn this paper, we introduce the notion of standard duals of operator bimodules. They coincide with the standard duals of operator spaces when the operator bimodules are nothing more than operator spaces. Using the Haagerup tensor product of operator sesquimodules and operator bimodules, we give a representation for the standard duals of operator bimodules in terms of the operator space standard duals. We also study the problem whether an operator bimodule is completely isometrically embedded in its second standard dual and its connection with the behavior of the adjoint operation. In addition, we also find out the standard dual of a direct limit of a sequence of operator bimodules
Generalized Spectral Projections on Symmetric Spaces of Noncompact Type: Paley–Wiener Theorems

AbstractOn a symmetric spaceX=G/Kof noncompact type, we consider the formulas[formula][formula]whereΠλis the spherical function onX. Taken together they represent, the synthesis and decomposition formulas for appropriate functionsfonXin terms of joint eigenfunctions of the invariant differential operators onX. The focus of this paper is the characterization of the range ofPλonCc∞(X) in the caseGhas real rank one. This result extends and generalizes a result due to Strichartz on odd-dimensional real hyperbolic space and provides a “spectral” reformulation of the Paley–Wiener theorem for Fourier transform onXdue to Helgason. As an application we provide a fairly general support result for the spherical mean operator onX
Homology for Operator Algebras II. Stable Homology for Non-self-adjoint Algebras

AbstractNew homology groups are defined for a non-self-adjoint operator algebra with a distinguished masa which is based upon cycles and boundaries associated with complexes of partial isometries in the stable algebra. Under natural hypotheses the zeroth order group coincides with theK0group of the generatedC*-algebra. Several identifications and applications are given, and in particular it is shown how stable homology is significant for the classification of regular subalgebras and regular limit algebras
R-Transforms of Free Joint Distributions and Non-crossing Partitions

AbstractWe introduce an extension of the notion ofR-transform, defined by D. Voiculescu, to (free)joint distributions, i.e., normalized linear functionals on algebras of non-commutative polynomials in several indeterminates. We point out that theR-transform has good behavior with respect to the operations of free product and free convolution of joint distributions. We prove that the explicit computation of the inverse-R-transform of a joint distribution is done via a formula of summation over the lattice of non-crossing partitions, which shows that theR-transform is the operator-theoretic counterpart of the “free cumulants” considered in the combinatorial approach of R. Speicher. Moreover, in connection to the equivariance of the multidimensionalR-transform under rotations, we show that a natural free analogue of a classical result about rotations of independent random variables is holding